



Textbook of Biological Psychiatry

edited by
Paul Pantano

TEXTBOOK OF BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY

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Interpreting evidence and bias

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FOREWORD

This is not the first attempt to integrate biology with human behavior and mental illness. The Greeks attributed emotional and cognitive functions to heart, kidneys, and liver. The ancients favored a humoral view of temperament (sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric, and melancholic). Over the ages the many attempts to treat mental illness have included physical and medicinal measures: purging, hydrotherapy, galvanic stimulation, and many other strange interventions. In the belief that doing something to the body would alleviate mental illness.

With the discovery of hormones, their effects on body, mind, and behavior—both normal and abnormal—were studied in the hope that they would be therapeutically useful. Early electroencephalographic investigations were expected to give us easy access to the functions of the brain and mind, but instead revealed disappointingly little information about mental illness and, in fact, about mental function in general. Only in the mid-20th century did Adolph Meyer promote a biological psychiatry that brought everything that was known to be relevant to mental health and illness to bear upon psychiatric diagnosis and treatment.

Eigentlich Freud, who was best known for his original and perceptive insights into the psychology of mental illness, in fact maintained a consistent interest in biology. From the mind he argued that the same neural systems and functions that, in illness, give rise to the signs and symptoms of neurological disease, also bring about the signs and symptoms of mental illness. In 1891, Wundt gave final form to the locution theory. Freud enthusiastically embraced it as a possible basis for what he called a "scientific psychology," resulting in an uncompleted work, later known as the Project for a Scientific Psychology. He admitted that after what he realized that it was a will of the wisp, an illusory scheme, based on verbal symbiosis rather than causal mechanisms. Biological psychiatry, as it became fully biological, has also abandoned many ambiguous mental constructs. Now a key challenge is how to bring those subtle attributes of the brain-mind, such as affects, into the neurobiological arena. One credible way is to try to link the visually observable instinctual appetites of animals to affective processes.

Freud's concept of drive was closely aligned with the ethologic concept of instinct; he attributed qualities to the drive that resemble closely those commonly associated with instinct. He saw instinct as "a concept on the frontier between the mental and

the somatic; . . . the psychical representative of the stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind." (Günther and Stein Verlagshaus, 1998, p. 121–122). *Standard Editions* running like a red thread throughout his work was the concept of energy, which always remained poorly defined. That too was a basic concept. On the one hand, it was psychic energy; on the other hand it anticipated that medications will have to be discontinued in 1990, the year of his final statement, would start their therapeutic effect by influencing this psychic energy.

Early indications of a direct relation between the brain and hallucinated images and sensations were disclosed by the studies of the effects of direct stimulation of the exposed human brain by Wilder Penfield and his disciples in the middle of the 20th century. Since thereafter, psychoactive and other psychoactive drugs revealed a chemically based neuronal apparatus with which neither neurotic nor psychiatry nor psychology has ever to agree.

It was soon after World War II that modern neuroscientific studies were initiated and rapidly developed momentum. Applied neuroscience (i.e., psychopharmacology) started its initial impact on a clinical psychiatry that had yet to become fully biomedical. Though they had been preceded by the barbiturates that, in their day, had proved very useful, the newer agents now substituted antidepressants and mood-altering powders. When the possibility of affecting mental illness chemically became clear, the drug companies addressed the problem with their formidable resources and in rapid succession introduced new varieties of the basic therapeutic agents. Although the psychiatric profession accepted and employed these medications enthusiastically, the early Barlowe exhibited little interest in using psychopharmacologic experience as a point of entry for a reassessment of mental illness. The amazing development of molecular neuropharmacology recently has ratified that overestimate.

The present volume represents a landmark in this developing field. Trained as a behavioral neuroscientist and psychiatrist, editor Uwe Patckopp is knowledgeable in the field of psychopathology and experienced in practical psychiatry. He has actively pursued reliable knowledge about brain function in its relation to behavior through careful animal experiments. He proceeds from the assumption that affect is the central variable in human behavior, to which other factors are secondary. His 1998 work, *Affective Neuroscience*, is becoming one of the milestones of the third revolution in 20th-century psychiatry. I consider psychopathologic psychiatry the first, psychopharmacologic psychiatry the second, and a functional neuroscientific psychiatry the third.

In *Affective Neuroscience*, Patckopp examined the several instinctual systems, their affective correlates, and the autonomic and physiologic systems that subserve them. The neuroscientist also provided points of correlation with established and potentially new pharmacologic strategies. His was a novel and original approach to human behavior that permitted clinicians like myself a view of the opportunities and the promise of the neuroscientific approach to psychiatry.

In this *Textbook of Biological Psychiatry*, Patckopp fulfills this promise. I drew the reader's attention especially to his introductory chapter in which he points the way to the elusive synthesis of studies of mind and brain, focusing on affect as the essential

and functional link. This emphasis is both timely and iconic since affect has been remote from the central interest of both psychoanalysts and neuroscientists.

For this endeavor, he has assembled a group of scientists and clinicians and invited them to apply contemporary neuroscience to psychiatric issues. This coordination of Panksepp's perspicacity and brilliance along with the insights of his carefully selected collaborators will afford a new, practical understanding of biological psychiatry, as once imaginative and realistic.

Mortimer Ostow, MD, Med. Sc., D.
President, Psychoanalytic Research and Development Fund

PREFACE

This work was initiated with the aim of bringing together the traditions that have helped shape modern biological psychiatry. The hope was to craft a perspective that could help project our thinking fruitfully into the future. During the past few decades, we have learned to quantify normal and abnormal brain functions at a level of precision unimaginable just a generation ago. However, progress in biological psychiatry is also based on new theoretical perspectives, for it is only through theory that we can envision what may emerge on the horizon of knowledge. Of course, theory can also be a firm that directs reality.

Our aim was to seek the middle ground—a balance of facts and theories, as well as consideration of both clinical and preclinical perspectives. My hope is that this book will be useful for students, teachers, and practitioners, as well as the scientists who harvest the basic knowledge from which future understanding must emerge. I owe a debt of gratitude to the many contributors who took precious time from their busy schedules to summarize the important themes covered in this book. The only regret I have is that space constraints made it impossible to treat all topics as fully as they deserve. Luisa Hurn, the acquisition editor for this contribution, exhibited remarkable perseverance and did not currently know in her faith that the project would reach completion in a reasonably timely manner. That proved to be a challenge for many.


A special word of gratitude goes to my wife, Anna, who read and commented extensively on the entire text. Each of the chapters underwent at least one major revision to optimize style and coverage, and several underwent cycles of intellectual adventure for both the contributors and editors. But even where the needs of the book and the desires of authors briefly clashed, the middle road was eventually found. Jeff Bergler, Casey Crumwell, and Nikki DeLoach also provided assistance at several critical phases of the project. I thank all for their contributions.

We wish to dedicate this text to the many pioneers, past and present, who have devoted their lives to understanding the normal and abnormal functions of the human mind. Many now appreciate that such a quest cannot be completed unless we also try to understand the brains and minds of other creatures. Indeed, some of the most interesting research on mind, brain, and behavioral relations has been emerging from animal research conducted in departments of psychiatry and neurology. This is a tradition in which all of the three giants—Eduard Krapfeler, Acholf Meyer, and Sigmond Freud—to

More recently this section was renamed to incorporate both historical events. Their profiles are used with the permission, respectively, of The University of Portsmouth, The Guildford School of Leadership & Management, and the Royal Society, London.

Although each of these profiles ended with philosophical and neurological issues, their collected paths constantly changed. However, because of historical and historical circumstances that emerged during the 2000 events (as summarized in Chapter 1), all seven paths that made contributions to these events in blood, mind, body, and body perspectives to maintaining mental health. The whole process is very important, but the starting stages of paths of which he or she is composed. Below the profiles details of several phenomena are mentioned with which we must become conversant in order to make progress, never forgetting that the example above is greater than the path. This book was constructed with such perspective in mind, and that, perhaps, that contributed to this effect.


Anti Pathways
Path Center for Medical Therapeutics
J.P. Anti-Center for Therapeutics, Michael Rogers



Paul Broca
(1809-1880)



Jules Chevalier
(1806-1888)



Alfredo Mauro
(1836-1919)

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Part I

FOUNDATIONAL CONCEPTS

The background topics relevant to psychiatric disorders in biological terms is vast and typically includes immunology, neurophysiology, and neurochemistry. Since such approaches are remarkably well represented in various recent handbooks, and typically all substantive neuroscience courses, we focus considerably effort in that direction would not be all that useful. Accordingly, we have used the limited space available to focus on topics that are more intimately related to psychological issues—the nature of consciousness, consciousness, stress, personality, and the brain imaging technologies that have changed the face of psychiatry in the past decade.

This decision was also informed by the recognition that we have finally reached a point where the mind-brain barrier is beginning to disintegrate. Although there are many ambiguities about what we may mean when we talk about “the mind,” most generous scholars accept that the dynamics of mind ride upon the dynamics of the brain, and we now know that for any psychotherapy to work, it must influence brain function (Foa et al., 2002). Empirical demonstrations of this concept are growing rapidly, even since Dager and colleagues (1992) demonstrated that cognitive behavioral therapy could induce the frontal cortical inactivity in obsessive-compulsive disorders. A few years ago the *Archives of General Psychiatry* published two back-to-back lead articles on how interpersonal therapy modified brain activity of depressed individuals in ways mirroring those of selective serotonin-specific antidepressants (Brotman et al., 2001; Marley, 2001).

Daniel J. Siegel said it well in the foreword to Cozolino's (2002) treatise on the *Neuroscience of Psychotherapy*, as he indicated that clinicians intuitively understand "in the stories of individuals who come for help to feeling better.... Whatever the approach, lasting change in therapy occurs as a result of changes in the human mind.... which involve changes in the functions of the brain. Exactly how the mind changes during the therapeutic process is the fundamental puzzle that the synthesis of neuroscience and psychotherapy seeks to solve" (p. ix). Siegel emphasized the difficult but productive marriage between clinical and neuroscientific disciplines, highlighting how "psychotherapy emphasizes the importance of subjective experience and the power of relationships to transform the growing mind" while "neuroscience focuses on quantifiable, objective data and the scientific method to create models of mind and brain" (p. x). The interpenetration of neuroscientific knowledge and psychiatric practice is becoming much more than the impressive realization of the great victories of the neuroscience revolution of the past half century. We are finally seeing, in many experimental domains, how subjective psychological processes are related to a demonstrable impact on the objective dynamics of the brain.

The first half dozen chapters of this text attempt to bridge between the clinical and scientific issues. To do this, we have to blend the fine and abundant evidence that is being derived from rather indirect studies of the human brain/mind and the detailed knowledge about brain functions we can pull from our fellow primates, who also live emotional lives that deserve our close attention and sympathy. These subtle issues, such as the fundamental neural nature of affective experiences, need to be discussed not only in neural terms, but also in terms of the evoked substrate and quality of consciousness. The logo of this book reflects this philosophy of recognizing that the multiple layers of functional evolution are reflected in the evolutionary passages which serve as a foundation for the human mind.

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BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY SKETCHED—PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE

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OVERTURE

It is a difficult task to capture the history of biological psychiatry in a brief essay. Let me frame this modest effort in a timeline *hermeneutic* perspective.

Psychiatry is the study and treatment of troubled mental lives. Its ultimate goal is to heal broken spirits. At its core, it is an attempt to better understand human thoughts and emotions and to allow this understanding to inform the healing acts. Despite our modern scientific hubris, we know rather little about how brains truly construct our minds and passions. Partly, this is because few scholars have come to terms with the need to understand the evolutionary neural dynamics that afflictive experiences are ultimately made of. It is all too easy to accept emotions as primitive "givens" and proceed toward a superficial understanding based on words, arbitrary definitions, and the qualities of logic rather than biology. But the greater and more significant

depths of this mystery have to be plumb by an integrative neuroscience that has hardly emerged.

It is surely not off the mark to claim that the single most important scientific question for biological psychiatry is the accurate decoding of the basic neural nature of affective values and related cognitive experiences. Emotions and moods guide most of our thinking processes and behavioral choices, whether well-intended or deranged. Many psychopathologies arise from imbalances in these feeling systems that motivate us to think and act in certain ways. At a deep psychological level, that often goes unspoken, emotionally distressed people have some insight into the weaknesses of their minds. They simply don't know how to manage their persistent psychic disequilibrium. They are certainly no more accustomed to thinking about these psychic forces in mental terms than are the researchers and psychotherapists from whom they seek guidance.

Tacititious schemes that do not directly acknowledge the underlying emotional faculties of the human mind and brain must be claimed provisional approximations of the goals to which we should aspire. Brain sciences that do not acknowledge or attempt to explore how such processes motivate and guide thinking do-in-past service to psychiatric thought. Mind sciences that do not dwell on the complexity of the internal world, replete with all manner of feelings and cognitions, do not serve our understanding well. The cognitive, behavioral, and affective sciences must devote equal effort to understanding the manifestations of mind in brain, body, environment, and culture; otherwise essential components will be overlooked. Only by blending these perspectives judiciously, without inflating simple-minded polarities such as nature/nurture, is psychiatric practice well served.

By the end of the 20th century neuroscience had advanced to a point where we now understand the brain rather well. Unfortunately, the dimension of equally important, but more slippery, mind matter continues to lag far behind. Credible finding facts about the brain in mind Rawlins is misleadingly difficult. There are few incentives in our current system for integrating the abundant paperwork of brain data into an integrated psychobiological understanding. A prevailing positivistic hope has been that knowledge will emerge automatically from the raw facts like steam rising from freshly exploded trunks. To an undeniably degree, theoretical views have been elevated to second-class citizenship. Accordingly, discussions of many key functional issues almost disappeared in neuroscience as it mattered how to study our mind nature during the last third of the 20th century. Indeed, the very concept of productive hypothesizing came to be termed, eventually, as "idle speculation," perhaps because too many students of the mind (and certainly too many human populations) keep the difference between a "working hypothesis" and a "prestigious conclusion." Major textbooks of biological psychiatry and neuropsychiatry no longer discuss emotion prominently. Some consider them needless trite that intervene between reliable diagnostic categories and descriptions of related brain changes. Often, there is little tolerance for such "middle-level" theorizing that seeks to meaningfully link brain functions with mind. One aim of this text is to reverse this trend.

Thus, I proceeded to this historical sketch with several common but oft-neglected perspectives that continue to trouble modern psychiatric thought. How are the passions of the mind truly created? How do they become overwhelming? How can mere words help heal minds? What is the healing touch? Why are character traits so important in patients as well as patients? What is the proper role of placebo in the therapeutic enterprise? Are our diagnostic categories as sound as they could be? Such concerns led me to encourage all contributors to this book to consider the central role of thought and emotion in psychiatrically significant disturbances of the psyche. My own bias is that the next great frontier in biological psychiatry is the logic that has been much neglected by modern neurosciences—the deep neurobiological nature of affective experience. Even though our understanding of such key issues remains woefully incomplete, we must continue to share the harvest of knowledge we already have, and thereby fertilize the field, once more, so that those who come after us are better prepared to contend with the perennial joys and difficulties of mental existence.

HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Although human interest in the nature of the mind and its passions surely goes back to a time long before the beginning of recorded history, the systematic scientific search for the causes of psychological disorders did not begin in earnest until the latter part of the 19th century. Prior to that, the practice of psychiatry was characterized more by superstition and punishment, punctuated by occasional humane concern. Although there were several sustained periods of enlightened care of the emotionally distressed, as in the ritual purification (*i.e.*, "incubation" or rest therapy) approaches of the Classical period, it is likely that one of the main functions of those whole-body, whole-mind efforts—which included athletics, baths, music, dance, and ritualized sexual encounters—was the alleviation of everyday stress and sexual inadequacy. The holistic cores of these healing temples, organized symbolically under the aegis of Asclepius, the god of health, thrived for well over a millennium, but surely the stigmatization and banishment of various mental ailments also remained abundant yet uncelebrated. While a hermeneutic tradition was sustained in many middle eastern countries, Europe succumbed to the flea-ticks, plagues and narrow-mindedness of the Dark Ages for an extended period, in which harsh punishments and the dismantling of monasticized human souls prevailed (for a more detailed historical coverage, see Andriamananjara (2001), Moore (1996) and Sterns (1997)).

Most biological approaches to treating mental ailments during the past several thousand years have been based on unsubstantiated beliefs and wild logic rather than scientific substance. Beatings, bleedings, surgeries, fire and cold water shock treatments, and restraints have all been heralded therapeutic fixtures, at least in the long-term. However, various socially sanctioned and often effective placebo approaches have often flourished, including witch-doctoring, shamanism, and occasional trappings of skulls to release evil spirits. Apparently our social brains respond quite

well to the sympathetic concerns of others, which may be the foundation of all placebo placebo effects in psychiatry (Havrington 1999; Macrae 2002; Shapiro and Shapiro 2003). Of course, we now know that placebo effects have real effects on the brain (Mayberg et al., 2003), perhaps brain opioid mediated (Petrovic et al., 2002), and the intervening perceptual feelings may be mediated, in part, by endogenous opioids (Pliszka et al., 1998).

A few revolutionaries also made substantive biomedical advances. Paracelsus (1493–1541) ordinatedly presented one of the few effective medicines available in his time (e.g., opium), and in *Diseases Which Destroy Men of the Reason* (1547), he described many abdominal concoctions, some of which contained heavy metals such as mercury. We now know that some of these toxic agents can help purge the body of certain psychopathological toxins, one of which was recognized as Thiomersal/palmitate in 1905—the agent responsible for causing syphilis and its resulting neurosyphilisiform mental deterioration. Unfortunately, the safety margin between the efficacious doses and lethal doses was not negligible. The eventual discovery that injection of Syphilis could sometimes halt syphilis-induced mental deterioration was honored with Nobel recognition (Lazzaro Liojus Wagner-Jauregg, MD) for the "discovery of the therapeutic value of malaria inoculation in the treatment of dementia paralytic" (Gasper, 1995).

With the emergence of the scientific tradition in the physical sciences, enlightened clinicians sought to approach human psychological problems with a new sensitivity. In France, Benjamin Rush (1745–1813) in America, along with Philippe Pinel (1745–1826) in France, and Vincenzo Chiarugi (1780–1826) in Italy, set in motion the "moral treatment" of the insane, even though some also advocated electric treatments. Benjamin Rush promoted bleaching, exercise, purges, spinal draffs, and his agitation-controlling, straight-jacket "tranquillizing chair," while Benjamin Franklin promoted electrical therapy for various ailments. These revolutionaries helped establish havens for the mentally ill in small humanistic hospitals where they sought to create therapeutic environments that aimed to facilitate the reestablishment of emotional homeostasis. The movement was sustained and amplified by social activists such as Dorothea Dix (1802–1887). Sadly, by the end of the 19th century this model had devolved in America into the massive warehousing of cognitively and emotionally impaired individuals in large state-run institutions.

Meanwhile, with the growth of scientific physiology and biomedicine throughout the later half of the 19th century, especially in German universities, neuropsychiatry became integrated into the standard biologically oriented medical curriculum. Indeed, modern psychiatry emerged from the nucleus of neurology, and the hybrid subspecialty of neuropsychiatry still thrives (Whittemore and Hale, 1997). However, a clear division of duties also developed—classical neurologists came to focus on standard brain abilities (i.e., sensations, perceptions, actions, and only more recently cognitive activities) while psychiatrists occupied themselves more with how people feel and how they impulsively react and choose to behave on the basis of their internal passions and other affectively experienced value systems.

Thus, the two sister disciplines, neurology and psychiatry, also commonly deal with different parts of the nervous system, the former with the somatic components and the other more with the visceral components. Theodore Meynert's 1884 textbook, *Psychiatry: A Clinical Treatise on the Diseases of the Nervous System*, was prescient in this regard. Since then, it has become increasingly clear that emotional regulation and psychiatric diseases are related more to limbic-limbic executive functions than to posterior cortico-thalamic, sensory-limbic functions. Paradoxically, Meynert was one of Freud's esteemed teachers, and even after his abandoned brain approach, Freud continued to acknowledge that his wide-ranging psychodynamic theories eventually needed to be linked to neuroanatomy. He recognized that what might eventually grow from that potentially fertile hybridization could be spectacular. As Freud noted in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (1920, p. 105): "Freud is truly a land of unlimited possibilities. We may expect it to give us the most surprising information, and we cannot guess what events it will return in a few short years. . . . They may be of a kind which will blow away the whole of our artificial structure of hypotheses." And by the end of the 20th century, his predictions had come true to such a degree that his own conceptual ideas also seemed to be blown away, or as it seemed to many who had become disenchanted with the possibility of scientifically understanding the "mental apparatus." However, there are recent indications of emergent interest in the relations between brain and depth psychological issues in the newly emerging neuropsychoanalytic movement (Julian and Tamburri, 2002), which seeks to build substantively on past and present discoveries.

THREE GIANTS OF THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY

The three pioneers who set the stage for thinking throughout the modern phase of 20th-century psychiatry were Rudolf Krapelin (1863–1950) in Germany, Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) in Austria, and Adolph Meyer (1869–1950) in America. The influence of Krapelin's perspective, derived from the success of German neurology, has been most pervasive, yielding a lasting influence on our conceptualization of what a comprehensive psychiatry should look like. Krapelin, now widely regarded as the father figure of biological psychiatry, started his academic work at Halle University at the edge of the German empire of medical science (then the University of Tübingen), where he wrote the first edition of his seminal *Treatise of Psychiatry*, which went through nine editions between 1881 and 1921. That contribution propelled him to Heidelberg and ultimately to Munich as the capital locus of German psychiatry. Recognition of his service, diagnostic and pathophysiological thinking remained widespread from the later half of the 19th century until World War I damped the vigorous beginnings of biological psychiatry.

Still, Krapelin had laid the essential foundations, and his approach continues to symbolically represent how scientific psychiatry should proceed (his influence is still especially clear in Axis I diagnostics of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual

of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition, (DSM-IV). He recognized that progress had to be based on systematic cross-sectional and longitudinal clinical observations, leading to diagnostic systems. He recruited all possible varieties of objective measures including behavioral and cognitive as well as neurological and biochemical, to achieve the most comprehensive understanding possible in his day. Through his desire to make a full appreciation of the organic underpinnings of pathological processes, Krenskoff gathered around him a remarkable group of talented neuroscientists who also became luminaries, such as Alan Alderman, Carlino Brodal, and Peter Kind.

Concurrently, Sigmund Freud was abandoning his early emphasis with neurological approaches to the mind, including experimentation with drugs such as cocaine for the treatment of opiate addiction, and was setting in motion a dynamic depth psychology that eventually captivated American psychiatry. Unfortunately, Freud's psychoanalytic approach, which revolutionized our view of how the mind operates with many unconscious "irrational" dimensions and urges, did not foster a robust scientific movement to properly evaluate his core秉承ing ideas. That, of course, would have been impossible in his day. Initial theory was built upon rather limited clinical observations, and then theoretical constructs were built upon other theoretical constructs, with no clear empirical operationalization or organic foundation. In the opinion of many, the resulting structure ultimately resembled a Tower of Babel, where one could not readily sift the good ideas from the bad. Freud's thesis that most psychiatric problems arise simply from psychological causes has now been largely abandoned in psychiatry, even though it is accepted that childhood trauma is a powerful neuropsychological factor in disrupting mental functioning (Chapter 4; Heils and Mannaroff, 1999). Pathogenesis is now more commonly discussed in strictly organic terms, or at the very least in terms of psychological factors that are linked to central substances (Chapters 6, 7, and 8).

A new chapter in modern psychiatry opened when Adolf Meyer came to America from Switzerland in 1894, moving to Johns Hopkins School of Medicine in 1902, where, under his leadership, the university became the leading psychiatric training center in the world. He established a utilitarian psychobiological tradition in American psychiatry, which consisted of a multidimensional and systematic conformation with patient's lives. He helped revolutionize the careful documenting of life histories and acknowledged the many psychological and biological forces that must go into the treatment of each emotionally troubled person. He emphasized the fact that all patients are unique and that one should consider all aspects of their lives in a careful workshop of the individual's psychological status. His analysis of case studies led to the recognition that the systematic harvesting of certain types of personal information could make a real difference in the care and prognosis of patients. He aspired to recruit all relevant aspects into multimodal treatment approaches that suited individuals' abilities and aspirations. This holistic approach set the stage for the emergence of a uniquely American psychiatry.

The intervening ideas and approaches of these giants permeated 20th-century psychiatry, but their different viewpoints also led to class conflicts that remain to be resolved in a voluntary synthesis to the present day. Partly this is due to the discovery of potent and highly effective drug therapies that swept most other approaches

from the scene. However, with the gradual recognition that these remarkable pharmacological advances are not the comprehensive, long-term picture they initially seemed to be, a consensus is once again emerging that complex systems such as the brain/mind require multiple avenues of study. One aim of this text is to promote that consensus and to help foment a greater recognition that a neuroscientific understanding of the fundamental nature of affect is an essential ingredient for future progress in psychotherapeutic practice and drug development. The brain does contain an evolved neural apparatus, and future progress will depend on how well we penetrate into the functional language of the nervous system (Chapter 20). We now know this will inspire a judicious blend of human and animal behavioral, brain, and mind sciences.

THREE GREAT PHASES OF 20TH-CENTURY AMERICAN PSYCHIATRY

Following the decline of German medical influence in 1914, the progression of 20th-century psychiatry emerged largely on the Anglo-American scene, at least until the most recent psychopharmacological era when new agents were discovered around the world, to have more remarkable and specific effects on the psyche than anything observed since morphine and cocaine. This history can be conveniently broken down into three phases of about three decades each, with the Kraepelinian approach to diagnostics and pathophysiology providing a sustained background theme for all. His systematics matured when effective medicines were discovered to treat most major disorders—with the advent of powerful medications for the treatment of schizophrenia, depression, mania, and anxiety in the 1950s. It remains controversial how much each phase advanced the field relative to the ones that preceded it. Nevertheless, each period was distinctive, reflecting, perhaps, an evolving progression of scientific understanding fraught with essential growing pains. Future progress will arise from a weaving of these strands into a whole cloth that does not yet exist.

ABOUT 1910-1940: THE MEYERIAN SYNTHESIS OF A HOLONIC PSYCHOBIOLOGY

Adolf Meyer, from his base at Johns Hopkins, developed a well-regarded "mental hygiene" approach to the treatment of the whole person. He recognized certain essentials of well-rounded psychiatric practice, centered on comprehensive life histories in which one could see the many factors contributing to psychiatric disorders. Each patient was seen as a unique individual who deserved to be treated in highly individualized ways. Pressure to pigeon-hole people into diagnostic categories was not emphasized as the humanistic antidote facilitation of lives that had been disabled. This era could also be seen as the humanistic era of American psychiatry. Psychopathology was recognized as a response to various life events: What terrible things happened to people, their responses to anger were compromised. Meyer's approach to a non-predominant social status examination is still emulated today. Even if such extensive

information is no longer as cogently incorporated into the care and prognosis of troubled lives, it remains an important way of viewing patients as individuals.

The Meyerian approach also fostered research into basic biological processes related to self-regulation. One of the pioneers was Kurt Richter at Johns Hopkins who pursued comparative animal research on feeding behavior, sleep, and circadian cycles (Sleath and Nollings, 1998). The hope was that such research could shed light on human issues that needed to be understood in some causal detail in order to effectively modify the underlying biological substrate. The support of basic animal research in many modern psychiatry departments correctly continues to be regarded as a cornerstone for future progress. The recognition that there is abundant natural variability of such underlying homeostatic processes has also fostered dimensional views of mental illness (now recognized in Axis II diagnoses of DSM-IV). The work of Meyer and others suggested that troubled people should not simply be placed in diagnostic categories, rather their various dimensions need to be treated through the lens of qualitative life histories reflecting temperamental strengths and weaknesses. With the completion of the Human Genome Project, and the recognition of deep homologies in the brain systems of all mammals, the role of genes and evolution in the governance of personality and developmental disorders is increasingly recognized (Chapters 8, 14, and 21).

WORLD WAR II THROUGH THE 1960s: THE PSYCHOANALYTIC ERA

Although psychoanalytic ideas have been percolating in American psychology since Freud and Jung's visit to Clark University in 1908, the full impact of depth psychology on psychiatry had to await the massive influx of psychoanalysts to England and America with the conclusion of World War I. As those energetic immigrants captured American psychiatry with unmatchable spirit, there was a dramatic shift toward the psychobiodynamics of the mental apparatus, as well as the controversy that still surrounds "talking cures." The success stories of this revolution, especially in the often successful treatment of war-tension-induced neuroses, allowed new approaches such as clinical psychology to become established as a distinct discipline, along with the resulting proliferation of new psychotherapeutic ideas. Although we now recognize that certain psychotherapies can modify the executive functions of the brain concentrated primarily in frontal lobe areas (Baxter et al., 1992; Reznick et al., 1998), the precise factors that produce such changes remain ambiguous. It is increasingly realized that the personal emotional qualities of a therapist are considerably more important than the specific psychotherapeutic approaches he or she employs (Baxter et al., 1991). Despite the blank overall results of scientifically rigorous outcome studies of psychoanalytic therapies (MacMillan 1997), this era firmly established a respect for the internal dynamics of the human mind within psychiatric practice.

Indeed, Eric Kandel (Kandel, Price, 2000), a psychiatrist who devoted his professional life to the neuroscience of basic memory processes in one stage in the hope of deriving general principles that would translate to humans (Kandel 2004), noted that "psychoanalysis will represent the most coherent and intellectually satisfying view

of the mind that we have" (Kochel, 1999, p. 205). This comment probably speaks as much to the sheer creative richness of psychiatric thought as to the difficulty of developing a modern psychiatry that is based on adequate neuroscientific conceptions of the mind.

This middle era, with its shift of focus from shaping the whole person to the nature of the drives and biological states of the mind, failed scientifically because it did not promote a solid research agenda. Likewise, the lack of replicable clinical results led to the decline of this oriented (and some say untenable) theory of the mind and its influence on mainstream psychiatry, especially on pharmacological approaches more beginning to yield robust and replicable therapeutic effects.

This may again change as a new generation of scholars begins to blend neuroscience and depth psychological studies (Schneidman and Turnbull, 2002; Chapter 19) where mental and nonconscious issues can be judiciously blended. The new armamentarium of brain manipulations and objective measurement tools presently offers the possibility of a resurgence for depth psychological approaches to the bioclient (Patterson, 1999). Whether a sustained era of persisting "psychobiological" research will arise from the emerging neuropsychodynamic synthesis remains to be seen, but if it does, it will only be because of the positive and pragmatic phase of neuroscientifically informed psychiatric research of the past 20 years.

Before turning to modern biological psychiatry, it is worth noting that the middle, psychosomatic era, with its neglect of robust research agendas, allowed more ideas, often entirely debatable, too much influence on psychiatric thought. In a sense, this was also a "magical fantasy" era. Dramatic new medical therapies, based on marginal research findings, flourished. Perhaps the British concept of Medical "exogen-energy" and the resulting "exogen box" (or "energy") could be taken as symbolic of this era. William Reich (1897–1957), whose own mental stability was eventually questioned, was convinced of fraudulent claims and died during his incarceration in a federal penitentiary. Others, like Bruno Bettelheim, presented needless guilt with concepts such as "refrigerator mothering," which allegedly was instrumental in causing early childhood autism. It took many years for that needless "guilt trip" to become an embarrassment to the discipline (e.g., Pollock, 1997).

This period also introduced radical manipulations such as induced and insulin-induced seizures for treatment of schizophrenia and depression. Delusional ecosystems gradually led to the highly effective and statinized electroconvulsive shock treatment for depression (Chapters 8 and 17), but there were casualties along the way. This era of radical experimentation was capped by the most controversial movement of all, psychosurgery (for critical overview, see Saksena, 1993). With the wisdom of hindsight, it is all too easy to criticize these approaches, but perhaps they are understandable from a historical perspective. We should acknowledge that they sprung from understandable motives, given the historical times they were advanced. That was an era when some groups routinely inflicted incomprehensible harm on their fellow human beings—from the fields of Siberia, the ovens of Auschwitz, and “lager” of Dachau to the internment of impoverished Americans, with euphemisms—all in the name of political and cultural progress and undisciplined cruelty. It was also a time when there were

few predictably effective treatments, with morphine still being very high on the list of short-term patients. The hospitals were full of desperately debilitated patients. Hence the field was grasping at straws, whether psychic or somatic, and the models of the time were placed directly by Freud's lobes—the executive seats of human imagination, acquired valuations, and creativity (Freudian, 1911).

Since such drastic interventions worked "inadequately" in a sufficiently large number of people (at least for management purposes), it was recognized that something of importance was happening to the homeostatic imbalance of the damaged brainchild. Indeed, the first estimated largely of psychobiological interventions, the ventricular aqueduct of the frontal lobes, is now recognized as a battery of emotion-cognition interventions (Bolla, 1999). What really happens in the brainchild is a result of these powerful somatic interventions required the advent of modern neuroscience and a neurochemical understanding of the brain that eventually permeated psychiatry.

ULTRAPositivistic PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY ERA (1970–PRESENT)

Modern biological psychiatry started in 1952 when the French psychiatrists Jean Delay and Pierre Deniker first evaluated the efficacy of chlorpromazine (thalidomide Thioridazine) in a variety of psychiatric disorders and found it to be highly effective for alleviating schizophrenia symptoms. This breakthrough was based on the recent discovery of surgeon Henri Laborit that such drugs were effective preanesthetic sedatives, and also potentially effective in controlling the agitation of various psychiatric disorders including schizophrenia. The robust calming effects and specific reductions in the positive symptoms of schizophrenia (e.g., delusions, hallucinations, and inappropriate touch) were as impressive that the use of chlorpromazine crept through psychiatry. The number of schizophrenics that had to be otherwise institutionalized decreased precipitously as soon as these agents came into widespread use.

With the recognition that one of the main targets of these agents was recently characterized dopamine systems of the brain (Avioli-Cathcart, 2004; Naleid, Price, in 2007), and the discovery of the various receptor endocodes for dopamine transmitters, the specificity and potency of antipsychotics were tested by creative pharmacologists such as Paul Janssen in Belgium (discoverer of Haloperidol, or Haldol, and also risperidone, or Risperidol). This led to our current array of atypical antipsychotics (Chapter 10), which can also alleviate some of the negative symptoms of schizophrenia (theanhedonic flattening of affect, the social isolation, and cognitive impairments often characterized as "second thought disorders"). These newer drugs also have the advantage of few troublesome long-term side effects such as motor dyskinetics that consistently emerged after长期 treatment with the earlier, more potent anti-dopaminergic antipsychotics. Within a few years of the discovery of chlorpromazine, antidepressants were developed, on the basis of the serendipitous discovery that certain drugs for tuberculosis gave many patients extra enthusiasm and psychic energy (the tricyclics or trizoles (TCA) inhibitor imipramine and iproniazid).

Other endocodes (e.g., the tricyclic imipramine) were soon discovered to be effective in treating depressive disorders and eventually panic attacks (Klein and Baldwin,

1981). With advances in neurochemistry, the two types of antidepressant effects were narrowed to classes of molecules that could inhibit MAO or block reuptake of synaptically released biogenic amines, especially of norepinephrine and serotonin (Julius Axelrod, Nobel Prize in 1970 for "discoveries concerning the function transmitters in the nerve terminals and the mechanism for their storage, release, and inactivation"). This eventually led to increasingly specific agents, until we now have an abundance of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) that effectively stabilize a variety of Axis I as well as some Axis II disorders (Chapter 8), with few troublesome side effects (except for occasional emotional numbing and diminished pleasure responses such as anergia). Still the long-term therapeutic mechanisms remain uncertain.

Various benzodiazepine anxiolytic agents came into use in the 1970s, directly developed from preclinical animal studies that initially observed sedative and anticonvulsant effects with dibenzodiazepine clorazepate (Librium). At this same time, the even earlier preclinical and clinical work on lithium by John Cade (1949) in Australia was gradually cashed into a treatment for manic-depressive disorders by Mogens Selsøe (1992) in Denmark.

These great passages of the psychopharmacology revolution have been retold many times, but never as comprehensively as in the excellent three-volume series entitled *The Psychopharmacologists* by David Heale (1998, 2008, 2018). The history of this fascinating era is detailed through a series of personal interviews with the main protagonists of the biological psychiatry revolution. In these first-person accounts, the reader can try to sort out the many controversies. Links between lines of thought and battles over priority.

The clinical successes of the 1970s equally led to the characterisation of various neurochemical systems in the brain (especially of norepinephrine, dopamine, serotonin, noradrenergic, and gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA)) and the emergence of preclinical psychopharmacology disciplines that sought to characterize how these drugs operated (for summaries, see Charney et al., 1999; D'Amato et al., 2012). It became routine to evaluate all new molecules in animals, often with classical behavioral techniques that were not based on any theoretically coherent ideas about how psychological systems might be organized in the brain. Indeed, the behaviorists who became "opinion leaders" in pharmaceutical firms, had no real idea of psychological theorizing and often of the brain itself. Inputs and outputs were deemed more important than the brain-based causes that interested.

Creating and mapping possible relationships was deemed of substantial predictive power to guide drug development. Eventually, when techniques for measuring receptor binding kinetics were developed, one could utilize hot-tube assays to predict the efficacy of psychotropic agents (Snyder, 1980). Many enthusiasts concluded it was unnecessary to worry much about psychological constructs in generating medications that could effectively treat mental disorders. An affectual study of input-output relations sufficed, and thus we still know little about how most of the psychiatric medicines in common use help create mental environments that are conducive to therapeutic change. This has been common in medicine where noninvasive practical advances often precede any substantive understanding.

Most of the successes of Biological psychiatry have arisen from our ability to manipulate just a few neurochemical systems (Fig. 1.1). This is now understandable. There exist a limited number of "state-control" neurochemical systems that arise from discrete brainstem nuclei and circuit widely in the brain, affecting many varied functions in fairly predictable ways. catecholamines such as norepinephrine (NE) and dopamine (DA) facilitate information transmission and engender affective responses (both positive and negative), and serotonin systems generally diminish and narrow the flow of information transmission, thereby perhaps decreasing the acute effects of both negative and positive biological and cognitive signs. The GABA system operates through much more widely dispersed clusters of small interneurons (as well as a few long-ascended pathways) to generally dampen the excitability of the brain. Hence facilitation of GABA can have striking effects on various types of cerebral mapping from anxiety to epilepsy. A brief synopsis of the Biological psychiatry revolution would look approximately like this (adapted from Pandya, 1998, p. 117):




Figure 1.1. Mesial aspect of the dispersion of biogenic amine (epinephrine (E), norepinephrine (NE) and serotonin) and acetylcholine systems in the rat brain. LC, locus caeruleus; DR, dorsal NE bundle; VNB, ventral NE bundle; RN, raphe nuclei; AC, anterior commissure; DR, dorsomedial nucleus; CTF, corpus callosum; HE, hippocampus; TH, thalamus; SC, superior colliculus; IC, inferior colliculus; MR, mesial raphe nucleus; MCDA, mesolimbic and mesocortical DA pathway; SNc, substantia nigra pars compacta; MFb, mesial forebrain bundle; CB, cholinergic basal forebrain. "P" designations indicate major NE and DA cell groups; "R" designations indicate major serotonergic cell groups; "C" designations indicate major cholinergic cell groups. [This figure is reprinted from Pandya (1998), *© Oxford University Press*, with the permission of Oxford University Press.]

"Of the drugs currently used to alleviate depression, some prolong the synaptic availability of biogenic amine transmitters, while others slow degradation. In the former class are the many tricyclic antidepressants that can inhibit norepinephrine, serotonin, or dopamine reuptake at synapses. More recently, other specific synaptic inhibitors have been developed, perhaps the most famous being the SSRIs. Representatives of the other major class of drugs inhibit the enzyme monoamine oxidase (MAO) that normally helps deplete biogenic amine following release. MAO inhibitors are less commonly used than the tricyclic antidepressants because they have more side effects, such as the increased toxicity of certain foods that are high in the amino acid tyrosine. However, recent developments (e.g., discovery of several forms of MAO in the brain) have yielded some safer and more specific drugs of that class. Some of them, such as fluoxetine, are also quite effective for other disorders, such as "social phobia," the strong discomfort that some people feel during social interactions.

The class of drug known as antipsychotics generally dampens DA's activity. If true there are several different DA receptors, modern work has sought to more specifically target the D₂ receptor, which are present in abnormally high quantities in the substantia nigra. Most antipsychotics are receptor blockers, which means that they prevent dopamine from having normal physiological interactions with its receptor. Other drugs that stimulate receptors are called agonists; such drugs can produce schizophrenia symptoms. For instance, the indirect agonists such as cocaine and amphetamines can induce sufficiently strong paranoid symptoms that psychiatrists have difficulty distinguishing them from the swelling.

Most modulatory agents interact with their own receptor, a benzodiazepine receptor, which are the main GABA_A receptors in the brain. More recently, some really new types of anxiety-agents have been discovered, such as buspirone, which interacts with serotonin receptors. With the realization of the role of many other neurotransmitters in the genesis of anxiety, perhaps specific agonists, it is likely that even more specific modulatory agents will be developed in the future.

Many investigators presently believe that functional psychiatric disorders result from neurochemical imbalances (i.e., lack of regulation) among many interacting systems as opposed to a pathology in a single one, or that they be many ways to restore overall balance. The recent discovery of a large number of neuropeptide transmitter and receptor systems has opened the door to the development of a new generation of psychiatric medicines, which may modify disease mechanisms and associated behavioral tendencies.²

It is also now widely recognized that the qualities of the therapist—his or her capacity for empathy—is as important for the efficacy of psychotherapy as any specific mode of treatment (Beutler et al., 1994). That is generally not thought to be the case for current biological interventions, where actions of drugs on specific chemical systems are believed to be the decisive factor in the efficacy of treatments, but many agents do work for several different diagnostic categories. For instance, SSRI's alleviate anxiety, panic attacks, and obsessive-compulsive disorders (Chapters 11, 12, 13, and 16). This may partly reflect the simple fact that broadly distributed neurochemical systems, such as the biogenic amines, are found to influence practically all emotions and mental activities. Few condition-specific therapies presently exist, but they may arise from the currently ongoing neuropeptide revolution (Chapter 21).

The systematic evaluation of all therapies is stymied by the existence of robust placebo effects that seem to emerge from our ingrained neural ability to improve when we simply perceive that we are being helped (Peters, 2011). In part, such effects are mediated by brain chemicals such as the endogenous opioids, which are influential in regulating pleasure and positive social ratings (Panksepp, 1998). Although some drugs and psychotherapies have effects on similar brain systems (e.g., Basile et al., 1992), they are typically thought to access different aspects of the brain/mind. While the beneficial effects of psychotherapies are surely initiated through the higher functions of the cerebral apparatus (i.e., symbolically, through conversational language functions that are uniquely human), drug therapies modulate more levels-of-awareness more directly within basic maintained operating systems that we share with the other animals. The conundrum appears to be in the modulation of the neuroplastic bias of middle-level emotional systems of the "limbic brain."

The enormous success of the biological psychiatry revolution has led to a variety of practical socioeconomic dilemmas, related largely to the high efficacy of the available agents. They include the problems of managed care and profit-driven psychiatry. Under such a system there are pressures to reduce type I errors as much as possible (i.e., the prescription of expensive therapies, when in fact they are not necessary). However, these same economic pressures tend to generate type II errors (i.e., claims that certain therapies are not effective, when in fact they are). Perhaps we should also be concerned about "Type F" errors (i.e., when certain high-priced drugs are aggressively pushed forward when equally effective low-priced drugs are available). When enormous economic factors come to bear on therapeutics, there is bound to be controversy about efficacy and optimal course of action. If one can't demonstrate which treatment is unambiguously best, there is bound to be a heightened tendency by some (i.e., drug providers) to go for the most expensive options, while others (i.e., drug manufacturers) prefer to go for the cheaper alternatives. This makes the issue of psychiatric diagnosis and prognosis an increasingly contentious and politicized affair.

These concerns have filled the pages of important psychiatric journals for the past decade. The flagship journal in the Western Hemisphere remains the *American Journal of Psychiatry* (with its immediate predecessor, *The American Journal of Insanity*), which has now been summarizing psychiatric thought for almost a century and a half. The massive recent progress of the field can be dated by the appearance of increasingly biologized journals: first, the *Archives of General Psychiatry* in 1990 near the beginning of the psychopharmacology revolution, and then *Biological Psychiatry* in 1998, when life basis systems (e.g., biogenic amines and GABA) accounting for the initial wave of enthusiasm became well-recognized as major topics of neurobiological inquiry. Many others have followed. We are presently at the threshold of the next post-pharma of the biological psychiatry revolution—with the blossoming of nanopsychopharmacology and molecular biological knowledge just around the corner. We can only imagine the new challenges that will need to be faced.

DILEMMA OF PSYCHIATRIC DIAGNOSTICS: DSMs AND BEYOND

Some mental disorders arise through stressful life circumstances. Others emerge more from constitutional infirmities. Nature-nurture arguments do not help us much in unravelling such interwoven complexities, unless discrete genetic differences can be discovered, as in fragile X and Williams syndrome (Chapter 14). Ultimately psychiatric thought must continue to be guided by a causal appreciation of the existing states of affairs *in action* on the stage of life. Neither the "biological" psychiatry of the middle of the 20th century, nor the "idiologics" variety of the past 20 years should be taken to represent the best we can achieve. The former should yield a synthesis. However, since we have been unable to unambiguously link most mental disorders to brain functions and have only been able to pin-point biological causes for a few rare genetic disorders, we have been left no other option than to categorize mental disorders on the basis of outward symptoms. Hopefully brain imaging and new chemical measures will soon become more prominent tools in diagnostics. Meanwhile, problems of diagnostic specificity and individual sensitivity remain to be resolved (Chapter 6).

Kraepelin's original taxonomy described the outlines of major psychiatric categories still accepted today. His textbooks had clear descriptions of syndromes that we now recognize as schizophrenia, various phobias, depression, and anxiety disorders with their links to obsessions and compulsions. The modern standard classification schemes, ever since the DSM-I of 1951, have clearly followed the Kraepelian outline, although the early versions were well spiced with psychoanalytic perspectives on depth psychological issues.

This approach has been refined through three more cycles, with the current DSM-IV (APA, 1994) and its European counterpart, International Classification of Diseases, Tenth Revision (ICD-10) (WHO, 1992), providing extensive descriptive guidance. Today's diagnosticers are largely based on "what" symptoms constitute a disorder, with silence on the issues of "why" or "how" a disorder emerges from underlying psychopathological substances. Still, the "multiaxial" approach of DSM-IV acknowledges psychological (Axes I and II) as well as organic, psychological, and environmental considerations (Axes III, IV, and V, respectively). While Axis I provides a Kraepelian set of diagnostics of major psychiatric categories, Axis II offers a dimensional scheme for evaluating personality problems. This serves as a coherent way for clinicians to communicate pragmatically without worrying too much about unresolved etiological questions.

Although difficulties with previous versions of the DSM have been reduced, many still regard it as only a provisional scheme that needs substantial improvement (McHugh and Slifstein, 1998). Several inconsistencies between DSM-IV and ICD-10 remain, for instance, in the way the two sets of guidelines handle somatoform and personality disorders, a discrepancy that contributes to international misunderstandings. The efforts to construct a DSM-V are presently being marshaled, but it remains controversial whether this approach still reflects sustained progress toward a

scientifically defensible initiation or simply an essential stop-gap measure that is socially needed until the etiology of psychiatric disorders are revealed. If the scheme does not serve disturbed human nature at its joints, it may actively impede scientific progress, especially when only a "natural" subset of a presumably homogeneous disorder will respond well to the therapy being evaluated.

The extent to which diagnostic schemes are influenced by societal standards is highlighted by the disappearance of homosexuality as a psychiatric disorder in the more recent versions of the manual. Partly, this has arisen from the scientific evidence that to some degree homosexuality reflects a natural variation in the organization of gender-specific brain circuitry during the second trimester of gestation (Chapter 4). It also partly reflects the emergence of new human rights movements. Scientific advances and cultural tensions will continue to permeate diagnostic practice since most "disorders" are only estimates of normal human temperamental variability (especially among the Axis II disorders), while others, to put it metaphorically, are more likely to reflect "broken parts" in the brain, most obviously in the severe Axis I disorders. The issue of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) is an especially poignant example since so many children are given medications that may have potent and less than desirable long-term effects on the nervous system (Gold et al., 2001).

All simple symptom-based approaches, such as the diagnosis of ADHD, are bound to remain controversial to some extent, for there are many useful ways to conceptualize array phenomena. It is only possible to move forward substantively on biologically based diagnostic criteria if we can objectively examine the relevant brain systems and resulting behaviors at an organic level (Kaufmann and Tamislie, 2002). Such work is now advancing on various diagnostic categories (Chapters 6, 7, 11, and 14). However, continuing ambiguities create a pressure to include more and more qualifiers. The emerging problem with the complexity of DSM-IV is evident in the proliferation of subcategories of mood disorders that can easily become mere DSM-III add-ons, but by DSM-III-R, there were 37, and according to Paul McHugh (2001), if you consider all the subcategories and specifiers in DSM-IV, one could categorize 265 subtypes. This problem may continue to be endemic to symptom-based classification systems, since small differences often complicate. The "success" of DSM-IV may partially explain the current estimate that about 25 percent of the population in America fulfill one or another of the criteria for a *Joint* 304 psychiatric diagnosis (Boggs et al., 1998).

A major goal is how to seek deeper levels of understanding, which confront us with a series of interlocking dilemmas. Epidemiologically, we must resolve what major disorders objectively exist, and we must be able to specify how we know they exist, above and beyond mere surface symptoms. This question—of how we go about measuring what actually exists at an *adult* neuropsychological level—has gotten a spectacular boost in the past decade from molecular biological and modern brain imaging techniques. However, so far neither brain-based criteria nor core emotional processes of the evolved aspects of the mind appear preeminently in psychiatric practice (Chapter 20).

A fuller recognition of basic emotional liabilities at the core of many psychiatric disorders may also help reverse a growing problem of modern psychiatry—the marginalization of patients by making them mere consumers of pills rather than ap-

in reconstructing meaningful human relationships and life insights. When the neuropeptides are finally harnessed for therapeutic purposes (Chapter 21), we may find that they work most effectively in social contexts comparable to those in which such neurochemicals first found their appointed roles in brain-mind evolution (Chapter 20). If so, some of the new medications may work optimally only when we help re-create these environments, perhaps through some type of Meyerian "neurophysiological" synthesis. Obviously, psychiatric disorders will continue to be permeated and modified by hosts of socio-emotional factors—above all, individual capacities for affective self-regulation and changeability.

FUNCTIONS OF DIAGNOSTICS

It is generally accepted that medical diagnosis should be closely related to scientifically documented underlying pathophysiological processes. Thus all medical diagnoses, including those in psychiatry, should eventually be assisted by biological measures. This has barely started to happen in modern psychiatry (Chapters 8 and 7).

We should recall that medical diagnoses have three major functions: (1) At the lowest level, they are designed to allow clinicians some assurance that they are talking about the same problem (DSM-IV fulfills that nicely). (2) They provide an efficient way to promote consistent therapeutic approaches (e.g., a short-hand path to prescription practices). (3) Also, they provide a rapid way to think about the etiology of disorders. Perhaps the Lakoffian message of the last function should be that we must reach a better understanding of the basic emotional systems of the brain, especially as they contribute to both psychiatric disease and health. Of course, this is based on the assumption that most psychiatric disorders ultimately reflect disturbances of affect-generating processes of the brain, a position that remains controversial among both psychiatrists and psychologists. Indeed, for the cognitive disorders of schizophrenia (Chapter 8) and some of the pervasive developmental disorders of childhood (Chapter 14), this may seem unlikely, even though changes in emotionality are surely contributory factors.

The third function of diagnostics relates directly to issues of pathophysiology and pathogenesis. With the emergence of an understanding of brain transmitter systems in the 1970s, there arose great hopes that imbalances in one or another system would map well onto psychiatric disorders. Schildkraut (1965) made the seminal suggestion that depression may arise from biogenic amine deficiencies, and norepinephrine depletion was suspected to be the major culprit. Unfortunately, the large and different types of depression might be diagnosed by patterns of cerebrospinal amine metabolites never carried out. However, at least one instance did bear fruit: The onset of manic episodes does correspond rather well to hyperactivity of brain serotonergic systems (Keller et al., 1999).

Likewise, there was optimism that certain forms of schizophrenia would ultimately reflect a variety of possible disruptions of metabolic pathways that would lead to the excessive synthesis of selected or indoleamine-like hallucinogens. The many fascinating hypotheses that were generated eventually led to no consensus concerning the

role of such factors. Still, these ideas are open territory for further development. A classic psychosis can be generated by imbalance glutamate activity in the brain with the phencyclidine hallucinogens. Thus, it is still generally agreed that schizophrenia is closely linked to imbalanced activities of certain brain dopamine systems, in contrast with various other neurochemicals (Karlsson et al., 2001) and that anxiety is intimately related to the activity of GABA along HVA systems (Chapter 16).

As far as neuroimaging is concerned, there have been spectacular advances in our knowledge of the molecules that will eventually be relevant for understanding psychiatric disorders (Charney et al., 1998) but much less enthusiasm for linking such entities to normal functions. Likewise ongoing attempts to link psychiatric disorders with specific brain systems has been criticized in recent years. Volavka (1998) provides one provocative historical overview of the many attempts and failures. He emphasized how research and progress has been slow. "In the absence of a coherent understanding of the pathophysiological basis of a disease, only serendipity can provide effective drugs for its treatment. Nowhere is this more evident than in an examination of the history of psychotherapeutic drugs" (quote by Sauer, 1980, in Volavka, 1998, p. 9). But his thesis has not gone unchallenged by leaders of the biological psychiatry community (for a debate, see Volavka and Charney, 2000). It is now generally accepted that there is much more to psychiatric disorders than neurochemical imbalances, and with recent technological advances, the neurophysiological search has shifted substantially to anatomical and genetic underpinnings.

FROM PATHOPHYSIOLOGY TO PATHOGENESIS

A clear description of pathophysiological processes is essential for the generation of insights into underlying pathogenetic processes. At one time, there was the hope that psychiatric disorders would turn out to be as simple as gout, where elevated uric acid levels lead to buildup of crystalline joints causing inflamed tissues and excruciating pain. Elimination of uric acid buildup (either by blockade of synthesis with allopurinol or reduced ingestion of purine precursors) eliminates the perceived causes and all the symptoms of gout. In a sense, the classic biogenic urine theories of psychopathologies were based on the expectation that such causality logic might apply to certain mental disorders (e.g., Schiltkamp, 1990). Unfortunately, they have not. Indeed, there has been movement to conceptualize psychiatric disorder more in terms of nonlinear dynamic perturbations (Tschöpe et al., 1997), perhaps with basic constitutional systems having strong influences within such hypercomplex systems.

Without adequate pathophysiological foundations, the classification of pathogenesis is bound to be limited. The tripartite cascade of analysis applies here as with any scientific question. First, one has to identify the variables of the phenomena in which one is interested. Second, one has to determine whether or not the variables actually have any relevant causal influence in the system. Finally, one has to develop a "mechanistic" theory of how the system operates. This has not been achieved for any of the classic psychiatric disorders, but the goal is being approached for certain new depressive disorders with psychotic implications (e.g., Chapters 14 and 15).

Alzheimer's disease and other dementias are classic neuropsychiatric examples of how a careful analysis of pathophysiology has gradually led the way to a deep molecular understanding of pathogenesis. From the initial description of the pathology of restricted cortical areas, the gradual revelation of underlying protein factors that predispose one toward such degenerative processes has finally emerged (Chapter 13). This knowledge is now slowly being translated into new and more effective therapies.

Typically, schizophrenia has been the "gold standard" by which our understanding of psychiatric disorders will be judged. During much of the 20th century there were abundant reports of both neuroanatomical and biochemical correlates, but the patterns did not begin to gel until the past few decades. The most striking discovery was the enlargement of the ventricles, which suggests a neurodevelopmental disorder that may have multiple causes (see Chapter 9). The fact that among identical twins only the afflicted siblings exhibited the brain deficit suggests the contribution of nongenetic factors. The enlargement of nerve cells also suggests that this type of brain impairment could have both genetic and postnatal (perhaps viral) underpinnings. If microtubules in the brain are the critical causal factors, as opposed to dynamic neurotransmitter imbalances, then even the best medicines are bound to be simply beneficial if synaptosomal control of the circuit with no realistic hope for a cure, as seems to be the case in pervasive developmental disorders (Chapter 14). For instance, the selective death of GABAergic cells in frontal areas may set in motion the degeneration of dopamine systems, which can be partly alleviated by antipsychotics. However, early intervention might still offer hope for better long-term management of the disease process.

Most psychiatric disorders exhibit substantial genetic loadings, and the more child-based syndromes, such as Williams and Rett's syndromes, the details have been worked out (Chapter 14). Studies in molecular pathogenesis continue to provide remarkable riches in understanding many neuropsychiatric problems. The persistent consequences of trinucleotide repeats in certain genes are now widely recognized. The most prominent ones for psychiatry are Huntington's disease and fragile X syndrome, in which a good protein is converted to a dysfunctional one by the addition of "junk" deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) to a coding site. The resulting synthesis of poorly constructed proteins has cascading consequences in brain function. The fact that certain genetic influences such as trinucleotide repeats can expand generation by generation is now seen as a potential factor for the increasing incidence and severity of certain disorders (e.g., Huntington's disease). The identification of such disease variants permits us to offer a definite diagnosis, usually leading to the designation of a distinct syndrome. For instance, the autistic-like mental impairment of fragile X children is now recognized as a separate medical entity (Chapter 14).

With the discovery of pathophysiological correlates that characterize specific disorders, the classification of pathogenic status is greatly facilitated. During the 20th century, some advances were made. Perhaps the most striking was the recognition of the devastating influences of early social loss (Bowlby, 1960) and other debilitating effects of stress (Chapter 4) that have many parallels in animal models (for a review, see Pruzek-Rusch, 2001). Although the discovery of this relationship in humans

come first, the cause will only be worked out by studies of other species. It is now generally recognized that the stress of social loss (whether it be in the form of separation distress or defeat in social encounters) may be a major factor in the precipitation of depressive disorders (Ehlers and Wenzel, 1995). The emerging genetic data will be especially valuable in helping characterize the Axis II personality vulnerabilities that may increase susceptibility to certain emotional disturbances (Chapter 5).

The discovery of environmental factors can rapidly lead to prophylactic measures. The classic example are the alleviations of mental retardation induced by phenylketonuria by the elimination of the toxic agent, phenylalanine, from the diet. Such a strategy, unfortunately, can currently be implemented in only a few metabolically induced disorders. For most organic disorders, the development of new therapies will require effective simulation of the disease processes in laboratory animals. To be effective, the animal models will have to be sufficiently homologous to critical aspects of a disease process so that effective manipulations can be made in the human condition. In the area of emotion, this remains a contentious issue that will only be resolved by the eventual achievement of practical success (Chapters 16 and 20).

