

DNSsec

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Overview of DNSSEC

- DNSSEC (Domain Name System Security Extensions) is a suite of extensions that add **security** to the DNS protocol
- It addresses critical vulnerabilities in the original DNS system:
 - DNS was designed in the 1980s without built-in security measures
 - Originally relied on trust without verification mechanisms
- DNSSEC protects against DNS-specific attacks:
 - **Cache poisoning** - when attackers inject false information into DNS caches
 - **Man-in-the-middle attacks** - intercepting DNS queries and providing fake responses
- DNSSEC does **NOT** provide:
 - Encryption of DNS data (it remains readable)
 - Protection against DDoS attacks
 - Confidentiality of DNS queries

Why DNSSEC is Needed

- The DNS protocol translates human-readable domain names (e.g., example.com) to IP addresses
- Without DNSSEC, this process is vulnerable to several attacks:
 - **DNS spoofing** - an attacker responds faster than legitimate DNS servers
 - **DNS cache poisoning** - falsified records are stored in DNS resolvers
 - This allows attackers to redirect users to malicious websites
 - Can persist for as long as the cache entry's Time-To-Live (TTL)
 - **DNS hijacking** - modifying DNS settings at various points
- Real-world consequences:
 - Users directed to phishing sites instead of legitimate banking websites
 - Email redirection for credential theft or business email compromise
 - Compromising encrypted connections (HTTPS) by directing to attacker-controlled sites

How DNSSEC Works

- DNSSEC uses **digital signatures** to verify the authenticity of DNS data
- It implements a **chain of trust** from the DNS root zone down to individual domain names
- Key components:
 - **Public-key cryptography** - uses asymmetric key pairs
 - Private keys sign DNS records
 - Public keys verify the signatures
 - **Digital signatures** - attached to DNS records
 - Created using the zone's private key
 - Can be verified using the zone's public key
 - Any modification to the record will invalidate the signature
- DNSSEC adds new DNS record types:
 - **DNSKEY** - contains the public key used for verification
 - **RRSIG** - contains the digital signature for a record set
 - **DS** - links a child zone to its parent zone (creates the chain of trust)
 - **NSEC/NSEC3** - proves the non-existence of records

Chain of Trust

- DNSSEC establishes a hierarchical **chain of trust** from the DNS root down
- How the chain works:
 - The DNS root zone is the trusted starting point (trust anchor)
 - The root zone's public key is widely distributed and trusted
 - Each parent zone authenticates its child zones using DS (Delegation Signer) records
 - This creates an unbroken chain from the root to any signed domain
- Verification process:
 - DNS resolver starts with the trusted root key
 - Validates signatures at each level of the domain hierarchy
 - Each successful verification allows trusting the next level
 - Any broken link in the chain causes validation failure
- Practical example:
 - To verify example.com, the resolver:
 - Validates the root (.) zone's signature
 - Uses the root to validate the .com zone
 - Uses the .com zone to validate example.com

Key Types

- DNSSEC uses two types of key pairs for each zone:
- **Key Signing Key (KSK):**
 - The more secure, rarely changed key
 - Used only to sign the Zone Signing Key
 - Published in the parent zone (as DS records)
 - Functions as the "anchor of trust" for the zone
 - Typically uses stronger cryptography and longer key length
 - Changing the KSK requires coordination with the parent zone
- **Zone Signing Key (ZSK):**
 - Used to sign all the actual records in the zone
 - Changed more frequently (key rotation)
 - Only referenced within the zone itself
 - Typically uses shorter key length for better performance
 - Can be rolled over without involving the parent zone
- This separation provides:
 - Better security (compromise of ZSK doesn't compromise entire chain)
 - Operational flexibility (easier key rotation)
 - Performance benefits (smaller signatures for routine operations)

DNSSEC Record Types

- **DNSKEY Record:**

- Contains the public key for a zone
- Used to verify RRSIG records
- Can be either KSK or ZSK (flagged accordingly)
- Multiple DNSKEY records can exist for key rotation

