On attempting to reify a few of the things we may mean by "consciousness" with code

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 - Mind, awareness, imagination, reasoning, consciousness, etc.

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
(Disclaimer: our backgrounds are CS/AI)

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- Our intuition is CS/AI could benefit from a deeper understanding of philosophy
 - But telling people to read more books/papers is not how to make this happen
 - So let's try to do it with code!

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 - But telling people to read more books/papers is not how to make this happen
 - So let's try to do it with code!
- Possibly benefit philosophy by bringing code-style concreteness
 - (TBD, will let the philosophers in the room speak to this!)

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• Searle's view of the relationship between consciousness and brain states

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- Generally is some confusion
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- Let's unpack this with code!

What we're not doing

- Not trying to
 - Propose a cognitive architecture
 - Propose a new AI or machine learning algorithm
 - Claim that the software agent is conscious
 - Convince anyone these are the correct/best/most useful definitions of consciousness or brain states
 - Convince anyone Searle is right or wrong

What we're trying to do

- Trying to create a software agent that is consistent with Searle's view on consciousness
 - (or at least a simplified version of Searle's view)

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- Trying to create a software agent that is consistent with Searle's view on consciousness
 - (or at least a simplified version of Searle's view)
- (Hopefully) gain a bit deeper understanding of what we may mean by consciousness, brain states, causal reduction, and ontological reduction along the way

Software Engineering, 101

- Requirements what the system must do
- Design how will we build the system to meet the requirements
- Implementation building the system consistent with the design

- Consciousness is causally reducible to brain states
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 - Third person, objective

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Conscious mental state

- A mental state in which it is "something it's like to be in"
- First person, subjective character of experience, phenomenal

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
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
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Phenomena of type A are ontologically reducible to phenomena of type B if and only if A's are nothing but B's



Class-instance distinction



Class-instance distinction



C Wine

Images from:

Class-instance distinction



C Wine

https://protege.stanford.edu/publications/ontology Case of wine https://protege.stanford.edu/publications/ontology Case of wine https://www.researchgate.net/figure/Owl-Viz-view-of-course-ontology fig1 261339041


Class-instance distinction



C Wine C White wine C Rose wine C Red wine C White Burgundy C Chenin Blanc C Chardonnay C Pinot Blanc C Sauvignon Blanc C Ice Wine C White Zinfandel C Beaulolais C Red Burgundy C Red Zinfandel C Pauillac C Margaux C St. Emillion C Graves C Red Bordeaux © Sauterne C Cabernet Franc C Cabernet Sauvignon C Medoc © Semillon C Pinot Noir C Chianti C Petite Syrah C Sancerre C Muscadet C Port C Sweet Reisling C Chablis C Dry Riesling (C) A set of wine bottles

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
- Class-instance distinction
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(C) Case of wine


Images from:

- Class-instance distinction
- Type-token distinction
 - "They drive the same car"
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
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


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


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Requirements: unpacking Searle's view

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Phenomena of type A are ontologically reducible to phenomena of type B if and only if A's are nothing but B's

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
Requirements, VO

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Design decisions


- Design decisions
 - Environment and the agent's "physical" form

• OpenAI's LunarLander benchmark environment




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
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
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



- Design decisions
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 - Left of the flags, right of the flags, high above the ground, close to the ground, falling too fast





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












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















{High above the ground, right of the center falling too fast}


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



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 - Our ontology






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 - Connectivity of the neural network
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Reinforcement learning



Implementation, VO

- Jupyter notebook time!
 - http://localhost:8888/notebooks/notebooks/TSC-2019.ipynb
 - https://github.com/Josh-Joseph/tsc-2019/blob/master/notebooks/TSC-2019.ipynb

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
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


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
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Design, VO




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Activations 4

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Phenomena of type A are ontologically reducible to phenomena of type B if and only if A's are nothing but B's

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
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
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


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


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Internal state at time t (set of regions the agent believes it's in)

• V0 Internal states are casually reducible to be Internal states are ontologically irreducible Phenomena of type A are ontologically reducib. phenomena of type B if and only if A's are nothing b Our ontology ('I am high above the ground', 'I am to the right of the center', 'I am falling too fast'} Layer weights of the neural network network activations at time t Activations 4 Connectivity of the neural petros Internal state instances are not "nothing but" Activations of the neural n The agent's observation at brain state instances under our ontology The agent's action at time The position and velocity of (they are different classes) ayer 4 weights A region the agent believe Brain state at time t (set of layer weights, activation, and connectivity)



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- Bits
- Python objects
- Electrons
- Quarks
- ..

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- Brain state at time t (all of the bits contained in my computer)
- Internal state at time t (set of regions the agent believes it's in)


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- Electrons
- Quarks
- ..

- V0
 - ✓ Internal states are casually reducible to brain states
 - X Internal states are ontologically irreducible to brain states

Phenomena of type A are ontologically reducible to phenomena of type B if and only if A's are nothing but B's


- Layer weights of the neural network
- Connectivity of the neural network
- Activations of the neural network at time t
- The agent's observation at time t
- The agent's action at time t
- The position and velocity of the agent at time t
- A region the agent believes it's in
- Brain state at time t (all of the bits contained in my computer)
- Internal state at time t (set of regions the agent believes it's in)

- Bits
- Python objects
- Electrons
- Quarks
- ..




```
{High above the ground,
              right of the center
              falling too fast
                    internal state t
brain_state_t
    Activations 4
                     brain state t
                          to
                    internal state t
```

```
def brain state to internal state(brain state):
    def i am high above the ground(observation):
        return observation[1] > 0.5 # observation[1] accesses y position
   def i am low to the ground(observation):
        return observation[1] <= 0.5 # observation[1] accesses y position</pre>
   def i am to the right of the center(observation):
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   def i am falling too fast(observation):
        return observation[3] < -0.2 # observation[0] accesses v velocity
    regions = [
       i am high above the ground,
       i am low to the ground,
        i am to the right of the center,
       i am to the left of the center,
       i am falling too fast
    internal state = set()
    recurrent activations = brain state['activations'][3]
    for activation, region in zip(recurrent activations, regions):
        if activation > 0.5:
            internal state.add(region. name )
    return internal state
```




Is this just some representation of "data flow"?

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
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- Is this something closer to summarization?

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- (or both?)

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
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def brain state to internal state(brain state):

def i am low to the ground(observation):

def i am high above the ground(observation):



return internal state

Conclusion

- Software engineer style philosophy reifying seemed to work well
- Created a V0 software agent who's
 - Internal states are casually reducible to brain states
 - Internal states are ontologically irreducible to brain states
- Download and play with the code yourself
 - https://github.com/Josh-Joseph/tsc-2019
- Disagree with us?
 - Great! Open an issue and/or submit a pull request in GitHub
- Thoughts on other theories of mind/consciousness that may be particularly well suited for this type of approach?