Table 1.1 summarizes a highly simplified model of what a human brain-emotion-based diagnostic scheme may look like. One reading of modern neuroscience (i.e., Panksepp, 1998) is that there is a limited but widely varying set of core emotional systems that regulate various instinctual urges critical for survival. These include systems that control appetitive-reproductive tendencies, anger irritability, fear anxiety, male and female courtship, maternal care/rearing, social bonding and separation distress, parental interactions, and a variety of bodily needs (thirst, hunger, and sleep). Another axis in this type of scheme would have to be based on an understanding of the status of the more general motivational systems (Fig. 1.1). Depression, for example, may reflect a global depletion of many of these neurochemical resources (highlighted in Table 1.1 and Fig. 1.1), especially in those systems that facilitate positive emotions most prominently.

Of course, each core emotional system has complex neural substrates, with multiple interrelations among the various emotions, as well as diverse cognitive-cognitive thinking structures they engender. Thus, even with such a "natural kind" of classification scheme, there is bound to be movement from the prototypal description of major emotional disorders to the level of subspecies and related species. That means inevitable as we focus on newly discovered details of the underlying processes. Still, the great challenge for the 21st century will be to coherently link the major psychiatric diseases to the basic involved functions of the brain—to the activities of emotional systems, interconnected processes, as well as cognitive and memory substrates (Chapters 2 and 3).

Such alternative conceptual schemes for the underpinnings of major psychiatric problems (Table 1.1) could also guide new drug developments and therapeutic programs in productive ways. Each emotional system is characterized by its own, at times unique, neuropeptide neuromodulators (Panksepp, 1998), which may become targets for novel therapeutic strategies (see Chapter 20). Viewing psychiatric disorder in this way, with reference to major emotional systems of the brain and their many general

TABLE 1.1. Postulated Relationships Between Basic Emotional Systems, Common Emotional Processes, and Major Psychotic Disorders^{a,b}

Basic Emotional System ^c	Emotional Function	Related Emotional Disorders
SOCIAL (+ and -)	Interest Introspection Caring	Obsessive-compulsive Personality schizotypal Addictive personality
RAGE (- and +)	Anger Inability Oppression Hated	Aggression Psychopathic tendencies Personality disorders
PLAY (+)	Simple mirth Mirth Popular humor	Generalized anxiety disorders Phobia Post traumatic stress disorder variants
HARM (-)	Reparative defense Sadness Distress Sorrow Harmlessness	Panic attacks Pathological grief Depression Agoraphobia Social phobia, autism
LUCK (+)	Joy and glee Happy (joyfulness)	Mania ADHD
LUST (+ and -)	Reproductive Indulgence	Paranoia Sexual addictions
CARE (+)	Maternalism Love Affection	Dependency disorders Antisocial disorders Attachment disorders

^aThe last two columns provide hypotheses of the major associations. Otherwise, multiple associated functions coexist in each of the emergent emotions (e.g., jealousy is also triggered by separation distress and anger), and all the associated disorders have multiple determinants. Plus and minus signs after each indicate major types of affective valences that each system can potentially generate (adapted from Panksepp, 2005).
^bCapitalization was used to designate the various emotional systems to highlight the fact that these are not identical to distinct neural entities but rather simple psychological concepts. The capitalized word components indicate conceptual influences that condition the basic behavioral, physiological, and psychopathological aspects of each emotional process.

^cFrom Panksepp (1998, 2005).

modulates such as the biogenic amines, may eventually help open a route past some of the standstills of DSM-IV (McHugh, 2001).

An understanding of the basic emotional systems we share with other mammals is already shedding important new light on acquired behavior-disorders such as substance abuse. Such tendencies are based upon natural psychotherapeutic urges (mediated partly

by mesolimbic dopamine systems) that motivate organisms to pursue resources needed for survival. This generalized appetitive HEDONIC system of the brain energizes the instinctual apparatus for goal-directed behavior, but it can be commandeered and altered—dissociated “to run after its own tail,” so to speak, as occurs when addictive drugs directly affect this biologically positive life-maintaining system. All the abused drugs from alcohol to nicotine release dopamine to some extent, leading neurons to perpetuate associated activities. As the arousal of this instinctual system becomes linked with the contingencies of drug acquisition and administration, the drive becomes consolidated by the newly acquired conditional “drives.” Thus this basic brain system that regulates the urge to pursue resources needed for survival becomes entrapped in a maladaptive vicious cycle. Similar processes may be operating in sexual addiction and various appetite control disorders.

This example highlights how the functional nature of certain brain systems can guide theorizing about underlying processes. However, our recognition of such systems is only the first step in the harvesting of psychiatrically useful knowledge. The actual details of how these systems operate will presumably provide insights on how they can be selectively modulated. Unfortunately, the recognition of such psychobiological constructs has been slow during this most recent molecular era of psychiatry because a widespread assumption has prevailed—one similar to that which characterized behavioristic psychology that we must forgo a deep psychological analysis of basic functions and move directly from DSM symptom-based diagnosis to underlying molecular causes. It now seems increasingly clear that this may not be possible. We do need psychological and psychoanalytic concepts to wrap our minds around what is happening to people in emotional distress. And it is not just cognitive concepts that are needed but sufficiently well-researched affective ones as well (Ogden, 2005).

PERENNIAL PROBLEM: DISTINGUISHING AFFECTIVE AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES

Let us now briefly return to the key psychiatric issues of affect and thought. Brain imaging has finally given us an objective picture of the brain emotional systems in humans (Chapter 2), and the primal neuroanatomy is that of the center systems that Paul MacLean (1990) first brought to our attention 50 years ago. It is an everyday fact that during intense affective states, bizarre dwell obsessively on noncongruent thoughts and strategies that readily flood their minds. One relates these naturally aroused ideas persistently in the mind’s eye as long as the affective states (“trails,” and if the associations—i.e., the “repetition compulsion”) persist for too long, the resulting symptoms can become psychiatrically significant.

Although it is obvious that our thoughts can influence our feelings, the understanding psychopathology it may be more critical to follow how our feelings channel and strengthen our thoughts. The prevailing assumption in cognitive science that cognition triggers emotions, is the more obvious part of the interaction. The more psychiatrically relevant aspects may be the other way around—when perceptions enter the nervous

system, they automatically get coded for affective significance, which normally causes the motivational apparatus to step into, but which, in its more intense forms, also sets up the potential for life-long transference relationships. In psychiatry, it may be easier to get the more recently evolved cortico-cognitive "cart" in front of the ancient evolved "horses" that carry emotional and motivational urges. Thus there is as much need for an "affective neuroscience of cognition" as a "cognitive neuroscience of emotions" (Lane and Nadel, 2008).

The classical distinction between rational and emotional processes, however salutary the two may be, must be recognized in order to understand how affective states emerge within the brain itself. Thus, in reintegration should begin tackling the fundamental nature of affective processes more directly than has been common in neuroimaging. It presently seems unlikely that the major source of our basic affective capacities—to be happy, angry, sad, and fearful—will be found in the neocortex. Although our ignorance about such matters remains enormous, we can only provide strong emotional feelings by manipulating brain areas below the cortex, in that extensive neural territory traditionally known as the limbic system.

It remains possible that affects functionally reflect the neurodynamics of biologically encoded urges in action. In advancing such a position, it is worth recalling that much of Freud's thought about the mind was based on the then "unconscious" nature of the instincts. In this regard, we should consider that affective consciousness and cognitive consciousness are quite differently organized within the brain. While their interactions provide fascinating examples of the diversity of socially derived emotional experiences—such as shame, guilt, embarrassment, and empathy—it is then our understanding of the basic, evolutionarily derived affects rather than of experientially derived emotions that major new insights into psychiatric therapies will emerge. These events are not as critical for the elaboration of the mind's basic affective potentials as they are for its cognitive ones. Affective functions appear to be genetically disposed in the underlying action systems of the brain, almost as if our basic pleasures and pains are the "affective voices of the genes."

In considering the affect-emotion distinction, we may be wise to consider Menzel's (2000) perspective that major brain processes can be divided into "chained" and "state" functions, with the *chained* functions corresponding to the discrete, computable forms of information processing that have traditionally been recognized as cognitive capacities. On the other hand, state functions correspond to the noncomputable maintenance organic processes that are broadcast more widely and diffusely throughout the body. The basic affects are examples of such global brain states, and must thus be capable of being regulated quite well, and perhaps eventually quite precisely, neurobiologically. This is not to deny that cognitive readjustments may also produce desired homeostatic changes, albeit more indirectly.

Although no credible working hypothesis has been advanced on how the affective (affect) cognitive activities, this remains one of the foremost scientific problems for psychiatry. In general, we can advance three general themes: (1) Affects are readouts of higher forms of cognitive consciousness that use activities of primitive or emotional systems as *tokens* of information in their cognitive deliberations. (2) Affects

any intrinsic aspects of the instinctual emotional systems in action. (2) Affects represent dynamic influences on quite primitive self-explanatory capacities that allow organisms a spontaneously active presence in the world (e.g., as developed in Phenix, 1998). Although it is probably some complex combination of all three, I suspect we will eventually find that affects arise substantially from a very widespread parallel broadcasting of neurochemical messages in the brain, as can be achieved by various neuuropeptides (see Chapter 21).

To the extent that psychopathologies reflect such global state changes, the need for cognitive interventions may diminish and the need for organic, neurochemical adjustments may increase. We should recognize that our neurobiological sciences are currently extremely well positioned to inform us about the nature of the general state principles that operate within the brain-mind continuums. Abundant pharmacological measures already exist and will certainly improve for modulating these background state processes that provide a context for cognitive activities. This should be a clarion call for a new form of neuropsychanalytic research that tries to systematically evaluate ongoing affective changes in individuals under a variety of conditions (Julian and Turnbull, 2002). Such strategies may give us a better image of the primal structure of the mental apparatus than preconceived paper-and-pencil questionnaires.

To the extent that channel functions are involved in mental disturbances, cognitive interventions will continue to be important. To treat specific thoughts, there is no reasonable alternative but to continue to work with the details of individual lives. To understand the existential meanings of individual lives, we must become conversant with the patients' life stories and coping styles and identify the affectively charged associations that serve as impediments to growth. It may also be worth considering the degree to which critical aspects of individuality are lost, and any clear scientific analysis becomes problematic, when we group people into diagnostic categories that may not match biobehavioral dynamics very well.

Despite the impressive advances and achievement in brain imaging (Chapters 2, 6, and 7), we should recognize and worry about how much neural complexity and individuality these paradoxicical clouds of neural map contain. The distinct thoughts and schemes that can filter through these areas are enormous. Typically most individual-specific brain changes are discarded in generating group statistics. This brings us, again, to the management issue of how important is it really for psychiatrists to understand and deal with the richness of individual experience? For mild depressions, the answer may be "very little," and neurochemical adjustments will have done persistent and intrusive cognitions (Kraemer, 1999). For specific phobias, obsessive-compulsive problems and perhaps panic, where cognitive behavioral and short-term psychoanalytic treatments are effective (Chapters 12 and 18), the proper answer must surely be "quite a bit."

Scientific psychiatry will need conceptualizations at various levels, ranging from "low-level" cellular and molecular models, to "middle-level" theories that focus on major functional systems of the brain, to "high-level" conceptualizations where the detailed mental events of individuals are considered. Because of the sensible successes of low-level molecular and cellular approaches, much of the field has shifted

legislative and legal constraints only to low-level theories, and hence major texts spend abundant time on the details of neurochemistry, neurophysiology, neuropsychology, and molecular biology and comparatively little on the human mind.

The goal of the present text is not to compete with these detailed treatments of the relevant biological substances that are now detailed in several recent compendia (Clayton et al., 1999; Geddes and Holt, 1997; O'Dell et al., 2002). The aim is to provide a coverage closer to the middle level of analysis (also see Blier and Ross, 2003), where mental functions can be related usefully to objective brain systems in ways that may be clinically predictive. Unfortunately, there has been a widespread tendency in biological psychiatry to neglect evolutionary and emotional systems in considering how the brain system is organized (Chapter 20), and this may now be hindering new drug development (Chapter 21).

Without a clear understanding of emotional systems (e.g., Table 1.1), we can easily lose focus if we try to leap between molecular and global diagnostic issues. Might this be one reason that advances in the discovery of new types of drugs for psychiatric illness have been so meager? We should remember that most of the popularly used drugs—the antipsychotics, antidepressants, anxiolytics, anticonvulsives and stimulant agents—were discovered before the advent of modern neuroscience, often through little more than trial-and-error initiatives. As such, the neuroscience of the past quarter century has largely picked up where previously established themes. Practically no new and effective drugs, nor insightful brain organizational concepts, have emerged from the research that has been conducted at the molecular level. Many of us have confidence that investments in the fine-grained molecular approaches will yield strikingly new concepts (e.g., the role of monoaminergic and neuropeptide modulators as discussed in Chapter 21). At the same time, some of us suspect that the implementation of middle-level affective and emotional system concepts will help enormously in better framing our molecular inquiries (Chapters 2 and 10).

Middle-level analyses presently provide excellent opportunities for docking mind and brain issues meaningfully and help generate new ways to look at psychopathologies and pathophysiologicals and to generate new ideas for therapeutics. For instance, the existence of a generalized mesolimbic dopamine-centered SELINGO system in the brain has only been recently recognized in biological approaches to the mind (Panksepp, 1998). The system was long misconceptualized as a simple pleasure, reward, or reinforcement system because of the pervasive failure to consider all the behavioral and psychological evidence (Panksepp and Moskal, 2003). However, even Aristotle recognized that the appetitive function of the "soul" permeated all other parts of the mental apparatus, and it may be quite informative to conceptualize the organization of affective processes in terms of distinct, albeit highly interactive, neurocircuitous constellations. As already noted, this appetitive motivational SELINGO system contributes heavily to drug addictions and the psychic distress of schizophrenia and other psychiatric problems.

In sum, we currently know a great deal about limbic system neurotransmitters and neuromodulators, but all too little about the functional subsystems of which the "emotional-visceral brain" is composed. However, animal research, especially if we

are willing to accept the affective nature of animal life, should allow us to work out the general evolutionary principles, yielding useful concepts that should also apply to humans (Panksepp et al., 2002). Among such core causal processes, cross-species homologies do prevail. Of course, this work has no chance of clarifying the massive cognitive complexities that arise when these ancient systems interact with our expansive cognitive-cognitive apparatus. To understand these interactions, a new psychobiological type of human mind research is needed (Panksepp, 1998). Still, a judicious blend of animal and human brain-based research should eventually yield a new and coherent psychobiological view that is bound to be of perennially significance.

ODD: INTERSECTION OF 20TH-CENTURY FORCES LEADING TO A 21ST-CENTURY SYNTHESIS

There were periods during the 20th century (e.g., the Freudian era) when psychologists interested in the deep dynamics of the mind isolated themselves from a progressive understanding of the brain. More recently, with the neuroscience revolution and the striking molecular successes of biological psychiatry, the converse problem has emerged in some quarters—an excessive separation of psychiatric thinking from any coherent attempt to conceptualize the nature of the mind. Now that our mind inquiries can be supported by an impressive new scientific underpinning, there is promise for even more impressive dealing of brain-based issues.

Because of such advances, and only because of them, creative psychological approaches, such as those advanced by Freud, can now be tempered with measurement, allowing many neglected ideas to be tested rigorously for the first time. For instance, there are many nonscientific ways to conceptualize repression, transference, projections, repetitive computations, and various defense mechanisms. With the advent of modern brain imaging and psychopharmacology, revitalized depth psychological theories may point us toward subtle mind issues that can finally begin to be empirically resolved.

However, in cultivating diagnostic precision, we must avoid creating new divisions out of marginal differences. We must avoid constructing Kaliyappi nightmares—documented similar to the Maltese Inquisitions that informed inquisitors of the Dark Ages, in great detail, how to identify and test witches. Without diagnostics that are linked to clear and measurable biological underpinnings, the classic tensions between the splitting and lumping are bound to remain. There are no easy resolutions of the differences such disparate views generate. With the one hand we must aspire to create a diagnostic precision that may be unattainable, and with the other we must fully support the humanistic and deeply experienced affective needs of individuals in ways that are often beyond our means. Only through a mutual tension between such perspectives can a balanced synthesis emerge.

In the final accounting, we must invest in variants of the "Mayesian synthesis" by accepting the multidimensional psychobiological nature of individual therapeutic relationships. Theory is no substitute for the human touch. Psychological existence, of both

doctor and patient, is built upon substantive emotional interactions. The life stories of individual patients should not be broken, even when managed care insists that simple medications should suffice. The individuality of each person is reflected within his or her unique life encounters, diverse dispositions, and vulnerabilities. Idiosyncratic individuality must continue to be cherished. Indeed, through an increasing understanding of genetic diversity, there may be generalized psychiatric medicines in the future. We may also be better able to identify individuals who can get by on lower doses of psychotropics than others, thereby minimizing side effects.

To achieve this, patients should be better educated so they can become more active participants in the evaluation of their individual treatment plans. Indeed, if new and gentle neuropeptide-based therapies do eventually emerge, we may find that they do not operate well without appropriately supportive social contexts. Such issues will be difficult to analyze empirically, but we should remain open to the likelihood that there will eventually be medicines that facilitate opportunities for people to master the existential subtleties of their lives. In addition, optimal therapeutic effects may only emerge when patients are encouraged, as in the ancient Greek "Moral purification," to serve their bodies in emotional ways, aided by dance, music, and the other bodily passions and arts.

As we increasingly investigate the neural emotional systems that evolution has built into the mammalian brain, we will better conceptualize the psychobiological nature of mental order as well as disorders. Our emerging knowledge about the biological origins of human nature, along with our traditional human tools to listen and to empathize, may eventually help us to regulate the passions of the mind with a precision that presently seems barely imaginable. Hopefully that will be achieved in the most humanistic way possible.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

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IMAGING HUMAN EMOTIONS AND AFFECTIVE FEELINGS: IMPLICATIONS FOR BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY

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ON THE NATURE OF EMOTIONS

The complexity of emotions is vast, but during the past few decades, progress in classifying the neurobiological substrates has been enormous. This knowledge will have increasing consequences for the neuroconceptualization of translational issues in Biological psychiatry. In deep subcortical regions of the mammalian brain, there exist a variety of genetically prewired circuits that mediate basic (intrinsic) emotional behaviors. As discussed in this chapter, and several others in this text, there are many reasons to believe that various basic affective experiences are dependent on the activities of such neural systems.

Emotions have a variety of attributes, including autonomic-body, behavioral-affective, cognitive-learned, and affective-experiential components. This last aspect—the subjective intensity and valence of our diverse emotional experiences—makes it a topic of foremost importance for psychiatry. Without affective feelings, it is hard to imagine that the concept of emotion would exist. People with psychiatric problems are commonly troubled by the chaotic, often misplaced and uncontrollable affective intensity of their lives. The success of most psychiatric interventions is premised on their ability to facilitate affect regulation.

Although there has now been enormous progress in imaging how the brain processes emotional information, until quite recently the fundamental neuroethological nature of affective experience remained really mysterious. Substantial progress has now been made in imaging key brain areas that help generate affect in humans as well as in neuroanatomical and neurochemical circuits that mediate core emotional responses in animals. Investigators are also learning how to blend information from the two models. Most human brain imaging studies presently provide anatomical covariates that may or may not reflect causal processes. On the other hand, animal brain research can help decipher the details of the underlying causal issues in ways that ethical human research could never achieve. Through a balanced imaging of human and animal psychobiological research, a level of knowledge can be achieved that neither approach alone could achieve. The translation of knowledge among species will depend on the degree of evolutionary homology in the underlying substrates (Chapters 18, 20, and 21).

The assumption that animals also have affective experience when they exhibit instinctual emotional behaviors can yield precise working hypotheses concerning the neural nature of basic affects that, after development and deployment of appropriate neuropharmacological tools, can be rigorously evaluated in the human species. For instance, various abnormalities identified through preclinical animal research can already guide the selection of new pharmacological targets to be evaluated in humans (e.g., Chapter 21). Unfortunately, this level of evolutionary continuity is not yet widely accepted. Since the subjective-experiential aspects of emotions cannot be observed directly in either animals or humans, the study of emotional feelings has lagged behind the science of emotional behaviors. Indeed, some investigation have been said to conceptualize separate the two, but we doubt if that semantic maneuver is ontologically justified. Affective feelings may be closely linked to, indeed interpenetrant with, the neurodynamics of instinctual emotional systems *in action*.

In sum, a new neuroontology of emotions is emerging, rigidly. Because of limited space, we shall not cover historical issues. Suffice it to say that the modern study of basic emotional systems qualifies and brings into question earlier peripheralist views that attributed emotions to visceral changes or cognitive-type propositional attitudes and appraisals that we acquire through life experiences. Even though it is still accepted that peripheral and cognitive factors modulate core emotional processes in many important ways, central brain mechanisms are taking center stage in modern analyses of emotions. While changes in the activity of the autonomic nervous system are important for the modulation of emotional intensity and specific types of bodily feelings that accompany

questions, the affective nature of our minds is not simply a result of the totality of bodily arousal by higher cortical-cognitive systems of the brain as has been long assumed in psychology (e.g., the classic James-Lange perspective). In fact, there are reasons to believe that brain emotional processes are very capable of modulating peripheral organ responses via direct control as well as many hormonal routes, including direct secretions from the brain into the bloodstream (Kasius et al., 1999).

It is now generally recognized that specific brain circuits, highly interacting with the visual and skeletal-muscular systems, are essential for emotions. The brain's emotional infrastructure is concentrated in midline, reciprocal regions of the brain (Papez, 1937) that were enshrined in the concept of the limbic system (MacLean, 1990). Although the utility of the limbic concept has been debated vigorously (e.g., Coey and Gardner, 2002; LeDoux, 1996), it is fair to say that most of the brain imaging work on affective processes (other than related cognitive information processing) affirms that the limbic concept correctly identifies the general neuronal territories where both the affective and emotional behaviors are observed in the mammalian brain.

The basic emotions come in various dynamic forms and certainly include core instinctual processes such as anger, fear, anger anticipation, joy, sadness, and playfulness (see Table 1.1), which also highlights the key neuroanatomies identified so far. All of these complex brain functions can be linked to major psychiatric disorders in fairly straightforward, albeit speculative, ways (Table 1.1). These action-feeling systems allow all species of mammals to respond to the world in characteristic ways; and, to the best of our current knowledge, the underlying neurochemical circuitry have been evolutionarily conserved, in principle, across higher vertebrates. Within the higher primates and especially humans these systems interact with cognitive processes, considerably more variable among species, which yield layers of epigenetic complexities where cross-species comparison will never be at issue.

The cortical-subcortical interaction creates a special richness for human emotional life, as well as existential forms of emotional turmoil unshareable to other species. The various socially derived emotions include a vast number of variants—including shame, guilt, jealousy, envy, embarrassment, pride and many others—that provide a special subtlety to human social life. Although special debates continue over how our moods and emotions are best conceptualized (see Lazarus and Dickinson, 1994), the realities that several criteria will be essential for defining such affective experiential states is now widely accepted, and increasingly so among even those mind scientists traditionally not accustomed to thinking in neural terms. The possibility of imaging such processes in the human brain, using positron emission tomography (PET) and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technologies, has helped trigger the “affect revolution” that is currently sweeping across the mind sciences.

The aim of this chapter is to provide an overview of how emotions are generated within the brain. Since research on humans and research on animals presently provide rather distinct lines of evidence, they will be summarized separately. First we will summarize human data as derived from new classic studies of brain-damaged individuals, followed by a summary of evidence from modern brain-imaging approaches. Then we

provide a synopsis of conclusions to be derived from animal brain research, and an attempt to blend these approaches into a coherent whole.

EMOTIONAL CHANGES FOLLOWING BRAIN DAMAGE

Cortical/Subcortical Factors in the Generation of Emotionality

Given that acquired brain lesions (such as strokes and tumors) are typically large and don't respect the boundaries of known cytoarchitectonic and functional areas (such as Brodmann areas; see Fig. 2.1), a main focus of lesion-behavior correlation studies in emotion studies has been hemisphere laterality. Studies in the 1940s and early 1950s found that lesions in the left hemisphere were associated with circumstantial reactions (shyness, depression, despair, anger), while damage to the right hemisphere was accompanied more by emotional indifference (lack of concern, emotional numinosity), and at times an unfeeling euphoric hypomania. These early findings were explained by expressive difficulties in the patients with left-side damage, and by neglect and anergia in the right-damaged ones. However, at about the same time, a group of neurologists in Italy reported similar emotional changes following unilateral hemispheric section with anesthetized sodium for the assessment of speech dominance (Montini and Rossi, 1951). Discussing cognitive or functional factors, they proposed that the left and right hemispheres exert opposite influences on emotional tone, with the left hemisphere subserving expressions of positive affect, and the right hemisphere subserving expressions of negative affect.

This view was further advanced by Chaitow (1972, 2001) and Suddath et al. (1982), who reviewed the literature on pathological laughing and crying produced by unilateral brainstem spino-cerebellar lesions. They confirmed a statistical association of pathological laughing with right hemisphere lesions, and pathological crying with left hemisphere damage. In addition, they reviewed the literature on emotional subharmonic local components in epilepsy, leading to a significant association of local laughing with left-sided foci and local crying with right-sided foci. Thus, Suddath et al. (1982) concluded that mood changes following unilateral lesion reflect distributions of contralateral release and not ipsilateral subcortical release. More recently it has been proposed that lateralized hemispheric mood changes result from release of ipsilateral subcortical centers within a vertical hierarchy of emotions I control rather than contralateral disinhibition (Lieu and Tacke, 1995). This issue remains empirically unresolved, although it has long been recognized that in animals certain types of bilateral cortical damage leads to the intensification of emotional behaviors (e.g., depressive rage).

Cases of pseudobulbar palsy, a condition in which patients have uncontrollable episodes of laughter or crying without an apparent triggering stimulus and without associated feelings of happiness or sadness (reviewed in Pessin, 1989; Ross, 1992), have been interpreted as reflecting damage to pathways that arise in the motor areas of the cerebral cortex, descend to the brainstem, and inhibit motor "output" systems for laughter and crying. In that view, the lesions placed mostly in subcortical structures (basal ganglia and the internal capsule), would stimulate or release the laughter-





Figure 2.1 Major regions of the human brain. Labels refer to the cerebral cortex only. See Fig. 2.2 for a schematic diagram of the entire brain.

and crying response systems (Panksepp, 1999; Ross, 1984). Recently, Parvizi et al. (2001) described a case of restricted damage to the ventral-posterior-limbic pathways, highlighting a role for cerebellar structures in the automatic programming of crying and laughter. Although these studies emphasize the noncortical subcortical motor output systems in such emotional responses, they should not be taken to indicate that subcortical systems have no role in the generation of affect. As discussed later, there is abundant evidence that parts of the corticolimbic instructed action apparatus are critical for the generation of emotional feelings.

Other lesion-behavior correlations have emphasized different hemispheric contributions to the regulation of noncognitive emotional influences, such as arousal and emotional expression. Right hemisphere patients have been found to be less aroused, with reduced cortical and autonomic reactivity, particularly to emotionally charged stimuli (Blakemore et al., 1978; Morris et al., 1991; Cullaghane et al., 1999), with less avoidant eye movements to aversive stimuli (Cullaghane et al., 1999) and greater dysfunction in initial arousal (see review in Baker and Dawson, 1994). In addition, patients with right hemisphere damage are less facially expressive than patients with left hemisphere damage (Borsig et al., 1989; Borsig, 1992, 2000). Similarly, normal adults have been found to express emotions more intensely on the left side of the face, particularly during spontaneous displays, which is inverted predominantly by the contralateral right hemisphere (Borsig et al., 1989). Interestingly, the left side of the face appears also to be more expressive in trauma, mania and in schizophrenia (Fernandes-Cortes et al., 2002), providing evidence for evolutionary continuity that argues for the ethological approach to the analysis of emotional behavior. On the other hand, voluntary emotional displays such as smile scaling, are typically more intense on the right side of the face.

Another line of evidence on hemispheric asymmetry for emotion derives from half-field and dichotic studies in healthy volunteers and research on deficits of emotion recognition in brain-injured patients. Tachistoscopic studies in normal participants have shown that the right hemisphere is typically faster and more accurate than the left hemisphere in discriminating facial expressions of emotion, even when the effect of face identity is partialled out (e.g., Ley and Bryson, 1979; Surana and Blazquez, 1996). Similarly, patients with right hemisphere damage showed greater deficits in recognizing facial expressions of emotion (e.g., Berwos et al., 1983; Gold and Taylor, 1991). Recently Adolphs et al. (2000) used an automated three-dimensional lesion reconstruction algorithm in a large group of right and left-hemisphere-damaged patients to identify a critical role for ventral primary and secondary occipitotemporal cortices (extending to the insular cortex), particularly on the right, in deficits of facial emotion recognition. These regions presumably contain neural maps of the bodily state associated with an emotion, in agreement with a theoretical framework emphasizing the role of somatic representation in feeling emotion (intrinsic motor hypothesis; Damasio, 1996).

Recognition of emotional prosody in speech has also been associated with predominantly right hemisphere lesion foci (Ross, 1981; Bernd, 1992, 2001) and recently confirmed by neuroimaging studies in healthy participants (Morris et al., 1995; Buchanan et al., 2000; Ross et al., 2001).

Anterior-Posterior Factors in the Generation of Emotionality

The effect of precise lesion location was not taken into account by the early studies on lateralization of emotional behavior reported above. With improved anatomical resolution of lesions (X-ray computed tomography and more recently MRI), it has become apparent that the anterior-posterior dimension is an important factor in predicting the occurrence of emotional changes following unilateral lesions. Robinson and colleagues (1986) found that poststroke depression was more frequent in the case of anterior lesions of the left hemisphere, and its severity correlated with the distance from the frontal pole (Robinson, 1986). In contrast, for the right hemisphere, poststroke mania was significantly associated with damage in right anterior regions (Barlow and Robinson, 1988), while damage to right posterior lesions was more associated with depressions (Robinson et al., 1984). Importantly, the relationship between poststroke depression and left anterior areas of lesions held when patients with aphasic syndromes were excluded or the effect of aphasia was partialled out (Chatterjee and Robinson, 1988).

Another important variable not considered in early studies is the extent of damage to subcortical structures. The basal of the midbrain, particularly on the left, has been associated with poststroke depression (Robinson et al., 1984), while the right thalamus and right basal ganglia has been associated with mania (Stussman et al., 1988).

MEDICAL IMAGING STUDIES OF EMOTION

As the topic of human emotion has been receiving greater scientific status in recent years, two methodologies, PET and fMRI, have contributed the most to our advancement of knowledge about the neural organization of emotion in humans. Before summarizing these results, let us briefly describe these technologies.

PET and fMRI Procedures

During the 1980's PET was the gold-standard of neuroimaging. In PET a small amount of a radiotracer is injected intravenously into the subject, and the concentration of tracer in brain tissue is measured by the scanner (see Fig. 2.2, top). While decaying, the radioactive tracer emits photons that, after traveling a short distance (1 to 2 mm) encounter electrons. The two types of particles annihilate each other, resulting in the emission of two gamma rays in opposite directions. The image acquisition is based on the detection in coincidence of the gamma rays in opposite directions by crystal detectors. Image reconstruction uses lines of response connecting the coincidence detectors through the brain (for more details on PET methods and a more comprehensive description of research uses of PET in psychiatry, see Chapter 6).

Our reconstructed PET scans (for active and control conditions) are spatially normalized to stereotaxic atlas, and group averaged. Then a voxel-by-voxel parametric difference contrast is carried out, resulting in a difference image that is thresholded to a statistical cutoff, which is overlaid on the same subjects' MRI for registration and visualization (see Fig. 2.2, bottom). Because the PET scanners have a resolution of 6 mm, allowing precise localization of cortical and some subcortical structures,




Figure 1.2: Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) setup of typical scanner. Activated regions in the subject's brain are active (red) and nonactivated brain regions are blue (background). Activation (beta>beta<0) = applied beta₁ - difference > applied beta₂ (beta₁>beta₂).

However, fMRI has no time resolution. However, the枕叶 (occipital lobe) has a half-life of 1 min. Due to the long integration time of each area, only "global" changes are possible. Areas of active tasks and control tasks are separated by periods of no acquisition, lasting 10 ms, so allow a complete return to baseline of the activations and a complete decay of the deactivations. Typically 10 to 11 scans are acquired, with 1 ms repetitions of each task. The main limitation of fMRI is the枕叶 response, particularly the absence of fast cognitive abilities, which limits hypothesizing, and the need of a complete steady-state image scan.

In contrast to fMRI, MEG is more used recently and many recent studies are available with this technology. It has rapidly replaced fMRI as the most popular form of neuroimaging. The MEG signal is induced with a strong magnet. When body tissues don't move, we place it in a strong magnetic field all photons in the brain molecules become magnetically aligned. Radio frequency pulses are then applied, producing spins in the patient. When they are no longer applied, the photon spins return to their original state releasing radio frequency signals. Radio frequency emissions vary with wave density in different tissues and can be registered with detector coils (see Fig. 2.2, 2.3).

The BOLD approach measures slight differences in blood oxygenation produced by changes in local blood flow in oxygenated regions during cognitive or motor tasks. As shown in Chapter 1, oxygenated hemoglobin binds iron atoms tightly. Therefore BOLD can measure the ratio of deoxygenated to oxygenated hemoglobin in order to obtain a measure of oxygenated blood flow (quantifying the BOLD, or Blood Oxygen Level-Dependent, method). For more details about the BOLD method and a more comprehensive description of research uses of BOLD, see *Chapter 6*.




Figure 1. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Top left: Sagittal magnetic resonance image (MRI) photograph of patient demonstrating hippocampal MRI hyperintensity (hypointensity relative to white matter is depicted). The hippocampus (polyoid expanded) provides greater than the patient's normal hippocampal volume during fMRI scanning. Bottom row: Coronal and axial hippocampal sections showing enlarged hippocampal volume. Bottom right: Lateral MRI showing hippocampal enlargement (demonstrated secondary to the normal hippocampal volume). See Figure 2 for color image.

Postural fMRI allows for higher spatial resolution (about 2 mm) than 1.5-T static fMRI machines and provides better time resolution than PET. However, even if the specific imaging technique allows for repeated data acquisition (2 to 3 sec for an entire brain volume), improved resolution is limited by the absence of the hemodynamic response, which peaks at 2 sec from stimulus onset (most recent, endogenous blood flow increase) to a sustained hyperemia (then hypoxia) about 30 sec.

With typical fMRI studies either block designs are used, with alternation of task-task hippocampal testing (20 to 30 sec). These task volumes are repeated in 2 to 3 sec. A large number of images can be collected in task proportions of approximately 30 to 60%, usually by using statistical computation (i.e., paired t) with independent t^* (first and last) then binarized for statistical significance. Meaning differences can be evaluated in three-dimensional MRI sections of the subject's brain for hippocampal effects (see Fig. 2, *3D analysis*).

Using fMRI, DMRI is complementary, offering the repeat studies in children and patients, and from an clinical or research will immediately provide baseline cognitive. The main limitation are claustrophobia (typically present for no more than 1 percent of the subjects), and the difficulty that fMRI with experimental conditions between the scanner (e.g., task-activation hippocampal differentiation task), hippocampal in the fMRI signal are present in the control basal state and induce regional mean effects (local or global) on cognition, making the study of cognitive and memory basic predominantly hippocampal areas are implicated in these processes (one of the biggest problems in

the very artificial and noisy environment in which subjects must be tested, which can easily reduce the ability of subjects to attain and sustain realistic emotional states. Thus fMRI may be considered better for monitoring affect (since cognitive and behavioral challenges can often be done outside the scanner), even though this is not possible for equally demanding tasks such as inhalation testing, while DMRI, because of its temporal features, is often the better tool for monitoring cognitive processes than for affective ones.

Although functional neuroimaging methods have contributed greatly to our understanding of the neural correlates of human cognition and emotion (Posner and Rothbart, 1994), a number of methodological hurdles make the study of emotion through these methodologies particularly challenging. To properly evaluate the rapidly increasing number of studies in the field, it is important to consider some of these difficulties.

Methodological Considerations

First, most neuroimaging studies use a contrast or subtraction method (see Sarter and Phillips, 2000), which critically relies on assumptions of linearity and additivity as well as on the critical choice of comparison control states. Experimental models in regard to cognitive assessments have been applied to the study of emotion, but it is debatable whether this is legitimate, considering certain fundamental differences in the nature of cognitive and emotional processes (Pratapay, 1998a, 2000, 2001). Basal-Himali effects impose pervasive influences on cognition, in part as a consequence of diffuse arousal states generated subcortically and broadcast widely via a variety of "state-control" pathways (e.g., acetylcholine, dopamine, noradrenergic, serotonin). To understand emotions, large-scale network properties and cognitive control (transient neural effects) are as important as the flow of information through discrete neuronal pathways. There is no assurance that such brain changes are well reflected in blood flow dynamics. In contrast, cognitive processes may rely on more modular cortical representations that arise from more discrete informational "channel-control" functions of the brain. These brain changes may be more apparent under imaging procedures.

It is important to note that the statistical analysis of fMRI images using the most common method [statistical parametric mapping (SPM); Harringworth, London] applies a general linear algorithm that assumes a typical time course of the hemodynamic function (peak at 3 sec, decay by 12 sec), but it has been shown that the time course of signal changes associated to emotional states generally starts later and has more protracted effects (over 20 sec) (Silvia Rohd, personal communication). In summary, methods perfected on the study of cognitive processes may not transfer automatically to the study of affective states and emotion/cognition interplay.

The choice of a control state is also of critical importance in evaluating most published functional imaging studies. Several studies have used an "baseline state" as "open-closed set" (OCS) condition. Others have adhered to the additive method tradition by proposing the use of a higher-level control state (e.g., mathematical imagery) that evokes more closely the active physiological condition (e.g., emotional imagery), thereby controlling, for example, basic sensory, motor, and attentional components of

a complex psychological process. Use of the ECBC condition has been criticized on the basis that the individual's mental state is typically not maintained, with random thoughts and feelings producing background "noise" (Andreasen et al., 1993). Greater interpretive bias would emerge if all studies employed at least two control conditions (one being ECBC and another a carefully selected "naïve" control), but that remains rare in the field.

Another limitation of early neuroimaging studies of emotion was the tendency to focus on selected anatomical regions of interest while ignoring many other areas of the brain. More recent studies tend to report more effects, due to the overall acceptance of a view of cognitive functions as represented in distributed networks of regions rather than discrete centers. Also, it used to be common to only report blood flow increases, while ignoring decreases or deactivations, which more recent studies highlight as important in emotional processing and mood/motivation interactions (Deruelle and Raichle, 1999; Mayberg et al., 1999).

Across relating studies, considerable variability in the regional findings derives from the variable choice of statistical thresholds employed in reporting effects (Liu et al., 2000a). Another major source of variability arises from differences in data transformation steps and statistical processing software (e.g., AFNI [Analysis of Functional Neural Images], CDA [Change Distribution Analysis], etc.) used across laboratories. Most neuroimaging studies employ a considerable amount of filtering and smoothing of the data, resulting in large maps with a final resolution of 12 to 20 mm (AFNI, Neuroimaging, London). While this may be an acceptable spatial resolution to locate cortical effects, it does not enable adequate identification of effects in smaller and more compact subcortical structures involved in triggering emotional reaction, especially critical hypothesized, midbrain, and brainstem structures. Hence, many studies, especially those using fMRI, have found no participation of subcortical structures, long implicated by animal research, in the constitution of human emotions. Some PET and fMRI studies, particularly those with an a priori regional hypothesis, have employed less filtering of the image volumes, and thereby approach the actual resolution of the current state-of-the-art PET (6 to 7 mm) and fMRI (2 to 3 mm) machines, which allows better localization of effects in subcortical structures (e.g., Liu et al., 2001; Tracy et al., 2002). The increasing use of high-field MRI scanners (3 to 7 T) and higher resolution PET cameras, combined with less filtering will improve spatial resolution of subcortical emotional effects.

Another important difficulty in the neuroimaging of human emotion arises from the wide discrepancy in experimental situations, mood induction paradigms, emotional tasks, and instructions employed. While some studies have been carefully designed to address a specific domain of emotional processing (emotion recognition, subjective feeling of affect, emotion expression), others have used a combination of these. Importantly, states of affect (e.g., anxiety and sadness) have generally been biased toward cognitive processing of the emotion-inducing materials (perceived, memory, visual imagery tasks), resulting in widespread activations of cortical structures probably involved in the narrative components of the emotional task. Only a few studies have imaged the induced affect after the initial affect-induction phase, when the subjective

experience had reached a desired intensity (see Damasio et al., 2000; Liotti et al., 2000a). A closely related problem reflects the finding of activation of critical brain structures participating in emotional processing. As an example, amygdala activations have been common in studies of facial expressions (particularly fear). However, it has been found that such activity: (1) facilitates over multiple cycles of presentation (Levitov et al., 1999), and (2) shifts to a desactivation in the case of emotion categorization tasks (Liotti et al., 2000a). In addition, (3) significant changes (increase or decrease) are typically absent in the brain territory in those studies that have taken pains to focus on the subjective affective feelings (Damasio et al., 2000; Liotti et al., 2000a). This suggests that the time-courses of activity (both activation and desactivation) are critical variables, but all too commonly ignored, in studies of emotional processing.

Third, there is now an abundance of evidence that emotional stimuli can have regionally specific effects on the brain. Regional effects have been shown for both stimulus-generated internally by viewing films of emotional scenes, as well as internally generated, memory-driven emotional reminiscences. However, the two approaches often yield different results (Lowe et al., 1997; Robinson et al., 1997; reviewed in Phan et al., 2002).

BRAIN CHANGES AS A FUNCTION OF EMOTIONAL STATES

In spite of the above limitations, neuroimaging studies of human emotion have now produced a wealth of data that have helped to promote a paradigm shift from a prevailing focus on cognitive issues in human neuroscience toward an affect revolution. As reviewed below, the available evidence points to discrete regional effects in limbic and neocortical regions for different affective states and different aspects of emotion processing. Important issues of affective homeostasis and regulation, including the nature of cortical–subcortical interactions during intense creative states, and the exact interplay of limbic and neocortical areas in emotion–cognition interactions are also beginning to get substantive attention (Liotti and Mayberg, 2001; Devenyi and Bechtoldt, 1998).

The relationship of the human neuroimaging findings to the core midbrain and brainstem emotional circuits identified in animal research (e.g., Panksepp, 1998a,b) are beginning to emerge largely from studies that have focused on generating intense affective states (Damasio et al., 2000; Liotti et al., 2000a). Although there are abundant gaps in our cross-species knowledge concerning homologs in the underlying brain circuits, existing evidence paints a provocative new mold of cortical–subcortical interactions (summarized at the end of this chapter) that may help bridge between animal and human emotion studies.

Neuroimaging of Sadness

A large number of imaging studies have reported neural correlates of the internal experience of sadness provoked in healthy individuals. This work has been largely

involved by an audience for understanding clinical depression. Considerable variability in the findings can be explained by the use of widely different imaging methods (neuroimaging studies or neurophysiological, Blumberg et al., 1997) and the cognitive assessments associated with the generation of the emotional state (Lund et al., 2000; Petaurist et al., 1998).

In a recent meta-analysis of 46 imaging studies of normal subjects, including 14 studies of healthy men and women, increased hippocampal volume was reported (Blumberg and Pfefferbaum, Fig. 11, right Fig. 11A, left Fig. 11B) as the brain area most consistently implicated in depression, independent of antidepressant medication (Pfefferbaum et al., 2000). This right hemisphere association is often seen at functional and structural neuroimaging in familial depression (Verma et al., 1997).

A series of studies have sought to pin-point the neural correlates of sadness and depressive moods both in healthy adults, while controlling some of the confounds of general imaging studies of sadness. Sadness subjects were scanned with ¹¹C tracer PET only after they had achieved elevated intensity of sadness through writing out associations of depressing autobiographical events, as measured on FCS (Schug et al., 1999) and rated memory related conditions (Jain et al., 2000). The Jaitrong et al. studies (also summarized in Chapter 7) found that perception of depressive thoughts, self-reported negative cognition [Blumberg et al., 2000] activates during sadness




Figure 11. PET changes during mood of sadness. (left) Subject vs. healthy baseline. Right: 'Sad' vs. 'neutral' mood. Row 1: coronal, right-left slices. Row 2: axial slices. Row 3: sagittal slices. Right images of association of sadness primarily show small blood flow in the left prefrontal cortex and hippocampus. Note the negative regions are situated in right prefrontal and temporal cortex. (Blumberg et al., reprinted from Blumberg et al. (2000) and Lund and Blumberg (2000) by Blumberg et al. with permission)

anxious in the healthy subjects and during the chronic dysphoria of unmedicated depressed patients. While dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; BA46/49), predominantly in the right hemisphere, was deactivated in both (Odeberg et al., 1999). In addition, the activation of the two areas were inversely related. Healthy subjects induced to be anxious in the same manner showed no changes in these brain areas (Liotti et al., 2000a), underscoring the specificity of these effects for feelings of anxiety. The existence of reciprocal connections between the subgenual anterior cingulate and DLPFC in animals provides a mechanism whereby emotional and cognitive interactions could be accomplished, as recently highlighted by fMRI studies (Gray, et al., 2002).

Demaree et al. (2000) report activation in midbrain and hypothalamic areas during arousal of several emotions, including sadness, which is consistent with the animal evidence of the critical role of adrenals in generating basic emotional effects (Panksepp, 1982, 1990, 1998a). However, such effects were not evident in Liotti et al.'s study using a similar memory-driven paradigm. These inconsistencies remain to be resolved but may be explained by the larger sample size (and hence higher statistical power) in the Demaree et al. study.

As mentioned above, early PET studies of induced sadness were carried out at the same time as the subject was involved in active cognitive processing of the emotion-inducing materials—either viewing sad film clips or sad faces or reading sad narratives or a combination of these. Interestingly, the majority of these studies show recruitment activation in right prefrontal cortex (BA9) (Kosman et al., 1991; George et al., 1999). This region has been associated with the cognitive evaluation of emotion (Pini et al., 2003), possibly involving orienting attention to emotional stimuli and possibly retrieval of emotional memories as well. More importantly, this corresponds to the area deactivated during the maintenance phase of the subjective experience (Odeberg et al., 1999), effects not described in the earlier studies.

Another region associated with normal and decreased dysphoria in the left ventral lateral prefrontal cortex (VLPC; BA47), Panksepp (1992) asked normal subjects to "think sad thoughts" or rest with their eyes closed. The only effect reported was an activation of left VLPC, an area previously associated with semantic fluency. Later studies have confirmed that it is in the maintenance process that activates this region and not the initial onset per se, since the effect disappears when using a related memory control state instead of ECR (Liotti et al., 2000a). This region was also found to be activated during the emotional maintenance phase (Liotti et al., 2000a), perhaps as a result of spontaneous (or residual) rumination. Of even greater interest is the fact that resting-state PET studies in depressed patients with less severe, nonendogenous depression, show predominantly abnormal hypermetabolism in this region, which normalizes with treatment (Deruelle, 2000).

Once again, this region appears to track down ruminative aspects of depression that dominate the picture in nonendogenous depression (see Liotti et al., 2002a, for a discussion). So, in contrast with regions such as dorsal ACC, subgenual ACC 25 and right DLPFC, left VLPC appears to be activated both during verbal associations to negative tasks and ruminations accompanying sadness or dysphoria (see Deruelle and Blaiberg, 1998).

Neuroimaging of Fear/Anger

The large majority of studies on fear processing have utilized recognition of frightening facial expressions and fMRI activation of the amygdala (Phan et al., 2002). Such activates did not depend on the conscious, explicit processing of the expression, since they persisted in the absence of conscious registration of the stimuli, when visually "masked" faces were used (Goleman et al., 1998; Whalen et al., 1998). However, amygdala activations have also been observed to fear-associated words (Lieberberg et al., 1999) and vocalizations (Phillips et al., 1998), as well as in response to aversive pictures (Cheirif and Makkioui, 2001), and to human adaptations of animal paradigms of conditioned fear (Lukkes et al., 1993; Morris et al., 1998; Whalen et al., 1998), to a virtual auditory, olfactory and gustatory stimuli (Zaidi, 2003), and to exposure to propane and inhalation of CO₂ (Keller et al., 1998; Brausens et al., 2001). These combined findings support a general role for the amygdala in the automatic, unconscious early detection of threat and danger in the environment, and possibly in triggering the experience of fear/anger. Interestingly, a regular response to fearful faces are increased in children and adolescents (Slater et al., 2001) and in childhood anxiety and in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) patients (Thomsen et al., 2001; Hull, 2002).

Temporal aspects of amygdala activity appear to form crucial importance. Amygdala responses to fearful faces tend to habituate over multiple repetitions (Brettner et al., 1998). In addition, one study has shown that while passive presentations of fearful faces gave rise to amygdala activation, explicit emotion categorization of the stimuli was accompanied by amygdala deactivation and DLPPC activation (Harms et al., 2000). There was also concomitant suppression of autonomic responses (Kaptein et al., 2001), providing further evidence that processing of cognitive/explicit components of emotional stimuli is carried out by the prefrontal resources (see below). Further, this work highlights that DLPPC and amygdala, similar to DLPPC and subgenual cingulate, display opposite activities depending on the level of processing of the emotional task. Finally, no changes in amygdala activity appear to be present when subjects are experiencing fear/anger in the absence of external stimulation (Dumaine et al., 2000; Lien et al., 2000a).

Studies of fear/anger induction in healthy subjects appear to identify a different set of anterior-limbic effects than those present for sadness. In response to anxiety, there is a predominance of neural cortical activation (orbitofrontal cortex, temporal poles, ventral insula) and a distinct set of ventral deactivations (posterior inferior temporal gyri BA31 and 30 and parahippocampal gyrus; see Fig. 2B; Lien et al., 2000a), consistent with the established connectivity of the amygdala with more ventral cortical regions.

Neuroimaging of Anger

Fewer studies have reported brain responses associated with anger. Interestingly, in spite of the obvious threat context of angry faces, they do not consistently activate the amygdala, or they do so much less than fear. One possible explanation is that fear expressions serve the social communication function to alert and alarm conspecifics about an impending threat in the environment, the source of which has not yet been

identified by the perceiver, while for angry-expressions the source of threat is immediately apparent to the subject, being the perceiver itself.

Our study reported activation of orbitofrontal cortex in response to angry facial expressions (Blair et al., 2001). Script-generated anger has been associated to activation in anterior temporal pole, orbitofrontal cortex (Dougherty et al., 1999; Kilburt et al., 1999) and ventral anterior cingulate cortex (Dougherty et al., 1999), while one study has emphasized deactivation of medial prefrontal cortex, possibly including the amygdala complex (Pettinai et al., 2000). The latter observations may be related to a recent study showing that transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over the anterior-middle frontal region selectively impairs recognition of anger (Harmer et al., 2001).

Neuroimaging of Happiness and Reward

The most consistent activation across several studies involving happiness induction is in the basal ganglia (ventral striate and putamen) (Phan et al., 2002). These include recognition of happy faces, pleasant pictures (including attractive faces), recall of happy memories, pleasant sexual stimuli and competitive account of a successful nature (reviewed in Phan et al., 2002). In one study, induced happiness had no areas of significantly increased activity but was associated with significant and widespread reductions in cortical rCBF, especially in the right parietal and bilateral temporoparietal regions (George et al., 1999).

Outcome of Reward

A number of recent neuroimaging studies have investigated reward mechanisms in humans. These studies have used monetary and nonmonetary rewards during planning and gambling tasks (Elliott et al., 2000; Knutson et al., 2001a,b; Delgado et al., 2001), or primary taste rewards (e.g., fruit juice) (O'Doherty et al., 2001). Elliott and colleagues (2000) studied with $^{113}\text{In}-\text{water}$ PET the response to non-monetary feedback in planning and gambling tasks and found bilateral activation in the caudate nucleus dorsal striatum when feedback was given, as opposed to when it was absent. Delgado et al. (2000) used fMRI in a card game with monetary rewards as punishments. They found increases of activity in dorsal striatum (lateral caudate nuclei) and left ventral striatum that were more sustained in cases of rewarding rather than punishing outcome. Similarly, Knutson et al. (2001) found that responses to rewarding outcomes increased with monetary value in the nucleus accumbens, substantia nigra, extended amygdala (SLEAs) of the basal forebrain, and hippocampus.

Anticipation of Reward

In their fMRI study, Knutson et al. (2001) found that the prospect of a monetary reward was associated with responses in SLEAs and orbital gyrus. In a similar study, Knutson et al. (2001a,b) used fMRI and found the anticipation of increasing rewards elicited ventral striatal (nucleus accumbens) activation, along with increased self-reports of happiness. In contrast, anticipation of increasing punishment did not. Activity in dorsal striate (medial caudate) was present in anticipation of both rewards and punishments.

Using a primary reward (fruit juice) in an fMRI study, O'Doherty et al. (2002) found that expectation of a pleasant taste produced activation in dopaminergic midbrain, amygdala, striatum, and orbitofrontal cortex. Only the latter was activated by reward receipt.

A remarkable PET study by Knutty et al. (1996) examined *in vivo* dopaminergic activity during a vibrotactile task cued by presenting ^{11}C -raclopride binding to central DA dopamine receptors. They found that binding was significantly reduced in the dorsal and ventral striatum during the vibrotactile cued task compared with baseline levels, coincident with increased dopamine release. Importantly, the binding reduction in ventral striatum positively correlated with the performance level during the task. Thus, the anticipation and outcome of a reward (not separable in this study) activate the dorsal and ventral striatum, and this may be mediated by increased firing in dopaminergic mesolimbic neurons, and increased dopamine release. The more recent fMRI data are consistent with such a conclusion (e.g., Knutson et al., 2004a).

Neuroimaging of Disgust

Precursors of facial expressions of disgust activate the basal ganglia and insula. Spitzerbreyer et al. (1996, 1997) found that patients with basal ganglia pathology, Huntington's disease, and obsessive-compulsive disorder show selective impairments in the recognition of disgust. Interestingly, recognition of disgust from prosody (Vidulich, 2002) is at chance levels in healthy subjects, suggesting that disgust may be an emotion largely conveyed through facial expression.

Neuroimaging of Primal Drives: Air Hunger

The neural accompanying the primal drive of hunger for air or breathlessness, is possibly one of the most powerful evolutionary subjective states. While there are well-defined medullary, mesencephalic, hypothalamic, and thalamic functions in the basic mechanisms of respiratory regulation, knowledge of cortical and affective control of breathing and the elements subserving the consciousness of breathlessness and air hunger is limited. A recent series of PET studies (Brammer et al., 2001; Lissi et al., 2001; Parsons et al., 2001) investigated such mechanisms *in vivo* young adults, where air hunger was produced acutely by 8 percent CO₂ inhalation. Comparisons were made with inhalation of a N₂O₂ gas mixture with the same apparatus, with paced breathing, and with RCR. Both respiratory parameters and subjective ratings were measured for each condition. Independent of the control state (RCR, CO₂ breathing, paced breathing), CO₂ stimulation activated a distributed network including pons, midbrain, hypothalamus, limbic and paralimbic areas (amygdala and periaqueductal region), ventral striate, parahippocampal and fusiform gyrus, insular nuclei, and pericerebellar. Strong activations were seen in dorsal cingulate, posterior cingulate, and postcentral cortex (Brammer et al., 2001; see Fig. 2.5, left). In the same subjects, subjective breathlessness was manipulated while ambient CO₂ was held constant. Subjects experienced a significantly greater sense of air hunger breathing through a fine mask




Figure 1.7. fMRI changes during task activation and deactivation. Left: fMRI changes during task activation. Right: fMRI changes during task deactivation. Activation (top left) and deactivation (top right) are represented by increases in activity and task task in active brain and will increase in no active or inactive or deactivation and activation (bottom row). Data are adapted from Gusnard et al. (2000) and Gusnard et al. (2004) for illustrative purposes.

Neuroimaging conclusions: The statistical conclusions from the fMRI activation analysis delineated substantial areas of primarily limbic/prefrontal brain regions, including amygdala, fusiform gyrus, insular cortex and middle temporal gyrus, medial/lateral hippocampus, amygdala and anterior cingulate (see Fig. 1.8, right). This pattern of activation was confirmed by a correlation analysis with functional MRI data (Giedd et al., 2000).

INTEGRITY OF HUMAN CORTECO-LIMBIC ACTIVITY

The above section gives extensive potential mechanisms of limbic control. Involving the need to control or understand how the limbic may accomplish the synthesis of stimuli and eliciting emotion regulation. Functional neural imaging using the technique of fMRI adaptive findings in healthy subjects (Liu et al., 2000; Gusnard et al., 2000) of active episodes of major depression (Mehlberg et al., 1999) as well as the emotional process in the presence of many stimuli such as art images, music, or pain (Liu et al., 2000) give rise to activation of subcortical, paleocortical, limbic, and frontal cortices, as well as prefrontal cortex, and the cingulate, insular, hippocampus, amygdala, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, and the orbitofrontal cortex. Specifically, activation of amygdala regions leading to affective cognitive functions (Liu et al., 2000; Gusnard et al., 2000). Conversely, cognitive processing and memory links in correspondence of depression are accompanied by increased activation in hippocampal structures involving prefrontal processing, and orbitofrontal cortex, and insular cortex, and dorsal ACC, and hippocampal activation of posterior cortex (Liu et al., 2000; Liu et al., 2004; Liu et al., 2006).

In their study of the neural correlates of sadness and depression recovery, Mayberg et al. (1999) also carried out regional rCBF and rGlx correlations and found that subgenual ACC (23) and right DLPPC showed the most significant correlation (a negative one) among all regions studied (also see Chapter 7). They concluded that, since animal connectivity studies show definite reciprocal projections between subgenual cingulate areas BA23 and DLPPC (BA9 and BA8), the rCBF and metabolic interactions they observed in these regions during sadness and recovery from depression may reflect functional changes in obligatory, hard-wired circuits (Mayberg et al., 1999). A number of other neuroimaging studies have reported negative correlations between blood flow in prefrontal cortex and amygdala in depression (reviewed in Orr et al. and Raichle, 1998; Ohman, 2000).

Another line of evidence in favor of inverse-sign interactions between limbic and nonlimbic regions comes from evidence of modulations in fMRI amygdala response to fearful faces as a function of (1) implicit associations versus explicit (distract) processing of emotion (Hazeltine et al., 2003), which may be mediated by the amygdala's interactions by frontal cortex, and (2) development, with greater activation in preschoolers followed by a postadolescent shift from an amygdala-mediated processing to frontal lobe-mediated processing (Kilgore et al., 2003), as well as a later general decline of amygdala activation with increasing age noted in Autipietro, 2002).