- **RRSIG (Resource Record Signature):**

- Contains the digital signature for a set of DNS records
- Includes information on: which key was used, signature validity period, the algorithm used
- Allows verification that records haven't been tampered with

- **DS (Delegation Signer):**

- Published in the parent zone
- Contains a hash of a child zone's KSK
- Creates the "chain of trust" between parent and child
- Example: .com zone contains DS records for example.com

- **NSEC/NSEC3:**

- Provide authenticated denial of existence
- Prove that a requested DNS record really doesn't exist
- NSEC lists the next secure record in the zone
- NSEC3 uses hashed names to prevent zone enumeration

DNSSEC Validation Process

- When a DNSSEC-aware resolver receives a response:
 - ① The resolver checks if the response is signed (contains RRSIG)
 - ② It retrieves the DNSKEY record for the zone
 - ③ It validates the DNSKEY using the DS record from the parent zone
 - ④ It uses the validated DNSKEY to verify the RRSIG
 - ⑤ If signature verification succeeds, the data is considered authentic
- Three possible validation states:
 - **Secure:** Full DNSSEC validation succeeded
 - **Insecure:** Domain not signed with DNSSEC (intentionally unsigned)
 - **Bogus:** Validation failed (potential attack or misconfiguration)
- When validation fails:
 - DNSSEC-validating resolvers will refuse to return the answer
 - They return a SERVFAIL error instead
 - This prevents users from receiving potentially malicious data

Challenges and Limitations

- **Complexity:**

- DNSSEC adds significant complexity to DNS administration
- Requires careful key management and regular key rotation
- Misconfiguration can cause domains to become unreachable

- **Increased DNS response size:**

- DNSSEC responses are significantly larger than regular DNS
- Can cause issues with UDP packet fragmentation
- May require fallback to TCP, increasing latency
- Can be exploited for DNS amplification attacks

- **Key management challenges:**

- Key compromise requires emergency key rollover
- Key rollovers must be carefully scheduled and executed
- Failure to update keys can break the chain of trust

- **Limitations of DNSSEC:**

- Does NOT encrypt DNS queries or responses
- Does NOT prevent eavesdropping on DNS traffic
- Does NOT protect against DDoS attacks
- Requires both authoritative servers AND resolvers to support it

DNSSEC vs. DNS over HTTPS/TLS

- DNSSEC and DoH/DoT solve different problems:

- **DNSSEC:**

- Provides **data integrity** and **origin authentication**
- Ensures DNS data hasn't been tampered with
- Works throughout the DNS hierarchy
- Does NOT provide privacy or encryption

- **DNS over HTTPS (DoH) / DNS over TLS (DoT):**

- Provide **transport security** and **privacy**
- Encrypt DNS traffic between client and resolver
- Prevent eavesdropping and some man-in-the-middle attacks
- Do NOT validate the authenticity of DNS data itself

- **Combined approach:**

- Both technologies can and should be used together
- DNSSEC ensures authentic data
- DoH/DoT ensures private, encrypted transport
- Together they address most DNS security issues

Practical Implementation

- **Enabling DNSSEC validation (as a user):**

- Most modern DNS resolvers support DNSSEC validation
- Public resolvers like Cloudflare (1.1.1.1) and Google (8.8.8.8) validate DNSSEC
- ISP resolvers may or may not validate DNSSEC
- Local resolvers can be configured to validate DNSSEC

- **Implementing DNSSEC (for domain owners):**

- Generate KSK and ZSK key pairs
- Sign all records in the zone
- Publish DNSKEY records in the zone
- Coordinate with parent zone to publish DS record
- Implement regular key rotation procedures
- Set up monitoring for signature expiration

- **Testing DNSSEC:**

- Online tools like DNSViz and DNSSEC Analyzer
- Command-line tools: dig +dnssec, delv
- Browser extensions to verify DNSSEC status