A third line comes from studies looking at voluntary suppression of emotion. Male sexual arousal has been found to produce a significant activation of the right amygdala, right anterior temporal pole (BA18), and hippocampus, but when subjects voluntarily inhibited their sexual arousal, no significant lack of activation was noted in these structures. Instead, significant activations were present in the right medial DLPPC (BA10) and the right ACC BA23 (Bremsergard et al., 2001). Similarly, healthy females induced into a sad state while viewing sad film clips showed activation of subgenual cingulate, insula, amygdala, and midbrain. When instructed to suppress their sad feelings, subjects showed significant lack of activation in the right DLPPC (BA9) and the right orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) (BA11). This is consistent with the role of right DLPPC in negative mood, as proposed by Lusk and Mayberg (2001) as well as TMS methodologies in treating depression (see Chapter 19).

BASIC EMOTIONAL OPERATING SYSTEMS OF THE BRAIN: ANIMAL STUDIES

Let us now briefly consider emotions from the basic animal research side. The core of emotionality resides within the intrinsic subcortical systems of the brain that emerged in deep-time via evolutionary selection to provide organisms certain basic tools for survival. At least seven core emotional systems that course through subcortical regions of the mammalian brain have been previously identified (Panksepp, 1998; the systems are capitalized to highlight that specific brain networks are the referents). They include (1) a dopamine-facilitated appetitive motivation SEEKING system that promotes organismic exploratory searching, foraging, and, with learning, specific goal-directed activity; (2) a PEAR network that mediates flight and freezing, with accompanying anxiolytic

feelings, which courses between the amygdala, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis and the periaqueductal gray (PAG) of the mesencephalon; (4) a BLA/B (or defensive/aggression) system, running approximately in parallel to PAG circuitry, that promotes aggressive acts and feelings of anger and irritation; (5) a separation-distress or PMSAC system that triggers separation-induced crying (perhaps foundations for human grieving, sadness, and depressive moods related to loss) and elicits social bonding, represented in social attachment; (6) a sexual LUST system that constitutes clinically to female and male sexuality and associated erotic feelings; (7) a CARE system to promote maternal caretaking and possibly feelings of love and devotion; (8) a PLAT system that instigates youthful rough-and-tumble playfulness and other ludic activities (e.g., laughter) that may be primal brain ingredients for joyful affect.

Yet other emotional systems may exist, such as those that promote social dominance, but this tendency may reflect motivational effects of the childhood PLAT system, as they interact with HAG and KNGL systems. In other words, many emergent emotions may arise epigenetically from core emotional systems that mature developmentally with each other and higher cognitive processes. Although these core systems may not be sufficient to evoke the designated affective state, they may be necessary for various distinct emotional affects to emerge in the brain. Although our understanding of these basic emotional networks is far from definitive, the relevance of such circuits stems from our neurobiological research efforts in ways that can yield new psychiatric concepts as well as medicines (Chapter 21).

Before proceeding, we would only note that there are many other affective processes in the brain, including those related to specific motivational systems, such as thirst, hunger, and thermoregulation, as well as various sensory rewards associated with alleviation of these bodily imbalances. The general principle here is that negative affective states are generated when bodily states deviate from homeostatic equilibrium, and various forms of pleasure are experienced as organisms build up activities that restore bodily imbalances toward normal. Many of these sensory affects are controlled, in part, by release of opioids in the brain (Panikkar, 1999a; Van Ree et al., 2000). We will not focus on these issues here, but rather upon the motivational action apparatus that constitutes the basic encyclopedic types of the mammalian brain. There is space here only to portray these systems in broad strokes, with minimal referencing, but a detailed coverage is available elsewhere (Panikkar, 1999a, 2000, 2001), and how much of these systems may relate to drug development initiatives is outlined in Chapter 21.

Appetitive Motivation SEEKING System

Self-stimulation of circuitry that courses between the ventromedial mesencephalic area lateralis in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the nucleus accumbens has long been recognized as the fundamental reinforcement or reward circuit of the brain (for overview, see Bernat and Panikkar, 1999). As we have come to appreciate the power and nature of instinctual systems of the brain, certain dubious ideas that came down to us from behavioral psychology have been soundly cast aside in an ethological view of animal nature. This so-called reward circuitry is, in fact, more critical for survival

exploratory urge and exaptive foraging as animals seek rewards (Panksepp, 1998a). The system is especially responsive when there is an element of unpredictability in forthcoming rewards (Schultz, 2000, 2002), for these are times when animals begin to exhibit especially vigorous curiosity and exploratory responses.

This system allows animals to search, find, and eventually eagerly anticipate the many things needed for survival. The system is not so concerned about the nature of specific rewards; it works equally well in seeking food, water, warmth as well as social goals, including sexual gratification, maternal engagement, and probably playful urges. In short, this system processes interest, curiosity, and desire for engagement with a host of life activities, and in this capacity it helps animals learn about the reward contingencies in their environments (Berridge and Robinson, 1998; Kennerly and Panksepp, 1999). This appetitive urge has now been imaged in humans (Breiter et al., 2001; Knutson et al., 2001a,b).

Unsatiation in these circuits can produce depression and dysphoria—a generalized failure of “mirth.” As it facilitates the fulfillment of many goals, this system may be the closest we have yet come to visualizing neural underpinning for the generalized Freudian concept of drive. Dysreactivity is generally regarded as having important implications for understanding paranoid schizophrenia, as well as mania and various moodings, from fear and drugs to sex and gambling. Every addictive drug converges on this system (Wise, 2002) and tends to amplify or bias its most characteristic of an organism (Panksepp and Panksepp, 2002).

When this system is poorly regulated—or overactive for extended periods, as induced by saturated D₂ receptor populations, schizophrenia tendencies arise—especially positive “functional” symptoms such as delusions and hyperrelationality (Kapur, 2003), which can be ameliorated with most existing antipsychotic medications (Chapter 10). Negative symptoms of social withdrawal and psychomotor retardation are permitted when this system is underactive. A key neurochemical in the SEEKING system is dopamine, especially the dopaminergic mesolimbic and mesocortical dopamine circuits arising from the VTA (see Fig. 1.1), but there are an enormous number of converging chemistries, and little is known about the specific types of information that are harvested. Nonetheless, we do know that this response does not simply yield “information,” as an output but rather, an insistent urge to act in certain ways. We know this because all the dopamine neurons behave essentially in the same way, with no indication that they are parsing differences that reflect the many distinct aspects of the world. In other words, there appears to be a mass-action effect of this system that imposes an urgent pressure for action—a process that has often been called metaphorically “psychic energy.”

A diversity of neurotransmitter-containing circuits converge on the SEEKING system, including noradrenergic, opioid, cholinergic, endocannabinoid (ECB), substance P, nitric, and others, allowing diverse neuromodulatory influences to control exploration and anticipatory expressiveness. Many of these chemicals are targets for antipsychotic drug development (Chapter 21). Psychoactive drugs derive their affective appeal and potential to produce soaring and psychosis by commanding this emotional system. Other drugs of addiction, such as opiates, nicotine, and alcohol, also derive at least part of their

addictive drugs by interacting with this system (Wise, 2002). Among the interesting properties of this system are sensitization effects that emerge from stress, as well as periodic experiences with nonpsycharmacological substances or the system such as amphetamines and cocaine (Robinson and Berridge, 2000). Sensitization reflects an altered responsiveness of the system to both internal and external stimuli.

Dopamine circuits tend to energize more basic appetitive behavioral tendencies as well as higher brain areas that mediate planning and foresight (such as the executive functions of the frontal cortex) processing, presumably, psychic states of eagerness and hopefulness that help mold purposive behavior by interacting with higher cortical-cognitive structures such as the working memory systems of frontal lobes. Only recently have we started to grasp the importance of such state-control systems of the brain, and many fit as well or better with the interacting-functional conceptions of brain functions than currently popular theories of information processing. Indeed, we can generate a remarkable number of compelling working hypotheses when we consider this system from several different vantage:

1. Dopamine cells exhibit a rhythmic firing that resembles the second hand of a clock, and it has been found that this brain system elaborates behavioral responses on fixed-interval schedules of reinforcement (see Panksepp, 1981, 1989a), and they show bursting when animals are behaviorally excited and very regular firing when they are not, which is supportive of some type of background clocking function (Hyland et al., 2002). When one gets tired and bored, subjective time is experienced as slowing down. This is especially evident during physical fatigue (e.g., presumably the internal clock is "ticking" very slowly, as at the end of an exhausting exercise program). Thus, a diminution in the rate of dopamine cell firing may contribute to feelings of fatigue. A related prediction would be that as we pharmacologically reduce dopamine firing, a psychological sense of fatigue would begin to emerge. If so, neuropeptides such as neuropeptide and orexin, which facilitate dopamine activity (Chapter 21), might be developed into mild anxiolytic agents.

2. The dopamine system seems to facilitate the transition from the perception of temporally correlated events to the conviction that there is causality among those events. There are many relevant examples from animal brain research, for instance, norepinephrine-induced polydipsia and adhesion (i.e., superstition) behaviors that depend on dopamine systems (for reviews, see Panksepp, 1993, 1999a). Might delusions be facilitated by activity in this system? It is well known that psilocybin tends to be increased by psychodelic hallucinogens that promote dopamine transmission while being diminished by anti-dopaminergics (Rogers, 2005).

3. Remarkable relationships have been demonstrated between the psychic energy of the REM/EDRE system and the storage of rapid eye movement (REM) sleep (see Chapters 7 and 8; Panksepp, 1999a). On the basis of such relationships, Solms (2003) has argued that dreams ("emerges") can be dissociated from those that promote REM sleep, and that the former is more closely linked to dopamine reward than to the positive REM-dream generators. On the basis of this, tight relations would be predicted between antidepressant doses of dopamine receptor blocking agents and the vividness, and perhaps the frequency, of dreams. Predictions similar to these could be generated

for all of the basic emotional systems of the brain and thereby guide forward-looking thought in biological psychiatry and depth psychology.

Anger-Promoting RAGE System of the Brain

Operating in opposition to the anticipatory suspense of the SIEK/PAG system is an opposed process aroused by irritation and frustration that can motivate anger responses. This RAGE system facilitates defensive actions by inspiring fire in other animals. It also inspites anger responses that facilitate retention of valuable resources when animals are irritated, frustrated, or undermined. Hostaged attitudes and behavior can be provoked in both humans and other animals by stimulating neural circuits that extend from the medial amygdala to the PAG of the central noradrenergic system (see Chapter 10, Pathology section). Human anger may derive much of its impulsive energy from this brain system. When brain neurons become this circuit, unprovoked pathological aggression may occur (e.g., Postma, 2002), while damage or psychotherapy along this system has been observed to provide serenity (Postma, 1982). Some of the key substrates of this system are highlighted in Table 11-1, providing urgent pharmaceutical targets for eliminating the "heat of anger." Although no highly effective and specific antianger drugs have yet been created, a detailed analysis of the RAGE system may eventually yield such medications (Chapter 20).

A FEAR System in the Brain

Several distinct systems for anxiety triplication may exist in the brain. One PAG circuit that occurs parallel to the BLA/DBS circuit has been extensively studied. When artificially aroused, this circuit produces freezing and hiding at low levels of arousal and flight during most intense arousal. We cannot conclude that other animals experience negative affect when this circuit is aroused, since they avoid environmental contexts in which such brain stimulation has been experienced in the past. Humans stimulated all homologous brain sites are unanimously regarded by intense anxiety. If it turns out to be that there is much less variability across species in the subcortical PAG systems of the brain that help produce anxiety than in the cognitive structures that regulate such feelings, then it follows that the study of the PAG system in animals constitutes an excellent strategy for coming to terms with the affective nature of fear in humans. This system as well as other variants of anxiety systems are more fully discussed in Chapter 16.

Separation Distress (PARIC) and Social Bonding (Affiliation-Love) Systems of the Brain

Every newborn mammal is socially dependent. Brain evolution has assured that perhaps (especially mothers) exhibit strong urges to take care of their offspring, which is suggestive of a basic affiliative-love system in the brain. Likewise, all infants have intrinsic emotional systems to facilitate care and attention when they are distressed.

One of the most distinct outputs of this care-mediating system, quite easy to study in animal models, is crying or emission of separation calls when socially separated from caretakers. Based on the possibility that precipitous arousal of this circuitry, which occurs between the PAG and more rostral brain areas (specific, septal, bed-nucleus of the stria terminalis, and anterior cingulate cortex) via medial thalamic efferents, may contribute to panic attacks, this system was originally designated the "PANIC" system (Panksepp, 1992). This and several other working hypotheses await empirical evaluation (Chapter 12).

A better neurobiological understanding of this circuitry is found to have important implications for biological psychiatry. An enormous number of emotional disorders are related to feelings of social loss and deficits in the ability to initiate sociality (Schmidt and Schulkin, 1999). Indeed, the psychopathology enterprise is a social process, and the sociophysiological aspects of brain organization are gradually being revealed (Carter et al., 1998, and Chapters 20 and 21).

The first neuroscience hypothesis concerning the neurobiological regulation of this system was based on the suspicion that opioid-based social addictive processes may exist in the brain. Social dependence/bonding and persistent opiate use share three critical features: (1) an initial additive, sensitized attraction-response phase; (2) a spontaneously emerging tolerance-substitution process whereby the affective potency of substance diminishes, as does the power of certain social attractions, which may lead to "weaning" of the young and the breaking of established adult bonds (e.g., as in divorce), and (3) a robust withdrawal response arising from the撤销 of attachments. In short, opiates are very effective agents in reducing separation distress, partly by directly dampening of the emotional circuitry that promotes crying. Thus, one reason opiate addiction may be especially prevalent among emotionally distressed individuals is that they derive pleasure pharmacologically from brain systems that normally generate positive affect as a result of parental interactions.

It is now clear that brain oxytocin species also promote the construction of social bonds (Carter et al., 1998; Insel, 1997; Nelson and Panksepp, 1998a). Oxytocin is the most potent agent known to alleviate separation distress in animal models. Although this response is not dependent on opioid systems (as indicated by the fact that it is not naloxone reversible), oxytocin does tend to block the development of opiate tolerance (Koslow et al., 1998). Thus, it remains possible that when oxytocin is released during social activities, as it is during nursing, a secondary benefit may be the maintenance of sensitivity to opioid-based endorphin activation within the brain.

One of the clearest neuuropeptide facilitators of separation distress has been corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH). Whether such knowledge will lead to new drug development for the treatment of acute separation distress (e.g., CRH antagonists) remains to be seen (Chapter 21).

LUST (Sexual-Love) and Mortarant CARE Systems of the Brain

As described more fully in Chapter 4, the subcortical controls for hormonal control of female and male sexuality were identified decades ago, and they are concentrated in

basal forebrain, septal, and anterior hypothalamic/prefrontal areas of the brain, continuing medially down to the PVN (Phaf, 1999). The gender-specific LSST systems have distinct components as well as many overlapping ones. For instance, female sexuality has been linked more closely to the dynamics of oxytocinergic brain regions, while male sexuality is more dependent on vasopressinergic components that integrate among its male sexual expression. The oxytocin receptors for all genders have strong, cyclical and coexisting aspects.

Considering the importance of positively-reinforced hormones such as oxytocin, endorphins, and prolactin in parenting and lactation, a satisfying theory has been that in subcortical neurohypophyseal circuits these same chemicals promote maternal urge to exhibit care and nurturance. Thus, it would seem that both mother and child derive psychological pleasure and physical benefit/reward from the release of such molecules during nursing and other prosocial activities. All of these systems figure heavily in the elaboration of social bonds and a working hypothesis is that they help generate positive feelings of social warmth and the various forms of love, from passionate to maternal. It is most intriguing that the neurochemicals that regulate sexuality, maternal behavior, and separation distress overlap enormously. The evolutionary suggestion is that maternal feelings emerged from more ancient brain systems that once only mediated sexual ones, which adds a new dimension to the concept of infantile sexuality.

Rough-and-Tumble PLAY-Joy System

Among the genetically ingrained creative systems of the mammalian brain, perhaps the most ignored has been the one that mediates playfulness. We can now be certain that certain mammals possess PLAT systems, largely subcortically situated, that encourage them to indulge in vigorous social engagements that probably promote socialization and the relevant forms of brain development (Panksepp, 1998). It would be perplexing if the human brain did not contain phylogenetically proximate homologues to those found in other mammals that facilitate such joyful, emotionally positive behaviors and feelings of social exhilaration. Such systems are especially active in young animals, helping to weave them into their surrounding social structures, providing many skills, including winning and losing gracefully. As animals mature, these systems may promote social competition and dominance urges, although the dentate or limbic developmental transitions remains unclear.

Touch is essential for triggering normal play, and recent work suggests that infantile touchless humans also form "tickle skin," stimulators of which facilitate playful mirth. A laughterlike process has been identified even in laboratory rats (Panksepp and Beaglehole, 2003). Although our understanding of these brain systems remains incomplete, the implications for psychiatry may be profound. For instance, if later, adult body-positive neurochemicals are disrupted, they may find a niche in the treatment of depression. Linkages to the etiology of attention deficit hyperactivity disorders (ADHD) have also been proposed and evaluated in animal models with promising results (Panksepp et al., 2002, 2003). One idea that now needs to be tested is that abundant access to rough-and-tumble play during early development may facilitate

maturation of frontal cortical executive processes, perhaps by inducing genetic transcription of neuronal growth factors (Panksepp, 2001).

If that turns out to be the case, as preliminary data suggest (Henders et al., 2000), it is possible that sustained access to vigorous, emotionally positive, social engagement during early childhood, from three to six, when rough-and-tumble is highest in our species (Saito and Panksepp, 2000), may help diminish ADHD-type symptomatology, which is steadily increasing in our culture (Panksepp et al., 2002, 2003). As Plato said in *The Republic* (Section IV) "our children from their earliest years must take part in all the more joyful forms of play, for if they are not surrounded with such an atmosphere they can never grow up to be well conducted and virtuous citizens."

Instinctual "Inergies" and Affective States

It now seems evident that there is considerable chemical coding of basic affective processes, and one major way to decode these codes is to chart the neural underpinnings of instinctual-emotional processes in the brains of other mammals. This project is just beginning. An urgent question for biological psychiatry is how affect is actually generated in the brain. So far we only have biogenetic amino theories of affect, especially dopamine, norepinephrine, and serotonin based hypotheses, but these very general state-control processes help regulate practically all emotions nonspecifically. The strengthen of the idea that distinct affective states are created, in part through various neuromodulatory modulations contained in emotional systems that may all have glutamatergic transmission at their core (Panksepp, 1995, 1998a), provides an abundance of novel therapeutic ideas (Chapter 21).

So far, the question of how affect is actually generated by neural activities has only been addressed in theoretical terms. As noted at the outset of this chapter, there is a prevailing notion that it is produced, in some manner, by higher cortical activities that mediate cognitive consciousness, for instance, by brain areas that mediate working memory (e.g., LeDoux, 1996) or in those that allow us to symbolize events in terms of language (Bella, 1999). Damasio (1996), with his "semantic marker" hypothesis, has maintained the classic James-Lange view that emotional experience arises from inputs to the somatosensory processing areas of the cortex.

We would advance the view that affect is an intrinsic aspect of the neurodynamics of the subcortically situated emotional systems of the brain that generate characteristic instinctual actions in response to various situations largely novel that promote survival as well as various archetypal threats to survival. This last perspective has maintained that the positive dynamics of affect operate, in substantial part, through a primal neural representation of a neurodynamically created "virtual body schema"—a "body self" concentrated in the posterior limbic areas, such as the PAG, that are richly interconnected with higher brain areas (Panksepp, 1998b). This theory has also been advanced by Damasio (1996). In addition, there are also various sensory effects (e.g., the pleasure and aversion of various tastes) that arise from brain mechanisms that encode the value of simple external stimuli that have consistently enhanced or diminished survival in the history of the species (Bergeridge and Robinson, 1998; Panksepp,

(1995). Considering the complexity of this important topic, it may well be that all of the above views will contribute substantially to an ultimate solution of how affective experience is created within the brain. Indeed, it is possible to envision how emotion-cognitive spaces of the brain, which transmit information from the cortex to basal ganglia via descending glutamatergic systems, would also have neuuropeptide codes that increase the duration of arousal in subcortical systems (for an example of such descending autocrine and paracrine modulating effects of CRH, see You et al., 1999).

However, a disparity remains between the animal and human work. The animal data has tended to emphasize emotional circuits quite low in the nervous, while the human data, as already summarized, has typically emphasized the functions of higher limbic areas that are well connected to these lower circuits. Although subcortical areas of the mammalian brain contain various genetically ingrained operating systems for certain basic-emotional behavioral responses, to appreciate the full complexity of human emotions, we must obviously focus on the role of higher cognitive processes—these unique mental complexities that have arisen from a massive cortical evolution in hominids. The full spectrum of human affective experience clearly requires hierarchical interactions between lower and higher brain zones, as highlighted throughout this chapter. However, it is also important to emphasize how much effort can still be elaborated in the human brain after most of the higher limbic reaches of the brain have been severely damaged (Deldin et al., 2003).

GENERATING EMOTIONAL FEELINGS THROUGH UPPER BRAIN-STEM-UMSIC AND CORTICAL INTERACTIONS

The combined body of evidence reported above supports a complex hierarchical view of how emotions are generated in the brain. For instance, the reciprocal relations in limbic and cortical regions during the imaging of emotions and cognitions in the human brain has prompted the formulation of a model of emotional regulation in which activity in neocortical regions plays an important role in the regulation of emotional states, including emotion generation, maintenance, and suppression (see Figs. 2.6 to 2.8). Elaborating on the observations on descending and short loops in cats and dogs, Roman (1997) hypothesized that the cerebral cortex serves to "modulate/unmodulate expressiveness of emotion."

This model posits that cortical regions involved in specific aspects of emotional appraisal of emotion, including perception, evaluation, attention, and memory encoding/retention, such as the right prefrontal cortex BA9, right inferior parietal cortex BA40, right inferior temporal cortex BA39/37, and the parahippocampal cortex, can inhibit or "turn off" subcortical emotional responses through efferent connections to their specific limbic/glandular targets, such as the ventral striatum/PAG, basal, orbitofrontal cortex, anterior temporal cortex, amygdala, and structures all the way down to the PAG (Fig. 2.6). However, by engaging these cortico-limbic regions in emotional processing, the cortical regions can also participate in triggering the emotional responses that they normally suppress. As the expression of the




Figure 1.6. Estimated distribution of a cohort of firms entering from 1990 to 2000 by industry (primary or secondary) and industry target (targeted or non-targeted). Note: I = primary and secondary industries for all other industries targeted using II.




Figure 3.17. Human subjects showed a variety of tactic choices when facing the two-player game when a win of threshold was required. In most trials, subjects chose the best possible strategy given known expected payoffs, where experience was used, augmented, and the new one always greater than other choices. A win was considered successful as the mean of trials = 1.0.




FIGURE 1.2. Meeusen discussed a model of task consciousness that links the emotion approach phase, where the subjective affective state makes one a utility respondent, the two areas to arousal open and the three task consciousness dimensions are activated.

physical response and the subjective state reach a critical threshold in the more individual regions of the engaged pathway, the limbic circuit begins become activated and the associated neural regions become deactivated (Fig. 2.7), resulting in a "flip-flop" inversion of the functional relationship between central and subcortical systems (Boggs et al., 1998; Reivich, 1997). Such changes in emotion regulation mechanisms would correlate those passed during walking and sleeping sleep, where brain synchronization is accompanied by sustained dampening of cortical functioning (Kalsbeek and van Nieuwenhuizen, 2002) as is evident. During most walking activity, the cortex tends to support higher activity (Fig. 2.8), helping create a dynamic "incentivized" but no always potentially positive daily environmental events that lead to greater motivation.

This model of daily-political function has the advantage of explaining both cognitive influences linked to psychological or affective disorders and behavioral influences linked to emotional arousal produced by UDFC or pharmacological agents or various cognitive difficulties. It also provides a mechanism to explain neurophysiology-documented distinct in affective disorders and other human emotional states. During self-control and depression, there is selective dampening of the limbic subcortical of emotional integration (right ULFFC, right insular posterior), with insular limbic performance improving with increased activity in right ULFFC during improved focus (Agrawal, 2006; and Maruff, 2002). Also, not direct hippocampal (declarative) spatial memory (deplete), a substrate of cognitive abilities (Liu et al., 2009a). In other words, cognitive dispositions during emotional states can generate clear task-specific cognitive links being imposed during those states.

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The available evidence suggests that brain cortical pathways are sufficiently organized among different neuronal systems, with some variability in regions such as visual prefrontal cortex, insula, and anterior insula (Flory et al., 2002; Courchesne et al., 2004; Liddle et al., 2004), possibly reflecting common dimensions of memory such as arousal. The task of identifying such integrated pathways is complicated by the frequent coexistence of different brain networks in both normal findings and affective disorders, and by the observation only a few studies report results of observations limited to an evaluation of such networks.

These comparisons in bacterial taxonomy suggest reduced solubility and sensitivity to toxicity amongst *Microcoleus* sp. It was found that the regions involved in methionine production and biosynthesis processes are distinct for cytosolic *trans*-methionine, while chloroplast regions—eight chloroplast DNA and nuclear plastid genes (R44)—were involved in the biosynthesis/transport of solubles, and nuclear regions predominantly the biosynthesis/production and quality/processing genes, more involved in the control/regulation of genes (Fig. 2).

The hypothesis could be with regard of the protein and fibrous protein distribution in clinical depression had not exhibited temporal and pathophysiological differences (van der Horst et al., 1992; Meijberg, 1997). Our protein analysis indicates that fibrous protein and middle fraction protein and fibrous protein distribution in healthy patients with FT1000-*n*, 0 (van der Horst et al., 1992), and non-depressed (N) patients (patients of non-psychotic control group)



Supplementary Figure 2. Impaired adhesion to collagen and density on collagen (P₀), under conditions that live and heat-treated are clearly shown, as well as increased proliferation compared to untreated control (P₀-H). Adhesive fibroblast cell count was measured (Supplementary Figure 2a) and found results after 5 months, with adhesion values (heat, live and heat-treated) are clearly visible, as above reported given P₀ thermal treatment changes result given high porosity and adhesiveness (cell proliferation) showing adhesion increased p₀ H-5%, and treated result - heat. Indeed these adhesion regions are distinct regions and signal changes. When this was done through different protein composition of P₀ these changes reflected fibroblast at a distinct position can be easily seen.

activation associated with normal and pathologic panic attacks and anxiety provocation, highly suggestive of a role of this circuitry in the suppression of effaced emotional responses (Johansen, 1997; Johansen et al., 1999). The observation of greater dorsal cortical deactivations (right prefrontal BA9, posterior parietal BA40?) during sadness as compared to anxiety, and greater ventral cortical deactivations (anterior temporal BA37?), posthippocampal gyr BA19/BA20) during anxiety as compared to sadness, also fit with a previous theoretical model. Lissek and Tucker (1999) proposed that asymmetries in dorsal/ventral cortical streams are relevant not only to differences in cognitive processing but also to differences in motivational/affective control, with the dorsal stream more involved in the regulation of emotional plastic mood (from euthymia/depression to happiness/sadness) and the ventral stream more involved in the regulation of emotional tonic activation (from relaxation to anxiety and hostility; Lissek and Tucker, 1999).

Framework for Origin and Neural Elaboration of Human Consciousness

Another constraint that benefits from such an integrated model of brain-cortical function emphasizing ventral control is the problem of where basic conscious awareness is represented and how it may have originated. Several lines of evidence suggest that pericentromic, affective processing of emotion-laden places subcortically, in areas such as the amygdala, hippocampus, and amygdala, while cognitive appraisal of emotions takes place in the prefrontal cortex and the anterior cingulate cortex.

To exemplify this issue recent PET work, CO₂-induced air hunger has shown that when brain activity in all CO₂ trials were contrasted to low-level baseline trials (room air, O₂ breathing, or pass hyperventilation), there were striking activations in the amygdala, the hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus, and cortical deactivations in dorsal anterior-midcingulate cortex, DLMPC, and orbitofrontal cortex, independent of the level of air hunger generated (Johansen et al., 2001; see Fig. 23, left). However, when CO₂ trials in which subjects experienced more air hunger (breathing through the nose, with a face mask) were contrasted to trials in which they experienced less air hunger (breathing through a mouth piece), the greatest activations were in dorsal ACC BA12, posthippocampal gyr, and anterior temporal pole, while little differential activity was present in the amygdala and midcingulate (see Fig. 23, right; Lissek et al., 2001). The same results were obtained with a voxel-by-voxel correlation analysis of brain flow during the CO₂ trials with subjective breathlessness ratings; the greater the reported air hunger, the more active the dorsal ACC and other parahippocampal cortical regions (Lissek et al., 2001).

The interpretation was that the amygdala constantly monitors the body milieu for changes in physiological functions triggered by chemosensation (such as changes in ventilation, blood pressure, glucose concentration, etc.), through bilateral projections from hippocampus and brainstem nuclei, much in the same way that it signals threat in the external environment. Thusly, it may act like a hormonal, constantly readjusting its activity level independent of our awareness (even during sleep).

In contrast, the dorsal ACC and possibly other prefrontal structures (superior temporal gyrus) would represent the state variable, eliciting the response that immediate state feedback needs to be taken in order to improve the state (Liu et al., 2001). This interpretation fits easily with current theory's notion of an observed outcome being used as control to the performance of past decisions (Kahn, 1996), a process dominated by fully automated motor learning and anticipation, particularly imagery. In addition with previous work of Lutjeh et al. (1999), who found that higher consciousness induced sustained attention and reduced blood flow to be reflected in the anterior cingulate cortex.

A more integrated neuroimaging studies involving both state and task-related subjective states place, as far as I am aware, no reported publications where an integrated activation in the region of the dorsolateral and middle dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Fig. 3; see Liou et al., 2001) and three basic and phylogenetically old behaviors share an explicit representation of changes. Both regulating and integrating the set of the basic and a series of actions that help ensure survival. Because such responses are passed through the amygdala, automatic association of changes in state or state may represent the common element of these responses... a primitive survival drive... bypassed until any other form of consciousness. In this sense, homeostatic balance may have been from an awareness of ongoing internal state and only gradually linked to processing of environmental information. Consciousness is grounded on ancient brain systems that determine how the body is being in the body in general. A concept such as "I feel therefore I am," is still quite incongruous from the perspective of Cartesian dualism, where one assumes entirely separate realms of cognition (psychology,



Figure 11.10: Neuroimaging studies of decision-making studies of brain areas including insular cortex, left superior temporal gyrus, and amygdala. Consciousness of processes in memory are underrepresented than very decision. However, it does not mean that memory does not involve other very different mechanisms of decision processes either related to brain areas (Paus et al. are selected by neuroimaging (2001) clearly showing).
 (Source: Paus et al., 2001)

with its claim that consciousness is either computational or a more local property of the highest brain systems, such as the neocortex. We believe that it is essential to parse consciousness in terms of evolutionary propensities, whereby higher cognitive functions are solidly based on more primitive forms such as affective consciousness.

The next chapter elaborates a vision of consciousness that is more consistent with the mass of neuroscientific evidence. It may be essential to recognize that the bodily forms of affective consciousness are grounded in the ancient organic processes of rather ancient regions of the mammalian brain. Without addressing the finer issues, we may have little chance of understanding the higher, more cognitive forms of consciousness that pervade the infinitude of cognitions detected by our exteroceptive sensory-perceptual apparatus.

CONCLUSIONS AND SOME PSYCHIATRIC IMPLICATIONS

During the 20th century, the instinctual apparatus of the mammalian brain was marginalized in psychiatry as well as neuroscience, with only psychodynamic theorists struggling with such concepts as the "Id" and the "Dynamic unconscious." It should again become a trans-lateral issue for all of psychiatry. Although affective consciousness has often been relegated to the unconscious aspects of the human mind, in many psychiatric disorders, this ancient form of consciousness has become so modified that it overrides the dictates of rationality. Indeed, we must remain open to the possibility that quite often the cognitive aspects of mind are more unconscious than the affective dimensions, as is often demonstrated by conditioning experiments where classical conditioning proceeds in the absence of any perceptual awareness of the conditioned stimuli (e.g., Zohar, 2003). Let us briefly consider a couple of examples where the weakness or strength of cognitive and affective coupling—in attachment and transference relationships—can cause emotional problems.

Consider the case of alexithymia, the inability to identify and consciousness one's feelings. This is not necessarily a deficit in the brain's ability to detect the ancient affective processes elaborated by subcortical systems of the brain, but rather is the inability of higher cognitive-attentional brain regions to connect up well with the ancient automatic forms of the instinctual emotional apparatus. It may be a partial dissociation syndrome between higher and lower brain functions. Alexithymia may represent a problem in affect regulation, whereby the linkages between subcortical and cortical systems are deficient. In a recent fMRI study that attempted to identify brain regions implicated in this personality trait, it was found that males who scored high on the Toronto Alexithymia Scale exhibited decreased cortical activation in left insular-frontal-paracingulate cortices in response to highly negative visual images, but they showed more activation in the midfrontal cortex, middle frontal gyrus, and anterior cingulate in response to highly positive pictures (Berthier et al., 2002). The tendency of the brain to overreact to positive emotional stimuli may be partly the cause of these same brains' underreaction to negative emotional presentations. In normal individuals, a tight interplay between cognition and emotion leads to a

balanced mental life. The decoupling of such processes, as in identity mix, may promote positive development of confidence.

Let us also briefly consider the phenomenon of *transference*, whereby the emotional residues of early childhood relationships, especially the unconscious memories linked to disturbing affective interactions, continue to impinge on future interpersonal dynamics. Such emotional-cognitive habits are ubiquitous in human relationships and reflect how the stamp of early patterns of behavior often continues to direct how we respond to others. In extreme cases, emotional systems may have "blinded" us so that they become excessive influences in people's lives (Chapter 11). One central aim of psychoanalysis is to allow such transference relationships a psychological space to be observed in a therapeutic context, and thereby brought back into active cognitive consciousness. Through the reflecting and the redescription of such affective-cognitive relations, it is hoped that people will derive new insights about their motivations and why they respond to other people in the ways they do.

Thus, while the transference relationship starts with poorly understood, almost unconscious, emotional habits, the ability of affect and anxiety work to bring these dynamics back into a fully conscious gives people more options in the way they choose to live their lives. Many psychiatric medicines do the same by regulating the affective "targets" that seem to have a mind of their own. Affective states are so hard to regulate because they ultimately emerge from ancient brain areas that have a spontaneous lability or "flexibility" of action, which serves as a foundation for our higher cognitive abilities. Clearly, certain popular targets of fine-grained neurocognitive inquiry, such as the amygdala, are only a fraction of the overall story; for that structure, which links aversive external events to fear tendencies, is not essential for feelings of anxiety (Domszki et al., 2009; Zald, 2009).

Because of advances in neuroimaging, we are now in a better position to understand the extensive neurobiological nature of this neural infrastructure —even the dynamic co-outputs of genetic transcription that help sustain mental life, with potential new insights in genetic medicine around the corner (Hanson, 2002). To do this effectively, we need to have new evolutionary perspectives concerning mental continuity among species. As Charles Darwin (1874/1961, p. 647) said, “the mental powers of the higher animals do not differ in kind, though greatly in degree, from the powers of man.” If we do not seek to understand the emotions of other animals, we can only have a surface understanding of human emotions. The animal research allows us to work out the details of the subcortical sources of human emotional feelings that have now been well highlighted by brain imaging. That type of knowledge will allow us to modify the relevant brain systems with new and more specific pharmacological agents as well as psychotherapeutic interventions.

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NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS: IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY

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INTRODUCTION

What does consciousness have to do with psychiatry? It is certainly true that we diagnose, conduct a mental status exam, and complete a clinical interview, for example, only with patients who are conscious. While our understanding of consciousness is in its infancy and we have much to learn, it is clear that any clinician will one day be able to noninvasively provide a nonpsychiatric diagnosis of意识 or sleeping patients. We can imagine how new technologies, such as magnetoencephalography, or functional imaging while performing adaptive tasks, will enable us to observe some of the neural processes (though not the experienced mental content) in states of dissociation, or coma, or even the enactment of an erotic dream. In each of these examples,

such technologies will be drawing the outlines of a working mind. The functional relationship and intimacy between the field of psychiatry and the state of consciousness in the patient has often been taken for granted, but this represents a serious neglect. Psychiatry on the whole has paid little attention to just what consciousness might be, particularly in terms of its neural substrates. Yet the notion of consciousness must be acknowledged as the very epiphany of any concept of mind, such that any deep understanding of the disordering of mind, behavior, and emotion central to psychiatric and neuropsychiatric syndromes constitutes a deeper understanding of consciousness. From these considerations, there can be little doubt that psychiatry will need to pay increasing systematic attention to consciousness as a foundational process for future progress. If we unfreeze the neurobiological base for consciousness, we may discover many new psychiatric treatments, potentially even highly effective therapies we currently could hardly imagine.

In the current climate of an exponentially expanding neuroscience, one of the most compelling questions still without a definitive answer is "What is consciousness really made of?" The nature of consciousness, like the nature of emotion, is a topic as old as culture, and yet still in its neuroscientific infancy (the word *consciousness* did not enter the English vocabulary until the 12th century as far as is known at that time it was referred to as *conscientia*). An scientific topic, both emotion and consciousness have just recently emerged from a scientific dark age in which behaviorism informed a systematic and deliberate neglect of both phenomena. Under the sway of behaviorism, consciousness was viewed as either impossible to understand or simply not an appropriate subject for serious scientific study. While these old prejudices are still alive in some quarters, they are no longer scientifically justified, particularly in view of the growing empirical literature on consciousness emerging in both neuroscience and cognitive science. There has been a major resurgence of scientific interest in consciousness and its neural substrates over the past 10 years, and science no longer sleeps under the blanket assumption that subjectivity itself should, or even could, be easily removed from the scientific equation. However, one might still wonder why a chapter on the topic of consciousness is included in a textbook of biological psychiatry. Some of the more obvious reasons are as follows:

1. There are a number of fundamental syndromes in clinical neuroscience best conceptualized as primary diseases or disorders of consciousness (dissociation, coma, persistent vegetative state (PVS), altered realism, and delusion as just five of the more prominent). Although several of these (coma, PVS, and to a lesser extent altered realism) have traditionally been seen as the province of neurology, both disciplines are moving toward synthesis, and these syndromes also potentially inform basic issues in psychiatry.
2. Many other clinical syndromes in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV)*, including anxiety disorders, affective disorders, autism, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and borderline and other personality disorders are probably best conceptualized as fundamental disorders of affect and affective regulation. While many psychiatric clinicians and

researchers tend to consider disorders of affect as distinct from disorders of consciousness, recent work suggests that affect and affective regulation may be foundational for "core" or primary consciousness, and therefore the understanding of affect and consciousness are deeply intertwined.

3. The monoamine systems [dopamine (DA), norepinephrine (NE), and serotonin or 5-hydroxytryptamine (5-HT)] and acetylcholine (ACh), almost exclusively the focus of classical clinical psychopharmacology, are key components of what is now conceptualized as an extended neural activating system, comprising a multicomponent, distributed system for global state control foundational to consciousness. This suggests that most psychiatric therapies affect core anxiety by components of these extended neural activating systems (ENAS) underpinning basic arousal mechanisms, and that the neural substrates of consciousness are more immediately relevant to psychiatry than generally appreciated.

For students relatively new to this topic, we would first acknowledge the intrinsic difficulty of the domains addressed in this chapter: (1) difficult philosophical issues about the ontological status of consciousness (what is it and how is it related to other phenomena); (2) terminological issues in the taxonomy of consciousness, including basic distinctions between a primary, core consciousness and its cognitive extensions ("extended consciousness"); (3) a new typology for disorders of consciousness and their complex brain correlates; (4) a clinical case study section presenting two domains of consciousness normally outside the domain of classical clinical psychiatry; (5) a complex and highly distributed neurobiology of consciousness; and (6) concepts from neurodynamic theory that attempt to explain how highly distributed neuronal systems might function in an integrated fashion to generate conscious states. Readers new to these subject matter may struggle with some of these concepts, but the three case studies provided should help anchor these complexities in the phenomenology and behavior of real clinical cases.

DUALISM VERSUS EMERGENT PROPERTIES

Most neuroscientifically oriented investigation support a monistic view of the mind and brain. Monism, as it applies to the mind-brain sciences, contends that mind and brain activity are of the same "stuff," the same order of things, although they may be different aspects of that "stuff" (known as dual-aspect monism). This position has largely prevailed over the older dualistic views that treated mind and brain as if they were two ontologically different orders of things. While dualism is philosophically out of fashion, it still pervades the assumptions and models of many neuroscientists, as it has been deeply ingrained in Western thinking for millennia. Still, it is far from intuitively obvious how we are to bridge conceptualizations in neuropsychology regarding the behavior of large-scale neural networks with the basic properties of substance. Thus, the "mind-body" gap remains a vast chasm with only the beginnings of bridgework.

Spanning that chasm is a central challenge of contemporary neuroscience. The philosopher David Chalmers (1995) has called the building of this bridge the "hard problem" in consciousness studies.

In keeping with the monistic perspective, most brain-mind scientists believe that consciousness is a phenomenon that emerges from the complexity of cortical nervous systems (CNS) development, arising from within the dynamics of the brain, and existing as an embodied and body-centered "subjective space," totally private to its owner. Consciousness is an intrinsically private process that has many components simultaneously integrated in normal experience: attention, intention, sensory input, affective states, including mood; at the periphery of consciousness, and cognitive content. Attention is the selection of stimuli for potential conscious content; intention is defined here as voluntary, goal-directed, or purposeful activity; sensory input includes proprioception and any other sensory system from the five senses; and affective states of a wide range of intensities, including underlying mood states that often lie at the periphery of consciousness. In addition (in contrast to initial human and less apparently in animals without language as we understand it), consciousness contains a great deal of highly differentiated cognitive content as well, which correlates with the increasing complexity of sensory processing and the differentiation of sensory content. Central to consciousness is a body-centered frame of reference ("embodiment"), with fundamental properties of agency and "ownership," in which actions (outside of reflexive disturbance of brain function) are experienced as coming from the self. These properties of qualia, embodiment, agency, and ownership, and the universal integration of all content in consciousness, have presented the most consistent supports for consciousness researchers attempting to define and model the neural substrate, and also the field's most consistent and formidable scientific challenges.

BIOLOGY: CORE VERSUS EXTENDED CONSCIOUSNESS

Poor hundred years ago, Descartes concluded that consciousness was reserved for human beings. The weight of evidence now suggests at least primitive forms of sentience in creatures besides Homo sapiens. We share an enormous degree of subcortical architecture, paleocortex, aminergic and peptidergic neuromodulatory control systems, and basic affective-motivational systems with a wide variety of mammals. Considering the closest subcortical brain systems that mediate basic motivations and emotions, such with a characteristic feeling tone or subjective valence, how can we not conclude that evidence from the assumption of phenomenal experience in other mammals, especially primates? Assuming otherwise would mean that these basic behavioral and neural system homologs do not possess an additional homology in terms of a basic sentience. Such a perspective is straightforwardly dualistic and therefore scientifically untenable.

Humans apart from other mammalian lines of evolution principally in terms of extended neocortical and prefrontal system development. These developments give humans vastly enhanced cognitive and conceptual abilities, including language, along with extended capacities for working memory (Baddeley, 1986), planning, and other

higher cognitive aspects of executive functions and behavioral organization. The prefrontal and neocortical extensions offer potential cognitive extensions to more primitive survival functions provided by the brain's prototypic affective operating systems and by the basal ganglia.

A number of prominent neuroscience researchers (Decety et al., 1998; Panksepp, 1998) have begun to argue that our higher cognitive processes rest on a primary or core form of consciousness. From this point of view, cognition is the latest evolutionary layer on the consciousness onion. This is explicitly different from most cognitivist notions advocating the reverse hypothesis, namely that consciousness depends on higher cognitive processes, including even a proposed dependence on language (Sokal, 1999). The preponderance of evidence favors the notion that these higher cognitive functions rest on foundations provided by the basic affective homeostatic functions of the brain, as negative anxiety is elicited and modulated by these affective systems although it is likely that these cortico-cognitive developments inform and perhaps even in some cases transform the core primitive aspects of core consciousness that we probably share with other mammals.

CLASSICAL WORK ON THE NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The earliest contributions to a neurobiology of consciousness came from basic observations in electrophysiology made possible by the invention of the electroencephalogram (EEG) by Hans Berger (Berger, 2001). The EEG had the then-remarkable capacity of providing a graphical distinction between conscious and unconscious states. Next, the classical cortex-hole and other modifications performed on animal brains provided initial insights into the brainstate tasks in regulating consciousness. Beginning in 1930, Bures's surgical procedures on animal brains provided key experimental formulations for a neurobiology of consciousness. In the mesophase hole, where the spine is severed from the brain, consciousness was not found to be impaired but freedom of movement was eliminated. A transection at the level of the high midbrain, beyond the cerebral cortex, left the animal in a coma for several months, with eventually some partial restoration of limited EEG desynchronization but with grossly persistent impairment of consciousness. In a lower transection, known as the midpositus postcranial hole, a great deal of waking EEG activity was observed, suggesting that the space between the cortex (midbrain) and the mid-positive holes contributed crucially to wakefulness. Additionally, because the midpositive hole provided no possibility of additional sensory input, mutism must could only be due to contributions from the brainstate tasks between the cortex and the midpositive hole, and not due to some quantitative or qualitative "threshold of sensory input" as the earlier concept of consciousness and brain function emphasized.

First Articulation of the Concept of a Particular Activating System

In 1959, building upon the work of Berger, Bures, and others, Moruzzi and Magoun (1948), noted that electrical stimulation of the basal diencephalic and anterior midbrain

resulted in physiological and behavioral activation in cats. This led to the hypothesis of the RAS as a group of structures and pathways necessary for "waking up," including the mental activity of dreaming during sleep. Moruzzi and Magoun noted Berger's observation that the transition from sleep to wakefulness correlated with a change in the EEG from high-voltage slow waves to lower voltage fast activity (alpha, Muñiz, Hostalek). These EEG changes occurred with any afferent stimulation that produced increasing alertness. Several earlier investigators had stimulated various sites in the ventral chiasmatic nucleus, midbrain-projecting protocerebral gray (PPCg) and pons, leading to cortical activation, but until the articulation of the RAS concept, there was no integrated theory for how this transformation occurred, either physiologically or anatomically. Moruzzi and Magoun extended and integrated multiple findings around parameters of cortical activation and alertness and in so doing repudiated earlier assumptions that alpha-blockade resulted from afferent stimulation directly to the cerebral cortex. In addition, Moruzzi and Magoun noted that "when an activation pattern was induced in the cortex, the pattern was not constrained to the sensory cortex of appropriate modality, and the corresponding area of the sensory cortex was not the first to be activated. 'Whether acoustic, auditory, etc., to a lesser extent, visual stimulation was employed, when an arousal reaction was evoked, it appeared simultaneously in all parts of the cortex, and often continued for considerable periods in it after afferent stimulation had ceased'" (Moruzzi and Magoun, 1949, p. 407). Moruzzi and Magoun, through stimulating the RAS but avoiding any sensory afferents, achieved cortical activation. Data on brain lesioning studies from Lindström et al. (1950), as well as their own barbiturate studies, led Moruzzi and Magoun to conclude that arousal begins with the RAS:

The conception of sleep as a functional deactivation of the nervous system is not opposed by this evidence if the term "deactivation" is broadened to include interruption of the arousing influence of the basic non-specific activating systems, the contribution of which to a stimulus can never prove more important than that dedicated to the cortex, even classical sensory paths. (1949, p. 473)

RECENT WORK ON THE NEURAL SUBSTRATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS: BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ANATOMICAL, CONNECTIVITY, NEUROMODULATORY, AND NEURODYNAMIC ASPECTS

There has been much progress since early conceptualization of a reticular activating system by Moruzzi and Magoun. Although there is still no universal agreement on many basic theoretical issues, a broad-based theoretical consensus is slowly emerging. Progress has been made in defining methods for rigorous empirical work; many studies now use a combination analysis methodology (first advocated by Haas 1994) in which consciousness becomes a dependent variable (i.e., studying conscious vs. unconscious forms of visual or emotional processing to test the differences). Many streams of research and theory about consciousness emphasize fundamental and intrinsic integrative processes that operate across widely-distributed networks. Foundations for these integrative

processes may be found in the structures comprising the extended reticular activating system (discussed shortly in detail), and in its thalamic extensions to "nongeniculate" thalamic systems, such as the intralaminar nuclei and the counterposed inhibitory parvocellular system organized by the nucleus reticulatus thalami (cf.). This "expanded RAS" has been dubbed the extended reticular thalamic activating system (or ERDAS) by Newman and Baars (1993). These distributed structures are thought to facilitate thalamocortical resonance and widespread thalamocortical communication that are likely deployed and guided by thalamic and forebrain mappings. Although there are important differences in the details of various theories about consciousness by leading theorists and investigators, such as Frith (1985), Baars et al. (2002), Seth & Pines (2003), Puccetti (1999), Edelman & Tononi-Gauthier (2001), Damasio (1999), Baars (1996, 2002), Llinás et al. (1998), Newman & Baars (1993), Kinsbourne (1994, 2000), Edelman (1987, 1999), Tononi (1998, 2000), Taylor (1998), Singer (1998), and others, many theories support the assumption that consciousness reflects globally integrative processes derivative of neurodynamical interactions between multiple coordinating brain systems, particularly communication between the critical triad of thalamus, brainstem, and cortex.

As an extension and modification of these ERDAS and thalamocortical theories, Damasio (1999) recently briefly proposed that consciousness reflects neural-order mappings between structures that correlate ongoing changes in primary or first-order mappings emerging out of brainstem and other forebrain-monitoring systems in conjunction with object mappings supported in various sensory systems. Structures contributing to body mapping in all of its many dimensions constitute proto-self-systems. This includes the extended set of reticular structures in the brainstem pons hypoglossal, parabrachial nucleus, periaqueductal gray, and several somatosensory systems, including the insula. Proto-self body-mapping systems at various levels of the nervous system include visual, proprioceptive, musculoskeletal, and primary somatosensory systems and also structures in the brainstem responsible for maintaining homeostasis. In Damasio's theory, this broad group of body-mapping proto-self systems interact with object-mapping regions in secondary mapping systems located in the locus, amygdala, and superior colliculus. In this formulation, consciousness emerges from correlations during neurodynamical mappings of current objects in the world and the current state of body. These correlations facilitate enhanced mapping of the particular object, "popping it out" from the unconscious background, and are proposed to be the foundation for the "here-and-in-the-brain," the integrated multimodal sensory fields of conscious states.

Another basic principle broadly supported in the consciousness literature is that consciousness is a resource-intensive and "blended bandwidth" system, and that the brain works rapidly to collect as much of its processing as possible to unconscious processes. Novel tasks that initially demand the resources of consciousness are quickly learned and become increasingly supported in basal ganglia and cerebellar systems that underwrite the consolidation of habits, procedural memories, and complex motor skills, thus allowing consciousness the luxury, so to speak, of focusing on the most essential and novel adaptive demands facing the organism.

Disorders of Consciousness: A Basic Typology

Recent work on classes of consciousness suggests a basic taxonomy with a gradient from acute, to persistent vegetative state (PVS), then to akinetic mutism (AM), hypokinetic mutism (HMM), a rare and little studied disorder, and finally to delirium (Gilliland and Plum, 2000). Table 3.1 outlines progressive impairment of functions that comprise essential components of primary or core consciousness and includes two basic components of more extended cognitive consciousness (short-term and working memory). As one can see from the table, annual to mild/moderate attention, function, and intention are progressively impaired as one moves toward more severe disorders of consciousness. Conversely, in disorders of consciousness that are less severe, such as delirium, the dimensions of attention and intention are often more partial, while memory is often disturbed and annual to mild/moderate in preserved (outside of stuporous delirium). The graded nature of these disorders of consciousness, with fuzzy borders and zones of transition between virtually all the syndromes, show increasing compromise of key mesocerebral regions as disorders become more severe. This suggests that consciousness is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, and that it is built through organizational hierarchies in the brain that feed back and forward, integrating the processing performed by many systems. This is why we have not yet, and presumably will

Table 3.1. Diseases of Consciousness

Class	PVS	AM	HMM	Delirium
Arousal	+	+	+	+
Attention	-	↓ ^a	↓ ^a	↓ ^b
Intention	-	-	↑ ^c	↑ ^c
STMR	-	-	-	↓ ^d
WSTM	-	-	-	-

^aAttention/working is preserved in mixed AM/HMM, and more disrupted in co-delirious or mixed AM/HMM, which shares a border with PVS.

^bYoung PVS patients show occasional disconnected affective displays, possibly a sign of slow arousal.

^cMilder AM/HMM may also appear to have some capacity for working memory and other cognitive content, probably in the context of preservation of some limited degree of conscious activation and thus salient for clients (see Case Study 3.1).

^dTypically, the agitated delirious show affective disturbance, while drowsy or stuporous delirious may not be burdened by either mood, behavior, or altered affect.

^eIntention, in the sense of impulsive, goal-directed behavior, is fragmented almost in direct proportion to the severity of the comatose state, but intensity and effect may be diminished in agitated delirious and impaired in stuporous delirious.

^fShort-term memory is affected in incongruous delirious without underlying or concurrent baseline dementia by the amplitude and duration of memory processes, and also by the frequency of retrieval in an otherwise operation-dependent or minimally processed associative recall. Comatose/delirious patients, in effect, is predisposing or underlying dementia (see above) for short-term memory when delirium is intentionally selective processes are compromised (as from typically delirious in association with baseline dementia secondary to Alzheimer's disease (AD)).

not aware, find a specific "consciousness center." Consistent with this graded, recursive conceptualization of consciousness, isolated lesions of mesodiencephalic or reticular components can generate delirium, while massive lesions typically generate coma or persistent vegetative state. This notion of consciousness as graded is consistent with basic distinctions made recently (Damasio 1998; Panksepp 1998) between primary, core, or affective consciousness and more cognitive, perceptually informed, or extended consciousness.

Lesion Correlates for Major Disorders of Consciousness

These lesion correlates are best approached as strong general tendencies with clinical predictive validity but not invariance, for there are exceptions.

Coma	1. Major lesions of mesodiencephalic areas or diffuse neural injury. 2. Severe toxic-metabolic or neurovascular disturbances.
PVS	1. Initial stage of recovery from coma from brain injury, from above etiologies. 2. Lesser lesions of mesodiencephalic and reticular areas, typically sparing some posterior, midbrain, or other mesodiencephalic regions.
AICD	1. A secondary stage of recovery from coma or PVS or AIOM, especially from posterior insular-infratemporal (PIN) lesions. 2. Bilateral thalamic lesions. 3. Extensive lesion of periaqueductal gray (PAG) or VTA lesions. 4. Extensive bilateral lesions of the basal ganglia (BG), especially nucleus accumbens and globus pallidus, more rarely bilateral caudate. 5. On rare occasions, medial forebrain bundle, other RNS areas.
AIOM	1. Extensive bilateral lesions of posterior hemispherical cortical fields, typically from bilateral middle cerebrovascular (MCA) infarctions.
Delirium	1. Serious toxic-metabolic disturbances or major disruption of neurovascular systems, particularly DA, ACh, but on occasion NEL, may occasionally 5-HT. 2. Major lesions of right parietal or right prefrontal areas, right basal ganglia, thalamus, or reticular regions. Less frequently, left-hemisphere lesions of same regions. 3. Classically associated with Alzheimer's disease (AD) and superimposed but relatively more modest toxic-metabolic or neurovascular disturbances. AD, along with several other neurodegenerative disorders, appears to substantially lower thresholds for delirium from a host of factors—see chapter on neurodegenerative disorders).

In lesion studies, one must note that lesions necessary for serious impairment of consciousness in the adult may be somewhat different from lesions potentially interfering with the development of consciousness in the young, and neurodevelopmental dimensions of this problem are very poorly understood. Despite these complexities,

lesion correlates suggest a fairly delimited, mostly midline set of structures that appear to be essential, with more dorsal and lateral structures enabling cognitive extension of a core consciousness. This is consistent with other lines of evidence that midline and ventral structures in the brain provide the more primitive, affective, and integrative functions. Evidence from several lines of investigation suggests that the most critical components in descending order are:

1. The midbrain-superior colliculus system previously outlined (the RAS broadly defined).
2. Several mesodiencephalic regions sitting above and in communication with those systems, including midbrain superior colliculus (SC) and cerebellar nucleus (CN), the intramedullary thalamic nuclei, and the SCN (nucleus of the SCN), which jointly comprise the dorsal system of the RDTAS or the extended anterior thalamic activating system (some authors label both SC and CN as "midbrain reticular formation" and therefore part of the DDTAS concept).
3. Regions of paleocortex, particularly anterior cingulate.
4. Heteromodal regions in posterior cortex, perhaps particularly right-hemisphere parietal regions, particularly inferior areas.

Regions for which there is incomplete evidence would include the cerebellum (particularly midline regions such as the vermis/flocculus nucleus that have largely noncognitive function), primary somatosensory cortex, insula, and several other posterior regions. It seems likely that cerebellar sensory and parcellable insula contribute more to core consciousness, while contributions of heterotypic somatosensory regions (S₁ and S₂) are more likely "extended" and cognitive. However, the matter is still largely unconfirmed, with no conclusive empirical evidence yet available. Unilateral bilateral damage to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, essential for working memory and the executive aspects of attentional function and goal control, produces a markedly disorganized state, akin to a chronic delirium (see clinical case discussions). It is an open question whether this is a disorder of core or extended consciousness. Unsymmetric bilateral lesions of three basic regions cause one of the disorders outlined in Table 3-1. Lesions of other brain areas (particularly of widespread unisensory and heterotypic unisensory regions) can and do produce serious affective, behavioral, and cognitive changes but probably not disintegration of primary or core consciousness.

CASE STUDY 7: DELIRIUM—A COMMON DISORDER OF ATTENTIONAL FUNCTION AND WORKING MEMORY

A 58-year-old female with a history of coronary artery disease was found in a disoriented and mildly agitated state one morning, wandering outside her apartment after she failed to show up at work. All laboratory studies were negative. Head computed tomography (CT) revealed a relatively small right anterior parietal infarct just inferior

to the fourth ventricle. Her confusional state cleared within a week, but for some time she continued to show significant disturbance in attention function, in spatial relations, especially spatial synthesis, and in other forms of conceptual or novel cognitive processing, along with quite poor and easily disrupted working memory. The attentional and working memory disturbance was significantly worse in the morning, for uncertain reasons. She became depressed, though this was successfully treated with an antidepressant that possessed both serotonergic and noradrenergic properties. This type of antidepressant was chosen over a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) with the hope that it would better improve right-hemisphere visual processing disrupted in the context of the right posterior reticular formation cerebrovascular accident (CVA).

Some 3 months later, the patient was brought to the hospital with cognitive brain failure, with associated acute total incontinence (blood urea nitrogen (BUN) > 90). At this time she also showed a moderate confusional state, with marked disorientation to the environment, obvious disturbance in her ability to sustain coherent attentional processes or task frameworks, and mild apathy. This second delirium was clinically and pharmacologically virtually indistinguishable from the first, with the exception of some greater degree of fatigue. It is possible that the previous stroke had itself had left a residual disruption of right-hemisphere visual, lowering the threshold for confusional states. In the context of toxic metabolic or neuroendocrine disturbances, this woman was clearly more vulnerable to delirium. Unlike many patients with confusional states, this woman did not evidence any sign of baseline dementia, nor did she evidence significant preexisting stage negative decline from very early Alzheimer's disease (AD). Given her vascular history, however, she was deemed at risk for such a neurodegenerative process and followed at yearly intervals.

Delirium may be the most commonplace disturbance of consciousness encountered by psychiatric clinicians, as well as by other physicians, and is virtually ubiquitous on medical services in general hospitals. Its quite commonplace nature contrasts with a common neglect within both clinical neurosciences and consciousness studies of the disorder, as relatively little attention has been paid to understanding the underlying central and neurometabolic foundations for delirious and non-delirious states. Delirium is most classically associated with neurometabolic disturbances of a wide variety, or neuroendocrine disruptions secondary to psychotropic medications, often superimposed upon and obscuring a baseline dementia of the Alzheimer's type. In terms of neurometabolic disruptions, it is most typically associated with the effects of anticholinergics, but it is also commonly seen in dopamine precursor loading, from the effects of opiates, and from gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) agonist effects of various medicines, including benzodiazepines and antidepressants. There is substantial clinical/hospitalized evidence that thresholds for anticholinergic delirium (and delirium from virtually all-anticholigics) are significantly lowered by possessing AD, even very early stage AD, where there are only fairly modest cognitive deficits. This may possibly be due to early involvement in AD of the cholinergic basal forebrain, although this correlation between lowered thresholds for confusional states and cholinergic depression of the forebrain is also not empirically established in AD. As a wide variety of dementia disorders progress into

their middle and late stages, the distinction between baseline dementia and confusional states gradually disappears, as patients progressively lose working memory integrity and taskbehavioral organization. Diffuse Lewy body disease, more recently appreciated as a disorder distinct from classical Parkinson's disease, often produces a chronic confusional state after only 2 to 3 years of cognitive and behavioral decline, possibly due to its extensive disruption of numerous brainstem neuromodulatory systems, including ACh, DA, and 5HT (see chapter on neurodegenerative disorders).

Although older concepts of delirium emphasized sensory alterations, perceptual illusions and hallucinations (not unlike some descriptions of schizophrenia), contributing to the tendency to misconstrue delirium as a psychotic disorder, more recent concepts emphasize the very attentional difficulties, and an associated collapse of the integrity of working memory. In delirious and confusional states, the normal scope of working memory collapses. Normally, working memories need to sense some sense "Follow their successors" and thus show a coherent trajectory. Instead, patients with delirium normally cannot link task and area when engaged in simple tasks, and working memory is highly vulnerable to interference. Patients with confusional states often become quite forgetful, and language becomes increasingly fragmented (as confusional states worsen) due to the progressive failure of semantic working memory. Patients often fail to register simple information from the immediate environment, in direct proportion to the severity of the confusional state. They frequently cannot shift or maintain a focus of attention in an adaptive manner. Gross behavioral disorganization ensues, particularly as the degree of confusional state worsens, often accompanied by agitation (in moderately confusional states). Confusional states sometimes show transient and disorganized paranoid thoughts that can lead to mislabeling some of the delirium as a psychosis. In misdiagnosed cases, subsequent treatment with neuroleptics (which often reduce the agitation), seem to confirm the psychosis, sometimes with unfortunate consequences (failure to identify reversible toxic/metabolic or neuromodulatory etiologies).

A major theoretical challenge remains for the clinical neurosciences to develop more heuristic concepts of delirium (like those of Mizrahi, 2000), integrating the domain of classical metabolic etiologies with less frequent structural lesion correlates. Case study 1 shows that external insults to crucial reticular systems in the right hemisphere may generate a disorganized state virtually indistinguishable from classical focal metabolic encephalopathies. In this case, the structural insult was a right posterior CTVA, leading to a disruption (possibly diffusely) although this is not known, of postural cerebellar, thalamocortical, and corticospinal nuclei in the reticular portions of the anterior pons, and subsequently disrupting thalamocortical arousal and integration. However, the more classic lesion and correlate for CTVA in the right hemisphere would be the heteromodal portions of the parietal lobe, particularly the inferior parietal lobes, as well as dorsolateral prefrontal regions, the thalamus and basal ganglia, and the cingulate.

This, one must emphasize that there exist many pathways to the clinical presentation of delirium, and our case represents only one lesion and one metabolic correlate. Delirium also shows us that the coherent organization of working memory can be disrupted by direct lesions of the classical working memory system in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, closely related heteromodal systems in parietal lobe essential to

attentional function, or by insults to thalamic, basal ganglia, and reticular support systems for basic heteromodal cortical areas. Working memory in turn can be conceptualized as an important index of attentional function, the reader of what attentional mechanisms "capture" within a global workspace. The common toxic metabolic processes generating delusions do so presumably by disrupting the gamma band activity required to functionally integrate those complex distributed networks, perhaps particularly their corticoamidial aspects (see section on neurodynamics). Such gamma activity may be more physiologically demanding and thus more vulnerable to toxicological problems. Delirium also illustrates the close, intrinsic relationship of attentional processes to higher executive processes and organized purposeful behavior, as these two fundamental functional envelopes of consciousness are both affected in direct proportion to the severity of the confusional state. Indeed, the selection, maintenance and updating of working memories is a critical executive task for the attentional system of the brain.

Lastly, but not trivially, delirium presents a little appreciated argument on a very controversial point in consciousness studies, concerning the neuropsychological substrates for feeling states, the manifestation of emotion in consciousness. There are three basic arguments coming from behavioral neuroscience on how this might happen: (1) Lafosse (1996) argues that working memory seems to represent the otherwise unconscious changes associated with emotional activity, and this happens largely in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex; (2) Bolls (1999) suggests that language representation underpins feelings; (3) Panksepp and Domanic suggest that feelings emerge from highly subcortical dynamics, with Panksepp (1998) emphasizing the interaction between DMG, superior colliculus, and putative motor systems, while Domanic (1999) emphasizes changes in the prefrontal system, particularly somatosensory areas, recognizing vision changes in bodily size, generated by the interaction with an emotionally charged object or person. In the nonstuporous delirious, emotion appears consistently destabilized, despite the derailment of working memory, and in the severe delirious, dereliction of even coherent language. This argues for the subcortical way of emotion, suggesting that the collapse of working memory and higher cognitive functions does not prevent emotion from entering a very disorganized conscious state. Dystrophic emotion and highly agitated states appear particularly released and uncontrollable, although delirious, from some DSM lesions, and other atypical delirious, will sometimes show manic features. One might readily argue that most individuals would be expected to become dystrophic and agitated when faced with the collapse of basic cognitive functions, including even perceptual integrity and stability, and that such a state is intrinsically frightening. Thus, any useful review of the clinical phenomenology of delirium does not support the notion that working memory or language are necessary for prototypical feeling states, and instead suggests that these states are underpinned cognition, undermine working memory, and other higher cortical functions.

Delirium remains very much a promising area for the neuroscientific study of consciousness. Yet, it is a curiously neglected "orphaned child" within clinical neuroscience, having achieved this status despite its virtually ubiquitous presence in general hospitals and nursing homes. Although the treatment of delirium has always emphasized the mitigation of the offending etiologies, research into interventions that

might mitigate attentional and executive collapse in chronic comatose states or improve recovery has elicited no initiative within the field of psychiatry and neurology. Given that comatose states (particularly in their more severe forms) deactivate capacities for independent functioning, the lack of any comprehensive theory or interest in ongoing empirical research is most puzzling.

NEUROANATOMICAL SYSTEMS AND CONSCIOUSNESS—BASIC LESION/FUNCTIONAL CORRELATES

Changing Concepts of the Reticular Activating System—Arousal Revisited

The concept of a reticular activating system has changed substantially since the original proposal by Moniz and Papez. Although original concepts emphasized the brainstem and the notion of a primitive "nonspecific" architecture in "behavior" with diffuse projections, more recent concepts have emphasized a highly distributed multi-complexed system containing many structures with specific specificity and yet broad connectivity. Consistent with this, the brainstem in general has very complex and highly specific connectivities, containing at least 50 different nuclei running from medulla to ventral thalamus, with extremely disparate functions that belie the unitary designation of "brainstem." It is not a coincidence, as Pavlet and Darsy (2001) emphasize, that the systems that regulate homeostasis, those that arrest the fibrillar, and others that form the neural foundations for attentional fluctuations are all closely contiguous in the brainstem. One might add that the brainstem also includes basic somatosensory maps. Integrating these components of attentional function, fibrillar arousal, and homeostasis with mechanisms for mapping (and activating) the body in basic motor activities, recent work conceptualizes an "extended" RAS as containing several groups of structures, which for didactic purposes we will group into three functionally related systems (see Fig. 3.2):

1. The classical reticular nuclei include the midline raphe (M-R) systems running from medulla up to the midbrain, and the lateral reticular nuclei. These lateral reticular nuclei (including the caudate nucleus, deep mesencephalic nucleus, mesocollis, parvocollis, portion of postcommissural tegmental nucleus, pretectalis, mesocollicular, and paramedial) send predominantly glutamatergic projections to basal ganglia (BG) and the more dorsal raphe project to intralaminar nuclei (ILN). These lateral reticular nuclei located in the lower pons and medulla also project to ILN, but their brainstem afferents to ILN are most numerous in the upper brainstem, declining at lower levels of postmetathalamic in a progressive gradient. Reticular nuclei in lower brainstem can modulate activity of upper brainstem nuclei, thus affecting the forebrain indirectly.
2. The "mesencephalic" nuclei include the parabrachial nucleus (PB) and PAG in pons and midbrain. Clinicians are often surprised to discover that the PB and PAG are thought to be telencephalic structures, though both systems have extensive

reciprocal connections with many other thalamic components. There are projections from PAG and PFC to the lateral septal nuclei, to basal forebrain, and also to various hypothalamic and mesencephalic nuclei. PAG has extensive projections to all the monoaminergic systems (particularly DA), and mesocortical communication with the hypothalamus, as well as with the nonspecific intralimbic system in thalamus, and the ventral (posterior) nucleus of the amygdala. PBN and PAG have long been known for involvement in control of autonomic/visceral functions, but they also modulate global activity of cerebral cortex, pallidum, and amygdala. PAG is probably especially key affective arousal being, as active, motoric process. Full function of this structure generates a severe form of AGM (see later case discussions), underlining its poorly understood but probably essential role in all motivated behavior. Thus, PBN and the PAG can modulate the activity of the entire mesial cortex, through other ILN or basal forebrain projections, and can also influence the lateral septal nuclei, and mesocerebral/hypothalamic nuclei as well. From these multiple connections, PBN and PAG can presumably tone the thalamocortical complex consistent with emotional needs and affective states.

3. The noradrenergic and acetylcholinergic nuclei are the classical neuromodulatory systems upon which psychiatry has focused much of its clinical intervention and research. They include three monoamine systems, with differential projection targets and differential global modulatory functions. These are direct noradrenergic (NA) and serotoninergic (5-HT) projections from the locus noradrenergic tegmental area and related raphe systems, respectively, which spread to the cortical matrix. Dopaminergic (DA) projections are more targeted toward prefrontal and limbic/motivational systems, with projections from the substantia nigra to putamen, caudate nucleus, nucleus accumbens, along with DA projections from the midbrain VTA to many cortical areas, with strong predominance toward prefrontal, dorsolateral, insular, and other paleocortical regions. There are also projections from brainstem DA, PBN, and 5-HT nuclei to the basal forebrain, regulating key cholinergic systems in the basal forebrain. Cholinergic systems in the pons, including the interstitial tegmental nucleus and cholinergic portions of the pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus, project to several midline and nonspecific thalamic nuclei, including particularly the nucleus reticularis and ILN systems, thus regulating thalamocortical function, and to also cholinergic basal forebrain regions essential to cortical regulation/modulation. In sum, the nucleus subtalaris thalami (NST) receives pallidum from all thalamocortical areas, inhibiting their activity via GABA, interneurons, functioning as a compatible "global gate" to cortex, but presumably above the thalamocortical complex to settle in and out of various states.

This is a complex set of processes with parallel and overlapping systems in the brain stem that regulate the forebrain, thalamus, and cortex directly, and by influencing the cholinergic basal forebrain, thereby modulating the cortex indirectly. The monoamines themselves have differential global modulatory roles, underlining further

the human mind is not a static process. Homeostatic systems (HS) appear crucial in anxiety control, as signal to noise in anxiety systems and the emotional dampening of positive control processes. The systems from HVS maintain a non-specific anxiety and motivational or affective stimuli which are related to behavioral and cognitive neural circuits, and short-term memory. HST, as inhibition, is relevant to behavioral inhibition, and may regulate "downregulation" of brain systems and some degree of inhibition of homeostatic systems. These additional roles are relevant to their social propagation targets (e.g., adults tend to project to teenagers' mental health concerns cultural communication skills, while HST projects more negatively towards their family functioning). As mentioned above, psychiatry has traditionally regarded that most anxiety of its patients had originated toward these systems. The brain topography of these multiple regulatory systems for global and local anxiety management is shown in a brain brain projection system (see Fig. 1.1).

1. Lesion neuroimaging projections from the dorsal posterior cingulate gyrus (DPCG) show HVS, and ventromedial prefrontal projections from DPCG (top), or thalamus activation of the HVS.




Figure 1.1. Targets for the Estimated Humanistic Activating System (HVS) projections. Brain areas of humanistic anxiety results by HVS areas, and from HVS to HVS system (bottom). Furthermore, neuroimaging evidence through project from cingulate and prefrontal regions the brain and brain activity levels (A, M, PFC) and lateral orbito-frontal cortex (LFC) projections regulating the affective function and brain hypoarousal/hyporeactive patterns according to Humanistic values (especially Q and P factors and dimension HVS), with presentation from Humanistic anxiety (Figure 1.1, color image).

2. Projections from the cholinergic pontine nuclei into the thalamus, especially targeting non-specific thalamic systems; additional cholinergic projections from basal forebrain to cortex from four basal forebrain nuclei: nucleus basalis (substantia innervata), lateral septal nucleus, diagonal band of Broca, and magnocellular preoptic nuclei.
3. Projections from the monoaminergic nuclei (serotonergic, noradrenergic, and dopaminergic) leaving the thalamus directly into forebrain and cortex, with differential projections to more anterior (dopaminergic) vs. more lateral more posterior (noradrenergic) cortical systems, consistent with the more modulatory or motivational as opposed to the sensory signal-to-noise locations of these aminergic systems, respectively.
4. Projections from the lateral striatal nuclei, posterior cholinergic nuclei, and the VLPO, DBH, and 5-HT autonomic nuclei (from locus caeruleus, VTA, serotonergic raphe, respectively) to basal forebrain regulating the cholinergic systems there.
5. There have been several suggestions that hypothalamic melanin- and orexin systems should be added to the RAS, given evidence that they are centrally involved in wakefulness.

Traditionally, the RAS has been seen as functionally synonymous with the concept of a noradrenergic arousal system. There are large and generally unappreciated gaps in what this notion really explains. First of all, the notion of arousal as noradrenergic is clearly mistaken from the standpoint of widely differential contributions from these many reclusive structures. Additionally, the notion of "arousal" has been used in very different ways. Arousal has referred to (1) any process that increases the likelihood of neuronal depolarization or that increases firing rates of distributed forebrain neurons, (2) affective arousal (as in states of anger), and (3) processes that facilitate global state shifts, such as into wakefulness, dreaming, and the various stages of sleep. The first meaning of arousal (increased firing rates in forebrain) is not an adequate explanation at a neurophysiological level for either the achievement of arousal in behavioral reflexive terms or for arousal by melanohormones, as consciousness cannot be meaningfully explained by the simple notion of increased firing of forebrain neurons under melanin influence. The second and third meanings of the term are intrinsically related, as arousal to consciousness is fundamentally a "hot" (intentional) rather than "cool" process, gaining only the appearance of affective neutrality and cognitive calm in humans as we have a great deal of inhibitory neurons. Lastly, arousal, as in simple arousal to wakefulness, is not an adequate functional correlate for the extended RAS systems, as wakefulness is preserved in PVS, where no consciousness is preserved present, often in the context of extensive RAS-dominant-hypothalamic lesions. Thus arousal to a comatose state cannot be conflated with simple wakefulness and requires other integrative functional "envelope" (core elements) that we have emphasized: alertness, intention, and emotion. Further, if arousal means that stimuli generate coherent behavioral responses, this notion simply begs many crucial questions about how these structures (and their modulators and co-modulators) underpin consciousness.

These cholinergic neurocochlear systems sit in close communication with several more dorsal and equally critical mesodiencephalic structures. The thalamic intralaminar nuclei (ILN), the thalamic reticular nucleus (TRN), and the midbrain reticular formation [primarily the superior colliculus (SC) and cuneiform nucleus (CN)]. ILN and TRN functional specialization are reviewed below in some detail. The functional roles of SC and CN are incompletely mapped, particularly CN. They may function as "gating" or "priming" systems, offering a kind of attentional "blazing" to higher resolution cortical systems. For example, SC projects to RAS, and also to various thalamic and cortical systems involved in spatial mapping, and lesions of SC can cause hemispatial neglect (Mesulam, 2000). SC may offer a kind of low-resolution multisensory mapping of the total sensory envelope for the organism, with this basic blurring available to and essential for the higher resolution mappings the cortex is capable of making (Overman and Baars, 1993).

Cholinergic suggests that these distributed RAS and other closely situated mesodiencephalic systems underpin the brain's ability to instantiate global neurodynamics, providing for the functional integration of highly distributed systems running from top to bottom of the brain. In this sense, the notion of *crossed control* by mostly separated from the remarkable process of widespread functional integration, and differentiation, individualization, recruitment/adaptation. Modeling this neurodynamically, and thus illustrating the brain's functional integration in conscious states, is still the most difficult challenge facing the neurosciences of consciousness.

THALAMIC SYSTEMS

Intralaminar Nuclei (ILN)

The intralaminar nuclei are a group of midline systems that receive primarily glutamatergic projections from the classical lateral reticular system in the brainstem (see summary of RAS) and also from parasympathetic systems. ILN in turn sends primarily glutamatergic connections to specific layers of cortex (typically layers I and II), to the basal ganglia, and to the basal forebrain. The ILN has traditionally been conceptualized as an extension of the RAS and, along with the SCN, part of the neuropeptidergic thalamus. The ILN includes both anterior and posterior groups of nuclei. Because of the complex commissaries of the ILN, these nuclei play a central role in vertical arousal, attention, memory, and interhemispheric integration, including time control, with gaze control being virtually paradigmatic for attentional control in visual animals. Schiff and Ellen (1999) propose that anterior ILN groups perhaps have a greater role in working memory/memory integration, and that, conversely, posterior ILN groups likely play a key role in motor integrating/computing of voluntary motor processes, and creation.

ILN lesions can produce depending on their severity: sedative/botulism coma, vegetative states, akinetic mutism, delirium, and other various kinds of dementia in an alert state (see our studies). Extensive bilateral lesions of the ILN system (of other components of the extended reticular activating system are relatively undemerged) show

a known and fascinating clinical course, as we have seen in the second case. This is a rare syndrome, but it underlines major theoretical challenges to the neuroscience of consciousness, suggesting that the SCN systems may provide integrative functions that neurobiologically link the extended brainstem reticular components and the thalamocortical mantle. These linkages appear to be essential for consciousness. However, uninvolved subcortical systems are able to progressively acquire these functions over time in a fashion that is still poorly understood.

Bilateral lesions of the SCN discussed in case study 2 may be one clinical syndrome that move dramatically than any other underline the extent of our fundamental ignorance regarding the complex integrative principles that underlie cortical mechanisms foundational for consciousness. This syndrome, which shows a walk-through of all the major disorders of consciousness, suggests that the fundamental integrative mechanisms for consciousness are "well large" throughout the brain's connectivity and functional performance in a fashion still not well mapped. This walk-through syndrome suggests that these fundamental integrative mechanisms cannot be neatly localized to any particular brain system. Rather, they are likely to be heavily instantiated in the extended reticular thalamic activating system (ERTAS) and other anatomically closely related systems. Lesser (or greater) disturbance of integrative mesodiencephalic neurodynamics produce a lesser (or greater) disorder of consciousness, from coma all the way to sustained states, and even including transitions to elements and within cognitive deficits. The walk-through syndrome argues for a graded-and-reserve non-exclusivity of consciousness, and not the traditionally more appealing all-or-nothing concept of consciousness. It suggests that consciousness involves a progressive or epigenetic layering of poorly understood integrative mechanisms, from its core vegetative elements through to its more extended cognitive aspects. No existing theory of consciousness in the scientific literature adequately explains this walk-through syndrome, and most theorists and researchers are not even aware of its now reasonably well-established existence.

Medial Reticular Thalami (mRT)

mRT is a thin sheet of neurons on the entire lateral surface of the thalamus. It is a GABAergic inhibitory system that receives collateral projections from all thalamocortical areas passing through it. mRT provides a basis for adaptive gating and selective inhibition and activation of the highly-distributed cortical systems, acting as a central pacemaker for thalamic oscillations. It receives projections from the posterior cholinergic nuclei and the midbrain portions of the reticular activating system including the superior colliculus and quadrigeminal nucleus. Lesion correlates for mRT have not been well-established given that it is almost impossible for naturalistic lesions of the thalamus to be confined to mRT, but it presumably has a central role in attentional gating, and in underpinning mutual reciprocal inhibition of multiple cortical areas in the service of directed cognitive activity. Several theories of thalamocortical function (Cleary, 1990; Shulman, 1990; Raam and Seeman, 1994) have jointly hypothesized that mRT functions as a "sort" or switch potential working memories and conscious cortical concepts, proposing that material makes it into working memory by virtue of potentially

widespread neurodynamic "alliances" established on its surface (in concert with activity in many other regions, particularly anterior and posterior heteromodal cortices and their thalamic counterparts). Cholinergic systems may play a role in the regulation of this, as it receives projections from the putative cholinergic system. One would predict that current models of AD function that associate damage to SII, particularly on the right side of the series, would generate serious attentional disturbance and a delirium, as mechanisms for global thalamocortical selection and inhibition would be severely affected.

CORTICAL SYSTEMS

Paralimbic Cortex and Heteromodal Cortex

The role played by the neocortex in the generation of consciousness was long assumed essential. Recent work suggests that if one pays careful attention to a distinction between *consciousness* and *core consciousness*, the role of the cortex, particularly the neocortex, appears to be limited to its underlying domains, cognitive contexts, with these conceptualized as cognitive extensions of core consciousness. An exception to this general principle may be paleocortex, and possibly other heteromodal systems anteriorly and posteriorly, particularly parietal regions and prefrontal regions. The regions of paralimbic cortex most consistently linked to consciousness is the anterior cingulate, long thought essential to emotional function, response arbitration, and motivational salience of virtually all stimuli.

The respective roles of heteromodal memory versus paleocortex in generating core or primary consciousness is incompletely understood, but research suggests that these paleocortex and heteromodal cortex is likely essential for the creation of phenomenal content ("the world in the brain"). The ability to have coherent sensory content in ANS-specific modality may require (coextensive body) heteromodal systems. Functional imaging studies (see Ross et al., 2002, for summary) comparing conscious and unconscious visual stimuli demonstrate that conscious stimuli show activation of various heteromodal regions in prefrontal and parietal cortex, plus visual cortices, while unconscious stimuli only activate visual pathways. Lesion correlates of hyperkinetic mutism (associated with bilateral destruction of posterior temporal-parietal association cortex) also suggest that posterior heteromodal fields are likely essential for core consciousness. Hyperkinetic mutism results in extremely severe delirium, with severe fragmentation of behavior, no evidence of working memory, and severe attentional collapse. (Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of the existence of hyperkinetic mutism is the question of why these patients are mute and do not produce Wernicke's aphasic speech output.) Interestingly, bilateral extensive damage to dorsolateral parietal heteromodal fields produces a very similar state, and also resembles a severe unresponsive delirium, although without the puzzling nature of hyperkinetic mutism if Broca's area is preserved.

This suggests that the posterior and anterior heteromodal fields and their reciprocal connectivities enable integrated action-perception linkages or cycles essential to

coherent agency, and the meaningful organization of both behavior and perception in consciousness. A reasonable hypothesis from these lesion correlates is that extensive bilateral damage to posterior or anterior inferotemporal cortical fields may prevent the organization of any kind of coherent perceptual object in any modality, or coherent working memory or task-organization-specific procedural memory, respectively. Behavior is disorganized in either very extensive anterior or posterior bilateral inferotemporal damage possibly because action-perception cycles (Fuster, 1992), linking behavioral organization to coherent perceptions of the world, are devastated in either instance.

The evidence argues though that consciousness is about "integrated relations and integrative communication." An ongoing dialog between paralimbic-hypothalamic systems and unimodal-idiosyncratic systems appears essential for normal sensory (and personality) motor content and the sense of agency also, although this has been much less closely studied. This communication between paralimbic-hypothalamic and more unimodal-idiosyncratic systems seems to allow "category-specific" regions (e.g., those dedicated to faces, words, or objects) to get their processing into conscious workspace, possibly by virtue of critical gating and selective modulation performed by the heteromodal regions. Differential forms of gating and selective enhancement and modulation may also characterize the roles of many deep mesocerebellar/basal ganglia regions via the cortex. However, much in terms of the critical interactions between cortex and these multiple deep mesocerebellar regions in constituting the core functional envelopes of intention, motivation, creation, and specific sensory content remains to be fully elucidated. Table 3.2 summarizes evidence for such a global workspace or global access theory, leaving many fundamental mechanisms still to be elucidated by future research.

Primary (or Idiosyncratic) and Unimodal (Early) Sensory Cortices

Unimodal and Idiosyncratic systems in the cortex are not essential to maintain a primary consciousness that are clearly essential for normal cognitive and sensory contents. Early sensory cortices are essential for the generation of content in any particular modality, but the evidence supports that, without "broadcasing" of the conjoint operations of the hierarchy of early and late sensory cortices into heteromodal systems, the content of these sensory operations do not make it into consciousness. Vision is clearly the best mapped of these sensory modalities. Evidence suggests that recurrent communications and various neural synchronies between a host of "early" sensory systems in V₁-V₄ and "late" ones in V₅ are essential to unify the distributed networks into a stable "conscious state" that provides a discrete percept. These connections may allow "backward projections" (Damasio, 1980) between top-down conceptual predictions and bottom-up feature detectors, to enable the generation of whole perceptions. Deprived of all connection to early sensory cortices, the brain cannot even hallucinate in that modality. This suggests a parsimony with respect to specification of cortical anatomy and consciousness. We do not need early (primary and unimodal) sensory cortices for a conscious state, or probably for any aspect of consciousness, but deprived of all early sensory cortices, consciousness would be empty indeed, except perhaps for our affective state (likely quite negative) and perhaps some degree of proprioception.

TABLE 3.2. Evidence for Global Access in Global Work Space Theories

Author	Method	Results of Non-Conditioned Conditions (Non-Responsible)	Results of Conditioned Conditions (Responsibly Responsible)
<i>Sensory Consciousness</i>			
Lugathota et al., multiple studies (1993)	Binocular rivalry between diagonal contrast edges, color, motion, and objects. Most-and exceeding) in visual areas of the macaque.	In early visual cortex: 12–20% of cells responded. In object recognition areas: inferior temporal & superior temporal sulci (IT/STS) no cells responded.	In early visual cortex: 12–20% of cells responded. In object recognition areas: <11.92% (10%) of cells responded.
Troyer et al. (1999)	MEG of binocular rivalry with binocular rivalry in human, alternative pairing of super signal with high digital masking (100% mask area), large regions of contrast.	Unidirectional frequency-tagged activation in visual and nonvisual areas.	10–100% higher intensity in many channels throughout cortex.
Schroeder et al. (1999)	As above.	Unidirectional frequency-tagged activation in visual and nonvisual cortex.	Higher intensity and coherence in visual and nonvisual cortex.
Delboeuf et al. (2001)	Functional MRI (fMRI) of visual backward masking vs. unmasked words in stimuli.	Regional activation in early visual cortex only.	Higher intensity in visual cortex plus widespread activity in parietal and frontal cortex.
Bauer et al. (1999)	fMRI of unmasked and masked words and pictures.	Low activation in nonactivation areas of visual cortex.	More activation in nonactivation areas of visual cortex.
Kijer et al. (2000)	Activation vs. deactivation visual word stimuli using PET.	Activation in visual word areas only.	Activation in visual word areas plus parietal and prefrontal cortex.
Pank et al. (2002)	Change blindness vs. change detection.	Activation of visual word regions, including fusiform gyrus.	Enhanced activity in parietal and right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as well as visual visual regions.

TABLE 3.2 (continued)

Author	Method	Results of Non-Contextual Conditions (Non-Reportable)	Results of Contextual Conditions (Context Reportable)
Yeshenko et al., 2001	EEG and micro ERPs (in visuospatial neglect, using MMNI and event related potentials (ERPs).	Activation of lateral visual regions.	General visual activation plus parietal and posterior regions.
Greco and Tallal, 2000	Dissociated vs. continuous stimuli in isolated neglect, MMNI, and ERPs.	Activation in lateral visual regions including fusiform gyrus.	Activation sites in parietal and frontal areas of the intact left hemisphere.
<i>Learning and Practice</i>			
Hale et al., 1992	PET before and after learning computer game Tetris.	Greater deactivation cortical metabolism activity.	Widespread, intense cortical metabolic activity.
Baechle et al., 1999	Word association vs. simple word repetition before and after training.	Trained word association (high frequency) from single word repetition.	More intense activity in anterior regions, left parietal and left posterior temporal lobe and right cerebellar hemisphere.
<i>Mental Effort</i>			
Decay and Goysen, 2000	Meta-analysis of 10 tasks comparing low and high mental effort (including problem solving, response selection, executive control, working memory, episodic memory and problem solving).	Low problem solving.	High problem solving, in frontolateral, midfrontal, midparietal, and lateral inferior occipital cortex.
<i>Writing vs. General Activities</i>			
John et al., 2001	Quantified by ERPs (QERPs) for activities vs. writing.	Loss of general brain activity, loss of coherence across major structures and cortex.	Widespread general brain coherence across and within hemisphere.

Source: Hale (2000), used with permission of Elsevier.

TWO CASE STUDIES OF MESODORSAL LESIONS

These case studies might traditionally fall under the province of behavioral neurology, but they provide important clues about the integrative functions necessary for consciousness states supported in deep mesodorsal regions, in the midbrain area, rostral of periaqueductal gray, and in the intralaminar thalamic nuclei. Case study 3.2 presents some of the most fascinating and little appreciated clinical data on disorders of consciousness stemming from R-N lesions. Both cases share three distinct features (AKM), one transiently, one apparently more permanently. AKM is an important syndrome for both psychiatry and neurology, informing us about how consciousness is underpinned and driven at a most basic level by emotion. Stripped of motivation or emotion, consciousness appears to virtually empty out. AKM has obvious and important clinical parallels to common psychiatric problems of severely reduced depression, apathy, and schizophrenia, and other apathy states.

Case Study 3.2: Bilateral R-N Lesion—A Progressive Walk-Through of the Taxonomy of Disorders of Consciousness¹

This patient was a male in his middle fifties brought to the hospital after he could not be woken up normally in the morning. He was in a low-grade coma, with double incontinence, punctuated by brief periods of responsiveness. His clinical and laboratory examinations were generally unremarkable with a blood pressure of 120/80, normal electrocardiogram, and normal metabolic studies. On neurological exam he had narrow pupil responsive to light, with the eyes tracking in midposition. Reflexes in painful stimuli were predominantly extensor movements and some painless flexor expression. Initial structural imaging with contrast enhancement revealed symmetrical bilateral paramedian thalamic lesions (see Fig. 3.2). The lesion was said as extending subthalamically somewhat into the ventral tegmental area. The fMRI findings consisted of generalized slowing of background activity, loss of differentiation, and some delta banding, thalamocortically and cortically. There were repeated bursts of generalized slowing, slow-wave and spike-and-wave discharges, at around 6 per second.

By the third day, there was some restoration of wakefulness and gaze, and the patient gradually transitioned out of the vegetative state. He began to pay more attention to his surroundings in terms of eye tracking but was totally akinesic and mute. One week after admission he remained in this condition. In week 2, he began to show more spontaneous movements, but there was still significant akinesia, with stereotypic movements, such as handling his guitar in a manner suggestive of some effort to play, but without evidence of much conscious participation, since his movements continued when the guitar was removed. There were other akinesic activities such as rubbing his abdomen for long periods of time without any evidence of discomfort. During the third week, the aketic state state changed into a more hypokinetic state with

¹Case material and graphics from van Donselaar, et al. (1996) with permission.




Figure 1.2. (left) Lateral and (right) axial maps of Broca's language region. Regions Broca's language region: C1 = anterior commissure; C2 = optic radiations; C3 = anterior thalamus; C4 = insular cortex; C5 = anterior insula; C6 = caudate segment of corpus callosum; C7 = posterior thalamus; C8 = internal capsule; C9 = hippocampal formation; C10 = posterior insula; C11 = amygdala; C12 = basal ganglia. Regions: F1 = cognitive salience network; F2 = executive network; F3 = default mode network; F4 = visual salience network; F5 = cognitive salience; F6 = executive salience; F7 = basic; F8 = cognition; F9 = semantic network; F10 = salient interconnecting regions; F11 = posterior commissure; F12 = core self network; F13 = core self network; F14 = anterior insula; F15 = posterior insula; F16 = lateral occipital cortex.

more signs of emotional expression. At the end of year 6.3, this improvements grew into more active social-emotional settings, often shared, with increased relational content, marking a progression of a decision. During this period of emotional rise, there was a growing ability (consistency) with the resolution of the elative situation (social and multi-dimensional behavior, including walking away from the road).

During the third year he observed the beginning of the ability to meaningful engage in neuropsychological assessment for both verbal global cognitive abilities, including a tested communication speech and executive memory systems. Working memory and higher cognitive aspects of executive functions were still quite poor. By the sixth year, he still showed multi-language pathology, including frequent erroneous pronunciations with various dysarthria, along with continued low language interests, consistent low linguistic attention and executive function. By this point the emotional state had largely resolved, and he continued to show gradual cognitive improvements over a prolonged period of time. At one point our team tested his emotional intelligence, a measure which intelligent factor (Wechsler IQ) score was estimated at 1.10 (adult) and 1.07 (postmenopausal IQ). By 10 months age, his verbal scores had improved to 1.11 with little change in the performance IQ. There was still a selective decrease in poor prose, with continued incapacity for word repetition independent sentence, some

loss of initiative, mild forgetfulness, and slightly disturbed balance. Two years after the event there was only mild-to-moderate gait palsy, a slight nocturnal insomia, and otherwise a virtually complete recovery of overall cognitive faculties, including short-term memory.

Follow-up MRIs done successively over a period of several weeks to months showed gradual restoration of normal background activity, gradual decline of the thalamocortical dysrhythmia, and no further signs of epileptiform activity or hippocampal atrophy. One might hypothesize that disruption of ILN participation in the process of ongoing thalamocortical feedback loops generates disturbance of cell-typical spike-wave and slow-wave discharges, as the ILN's inhibitory control over thalamocortical firing is diminished by the loss of ILN glutamatergic projections. During the earliest portion of this evolving syndrome, the EPAT findings were similar to those found in absence seizures (and this is exactly how patients with PWS present).

Contrary to widespread clinical folklore on this issue, lesions restricted to the ILN virtually never generate a sustained coma. Several of these restricted paramedian thalamic vascular insults consistently show the fascinating syndrome of "walking through the taxonomy of consciousness," beginning with the most severe and progressing to the least severe. The clinical presentation begins with a brief period of initial coma lasting hours to days, followed by a restored period of postictal vegetative state, sometimes a more protracted period of akinetic mutism, and then typically a period of circadian lability, finally yielding various degrees of long-term baseline cognitive deficit. In some instances, the coma involves a nearly full recovery with only residual chronic downward gaze, a finding presumed secondary to the disruption of intrathalamic connections between thalamic nuclei (see earlier) and the frontal eye fields. (See later discussion of intrathalamic nuclei function for more details.) The initial period of akinetic mutism in this particular case may also have had some contribution from the partial disruption of the ventral tegmental area, as massive lesions of this lead to generic severe and legally unwilling AGM. However, other cases without VTA involvement show this progression, so it is unlikely that the VTA lesions played a major role in determining the clinical presentation.

Case Study 3.3: A Full Caudal-Rostral Perisyllectomy Gray (PAG) Lesion: Akinetic Mutism and the Emptying Out-of Consciousness¹

This man in his early thirties was found unresponsive and in a deep stupor. Initial structural imaging with CT showed a large expanding mass lesion of the midbrain. The patient was treated with steroids to reduce swelling and had a marked, rapid regression of the lesion in the midbrain. After the lesion resolved, his stupor improved and he was then found to demonstrate a classic akinetic mutism state: vigilant appearance, relatively intact ocular tracking, some quite limited spontaneous movements of the left arm with stimulation, but following no commands or showing any reliable signs of human social interaction, affect, speech output, higher cognitive

¹Case material from Dr. G. S. Grossman's communication.

functions, or any motivated behavior. An MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) then showed high signal abnormalities in the midbrain, posterior around the aqueduct, and some involvement into the posterior thalamus on the left, probably affecting various midline and intralaminar systems, but no other discernible structural pathology. A SPECT (single-photon emission computed tomography) scan showed diffuse hypometabolism widely affecting association cortices bilaterally, including frontal, parietal, and temporal association cortices, consistent with the impression that higher cognitive and executive functions were all offline. The patient died several months later secondary to pneumonia, but without any clinical change in his neurological or ultimate state mental status. At autopsy, pathology confirmed a lymphoma that had progressed through and subsequently destroyed the posterior tegmental mesencephalic, tracked through the aqueduct to the thalamus, crossing partially into the anterior intralaminar regions on left side, with the preservation of the right intralaminar regions possibly allowing for some apparently purposeless movements of the left upper extremity.

As far as we know, no other case of full mesencephalic PAG involvement (without selective sparing of the other mesodiencephalic areas) has been documented by this much structural imaging, functional imaging, and neuropathological data. This case is fully consistent with animal work in which extensive midbrain lesions of PAG consistently produce a severe akinetic mute state with little progress toward any resolution or generation of voluntary effort or spontaneous motivated behaviors. The PAG receives telencephalic projections restricted to limbic and paralimbic systems such as the cingulate nucleus of amygdala and anterior prefrontal cortex (cingulate and orbital frontal), and there is a close relationship between this structure and the largely DA-mediated reward system (Phenoptis, 1999). PAG has extensive reciprocal projections to these systems and also to the hypothalamus, multiple mesencephalic nuclei, and the thalamus (LS) system, the posterior SCN group in pretectal (ventromedial/pars dorsalis).

Animal work suggests that PAG plays an essential role in making decisions on active motoric process, at least prototypic affiliative behavior (giving, sharing, copulating, affective vocalizations, possibly even attachment behaviors) and appears to be organized by PFC-hypothalamo-thalamic motor system networks. Its role in the complexity of more cognitively human affiliative states is still poorly outlined empirically, but it may be responsible (by virtue of its extensive reticular and intralaminar connections) for widely influencing the thalamocortical system consonant with underlying affective states, thus being in a position to "gate" or modulate state spaces of the thalamocortical system (see Wies, 2000, for summary). This gating function might be an important substrate for basic aspects of prototypic strong emotion, such as how playful behaviors are not available when we are angry.

Observation and discussion of ACM often begs the question "Well, aren't these patients still conscious?" Lesser versions of the syndrome seen in more limited cases of bilateral cingulate disease typically show sufficient recovery that patients are later able to report experiencing events but lacking desire or motivation. In some cases, bilateral cingulate patients will even respond to verbal inquiry, particularly if supplementary motor areas are spared. This leads to a deepening of the suspicion that ACM is not a

"true" disease of consciousness. These milder versions of ACM appear to offer evidence of the independence of consciousness from an emotional bedrock, and that the former can exist without the latter. Our somewhat different conclusion is that lesser versions of ACM (clinically associated with bilateral cingulate damage) may allow some phenomenal content, while the more severe forms associated with very extensive lesions of PAG, or ventral tegmental area (VTA), and more subcortical bilateral basal ganglia presentations may show a virtual "emptying out" of consciousness. In these cases, events may be virtually meaningless and simply don't matter anymore. It may be an essential requirement that stimuli have at least some potential subjective significance in order to gain access to the conscious workspace. In extensive PAG lesions, consciousness thus may be essentially "played out." This suggests that these more severe ACM patients live in a kind of stupor, virtually undifferentiable without close to the border of a persistent vegetative state. With the patient discussed above, and in the five other clearly stated cases with extensive PAG lesions, the clinical condition of akinesia mutism does not appear to resolve. In contrast, the akinesia mutism from an LN lesion (Case study 3.2) is almost always temporary.

Our taxonomy of disorders of consciousness emphasizes their graded, progressive nature and endures as often nothing neurological. While intuitively appealing, an all-or-nothing picture of consciousness provides a limited basis for heuristic-inspired study of the underpinnings of consciousness from a neural systems point of view, as compared to a graded or hierarchical one that emphasizes the core functional envelopes of emotion, intention, and attention. From this vantage point, akinesia mutism is a deeply informative syndrome, as it provides clues to the neural "continuum" for motivated behavior and emotion in the human brain. Additionally, it hints at the possibility that the syndrome of akinesia mutism potentially provides clues to psychiatry about neural substrates of other related, but lesser, apathy states, such as those seen in severe retarded depression, schizophrenia, catatonia, and the like.

NEURODYNAMIC ASPECTS OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Held's visionary notion in 1949 of "interfiring cell assemblies" was an important beginning point for a neurodynamic emphasis. Neurodynamics is thus a relatively new discipline, addressing how brain activation changes over time. The neurodynamic Perspective is complementary to traditional perspectives that emphasize structures, connectivities, and neuromodulators in that it seeks to understand the time-dependent changes that occur in neuronal populations (neural network models, by comparison, do not reference time). The behavior of these time-sensitive populations are typically measured by EEG, single unit recordings (here for in these indirectly imply population influences), or magnetoencephalography (MEG) and also in dynamic neurofunctional measures, such as *in vivo* fMRI. Neurodynamics attempts to correlate these signatures from various measurement modalities with behavioral and subjective measurements, focusing on the challenge of modeling context-dependent and sequential activations of these highly distributed transient neural ensembles on a moment-to-moment basis.

High levels of temporal resolution are necessary to investigate this, as the neurodynamic integration that underpins specific "qualia" or subjective content happens quickly but not instantly (requiring, according to some researchers, approximately 300 msec [Libet, 1982]). Most of the high-temporal-resolution techniques have poor spatial resolution past the surface of the brain, and even fMRI cannot reconstruct neurodynamics in the brainstem.

Without a neurodynamic perspective, consciousness cannot specify how any physical processes could satisfy the important criteria of consciousness that many theorists feel is essential to bridging the hard problem: How is it that any aspect of the behavior of neurons can generate phenomenal experience? Most theorists assume that this bridge must be constructed by finding properties of large-scale neuronal ensembles that are functionally dissociable and temporally correlated with phenomenal experience. Most theorists also agree that neurodynamics must model the integration of top-down and bottom-up processes, and this applies to both early (bottom-up) and late (top-down) sensory cortices, as well as to the larger issue of the relation between thalamus (bottom-up) and cortex (top-down). Neurodynamic models explicating the selective attention, sensory integration, and sense-of-agency in consciousness would be important bridges indeed.

One of the most puzzling and yet crucial properties of consciousness is its seamless integration and functional unity. Many investigators have suggested that populations of neurons are coordinated via the generation of coherent patterns of oscillatory envelopes that structure integrative communication between brain regions. Several investigators postulate that the synchronous firing behavior among these distributed populations could constitute the essential neurodynamic underpinnings for conscious states and their contents. Many if not most neurodynamic theories of consciousness are elaborations of basic neuroscientific concepts that emphasize thalamocortical connectivity, and there is relatively little neurodynamic work looking directly at possible contributions of structures underneath the thalamus. These theories propose that essential features of functional integration are achieved thalamocortically, perhaps largely via the functioning and connectivities of the composite thalamocortical system (Llinás et al.). However, the lesion correlates that we have summarized in previous sections suggest that these mesopontine thalamic systems are highly dependent upon poorly understood processes in deeper cerebellocerebral regions, as the most severe disorders of consciousness are brought about by damage underneath the thalamus (see case study 3.2).

Singer and Gray et al. (1994) have proposed that neuronal synchronization is necessary for object representation, response selection, sensorimotor integration, and attention. They suggest that temporal synchronization of action potentials in a midfrequency range underpins adaptive responses via recruitment of widespread neuronal groups. Thalamocortical (not just corticothalamic) synchronization has also been found to be crucial, underlining the importance of the various reticular structures just reviewed, with synchronization found to group superior colliculus neurons into functionally coherent assemblies. These authors suggest that the thalamus need not come from neuronal activation, and they do not view the oscillatory activity as a passive response to external stimulation.

atmosphere. Instead, they propose that synchronization results at least in part from internally generated goal states, and that external stimulation contributes to the selection of salient goals. Siegel et al., argue that the binding that leads to consciousness is brought about by "phase locking" that occurs at single frequencies. From this point of view, the participating neurons emit their trains of action potentials after entrainment. Because the net effect is summed, this model would be considered a linear one, based on linearly proportional relationships. Non-linear models do not have this proportion as a central feature, as in chaotic systems, where a tiny input can destabilize the system and have profound outcome. Freeman's work (discussed below), highlights the non-linear, chaotic characteristics of neuronal population behavior.

Edelman's (1987) theory of neuronal group selection is not dissimilar. He has argued that representations arise from a Darwinian-like selection of neuronal groups, that these groups continually interact via "reciprocity" (reciprocal feedbacks) and that consciousness emerges from widespread neurodynamic coherence enabled by reciprocity. Using a 148-channel MEG and a binocular rivalry paradigm, Tononi and Edelman (1993) found that neuronal responses to visual stimuli occurred in a great number of cortical regions, both when the subjects consciously perceived the stimuli and when they did not. However, conscious perception resulted in highly significant differences: "Neuroelectric responses evoked by a stimulus were stronger by 20–60 percent when the subjects were conscious of the stimulus than when they were not conscious" (p. 354). This increase of coherence among various brain regions is consistent with the hypothesis that consciousness reflects rapid integration via reciprocity.

Both Siegel's and Edelman's neurodynamic models advocate a selective and time-dependent organization of neuronal assemblies that occurs on the order of milliseconds. Both agree upon a hierarchical model—that is, there is no reference to layers of binding at different ranges of organizational breadth or complexity. Siegel and Edelman state that neuronal groups are selected and constantly reselected according to the evolving goals and needs of the organism. Edelman's model, by contrast, suggests that synchrony occurs via a hierarchical-effect convergence zone located in the association cortices, where the binding of lower-level neuronal groups.

Llinás and Ribary (1991, 1993), and Jolani et al. (1994) have emphasized the importance of gamma band (40-Hz oscillations) and thalamocortical resonance as neural neurodynamic foundations for consciousness. Llinás and Ribary (1993) studied gamma oscillation in rapid eye movement (REM) sleep and in wakefulness and found coherent 40-Hz activity was evident during REM sleep as well as during wakefulness using a 21-channel MEG. This was the first time that coherent gamma activity was found in REM sleep. No gamma activity was found during delta wave sleep, where consciousness is mostly presumed not to exist. There is evidence that positive thalamocortical projections into the thalamus are essential for the cortex to organize these fast 40-Hz oscillatory states and that acetylcholine is present here, outlining one possible mechanism for the induction of confusional states by anticholinergics (Bentler et al., 1991).

Walter Freeman, a pioneer in neurodynamics, has emphasized that nonlinear, chaotic characteristics of neuronal population behavior, suggesting that the essential

neurodynamics of perception and consciousness are nonlinear. Freeman (1975) initially studied population activity via study of the olfactory system, utilizing a hybrid microelectrode EEG. Freeman proposes that the system undergoes global transitions in reaction to meaningful stimuli, settling into a series of spatial-spatial patterns, a type of oscillatory envelope that is generated by chaotic dynamics of the population. Freeman, who along with Destexhe (2000), find neural time gamma activity to describe this extended synchronous activity, argues that this synchronized gamma activity arises from populations of excitatory and inhibitory neurons in negative feedback. Sustained drive the system into a functionally more ordered state, in which neural activity can be modeled in terms of mesoscopic wave packets, bound spatial patterns that have time constants closely matching the temporal dynamics of perception and other contents in consciousness (100 to 300 msec). He cites evidence that synchronization is spontaneous and elusive, spreading across the entire gamma band (40 to 70 Hz), and not reducible to a single frequency (e.g., 40 Hz). Consciousness, according to Freeman, emerges from how such spatially and temporally extended neural patterns across the gamma band underlie widespread integration of brain activity. This kind of brain activity enables not a static set of representations but a highly plastic and evolving system of meanings for the organism.

SUMMARY HIGHLIGHTS/QUESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

1. *Evolutionary Perspectives.* From an evolutionary perspective, consciousness could only have been selected for its adaptive advantages in maintaining life and fending protection. Most agree that the conscious mind evolved from unconscious brain dynamics. Thus, basic evolutionary perspectives on both the adaptive functions and the neural interactions underlying consciousness uses a sole separating assumption for theory building and hypothesis testing. This would include assuming Darwinian mechanisms for how neurons and neuronal groups are selected for the functional network integration (i.e., that subserve consciousness; Edelman, 1987). Thus, salience-selected competition within attention, and competition between potential working memories and other content determine what potentially gain access to consciousness generating neuronal work spaces. Most empirical work and theory have emphasized the crucial roles played by multiple reticular systems, and/or by thalamocortical connectivity (and to a lesser extent, paralimbic-limbic cortical cortices). However, more specific details regarding how these two major component systems (the highly distributed and extended reticular structures, reviewed in detail in this chapter, and the thalamocortical matrix intact are still poorly mapped. How the brain acquires affectively and causally through a succession of these systems (and fraction-of-a-second) functional integrations of widespread regions these cognitive moment to cognitive moment also remain poorly understood (see Item 2).
2. *Neurodynamics Perspectives and Functional Integration.* The clinical data suggest that consciousness must be conceptualized as a graded, recursive, and

hierarchically organized phenomena, with various core aspects interacting with extended cognitive aspects. Core aspects include wakefulness, attentional functions, sensory systems, salience, affective motivation, and agency. These core components permit cognitive extensions in extended working memories, language, and a host of higher cognitively critical functions that allow us an extraordinary richness and fast differentiation of remedial content. Although we have studied consciousness, in terms of these examples, functional neurotypes (attentional function, interests or directed activity, creation, basic sensory systems), there are clearly brain-dependent and brainlessly integrated aspects of consciousness, slices of the consciousness pie. Each of these functional domains represents a formidable neuroscientific problem in itself, and each requires widely distributed neural networks that are hard to study empirically. Global neurodynamic perspectives are essential to this task of mapping this functional integration, and neuroanatomy alone is certainly insufficient. An important focal point for future research and theory would be to explain neurodynamically how lower levels of multiple reticular activating system components can generate delusion or delusional mania, while more massive lesions of these very same systems yield coma or persistent vegetative state.

3. *Anatomical Perspectives and the Midline/ventral/dorsal Distinction.* This is a perspective fully supplementary to the neurodynamic. Neurodynamic perspectives informed by the functional neuroanatomy of consciousness reinforce the finding that a typical hippocampal slice that does not adequately integrate the lesion correlate class summarized here. Indeed, understanding the organization of global neurodynamics will require arranging how the contributions of many distributed neuronal populations are hardly equal in consciousness (or that contributions from some populations are clearly more equal than others). Global neurodynamic formulations have to incorporate evidence that virtually all the structures that appear essential to conscious states (with the exception of hippocampal systems in cortex) are midline systems. This finding is consistent with classical principles of functional neuroanatomy in which dorsal and ventral systems are earlier developing and more tied to homeostatic and emotional regulation, while midline systems situated more dorsolaterally are later developing and more tied to cognitive functions. Consistent with this midline-ventral hierarchy for consciousness, even extensive lesions of the hippocampal systems in prefrontal and parietal lobes can only generate one of the lower disorders of consciousness (HICL, or delusion, and never coma, PVS or AGM). Although we have emphasized that there are many disparate systems in these ventral mesodiencephalic regions, jointly they appear to provide the most crucial foundation for the functional integration of the brain in conscious states.
4. *General developmental Perspectives.* The above considerations suggest that we will make considerably more progress if we can understand how consciousness unfolds from its earliest beginnings in a presumably primary affective form, in humans and in other mammals, and then develops into more complex,

cognitive-emotional forms with the help of symbolic language acquisition. Non-rodent-based research into the fundamental mechanisms of consciousness in infants is understandable, modelled by obvious epistemological/practical reasons, as much of the current neuroscientific work focuses on neural correlates of higher conscious and cognitive activity in adult brains. This suggests that basic research will have to refocus attention on basic neural processes taking place in the first year of life, as early cognitive processes must be brought on-line to operate in an integrated fashion very early in neurodevelopment. Such research into early development will also likely pay dividends clinically in terms of an increased ability to understand and treat disorders of consciousness, such as coma and persistent vegetative states, but also lesser forms of altered awareness, autism, and schizophrenia. We suspect that the substrates for the adult-like cognitive-affective responses of the infant to its interactions with a caretaker potentially confirm the more fundamental constituent neural processes for a primitive or core consciousness. These considerations suggest that consciousness first develops within the context of a primary attachment to mother/caring figures, and in the context of affectively guided orienting toward and interacting with a primary caregiver.

To more fully understand the nature of conscious processes would pay enormous dividends to all areas of psychiatry, illuminating many of the still well-hidden secrets within the mind-brain realms from where emotional distress arises. Such an understanding of functional neural integration in the brain would also no doubt open many new mysteries and questions. A special focus on early neurodevelopmental processes will also have readily important implications for psychiatry (Schore, 2000), as the affective climate of early life must have a profound effect on the developing brain, substantially increasing or reducing an organism's vulnerability in later life to many psychiatric conditions. There is already abundant evidence from preclinical studies that positive social interactions have robust and life-long benefits for the neuroemotional resilience of young animals (Monroy, 2001). Such an understanding of early neurodevelopmental processes will eventually help clarify positive and negative risk factors for most if not virtually all Axis I and Axis II disorders. It may also herald many new ways to increase positively in-development programs that will help prevent future psychiatric problems while also giving us lasting insights into the nature of the emotional aspects of human consciousness. However, these fundamental neurodevelopmental questions are uncharted territories where an enormous amount of research remains to be done, and such neurodevelopmental-affective perspectives on investigating consciousness are certainly not the dominant focus in current consciousness studies.

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STRESS, SLEEP, AND SEXUALITY IN PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS

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INTRODUCTION

Over the course of the past century, exposure to stressful life events has emerged as one of the most ubiquitous determinants of ultimate health outcomes for the individual. Stress is pervasive in human life, and it plays a prominent role in mediating both the onset and severity of many major psychiatric syndromes. Indeed, one of the primary issues that has driven stress research is the question of how a general construct such as "stress" can produce such a wide array of psychiatric and physiognomical ailments. This puzzle is further complicated by the observation that comparable life stresses produce widely discrepant effects across different individuals. It is clearly of interest for clinicians and researchers alike to develop a fundamental understanding of stress as a mitigating factor in disease susceptibility and progression. This chapter will provide an overview of the major stress responsive systems against a historical backdrop.

outline several important new areas of inquiry in the field of stress research, and demonstrate how these stress responsive systems can both precipitate and exacerbate major psychiatric illnesses.

In addition to a coverage of stress, brief discussions of work on sleep and sexuality are included at the end. These may seem like odd bedfellows. Partly, this juxtaposition is a matter of expediency since these important topics could not be given separate chapters with the space constraints of this book. However, there are also good reasons to consider these foundational issues together. Individuals who have been exposed to stressors exhibit difficulty sleeping and are less likely to indulge in pleasurable activities such as sex, presumably because more pressing emotional and motivational demands are monopolizing environmental resources. However, even as we highlight such interrelations, we will treat these topics in series.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING STRESS-RESPONSIVE SYSTEMS

On some level, we all have an intuitive understanding of stress as a psychological concept. Most people would define stress as a sense of internal pressure, nervous tension, anxiety, strain, or even a state of constant worry. While these terms are perfectly accurate and sufficient for communicating about stress in a colloquial setting, they are insufficient when we try to operationalize stress in a scientific manner. Indeed, scientists have argued for the better part of the last century about what would be an appropriate scientific definition for the term stress. In 1946, Hans Selye published a seminal paper describing a non-specific biological response to physical stressors (Selye, 1946). His approach was based on the observation that the bodily consequences of physical trauma were independent of the nature of the precipitating insult. His ultimate synthesis was encapsulated as the general adaptation syndrome (GAS), which remains one of the guiding theories for stress research today. According to Selye, the GAS consisted of three successive stages of adaptation to insult: (1) the alarm reaction, (2) the stage of resistance, and (3) the stage of exhaustion. During the alarm reaction, or acute, phase of the GAS, the organism's general resistance to the stressor falls below normal. Thus, as adaptation is acquired in the stage of resistance, the capacity to resist rises above normal. Small, repeated, or modest but continuous exposure to the precipitating stressor will be adequately handled by the organism during the stage of resistance. Eventually, continuous exposure to the stressor will lead to a state of exhaustion, in which organisms' defenses against further challenges systematically break. This usually occurs when the stress or insult begins to overwhelm the capacity of the physiological systems to effectively respond. The exhaustion phase is where pathological processes begin to emerge.

While these stages have proven applicable to psychological stressors, it is important to note that Selye was trained as a physician. Thus, the focus of his original theory rested primarily within the bounds of physiological insult, such as pharmacological challenges, exposure to a cold environment, infections, and surgery. Nevertheless, the original

framework provided by Selye continues to be a guiding light for stress researchers to this day and provides an effective springboard toward a more modern synthesis of stress as a psychological concept.

With this in mind, there are several key considerations regarding stress that must be conveyed from the outset. The first consideration is that of *stimulus versus state*. Irrespective of how we define stress, it is imperative that we distinguish between the stimulus that induces stress (referred to as the *proximate*) and the ultimate stress that is produced in the individual by that stimulus (referred to as *stress*). Consider a deer running down to a stream for a drink of water, with a mountain lion poised ready to attack. Upon detection of the predator, the deer experiences an immediate onset of physiological, affective, and cognitive alterations that may be globally characterized as a heightened state of arousal. In this scenario, exposure to a predator is the precipitating stimulus, or stressor, that clearly elicits an internal state of stress in the host organism. This nomenclature, originally developed by Selye (1946, 1956), remains relevant for a proper discussion of the relationship between stress and major psychiatric illness.

In the above example, the presence of a predator is clearly identifiable as the environmental event that elicited the deer's stress reaction. Predator-prey interactions fit conveniently into the common parlance of stress homeostasis. However, if the deer had consumed a pathogen such as a virus or bacteria in the water rather than a mountain lion, a very similar complement of physiological, affective, and even cognitive alterations would likely ensue, although on a slightly delayed time course. Thus, the second consideration that we must take into account is that physiologically undifferentiated physiological challenges representing threats to survival can elicit a stress reaction comparable to events threats from the environment.

Perhaps the most important distinction between environmental and physiological stressors is that physiological stressors do not necessarily require cognitive appraisal, emotional evaluation, or conscious awareness to exert their effects. For instance, exposure to infectious agents (bacteria, viruses, toxins, etc.), hypoxia, hypoglycemia, and hypothermia are all examples of physiological stressors that elicit a stress reaction. Clearly, once the consciousness of the physiological challenge passes some identifiable threshold, the individual would normally develop a subjective experience of stress, which may then further activate stress responsive systems. Nevertheless, psychic stressors are qualitatively different than environmental ones and may activate stress responses via distinct pathways (Herman et al., 1995; Herman and Calhoun, 1997).

The final consideration is one of perception. It is common to view stress as a maladaptive, debilitating state that is best avoided. However, when we delve into the basis of stress physiology, it becomes clear that physiological responses to stress represent positive evolutionary adaptation. Most components of an organism's response to stress have evolved in such a manner as to promote an adaptive outcome (i.e., survival) under the given circumstances. However, this may not be the case when an organism is exposed to chronic stressors above and beyond those circumstances in unusual environments of evolutionary adaptation, repeated and sustained exposure to stressors eventually exhaust resources that are normally available for contending with

more modest challenges, which in turn produce various adverse health outcomes (see McEwen (2000) for a superb review).

One conclusion that can be drawn from the discussions thus far is that regardless of the type of stressor an organism encounters (i.e., environmental, psychological, or physiological), there are several underlying characteristics that help to define a stressor event as a stressor: (i) it represents an immediate (real or perceived) threat to the individual, (ii) requires mobilization and coordination of multiple physiological systems (usually accompanied by increased metabolic demands), and (iii) necessitates behavioral adjustments that typically represent deviations from the normative species. Importantly, the successful implementation of those changes would normally promote survival, validating the adaptive nature of the organism's response to the stressor.

DIATHESIS-STRESS MODELS

Exposure to stressful life events has been recognized as an important precursor of major psychiatric illness for many years (i.e., the classic diathesis-stress model). This belief stems from observations that episodes of psychiatric illness are more frequently observed shortly after major life stressors and that clinical symptoms of many psychiatric illnesses worsen during times of stress (Maruff and D'Onise, 1995). Indeed, the role of life stressors as determinants for the onset and severity of many major psychiatric conditions has been common parlance in psychiatric settings for decades. Stress has been reported to promote symptomatology in diverse psychiatric conditions ranging from posttraumatic disorders, to affective disorders, to dissociative disorders, and to somatic disorders. With such a wide range of conditions affected by exposure to stressors, it is clearly of interest to understand the organization and function of stress responsive systems in the brain that might serve as common themes for promoting mental health. While this is indeed, it is not enough to simply note that stress exacerbates major psychiatric symptomology. Marked differences are observed across individuals in how the consequences of stress become manifest. Many individuals who experience adverse life events do not develop major psychiatric illness, and not everyone who develops a major psychiatric illness appears to have a precipitating life event. These findings have spurred research toward understanding (a) how exposure to qualitatively distinct stressors might differentially affect health outcomes, and (b) how individual subject's vulnerability may predispose or protect against the development of major psychiatric and psychological illness.

For instance, exposure to stressors for some individuals produces gastrointestinal (GI) dysfunction (diarrhea, constipation, etc.), while others may manifest immunological disturbances (frequent infection due to stress-induced immunosuppression, increased susceptibility or worsening of autoimmune diseases, etc.). Such disparities in physiologically outcomes of stressor exposure has led many researchers to postulate that individuals vary in the organ or brain systems that are constitutionally weaker and thus more susceptible to adverse health outcomes during times of stress. In this regard, one could attempt to explain the occurrence of chronic constipation in relation to stressor exposure by

mapping Selye's general adaptation syndrome with modern evolutionary principles. The interpretation would be that the GI that was the least competent physiological system within that individual (or group of individuals), and thus reached the stage of exhaustion more rapidly than other systems. As a result, adverse symptoms (as in the case of colitis) repeatedly occur during times of stress (indeed Charles Darwin's own chronic health problems following his return to England may have had such an etiology).

Multiple models have been proposed to explain how similar life events can produce such highly variable health outcomes across different individuals. All of these models propose that adverse life events act as a triggering mechanism that initiates some underlying predisposition toward the development of a specific disorder. The inherent differences in disease susceptibility are frequently cast in the light of genetic differences/predispositions. However, the availability of effective coping strategies and social support are also critical moderating variables that can be used as predictors for health outcome following stressor exposure. Thus, the ultimate health outcome depends on a complex interaction between precipitating life stressors, individual differences in effect for coping strategies, and underlying biological predispositions. See Dealewoud and Dolzenko (1991) for a thorough discussion of various permutations of diathesis-stress models that are applicable to biological psychiatry.

Given our understanding of diathesis-stress models and advances in molecular cloning and gene sequencing, a new generation of researchers are tracking down genetic markers that may point toward specific disease susceptibility. Likewise, clinicians have made similar progress in identifying specific coping strategies that, when absent in an individual, might promote the occurrence of major psychiatric illness following adverse life events. One recent breakthrough was the finding that disease-prone individuals often exhibit a higher propensity to seek out stressful life situations, thus further increasing the likelihood that psychiatric illness might develop (Masten, 1998). Furthermore, clinical observations suggest that stress may be critical for initiating the first episode of psychiatric illness (e.g., depressions) and much less important for subsequent episodes (e.g., Park, 1994), suggesting noninitiation-healing processes can occur in the system, although this issue is still far from resolved.

STRESS RESPONSIVE SYSTEMS

The theoretical construct provided by diathesis-stress models is a cornerstone of psychiatric thinking and a driving force behind diverse areas of neurobiological and clinical research. Thus, it is likely that valuable insight into the etiology of psychiatric illness can be obtained through the identification and examination of biological responses to stress. For the sake of simplification, we have broken biological stress response into four independent categories. The reader should note, however, that overall visceral, cognitive and behavioral responses to stress are most likely a result of synchronous activity among these systems. That is, none of these systems are singularly responsible for an individual's subjective experience of stress or the overall health consequences that might ensue. Nonetheless, the following categorical description of the four proposed systems is provided as a heuristic overview of both classical stress responsive

systems (sympathetic nervous system and the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis) as well as more recently discovered systems implicated in stress [parasympathetic noradrenergic-clearing hormone (PNC) systems and brain cytokines].

Sympathetic Nervous System

Perhaps one of the most widely documented of the stress responsive systems is the sympathetic nervous system. The impact of stress-induced catecholamine secretion for the maintenance of homeostatic processes was initially recognized by Walter Cannon in his seminal work during the first third of the 20th century (Cannon, 1932). In his original review, Cannon described the role of catecholamine secretion from the adrenal medulla as an essential element for (1) the mobilization of glucose to fuel heightened cellular activity during times of stress, and (2) effective physiological coping in the face of life-span challenges or homeostasis. Even at this early juncture, Cannon recognized that in the absence of a properly functioning sympathetic response to stress, the ability of the organism to survive the impending challenge was immediately impaired.

Activation of the sympathetic nervous system produces an immediate and sustained increase in catecholamine secretion (i.e., epinephrine and norepinephrine; EPNE). Sympathetic nerve terminals secrete EPNE directly onto target tissues, which elicits an immediate postsynaptic response that occurs and subsides within a very short time frame (i.e., within a few seconds). For instance, secretion of EPNE from sympathetic nerve terminals directly onto cardiac muscle potently increases heart rate and strengthens the force of contraction. Meanwhile, EPNE released within the eye dilates the pupil to boost visual acuity and responsiveness. These are just two common examples of how direct sympathetic innervation can promote coordinated activity within different effector organs, and thus promote survival in a threatening context.

In addition to direct sympathetic input to target organs, the adrenal medulla also secretes EPNE into the general circulation during times of stress. Thus, EPNE released from the adrenal medulla has the ability to affect numerous target organs and cells distant to the site of origin, with a duration of action that persists 2 to 10 times as long as direct EPNE release from sympathetic nerve terminals (since the clearance rate in blood is much slower than that at synaptic clefts). Secretion of EPNE in this endocrine fashion augments the effects produced by EPNE released from sympathetic nerve terminals and nerves, as occurs by which the function of target cells that are not under direct sympathetic influence (such as immune cells) can also be modulated during times of stress. Irrespective of the source of catecholamine secretion, the importance of this response is clearly underlined by the evolutionary inherent in the system.

Catecholamines within the central nervous system also play a prominent role in modulating an organism's response to stress. For instance, the locus coeruleus is a major catecholamine center in the brainstem that is responsible for coordinating stress responses via interactions with higher brain structures such as the hypothalamus, the amygdala, and the cortex (Swanson, 1987). Specifically, environmental stimuli that require perceptual organization, cognitive appraisal, or affective evaluation in order

to be deemed "stressful" eventually activate peripheral sympathetic via descending autonomic output through the locus coeruleus. In this role, the locus coeruleus also serves as a final site of integration for the propagation of certain peripheral autonomic responses to stress.

On the other end of the spectrum would be physiognomical threats to homeostasis such as hypoxia, hyperglycemia, or hemorrhagic shock that are detected in brainstem structures such as the pons, medulla, and reticular formation. In cases such as these where threat is not necessarily detected by the cognitive or perceptual apparatus of the organism, but rather by alarm systems that continuously monitor peripheral physiological status, the locus coeruleus sends ascending catecholameric input to higher brain centers. Such information is then processed by higher cognitive structures in order to "generate" behavioral strategies that will attenuate the threat to homeostasis. Thus, brainstem autonomic nuclei such as the locus coeruleus are critical sites of integration for threatening stimuli irrespective of whether the threat originates from higher brain centers or peripheral challenges to homeostasis [see Hare and Oordend (2001) for an excellent review].

Monocamine Systems

Since its neurons respond equivalently to all aversive-predicting and alarming external stimuli, the locus coeruleus is a primary generator of central nervous system (CNS) sympathetic nervous system responses to stress. However, this type of arousal occurs irrespective of whether the perceiving stressful stimulus is of peripheral origin such as with threatening physiological situations that require immediate activation or initiated centrally (as in the case of some perceptual or cognitive event). As a result, disturbances in locus coeruleus function have been implicated in a variety of psychiatric illnesses such as major depression. Specifically, it has been hypothesized that exposure to stressors can produce adaptations in locus coeruleus function that ultimately lead to depressive-like symptoms (Hare and Oordend, 2001). Along these same lines, adaptations in locus coeruleus function in response to stress would be expected to alter the individual's response to subsequent stresses (either types or hyperarousal), depending on the nature of the stressor. Indeed, there is strong evidence to suggest that stress-induced alterations in locus coeruleus function and corresponding sympathetic output may play an etiological role in psychiatric illness, especially in the case of depression. Such a connection has long been suggested by the utility of monoamine-modulating drugs to treat individuals suffering from this disorder. Clearly, the interaction of qualitatively different stressors and their corresponding effects on the ability of the locus coeruleus to integrate and modulate sympathetic nervous system responses to subsequent challenge is a critical area of research in both basic and applied arenas today.

Indeed, one competing animal model of depression relies on the interaction among multiple different stressors administered over 5 to 7 days to produce depressive-like symptoms. These models come in a variety of forms and are typically referred to as "chronic mild stress" paradigms (Willner, 1997). The real advantage of these models

is that by employing different measures on each day (foot shock on day 1 followed by social conflict on day 2, etc.), researchers can more appropriately model the cumulative nature of stress in human populations. Furthermore, using the same consequence of exposure to multiple measures helps eliminate experimental confounds that might be a result of the contrasted nature of stress rodent stressor paradigms. (After all, what does a person with a foot shock in the real world feel in humans?) Nevertheless, evidence from chronic stress paradigms clearly demonstrate a role for sympathetic nervous system output and its governance by the locus coeruleus in psychiatric illness.

Noradrenergic Responses to Stress

The hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis is one of the most widely studied of the stress responsive systems. This cascade begins with the release of CRH from the parvocellular neurons of the paraventricular nucleus of the hypothalamus into the anterior lobe of the pituitary gland, where it acts as a neurohypophyseal adenohypothalamic factor adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH). ACTH is then released into the systemic circulation and carried through the blood to the adrenal cortex, where it stimulates cells in the zona fasciculata to produce and release glucocorticoids. The glucocorticoid released in response to stress in the rat is corticosterone (CORT), while the human adrenal cortex secretes cortisol. Since corticosterone and cortisol vary only slightly in their chemical structure, both are classified as glucocorticoid hormones and bind to the same receptors in the body with comparable affinity. It is perhaps important to note that other species such as bats secrete corticosterone and cortisol during times of stress. As a result, it is necessary to measure cortisol and corticosterone in species that produce both of these glucocorticoid hormones during times of stress.

Although glucocorticoid secretion is the ultimate hormonal endpoint of the HPA axis, this is just the beginning of the most important physiological effects of HPA activation. Being highly lipophilic, glucocorticoids travel through the blood and passively diffuse across plasma membranes where they bind to cytosolic receptors (Drsman et al., 1992). When activated, the glucocorticoid receptor complex translocates to the nucleus of the cell and has the ability to alter gene transcription. This in turn leads to glucose mobilization for the organism, alterations in immune function, and changes in CNS functioning (see Blaustein et al., 1994 for a classic review of glucocorticoid function). Furthermore, glucocorticoids can bind to receptors in the hippocampus, hypothalamus, and the anterior pituitary and subsequently decrease the release of CRH and ACTH. This serves as a negative feedback mechanism that limits the amount of glucocorticoid secreted in response to subsequent stressors (e.g., Spencer et al., 1990).

As mentioned previously, the effects of CORT are mediated by two high-affinity intracellular receptors. These two receptors are referred to as mineralocorticoid receptors (MR) or type I receptors and glucocorticoid receptors (GR) or type II receptors. The affinity of MR ($K_d = 0.5$ to 1 nM) for CORT is greater than that of GR ($K_d = 5$ to 10 nM), which leads to greater occupancy of MR under basal CORT conditions (Spencer et al., 1990). Both of these receptors are located in the cytoplasm

until they become occupied by CORT. Receptor occupation leads to rapid receptor translocation to the nucleus where the receptor acts as a hormone-activated transcrip-tional factor (Dunn et al., 1992). Thus, the number of cytoplasmic CORT receptors reflects the number of unoccupied CORT receptors, while the number of nuclear CORT receptors reflects the number of occupied/activated CORT receptors. Indeed, the relative proportion of occupied receptors in the set given different circulating levels of CORT has been well characterized (Spencer et al., 1990).

The magnitude and temporal dynamics of the CORT response varies markedly with the type and duration of the stressor. However, the first onset of increases in plasma CORT levels in response to stress is slightly delayed relative to indices of sympathetic nervous system activity (as discussed in the previous section). For instance, observable increases in CORT can usually be detected within 2 to 3 min from the onset of the stressor, while a maximal CORT response is generally only observed if the stressor persists for at least 20 to 30 min. Finally, the stress-induced rise in CORT typically dissipates completely within 60 to 90 min following termination of the stressor (Jacobson et al., 1989). Thus, the unique temporal dynamics of the pituitary-adrenal response to stress must be taken into serious consideration when designing experiments to examine the potential role of glucocorticoids in mediating the ultimate health consequences of stressor exposure.

Implications for Biological Psychiatry. There are several facets of HPA activation that are particularly relevant to biological psychiatry. First and foremost, prolonged exposure to high circulating levels of CORT (such as with chronic stress) produce deleterious effects on normal CNS function. Since the hippocampus is extraordinarily rich in both CR and CR expression, it is not surprising that the hippocampal system has been the subject of intense scrutiny with regard to glucocorticoid actions. Specifically, sustained high levels of CORT have been shown to produce dendritic atrophy (Saklatvala et al., 1991), induced neurogenesis (Kaneko and McEwen, 1999), and increased gene neurototoxicity (Kozen and McEwen, 1997) within the hippocampus. Such empirical findings have led to the belief that chronic stress throughout the life span—and the prolonged glucocorticoid exposure that ensues—may contribute to the development of multiple psychiatric conditions such as major depression, Cognitive syndrome, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and age-related dementia (see Chapter 11 and Sapolsky (2000) for a recent review).

Extrahypothalamic CRH Systems

To reiterate a point made earlier, it is not simply exposure to aversive events that ultimately propagate stress in an individual, but also the anticipation of aversive events. The anticipation of aversive events may include learned associations that are formed across the life span as well as species-specific innate responses to biologically hard-wired threats. For instance, learned associations between fearful stimuli and the context where those stimuli are encountered are mainly formed. Certain other fears appear to be unlearned such as the fear of open spaces in rodent species. Regardless

of whether these fears are learned or innate, exposure to stimuli that elicit such fear will ultimately lead to activation of stress responsive systems. Common experimental paradigms used to examine the neural substrates of learned and innate fears (i.e., the anticipation of aversive events) include conditioned and unconditioned fear conditioning in the rat, and exposure to predator cues such as fox faces and snake odors. The interesting point to be made here is that the anticipation of aversive events leads to mobilization of stress responsive systems. However, when sustained anticipation occurs over a prolonged period of time, the measures necessary for effective coping with such stressors eventually become depleted, and deleterious health consequences are likely to ensue. Indeed, the ultimate cost to the individual of prolonged negative anticipation has been conceptualized as "allostatic load" (McEwen, 2000; Schulkin et al., 1994). Thus, it is advantageous to link learned animal models of fear and anxiety to an understanding of the neuroanatomical and neurochemical basis of learned fears (see Chapter 10), which should in turn help elucidate how chronic anticipation of aversive events may predispose individuals toward psychiatric illness. Indeed, one of the most provocative advances in stress research over the past decade has been the demonstration that CRH in brain regions other than the paraventricular nucleus of hypothalamus that innervate pituitary ACTH secretion (referred to as extrahypothalamic CRH systems) may play a critical role in stress-related disorders. Thus, we will now turn our discussion toward specific evidence supporting the important role for extrahypothalamic CRH.

Corticotropin-releasing hormone is a 41-amino-acid peptide initially identified as a hypothalamic factor responsible for stimulating ACTH from the anterior pituitary (Vale et al., 1981). As discussed in the previous section, stressors induce the synthesis and release of CRH from cells of the paraventricular nucleus into the portal blood, initiating the HPA response to stressors. CRH is also involved in mediation of the neural autonomic and behavioral consequences of exposure to stressors. For instance, the intraventricular (i.v.) administration of CRH produces autonomic activation and many of the same behavioral (Koob and Britton, 1990), neurochemical (Davis and Berndt, 1990), and electrophysiological (Valentino et al., 1983) alterations that are produced by stressors. Furthermore, the i.v. administration of CRH antagonists such as selective CRH₁ and CRH₂ receptor antagonists or block these stress-induced alterations in behavior and autonomic activity (e.g., Karki et al., 1990). Many of these effects can be obtained by infusing CRH or its antagonists into nonhypothalamic sites such as the locus coeruleus and amygdala (Buller et al., 1990), and persist in hypophysectomized and dexamethasone-treated subjects (Britton et al., 1990).

These facts together with the wide extrahypothalamic distribution of high-affinity CRH receptors and CRH-like immunoreactivity support that CRH functions as a neuromodulator as well as a hormone, and that it mediates stress-related behavioral responses by action at extrahypothalamic sites (Davis and Berndt, 1990; Koob, 1990). Given the widespread involvement of extrahypothalamic CRH in mediating the consequences of stressor exposure, these systems have been proposed as key mediators of anticipatory stress. Thus, a review of the relationship between extrahypothalamic CRH systems and learned fear as a model of anticipatory stress will provide further evidence to this end.

Brain CRH systems have been shown to be important in mediating the fear responses observed in fear conditioning experiments. Rats and other organisms freeze when placed in an environment in which they have previously received an aversive stimulus such as foot shock, and freezing has been shown to be a measure of fear conditioned to the environment by the aversive stimulus (Panhuizen and Lederer, 1988). The term fear-conditioning refers to the fact that both classical and conditioned cues that are present during exposure to a stimulus such as foot shock can elicit behavioral and physiological responses such as freezing, inhibited appetitive behavior, generalized startle, increased aromatic and HPA activity, and the like (Davis, 1992). It is to be noted that freezing is not simply an absence of movement, but rather an active defensive response consisting of no movement beyond that required for respiration including the absence of vibrissae movement, typically accompanied by a hunched posture and muscular rigidity. Importantly, the α -helical CRH induces the freezing that occurred when rats were exposed to the environment in which they had received foot shock, and it also reduces the potentiation of startle produced by a light that had previously been paired with shock (Panhuizen et al., 1989). These data suggest that endogenous/circulating CRH is important for the normal expression of fear-related behavior.

The amygdala plays a key integrative role in both the induction of fear conditioning and the expression of fear-related behavior. Lesions in basolateral regions of the amygdala (Campos and Davis, 1995) or microinjection of N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) antagonists (Friedman and Kim, 1994) in this region prevent the induction of fear conditioning. In contrast, injections of NMDA agonists into the central nucleus of the amygdala do not retard fear conditioning (Panhuizen and Kim, 1995), even though electrolytic lesions of that structure are effective (Campos and Davis, 1995). NMDA agonists, injected either into the amygdala (Wiseenius et al., 1990) or iv (Kim et al., 1992) have no effect on the expression of fear that has been previously conditioned. This pattern of data has led in the view that the associations between the sensory cues that precede the stimulus and the stimulus itself are formed in basolateral regions of the amygdala and critically involve NMDA receptors. The information that flows to the central nucleus of the amygdala, which functions in the behavioral expression of fear via a final common path that integrates the bodily manifestations of fear (Davis, 1992), and it is likely that unconditioned physiological (allostatic) fear responses are also so induced (Chapter 16). In sum, NMDA receptors that mediate learning of fear do not appear to be essential in the central nucleus expression mechanism.

The amygdala contains CRH immunoreactive cells and fibers (Panhuizen et al., 1983), and both the type 1 and type 2 CRH receptor are widely distributed in both the basolateral region and central nucleus (Chabrus et al., 1995). Exposure to a stressor has been reported to increase CRH messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) in the amygdala (Kalin et al., 1994), and microinjection of α -helical CRH into the central nucleus decreases the expression of conditioned fear (Friedman et al., 1993) as well as other stressor-induced behavioral changes (Heimstra et al., 1993). Thus previous research has implicated NMDA-related processes in the basolateral amygdala in the induction but not expression of fear conditioning, and CRH in the central nucleus in the expression of fear. The potential role of CRH in the induction of fear conditioning

has only recently been explored, and the results suggest that CRH is important in both induction and expression of conditioned fear (Devak et al., 1999). Clearly, it would be of interest to determine whether the critical site of CRH action in the induction of fear is the basolateral amygdala.

Implications for Biological Psychiatry. The evidence described above clearly points to CRH function within discrete regions of the amygdala in the unconditioned generation and learned maintenance of fear-related behavior. At the human level, extrahypothalamic CRH has been implicated in a number of human disorders such as major depression (Gold et al., 1996; Nefford, 1996), PTSD (Keller et al., 1994), and bulimia (Keller and Klimstra, 1998). As a result, the development of novel therapeutic agents that target specific CRH receptor subtypes has become a major thrust in recent years. However, one major problem associated with the use of anti-CRH drugs to treat human clinical populations has been that most of these agents do not pass through the blood-brain barrier efficiently and thus cannot bind to CRH receptors in the necessary neural substrates to effect therapeutic change. As a result, there has been a push in the past decade toward the development of acceptably CRH antagonists that cross the blood-brain barrier and can be used in treating human clinical populations. Several of these drugs are currently in clinical trials and have enjoyed moderate success in treating human clinical populations (Zohdi et al., 2000).

INTEGRATIVE ROLE FOR BRAIN CYTOKINES

During an acute bout of stress, signs of behavioral activation are frequently displayed that presumably allow the organism to identify and escape the impending threat. However, after the acute threat has passed, it is common to observe delayed and sustained alterations in normal behavior and creativity. As a result, there has been the suggestion that behavioral alterations that occur during chronic exposure may be mediated by wholly separate neurobiological entities than the delayed and sustained behavioral alterations (Hermany et al., 2001). Many of the immediate behavioral consequences of stress exposure are mediated by the interaction of the sympathetic nervous system (including catecholaminergic cell groups in the brainstem) and extrahypothalamic CRH systems. In contrast, recent data suggest that long-term changes in behavior that are produced by stress exposure (decreased food and water intake, decreased social and sexual interaction, reduced exploration of novel environments, etc.) may be mediated by factors that are more traditionally associated with the immune system (Miller and Watkins, 1999).

These immune factors are referred to as proinflammatory cytokines and are more commonly acknowledged for their role in coordinating the immune response during times of infection. Activation of the immune system also leads to a characteristic set of behavioral responses that are typically referred to as sickness behavior (van, 1998). For example, immune activation can reduce food and water consumption, decrease sexual behavior, increase slow wave sleep, decrease locomotor activity, reduce aggressive behavior, and decrease social interaction (see Kim et al., 1992). Interestingly, many

of these same behavioral changes are also observed following stressor exposure (Short and Maier, 1993; Milligan et al., 1998). These similarities have led some investigators to postulate that the neural circuitry underlying the behavioral effects of stressor exposure and immune challenge may also be similar.

Many of these behavioral changes observed following immune stimulation are mediated by central production of the proinflammatory cytokine interleukin-1 (IL-1). Central administration of IL-1 produces fever, hypotension (Winkler et al., 1994), induces short-wave sleep (Dopp and Krueger, 1991), reduces food and water intake (Kaval et al., 1998), alters peripheral immune function (Hollister et al., 1997), increases plasma ACTH and glucocorticoids (Dunn, 1995), reduces social interaction (Kaval et al., 1992), and decreases some measures of anxiety (Monteleone et al., 1997). Many of the behavioral changes produced by i.v. administration of IL-1 can be blocked or attenuated by prior i.v. administration of IL-1 receptor antagonists (IL-1ra) (Dopp and Krueger, 1991; Kaval et al., 1998). Thus, central production of IL-1 appears to be a critical component of the defense against peripheral infection and subsequent recovery.

In addition to its role in mediating sickness behaviors, central production of IL-1 has also emerged as an important mediator of behavioral and neuroendocrine responses to stress. Shimizu et al. (1995) have shown that central injection of IL-1 produced a robust activation of the HPA axis and increased hypothalamic melanocyte-stimulating hormone. These changes are typically considered the hallmarks of stressor exposure. Importantly, IL-1ra has been shown to block the HPA and neuroendocrine response to immobilization stress (Shimizu et al., 1995). Central IL-1 has also been implicated in mediating the behavioral consequences of inescapable tail shock since the enhancement of fear conditioning and interference with escape learning produced by this shock experience can also be blocked by i.v. administration of IL-1ra (Schafe and Winkler, 1993). Likewise, nMSH administered i.v. blocked all of the acute phenotypic changes that have been observed following inescapable tail shock exposure (Milligan et al., 1998). When coupled with the observation that exposure to psychological stressors can increase IL-1 production in specific brain regions (Pigeyen et al., 2000), it can be concluded that stress-induced production of IL-1 may be critically involved in long-term behavioral and physiological adjustments that are produced by stressor exposure.

This is not to say that all stressors induce central production of IL-1, or that IL-1 mediates all effects of stressors. Indeed, there are stressors, such as exposure to predators, that do not affect brain cytokine levels at all (e.g., Plata-Salamon et al., 2000). As a result, the critical determinants for the observation of stress-induced increases in brain IL-1 levels deserve additional further study. These effects must begin by determination of which stressors cause increases in central cytokine production, and the role that these cytokines play in mediating subsequent behavioral and physiological consequences of stressor exposure.

Implications for Biological Psychiatry. Traditionally, psychological stress and major depression have both been associated with impaired immune function and increased susceptibility to disease. In recent years, however, it has been recognized that

exposure to psychological stressors and major depressive episodes are also associated with signs of immune activation [for an excellent review see Conner and Leonard (1998)]. One particularly interesting facet of this immune activation is that circulating levels of proinflammatory cytokines are elevated during times of stress and in clinically depressed populations. Since proinflammatory cytokines normally produce the behavioral and physiological adjustments that occur during sickness, it has been suggested that their release may mitigate some consequences of exposure to psychological stressors and major depressive episodes (Wise and Watkins, 1998). For instance, psychological stressors, depression, and sickness due to infection all produce disturbances in appetite, alterations in normal sleep patterns, reduced social interactions, impaired cognitive function, and psychomotor agitation or impairment (Conner and Leonard, 1998). Moreover, similarities have also been observed between the physiological responses to stressors and major depression. These physiological symptoms include changes in circulating lymphocytes, alterations in plasma levels of acute-phase proteins, persistent fever, elevated plasma cytokines, and hypercortisolism (Daskalakis et al., 1997; Minev, 1999). As a result of these findings, it has been suggested that activation of the immune system may be etiologically related to depressive illnesses in certain prone individuals.

The key element we are emphasizing here is that in some cases, exposure to psychological stressors alone i.e., in the absence of any apparent tissue damage or pathogenic insult is capable of inducing proinflammatory cytokine production. Furthermore, cytokine production in response to stress appears to be important for at least some of the long-term changes in behavior that are normally produced by that stressor, especially those that resemble depressive or despairing behaviors (Hanssley et al., 2001). Thus, stressor-induced proinflammatory cytokine production may represent a novel mechanism underlying certain human psychiatric illnesses. This new conceptualization raises a whole host of empirical questions regarding the possible role of infection as a precipitating event in the onset of major psychiatric illness, especially if such a challenge event is made during critical developmental periods.

In summary, while we have tried to emphasize the preventable role of stress and its far-reaching implications for biological psychiatry, we have also tried to emphasize stress responsive systems are not restricted to a single neural pathway, a single neurochemical system, or even to the central nervous system itself. Rather, stress responsive systems—upon activation—have the ability to alter molecular, cellular, and systemic processes below the entire organism. Indeed, stress affects everything an organism does. In the following two sections, we will briefly focus on two systems that are especially stress responsive, sexuality and sleep. However, our aim is not simply to focus on the fact that both are greatly impacted by stress (as is true of all neuronal systems) but to briefly discuss key aspects of the physiology of these systems.

SEXUALITY AND THE PASSIONS OF THE BRAIN

Introductory Remarks

Social stress is one of the prime triggers for quality-of-life issues in both humans and other animals (Sapolsky et al., 2000). This is especially evident in the capacity to sustain

and enjoy sexual relationships. Sexual motivational systems lie at the root of some of the most intense human feelings, ranging from the aversion and cravings of sexual arousal to the delights and disappointments of orgasm, not to mention sexual bonding and attachment, not to mention the ongoing dynamics of social relationships and dependencies. Sexual motivation and sexual performance are often dissociated (Brennan, 1990), as are social sex and coexistence, especially in the presence of cognitive need and emotional states. To better grasp how these relationships may promote psychiatric concern, the aim of this brief section is to provide an overview of the general underpinnings of mammalian sexuality.

Reproductive fitness is the ultimate currency of evolution. Sexual selection and the sources of human sexual principles were the topics Darwin struggled with in his second great book on evolution *Descent of Man* (1871, 1874, 1st and 2nd editions; for more on related evolutionary psychiatry issues, see Chapter 20). In laying the groundwork for modern sociobiology, Darwin made many provocative and often troublesome assertions, especially since human sexuality is politicized and regulated in most cultures. For instance, he asserted that "man is more amorous, promiscuous and energetic than woman, and has a more inventive genius" (1874, p. 552). We now know that this viewpoint reflects more cultural misconception than true biological fact. We now know that there are subtle sex/gender differences in emotional/vigilant strength/vulnerability at the population level, as well as at the level of brain structure and function (Kossler, 1999; Moustay, 2000), but it is exceedingly difficult to test the issue, first one must pre-occupy with caution since prejudicial attitudes incubate easily in human minds, perhaps in part due to our evolutionary heritage (Chapter 20).

To this day we struggle with our inability to distinguish biological fact from cultural fiction (Panksepp et al., 2002; Panksepp, 2002). There was a time when diagnostic manuals placed heterosexuality in the category of sexual deviation, but now we recognize cross-gender psychological identities as a natural part of the way our brains are organized. At the social level we easily accept the dictum that "variety is virtuous" (Jenks, 2001). At the same time it has been exceedingly difficult to accept that there are emotion-expressing molecules in our brains, and that there may be more differences among the sexes and genders in the evolved mental aspects of sexuality. Still, during the past century we gradually came to accept sexual variety as the norm, with only two major remaining problems: the consequences of individual bias when people harass or offend each other, and the psychological difficulties that ensue when one cannot function sexually at the level one desires. When our complex sexual/reproductive apparatus does not work properly, there can be a great deal of emotional distress.

Let us briefly consider these topics in reverse order: (1) What are the factors that impair sexual ability? (2) What is it about the organization of our brains that causes, at least at a statistical level, the neurophysiology of maleseness and femaleness? (3) What leads us to have sexual urges? and (4) How can we minimize harm in sexualized activities? Since there is not sufficient space to probe such issues in depth, we will restrict our discussion to those issues we feel are pertinent to treatment strategies in biological psychiatry.

Psychogenic Factors that Impair Sexual Ability

Through its pervasive influence on a diversity of mind-brain functions, stress can increase or diminish a variety of motivational urges, including sexuality. While mild stress can sometimes increase sexual urges, sustained stress diminishes sexual urges. Indeed, one of the primary stress hormones in the brain, CRH, dramatically reduces all presexual and sexual activities, as well as all other appetites, when released within the brain (Chapter 2).

None of the major psychiatric drugs, aside from dopamine facilitators (Panksepp, 1998), consistently promote sexual urges, but many reduce them in ways that are often emotionally troublesome to people. The most widespread problems are associated with the antagonists and inducers of sexual motivation that result from the use of antidepressants, most recently the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) (Brennan et al., 1999). However, other agents are not without problems (O'Dell, 1998), and there are some drugs that can facilitate sexual abilities (Cantinelli and Goldberg, 2000). Mammalian sexual energy is dependent heavily on brain dopamine release, so it is not surprising that all antidepressants tend to diminish sexual urges (Van Patter et al., 1999). There is no simple way around these problems except drug discontinuation. Despite the ability of sexual performance enhancers such as sildenafil (Viagra) to promote sexual capacity, they still need to be evaluated in interaction with the major psychiatric drugs as well as in terms of various psychological factors relevant to psychiatric practice.

Genetic and Epigenetic Creation of Maleness and Femaleness

We have a better understanding of the systems that control sexual urges in the brains of animals than of humans, but there are now abundant reasons to believe the principles, if not the details, will translate well across many mammalian species (Panksepp, 1998; Mann, 1998). However, since the variety of sexual strategies among species is so vast (Jahoda, 2002), the underlying brain details will also vary. Likewise, many complexities arise from the fact that sexual motivation and performance are developmentally, albeit highly interactive, systems in the brain (Baptista, 1999). Although there has been resistance to the use of animal work to illuminate the human condition, here we will summarize the general principles, while not skipping the abundant differences in details across species (McEwen, 1998).

To a remarkable degree, male and female sexuality are subservient to many distinct, as well as several overlapping brain controls (summarized in Panksepp, 1998; Hull, 1999). The role of the sex-determining gene on the Y chromosome in eliciting male genital-development and the resulting testosterone (T) based signaling of maleness to the brain has been worked out in considerable detail, at least *in situ* (Mast, 1999). It is during the critical organizational phase of gender determination, during the last few days before birth (in humans) that happens in the second trimester of gestation, and a few days before birth (in rats), the cascade of biochemical events goes according to the standard schedule, the basics of maleness become masculinized. To be effective in precipitating this developmental cascade, the pulsatile secretions of T *in utero* have

to be converted to the metabolite estrogen via aromatization. If sufficient estrogen (E_2) does not bathe the male brain at the right time (e.g., because of a deficiency of T secretion, inadequate aromatase, or deficits of estrogen receptors in the right regions of the brain), the male brain remains organized in the primordial female-typical pattern. Paralleling this, since the mother's estrogen could promote masculinization of the female brain, female foetuses have "feminized" gonoplastic molecules, such as α -fetoprotein, that can impede maternal estrogen.

Since male-typical body organization is elaborated more by a different metabolite of T, namely dihydrotestosterone (DHT), produced via the enzyme 5 α -reductase, one can see a female male-typical brain in a female-typical body, and vice versa, depending on which hormones the fetus was exposed to during the critical organizational periods of sexual differentiation. Without denying the importance of psychosexual learning on many aspects of human development, the metabolic conversion of T into E and DHT may provide some insight into transsexual and hermaphroditic tendencies. Although these issues cannot be analyzed readily in the human species, there is now substantial evidence, especially from work on rodents, that male bodies can contain female-typical brains, and female bodies can contain male-typical brains in rats. There is also suggestive evidence this can occur in humans (e.g., Imperato-McGinley, et al. 1979). These realignments of brain and body gender identities can doubt produce substantial psychological consequences during adolescence as individuals reach sexual maturity (Kraemer, 1989; Leibl, et al. 1993).

What does it mean to have a masculinized brain? In animals we know this is reflected in the fact that certain neuronal groups in the anterior hypothalamus [the sexually dimorphic nuclei of the preoptic area (SDN-POA)] grow larger than in most females. Partly this is due to the slowing of early normal "weeding" and partly to the neural growth-promoting effects of T. There is increasing data to show that the same type of circuits are present in the human brain (deMayo, et al. 1993), especially in the intermediate nuclei of the anterior hypothalamus (IAH), but other brain areas as well (Zhao, et al. 1993). These morphological differences participate in the elaboration of sex-typical psychological and behavioral differences. The failure to recognize that such neurobiological organizational processes do occur in humans has been a source of prolonged distress to those who have been treated according to culturally politicized models of gender determination (Cahill, 2000).

One of the remarkable aspects of these psychobiological findings, at least in rats, is that environmental events, such as maternal stress, can influence the brain organizational effects of early hormone secretions. The male foetuses of mothers rats that have been stressed consistently exhibit a reduction in both neural and behavioral masculinization. This is partly due to the fact that the fetal secretions of T are too early, before adequate aromatase enzymes are present to convert T to E, and also before the receptive elements for estrogen have matured. Conversely, female offspring tend to exhibit some masculinization as a result of maternal stress, but the mechanisms for this phenomenon have not been worked out. There is a modest amount of evidence that similar effects can occur in our own species (Ellis and Ebner, 1991).

General Urges: Requests and Remedies

The different gender identities of the brain, engendered during fetal development, are activated by maturing gonadal steroid hormones during puberty. To have a male brain costs many things. The enlarged SDH-POA nuclei of males possess male-typical sexual urges via the activation effects of T, and experimental damage to these brain areas diminishes male sexual behavior more than that of females. In contrast, female receptivity is dependent much more on circuits within the ventromedial hypothalamus, which are stimulated by E and progesterone (Pfaff, 1999), which are not essential for male sexuality. Of course, there are many other brain areas, including prenatally the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST) and corticomedial amygdala, along with many neurocircuits, that contribute to the flow of sexual arousal. To some degree both males and females contain circuitry that is more typical of the other gender. For instance, administration of T into adult females can rapidly promote male-typical ways of thinking and feeling, while E can do the reverse for males (Van Casteren et al., 1999).

Under gender-typical hormone conditions, male and female sexual circuits have different neurochemical correlates (as summarized in Parkes et al., 1998; Pfaff, 1999). One of the biggest differences is the higher prevalence of arginine-vasopressin (AVP) in the SDH-POA, and associated sexual circuits of males as compared to females. AVP gene expression is under the local influence of T, and this neuropeptide diminishes characteristically following castration. This partly explains male sexual deficits, which emerge much more rapidly in male rats than females following castration because human behavior is supported by more robust and subtle peptide signaling abilities and habits. In any event, T restores sexual urgency in both, and in rats this can be achieved simply by replacing T in the SDH-POA.

The AVP intensifies male sexual arousal partly by promoting sexual persistence; in animals this is evident in sustained territorial marking behavior and elevations of sex-related aggression. In humans, plasma AVP levels surge during sexual arousal but decline sharply at orgasm (Murphy et al., 1999). Whether new drugs that can facilitate AVP activity in the brain might promote sexual desire remains a poorly developed line of inquiry that may have interesting therapeutic implications, as might AVP antagonists in the control of sexual aggression and jealousy (see Chapter 2).

On the other hand, various estrogen, progesterone, and oxytocin receptors are situated in female brains, where they contribute to female-typical sexual receptivity (Pfaff et al., 1999; Pfaff, 1999). In this context, it is noteworthy that female sexual urges diminish dramatically when the male facilitator AVP is infused into the brain (Glockner et al., 1999). On the other hand, oxytocin does contribute positively to male sexuality. It is one of the most effective ways to induce erection when placed directly into a variety of brain areas (Arguello and Gross, 1991), especially those where Paul Broca originally mapped the erection circuits of the primate brain (MacLean and Flory, 1981). In human males, plasma oxytocin levels remain low during sexual arousal but a large bolus is released at orgasm. Interestingly, the nonsteroidal phorbol ester ingenol is able to increase penile/tubal oxytocin secretion (Urrutia-Moleng, 1998). If these changes also occur inside the brain, it would suggest that both males and females obtain an oxytocin-mediated affective reward not only at orgasm but also

during pleasurable skin contact. However, those important neuropsychological events are surely not limited to a single chemotype. For many neurochemicals, including opioids, contribute to the pleasure of sex as well as many other rewards (Van Ree et al., 2000). Another key player is the lactating hormone—lactotransferrin, which can substantially increase female libido. Whether such manipulations could be deployed to facilitate human sexuality remains a poorly studied idea that is progress with possibilities (Chapter 20). There are some antiloping agents such as the monoamine oxidase (MAO) inhibitor, selegiline, that can prolong sexual viability in animals (Knoll, 1992), and hormone replacement therapies along with some pharmacological agents remain effective and ever popular (Cronkite and Goldberg, 1996).

Sex steroid control of sexual readiness operates partly through the ability of estrogens and testosterone to activate gene transcription in sexual readiness circuits (Pfaff, 1999). Estrogen priming (and like normal estrus) promotes oxytocin synthesis, oxytocin receptor proliferation in female sex circuits, especially in the medial hypothalamus, as well as promoting cytochrome oxidase within that system. After hormone priming, female sexual urges are markedly diminished by blocking oxytocinergic transmission at key points within this system—such as in the medial hypothalamus. Male sexual behavior is also diminished following central administration of these antagonists, suggesting there is a tonic level of oxytocin stimulation that provides a normalized background for sexual readiness (Carter, 1998). In this context, it is also noteworthy that oxytocin can pacifying the sexual inhibitory period following ejaculation, suggesting it may participate in the affective “afterglow” following copulation.

Finally, we would note that similar circuits and chemistries control sexuality in cold-blooded reptiles and that the loci of maternal behavior circuits in mammals are closely interwoven with those ancient sexual systems, especially in preoptic and anterior regions of the hypothalamus (Panksepp, 1998). Thus, just as the gratification of romance may arise from circuits that originally evolved to mediate sexual attraction, urges, and pleasure, long before the “social-attachment bond” between mother and child had emerged in mammal’s species. Now we know that a great deal of social bonding is mediated by chemicals such as oxytocin, vasopressin, and opioids (Carter, 1998; Insel, 1999; Nelson and Panksepp, 1998).

As already noted, environmental factors (e.g., stress) can strongly influence the course of parenthood differentiation, and their influence does not diminish after birth. The number of long-term consequences on child development are enormous (Panksepp, 2001; Nelson, 2001), and the list of long-term effects related competence resulting from modifications of socioenvironmental quality steadily grows. One of the most fascinating findings has been the effect of maternal quality on programming their next matrilineal care of their offspring in species ranging from primates (Sawat, 1997) to rats (Massey, 2000), with effects often lasting across generations (Pining et al., 1999). The rat work indicates that the maternal care (partly in the form of antipredator behavior) block the life-long benefits for the mental and physical health of the offspring. In rats, mothers devote more of this type of care/mate toward male offspring, and if one experimentally alters the same levels of attention in females, they exhibit lower differences in sexual behavior during adulthood than would otherwise be observed (Hoyer, 1995).

We now address the occurrence of the various aspects of sexual arousal in the human brain. The human brain has not been imaged during various types of sexual arousal. In males, sexually induced sexual arousal, evaluated in a dose-response fashion with escalating doses of erotic materials, generates a dramatic increase in arousal just below the top of the skull, in the midcingulate region of the higher limbic system (Kohout et al., 2000). This is a key area where emotional and cognitive factors are intensely blended and represents the optimal brain region where sexual imagery provokes the cascade of lust. This, along with temporal lobe regions, especially the anterior medial regions of the amygdala, appears to be where the reconsolidation of the subcortical systems are triggered into arousal by cognitive events.

And where is the epicenter for the sensations of orgasm in this tangled circuit? It has been imaged a few times, and initial single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) studies only saw arousal in the right frontal cortex (Tilbrouk et al., 1994). More recently estimates of increased blood flow using positron emission tomography (PET) imaging indicate abundant arousal in many brain root and areas, the cerebellum, as well as the ventral representational area of the meso-cerebrospinal junction (Georgiadis et al., 2002), where dopamine systems long implicated in sexual sexual arousal and psychostimulant reward are situated (Plaut, 1996; Van Kie, 2000). The female orgasmic response has regrettably not been visualized yet.

Although addictive processes are not specifically covered in this text, we would like stress and in relation that there are strong relations between sexual urges and rewards and the pleasure derived from drugs of abuse, especially the psychostimulants and opioids. The role of opioids in elaborating sexual-arousal has long been recognized (Panksepp, 1998), and the dopamine systems that figure heavily in the appetitive phase of sexuality (as well as every other emotion) is aroused by sexual stimuli (Kohout and Panksepp, 1997; Plaut, 1996). Indeed, the finding that animals sensitized to psychostimulants typically seek drugs and sex more vigorously than those that have not (Voorhees and Panksepp, 2002) is in accord with this conclusion.

SLEEP, STRESS, AND THE RESTORATION OF BRAIN AND MIND

Introductory Remarks

More research has been done on sleep mechanisms than any other state-control processes of the brain. We now know the location of the major circuits that control slow-wave sleep (SWS) as well as three periodic arousals that are full of vivid amniotic dreams and rapid eye movements (REM sleep). We know much about the neurophysiological changes that reflect these natural states of the brain and the major neurochemicals that control these passages of consciousness, but rather little about the adaptive functions of sleep stages at a scientific level.

However, several everyday observations are important to keep in mind. Sleep, in proper amounts, alleviates tensions that builds up during waking. Sleep also washes up the cerebral sheen of care. If one goes to sleep with a troubled mind, difficult

as it often is to get to sleep, one usually wakes feeling occasionally less burdened. Was it simply due to the passage of time and ensuing forgetting, or was there an active emotional regulation process proceeding under the cover of our daily slurs of unconsciousness during SWD under altered consciousness during REM sleep? No one knows for sure, but the number of intriguing, psychiatrically relevant findings that are emerging demonstrates the importance of sleep in the homeostasis of both cognitive and affective aspects of mind. Indeed, the possibility that the moods that accompany disease may be a useful way to monitor the deep emotional states of psychiatric patients needs to be more fully examined (Domhoff, 2002). The aim of this short summary is neither to describe the pattern of sleep and the neurobiology of sleep stages nor to reiterate once more the well-established neuroscience findings in the field (for that see Krueger et al., 2008). The goal is to briefly highlight the main psychiatrically relevant themes that relate to emotional issues and then to delve into the emotional homeostatic function of sleep.

Factors that Promote and Inhibit Sleep

It is well known that satisfying basic bodily needs, such hunger, in sexual satiation, promote sleepiness. Conversely, all kinds of emotional distress tend to reduce sleep onset and quality. This effect is very prominent in the difficulty that depressed individuals commonly experience in falling asleep and maintaining sleep, and also in the disrupted sleep patterns found in various anxiety disorders, mania, and schizophrenia (Krueger et al., 2008). It is well known that physical exertion during the day tends to increase SWD, while mental and emotional exertions, as long as they are not too-strenuous, tend to increase REM (Panksepp, 1998).

Closely there are several SWD generators in the brain, but one of the most prominent, tightly located, ones is in the lateral anterior lateral hypothalamus, which contains gammaaminobutyric acid (GABA) as the main transmitter, which explains the utility of GABA facilitators (Table 4.1) to facilitate sleep (Krueger et al., 2008). The location of this generator helps explain one of the first findings in the neurobiology of sleep, von Economo's classic observation of absence insomnia in patients who had suffered damage to the anterior hypothalamus. On the other hand, the widely distributed waking generators, which are well represented by the acetylcholine and biogenic amine system (including dopamine, norepinephrine, and histamine), are more concentrated in the posterior hypothalamus, where damage has long been known to produce somnolence (Panksepp, 1998).

The REM generator in the lower brain stem appears to be a remnant of an ancient wake-promotion system that may, at some point in pre-mammalian evolution, have been one of the major regulators of waking activities, perhaps of the emotional subroutines of the brain system (Panksepp, 1998). It has recently been diligently argued that dreaming mechanisms can be dissociated from REM mechanisms (Nelson, 2006). Even though they are typically coordinated, it seems that while REM sleep is critically dependent on the posterior generators, dreaming is much more dependent on areas of various

TABLE 4.1. Sleep Medications Currently in Use^a

<i>Traditional Benzodiazepine (BZ) Hypnotics</i>
<i>Tetrazepam:</i> Common initial dose: 0.25 mg; PDA, AMDD: 0.2 mg
<i>Trifluoperazine:</i> Common initial dose: 15 mg; PDA, AMDD: 20 mg
<i>Fluanisopem:</i> Common initial dose: 15–30 mg; PDA, AMDD: 20 mg
<i>Nonbenzodiazepine, Selective 5-HT Receptor Agonist Hypnotics</i>
<i>Zolpidem:</i> Common initial dose: 10 mg; PDA, AMDD: 20 mg
<i>Zolatriptan:</i> Common initial dose: 10 mg; PDA, AMDD: 20 mg
<i>Anxiolytic Benzodiazepines Used as Hypnotics (mg/day)</i>
<i>Chlorazepate:</i> CDE: 0.5 mg; PDA, AMDD: 4 mg divided for anxiety conditions
<i>Bromazepam:</i> CDE: 1 mg; PDA, AMDD: 4 mg divided for anxiety conditions
<i>Alprazolam:</i> CDE: 0.25 mg; PDA, AMDD: 4 mg divided for anxiety conditions
<i>Using Antidepressants (mimetics) Used as Hypnotics (mg/day)</i>
<i>Trazodone:</i> CDE: 50 mg; AMDD: PDA, AMDD: 200 mg divided (for depression)
<i>Amitriptyline:</i> CDE: 50 mg; PDA, AMDD: 200 mg divided (for depression)
<i>Imipramine:</i> CDE: 200 mg; PDA, AMDD: 200 mg divided (for depression)
<i>Fluoxetine:</i> CDE: 20 mg; PDA, AMDD: 200 mg divided (for OCD)
<i>Clomipramine:</i> CDE: 12 mg; PDA, AMDD: 40 mg (for depression)
<i>Sertaline:</i> CDE: 100 mg; PDA, AMDD: 200 mg divided (for depression)

^aRecommended CDE—adult common initial dose; but dose is generally recommended to about PDA, AMDD—Food and Drug Administration Approved Maximum Daily Dose. For antidepressants see doses for MAOI apparent inhibition, such as clomipramine, clomipramine (Ketamine) are listed.

limbic cortical circuits, with perhaps especially strong influences through modulating dopamine-based appetitive-motivation SAI/KPCG systems (Gremillion, 2002; Solis, 2009). Thus, it would seem likely that REM sleep is especially important in regulating emotional/affective homeostasis.

The main evidence for this is as follows: REM-deprived animals are generally hyperactive and hypoaroused, suggesting that the neurophysiological activation promoted by REM (i.e., dreams) are able to dissipate excessive emotional “memories”—to keep the emotional and cognitive aspects of key mental signs and processes balanced in favor of the negative side. In other words, during dreaming, organisms may reprocess emotionally salient information in such a way as to reduce its affective impact during waking. Perhaps this is achieved, in part, by the ability of the brain, during REM, to extract useful cognitive relationships from waking activities (Donohoff, 2001). This may allow experience to more effectively power long-term as opposed to short-term plasticity, especially those related to emotional attention (Panksepp, 1998), which may partially explain why people are typically less emotionally stressed after “waking from a good night’s sleep.”

Restorative Effects of Sleep

As mentioned above, sleep problems are common in psychiatric disorders. Again, the most prominent example is the tendency of depressed individuals to sustain sleep poorly and to wake in the middle of the night, partly because their pituitary-adrenal axis wake-alarm system becomes active much earlier than normal (Kryger et al., 2000). Other factors include an excessively rapid entry into the REM phase after sleep onset. Since sleep recruits endogenous anti-anxiety mechanisms and depression impairs quality sleep, the sleep problems of depression may tend to perpetuate ongoing problems. Although there is likely some truth to that hypothesis, such a problem would have to reside within the claspings of SWS rather than REM. A remarkable finding is that REM sleep deprivation is a fairly effective short-term antidepressant, and practically all of the pharmacological antidepressants are selective REM sleep inhibitors (Kryger et al., 2000). One could construct a psychological explanation by suggesting that the failure to discharge emotional energies during REM might help make them available for waking activities, but no test of such an idea is available. An appropriate experiment would require some way of measuring these types of neuropsychological energies.

One way this has been done in animals is to see how specific emotional systems operate as a function of the REM sleep process. This has been achieved by surgically clamping REMonia, which normally keeps animals occupied during the supposed emotional episodes of their dreams. In such animals, the various (inhibition-emotion) action programs, which are presumably active in dreams, are now expressed physically—including predatory striking, rage and fecal behaviors, and grooming. This indicates that emotional processes are, in fact, aroused in the dreams of other animals, which is consistent with the finding of high levels of excitability in human dreams, as well as the fact that the limbic system tends to exhibit selective arousal during REM sleep (Natererger et al., 1997).

Another way to get at the relationship between REM and emotions would be to take one emotional system and study its dynamics as a function of REM deprivation. This has been done with self-stimulation of the lateral septum (the 5HT_{1A}/5HT_{1B}) system described in Chapter 12. This emotional substrate is more responsive in REM-deprived rats since they self-stimulate more. Even more remarkably, rats that are allowed to self-stimulate (i.e., to use up the energy in this system) during the course of the REM deprivation do not exhibit the type of compensatory REM sleep rebound (i.e., post-deprivation elevations in REMs) that is normally seen in deprived animals. A similar absence of rebound following REM deprivation is also seen in schizophrenia patients, suggesting that brain-making activities may be depleting the neuropsychological emotional energies that normally build up when organisms are not allowed to undergo REM sleep. One way to view these findings is that REM deprivation increases dopamine around in the brain, while REM sleep diminishes it. From this perspective, it is interesting that dopamine facilitates generally brighter mood, even in the realm of euphoria, and some have found a place as anti-depressors as well as anti-craving medications for tobacco addiction (bupropion; Wellbutrin or Zyban, respectively).

Although there are many theories concerning the functions of dreaming, none has sufficient support to be well accepted (for summaries of controversies, see the

special issue of *The Behavioral and Brain Sciences*, 2000, vol. 23(6), pp. 799–1121). In contrast, there are fewer theories about the function of SWS, but the characteristic secretions of growth hormone that occur at the onset of SWS strongly suggest that at least part of the story is body restoration. Further, since one is easily unconscious during deep SWS, and cerebral metabolism is markedly reduced (Nienhuis et al., 1993), one would expect that there is abundant regeneration of brain neurons during this phase of sleep. Attempts to characterize the changes in gene expression that accompany sleep indicate that about 0.3 percent of genes are expressed differentially in the cerebral cortex across phases of sleep, and those that are upregulated during sleep tend to be presently unidentified genes (Tonello and Civelli, 2001). This gives us very little foray for any major interpretations, except to say that many important things are happening.

Sleep Problems and Disorders (From Ambien to Zolpidem)

The diagnosis of sleep problems is based on non-standardized criteria summarized both in *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition* (DSM-IV) and the more detailed classification of the ICD International Classification of Sleep Disorders (Pitman and Orr, 1997). Unlike psychiatric diagnoses, which are typically obtained from a consultation with a psychiatrist through structured interview, sleep disorders have more "objective" criteria, consisting of electroencephalograms (EEG) measures of (i) sleep latency, (ii) REM latency (including "REM latency minus awake"), (iii) amount of SWS, (iv) amount of REM sleep, (v) eye movement density in REM sleep, and (vi) sleep efficiency (i.e., total number of minutes of sleep divided by the total time in bed). There is abundant data using these measures not only in standard nonpsychiatric sleep disorders, such as snoring, but also in many psychiatric situations (Kangaroo, 1999).

Objectively measured sleep problems allow clinicians to provide pharmacological assistance that has been standardized in clinical populations (Kryger et al., 2000). The enormous amount of drug development in this area attests to the prevalence of sleep problems in our society. Although there is no up-to-date detailed literature, the list of effective sleep drugs now on the market is lengthy, and the covers the list of those agents approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) (Table 4-1). This is because all the benzodiazepine (BZ) receptor agonists can serve as sleeping aids, but the approved ones are typically the short-acting agents such as zolpidem (Ambien) for individuals simply having difficulty falling asleep. The longer-acting agents can maintain sleep, but are more likely to have additive carryover effects into the morning (Driner, 2000).

The problems with BZs, with regard to cognitive impairment, memory loss, and addictive potential (Chapter 19), are sufficiently large that a vigorous search was mounted for other effective agents that have no such problems. A new class of non-BZs that are stimulants for the GABA receptor, and hence GABA facilitators of SWS processes, has revolutionized the medication of sleep problems. The fast-acting, short-duration agent that has taken away a substantial market-share from triazolam (Halcion) is zolpidem (Ambien), which can be taken in the middle of the night in scattered early-morning awakenings. Of course there are also highly effective longer-acting agents, such

as flurazepam, as well as a large number of SSAs as well as isolating antidepressants that are still commonly used for sleep problems (Table 4.1). Also, there is vigorous research activity to develop slow-release forms of the sedating agents, as well as natural ingredients such as melatonin, to help sustain sleep through the night. Of course, chronic use of SSAs is not advised because of strong withdrawal reactions when tolerance has developed to these agents (see Chapter 10). The one highly effective over-the-counter agent is the natural hormone melatonin, whose efficacy has long been known (Arendt, 1976) but which has not been promoted by the pharmaceutical or medical community since it has not been approved by government regulatory boards. Obviously, there is little incentive for conduct of necessary efficacy trials for agents that cannot be patented. Accordingly, the search continues to identify melatonin congeners that can be patented. Even though there is now a large number of such agents, there is yet no clear evidence that any of them will have a substantially better efficacy profile than the natural ingredient, except perhaps when they begin to manifest using slow-release forms that might reduce anxiety surreptitiously.

Although there are no sleeping aids that are specific to the problems of any given psychiatric disorder, such as depression or schizophrenia, it is noteworthy that practically all the selective serotonin facilitating antidepressants can promote sleep and ameliorate sleep problems (Kryger et al., 2000). Among the other generation-of-drugs, Amitriptyline was especially sedating, but most of the modern SSRIs can improve sleep, especially as their antidepressant effects kick in, although none is approved for the treatment of insomnia.

Considering the anxiolytic effects of a good night's sleep for all forms of mental distress, the search for more specific interventions will continue. Since CRH aerosol in the brain provokes generalized stress and anxiety effects in the mammalian brain, antagonists for these receptors should be effective in promoting better sleep patterns. Preliminary data already suggest that such a beneficial profile is present in some of the available CRH receptor antagonists (Liu et al., 2002).

Conclusions and Role of Positive Emotions in Regulating Stress

Our understanding of the stress processes of the brain has been impressive, especially since the emergence of brain CRH systems as a central regulator of the stress response. Not only is the CRH receptor now a prime target for drug development, but a host of other neuropeptide systems have been identified that participate in the stress response. This knowledge is percolating through all research areas interested in the etiology of stress-related psychiatric disorders as well as the nature of basic emotional and motivational systems (Chapter 21).

Considering the increasingly well-documented effects of stress on the body and the effects of chronic stress on a host of disease entities (Bennet et al., 2001; Meyer and Saper, 1999), there is an increasing acceptance of the interdependency of brain-mental and body-physical processes (Uddin et al., 1996). Social attachments are a powerful modulator of physiological stress responses (Panzica and Kirkpatrick, 1996; Reynolds, 1997), and our growing understanding of the brain mechanisms of social

bonding (and hence mother-infant) levels have implicated oxytocin, prolactin, and the endogenous opioids as prime surrogates of social attachment (Carles, 1998; Inati, 1991; Nelson and Pantleppi, 1995). Females are generally more responsive to social support than males (Kinsbourne et al., 1995), as they are to the effects of prosocial hormones and stress (Clarke and Carter, 2000; DeVoe et al., 1996). Couples who are better able to soothe each other's stress responses are more likely to remain married than those who tend to intensify each other's stress-related autonomic arousal (Gottman et al., 2002).

This recognition, as well as the "positive orientation" that has been sweeping through psychology and other social science disciplines, has helped create a robust, scientifically based positive health movement that characterizes key factors that promote disease, while also identifying those that can facilitate a more positive spectrum of health. New composite measures of long-term healthy stress, such as the "allostatic load" and a variety of new concepts and hypotheses, are emerging (e.g., Poff and Singer, 1998). The preliminary fruits of this movement have recently been harvested into a compilation of progress (Oryszak and Legge, 2002). When the aspirations of such mind-body initiatives are eventually established on a more solid empirical foundation, we may find that a host of new and wider psychiatric medicines could be developed (e.g., see Chapter 21).

The development of these medicines will require new types of research paradigms that are willing to evaluate the long-term effects of certain agents not only in traditional disease-targeted ways, but in the context of positive physiological support systems that may interact in beneficial ways with new medicinal agents that may only have rather modest effects on their own (Sachdev et al., 1999; Taylor et al., 2001). For optimal efficacy, such agents may also require interventions to alter and then upregulated views of depth-psychology (e.g., Nelson and Turnbull, 2002). In short, it is ever again time in psychiatry to triangulate more compactly between the molecular aspects of the brain, the behavioral symptoms of psychiatric disorders, and the intervening neuropsychological processes that comprise mental experience.

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PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS

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OVERVIEW

Historically, the definition and treatment of personality disorders has fallen under the rubric of psychodynamics theory (Bleich, 1949). Initial empirical efforts to study personality disorders focused on clarifying connections between personality disorders and other psychiatric disorders (Natalie, 1991). More recent efforts have focused on conceptualizing each personality disorder in terms of underlying dimensions or components (Clark, 1999). Findings from this literature are beginning to converge with a long tradition of psychometric work by psychologists on personality traits of healthy people (Costa and Whitbeck, 1994). In the first half of this chapter, we will review operational definitions of personality disorders and personality as well as points of convergence and divergence in their conceptualization and measurement.

In the second half of the chapter, we will review how recent developments in neuroscience and genetics relate to personality disorder symptom and disease course.

Implications of these findings for treatment. Explosive advances in neurosciences and genetic techniques at the turn of the 21st century have yielded findings that hold promise for the characterization and treatment of personality disorders. These new findings may help scientists to elucidate biological mechanisms and markers associated with different personality disorders, particularly when conceptualized from a dimensional perspective (Livesley, 2004).

WHAT ARE PERSONALITY DISORDERS?

The *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) describes several overarching aspects of personality disorders (Axis II) that theoretically distinguish them from other psychiatric disorders (Axis I). The personality disorders were originally placed on Axis II along with mental retardation because, in theory, they begin early in development and last a lifetime. However, recent research suggests that some personality disorder symptoms may respond to both pharmacotherapeutic and psychotherapeutic interventions (Kazdin and Blase, 1998). Personality disorders are additionally described by the DSM-IV as an enduring or chronic pattern of experience or behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of an individual's culture involving cognition, affect, social function, or impulse control. Such a pattern:

1. is inflexible and pervasive across different domains of functioning;
2. leads to clinically significant distress or impairment;
3. is stable and begins early in life;
4. is not due to another mental disorder; and
5. is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance or medical condition.

Detailed descriptions of each of the 10 personality disorder diagnoses can be found in the DSM-IV. However, because we believe that the clearest linkage between personality disorders and physiology may lie at the level of symptoms and their interrelationships rather than at the level of existing diagnoses, we will focus more on the symptoms that comprise the diagnoses rather than on the diagnoses themselves. The 10 personality disorders listed in the DSM-IV can be grouped into 3 clusters on the basis of similar symptoms. Specifically, people diagnosed with a personality disorder in cluster A (paranoid, schizoid, or schizotypal) tend to show odd and eccentric behaviors. Interpersonally, they are often reclusive and suspicious. People diagnosed with a personality disorder in cluster B (dramatic, erratic, or borderline) tend to show dramatic, emotional, and impulsive behavior. People diagnosed with a personality disorder in cluster C (anxious, dependent, and obsessive-compulsive) tend to show anxious or fearful behavior (see Table 5.1).

Since personality disorders are difficult to diagnose reliably, incidence data are rare and variable. According to a recent review, current U.S. population estimates for any personality disorder (PD) based on DSM-IV criteria ranged from 8.7 to 33.1 percent, with the authors concluding that lifetime prevalence of at least one personality

TABLE 5.1. Primary Symptoms of DSM-IV Personality Disorders.

Cluster	Personality Disorder	Primary Symptoms
Paranoid/Ambivalent (A)	Paranoid	Distrust and suspiciousness
	Schizoid	Detached from social relationships; restricted emotional expression
	Schizotypal	Disordered in close relationships; cognitive perceptual distortions; eccentric behavior
Impulsive/Harmful (B)	Antisocial	Disregard for and violation of the rights of others
	Borderline	Instability in interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affect; impulsive behavior
	Narcissistic	Grandiosity; need for admiration; lack of empathy
	Malignant	Mesmerizing manipulativeness;岸情執事
Anxious/Fearful (C)	Anxious	Social inhibition, feeling of inadequacy; hypersensitivity to negative evaluation
	Dependent	Submissive and clinging behavior; excessive need to be taken care of
	Obsessive-compulsive	Preoccupation with routines, perfectionism, and control

cluster diagnosis appears to be approximately 10 to 15 percent. Estimates for the odd/eccentric cluster fall under 6 percent with schizotypal PD being most prevalent, estimates for the impulsive/harmful cluster fall under 8 percent (with antisocial PD being most prevalent), and references for the anxious/fearful cluster fall under 18 percent (with obsessive-compulsive PD being most prevalent; Martis and Zimmerman, 2001). However, these numbers surely overestimate the number of diagnoses actually made since most of the estimates were calculated from randomly sampled individuals that were recruited to receive a diagnostic psychiatric interview. Commonly, people with personality disorders lack awareness that they have a problem and so would be less likely to voluntarily submit themselves to such an interview.

Some research has hinted at demographic differences in the incidence of personality disorders. One of the better documented demographic differences involves gender specificity. People diagnosed with antisocial and obsessive-compulsive personality disorders are more likely to be male, whereas people diagnosed with dependent personality disorders are more likely to be female. Overall, people diagnosed with personality disorders also tend to be younger than the age of the general population, except in the case of schizotypal personality disorder (Zimmerman and Coryell, 1989).

Other differences may involve culture specificity. For instance, a lower incidence of antisocial personality disorder has been reported in some (e.g., China and Japan) but not all (e.g., Korean Asian countries; Lee et al., 1997). Of course, these differences also raise the possibility that culturally biased value judgments influence the definition of personality disorder criteria.

Despite the heuristic and descriptive utility of DSM-IV personality disorder diagnoses in medical settings, researchers have noted several shortcomings of these categorical diagnostic schemes. First, although the DSM-IV places personality disorders on a separate axis from other psychiatric disorders (Axis I), personality disorders often co-exist with other psychiatric disorders, and often do so in predictable ways (Brotman & et al., 2001). For instance, people with antisocial personality disorder are more likely to also receive a diagnosis of substance dependence. Second, although the DSM classifies personality disorders as belonging to a distinct category from normal personality, a preoccupation of empirical evidence suggests that personality disorder symptoms are continuously distributed across both clinical and healthy samples (Lounsbury et al., 1991). This fact helps to explain why clinicians might have difficulty establishing stable "cutpoints" for distinguishing personality disorder diagnoses from normality. Third, personality disorder diagnoses are difficult to measure since they often show poor psychometric properties such as validity (i.e., diagnostic criteria index the targeted traits/tendencies but not other traits) and reliability (i.e., diagnostic criteria show stability across different measurement attempts) (Kraus and Newman, 1997). Validity comes in many forms and can include either internal validity (i.e., criteria that index the same thing are more correlated with each other than with criteria that index something else) or external validity (i.e., criteria predict relevant external features such as etiology and prognosis). Studies of the internal validity of personality disorder criteria suggest that they show only modest convergent (O'Farrell and Bell, 1995) and discriminant validity (Widiger et al., 1995). In other words, a criterion for a given diagnosis is as likely to correlate with criteria from different diagnoses as with criteria from the same diagnosis. Fourth, personality disorder diagnoses have limited clinical utility in that they do not typically help practitioners to choose between distinct pharmacological or psychotherapeutic interventions (Sanderson and Cladis, 1994). Fifth, because they have been defined by the DSM-IV, the criteria for personality disorders have not been wholly empirically derived. Rather, they have emerged through a combination of historical precedents, clinical observations, legal necessity, and repeated deliberations by expert committees (Fraser et al., 1994). As a result, the disorders and their criteria have changed somewhat with each new edition of the DSM. Together, these five shortcomings of the categorical diagnostic framework threaten to limit investigators' abilities to define personality disorders in a quantitative and replicable way, and to might slow cumulative research on the occurrence and treatment of personality disorders.

In an attempt to circumvent these shortcomings, a number of theorists have proposed that personality disorders be defined dimensionally rather than categorically. An illustration of this alternative appears in the field of cognitive testing, where intelligence can be described either with a continuous measure such as the intelligence quotient (i.e.,

XII) or according to a cutoff with a categorical label such as "normal" versus "abnormal." In a similar manner, Steer and Davis (1991) proposed that four continuous behavioral dimensions may underlie both personality disorders at less severe levels (Axis II) and clinical psychiatric disorders at more severe levels (Axis I). These dimensions include irregular/bypathological organization, impulse control, affect regulation, and anxiety modulation. According to their proposal, cognitivedeceptual alterations should map onto the odd/eccentric cluster of personality disorders (i.e., cluster A of Axis II) as well as into schizophrenia (Axis I). Poor impulse control and affect regulation should map onto some of the impulsive/dramatic cluster of personality disorders (i.e., cluster B, specifically, borderline and antisocial disorders of Axis II) as well as into mood disorders (Axis I). Poor anxiety modulation should map onto the anxious/fearful cluster of personality disorders (i.e., cluster C of Axis II) as well as into anxiety disorders (Axis I). These proposed dimensions suggest that several continua bridge Axis II and Axis I and can potentially account for the frequently observed co-occurrence of personality disorder and psychiatric diagnosis.

In support of this proposed continuity between Axis II and Axis I, research suggests that at least one disorder in the odd/eccentric cluster schizophrenia (DSM) lies on a continuum with schizophrenia (Olfman et al., 1995). This continuity particularly seems to hold in the case of negative symptoms such as affective blunting and a lack of social engagement (Chapman et al., 1994). However, research has generally not supported additive dimensional relationships between the impulsive/dramatic cluster of personality disorders and mood disorders, or between the anxious/fearful cluster of personality disorders and anxiety disorders. Instead, people with either impulsive/dramatic or anxious/fearful personality disorders have a higher risk for comorbidity of all types of Axis I disorders (Dolan-Sewell et al., 2001). Some exceptions to this apparent lack of specificity include the findings that impulsive/dramatic cluster personality disorders uniquely co-occur with increased rates of substance abuse (Olfman et al., 1995) and that anxious/fearful cluster personality disorders predominantly co-occur with increased rates of somatoform disorders (Tyler et al., 1991).

A several dimensional approach to assessing personality disorders has arisen from empirical data rather than theory. Livesley and colleagues identified and collated a panpsychological set of personality disorder symptoms (as judged by psychiatrists) spanning all Axis II diagnoses with minimal overlap. They then combined these items in order to construct a psychometric instrument called the Dimensional Assessment of Personality and Psychopathology (DAPP) (Livesley et al., 1992). Next, they administered the DAPP to patients with personality disorders as well as healthy volunteers. Finally, they conducted factor analysis (a mathematical method of examining the correlational structure between many items) on both patients' and healthy volunteers' responses. The investigators found that a similar factor structure described relations among symptoms in both patients and healthy volunteers, suggesting continuity across the groups, but also that the patients had more extreme scores than the healthy volunteers. While factor analysis with an oblique rotation (which allows dimensions to correlate with each other) yielded an underlying structure similar to the discrete personality disorders listed in the DSM-III-R (see column 2 of Table 5), factor analysis with an orthogonal rotation

TABLE 5.2. Conceptual Translation: Schema for Personality Disorder Clusters and Personality Traits Measured by a Selection of Psychometric Inventories.

DSM-IV Cluster	DAMP-BP ^a	DAS-B ^b	EPQ-B ^c	MES-PB ^d
Oppositional aggressive (A)	Intervention	Low dom/ low off	Extraversion ↔	Intervention (+)
Impulsive dramatic (B)	Disagreements	High dom/ low off	Psychoticism	Agreeableness (-)
Peer-faulty anxious (C)	Maintaining	—	Neuroticism	Neuroticism
—	Competitiveness	—	—	Competitiveness
—	—	—	—	Optimism

^aLivesley et al. (1995).

^bAngst and Brügel (1993).

^cBouchard and Lykken (1993).

^dClark and Mineka (1996).

(which does not allow dimensions to correlate with each other) revealed four factors similar to those found in studies of healthy personality (i.e., neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, and competitiveness) (Livesley et al., 1996). Coincidentally, Clark and colleagues used a similar empirical strategy to construct a measure of personality disorder symptoms (called the Schedule for Nonadaptive and Adaptive Personality (SNAP)) and found similar results (Clark, 1990). Of greatest interest, the four orthogonal factors observed in both studies appear to comprise pathologically extreme versions of two of the "Big 5" factors commonly observed in studies of normal personality (Clark and Harrison, 2001; Livesley et al., 1996; see Table 5.2).

In sum, studies support some degree of continuity between Axis II and Axis I, given that the odd/even-odd cluster of Axis II may be on a continuum with the Axis I diagnosis of schizophrenia. However, relating evidence with traits strongly suggests that the impulsive/dramatic and anxious/faulty cluster disorders of Axis II lie on a continuum with symptoms shared not just by one but by several Axis I diagnoses (Angst and Brügel, 1993), as well as with traits that comprise "normal" personality. Thus, it may be that some personality disorder symptoms represent extreme variants of normal personality traits. Before addressing this possibility in greater detail, we briefly review how researchers operationally define and measure "normal" personality.

WHAT IS PERSONALITY?

Theories of human personality predate scientific methods. In the oldest documented example, ancient Greek physicians at the time of Galen attributed individual differences in temperament to the balance of bodily fluids in a given individual (Angst, 1998). Regardless of the mechanistic correctness of this explanatory framework, the

Clock physicians' observations intrigued and inspired many of the progenitors of modern experimental psychology, including Pavlov (1905) and Wundt (1896). Early in the 20th century, experimental psychologists turned their attention not only to describing individual differences in humans but also toward measuring them. While some focused on traits related to intelligence (Binet, 1890), others focused on traits related to emotional and social functioning.

Allport emphasized both the content and organization of these so-called initial traits when he defined personality as "the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysiological systems that determine characteristics of behavior and thought." Although traditionally, "temperament" referred to "innate" traits of biological origin while "character" referred to "nature" traits that have been shaped by socialization, Allport included both types of traits under the rubric of "personality," due to numerous about-trait or evaluative correlations of a distinction between temperament and character (Allport, 1961). His decision not to distinguish the two proved empirically practical since recent studies suggest that both putatively "temperamental" and "characterological" traits show comparable degrees of heritability (Plomin et al., 1991), and indices purporting to measure each separately are often intercorrelated (Cloninger et al., 1988; Herbst et al., 2000).

Psychometric studies that followed Allport's early formulations (Allport and Odbert, 1936) helped to lay the foundation for current personality theory. Specifically, scientists began to employ factor analysis as a means of determining the underlying structure or dimensionality of people's personality descriptions of themselves and others. Some researchers randomly sampled descriptors from bodies of spoken or written language (e.g., dictionaries) while others selected descriptors on the basis of theory. Although resulting models of personality sometimes contained different numbers of factors, all of the models relevant to personality disorders tend to share a handful of common factors.

One such model was developed by Leary and colleagues and based on Sullivan's theory of interspersed behavior (Friedman et al., 1991). This "interspersed circuitry" model describes personality in terms of two independent dimensions dominance and affiliation. An example of an instrument used to measure adhesion/interspersal descriptions is the Interspersed Adjective Scales—Korsak (Wiggins et al., 1983), and a revised instrument that measures interspersed problems is the Inventory of Interspersed Problems (Bisousitz et al., 1988). More recent extensions of this model that have been used to assess personality disorder symptomatology include the Structural Analysis of Social Behavior, developed by Benjamin and colleagues (Benjamin, 1991).

A second model that focused more on the interaction than on the or the social interactions was proposed by Dyzenski, who was inspired by Pavlov's observations of individual differences in the behavior of dogs as they learned to discriminate between different incentive cues (Dyzenski, 1981). This "Pav" model described personality in terms of three dimensions: predictability, extensiveness, and consistency. A modern extension of Dyzenski's model (Costa and McCrae, 1992) also reflected the findings of extensive factor analytic studies of personality descriptors in the English language (Goldberg, 1993). This "five-factor model" (also the "big 5") described

personality in terms of five dimensions: extraversion, neuroticism, openness, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. A currently popular instrument for measuring these five factors in healthy individuals is the NEO Personality Inventory, Revised (NEO-PER; Neuroticism-Extraversion-Openness Personality Inventory, Revised) (Costa and McCrae, 1992). Investigators have also developed the Structured Interview for the Five-Factor Model of Personality (SIFFM) to assess these five factors in personality-disordered individuals (Trull and Whitbeck, 1997).

Subsequent research and analyses have verified that some factors from the five-factor model map onto two factors in the interpersonal dimension and the PIS model in healthy individuals. Specifically, low extraversion corresponds with the low dominance/aggression quadrant of the interpersonal dimension, while low agreeableness corresponds with the high dominance/high affiliation quadrant of the interpersonal dimension (Costa and McCrae, 1992). Additionally, in one triple product based on the definition of the NEO from Ryndell's PIS model, high NEO-PER extraversion corresponds with high PIS dominancy, high NEO-PER agreeableness corresponds with high PIS agreeability, and low NEO-PER agreeableness corresponds with high PIS psychotism (see Table 5.2). Despite differences in the derivation and construction of these measures, this convergence suggests that decades of personality research have led to a reasonable consensus regarding the basic structure of personality traits (Digman, 1990). Four of the five factors (all but openness) have repeatedly been replicated in cross-cultural comparisons (de Raad et al., 1998), and such items represent heritable components in twin and adoption studies (30 to 50 percent) (Bouchard, 1994; Bouchard and Loehlin, 2001). Thus, these four traits probably reflect the operation of integrated "psychophysiological systems" (a la Allport), rather than culturally acquired semantic biases (Plaut and Norman, 1990).

HOW ARE PERSONALITY DISORDERS AND PERSONALITY RELATED?

Thanks to the emergence of psychometrically reliable and valid measures of personality disorder symptoms and of personality traits, investigators have begun to map points of correspondence between the two. As mentioned previously, the factor structure of personality disorder symptoms (as assessed by Livesley et al.'s DASPP-BQ or Clark et al.'s SSADP) shows broad similarity with the factor structure of normal personality traits (as assessed by Costa and McCrae's NEO-PI-R). Specifically, factor analyses of the DASPP-BQ yield common factors approximating neuroticism, extraversion (positive), agreeableness (negative), and conscientiousness. Thus, the only NEO-PI-R factor not represented in measures of personality disorders appears to be openness to experience (Clark et al., 1994; Schneidman et al., 1994). Together, this evidence suggests that personality disorders can be characterized in terms of the same types of dimensions that investigators use to characterize normal personality, even if these measures tap different ends of a severity spectrum running from health to psychopathology.

WHAT LEADS TO "DISORDERED PERSONALITY"?

The promise of measuring dimensions of personality disorder symptoms leads to the possibility of linking those measures to physiological substrates. As succinctly stated by Jang and Vernon (2001): "The definition of the phenotype versus the causal importance/principles for successful genetic studies" (p. 177). In other words, investigators can most easily link protein expression mechanisms to phenotypes that are internally coherent, distinct from other phenotypes, and stable across measurement attempts. Because some personality traits show desirable psychometric qualities of validity and reliability and describe key features of personality disorders, they may provide ideal "endophenotypes" for linkage to genetic and intermediate physiological mechanisms (Jang and Vernon, 2001). Investigations of the relationship between genetic polymorphisms and personality traits provide little ground for inquiry. For instance, mice genetically engineered to lack serotonin 1A receptors show increased anxious behavior, and this anxious behavior can be normalized by "fixing" it" through serotonin receptors through genetic induction in adulthood (Gross et al., 2002). These findings provide an exciting parallel to the usually observed associations between a genetic polymorphism that regulates serotonin function and association to personality traits that indicate the chronic experience of anxiety in humans (Loeck et al., 1998).

Indeed, as in the case of "normal" personality traits, a large twin study has revealed substantial heritability of traits that index personality disorder symptoms (Jang et al., 2000). This heritable component implies a model in which gene expression leads to protein expression, which alters neurophysiological function, which manifests in behavioral tendencies, which over time manifest as a trait, which may confer vulnerability to an eventual personality disorder. Along with inheritance, environmental influences surely also influence gene expression. Either way, the simple causal model outlined above suggests that the physiological correlates of personality disorder symptoms should be more closely associated with behavioral traits than with specific diagnoses. We turn now to review evidence for physiological correlates of personality disorder symptoms.

Neurotransmitter Correlates

Perhaps because many psychiatric medications affect a class of neurotransmitters called the biogenic amines (i.e., serotonin, dopamine, and norepinephrine), associations between biogenic amine function and personality disorders have received the most extensive characterization. However, a limited number of studies also address links between serotonergic and norepinephrine function and personality disorder symptoms. We review those findings below.

Serotonin. The inverse relationship between brain serotonin activity and impulsive aggression represents one of the best replicated findings in biological psychiatry.

Valzelli first documented that decreased turnover of the neurotransmitter serotonin (induced by either selective breeding, pharmacological manipulations, or social isolation) reliably increased aggressive behavior in rhesus and rats (Valzelli, 1980). The fact that early social isolation can reduce brain serotonin in animal models and that neurobiological serotonergic indices show only moderate heritability (~30 percent) in humans suggests that serotonergic function responds both to genetic and environmental contingencies (Klimstra et al., 2004). One indirect measure of brain serotonin function in humans involves administering a spinal tap and extracting a serotonin metabolite called 5-Hydroxyindoleacetic acid from the cerebrospinal fluid (CSF 5-HIAA). An initial study that reported an association between low CSF 5-HIAA and history of violent tendencies (Aberg et al., 1976) was followed by a string of reported associations between low CSF 5-HIAA with other impulsive/aggressive behavioral correlates in personality-disordered patients. These behavioral correlates included a history of impulsive assault, murder, and arson (Winkler et al., 1987). However, these associations have proven more difficult to detect in nonclinical samples, possibly because CSF metabolite measures provide, at best, an indirect measure of brain serotonin function (Cassano, 2004).

Another means of making inferences about brain serotonin in humans involves noninvasive challenges. For example, researchers have induced serotonin agonists such as fenfluramine into subjects' veins, which bind to serotonin receptors in the hypothalamus and cause release of the hormone prolactin from the pituitary gland into the peripheral circulation. Thus, the prolactin response to d-J-fenfluramine is thought to provide an index of brain serotonergic function. A number of studies conducted on this topic (but not all) have revealed inverse relationships between fenfluramine-induced prolactin release and indices of behavioral aggression and hostility in personality-disordered patients. Studies utilizing other serotonin agonists such as meta-chlorophenylpiperazine and ipsapirone have also revealed inverse associations with prolactin release and ratings of hostility in personality-disordered subjects (Cassano, 1998). Although current alcoholics was a potential confounding factor in many of these clinical studies, fenfluramine-induced prolactin release was also negatively related to life history of aggressions and MMPI-PLR associations in a large sample of healthy men, but positively related to NEO-PI-R conscientiousness (Marsch et al., 1999). These relationships were also observed in postmenopausal but not premenopausal women. The authors raised the possibility that circulating estrogens may have obscured prolactin secretion in premenopausal women.

In addition to examining the effects of serotonin agonists on neuroendocrinology, a few studies have examined the effects of these agents on brain function. For instance, investigators have observed lower levels of resting prefrontal glucose metabolism in borderline personality-disordered subjects relative to healthy volunteers with positron emission tomography (PET). The magnitude of these reductions in prefrontal cortical activity was inversely correlated with life history of aggressions (Kopar et al., 1994). The issue of these reductions is unclear since some evidence suggests that reduced frontal metabolism may result from prior trauma (e.g., due to physical abuse, accidental injury, or other insults), which has frequently been observed in murderers and other violent individuals (Brewer and Phin, 2001). While injection of

serotonin agonist increased glucose utilization in prefrontal regions (i.e., orbitofrontal, medial prefrontal, and anterior cingulate cortex) in healthy volunteers, this enhancement was blunted in patients with impulsive-aggressive personality disorders (Swerer et al., 1995; Seloff et al., 2000). Finally, recent PET studies of healthy volunteers utilizing serotonin ligands have reported negative correlations between basal serotonin binding in cortical regions and the anxiety subscale of NEO-PI-R neuroticism (Tsekhier et al., 2001). Together, these findings support a possible link between brain serotonin function and traits characterized by impulsive-aggressive behavior. In terms of personality traits, such a "low serotonin" phenotype might show increased neuroticism and disinhibition (Kraemer et al., 1999).

Dopamine. Correlational fluid measures of the dopamine (DA) metabolite homovanillic acid (CSF HVA) have revealed that patients with schizotypal personality disorder have increased CSF HVA, relative to healthy volunteers. Further, the number of psychotic symptoms (e.g., suspiciousness, ideas of reference, magical thinking) shown by patients with schizotypal personality disorders correlated positively with CSF HVA levels (Swerer et al., 1995).

Although no neuroendocrine challenge studies involving dopamine agonists have involved schizotypal patients, behavioral responses to injections of the dopamine release/hypothalamic blocker amphetamine have been examined. Specifically, patients with comorbid border-line and schizotypal personality disorders show psychotic symptoms in response to amphetamine injections, while patients with borderline personality disorder alone do not (Schultz et al., 1998). Thus, while there is less data regarding dopamine function in personality disorders than serotonin function, the existing data provide some evidence of dopaminergic dysregulation in schizotypal subjects, as has been reported in schizophrenia.

Our nonchallenge challenge study of healthy volunteers found a positive correlation between DA agonist (bromocriptine)-induced prolactin release and a trait variable called positive emotionality (Depue et al., 1994). Positive emotionality correlates with NEO-PI-R extraversion and it could be conceptualized as the inverse of DAFF introversion (see Table 3-2). PET studies suggest that dopamine ligand binding may be negatively related to psychometric indices of interpersonal detachment in the patients (Fusar-Poli et al., 1997) and positively related to psychometric indices of novelty-seeking in the normals (Sabatti et al., 2001), suggesting links between basal dopamine function and traits similar to NEO-PI-R extraversion. Further, a recent study combining both PET and a challenge with the dopamine release/hypothalamic blocker amphetamine revealed a positive correlation between ventral striatal dopamine release and the personality trait of novelty seeking-exploratory-curiosity, which is conceptually similar to NEO-PI-R extraversion (Leggett et al., 2002). Together, this preliminary neurobiological evidence implies a positive relationship between extraversion in healthy volunteers and dopaminergic function, particularly in the ventral striatum.

Melanopsin, acetylcholine, and Peptides. Although CSF measures of the serotonergic metabolite 5-methoxy-4-hydroxyphenylglycol (CSF 5-MHPG) were

reported to correlate with life history of aggression in a sample of personality-disordered subjects, covariance analyses revealed that most of this relationship could be statistically accounted for by mutations in TEP-NR3A (Cassano et al., 1999). One study investigating the effects of the norepinephrine alpha-2 receptor agonist clonidine on the release of hypothalamic growth hormone release revealed a relationship with self-reported "irritability" in both personality-disordered patients and healthy volunteers (Cassano et al., 1991), but this effect seems to be replicated.

Only one study has focused on the effects of an acetylcholinergic challenge in personality-disordered patients. The investigators reported that injections of physostigmine, which increases brain acetylcholine by inhibiting the enzyme acetylcholinesterase, increased self-reported depressive symptoms in borderline patients but not in healthy volunteers (Strubing et al., 1997). In the only investigation of a neuropeptide in personality-disordered patients, Cassano et al. (1998) found a significant positive correlation between CSF measures of neuropeptides and life history of aggression and aggression against other people in particular. Notably, this association could not be accounted for by covarying out associations of neuropeptide measures with life history of aggression (Cassano et al., 1998).

Genetic Correlates

Research has also begun to focus on associations between genetic polymorphisms and personality traits. These polymorphisms may be either functional (i.e., they may encode for a specific protein) or not. Cloninger has developed a theory that explicitly links biological brain function with personality traits (Cloninger, 1987). In the first version of this theory, which included only passively "independent" traits, Cloninger hypothesized that a trait called novelty seeking would be related to dopamine function, a trait called locus avoidance would be related to serotonin function, and a trait called reward dependence would be related to noradrenergic function. Cloninger and colleagues also developed a questionnaire to measure these three constructs called the Tridimensional Personality Questionnaire (TPQ). An initial study reporting an association between a polymorphism of the dopamine-4 receptor gene (*D4DR*) and individual differences in a combination of high NAO-PHR activation and low conscientiousness (both purported to index aspects of TPQ novelty seeking) appeared to support this theory (Elstein et al., 1999). While a meta-analysis of follow-up studies revealed a subsequent failure to replicate this particular association, it did support some evidence for an association of a different functional polymorphism in the upstream promoter region of the *D4DR* gene (E-RITE) with TPQ novelty seeking (Elstein et al., 2002).

Unfortunately, no studies have psychometrically related Cloninger's TPQ traits to those measured by either the NAO-PHR or the DAPB-BQ. This may be partially due to the fact that both Cloninger's theory and measures have since undergone at least two major revisions, expanding from three to five and then six traits in the process. However, accumulating evidence does appear to support a second set of relationships between NAO-PHR measurements as well as possibly conscientiousness and a functional polymorphism of a gene that regulates the expression of the serotonin receptor mechanism 5-HT2A/PBR (Louch et al., 1998; Murphy et al., 2001).

While these initial findings are intriguing, biogenic amino function is complex and necessarily involves many physiological processes including gene expression, intracellular signaling, transduction and release of neurotransmitters, changes in the number and affinity of postsynaptic receptors, and enzymatic breakdown or recycling of released neurotransmitter. Different genetic polymorphisms could affect any or all of these steps, and many other polymorphisms remain to be examined. Additionally, currently popular statistical methods primarily deal with single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) or point mutations, and are only beginning to address multi-variate interactions such as multiple loci and gene-gene interactions, which could play important roles in generating complex phenotypes such as personality traits (Koenig et al., 1998). Further, other neural systems besides the biogenic amino (e.g., amino acids, neuropeptides) undoubtedly play important roles in the expression of trait phenotypes. The present gap between heritability estimates for personality traits (~30 percent) and SNP effects (less than 1 to 3 percent) may merit further but may also indicate that existing classifiers are flawed.

HOW CAN "DISORDERED PERSONALITY" BE TREATED?

Studies of physiological correlates of personality disorder symptoms cannot establish causality. They have open the question of whether the physiological correlate leads to symptoms, whether the symptoms produce the physiological correlate, or both. Causal evidence for a physiological effect on personality disorder symptoms might come from double-blind studies in which neurotransmitter function is selectively manipulated and changes in specific symptoms are monitored. A few relevant studies have been conducted in humans. Based on the evidence presented above, one might hypothesize that serotonin interventions should ameliorate symptoms related to impulsive aggression that are commonly observed in personality disorders such as borderline personality disorder, while dopa-agonistic interventions might reduce psychiatric symptoms that sometimes accompany subclinical personality disorders.

Four placebo-controlled double-blind studies have examined the effects of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) on personality disorder symptoms. In the first, fluoxetine treatment reduced the anger of 13 borderline patients, relative to 9 placebo-treated patients (Salzman et al., 1998). A second preliminary study reported general efficacy of fluoxetine in the treatment of borderline personality disorder in reducing a number of symptoms, including anger and aggression (Bullock et al., 1995). In the third study, fluoxetine treatment reduced verbal aggression and aggression against objects in 20 personality-disordered patients, relative to 20 placebo-treated patients (Ciccare and Karman, 1997). In a fourth study, fluoxetine treatment reduced manic symptoms (depression, irritability, and anxiety) but not impulsivity or aggression in 20 women with borderline disorder, relative to 18 placebo-treated patients (Kline et al., 2002).

If traits that promote impulsive aggression in personality disorders are continuous with "normal" personality traits, then SSRI administration should also affect these traits in healthy individuals. Only two studies have examined the effects of chronic SSRI

treatment in healthy volunteers with placebo-controlled double-blind designs. The first revealed that propantheline treatment reduced indices of hostility (and more generally, negative activated mood), as well as enhanced a behavioral index of aggression in 16 healthy volunteers, relative to 25 placebo-treated controls (Kunstler et al., 1998). The second reported that citalopram treatment increased behavioral indices of both cooperation and dominance in 10 healthy volunteers, relative to 10 placebo-treated controls, although mood was not significantly affected (Lin and Bond, 2002). These studies provide some preliminary evidence that brain serotonin function may play a role in mediating personality traits related to neuroticism and/or agreeableness and to support the notion of continuity between healthy personality traits and those that contribute to severe personality disorder symptoms.

In two large placebo-controlled double-blind studies, dopamine-blocking neuroleptics reduced psychotic symptoms (as well as anxiety) in patients with borderline and/or schizotypal personality disorder (Goldberg et al., 1996; Seloff et al., 1998). However, more recent studies have shown either mixed or no efficacy for neuroleptic versus placebo treatment in personality-disordered patients (Cordery and Gardner, 1998; Seloff et al., 1999). Administration of neuroleptics may be most efficacious in highly impaired schizotypal patients with prominent psychotic symptoms. Further, studies that indicate a relationship between dopamine activity and extraversion in healthy volunteers raise the concern that dopamine blockers may have the unintended side effects of decreasing motivation and sociability in some patients.

Other psychoactive medications have proven effective in personality-disordered patients who do not respond to SSRIs or neuroleptics. For instance, lithium carbonate has been shown to reduce behavioral aggression in prison inmates with a probable diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder, relative to prisoners treated with placebo (Edwards et al., 1997). On the other hand, agents that increase dopaminergic or norepinephrine activity, in addition to anxiolytics, may increase "typical dyscontrol" in patients with borderline personality disorder, and so are not recommended as first-line for this group (Cordery and Gardner, 1998).

In summary, mounting evidence suggests that serotonin receptor blockers modulate the expression of traits related to impulsive aggression in both patients with personality disorders and in healthy volunteers. The evidence for the utility of dopamine antagonists for treated patients with schizotypal personality disorder is more mixed. Regardless of the efficacy of a given pharmacotherapeutic intervention, neurotherapeutic systems modulate and guide learning over the life span, so psychotherapy in conjunction with pharmacotherapy probably provides the optimum platform for patients to explore more intratemporal patterns of socioemotional behavior.

We should note here that personality disorders were placed on Axis II rather than Axis I because of their putative chronicity and inflexibility. Even clinicians who consider personality disorders to be malleable generally concur that they are among the most difficult of psychiatric diagnoses to treat. This is probably for good reason. In addition to their chronicity, inflexibility, and maladaptation, some personality disorders are masked by patients' inability to reflect on or acknowledge their complexity in their own defenses (Sill, although only a few clinical controlled trials exist for either

psychotherapy, pharmacotherapy, or combined treatment protocols of personality disorders, existing evidence does suggest that therapists can offer patients some relief from personality disorder symptoms (Santorus and McElroy, 1995). We contend here that better methods of assessing personality disorders and more precise physiological models of their symptoms may lead to better targeted and thus more effective treatments. Ultimately, we suspect that the most effective treatment will be multifaceted, including some combination of a supportive therapeutic alliance, pharmacotherapy as a short-term tool for forestalling affective or impulsive reactions, and cognitive-behavioral training as a long-term means of replacing maladaptive patterns of behaving and interacting.

SUMMARY

Although the scientific study of personality disorders is at an early phase, research provides some preliminary answers for a number of the questions raised in this chapter. First, in addition to diagnostic specification by the DSM-IV criteria, personality disorders can be pervasively characterized with a limited number of continuous trait dimensions using psychometrically sound instruments (Lounsbury et al., 1993). Second, healthy personality can also be characterized in terms of a limited number of continuous dimensions using psychometric instruments. Third, the content domain of personality disorder symptoms and personality traits overlaps and can be characterized in terms of four independent traits: introversion, neuroticism, disagreeableness, and conscientiousness (but not necessarily openness). Fourth, preliminary research on physiological correlates of personality disorder symptoms suggests that low autonomic function may be associated with neuroticism and disagreeableness, while low dopamine function may be associated with introversion. Fifth, serotonin mechanisms appear to affect symptoms related to neuroticism and disagreeableness, while the effects of dopamine interventions on introversion have received less characterization, both in personality disorders and healthy samples.

While these answers provide some clarifications, they also raise further questions. Instead of new theories or measures, perhaps what is needed most at the present is integration across different levels of analysis (Depue and Collins, 1996; Krueger et al., 1996). Despite the incompleteness of our knowledge regarding the description, causes, development, and treatment of personality disorders, the advent of psychometrically sound measures of personality disorder symptoms can provide an anchor for integrative analysis. These symptom-based measures may also provide optimal endpoints for validating physiological mechanisms that can promote, perpetuate, and even prevent personality disorders.

POSTSCRIPT: A VIEW TO THE FUTURE

We begin this chapter by noting advances in measurement and technology at the turn of the 21st century. Conceptual advances, too, are afoot. Both experimental psychologists

and biological psychiatrists are turning from strict focus on behavior and cognition to interpretate emotion. Spurred by comparative research, the idea of emotional operating systems in the brain offers fertile ground for generating hypotheses about mechanisms that might mediate connections between genes and traits (Psychop, 1998).

Recurring basic emotional experiences may constitute key features of many of the maladaptations in both healthy personality and in personality disorders. For instance, in the rubric of the five-factor model of personality (see Table 3.2), anger might provide a core theme of neuroticism, playfulness of extraversion, and anger or disagreementness. These associations can be verified not only psychometrically with measures designed to index emotional operating systems (Davidson et al., in press) but also visually with brain-imaging methods that afford the necessary spatio-temporal resolution for visualizing the ongoing activity of emotional circuits (Carli et al., 2001; Ruisan et al., 1999).

In the case of hostile and antisocial personality disorders, anger provides an especially relevant example. The chronic experience of anger constitutes a prominent feature of the personality trait neuroticism and disagreeableness. Accordingly, angry behavior may involve both negative emotion and lack of constraint. These phenomena may stem from a combination of hypoactivity in still vaguely defined threat-processing regions of the subcortex (e.g., the amygdala and medial hypothalamus) and hypoactivity of inhibitory regions of the ventral prefrontal cortex (Davidson et al., 2000). Certainly, in both comparative and human research, frontal lobe damage can potentiate aggressive outbursts, while treatment with serotonergic agents, which enhances resting prefrontal metabolism, can diminish their frequency (Llimona and Charney, 2000). In addition, peptides (e.g., substance P, vasoactive) and hormones (e.g., testosterone) may prime activity in subcortical circuits related to aggressive behavior in comparative models (Pettit et al., 1997; Siegel et al., 1998), and so may present promising pharmacotherapeutic targets for the future. An emotional systems perspective may thus inform both the diagnosis and treatment of personality disorders.

While applications of emotion theory may successfully generalize to the clinic, they may also inadvertently raise ethical issues (Fridell, 2002). What if core features of personality disorders could be diagnosed with a brain scan? What if problematic behaviors could be selectively altered with pharmacological manipulations? At what point do people require treatment? Should effects that result by administration to people who don't want to change? These emerging ethical questions underline the need for the researchers and clinicians to work together toward a optimally combining of technological wisdom and human compassion in treating disorders of personality.

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FUNCTIONAL NEUROIMAGING IN PSYCHIATRY

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INTRODUCTION

Historically, structural brain abnormalities have been of primary interest in research in the field of psychiatric diseases. However, the development of radioactive labeled compounds and appropriate detection devices has enabled researchers to study the underlying pathophysiology, in particular metabolic and neurochemical brain alterations of psychiatric diseases *in vivo* in humans. Isotopes can be incorporated into biological compounds to measure blood flow, glucose and amino acid metabolism, or to quantitatively analyze neurotransmitter receptors in psychiatric patients. Furthermore, both single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) and positron emission computed tomography (PET) allow *in vivo* assessment of psychotropic drug effects in animals and humans, providing a better understanding of drug effects. Thus, the introduction of functional neuroimaging with radioisotopes as well as functional

magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) has led to a remarkable increase in knowledge about brain function in psychiatric diseases.

This chapter provides an overview of major recent advances in the use of functional neuroimaging, with radionuclides as well as with MRI, while also pointing out how these findings impact (or don't) on clinical psychiatry at the "bedside."

MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING

Since its inception in 1973, magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) has been a revolutionary development in its scope and utility. The range of parameters that may be mapped using nuclear magnetic resonance has continued to increase and currently spans such phenomena as proton density measurement, nuclear magnetic relaxation times T1 (longitudinal relaxation times) and T2 (transverse relaxation times), flow in large vessels, diffusion, perfusion, temperature, blood volume, and blood oxygenation. All of the above-mentioned parameters have applications of clinical relevance, and many of them are in routine use. Clinical MRI is likely to move on from its current role simply as a structural technique for visualizing pathology, since researchers have now developed methods used to measure dynamic or functional aspects of human physiology. One of the significant applications of dynamic-functional MRI is in the visualization of localized neuronal activity, inferred through its physiological correlates, such as accompanying changes in cerebral blood volume, cerebral blood perfusion, and cerebral blood oxygenation.

The investigation of neuronal activity via fMRI is based on three main principles: (1) blood volume imaging techniques, (2) blood flow imaging techniques, and (3) blood oxygenation imaging techniques—the last of these being the most commonly used.

Blood Volume Imaging Techniques

For some years now, bolus injections of delayed contrast agents, in particular gadolinium diethylenetriamine pentaacetic acid, have been used to assess regional cerebral blood volume, and, when the mean transit time of the contrast agent through the brain is known, cerebral blood flow. The high paramagnetic nature of these contrast agents alters the relaxation processes of water molecules in their surroundings. Changes are evident as a shortening in the relaxation times, and it is this shortening that is used to obtain a qualitative map of regional cerebral blood volume. The major disadvantages of this technique are the necessity of repeated bolus injections of a contrast agent, the potential for subject motion between injections to mask any regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) changes, and the limited number of neurological states that can be studied in a single session.

Blood Flow Imaging Techniques

This second class of imaging technique gains its contrast from the presence of moving spins, and in particular from water molecules in blood that have been magnetically

labeled. When the perturbed water molecules pass through capillaries in the slice of interest, they diffuse into the brain tissue, where they exchange with extracellular tissue water molecules and cause an sharing of the image signal intensity from that which would be seen had the arterial spins not been tagged. Though this effect is quite subtle, in a carefully designed experiment the signal change can be detected, and an rCBF map calculated. Such spin "tagging" sequences can theoretically yield a quantitative measure of rCBF, but are more often used to generate qualitative relative rCBF maps.

Blood Oxygenation Imaging Techniques

Another method that provides images that may be used as indicators for neuronal activity is that of blood oxygenation dependent (BOLD) contrast. The underlying mechanism in BOLD contrast imaging is similar to that of blood volume mapping by intravascular paramagnetic contrast agents described above. The major difference is that blood itself is used as the intravascular contrast agent, or, more specifically, the change in the blood deoxyhemoglobin concentration provides the magnetic signal. Oxygenated hemoglobin has a magnetic susceptibility close to that of tissue, whereas deoxygenated hemoglobin has a susceptibility higher than that of oxygenated hemoglobin. The difference in the susceptibility is high enough to cause blood vessels to show a measurable signal when the local oxygenation level falls. During neuronal stimulation it has been shown that blood flow increases substantially, whereas oxygen consumption is not increased as much. This leads to an increase in the concentration of oxygenated blood in capillaries and vessels close to areas where neurons are active, relative to their resting state. Since the susceptibility of oxygenated hemoglobin is closer to that of brain tissue, a decrease in the strength of the microscopic gradients and a concomitant increase in MRI signal intensity is noted during neuronal activity. This is the basis of the postulated mechanism for BOLD image contrast.

PET AND SPECT

Both SPECT and PET use radioactive-labeled ligands and radio detection devices to quantitatively analyze brain metabolism or neurotransmitter receptors. The major difference between the two is in terms of spatial resolution and the ability for absolute quantification. In PET the radiolabel is incorporated in naturally occurring elements carbon, oxygen, nitrogen, giving it versatility. PET cameras provide higher spatial resolution (~ 5 mm), and with the use of arterial sampling it is possible to achieve absolute quantification of metabolopharmacologic parameters. However, this comes at a cost. Positron emitters have relatively brief half-lives, necessitating the use of an on-site cyclotron to produce short-lived isotopes (~ 2 min for ^{15}O) and ~ 20 min for ^{11}C), or sophisticated logistics in the case of longer acting ones (~ 100 min for ^{18}F). Additionally, a PET center requires the capability for incorporating these isotopes into the desired tracer compound quickly, and immediately applying the tracer to a test subject.

SPECT, on the other hand, uses much longer lived isotopes such as ^{113}In ($t_{1/2} \approx 10$ hr), and for some purposes also ^{119}Tc , which although short-lived itself, may usually be obtained from a longer lived precursor. The latter can be produced off-site and shipped to the location of use, thereby posing much lesser technical demands than PET. However, SPECT isotopes are not biological constituents of most molecules degradable in tissues, thus restricting the availability of useful tracer substances. Also, compared to PET, SPECT applications allow less accurate, sometimes called "semiquantitative," estimation of labeled structures and are restricted by the relatively low resolution of the procedure. Thus, in practice, PET has largely been used as a research tool, whereas SPECT has established itself as a clinical diagnostic modality.

In principle, radiotracer-based neuroimaging studies can be broadly divided into two categories. The first and more commonly used category is constituted by studies attempting to visualize blood flow, glucose, or amino acid metabolic processes thought to represent the "activation" of specific brain regions. The Isotopes commonly used for this purpose, such as $^{133}\text{Xe}/\text{IMPAC}$ for SPECT or $^{15}\text{O}/\text{H}_2\text{O}$ and $^{18}\text{F}/\text{FDG}$ for PET, represent cerebral blood flow ($^{133}\text{Xe}/\text{IMPAC}$, $^{15}\text{O}/\text{H}_2\text{O}$), an indirect measure of cerebral metabolism, or, more directly, neuronal glucose uptake ($^{18}\text{F}/\text{FDG}$). The second category, which may be termed "neurotransmitter imaging," employs receptor-specific ligands in order to investigate the concentration of available receptors (the "binding potential"), endogenous ligand concentration, or the pharmacodynamics and pharmacokinetics of psychotropic drugs.

Interpretation of Acquired Data

Both SPECT and PET images are generated to represent different signal intensities in diverse brain regions as variations in brightness or color. Because the acquired images are functional representations, their interpretation with respect to identification of specific active areas, requires a correlation with the underlying structural anatomy of the brain. There are several different approaches to correlating the relatively poor anatomical resolution of these procedures. The first is to delineate a "region of interest" (ROI) around an area of predicted change on a composite PET image or on a co-registered MRI scan, allowing for comparison of the previously defined, sometimes arbitrary abnormals, brain areas. Lately, this method has been further developed by superimposing MRI-based templates on PET scans to more reliably identify anatomical structures or regions (Siegel et al., 1990; Reznick et al., 1990). In order to estimate specific tracer uptake, different tracer binders must be applied. After specific binding is compared to nonspecific and free radioligand in a reference region thought to be free of specific binding, which can be performed with a simplified reference tissue model (Lammertsma and Hume, 1990), or, less desirable for studies in psychiatric patients, a full arterial model relating the arterial input function through arterial cannulation and time-consuming metabolite measurements. The parameter of interest for all models is the binding potential (BP), which is defined as the number of available binding sites ($N_{B_{\text{max}}}$) over the dissociation constant (K_d), or affinity (Albers et al., 1988).

Another approach aims at using a "voxel-wise" analysis of the brain. A voxel represents the smallest volume unit that can be reconstructed depending on the spatial

resolution of a scanner. For a voxel-by-voxel comparison, parametric images representing the binding potential in any given voxel need to be generated. In addition, these parametric images need to be smoothed and normalized into a standardized three-dimensional coordinate system, such as one based on the Talairach brain atlas (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988) or the standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) brain space. This can be done using Statistical Parametric Mapping version 99 (Friston et al., 1999) (SPM99) and a ligand-specific template (Meyer et al., 1999). Results can subsequently be displayed as probability maps, in which areas of significant difference in activation changes in baseline condition (*i.e.*, cocaine) are graphically displayed.

STUDIES OF CEREBRAL METABOLISM AND BLOOD FLOW

Since the introduction of radioactive-based neuroimaging techniques more than 20 years ago, a number of studies have attempted to improve our understanding of the underlying biology of mental processes in normal volunteers and humans suffering from psychiatric disorders through examining changes in cerebral metabolism and rCBF during active drug paradigm as compared to a baseline condition. These activation patterns are thought to represent changes in the neuronal activity of the corresponding brain regions, for instance, memory processing (Fukui et al., 1994). Studies of blood flow and metabolism depend on comparisons of relative changes. Studies of cerebral blood flow and metabolism have examined changes in global cerebral blood flow and hemispheric symmetry as well as in many specific cortical and subcortical regions such as the frontal lobe, temporal lobe, various limbic structures (*i.e.*, the hippocampal formation, amygdala, and nucleus accumbens), cingulate gyrus, parafascicular lobes, occipital lobe, basal ganglia, thalamus, and cerebellum. Although a variety of psychiatric entities have been examined in this fashion, by far the greatest body of literature has been accumulated on affective disorders and schizophrenia.

Studies of Cerebral Metabolism and Blood Flow in Depression

Because changes in rCBF and metabolism are thought to represent activation of the affected brain regions, neuroimaging studies endeavor to study the involvement of specific brain regions in generating or modulating psychological phenomena such as mood and affect, drive, motivation, and memory, which are the main psychological functions affected in the clinical presentation of mood disorders. For this reason, it has been the main focus of such studies to identify specific functional neuroanatomical circuits and pathological changes that may represent the biological basis of mood and related disorders. By now, a considerable body of evidence has accumulated that has led to the formulation of a neuroanatomical model of mood regulation comprising the prefrontal cortex, amygdala-hypothalamic complex, thalamus, and basal ganglia as the main regions involved. In addition to the evidence provided by *in vivo* neuroimaging studies, these brain areas were found to have extensive interconnections in postmortem studies. It now appears that two main neuroanatomical circuits are responsible for the

regulation of mood functions. The first is a limbic-thalamic-cortical circuit including the amygdala, nucleus caeruleus of the thalamus, and the medial and ventral prefrontal cortex. The second is a limbic-striatal-pallidal-thalamic-cortical circuit including the striatum, ventral pallidum, and a number of regions also involved in the first circuit mentioned. The evidence from functional neuroimaging studies implicating the involvement of these two circuits has been summarized in several extensive reviews (e.g., Drivets, 2000; Saxe and Mann, 1997).

The cingulate gyrus seems to play a central role among the findings of recent studies. Hypermetabolism in the ventral anterior cingulate cortex is predictive of good response to treatment with antidepressant drugs, while hypermetabolism of the same region is predictive of nonresponse (Pitkänen, 2001). Another particularly interesting finding has been the demonstration of an inverse reciprocal relationship in the activities of subgenual cingulate cortex and the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex through changes from the depressed to euthymic mood state and vice versa. These two areas, both part of the above-mentioned circuits, have been shown to change dramatically in activation with change in functional mood states. An increased activation of the first of these two regions, the subgenual cingulate cortex, has been found to represent a marker for mild or depressed mood that requires upper ventilation, while increased activation of the other, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, has repeatedly been found to represent a marker of attentional processing (and, incidentally, metabolic normalization of this region has also been reported to be a marker of antidepressant treatment effects). These findings contribute to and support a comprehensive neurobiological model of the pathophysiology of depression, which so far has not been possible to replicate to the same extent for any other psychiatric condition. These findings may therefore also be seen as representative of the possibilities afforded by neuroimaging techniques toward advancing our understanding of the physiology and pathophysiology of mental functioning (also see Chapters 2 and 7).

Studies of Cerebral Metabolism and Blood Flow in Anxiety Disorders

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD). A dysfunctional corticostrato-thalamic-cortical circuitry may play an important role in this disorder (Rauch and Simonoff, 1994; Rauch et al., 1995). According to this model, the primary pathology affects subcortical structures (striatum/thalamus), which leads to inefficient gating and results in hypoactivity within the orbitofrontal cortex and also within the anterior cingulate cortex. Compulsions are conceptualized as repetitive behaviors that are ultimately performed in order to reveal the inefficient circuitry to achieve thalamic gating and hence to neutralize the unwanted thoughts and anxiety. PET and SPECT studies have consistently indicated that patients with OCD exhibit increased regional brain activity within subcortical and anterior cingulate cortex, in comparison with normal control subjects (Bentin et al., 1988; Martirosian et al., 1991; Noshita et al., 1989; Rubin et al., 1992; Simeone et al., 1992). Observed differences in regional activity within the caudate nucleus have been less consistent (Kender et al., 1990; Rubin et al., 1992). Pre- and posttreatment studies have reported treatment-associated attenuation of abnormal

brain activity within orbito-frontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and caudate nucleus (Baxter et al., 1992; Fischl et al., 1990; Schwartz et al., 1996; Freedman et al., 1992). In addition, both pharmacological and behavioral interventions appear to be associated with similar brain activity changes (Baxter et al., 1992; Schwartz et al., 1996). SPECT neuroimaging studies using PET (McClure et al., 1994) as well as fMRI (Leckman et al., 1998) have also most consistently shown increased brain activity within anterior-lateral orbitofrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and caudate nucleus during the OCD symptomatic state.

Cognitive activation studies using PET and fMRI have provided functional integrity of the cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical circuitry in OCD. In these studies patients with OCD performed implicit learning paradigms that have been shown to reliably recruit striatum in healthy individuals (Blanchard et al., 1995a, 1997c). In both studies, patients with OCD failed to recruit striatum normally and instead activated medial temporal regions typically associated with conscious information processing. Taken together, these neuroimaging findings are consistent with dysfunctions of a cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical circuitry and support the view of a primary striatal pathology and striato-thalamic insufficiency, together with orbitofrontal hyperactivity in OCD.

Social and Specific Phobias. Relatively few imaging studies have investigated specific phobias. Most have employed PET imaging. While one study failed to demonstrate changes in rCBF (Sahakian et al., 1993), results from others suggested activation of anterior parahippocampal regions (Kazdin et al., 1993a) and amygdala nuclei (Prestwich et al., 1999; Wilk et al., 1993) corresponding to stimulus influx associated with a symptomatic state. Although such results are consistent with a hyperarousal hypothesis for assessment of or response to specific threatening cues, they do not provide clear anatomic substrates for the pathophysiology of specific phobia. Whereas one SPECT study of patients with social phobia and healthy control subjects found no significant between-group difference during resting conditions (Jonsen and Lenze, 1998), more recent cognitive activation neuroimaging studies revealed exaggerated reactivity of medial temporal lobe structures in human face stimuli (Furukawa et al., 1998; Sahakian et al., 1999). This hyperreactivity may reflect a neural substrate for social anxiety.

The isotope (^{18}O) was used in one PET study to measure rCBF in 18 patients with social phobia and a nonphobic comparison group while they were speaking in front of an audience and in private (Tullius et al., 2001). During public versus private speaking, subject reactivity increased more in the social phobics, and their increased activity was accompanied by enhanced rCBF in the amygdala. Conversely, rCBF decreased in the social phobics and increased in the comparison subjects more during public than private speaking in the orbito-frontal and insular cortices, as well as in the temporal pole, and increased less in the social phobics than in the comparison group in the parietal and secondary visual cortex. In summary, rCBF patterns of relatively increased cortical rather than subcortical perfusion were observed in the nonphobic subjects, indicating that cortical evaluative processes were used by public performers. In contrast, the social phobia symptom profile was associated with increased subcortical activity. Thus,

the authors proposed that the functional neuro-anatomy of social phobia involves the activation of a phylogenetically older danger recognition system (Tillis et al., 2001).

Another interesting PET study identified common changes in rCBF in patients with social phobia treated with clomipramine or cognitive-behavioral therapy (Purkayastha et al., 2002). Within both groups, and in responders regardless of treatment approach, improvement was accompanied by a decreased rCBF response to public speaking bilaterally in the amygdala, hippocampus, and the parahippocampal, frontal, and paralimbic cortical areas. The degree of amygdala-limbic attenuation was associated with clinical improvement a year later. The authors proposed that common sites of action for clomipramine and cognitive-behavioral treatment of social anxiety comprised the amygdala, hippocampus, and neighboring cortical areas, which are brain regions subserving healthy defense reactions to threat (Purkayastha et al., 2002).

Panic Disorder. Panic disorder (PD) may be characterized by fundamental amygdala hyperactivity to subtle environmental cues, triggering full-scale threat-related responses in the absence of conscious awareness. Resting-state neuroimaging studies have suggested abnormal hippocampal activity with abnormally low left:right ratios of parahippocampal blood flow and a rightward shift after treatment with imipramine (Purkayastha et al., 1998). One study demonstrated a reduced blood flow in hippocampal areas bilaterally (De Cesaris et al., 1999). In contrast, others have observed elevated metabolism in the left hippocampus and parahippocampal area (Bissig et al., 1998). SPECT imaging provocation studies have revealed reduced activity in widespread cortical regions, including prefrontal cortex, during symptomatic states (Fischer et al., 1998; Hoffman et al., 1998; Stewart et al., 1998; Wijngaards et al., 1998).

In a [¹¹³I] PET study, Meyer et al. (2000) found an increased left posterior parietal-temporal cortex activation after a challenge with D-tartarazine in 17 women with panic disorder. In particular, they found hypoactivity in the precentral gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, the right amygdala, and the anterior insula during anticipatory anxiety in PD patients. Hypoactivity in patients compared to control subjects was observed in the parahippocampal gyrus, the superior temporal lobe, the hypothalamus, the anterior cingulate gyrus, and the midbrain. After the tartarazine challenge, the patients showed decreases compared to the control subjects in the precentral gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the anterior insula. Regions of increased activity in the patients compared to the control subjects were the parahippocampal gyrus, the superior temporal lobe, the hypothalamus, the anterior cingulate gyrus, and the midbrain. Another [¹⁸F] PET study described specific rCBF differences between panic disorder patients and control subjects during anticipatory anxiety and rest (Rothbaum et al., 2002). During anticipatory anxiety there was hypoactivity in the precentral gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, the right amygdala, and the anterior insula in the PD patients. Hypoactivity in patients compared to control subjects was observed in the parahippocampal gyrus, the superior temporal lobe, the hypothalamus, the anterior cingulate gyrus, and the midbrain. After a panicogenic challenge, the patients showed decreases compared to the control subjects in the precentral gyrus, the inferior frontal gyrus, and the anterior insula. Regions of increased activity in the patients compared to the control subjects were the parahippocampal

gyrus, the superior temporal lobe, the anterior cingulate gyrus, and the midbrain. The authors concluded that the pattern of PCBF activations and deactivations observed both before and after the pentagastrin challenge was the same, although different in intensity (Pantelis et al., 2002).

Studies of Cerebral Metabolism and Blood Flow in Schizophrenia

The frontal lobes have played a prominent role in hypotheses of schizophrenia since the neuroimaging of the illness. Early functional neuroimaging studies, beginning with Lepage and Fransson's (1974) seminal finding that patients with schizophrenia had relatively lower blood flow to frontal regions, provided evidence for the involvement of the frontal lobes. Changes in blood flow in response to cognitive activation were also first observed in these early studies. A large number of activation studies were published over the past 15 years that report frontal lobe impairment in schizophrenia. The overwhelming majority of these investigations have detected abnormal prefrontal responses to a variety of cognitive activities designed to assess auditory verbal memory, particularly working memory. The prefrontal site most commonly affected is the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and, until recently, the physiologic abnormality in this brain region was consistently seen as hyperactivity (Archibald et al., 1991; Bowman et al., 1993; Buchanan et al., 1993, 1996; Carter-Osman et al., 1991; Daniel et al., 1991; O'Gorman et al., 1990; Lewis et al., 1992; Rubin et al., 1991; Volkwyk et al., 1997; Weinberger et al., 1990). However, the relative unanimity with which the schizophrenic prefrontal series had been reported as hyperfunctional, in the past several years, has given way to the notion that the observed neural responses in prefrontal cortex are more complex, including hyperfunction under some circumstances (Cullum et al., 2000; Hackens et al., 1998; Manuck et al., 2000). Some studies reported no between-group differences (Brown et al., 2000; Buckley et al., 1997; Curtis et al., 1999; D'Onofrio et al., 1999; Sypnies et al., 1999). Studies finding an abnormally increased prefrontal response have been primarily carried out with fMRI, rather than PET, and usually when the cognitive paradigm takes advantage of the temporal properties of fMRI in order to employ shorter blocks of task performance, easier cognitive task switching. This fact suggests that the anatomical or chemical perturbations of the schizophrenic prefrontal series can be masked by inappropriate overestimation of prefrontal neural activity during a relatively brief cognitive challenge with failure to sustain this recruitment over longer periods. However, regardless of the direction of prefrontal physiologic abnormality, the functional neuroimaging literature leaves little doubt that prefrontal pathology exists in schizophrenia.

A number of potential explanations for this pathology need to be considered. One potential confounding factor is antipsychotic medication, as the majority of studies was performed in nondeleptic treated patients. However, studies performed with first-degree relatives of patients with schizophrenia who have not been treated with antipsychotics have found similar frontal lobe functional abnormalities (Blackwood et al., 1999; Egan et al., 2001; O'Donnell et al., 1999), and frontal lobe abnormalities during cognition have been found in a number of studies of young patients who have never received neuroleptics (Archibald et al., 1997; Buchanan et al., 1992; Cudlitz et al., 1994; Rubin

et al., 1994). Thus, there is limited evidence that neuroleptics generate the observed functional (cortical) abnormalities.

Most previous among potential schizophrenia and controls examined has been the effect of poor performance. Considerable controversy has often ensued the possibility that patients' poor performance on the given task somehow causes the frontal pathophysiology, rather than the neurobiologically plausible explanation that underlying pathology is responsible for the poor performance. Studies were carried out in patients who, like schizophrenics, perform poorly on frontal lobe tasks but have disorders other than schizophrenia (Spirito et al., 1990, 1995; Goldberg et al., 1990; Schapiro et al., 1995). Results of these studies indicated that poor performance per se does not necessarily produce the picture seen in schizophrenia.

The temporal lobe is of interest in schizophrenia for several reasons. Disease of the medial temporal lobe can be associated with psychotic symptoms, and some neurophysiological aspects of schizophrenia implicate both lateral and medial temporal lobe structures. Although the data overall are less compelling than for the frontal lobe, and confounds and potential mechanisms are less well explored, a number of neuroimaging studies have reported functional abnormalities in both lateral and medial lobe structures (Galarza et al., 2000).

Studies of Cerebral Metabolism and Blood Flow in Dementia

Studies with FDG PET in Alzheimer's patients revealed a typical hypometabolism in noncortical structures, mainly the parietal, frontal, and posterior temporal association cortices, that is the same area where neuronal as well as synaptic degenerations are most severe in postmortem studies. In addition to the regional abnormalities, these patients also exhibit a global reduction of cerebral glucose metabolism. Metabolic changes in the posterior-temporal association cortex has been recognized as potentially diagnostic for Alzheimer's disease, and this recognition has facilitated the use of PET in clinical settings to evaluate patients with dementia. Also suggestive of dementia of Alzheimer's type (DAT) are bilateral, mainly in reduction in the parahippocampal association cortex, glucose metabolism reduction in the frontal association cortex, mainly in advanced disease, relative preservation of primary neocortical structures, such as the somatosensory and primary visual cortex, and also of subcortical structures, like basal ganglia, thalamus, and cerebellum, and variable presentation of metabolic reduction in the medial temporal cortex. A high diagnostic accuracy by FDG PET in the initial assessment of suspected DAT patients, and those who will subsequently be diagnosed with DAT, can be achieved by using such criteria as preferential and/or bilateral temporo-parietal hypometabolism. Longitudinal PET studies in DAT patients showed an expansion as well as an increased severity of hypometabolism in associated cortical areas and subcortical structures, and a close correlation between progressive metabolic reduction and impaired cognitive performance has been shown.

Recently, ligands were developed that bind to amyloid plaques, which are specific for DAT. 3-(1-[¹⁸F]-2-(2-mino)-3-iodophenoxy)allyl ibuprofen-18F (¹⁸F-FDDNP) in conjunction with PET allows for the determination of frontal lesions and load of neurofibrillary tangles (NFTs) and beta-amyloid senile plaques




Figure 12.12 PET scans in nine 26-patient family cohort with early AD (mean 20.6 years) show higher metabolic rate in the amygdala, hippocampus, cingulate, the amygdala, hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus in the non-demented cohort patients as measured compared with their spouses. Courtesy of Dr. John Toga and Prof. L.J. Thompson, and Department of Brain, Cell, and Behavior, University of California Los Angeles.

amyloid plaques/SDH in the brains of living Alzheimer's disease patients. Similarly, the Alzheimer's PET/CT scan provides evidence for AD's multi-stage nature at the earliest point of the disease (patients 0–10, 10–15). This observation highlights the continuing AD and MCI development. It is expected to facilitate diagnostic assessment of patients with Alzheimer's disease and assist in cognitive monitoring during drug development.

PROSPECTIVE CLINICAL TRIAL DESIGN STUDIES

Neuroimaging imaging studies employ specific ligands in a variety of all, short-term experimental protocols. For example, for low PET ligands ^{113}In -DTPA-EDTA and ^{113}In -DTPA-EDTA have been validated for Alzheimer's disease, although ^{113}In -DTPA-EDTA might be bind only to the presynaptic form of the DA receptor whereas ^{113}In -DTPA-EDTA ligand is thought to reflect both the presynaptic and the postsynaptic form of the

receptor. In addition, D₂ receptors, although usually localized to the cell membrane, may also be internalized in cell vesicles. While [¹⁸F]dopa-DOPE is thought to bind only the membrane-bound receptors, [¹⁸F]N-methylspiperone may also bind to internalized receptors because of its greater lipophilicity. As should be evident from this example, one ligand may be preferable to another depending on the specific question to be examined in a study. Data acquired using one ligand may not simply be extrapolated to another. Therefore, knowledge of both the ligands and the methodological approaches is necessary in order to avoid type I errors and interpretational mistakes. A brief overview of the ligands and methodological approaches used most frequently in psychiatric neuroimaging studies can be found in Tables 6.1 and 6.2.

TABLE 6.1. Commonly Used Radiotracers for Neurotransmitter Imaging with PET and SPECT

SPECT-Ligand	Application	PET-Ligand
[¹²³ I]M-CIT	DAT and MHTT	[¹⁸ F]fluoride
[¹²³ I]meta-I-CIT	S-MTT	[¹⁸ F]methylspiperone
[¹²³ I]iodobenzodiazepine	S-MT ₁ , receptors	[¹⁸ F]iodobenzodiazepine
—	S-MT ₂ , receptors	[¹⁸ F]iodobenzodiazepine
[¹²³ I]IBZP	Dopamine D ₂ receptors	[¹⁸ F]iodobenzodiazepine
[¹²³ I]IBZM	Dopamine D ₂ receptors	[¹⁸ F]N-methylspiperone
[¹²³ I]Cephalopride	Reinforced D ₂ receptors	[¹⁸ F]Cephalopride
[¹²³ I]benztropine	Dopamine D ₂ receptors	[¹⁸ F]benztropine
[¹²³ I]DOPETEP - ECPI	DASB _{2A} , receptor	[¹⁸ F]benztropine

TABLE 6.2. Applications of Functional Neuroimaging in Neuropsychiatric Research

Method	Application
Radioisotopes	Distribution in brain and other regions
Radioisotopes in tracer drug application	Concentration of binding sites in brain and other tissues (= binding potential)
Combination of a tracer with a drug for binding sites	Relative receptor occupancy of the drug
Simultaneous use of a drug and a tracer with affinity to a different neurotransmitter system (¹⁸ F-DOPA, ¹⁸ F-DPAO, or ¹⁸ F-FDG)	Effect of the drug on other neurotransmitter systems
Controlled enzyme substrates	Regional cerebral blood flow or metabolism; indirect demonstration of enzyme activity or cerebral metabolism

The two best investigated neurotransmitter systems in psychiatry are the serotonin and dopamine systems, followed by the noradrenergic and cholinergic systems, and to a much lesser extent also the glutamatergic, GABAergic, and gaseous systems. In addition, the opioid and endogenous cannabinoid systems are sometimes also of interest for psychiatric neuroimaging studies, primarily for investigations into the neurobiology of substance use and abuse.

Neurotransmitter Imaging of the Dopamine System

The classical psychiatric disorder primarily affecting the dopaminergic system is schizophrenia. Beyond that, dopamine is also thought to play a major role in substance abuse and the neurobiology of addiction, as well as in Tourette syndrome. A comprehensive review summarizing the state of knowledge on the involvement of dopamine in psychiatric and neurologic disorders was recently published (Volkow E., 1999) and, although missing the more recently acquired knowledge, it is recommended to readers with special interest in the subject.

Dopamine and Schizophrenia. The dopamine hypothesis of schizophrenia (also see Chapter 9) was first formulated by Carlsson and Lindqvist (1963). The central role for dopaminergic transmission in the pathophysiological model of schizophrenia has since been substantiated and developed by numerous later research papers, many of which were made possible by the new methodological possibilities afforded by the introduction of SPECT and PET into clinical research. Carlsson and Lindqvist speculated that schizophrenia would be characterized by a hyperactivity of dopaminergic transmission. The expression of this central idea has by now been well demonstrated in a number of PET investigations showing an increase in the level of both tonic and phasic mesocortical dopaminergic transmission in schizophrenic patients (Abe-Dargatz et al., 2000; Opte and Wong, 2001; Lenzi et al., 1996).

After more than 25 years of discussion about possible alterations of striatal D₂ receptors in schizophrenia, which were studied both postmortem and *in vivo*, there is now a consensus that specific alterations of the dopaminergic mesocorticolimbic system exist in schizophrenia. On the one hand, schizophrenic patients showed an increase in [³H]fluanzapine binding with increased dopamine transporter activity (Reith et al., 1994), and on the other hand, schizophrenia was associated with an increased release of intrasyaptic dopamine after amphetamine challenge (Baker et al., 1999; Lenzi et al., 1996). It is still unclear whether the number of striatal D₂ receptors is altered in schizophrenia. The number of striatal D₂ receptors was not altered in antipsychotic naïve patients examined with [¹²³I]iodobenzamide (IBZM) or [¹¹C]raclopride (Chiti et al., 1999). In contrast to studies with these benzamides, a PET study using [¹⁸F]fluorodopa-phenothiazine found an elevated number of D₂ receptors in schizophrenia (Wong et al., 1996). The discrepancy can be explained by the benzamides' sensitivity for intrasyaptic dopamine changes, whereas antipsychotics such as risperidone are undergo an agonist-mediated D₂ internalization. That schizophrenia indeed may be associated with an elevation of striatal D₂ receptors has recently been confirmed

in another FDG SPECT study after application of α -methylphenyltyrosine (AMPT). This led to an acute dopamine depletion in the striatal shell, which confirmed an elevated number of striatal D₂ receptors in schizophrenia (Abi-Dargham et al., 2000). Interestingly, in a similar study investigating the effect on both D₂ and D₃ receptors, AMPT-induced dopamine depletion unmasked D₃ receptors, but it did not do so for D₂ receptors (Verhaeghe et al., 2002). It has been speculated that the relative up-regulation of D₃ receptors in schizophrenia may reflect chronically increased basal dopamine levels (Kojima and Wong, 2002). Besides a positive role of striatal D₃ receptors in the pathology of schizophrenia, there are papers of reduced D₄ receptor density in the prefrontal cortex, which were positively correlated with the severity of schizoaffective negative symptoms (Sakata et al., 1997), and of reduced substantiated D₄ receptors in the anterior cingulate cortex, which were inversely correlated with the severity of positive symptoms (Sakata et al., 2002). Recent studies point toward prefrontal D₄ receptor pathology being associated with negative symptoms (Sakata et al., 1997), and relatively reduced D₄ receptor number in the anterior cingulate cortex as one possible contributing factor in schizoaffective positive symptoms (Sakata et al., 2002). In summary, nuclear neuroimaging procedures provide strong evidence of a subcortical "hyperdopamine" system in the pathology of schizophrenia.

Dopamine and Antipsychotics: Even more important than their role in elucidating the primary pathology of schizophrenia, studies using SPECT and PET significantly advanced our knowledge of basic mechanisms of actions of antipsychotic drugs. The D₂ receptor is thought to be key for both the clinically desired "antipsychotic" effects and unwanted motor side effects. Using PET or SPECT to investigate the relative proportion of receptors occupied by a drug versus the available (i.e., drug-free) receptors, which is termed receptor occupancy of a given drug, it has been possible to establish a minimal threshold necessary for clinical antipsychotic effects with typical neuroleptics. A low established use upper thresholds with high risks for drug-induced extrapyramidal motor side effects (EPS) such as dyskinetic reactions, drug-induced parkinsonism, akathisia, tardive dyskinesia, or the consequences of increased prolactin secretion such as galactorrhea, amenorrhea, and impaired libido. Although these thresholds represent averages across a population and significant interindividual variations are possible, these findings represent a major advance in antipsychotic pharmacotherapy. From three studies, a maximal occupancy of approximately 60 percent D₂ receptors appears to be necessary for achieving antipsychotic effects clinically, while dopamine-dependent motor side effects begin to appear at occupancy levels from 20 to 30 percent occupied (Pardo et al., 1998; Kapur et al., 2000; Tamminga et al., 2002a). The importance of these findings can be underscored by the fact that one of the most frequently used clinical neuroleptics, haloperidol, is commonly used in doses ranging from 10 to 20 mg/d, and more. This dose is much outside the results from PET and SPECT studies supporting that the optimal dose of haloperidol lies between 2.5 and 5 mg/d, with complete saturation of D₂ receptors reached at around 7 mg in most patients (Kapur et al., 2000; Tamminga and Kapur, 2001). Findings from SPECT and PET as well as from clinical studies do not point to an advantage of the higher doses commonly used

is related positively; rather such damage may lead to a higher incidence of side effects. Most novel antidepressants have been compared with either SSRI or SNRI in random discontinuity relationships. Results from these studies point to an equivalence range of depression from 1 to 3 mg (Kapur et al., 2003) and of anxiety from 1 to 2.5 mg (Kapur et al., 1999; Tollefson et al., 1998).

The use of neuroimaging techniques has also improved our understanding of the pharmacodynamics of antidepressant drugs. The action of psychotropic drugs relies on their plasma kinetics (please see Appendix A). Consequently, drugs with short plasma elimination half-lives are thought more therapeutic than longer-lasting drugs. However, it has recently been demonstrated that the kinetics in the brain often substantially resemble kinetics in plasma, with plasma half-lives for the onset of antidepressant drug hypoactive and anxiolytic being significantly shorter than the half-lives of these drugs in the brain (Bentler et al., 2004). The results of this study imply that the same antidepressant-drug patterns of longer than one study might be ineffective, whereas the actual pattern of drug according to plasma kinetics may in fact lead to drug discontinuation in the brain (Fig. 6A). Furthermore, it may not always be necessary for




Figure 6. Significant deactivation of brain amygdala activity after a single dose of a novel antidepressant quantifying the regional relation of plasma elimination half-life as a criterion for discontinuing existing antidepressants/drugs with plasma 50% reduction (hypothetical discontinuing drugs). No figure was first published on the issue of Antidepressants and C. M. J. (2002) by Kapur (see notes).

antipsychotics to even-constant high D₂ blockade to achieve antipsychotic response. In a recent PET study with quetiapine, antipsychotic efficacy was demonstrated despite only transiently high D₂ receptor blockade with quetiapine administered once daily (Clauzen-Winkowski et al., 2002).

Dopamine Receptor Imaging in Substance Abuse. Apart from schizophrenia and receptor occupancy-imaging studies with antipsychotic drugs, SPECT and PET have also provided valuable information in other psychiatric illnesses thought to reflect abnormalities in dopaminergic function. The dopaminergic system in the nucleus accumbens (ventral striatum) is thought to be centrally involved in the regulation of the endogenous reward system. Some of the behaviorally most reinforcing psychostimulant drugs, such as cocaine and methamphetamine, cause an increase in dopamine transmission by blocking the dopamine transporter (DAT) necessary for uptake of dopamine. A number of PET studies investigating the pharmacological properties of these drugs, and the relationship of these to the symptoms of drug abuse and dependence have been performed. Much of this research has been performed on cocaine as this substance blocks DAT, an effect that is responsible for both the elicitation of euphoria and for the reinforcing effects of the drug. An interesting approach has been to correlate the subjective effects of cocaine with the extent of DAT blockade elicited by the drug (Niklow et al., 1997). In this study, the minimal dose of cocaine able to elicit reinforcement was found to be at least than 0.1 mg/kg, while the minimal dose needed to elicit euphoria was found to be between 0.3 and 0.8 mg/kg. Correspondingly, the same study found that DAT occupancy rates from 47 percent upward were already sufficient to elicit reinforcement, while the doses commonly used by intravenous cocaine abusers, around 20 to 30 mg/kg, cause DAT occupancy rates between 60 and 80 percent. As evidenced by these findings, significantly lower doses than those needed to cause the euphoric effect sought by the abuser already appear to be sufficient for unleashing the reinforcing effects of the drug. Therefore, contrary to previous hypothesis, it appears possible that the neurobiological basis of psychological drug addiction is not completely identical with that causing the subjective feeling of a "high." Another interesting finding from this line of research has been that a low density of ventral D₂ receptors may represent a susceptibility factor for some substance use disorders (Niklow et al., 1995). It has been found that a low density of ventral D₂ receptors correlates with a positive subjective experience with methamphetamine (as compared with similar pharmacological actions to cocaine) use, while subjects with a high density of D₂ receptors have subjectively negative experiences with the same drug.

Neurotransmitter Imaging of the Serotonergic System

The serotonergic system is thought to be critically involved in a large number, if not the majority, of psychiatric illnesses. The most important and well studied of these is major depressive disorder (MDD). However, the serotonin system is also considered important in schizophrenia, anxiety and phobia, alcohol recompulsive disorders, eating disorders, sleep, and numerous other psychiatric conditions.

Serotonin and depression. Several studies have found evidence for an increased availability of serotonin 5-HT_{1A} receptors in the brains of untreated depressed patients and suicide victims (Overath et al., 1998; O'Hearn et al., 1992; Stanley and Blane, 1990). The extent to which these findings exist in depressed persons without recent suicide attempts remains controversial. A ¹⁸F-labeled PET study assessed the 5-HT_{1A} receptor binding potential in 14 depressed and 19 healthy subjects (Meyer et al., 1999a). Interestingly, the 5-HT_{1A} binding potential was not increased in untreated depressed subjects who have not made recent suicide attempts (Meyer et al., 1999a). However, the authors conclude that this negative finding does not rule out the possibility that there is a role for 5-HT_{1A} receptors in treatment or that 5-HT_{1A} receptors are increased in highly suicidal states.

In another study, the uptake of [¹⁸Fl]-5-hydroxytryptophan was found to be decreased in the frontal cortex of untreated depressed patients, indicating an abnormality in the transport of the serotonin precursor substance 5-hydroxytryptophan across the blood-brain barrier (Agrawal et al., 1993; Hardig et al., 1991). Finally, neuroimaging studies have also provided evidence for a blunted regional metabolism in response to oral d,L-fenfluramine induced serotonin release in 8 patients diagnosed with MDD (Blane et al., 1998). However, this could not be replicated in a larger sample of 13 depressed patients using [¹⁸Fl]FDG PET after intravenous d-fenfluramine administration, which revealed similar neuronal reactivity to d-fenfluramine in depressed and healthy subjects (Meyer et al., 1999).

In addition to the noted 5-HT_{1A} results, two PET studies recently reported a lower number of 5-HT_{1A} receptors in untreated depression (Breteler et al., 1999; Saiguri et al., 2000) and depression treated with SSRIs (Jagad et al., 2000). There is also evidence for altered serotonin transporter (5-HTT) density in depression. A SPECT study using ^{99m}Tc as a ligand for 5-HTT and DAS found significantly reduced 5-HTT availability in depression (Malison et al., 1998). This result was subsequently replicated in patients suffering from seasonal affective disorder (Wilkoff et al., 2000).

Taken together, these findings provide ample proof of the involvement of the serotonergic system in the pathophysiology of depression. This is further substantiated by a number of studies that have shown antidepressant drugs to bind to 5-HTT in vivo. For the majority of the substances, and similar to those described in antidepressants above, curves representing the relationship of dosage to the percentage of inhibited 5-HTT may be calculated from the appropriate PET data. It is interesting to note, however, that while the clinically used dose of paroxetine is 20 to 60 mg a day, data from neuroimaging studies has shown 20 mg of paroxetine to effectively occupy around 50 percent of available 5-HTT in most patients (Meyer et al., 2001). Because of the exponential nature of the dosemresponse relationships and the resulting hyperbolic shape of these curves, small increases in daily dosage may lead to significantly greater increases of 5-HTT occupancy within the low dose range, while at high doses great increases in daily dosage are necessary in order to effect even minor increases in 5-HTT occupancy. In this sense, the above-mentioned finding suggests that an escalation of the dose of paroxetine beyond the range of 20 mg per day would lead to only nonsignificant increases in 5-HTT occupancy (Meyer et al., 2001). Clinically, although many patients

respond well to 20 mg of paroxetine, some only show a reasonable response once the dose is raised to 40 or even 60 mg a day. The clue to solving this apparent discrepancy may lie in the possibility that some antidepressants cause their clinical effects at least partially through mechanisms other than SERT blockade.

Serotonin and Schizophrenia. Postmortem studies showed an elevation in cortical serotonin 5-HT_{1A} receptor density in schizophrenia using [¹²⁵I]I-019-039T as a ligand (Mitsuhara et al., 1993). The ligand 9408-100835 has been labeled at the [¹²⁵I]carboxyl (¹²⁵I>C) position (Furukawa et al., 1997) and can be used for the quantitative analysis of binding to 5-HT_{1A} receptors in humans (Furukawa et al., 1998). Using PET and [¹¹C]9408-100835, our group demonstrated an age-dependent decline of cortical 5-HT_{1A} receptor BP (binding potential) in healthy volunteers (Tsunashima et al., 2001a), consistent with postmortem studies that showed a decline in 5-HT_{1A} receptor numbers with age (Elliott et al., 1993; Lowry et al., 1997; Mitsuhara et al., 1993).

Our group recently completed a PET study in 14 neuroleptic-naïve patients with a *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders*, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) diagnosis of schizophrenia suffering from a first psychotic episode. On the basis of human postmortem studies, we hypothesized that the *in vivo* 5-HT_{1A} receptor BP as measured with [¹²⁵I]9408-100835 and PET will be higher in frontal and temporal cortex of schizophrenic patients, as compared to an age-matched control group of healthy volunteers. In a PET study comparing the 5-HT_{1A} BP of 14 antipsychotic naïve patients to 14 age-matched healthy controls, we found a mid-temporal increase of cortical 5-HT_{1A} receptor BP in patients suffering from a first episode of schizophrenia (Cleucher et al., 2002a) (Fig. 8.2).

[Image not available in this electronic edition.]

Figure 8.2. Composite mean 5-HT_{1A} receptor binding potential images of 14 healthy controls and 14 agematched patients with schizophrenia indicating higher 5-HT_{1A} binding potential values in patients in the left and right midtemporal regions of interest. With permission from the Archives of General Psychiatry, this figure was first published in *Arch Gen Psychiatry* 59(2):14–20 (see the site for color image).

The published studies of 5-HT_{1A} receptors in schizophrenic patients to date have mainly involved postmortem brain samples, and produced conflicting results. While six studies found a reduction in 5-HT_{1A} receptor density in the frontal cortex of schizophrenic patients, four others did not find significant differences compared to controls. Among numerous PET tracers developed for 5-HT_{1A} receptors, only [³H]aztreptamine, [¹⁸F]fluorospirene, and [¹¹C]MDL 100,807 have demonstrated appropriate in vivo properties for a successful imaging agent in humans. In two recent [¹⁸F]aztreptamine PET studies using ROI analysis, no decreases in 5-HT_{1A} receptors were observed in nonpsychotic or nonpsychotic-naïve schizophrenic patients (Lewis et al., 1999; Trichard et al., 1999). However, localized differences may have been diluted in these ROI's, if either some areas were considerably smaller than the ROI's or if some areas were omitted or only partially included in the ROI's. Therefore, additional 5-HT_{1A} PET studies have been performed using voxel-by-voxel analysis by the application of SPM. One study analyzed data from 19 schizophrenic patients obtained in a previous study (Lewis et al., 1999) but compared them with a larger group of 38 age-matched controls (McEvoy et al., 2000). No substantial 5-HT_{1A} receptor changes were observed in the schizophrenic patients. Another [¹⁸F]aztreptamine PET study indicated significant 5-HT_{1A} receptor decreases in the left and right prefrontal cortex in 6 schizophrenic patients versus 7 age-matched controls (Ngan et al., 2000). It is conceivable that the 5-HT_{1A} receptor decreases observed in earlier postmortem studies in schizophrenic patients either are antipsychotic medication or withdrawal from antipsychotics before death was confounded by medication effects. The discrepant findings between the *in vivo* studies could, similar to the discrepancies between the postmortem studies, be due to heterogeneity in the populations of schizophrenic patients studied. An *in vivo* SPECT study investigating potential alterations of striatal DAT and brainstem 5-HTT density in schizophrenia did not find alterations of DAT in the striatum or 5-HTT in the brainstem (Laruelle et al., 2000), despite one postmortem study in schizophrenic patients that showed decreased 5-HTT in the prefrontal cortex.

Serotonin and Anxiety. Somatosensory 5-HT_{1A} receptors are thought to play a role in modulating anxiety. Lewis, there has been a report of an inverse correlation between 5-HT_{1A} receptor BP and anxiety in healthy subjects (Tucker et al., 2001a), but thus far there are no published reports on *in vivo* 5-HT_{1A} binding in anxiety disorders.

Imaging of Other Neurotransmitter Systems

The GABAergic system is thought to play a central role in mediating the effects of alcohol. This is substantiated by the finding that besides binding sites for gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) and benzodiazepines, the GABA_A receptor also contains a binding site for alcohol. Direct measurements using PET and [¹⁸F]ethernet, an inverse agonist at the GABA_A receptor, have found a reduction in the concentration of these receptors in the medial frontal lobes and cingulate gyrus of alcoholics subjects and the corollary of patients with chronic cerebellar degeneration (Dillman et al., 1998).

Similarly, a SPECT investigation also found decreased binding of [¹²³I]iodamphetamine to GABA_A receptors in the anterior cingulate gyrus, frontal lobe, and cerebellum of Alzheimer patients. However, based on these findings alone it is not possible to discern whether the described reduction in GABA_A receptors represents a preceding susceptibility factor or the result of chronic elevated stress.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CHALLENGES

Currently, functional neuroimaging in psychiatry serves as a tool in basic research to understand the underlying pathophysiology of neuropsychiatric disorders and to elucidate basic principles of psychopathology at the synapse/neurotransmitter level. In the coming years, one can expect better technology (i.e., better spatial and temporal resolutions) and a better approach to methods, leading to more precise analysis. However, the main challenge for the field will be to deliver these basic science findings to the bedside. Whether the field can do that is a question to be answered over the next decade.

The current abundance of neuroimaging findings has been very useful in changing the theoretical conception of many psychiatric illnesses; prevalent concepts such as the "circuit-circuit" and the "occupancy hypothesis" are directly attributable to neuroimaging. However, this is not the same as a diagnostic test. The main challenge is turning these and other findings into clinical tools has been the small effect size. All the findings noted above have been ascertained using groups of approximately a dozen patients and comparing them to similar numbers of normal subjects. While these groups may differ, and this can be evaluated with appropriate statistical tests, such procedures do not solve the problems faced by the clinician. Clinicians are typically more interested in single individuals, and therefore they are especially interested in issues of sensitivity, specificity, and the positive predictive power of new data. Providing findings of high predictive power is the challenge for neuropsychiatric imaging.

There is hope on this front. In the field of geriatric psychiatry, fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) PET (or similar SPECT) approaches are increasingly being incorporated into routine clinical use for the diagnosis or differential diagnosis of dementia and related illnesses (also see Chapter 17). It is conceivable that more specific ligands for neurotransmitter targets and plaques in patients suffering from dementia of Alzheimer's type will provide major breakthroughs in the diagnostic assessment of this disorder, providing the first *in vivo* proof of these pathognomonic brain alterations. Another promising future clinical application of functional neuroimaging may be in predicting clinical response to specific pharmacological or nonpharmacological therapeutic interventions. And last but not least, functional neuroimaging can be combined with genetic studies with the aim of finding genotype-phenotype associations typical for specific neuropsychiatric disorders (also see Chapter 14). If the fast pace of developments in this field are any guide, there is every reason to be hopeful that clinical psychiatry may soon be transformed by these techniques in a manner comparable to their impact on basic psychiatric research.

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Part II

CORE PSYCHIATRIC CHALLENGES

Conceptual categories reflect one of the crowning capacities of the human mind—the ability to see, and to create, finer and finer distinctions among the things we perceive. Indeed, one could argue that this is the main function of our evolved cognitive apparatus. This function allows us to see deeply into the nature of things and also to make distinctions that serve no function other than endlessly detailing minor differences, both real and imaginary.

Modern psychiatric diagnostic categories have long been open to such criticisms. From a pragmatic, utilitarian perspective, the critical issue is at what point do our distinctions provide useful new understanding as opposed to weighing us down with needless details. This has always been the diagnostic dilemma, and even though we have yet to create diagnostics that tell us much about the etiologies of the major psychiatric disorders, there is substantial agreement that distinctions of lasting importance have been established.

There are characteristic disturbances of the mental apparatus that have sufficiently robust class similarities, to offer substantial confidence that we have come to grips, with considerable agreement, some of the major emotional difficulties of mental life. The schizophrenia, the depression, mania, and varieties of anxiety disorders will remain with us as fundamental concepts for as long as humanity will survive. We know that various symptom clusters often go together, and we can utilize such diagnoses as resources for prescription practices. The major adult psychiatric problems will be the focus of discussions in this section (Chapters 7–13). Chapter 14 will be devoted to the many childhood

syndromes that are now provisionally understood at the genetic level, and Chapter 18 is devoted to aging problems that have to be discussed in terms of the gradual dissolution of the nervous system.

There were many other topics that deserved to be covered, from addictions, to various sexual and other appetite problems, to disturbances of body image. Unfortunately, space did not permit any comprehensive coverage of such issues. Some of these topics are touched upon in various notes and citations of this text. However, our larger goal for this middle section of the text was to cover most of the main-line topics of biological psychiatry. In carefully crafted chapters, we cover the major syndromes from basic science and therapeutic perspectives. My hope also is that as the nosocomial revolution continues, and our understanding of the mental apparatus matures, that our capacity to use biological interventions in supportive humanistic frameworks, whereby patients can help create new and positive meanings for their lives, will increase rather than diminish.

DEPRESSION: A NEUROPSYCHIATRIC PERSPECTIVE

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DIAGNOSTIC AND CLINICAL FEATURES

Clinical Neuropathology

Feeling "depressed" is a common human experience, occurring most often as a normal response to external events or personal loss. A major depressive episode, on the other hand, whether idiopathic or occurring as a part of a defined neurological disorder is a pathological condition, diagnosed not only by the presence of persistent negative mood or anhedonia but also by associated changes in (1) sleep pattern, (2) body weight, and (3) motor and mental speed, with (4) fatigue or loss of energy, (5) poor concentration and apathy, (6) feelings of worthlessness or inappropriate guilt, and (7) recurrent thoughts of death with suicidal ideations or suicide attempts (APA, 1994).

Symptom Dimensions. While these criteria provide a standardised method for assessing reliable depression diagnoses, they offer little neurobiological context. Toward

this goal, correlative studies examining relationships between behavioral features and specific neurochemical or anatomical systems provide an important perspective. For example, behavioral pharmacology studies have linked disturbances in energy, drive, and impulsivity to general dysfunction of the norepinephrine (NE), dopamine (DA), and serotonin or 5-hydroxytryptamine (5-HT) systems, respectively. In this context, core symptoms of depression would appear to involve multiple and interactive neurochemical systems: decreased motivation as a combined NE and DA disturbance (energy + drive), and anxiety and irritability as a change in NE/5-HT (energy + impulsivity). While not all depression symptoms are accommodated by such a biochemical construct, nor are known variations in illness presentation easily explained, this approach has nevertheless provided an important framework for antidepressant drug development and general treatment strategies (Chamay, 1998; Thase et al., 2001).

Alternatively, syndromal features can first be grouped categorically, based on general neurological principles of behavioral localization, with neurochemical dysfunction considered secondarily in context of specific regions and neural pathways (Mesulam, 1985). From this perspective, four behavioral domains appear to capture the principal components of depression: mood, circadian-somatic, cognitive, and motor (Fig. 7.1). While this categorical approach is a gross oversimplification, it provides a conceptual framework to examine heterogeneity in clinical presentation as well as targets of antidepressant treatment from an anatomical, physiological, and biochemical perspective. For example, a depressed patient with motor slowness, executive dysfunction, apathy, and inattention is as classic a presentation as one with motor agitation, anxiety, and ruminative guilt. Similarly, typical and atypical patterns of sleep and appetite disturbances (anorexia with insomnia; excessive sleep with overeating) are both common. Despite these apparent contradictions, symptoms can nonetheless be categorized into motor, cognitive, and vegetative/circadian subsystems where mechanisms mediating




Figure 7.1. Depression: Clinical dimensions. DSM-IV diagnostic criteria are reorganized into four principal behavioral domains—mood, cognitive, circadian, and motor—of relevance to a putative neural systems model of the depression syndrome.

variations within a behavior domain might be more easily evaluated. This approach is in many ways analogous to that taken with hyperkinetic and hypokinetic movement disorders where variable presentations of motor functioning (e.g., dyskinesia versus bradykinesia) have been linked to different functional states of common neural pathways within the extrapyramidal motor system (Lange and Lees, 1998). Such an approach has not been systematically applied to the study of depression subtypes using current or previous classification schemes despite experimental evidence that endogenous cognitive/motivational and neurotic-maladjustive depressions appear to be clinically and possibly etiologically distinct (Klein, 1974). The potential utility of this approach will be developed throughout this chapter.

Differential Diagnosis

While depression is generally thought of as a primary psychiatric disorder, it is also commonly seen with a variety of neurological and medical illnesses (Bartels and Robinson, 1993; Gauthier and Shapiro, 1996; Moyne and Scheibel, 1999). Recognition of these associated conditions is critical since different treatment strategies may be necessary for optimal clinical response in different populations. In evaluating a newly depressed patient, drug-induced mood changes, comorbid general medical illness, and substance abuse should always be considered, particularly in patients whose symptoms are atypical or of uncharacteristic onset. A related problem is the recognition of depression in patients with certain neurological disorders such as dementia or Parkinson's disease, where the diagnosis of depression may be obscured by neurological findings such as inattention, memory loss, apathy, motor slowing, or bradyphrenia (Marin, 1993; Starkstein et al., 1990a). Similarly, the presence of these cognitive symptoms in the absence of a true mood disturbance must also be considered, to avoid delaying more appropriate diagnostic or treatment interventions.

Epidemiology

Major depressive disorder has an average lifetime prevalence of about 12 percent, with a twofold greater prevalence in women than men. Age of onset is generally after age 20 and before age 30. Onset after age 30 is associated with a higher incidence of structural brain lesions, including strokes and subcortical white matter changes (Collie et al., 1993). While single episodes are not rare, depression is generally considered a chronic, relapsing, and remitting illness. While periods of clinical normality are seen throughout the natural course of the disorder, relapses occur with higher frequency and with greater intensity if episodes are not treated (Frank and Thase, 1999).

Biological Risk Factors

Family history, female gender, seasonal temperaments, gene polymorphisms as well as developmental and early life insults, environmental stress, biochemical abnormalities




Figure 7.2. Depression pathogenesis. Schematic representation of the ongoing interactions between biological risk factors, exogenous environmental stressors and critical Limbic-Cortical Circuits responsible for maintaining normal responses to ongoing emotionally salient stimuli. Decompensation of this system precipitated by unknown factors leads to a disequilibrium state otherwise known as a major depressive disorder. Adapted & modified from Akiskal & McKinney (1975).

and certain brain lesions have all been linked to increased depression vulnerability (Fig. 7.2).

Genetics. Converging evidence from adoption, twin, and family studies point to a significant genetic contribution, although specific markers have yet to be identified (Johansson et al., 2001). Meta-analytic studies of twins identify an overall heritability of 37 percent with no effect of a shared environment and a 63 percent effect of the unique environment suggesting complex interactions between genes and environment (Sullivan et al., 2000). Linkage studies, however, have yet to define candidate genes, in contrast to the many linked thus far to bipolar disorder. Association studies examining polymorphisms in genes related to monoamine function, on the other hand, have identified several potential targets. One of the most promising is the insertion/deletion polymorphism in the promoter region of the serotonin transporter 5-HTT (Murphy et al., 2001). While the homozygous short allele version of this gene (*s/s* 5-HTTLPR) has been linked to depression, the association is not disease specific: correlations with anxiety, alcoholism, aggression, and suicidality are also described (Lesch et al., 1996). Furthermore, these findings are extremely variable with many published nonreplications, perhaps reflecting complex interaction of this gene with other functional polymorphisms (i.e., monoamine oxidase-A, catechol-o-methyltransferase). Notable is a postmortem study demonstrating no correlation of the *s/s*

5-HTTLPR allele with either a depression diagnosis or the degree of serotonin transporter binding in the brainstem and prefrontal cortex of deceased depressed patients (Mann et al., 2005).

Biochemical. Primary dysregulation of specific neurochemicals and neuuropeptides is also theorized, supported by abnormalities in platelets, spinal fluid, and postmortem brain samples (Kauer and Price, 1994) (see discussion of biochemical biomarkers later in this chapter). Definitive links, however, have not been made to disease pathogenesis, nor are there clear predictive biochemical markers identifying individuals at risk.

Exogenous Stressors. The influence of environmental factors is equally complex. While no correlation between depression and socioeconomic status, education, cultural background, or specific lifestyle have been demonstrated, stress is a common precipitant (Kandler et al., 2002). Recent studies in both human and animal provide further evidence that early life trauma and abuse, as well as prenatal and perinatal maternal stress may also contribute to an increased vulnerability to develop various types of affective disorders in later life (Klein et al., 2000; Lyons et al., 2000; Shankar et al., 2001), but causal relationships between stress, disease vulnerability, and presentation of an acute depressive episode are far from clear. The association of stress-provoking life events with the onset of a major depressive episode does, however, appear to be strongest for the first such episode than for subsequent recurrences. Thus, associations continue to hold true over time only for those patients without a positive family history, suggesting a more fundamental brain difference in those with genetic risk factors (Kandler et al., 2002). Neuroticism, a personality trait reflecting temperamental hypo sensitivity to negative stimuli or the tendency to experience more-greater negative mood states in situations of emotional instability or discontinuity (Costa and McCrae, 1987) appears to be a significant independent risk factor (Roberts and Kandler, 1999). While links between neuroticism and the 5HTT gene were initially considered quite promising, findings have been difficult to replicate across a number of samples worldwide, possibly due in part to use of different neuroticism scales as well as insufficient control for gender and family history of depression (Pley et al., 1999; Pluess et al., 2005). Additional studies are ongoing.

TREATMENT OPTIONS

Clinical Management

An untreated major depressive episode generally lasts 6 to 12 months. Treatment, whether with pharmacological or nonpharmacological strategies (APA, 2000), can significantly reduce this period. Unfortunately, it is well recognized that patients with a poor or incomplete response to one form of treatment often respond well to another. Others will respond to treatment augmentation or combination strategies using drugs with complementary pharmacological actions, combined drug, and cognitive behavioral therapy, or in medication-resistant patients electroconvulsive therapy. Such resistance

to treatment is reported to occur in 20 to 40 percent of cases. Newer strategies for more severe patients now also include repetitive transcranial magnetic and vagal nerve stimulations, although these are still considered experimental (George et al., 1999; Raab et al., 2000). More rarely, refractory patients are treated neurosurgically with selective lesions in the cingulate bundle, anterior internal capsule, or substantia nigra (Coagurov and Rauch, 1995). For patients with mild to moderate as well as more severe depressions, medication and cognitive therapies have been shown to be equal in their efficacy to treat depressive symptoms (DeRubeis et al., 1999). There are, however, no clinical, neurochemical, or imaging biomarkers that can either identify which patients are likely (or unlikely) to respond to a given intervention or predict which patients are vulnerable to relapse during maintenance treatment (Rauch and Thase, 1999). While patient subtyping for the purpose of treatment selection has been attempted, there are at present, no clinical algorithms that can reliably determine the necessary and sufficient treatment of individual patients, as is the case for many medical conditions, such as diabetes and ischemic heart disease.

Potulated Mechanisms

Pharmacological: Preclinical studies of antidepressant drugs (serotonin and norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors, monoamine oxidase inhibitors, tricyclics) demonstrate a chain of events including acute autoreceptor or degradative enzyme inhibition and more chronic postsynaptic autoreceptor desensitization, up and down-regulation of multiple postsynaptic receptor sites, adaptation of intracellular signal transduction pathways, and retrograde effects (Bauer and Pharae, 1994; Tsebrys and Danzer, 2000). Requisite brain regions mediating actual response effects are unknown, although putative primary sites of action in the dorsal raphe, locus caeruleus, hippocampus, and hypothalamus, with secondary changes in frontal cortex are demonstrated (Blier and de Montigny, 1999; Fino et al., 2000).

Somatic: Changes in many of these same systems are seen with electroconvulsive therapy, with an emerging focus on common changes in intracellular signal transduction pathways. Axonal sprouting indicative of neurotrophic effects has also been identified in the dentate gyrus in animal electroconvulsive shock models (Nilseys et al., 1997). Other somatic treatments such as vagal nerve stimulators and repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation are in early stages of investigation with an emphasis on studies of requisite neural pathways rather than specific biochemical or molecular effects. Preliminary imaging studies suggest modulation of selective limbic-cortical pathways, although results are quite variable (Lomber et al., 2002; Timbrell et al., 1999). Similar mechanisms are postulated for surgical ablations where these distinct lesions, anterior cingulotomy, cingulotomy, and subcallosal tractectomy—all show comparable clinical antidepressant efficacy but disrupt different white matter targets (Coagurov and Rauch, 1995). Both top-down (corticolimbic, corticocortical) and bottom-up (basal forebrain, limbic-cortical) mechanisms have been proposed, although the precise limbic, subcortical, and cortical targets

or pathways necessary for amelioration of depressive symptoms are not yet characterized. Chronic chemical changes associated with these abative lesions have not been studied.

Cognitive. Nonpharmacological antidepressant treatments such as cognitive behavioral therapy and integrative psychotherapy aim to facilitate changes in depression-relevant cognitions, affective bias, and maladaptive information processing, modifying specific but alternative neural processes to those likely targeted by medication and somatic treatments (Beck et al., 1979; Denkla et al., 1998). The time course of symptom changes with cognitive behavioral therapy, for example, suggests primary cortical sites of action with top-down neural effects, as improvement in depression and related social and mood private changes in vegetative and motivational symptoms—a finding not seen in patients treated with pharmacotherapy (Koch et al., 1992). Brain correlates of these phenomena are in early stages of investigation (see neuroimaging section below).

SYNDROMAL MARKERS

Circadian Dysregulation

Sleep Disturbances. Normal sleep is a core symptom of major depressive disorder, with sleep disruptions seen at all stages in the sleep cycle (Bentler, 1994). Symptoms include difficulty falling asleep, or staying asleep, as well as early-morning awakening. Hypersomnia is also described. Electroencephalographic (EEG) abnormalities in depressed patients include prolonged sleep latency, decreased slow-wave sleep, and reduced rapid-eye-movement (REM) latency with disturbances in the relative time spent in both REM (measured) and non-REM sleep (measured time over sleep).

Reduced REM latency probably is the best studied and most reproducible sleep-related EEG finding in depressed patients, and this abnormality is reversed by most antidepressants. Sleep deprivation, particularly if initiated in the second half of the night, has a similar effect, although the rapid, dramatic improvement in depressive symptoms is often brief (Wa et al., 1999). Changes in internal body temperature and alterations of the normal fluctuations in core body temperature during sleep further suggest a more generalized dysregulation of normal circadian rhythms in patients with depression. To date, however, none of these markers have proven to be specific to depression.

Endocrine Disturbances. Dysregulation of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis is one of the most reproducible biomarkers of major depressive disorder reviewed in Holtkamp (2003). Increases in urinary cortisol production, levels of corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) in spinal fluid (Vivarelli, 1998), and a general disturbance in the normal pattern of cortisol secretion have been identified (Cattell et al., 1991). Blunted suppression of morning cortisol levels following oral dexamethasone administration, the so-called dexamethasone suppression test (DST), was

previously considered a specific marker of depressive illness. It is now recognized as an abnormality in only some subsets of depressed patients, notably psychotic depressives. It has reported in blunted adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH) response to exogenous CRH. More sensitive to detect HPA dysregulation is the combined use of the DST and the CRH stimulation test. In the setting of an abnormal HPA axis test, clinical response appears to best correlate with reversal/abolition of the neuroendocrine abnormality. Elevated plasma cortisol following dexamethasone (DX) predicts a prolonged clinical course. The combined DX/CRH test appears to be a useful predictor of increased relapse risk. Several reports of alterations in cortisol regulation in women with a history of early life trauma or abuse further suggest that HPA axis dysregulation may be an important marker of vulnerability to various types of affective disorders in later life, paralleling studies in rodents and primates (Heim et al., 2000).

Thyroid markers have also been quantified in patients with affective disorders (Prestonett, 1989). Even with normal levels of circulating thyroid hormones, elevated levels of thyroid antibodies have been demonstrated in patients with depression but without overt thyroid dysfunction. A blunted response of thyroid-stimulating hormone to exogenous thyroid-releasing hormone (thyroid stimulation test) has also been described.

Motor Performance Deficits

Motor and psychomotor deficits in depression involve a range of behaviors including changes in mobility, mental activity, and speech (Caligari and Edengut, 2000; Lenita et al., 1999). Depressed patients often perceive these signs as motor slowing, difficulty translating thoughts to action, and lack of interest or fatigue. These motor signs appear to be well correlated with both the severity of depression and treatment outcome. Spontaneous motor activity is significantly lower when patients are depressed compared to the euthymic, or nondepressed, state with a progressive increase in activity levels as other clinical features improve.

Cognitive Deficits

Anthropopathological Findings. Cognitive impairments in depressed patients are common (Elliott, 1998). Most often affected are the domains of attention, memory, and psychomotor speed; specific impairments in language, perception, and spatial abilities do not normally occur except as a secondary consequence of poor attention, motivation, or organizational abilities. Deficits are usually of moderate intensity but can become severe in prolonged or intractable depressions, adding to everyday functional disability. Anxiety symptoms may further impair cognitive performance. Age, in general, is an influential factor (Lykken et al., 1994). Patients over 60 generally demonstrate more focal deficits in tests of attention, information-processing speed, and executive function, while those over 30 often show more widespread abnormalities in memory and executive function. First onset of depression over age 70 is associated with an increased risk of subsequent dementia (van Reekum et al., 1999).

Mechanisms. Two mechanisms have been postulated for these cognitive behavioral findings: a generalized "energetic" deficit and domain-specific, localized brain dysfunction. The first hypothesizes reduced cognitive capacity or decreased efficiency in the allocation of cognitive resources to most specific task demands (Topliff et al., 1986). Patients are unable to increase the "gain" of the system sufficiently to handle complex cognitive material and also show an inability to switch cognitive effort across various task types. A differential impairment in verbal versus automatic tasks is demonstrated in depressed subjects when presented with concurrent tasks competing for limited attentional resources. Depressed subjects also perform disproportionately worse on recall of unstructured than structured verbal material, the former potentially requiring more effortful cognitive processing (Mata et al., 1990). Similarly, there is evidence of worsening cognitive performance with increased complexity and degree of encoding required by specific task demands. Decreased task motivation, intrusion of depressive thought content, and secondary effects of fatigue or sedation are also proposed mechanisms for these generalized cognitive deficits.

In support of more regionally localized, domain-specific cognitive abnormalities is the observation that the pattern of deficits seen in patients with major depression shares many features with those seen in subcortical disorders typified by Parkinson's disease and Huntington's disease. These disorders selectively affect concentration, working memory, problem-solving speed, planning, strategic reasoning, and flexibility of goal-directed mental activity associated with frontal-striatal pathway dysfunction (Sargi et al., 1981; Starkstein et al., 1990a). Executive deficits on tasks targeting reward and motivation have also been demonstrated. In these paradigms, depressed patients fail to use negative feedback as a motivational stimulus to improve subsequent performance, implicating orbital frontal and ventral striatal pathways previously identified in both primate electrophysiology studies and with focal lesions in humans (Elliott et al., 1978; Thambly and Shultz, 1990). State-trait factors contributing to these findings are not yet defined; however, studies of negative cognitive bias suggest persistent deficits even in remitted patients (Segal et al., 1999). Relationships between deficits in verbal memory, cortical dysregulation, and hippocampal atrophy is another area of active research (Malterer, 2003; Brewner et al., 1998).

Depressive dementia. Depressive dementia, also known as pseudodementia, is seen in a subset of depressed patients, generally the elderly (Starkstein et al., 1989). Estimates of the occurrence of depressive dementia range up to 15 percent in this clinical population. The differentiation of depressive dementia from primary dementia is generally straightforward. Most elderly patients with depression perform better overall on neuropsychologic tests than do age-matched subjects with primary dementia. Likely depressed patients also show a pattern of cognitive deficits (e.g., poor memory and attention but intact language and visual-spatial abilities) that is different from that seen in subjects with dementia, as well as a number of clinical features that are specific to depression (e.g., sadness, poor self-esteem, somatic symptomatology [Jones et al., 1992]). Nevertheless, occasionally a clinician may encounter a depressed patient with cognitive decline that is difficult to distinguish from early dementia. In these cases, a

trial of antidepressant medication is often warranted. The general finding is a return to normal levels of cognitive function in patients with depression, in contrast to those with dementia, after an adequate course of treatment. However, more recent studies now strongly suggest that comorbid depression and cognitive impairment may be an early sign of Alzheimer's disease (van Beekum et al., 1999).

Cognitive Bias. While not a cognitive deficit in the classical sense, exaggerated sensitivity to negative emotional stimuli, or *neuroticism*, also influences the cognitive processing of emotional stimuli. Cognitive models of depression in fact focus on the development of maladaptive and highly reinforced learned associations that produce depressive cognitions, negative self-labelling, and impaired decision making in patients with vulnerable temperaments of this type (Beck et al., 1979). Neuroticism, as measured by the NEO personality inventory has been shown to correlate with measures of depression severity (Shagley et al., 1992). More significantly, neuroticism scores remain elevated and stable above normative values even in the clinically remitted state. This neuroticism "trait," has long been postulated to increase vulnerability to a major depressive episode, a hypothesis now supported by large-scale multivariate analyses of depressed patients (Perna et al., 2002).

Consistent with these observations, depressed patients in general show better recall for negative words when presented with a list of words varying in emotional tone and are faster than nondepressed individuals at identifying negative adjectives as maldescriptive (Murphy et al., 1999). Depressed patients also produce higher probability estimates for future negative events and make more pessimistic predictions for themselves and others. Like depressed patients, normal individuals scoring high on neuroticism also respond faster to and recall more negative cue words, make more pessimistic predictions for self and others, and demonstrate a susceptibility to retrieving more negative personal memories. Activity in ventral medial frontal cortex, an area previously implicated in negative feedback and response performance in patients (Elliott et al., 1991a), is also tightly correlated with negative temperament in healthy volunteers (Knightley et al., 2002; Zald et al., 2002), suggesting a potential brain biomarker for future illness vulnerability.

BIOCHEMICAL MARKERS

No single neurotransmitter abnormality has been identified that fully explains the pathophysiology of the depressive disorders or the associated constellation of mood, motor, cognitive, and somatic symptoms. Changes in norepinephrine, serotonin, dopamine, acetylcholine, opiate, and gamma-aminobutyric acid (Blaszt and Haier, 1994) have all been reported with new studies additionally focused on dysregulation of several neurotransmitter systems, gene transcription, neurotrophic factors, and cell turnover (Thivierge and Danion, 2001).

Serotonin and Norepinephrine. Disturbances in the serotonergic 5-HT and norepinephrine (NE) systems have dominated the neurochemical literature on depression for more than 30 years, based in large part on the consistent observations that

most antidepressant drugs affect synaptic concentrations of those two transmitters via either presynaptic uptake transporters [tryptamine, serotonin, norepinephrine] or norepinephrine uptake inhibition, i.e., selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), norepinephrine reuptake inhibitors (NRIs) or degradation enzymes [monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs)] (Schultzbaugh, 1985; Charney, 1988; Kessler and Newman, 1989). Consistent with these mechanisms, serotonin and norepinephrine metabolite abnormalities have been identified in spinal fluid, blood, and urine in subsets of depressed patients. Decreased cerebrospinal fluid (CSF), 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA), and urinary 3-methoxy-4-hydroxy-phenylglycol (3-MHPG) are the best replicated findings, as is the decrease of platelet transporter binding sites. The relationship of these measures to changes in brain size marker or their cortical projections are unknown. In further support of a biogenic amine etiology, dietary restriction of tryptophan, resulting in an acute decrease in brain serotonin (the tryptophan depletion challenge), and antidepressants (the alpha-methyltyrosine tyrosine challenge) are selectively associated with an abrupt transient relapse in treated depressed patients (Moreno et al., 2000).

Pet-scan studies of deceased depressed patients and suicide victims report changes in a number of additional serotonergic and catecholaminergic markers including regional transporter binding, postsynaptic receptor density, and second messenger and transcription proteins (Anango et al., 1991; Kilpatrick et al., 1997). Recent work examining the serotonin transporter S-5HTT has identified baseline and widespread cerebral postmortem decreases with prominent involvement of the central and subgenual segments of the anterior cingulate, overlapping functional imaging findings, discussed below. Changes associated with suicide without depression demonstrate more restricted orbital frontal decreases consistent with studies of impulsivity with acquired orbital frontal lesions. Correlative relationships between prefrontal S-5HTT binding and dorsal raphe 5-HT_{1A} receptor messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) suggest ongoing compensatory modulation of serotonergic neurotransmission via these cortical binding site targets of many common antidepressant drugs (Anango et al., 2001), a conclusion further supported by long-distance projections from subgenual cingulate to the dorsal raphe (Frederick et al., 2000).

Dopamine. While a primary dopaminergic mechanism for depression is generally considered unlikely, a role for dopamine in some aspects of the depressive syndrome is supported by several experimental observations (Saperstein et al., 1997; Zarabian and Andrus, 1991). The need and differential prognosis and clinical utility of methylphenidate in treating some depressed patients is well documented, although dopaminergic stimulation alone does not generally alleviate all depressive symptoms. Dopaminergic projections from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) show regional specificity for the orbital/ventral prefrontal cortex, striatum, and anterior cingulate, overlapping areas of high S-5HTT transporter density. There are also areas reportedly identified in functional imaging studies of primary and secondary depression (Hugdahl, 1994). Degeneration of neurons or their projections from the ventral tegmental area, however, has not been demonstrated in patients with primary unipolar depression.

Central Corticosteroid Receptors. Consistent with evidence of HPA axis dysregulation, there is also a growing interest in the role of the central corticosteroid receptor (CR) in the pathogenesis of major depression (Nemeroff, 1996; Hollis, 2005). Increased CRH has been measured in the CSF of actively depressed patients. It has also been measured in postmortem samples, as increases in the number of CRH-binding neurons in the hypothalamus and decreased CRH-binding sites in frontal cortex, presumably a compensatory response to increased CRH secretion. These brain findings are complemented by neuroimaging studies described previously and supported by a number of rodent and primate studies of psychological stress (Lepov et al., 1998; Sanchez et al., 2001). Central CRH-1 and CRH-2 receptors are the focus of ongoing pharmacological studies, with CRH-1 antagonists seen as potential novel antidepressants or anxiolytic medications.

ANIMAL MODELS

A variety of animal models of depression have been proposed (Wilner and Mitchell, 2002). Many focus on replicating the behavioral, biochemical, and physiological changes seen in depressed patients using various forms of chronic stress. Models include maternal separation, social subordination, forced swim, learned helplessness and extinguished glucocorticoids, among others (Liu and Fanselow, 1992; McEwen, 2000; Phillips, 1998; Petty et al., 1997; Rasmusson et al., 2001; Sherry et al., 1997). Behavioral observations of animals exposed to these conditions generally confirm the face validity of such models with changes in posture and motor activity, distractability, increased or decreased arousal, and alterations in basic drives and circadian behaviors (feeding, mating behavior, sleep, endocrine) all readily apparent. Despite clear chronic behavioral changes, there are no good transient or short-term stimulus-response models to reliably study parallels of disease vulnerability seen in humans. Rodent strains with particular "depressive" traits and genetic knockout are a growing area of research (O'Donnell, 2000), in an effort to identify neural apoptosis models where decreased hippocampal neurogenesis may provide plausible mechanisms underlying the hippocampal atrophy described in subsets of depressed humans (McEwen, 2002) (see Imaging section below).

REGIONAL BRAIN MARKERS

Brain Localization

Anatomical Perspective. Modern theories regarding the neural localization of depressive illness date back to the 1950s, around the time of the first descriptions of functional neurosurgery for refractory melancholia reviewed in Holmes (1951). Klein's early observations of mood and emotional alterations following direct stimulation of the ventral frontal lobes (Brodmann areas 47 and 11) focused attention on prefrontal brain regions. Building on early studies by Broca, Papez, Holmes, and MacLean, among

others, elaborated many of the anatomical details of these cytoarchitecturally primitive regions of cortex, as well as adjacent limbic structures including the cingulate, amygdala, hippocampus, and hypothalamus, thus providing the first anatomical template for "corticons". Comparative cytoarchitectural, connectivity, and neurochemical studies have since delineated reciprocal pathways linking various "limbic" structures with widely distributed insular, striatal, parvocellular, and subcortical sites (Kernell and Price, 1990; Haber et al., 2000; Nagy and Pandya, 1991, among others). Associations of specific regions and pathways with various aspects of motivational, affective, and social/sexual behaviors in animals have also been described (Barber, 1995; Panksepp, 1995; Rolls, 2000; Tremblay and Schultz, 1995). Additional clinical observations in depressed patients have similarly identified a prominent role for the frontal and temporal lobes and the striatum in regulation of mood and emotion (Clarkstein and Robinson, 1993), complemented by parallel experiments of specific affective behaviors mapped in healthy volunteers. Together these converging findings support the depression is likely best characterized as a system-level disorder, offering discrete but functionally linked pathways involving specific cortical, subcortical, and limbic sites and their associated neurochemicals and peptide mediators (Mayberg, 1997).

Structural Abnormalities

Neurological/Deformations. Lesion deficit correlation studies demonstrate that certain disorders are more likely to be associated with a major depression than others: (a) discrete brain lesions, as seen with trauma, surgery, stroke, tumors, and certain types of epilepsy; (b) neurodegenerative diseases with regionally confined pathologies such as Parkinson's, Huntington's, and Alzheimer's disease; (c) disorders affecting diffuse or multiple encephalic locations such as multiple sclerosis, and (d) systemic illness with known central nervous system effects such as thyroid disease, cancer, and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS) (Table 1).

Computed tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) studies in stroke patients have demonstrated a high association of neural changes with infarctions of the frontal lobe and basal ganglia, particularly those occurring in close proximity to the frontal pole or involving the nucleus caeruleus (Robinson et al., 1994; Starkstein et al., 1993). Studies of patients with basal lesions or brain tumors or who have undergone neurosurgery (Gunderson et al., 1988) further suggest that dorsolateral rather than ventral-frontal lesions are more commonly associated with depression and depressive-like symptoms such as apathy and psychomotor slowing. As might be expected, more precise localization of "depression-specific regions" is hampered by the heterogeneity of these types of lesions.

These limitations shifted focus to those disease in which the neurochemical or neurodegenerative changes are reasonably well localized, as in many of the basal ganglia disorders. Notable is the high association of depression with Parkinson's disease (Mayberg and Solomon, 1995), Huntington's disease (Robinson et al., 1993), and others. These observations directly complement the findings described in studies of discrete brain lesions and further suggest the potential importance of functional circuits linking these regions (Witelson et al., 1990; Haber, 2000).

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Primary Psychosis	Primary Neurological	Systemic Disorders
<u>Hallucinatory:</u> Major depressive disorder Bipolar disorder Substance abuse disorder Hypothalamic/hypothysis Park's disease Generalized anxiety disorder Posttraumatic stress disorder Obsessive-compulsive disorder	<u>Psychotic:</u> Schizophrenia Transmogrified disorders Complex partial seizures Multiple sclerosis <u>Degenerative Disease:</u> Pick's disease Huntington's disease Diffuse Lewy body disease Progressive nonfluent aphasia Pola's disease, Wilson's disease Addison's disease Frontal-temporal dementia Park's disease	<u>Endocrine:</u> Hypothyroidism, hypopituitarism <u>Adrenal disease:</u> (Cushing's, Addison's) <u>Paroxysmal:</u> Paroxysmal nocturnal headache <u>Metabolic:</u> Uremia Porphyria Vitamin deficiencies <u>Inflammatory/Infectious:</u> Syphilis, lupus erythematosus Sjogren's syndrome Sarcoidosis, mononeuritis AIDS (also medication side effects)
<u>Delusional:</u> Anorexia nervosa Bulimia nervosa Substance abuse "NOS/other" schizotypal psychoses Cocaine, amphetamines, other stimulants	<u>Other CNS:</u> Neurosyphilis MS (optic involvement) Celiac neurological symptoms Paraneoplastic limbic encephalopathy Migraine, cluster, pain	<u>Other:</u> Intrinsic brain disease Medication side effects Obstructive fatigue syndromes Obstructive sleep apnea

Studies of systemic diseases, such as lupus erythematosus, Sjögren's syndrome, thyroid and adrenal disease, AIDS, and cancer, describe mood symptoms in subsets of patients. As with the more diffuse neurodegenerative diseases, such as Alzheimer's disease (Cummings and Visconti, 1999), a classic lesion deficit approach is generally difficult because consistent focal abnormalities are uncommon. Studies of plasma levels in patients with multiple sclerosis suggest an association of depression with lesions in the temporal lobes, although it is not yet clear whether this effect is lateralized (Bauer et al., 1997).

Despite these apparent patterns, certain paradoxes remain. First, despite comparable underlying pathologies, not all patients with a given disorder develop depressive symptoms. For instance, in Parkinson's disease and Huntington's disease, the reported rate is about 30 percent. As presented for primary affective disorders, correlations for this dimension have been genetic as well as environmental markers. In Huntington's disease, a genetic disorder for depression, is associated with consistent affective symptoms.

in some but not all studies, suggesting a more complex interaction at the molecular level (Grotstein et al., 1999). Furthermore, in this population, depression and mania are both recognized. Unlike stroke, no localizing or regional differences can be offered to explain this phenomenon. In general, there is also no consensus as to whether the left or the right hemisphere is dominant in the expression of depressive symptoms in any neurological disorder. Reports of patients with traumatic frontal lobe injury indicate a high correlation between affective disturbances and right-hemisphere pathology (Dedman et al., 1986). Secondary mania, although rare, is most consistently seen with right-sided basal frontal-temporal or subcortical damage (Markakis et al., 1986). On the other hand, studies of stroke patients suggest that left-sided lesions of both the frontal cortex and the basal ganglia are more likely to result in depressive symptoms than are right-sided lesions, where displays of euphoria or indifference predominate (Robinson et al., 1998). There is, however, considerable debate on this issue (Cesario et al., 2003). Similar contradictions are seen in studies of patients with temporal lobe epilepsy where an association between affective symptoms (both mania and depression) and left, right, and nonconvulsive foci have been described (Attalou et al., 1999). Anatomic studies have yet to define the critical sites within the temporal lobe most closely associated with mood changes.

Lastly, and in *several ways counterintuitive*, is the absence of reported depressive symptoms with primary injury to limbic structures such as the amygdala, hippocampus, and hypothalamus, despite their fundamental involvement in critical aspects of motivational and emotional processes. This apparent contradiction would suggest that these key regions have a much more complex organizational structure than that revealed by classic lesion-disease correlation methods.

Primary Depressive Disorders. Microscopic anatomical findings in patients with primary affective disorders have been less consistent than those of depressed patients with neurological disorders (reviewed in Harrison, 2002; Sours and Mann, 1997). Brain anatomy is grossly normal, and focal microstructural abnormalities have not been identified using standard structural neuroimaging methods. Total volume loss has been described using MRI in subcortical medial frontal series (Bentley et al., 1997). Also described are small hippocampal in patients with recurrent major depression (Skelton et al., 1999), with a postulated mechanism of glucocorticoid sensitivity, consistent with both animal models and studies of patients with posttraumatic stress disorder (Bremner and Narins, 1998). Nonspecific changes in ventricular size, and T₂-weighted (MRI) changes in subcortical gray and periventricular white matter have also been reported in some patient subgroups, most notably, elderly depressed patients (Caffey et al., 1993). The parallels, if any, of these observations with the regional abnormalities described in lesion and neurological patients with depression are unclear. Further studies of non-acute patients, or psychiatric *at-risk* subjects, are needed to clarify whether these changes reflect disease pathophysiology or are the consequence of chronic illness or treatment.

Neuropathology Studies. *In vivo* structural abnormalities, identified using MRI, have provided a foundation for the systematic examination of histological and cellular

correlates in postmortem brain (reviewed in Harrison, 2002; Rajkowska, 2001). To this end, neurofibrillary and immunocytochemical changes in neurons and glia as well as synapse and dendrite markers have been reported, with studies targeting some but not all subdivisions of the frontal cortex, anterior cingulate, hippocampus, and striatum. A loss of glia is the best replicated and most robust finding, affecting orbital frontal (ventral prefrontal) and prefrontal cortex (BA9), as well as the cingulate (prefrontal, parahippocampal). Glial abnormalities are seen in both bipolar and unipolar disorder, and are most consistent in patients with a positive family history of mood disorders. Neuronal abnormalities are less consistently identified and generally involve a decrease in size, not number. Synaptic terminal and dendrite abnormalities, in support of aberrant cellular plasticity or impaired neurotrophin signaling, are also reported but appear to be a more variable marker of bipolar disorder. Despite repeated demonstration of hippocampal atrophy on MRI, there are no consistent cellular correlates to support the hypothesis of stress-induced hippocampal vulnerability. Rather are there clear correlates of the stress-induced hippocampal enlargement demonstrated in animal stress models.

Functional Abnormalities

Functional imaging further complements structural imaging findings in that the consequences of lesions for global and regional brain function in putative functional neurocircuits can also be assessed. In addition, one can test how similar mood symptoms share with anatomically or neurophysiologically distinct disease states as well as why comparable lesions do not always result in comparable behavioral phenomena. Specific cohorts such as healthy family members or sit-pairs, presence or absence of specific risk factors (high and low association), presence and absence of specific genetic polymorphisms, family histories, early abuse, etc., can be systematically targeted. Parallel studies of primary affective disorder and patients with neurological depression similarly provide complementary perspectives.

Brain imaging. Positron emission tomography (PET) and single-photon emission tomography (SPECT) studies of both primary depression (unipolar, bipolar) and depression associated with specific neurological conditions (dialysis, degenerative diseases, epilepsy, multiple sclerosis) identify many common regional abnormalities (reviewed in Mayberg, 1994; S器mer et al., 1996). For example, in depressed patients with one of three prototypical basal ganglia disorders—Parkinson's disease, Huntington's disease, and left caudate stroke—resting-state functional hypermetabolism (ventral prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate, anterior temporal cortex) was found to differentiate depressed from nondepressed patients within each group, as well as depressed from nondepressed patients, independent of disease etiology (Mayberg, 1994). These regional findings, replicated in other neurological disorders (Bremser et al., 1992; Hiltz et al., 1998; Stalnaker et al., 1996c), suggest involvement of critical common pathways for the expression of depression in distinct neurological populations, findings of potential relevance to studies of primary mood disorders (Fig. 7.2).




Figure 1.1. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) regions of hypometabolism. Magnetic resonance slices show areas of decreased metabolism in patients with major epileptic seizures (PGTCs). Hypometabolism and dysmetabolism with temporal lobe lesions may be observed. The top row illustrates a common pattern of decreased basal and central metabolism (PGTCs), whereas patients with PGTCs and certain epileptic syndromes (e.g., Lennox-Gastaut syndrome) or even the same patient group (the bottom row) demonstrate more specific abnormalities, predominantly in subcortical and limbic structures such as the anterior nuclei and anterior thalamic hypermetabolism, consistent with the hippocampal neuronal damage. Conversely, other patients with temporal lobe epilepsy including some changes in basal metabolism that focus exclusively on the neocortex. In addition, with certain types of partial epilepsy, the thalamus may exhibit focal, localized hypometabolism between major hypermetabolism at PGTCs and relatively normal, nonfocal hypometabolic areas (e.g., amygdala).

Studies of blood flow and glucose metabolism in patients with primary generalized tonic-clonic seizures in general agreement with the patterns seen in nonconvulsive seizures (Bates et al., 1987; others reviewed in Bates et al., 1995). The most robust and consistent finding is decreased thalamic blood flow, although recent fMRI as well as hypometabolic activity has also been reported (Bates et al., 1995). In addition, anterior thalamic and/or the habenular nucleus and lateral forebrain bundle often show increased blood flow and metabolic activity (Bates et al., 1995). Findings are generally bilateral, although asymmetries are described. Regional changes are also frequently seen and apparently involve subcortical regions (Bates and Uhlmann 1987; Murphy et al., 1995). Other limbic glucose hypometabolism may also have been identified, but the findings are more variable (reviewed in Murphy, 1995). Few of these metabolic changes predictably occur before onset of seizure but have provided no important behavioral evidence for explaining these regional abnormalities and differences

among patient subgroups (united versus sporadic, bipolar versus unipolar, primary versus secondary), as well as heterogeneity regarding clinical symptoms is also thought to significantly contribute to this variance, but there is not yet a consensus.

biochemical imaging. Several neurochemical markers have also been examined in depressed patients using imaging, but findings are quite variable. Decreases in serotonin transporter S-HTT binding has been reported in frontotemporal (Malison et al., 1998) but not in any of the other regions identified in post-mortem studies of depressed suicides, such as ventral prefrontal cortex or anterior cingulate. S-HT_{1A} and S-HT_{2A} receptor densities have also been examined but with inconsistent findings in the drug-free state (Surgeon et al., 2000; Meyer et al., 1998). Relationships between receptor and transporter markers or between neurochemical and regional metabolic changes have not yet been systematically explored, as has been a growing trend in post-mortem examinations. Studies of other markers of interest are limited by the lack of suitable radioligands.

Clinical Correlates. The best replicated behavioral correlate of a resting-state abnormality in depression is that of an inverse relationship between prefrontal activity and depression severity (reviewed by Kauer et al., 1998). Prefrontal activity has also been linked to psychomotor speed and executive functions (Bench et al., 1993), parietal and parahippocampal activity with anxiety (Ochs et al., 2000), ventral frontal and insular activity with cognitive performance (Bench et al., 1993), and that of amygdala with cortisol status (Drevets et al., 2002). A more complex, bidirectional integration of frontal lobe functions has also been described with anxiety/tension positively correlated with ventral prefrontal activity and psychomotor and cognitive slowing negatively correlated with dorsolateral activity (Koob et al., 2004a). The prefrontal cortex abnormalities seen in patients with a more manic presentation (clinical presentation is consistent with findings described in primary anxiety and obsessive disorders, hyper-anxious anxiety and fear in healthy subjects, and from normal variations in individual responses to the testing environment due to novelty or state anxiety (Lion et al., 2000).

Correlative Mapping Studies. Direct mapping of specific behavioral features is an alternative approach, allowing head-to-head comparisons of patients and healthy controls (Delaney et al., 1993). With this type of design, one can both quantify the neural correlates of the performance decrement as well as identify potential disease-specific sites of task reorganization. This type of studies can be performed with any of the available functional methods, including PET, functional MRI (fMRI), and event related potentials (ERPs). Using this strategy, for example, George et al. (1997) demonstrated blunting of an expected left anterior cingulate blood flow increase during performance of a Stroop task. A shift to the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a region not normally recruited for this task in healthy subjects, was also observed. Elliot et al. (1997a), using the Tower of London test, described similar attenuation of an expected blood flow increase in dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and failure to activate anterior cingulate and caudate regions recruited in controls.

Treatment Studies

Regional Effects. Studies of regional metabolism and blood flow with recovery from a major depressive episode consistently report normalization of most regional abnormalities identified in the pretreatment state. Changes in cortical (prefrontal, parietal), limbic-prefrontal (cingulate, amygdala, insula), and subcortical (caudate/pallidum, thalamus, brainstem) areas have been described following various treatments including medication, psychotherapy, sleep deprivation, electroconvulsive therapy (ECT), repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS), and ablative surgery (Bentley et al., 1999; Buchsbaum et al., 1997; Renshaw et al., 2000b; Nohr et al., 2001; Tsembelic et al., 1999). Normalization of frontal hypometabolism is the best replicated finding, seen with all classes of medication, although normalization of frontal hypermetabolism is also reported. Changes in limbic-insular and subcortical regions are also seen, often involving changes in previously "normal" functioning regions (Fig. 7A and B). Region-specific radiotracer clinical accuracy has not been determined, nor have clear distinctions been made between different modes of treatment.

Receptor Changes with Treatment. Treatment studies using SSRI's or tricyclic antidepressants report down regulation of $5HT_{1A}$ receptors consistent with pharmacological studies in animals (Tulloch et al., 1999; Meyer et al., 2001). Like the abnormalities identified in the pretreated depressed state, the reported changes are generally global rather than focal. $5-HT_{1A}$ receptors show no change with treatment, suggesting the pre-treatment abnormalities may be a compensatory rather than a primary etiological finding (Sargent et al., 2000), as postulated in recent post mortem studies of these markers. While there are no direct comparisons of SSRI and TCA action on serotonin binding, the areas with the greatest magnitude change withidepressant treatment are medial frontal regions—overlapping sites of the most robust serotonin decreases with more selective SSRIs such as fluoxetine and areas of highest concentration of the serotonin transporter. While neural D₂-dopamine changes have been reported, quantifiable binding is unreliable with currently available tracers.

Time Course of Brain Changes. Examination of the time course of changes and differences between responders and nonresponders to a given treatment provides additional localizing clues (Markamp et al., 2000). Responders and nonresponders to 6 weeks of fluoxetine, for example, show similar regional metabolic changes after 1 week of treatment (hippocampus, insula, posterior cingulate, striatal, limbic decrease), which is consistent with absence of clinical change in both groups. In contrast, the 6-week metabolic change pattern discriminates them, with clinical improvement uniquely associated with limbic-prefrontal and striatal decreases (subgenual cingulate, hippocampus, pallidum, insula) and brainstem and dorsal cervical increases (prefrontal, anterior cingulate, posterior cingulate, peristriate). Failed response to fluoxetine was associated with a persistent 1-week pattern (hippocampal increase; striatal, posterior cingulate decrease) and absence of either subgenual cingulate or prefrontal changes.




Figure 14. Coronal slices of midbrain/hypothalamic MRI with differentiation between normal subjects, where no gross brain abnormalities can be seen with visual inspection. In both 3 weeks of follow-up in control (normal) (A and B), the mid-pineal (CP) is clearly visible as a small hyperintense (bright) hypointense (dark) structure in the posterior part of a more or less hyperintense (bright) surrounding tissue. A finding between 1 and 6 weeks after surgery that contains either a primary tumor, a second and completely different growth, clearly both altered and altered surgical resection artifacts as well as microvascular changes. These slices illustrate additional anatomical findings. Note, however, that neither contains complete evidence of gross Congress and Keeler, 1993; Kennedy et al., 2000; Lewis et al., 2000; Mabrey et al., 2000; Salvi et al., 2000) (see Hypothalamic slice images).

The same-day analysis of unoperated basal patient and control scans (Mabrey et al.) was demonstrated with respect to prevalence (Kennedy et al., 2000), in particular by presenting treated with irradiation (Salvi et al., 2000), as well as with (and without) surgical intervention (as part of the Radiation study just described (Mabrey et al.,

2002) (Fig. 7.4b–c). It is, however, the unique subcortical changes with active medications (fluoxetine, bupropion, venlafaxine), which are not seen with placebo-treated respondents, that provides the best initial support for the hypothesis that both treatment-specific and response-specific effects can be identified.

Since improvement in depressive symptoms best correlates with increases in the activity of prefrontal cortex (PFC) and decreases in subgenual cingulate (CGC), it is additionally postulated that these changes may be most critical for illness resolution. This hypothesis is further refined by preliminary evidence of generalized CGC hypermetabolism and posterior cingulate hypometabolism in a new group of fully recovered patients on maintenance SSRI treatment (Licht et al., 2002) (Fig. 7.4e). These findings might suggest that persistent limbic changes in treated patients are the adaptive homeostatic response necessary to maintain a recovered state. In this context, it is interesting to note that the limbic labeling procedure performed on two severe endogenous depressions displays different and distinct subgenual cingulate patterns (subcortical tractotomy component; Fig. 7.4f, bottom arrow), as well as insular-cingulate connections (single-photon computed, top arrow) (Keller et al., 2000; Vogl and Pandya, 1987).

Despite this convergence of findings, a further demonstration of cognitive changes with a formal neuropsychological therapy is needed. At issue is whether resolution mediated by cognitive or psychopathology involves similar or unique brain changes as compared to those seen with medication. The few published studies thus far show no common patterns. A new preliminary analysis comparing outcomes achieved through cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT) on the one hand and through paroxetine on the other, studied in two separate outpatient cohorts revealing some interesting differences (Odegaard et al., 2002; Kennedy et al., 2003). Remission with paroxetine treatment, as seen with fMRI, was associated with metabolic increases in prefrontal cortex and decreases in subgenual cingulate and hippocampus. In contrast, CBT response was associated with a completely different set of changes: lateral prefrontal decreases, similar to those seen with interpersonal psychotherapy (Brody et al., 2004b), as well as medial frontal decreases and hippocampal and radial cingulate increases, not previously described. These CBT-specific changes are particularly interesting given current cognitive models (Black et al., 1999; Siegal et al., 1999) and the known roles of medial cingulate and hippocampus in emotional monitoring and memory and lateral and medial frontal cortices in perception, action, and self-referent processing (reviewed in Odegaard, 1999).

The differences in change effects between the two interventions thus provide new support for treatment-specific effects rather than a common response-effect pattern, as postulated by previous studies. However, the similarity in change patterns seen with fluoxetine and paroxetine despite differences in baseline frontal activity further suggests a more complex interaction between pretreatment abnormalities, attempted compensatory responses, and actual treatment effects. Testing of this hypothesis likely requires the use of a multivariate statistical approach, where relationships between independent and dependent variables can be simultaneously observed (McIntosh, 1999).

Prognostic Markers


Response Predictors. In light of the described differences between responders and nonresponders with treatment, an obvious related question is whether baseline findings predict eventual treatment outcome. Several studies have found that pre-treatment metabolic activity in the medial (prefrontal) cingulate uniquely distinguishes medication responders from nonresponders (Mayberg et al., 1997), a pattern replicated in Parkinson's disease and other unipolar depressed cohorts (Kennedy et al., 2001; Steinbok et al., 2001b). A similar finding also predicts good response to one night of sleep-deprivation (Wu et al., 1999). While additional studies are needed, these data suggest physiological differences among patient subgroups that may be critical to understanding brain plasticity and adaptation to illness, including propensity to respond to treatment. Additional evidence of persistent hyperactivation in patients in full remission on maintenance SSRI treatment for more than a year further suggests a critical compensatory or adaptive role for neural changes in facilitating and maintaining long-term clinical response (Liu et al., 2002).

Risk and Illness Vulnerability. A further goal concerns identification of patients at risk for illness before as well as those vulnerable to illness onset. Challenge or stress tests might be used as a possible avenue toward this goal. As such, novel induction experiments initially conducted in healthy subjects to define brain regions mediating modulation of acute changes in mood state relevant to depressive dysphoria have been similarly performed in acutely depressed and remitted depressed subjects, and have identified illness-specific modifications of these pathways (Liu et al., 2002). Specifically, with acute sad mood induction in healthy volunteers, ventral and subgenual cingulate blood flow increases are consistently described (Drevets et al., 2000; Mayberg et al., 1999); these cingulate increases are not found in depressed patients correspondingly provoked, where unique dorsal cingulate increases and ventral and orbital frontal decreases are instead seen. Similar findings in both euthymic-remitted and acutely depressed patients suggest that these differences may be depression trait markers. In addition, the pattern seen with memory-provoked sadness shows striking similarities to resting-state studies of refractory unipolar and neurologically depressed patients (Mayberg, 1994), as well as the changes seen following acute hippocampal deplection during the early phase of ECT treatment (Bremner et al., 1997). This brain change pattern has also been described using fMRI in a recent case of tetragenic mood dysphoria induced by high-frequency deep-brain stimulation of the right substantia nigra pars compacta for treatment of intractable Parkinson's disease in a patient with a remote history of major depressions (Steinbok et al., 2001a; see also Bajaj et al., 1999). Consistent with recent clinical studies demonstrating increased telencephalic risk in these remitted depressed patients with persistent hypoactivation to negative visual stimuli (Bajaj et al., 1999), the converging imaging evidence suggests strategies for future studies of potential neural mechanisms of illness vulnerability.

Challenge experiments of this type may additionally identify prepathological subjects with high illness risk as suggested by preliminary studies demonstrating differential rest and stress-induced patterns of change in healthy control subjects selected for high

and less complex homoplasies (Boggs et al., 2009; Dels et al., 2010). Future test-complexity analysis between the simpler (more difficult) states and a high-complex state-distribution approach to model state-distribution suggests potential modes of disease transmission, associated only with contained areas. The development of these types of paradigms may have future potential for precision testing of human-family members of geographically defined cohorts. Extending testing like Boggs et al. is the demonstration that sensitivity under appropriate diagnostic challenges among healthy individuals, risks and reduces a family history of dispensation to more directly related to the potential of other transmission routes than the first two stages (Gammie et al., 2010). This question extends the interesting test-complex interactions between antibiotic use and other genetic risk poly-morphisms and dispensation relationships.

In an attempt to explore the leading mechanism in the previous sections, we focus on two additional mechanisms that also allow transient changes, namely, one in which the system is connected to a slightly different network (illustrated in Fig. 1d) proposed by Kellman et al., 2006. Figure 1f shows the resulting network in longitudinal projection.



the combination of clinical symptoms seen in depressed patients (i.e., mood, motor, cognitive, vegetative-syndromal). Regions are grouped into three main "compartments" or levels: cortical, subcortical, and limbic. The frontal-limbic (frontal-cortical) segregation additionally identifies those brain regions where an inverse relationship is seen across the different PET paradigms. Sedentary and depressive illness are both associated with decreases in cortical regions and relative increases in limbic areas. The model, in turn, proposes that illness resilience occurs when there is appropriate modulation of dysfunctional fronto-cortical interactions (posterior black attorney)—an effect facilitated by various forms of treatment. It is further postulated that initial modulation of unique subcortical targets by specific treatments facilitate adaptive changes in particular pathways necessary for network homeostasis and resulting clinical recovery. Medial frontal, ventral striatal, and orbital frontal regions are separated from their respective compartments in the model to highlight their primary role in self-reinforcing the salience of exogenous emotional events—a phenomenon that differentiates healthy from depressed states.

This working neural systems model can also be used in context of the multidimensional construct illustrated in Figure 7.1. Namely, the functional state of the depressed brain reflects both the initial result or "functional lesion" and the ongoing process of attempted self-correction or adaptation influenced by such factors as heredity, temperament, early-life experiences, and previous depressive episodes. From this perspective, the net regional activity or state total of various sympathetic and somatosensory inputs is what accounts for the observed clinical symptoms. For instance, if frontal hypoactivity is seen, it might be interpreted as an exaggerated and maladaptive compensatory process, manifesting clinically as psychomotor agitation and rumination, whose purpose is to override, at the cortical level, a persistent negative mood generated by abnormal chronic activity of limbic-subcortical structures. In contrast, frontal hyperactivation would be seen as the failure to initiate or maintain such a compensatory state, with resulting apathy, psychomotor slowness and impaired executive functioning as is common in melancholic patients. In this context, different interventions with varying primary mechanisms of action should be equally effective if the functional integrity of pathways is preserved within the depression circuit overall, perhaps offering a neurobiological explanation for the comparable clinical efficacy of pharmacological and cognitive treatments in randomized controlled trials. Similarly, progressively more aggressive treatments needed to relieve symptoms in some patients may reflect poor adaptive capacity or an overall disintegration of network connections in these patient subgroups. Lastly, stratifying of inherent adaptive responses within these critical systems with properly targeted interventions might identify preclinical vulnerability or relapse risk. While such a network approach is a deliberate oversimplification, it provides a flexible platform to systematically test these hypotheses, as well as consider the relative contribution of additional genetic and environmental variables to disease pathogenesis and treatment response. Continued development of imaging and multivariate statistical strategies that optimally integrate these factors will be a critical first step in fully characterizing the depression phenotype at the neural systems level.

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TREATMENT OF MOOD DISORDERS

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OVERVIEW

The fact that severe depressive states are not simply normal reactions to distressing life events has been recognized since the time of the ancient Greeks. However, it was not until the latter half of the 20th century that the disorders of major depression and bipolar disorder came to be fully defined and accepted as the two most important forms of mood disorders. Most of what is known about these conditions and their treatment has been learned in the past 30 years. An increasing body of clinical research has advanced our understanding of the theoretical basis and underlying causes of these illnesses and refined our knowledge of brain function and the mechanism of action of antidepressant and antimanic medications. The treatments developed in the past 30 years have had a tremendously beneficial impact on millions of people suffering from these devastating conditions. Further, as our knowledge continues to grow, new treatments are being explored every day. As the rapid pace of discovery continues, the future for the development of more effective and rapidly acting treatments seems bright.

However, several key questions remain as the current focus of research and will have to be answered before we can significantly improve on the best of the

currently available treatments. We only have a rudimentary knowledge of the genetic or biochemical factors that predispose to or cause depression or bipolar disorder. We are not sure if these different diagnostic categories represent biologically distinct entities or a spectrum of severity. We do not yet fully understand the mechanism of action of antidepressant or antianxiety agents, the usual time lag in therapeutic effects, or the reason some patients seem to respond to some treatments but not others. This chapter will provide an overview of mood disorders and the currently available medication and physical treatments for them.

CLASSIFICATION

The modern conception of mood disorders emerged in the 19th and 20th centuries. As the scientific method began to influence the methodological approaches used to understand mental disorders, analytical and impressionistic work began to be replaced by more observational and longitudinal approaches. The work of Emil Kraepelin is one of the most notable in this regard (Kraepelin, 1921). Through meticulous longitudinal observation, Kraepelin proposed that recurrent affective illnesses were distinct from other mental disorders and could be conceptualized as "unstable-depressive insanity," now referred to as bipolar disorder. In part due to the influence of psychoanalytic theories, in the 1950s and 1960s depressions were grouped based on whether they were thought to have been caused by a stressful life event as opposed to having occurred spontaneously, presumably due to a chemical imbalance. The shift from a "biological" view of mental illness in the 1960s to a "multifactor" view of mental illness in the 1980s was stimulated by the advent of effective pharmacological treatments. As new research from studies of early social deprivation and studies of psychotherapeutic treatments began to accumulate, it became clear that more complex models for mental illness were needed. In the late 1980s, a more integrative perspective began to take hold, recognizing that brain structure and function can be modified by learning and life events. The abandonment of the concept of biological versus psychological types of depressions has been important because it reflects our understanding that depressions do not exclusively have either environmental or biological causes, and these distinctions do not help us decide which patients will respond to medication treatment and/or psychotherapy (Grobler and Janavs, 1999).

It is currently believed that mood disorders are caused by a complex interaction between many genetic and acquired factors, including but not limited to genetic differences, stressful life events and traumatic life experiences, inherent and acquired coping abilities, and general health and medical status. The most likely person to develop depression is someone with a family history of severe depression who is living with substantial stress and has had many traumatic life experiences as well as a chronic general medical illness (such as diabetes) and also has poor coping strategies (e.g., tends to make things worse for themselves when under stress). Acid in substance abuse and the risk is even higher. Therefore, most people with depression have both stressful life events and genetic predispositions as causes for depression. A corollary is that all biological vulnerabilities

are not necessarily genetic in origin. The brain's biological nature is altered by non-physical forms of stress and learning. It is likely that these nongenetic, population-wide acquired biological differences can also predispose to depression (Byram and Nemeroff, 1997; Duman et al., 1997, 1999; Sudduth, 1999; Kellner et al., 2001).

The most widely used classification system for mental disorders is the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition* (DSM-IV; American Psychiatric Association, 1994). The DSM-IV takes an aetiologic and phenomenological approach to diagnostic classification, attempting to establish diagnostic categories when symptoms seem to cluster into biologically valid groupings. In regard to mood disorders, DSM-IV builds clinical diagnoses based on the presence of "episodes." DSM-IV divides mood disorders into unipolar and bipolar based on whether the person just has episodes of depression or episodes of both depression and mania or hypomania. Table 11.1 shows the criteria for a major-depressive episode (MDE) and Table 11.2 shows the criteria for a manic episode. A hypomanic episode is qualitatively similar to mania but less severe.

Table 11.1 DSM-IV Criteria for Major Depressive Episode

-
- A. Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the same 2-week period and represent a change from previous functioning: at least one of the symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of interest or pleasure.
1. Depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either subjective report or observation made by others.
 2. Markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of the day, nearly every day (as indicated either by subjective account or observation made by others).
 3. Significant weight loss or weight gain when not dieting, or decrease or increase in appetite nearly every day.
 4. Insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day.
 5. Psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by others, not merely subjective feeling of restlessness or being slowed down).
 6. Fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day.
 7. Feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt which may be delusional, nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about being sick).
 8. Diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day (either by subjective account or as observed by others).
 9. Recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal ideation without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing suicide.
 - B. Symptoms do not meet the criteria for a mixed episode.
 - C. Symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.
 - D. Symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., hyperthyroidism).
 - E. Symptoms are not better accounted for by bereavement, i.e., after the loss of a loved one, the symptoms persist for longer than 2 months, or are characterized by marked functional impairment, mood-congruent delusions, or delirium, psychosis, or psychotomizers.
-

Table 8.2: DSM-IV Criteria for Major Episode

- a. Distinct period of abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood lasting at least 1 week (or any duration if hospitalization is necessary).
- b. During the period of mood disturbance, three (or more) of the following symptoms have persisted (one of the need to only irritability and horn been present to a significant degree):
 - 1. Inflated self-esteem or grandiosity
 - 2. Decreased need for sleep (e.g., feels rested after only 3 hours of sleep)
 - 3. More talkative than usual or pressure to keep talking
 - 4. Flight of ideas or subjective experience that thoughts are racing
 - 5. Distractibility (i.e., attention too easily drawn to unimportant or irrelevant external stimuli)
 - 6. Increase in goal-directed activity either socially, at work or school, or sexually (or psychomotor agitation)
 - 7. Excessive involvement in pleasurable activities that have a high potential for painful consequences (e.g., shopping, in unrestrained buying, sports, sexual indiscretions, or foolish business investments)
- c. Symptoms do not meet criteria for a mixed episode.
- d. Mood disturbance is sufficiently severe to cause marked impairment in occupational functioning or in usual social activities or relationships with others, or to necessitate hospitalization to prevent harm to self or others, or there are psychotic features.
- e. Symptom(s) are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication, or other treatment) or a general medical condition.

In depressive disorders (unipolar) people have MDDs but never have episodes of mania or hypomania. Depressive disorders include major depressive disorder and a less severe and more chronic form of depression called dysthymic disorder. Bipolar disorders include bipolar I disorder (episodes of full-blown mania with or without depression), bipolar II disorder (full-blown MDD and hypomania), and cyclothymic (mild depression and hypomania). Table 8.3 lists DSM-IV mood disorders. Major depressive episodes can further be described in regard to whether the person also has symptoms of psychosis, seasonal pattern, and atypical or melancholic features. Psychosis refers to a complete loss of touch with reality. This can include frank delusions and/or auditory or visual hallucinations. Psychosis can be present in many other mental disorders and does not help in establishing the diagnosis, although when psychosis occurs in a depressed individual, the psychiatric symptoms usually involve现实中感知到的、可识别的或具体的幻觉。When psychosis is present in people with mania, the delusions or hallucinations must often have a grandiose or pathologic content. Recognizing psychosis as a part of a severe mood disorder is very important because it is one of the few symptoms that is associated with potentially fatal response to certain treatment combinations or electroconvulsive therapy and is more often associated with potentially dangerous behavior, including homicide or suicide.

TABLE 8.1 DSM-IV Mood Disorders

Depressive disorders (continued)
Major depressive disorder
Major depressive episode (x) (MDE)
Bipolar disorder
Chronic or recurrent depressive symptoms without full MDE
Depressive disorder not otherwise specified
Bipolar disorders
Bipolar I disorder
Major episode with or without MDE
Bipolar II disorder
Hypomanic episode (x) with MDE (x)
Cyclothymic disorder
Recurrent hypomanic episodes without full MDE
Bipolar disorder not otherwise specified

GENERAL TREATMENT PRINCIPLES

With the growth in knowledge and the availability of newer drugs has come an increase in the number of factors that should be taken into account in appropriately selecting antidepressant medications. This section will provide an overview of the decision-making process involved in using available medications for depression, including known benefits, potential side effects, and proper usage.

It is important to note the limitations in our current concepts of antidepressant, mood stabilizer, and anticonvulsant. Antidepressants implies selectivity and specificity for depression. This is inaccurate. Antidepressant drugs are effective in the acute treatment of wider mood disorders such as dysphoria as well as other mental disorders such as generalized anxiety, panic disorder, social phobia, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), bulimia and anorexia nervosa, and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Similarly, anticonvulsant and mood stabilizer drugs can be used to enhance antidepressant effects as well as being useful in agitation.

Antidepressant, anticonvulsant and mood stabilizer drugs affect the core brain systems involved in modulating stress. Not surprisingly, the conditions in which antidepressant drugs are indicated are exacerbated by stress, suggesting that antidepressants may simply restore function by reversing the adverse effects of stress or buffering the brain from stressful life events. Antidepressants do not "cure" depression or any other condition (Hyman & Neffler, 1996; Denner et al., 1997, 1999; Szeifert, 1998). This is most evident through the high rates of recurrence on discontinuation of successful treatment, even after long periods of medication-induced remission (Keller, 2004).

The limitations of concepts such as 'antidepressant', 'antianxiety', and 'tranquil stabilizer' argue for us to think about these drugs in a different way than we have in the past. Previously, we conceptualized the treatment of mental disorders as being analogous to treating disease or illness. However, this implies that antidepressants are providing some missing natural substance that leads to a cure. We know that this is not the case. It may be more accurate to use a different model. For example, the model of corticosteroids and inflammatory diseases may be closer to what is actually happening. Corticosteroids do not restore a missing substance when they help someone with arthritis or someone else with a rash. Corticosteroids can reduce inflammation, no matter what the cause is. Corticosteroids work whether inflammation is caused by disease, a genetic disease, or simply stress. Corticosteroids also do not cure any disease or condition; they just slow down or reduce one of the consequences of disease (inflammation). Therefore, antidepressant drugs may be much more than antidepressant; they may be antianxiety and seem to have beneficial effects in many different normal conditions associated with stress (Duman et al., 1999; Delgado et al., 1997).

Decision to Initiate Medication Treatment

Treatment should follow a careful assessment of symptoms and course, a review of patient health status, a formal diagnosis, and in some cases physical examination and laboratory testing (Depression Guideline Panel, 1993). This can usually be accomplished in one visit, especially if medically relevant history and past psychiatric and substance abuse history are available. Once a diagnosis of major depression or bipolar disorder has been made, medication treatment is usually indicated. Medication treatment should be initiated with the understanding that the choice of agent may be significantly affected by preventing symptoms and -resistant psychiatric, medical, or substance abuse diagnoses. Considerate supportive, educational, and/or cognitive psychotherapy is usually indicated, although in severe depression or trauma significant modifications in the methodology and goals of psychotherapy are usually required, and these will change over time depending on the extent and rate of clinical improvement and capacity to participate (also see, Chapter 10).

Hospitalization, once an expectation for most patients being treated for a major mood disorder, is now reserved for those situations where there is imminent risk of harm to self or others or an inability to maintain outpatient status. With the exception of mania or psychotic depression, treatment for most mood disorders can be accomplished entirely on an outpatient basis. Mania, severe psychosis, and/or suicidal intent are the most common situations in which hospitalization is usually required. Over the past 30 years, the purpose of hospitalization has undergone a major shift from a focus on definitive diagnostic evaluation and treatment to rapid stabilization and tragic to an appropriate outpatient-based treatment setting.

Several situations call for initiation of medication treatment as soon as possible. These include conditions where improvement is unlikely without medication treatment, where possible harmful consequences may arise if the depression is untreated (e.g., loss of job or risk of suicide), or where relapse and recurrence are highly likely outcomes.

Medication treatment should be postponed if other treatable conditions may be responsible for the symptoms, the symptoms are very mild, the risk of benefit minimizes risk, or if the patient is strongly averse to the use of medication treatment. The most common of these situations occur when a recent life stress raises the possibility that the presenting symptoms represent a transient form of an adjustment disorder or that the depression may be secondary to medical illness, due to a side effect of medication treatment for another condition, or substance abuse. The decision to initiate medication treatment in these cases should follow one or two further evaluation meetings. Careful assessment for one of the rarer known causes of mania such hypothyroidism, stridor or decompressive stroke, or right-sided brain lesions (Goodwin and Jamison, 1990) is particularly important in patients with a first episode of acute mania, in a patient with a unusual symptom profile, or in mania or psychotic depression with a first onset after age 40 (Depression Guideline Panel, 1993; Schaffberg et al., 1998; American Psychiatric Association, 2000).

Disease Management

Most disorders are chronic disorders, with high rates of relapse on discontinuation of drug therapy, making it important that treatment be conceptualized as a long-term process (Kripke, 1971; Angst et al., 1973; Kellner et al., 1992; Kripke et al., 1992). Medications restore function but the disease process is not cured.

Most patients with a mood disorder will have more than one episode. Relapse rates for depression are estimated to be at least 50 percent for patients with one episode of major depression and 80 to 90 percent if the person has had two episodes (Angst, 1990; Kripke, 1991). Seventy to 80 percent of patients with a successfully treated major depression will experience a recurrence of illness when placebo is substituted for active medication during a 3-year maintenance phase, as opposed to only 15 to 20 percent taking a full dose of imipramine (Fruck et al., 1991).

Three phases of treatment have been proposed: acute, continuation, and maintenance treatment phases (Kripke, 1971). The stages are defined in relation to the status of symptoms and include the concepts of treatment response, relapse, remission, recurrence, and recovery (Fruck et al., 1991). Response refers to a partial diminution in symptoms following initiation of drug treatment (usually 50 percent reduction). Relapse involves the return of some symptoms of a disease during or on cessation of treatment. Remission refers to a diminution of the symptoms of a disease and implies that there has been a clinically meaningful decrease of some (usually 70 percent or greater reduction). Recurrence describes the return of symptoms after a remission. Recovery describes a more complete resolution, implying the absence or near absence of symptoms.

The acute treatment phase begins with a clinical interview, diagnostic assessment, physical and neurological examination, and clinical and laboratory studies as appropriate (Schaffberg et al., 1998; American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The goals of this phase include establishing a diagnosis, defining a short-term and long-term multi-disciplinary treatment plan, selecting the most appropriate medication, treating the

down to a therapeutic range, monitoring of side effects, compliance, and determining the magnitude and quality of response. This phase lasts from 6 to 12 weeks and patients are usually seen every 1 to 2 weeks during this phase.

If a response is obtained, then the continuation phase ensues and consists of monitoring for completeness of response and side effects. Discontinuation of medication during or before this phase is complete is associated with a high rate of relapse (Pies and Kupfer, 1986; Kupfer, 1991). Continuation treatment lasts 4 to 9 months and can be thought of as a consolidation phase. A recent World Health Organization (WHO) consensus meeting suggests that the minimum period of time for maintenance treatment is 6 months (WHO Mental Health Collaborating Centers, 1992; Kupfer et al., 1992; Aitken and Potashnick, 1992).

Maintenance is in general thought to be prophylactic, although it is increasingly clear that for many patients this phase is essential, not simply to prevent new episodes but to maintain the response since the illness persists. Normal data suggest that medication during during the maintenance phase should continue at the same level as during the acute phase and that supportive psychotherapy can help to reduce the risk of relapse and recurrence (Frank et al., 1992; Kupfer et al., 1992).

Patients should be seen every 4 to 12 weeks for the first year of maintenance treatment and at 6-month to yearly intervals thereafter. The frequency of visits during this phase should be individualized based on psychosocial factors, compliance, and presence of symptoms and side effects. Rates of depressive relapse appear to be higher when antidepressant drugs are discontinued rapidly compared to a slow (1 to 4 weeks) taper (Johnson et al., 1991; Kupfer, 1991). Therefore, if an antidepressant is discontinued, it should be tapered over at least a 4-week period.

Choosing a Drug

A large number of clinical and pharmacological factors can influence the selection of antidepressant drug, and therefore the choice should be made on an individual basis. Choosing the safest and most efficacious drug with the side effect profile most compatible with the patient's specific symptoms is the main pragmatic approach.

The clinical factors that can influence choice of drug include primary diagnosis, subdiagnosis (e.g., presence of psychosis or affective features), comorbid disorders, general health status, age, prior treatment history, and prior nonresponse to specific antidepressants, current severity of illness, and symptom profile. While certain subtypes of major depressions have been suggested to have a greater likelihood of responding to specific antidepressant drugs or to specific combinations, the only subtype of depression that has consistently been found to selectively respond to a particular treatment is depression with psychotic features. When psychosis is present, either electroconvulsive treatment alone or combination treatment with antidepressant and antipsychotic medications is required.

It is important to understand the pharmacological effects of antidepressant medications that are most likely to relate to therapeutic action and those effects that primarily contribute to side effects. A growing body of data now suggests that the

most important pharmacological effects of antidepressants that lead to their efficacy in major depression are their ability to increase neurotransmission through serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine; 5-HT), norepinephrine (NE), and/or dopamine (DA) releasing neurons in the brain. Alternatively, side-effects can occur related to adrenergic, cholinergic, and histaminergic receptor blocking properties. More detail on side-effects and therapeutic mechanisms will be provided in the following sections.

ANTIDEPRESSANTS

Antidepressant drugs have been categorized in a variety of ways. The traditional classification scheme has been the distinction between monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs), tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs), and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs). This system used pharmacological effects (what the drug actually does) for one group and chemical structure (the drug's molecular type) for the others. As we've learned more about the effects of antidepressant drugs that are essential for their beneficial effects, their classification of antidepressants has shifted to a focus on pharmacological properties.

Pharmacological Mechanisms of Antidepressant Drug Action

Most antidepressants have potent pharmacological effects that cause increased synaptic levels of the monoamines neurotransmitters NE and/or 5-HT and in some cases DA. Levels of monoamines can be increased by blocking their reuptake as well as by inhibition of their catabolism by the enzyme MAO. However, while levels of monoamines increase within hours of ingestion of the first dose of an antidepressant, the therapeutic response does not begin until 2 to 4 weeks later. This lack of temporal relationship between increased synaptic levels of monoamines and clinical response has led to a search for other effects of these medications that correlate more closely with therapeutic response.

Perhaps the most well-documented, extensive data concerning the pharmacological mechanisms underlying antidepressant action has been presented from neuroimaging studies conducted throughout the past 15 years (Delgadillo et al., 1997). The reversed depletion of 5-HT or NE in living people allows a more direct method for investigating the role of monoamines.

The methodology for neuroimaging depletion in humans is relatively straightforward. 5-HT can be reduced in humans by rapid depletion of tryptophan, the precursor amino acid for 5-HT (Delgadillo et al., 1998). Brain NE can be reduced by administering alpha-methyl-p-tyrosine (AMPT), an agent that blocks the rate-limiting step in the conversion of tyrosine to NE (Delgadillo et al., 1992). Prior research explored the effects of 5-HT or NE depletion in three sample populations: patients whose depression was being treated with SSRIs, patients whose depression was being treated with desipramine, patients whose depression remained untreated, and healthy control subjects who had no personal or family history of depression. When the depletion

procedure is administered, changes in mood—if any—occur rapidly, often within a matter of hours. Conversely, when mood changes occurred, they lasted from 4 to 36 h (Delgado et al., 1997). Since those experiments began in the late 1980s, no person studied by the author has had to be hospitalized nor has a subject required a change in treatment due to adverse effects of clomipramine toxicity.

Composite results from multiple studies are presented in Figure 8.1. One of the most striking findings is that antidepressant responses can be rapidly but transiently reversed, with the response being dependent on the class of antidepressant. About 60 percent of patients who were taking an SSRI for depression experienced a transient return of depressive symptoms when 5-HTT was depleted, and for about 80 percent of patients who were taking SNRIs serotonin inhibitory depressive symptoms transiently reappeared when 5-HT was depleted. Conversely, most patients who had been taking SNRIs for depression tended not to experience depressive symptoms with depletion of 5-HT, and those who had been taking SNRIs inhibitors did not experience depression with depletion of 5-HTT. In healthy controls and patients whose depression was not being treated, depletion of 5-HT or 5-HT did not worsen or lead to the onset of new depressive symptoms. The ability to selectively deplete and selectively reverse the antidepressant effects in people taking serotonergic agents suggests that, at least in these patients, only one particular neurotransmitter had a role in the mechanism of action of that medication. The fact that the type and severity of depressive symptoms did not change in nondepressed, currently depressed patients—and did not surface in healthy patients—seems to imply that more than a simple alteration of monoamine synthesis is responsible for depression. In other words, drugs that increase either 5-HT or 5-HTT concentrations can fully treat depression through parallel and partially independent pathways, but a deficiency of either 5-HT or 5-HTT is sufficient to cause the syndrome of clinical depression.




Figure 8.1. Summary of neurotransmitter depletion studies. SSRI, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor; SNRI, norepinephrine and serotonin reuptake inhibitor; 5-HT, serotonin; 5-HTT, norepinephrine (Delgado et al., 1990, 1991, 1994, 1997, 1999). See figure for color image.

While the findings presented above are not conclusive, neurotransmitter depletion studies do provide important information from which further studies can be generated. Results are consistent with a model in which depression is caused not by an insufficiency in monoamines but by altered functioning in the areas of the brain that are regulated by monoamines (Delgado et al., 1994). Understanding whether antidepressants work through a single common pathway or through parallel pathways is critical to the development of new antidepressants and for optimal clinical use of existing medications.

Treatment Studies

Since the early 1950s, when MAOIs and imipramine were serendipitously discovered to have therapeutic effects in the treatment of depression (Lanser et al., 1997), a steady stream of new medications for depression have become available for clinical use. The first of these drugs were simple modifications of the original tricyclic antidepressant TCA or MAOI inhibitor compounds. However, as our understanding of the pharmacology of these compounds has evolved, newer drugs have been tailored to have specific neurochemical effects. The vast majority of newer compounds have been designed to potently enhance NE and/or 5-HT neurotransmission without anticholinergic, antiadrenergic, or antihistaminic properties. It was hoped that this would lead to drugs with fewer side effects and greater efficacy and faster onset of action.

The following sections provide a selected review of data from clinical studies investigating the efficacy of several drugs with potent effects of NE and/or 5-HT for treatment of major depression and several anxiety disorders. Table 8-4 lists currently available antidepressant drugs (and related nonpharmacological treatments), grouping them based on the pharmacological effects of the parent compound that most likely underlie the therapeutic effects. The sections that follow describe important characteristics of medications in each category.

Monosamine Reuptake Inhibitors

Monosamine reuptake inhibition is the most common mechanism by which antidepressant drugs work. Drugs with this pharmacological action include the old TCAs, the selective 5-HT reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), and several newer drugs such as venlafaxine, duloxetine, and nortriptyline. The older drugs in this group (such as imipramine, desipramine, and amitriptyline) tend to be relatively nonspecific and frequently have many active metabolites. The newer drugs tend to be highly selective for reuptake blockade with less receptor blocking properties and because of this have fewer side effects (e.g., sedation). Table 8-5 shows the relative affinity of selected antidepressants for binding to the 5-HT and NE transporters.

NE Reuptake Inhibitors (NRIs). Desipramine is one of the classical NRIs, and there are extensive data available regarding its clinical efficacy profile. It is well established as effective in the acute treatment of major depressive episodes in 45 to 60 percent of outpatients and 48 to 63 percent in inpatients (Depression Guideline Panel,

TABLE II. Antidepressant Treatments

NE reuptake inhibitors	5-HT/NE reuptake inhibitors	5-HT reuptake inhibitors
Desipramine (Napsacaine and others)	Imipramine (Tofranil and others)	Fluoxetine (Prozac)
Norfluoxetine (Paxil)	Clomipramine (Sancat)	Sertaline (Zoloft)
Propantheline (Vivactil)	Amitriptyline (Elavil and others)	Paroxetine (Paxil)
Maprotiline (Lofepramine)	Trimipramine (Surmontil)	Fluvoxamine (Luvox)
Amoxapine (Endep)	Venlafaxine (Effexor)	Citalopram (Celexa)
Reboxetine	Duloxetine (Cymbalta)	SSRIs (Sertraline, Lustral)
	Milnacipran (Sibutramine)	
Drugs with mixed actions (Other antidepressants) Tricyclics	NE/DA reuptake inhibitors Bupropion (Wellbutrin)	Receptor antagonists Mirtazapine (Remeron)
Tramadol (Ulrex) Antidepressants (Aurorix)		Clomipramine (Sypram) Quetiapine (Seroquel)
Inversible MAO inhibitors	Misoprostol releasing agents	5-HT ₂ partial agonists
Isocarboxazid (Marplan)	4-Aminophenoxazine (Tavist)	Bupropion (Zyban)
Phenelzine (Nardil)	Metyrosine (Methanserin)	Cloperotol
Tranylcypromine (Parnate)	Penfluridol (Sparine)	
Stimulants	Novel pharmacological agents	Psychotherapy treatments
Electroconvulsive therapy	Neurokinin-1 receptor antagonists	Cognitive behavioral therapy
Full serotonin light therapy	CRF antagonists	Unipolar therapy
Vagal nerve stimulation	Glucocorticoid antagonists	
Transcutaneous magnetic stimulation	Clobenzorex receptor antagonists	
Electrode		

NEO, norepinephrine; NE, norepinephrine; DA, dopamine; 5-HET, serotonin; CRF, corticotrophin-releasing factor.

1993). Like other tricyclic antidepressants, it has a host of pharmacological properties that contribute to its side effect burden. These include anticholinergic, antihistaminergic, and antiadrenergic effects (Depression Guideline Panel, 1993).

Maprotiline is a very weak DA reuptake blocker/inhibitor; its behavioral profile in laboratory animals and humans is that of a central nervous system (CNS) stimulant and indirect DA agonist (Hobson-Watts and Richardson, 1993). It has no significant effects at blocking receptors of 5-HT or NE, although its primary metabolite (hydroxymaprotiline) is a potent NE reuptake inhibitor (Perlis and Cooper, 1992). Hydroxymaprotiline

TABLE 15.5. Affinity of Selected Antidepressants for Binding to 5-HT and 5-HT₂ Receptors.

Drug	5-HT ₂	5-HT _{2A}	5-HT _{2C}
Reboxetine ^a	110 ^c	490.0	0.09
Amitriptyline ^b	2.0	77.0	0.06
Doxepin ^b	0.7	75.5	0.08
Amitriptyline-HCl ^b	1.4	9.4	1.47
Noradrenergic ^b	580.0	500.0	1.25
Imipramine ^b	18.0	8.0	0.18
Desipramine ^b	8.0	6.7	0.08
Tramadol ^b	3880.0	19.2	129.00
Fluoxetine ^b	380.0	1.1	544.00
Propantheline ^b	43.0	0.1	450.00
Fluvoxamine ^b	142.0	1.0	520.00
Sertindole ^b	714.0	0.9	250.00
Citalopram ^b	4190.0	1.0	5666.75
Buclizapine ^b	184.0	1.1	7128.18
Imipramine ^b	>10,000	>10,000	>10,000

^aHynes et al. (2002).

^bNorth et al. (2002); NIDA Psychotropic Drug Screening Program,

<http://psychotic.nida.nih.gov>.

^cHynes et al. (2002).

^dOrmel et al. (2002).

is absorbed rapidly in humans, with peak plasma levels of up to 3 times those of imipramine and a half-life of 24 hr. Therefore, orally administered imipramine is likely to lead to significant 5-HT₂ receptor inhibition and relatively less 5-HT_{1A} receptor inhibition. Imipramine increases locomotor activity and causes stereotyped behaviors in laboratory animals. In humans, it causes sedation, insomnia, anorexia, and psychosis. Imipramine is structurally related to phenothiazine barbiturates and unrelated to the TCAs, SSRLs, or MDDOs. It has no significant potency at binding to any known neurotransmitter receptors. Clinical studies have demonstrated that imipramine is effective in the treatment of major depressive episodes (Depression Guidelines Panel, 1993). While early studies suggested that imipramine might be less likely to cause hypomania or mania in bipolar patients, subsequent studies suggested that it can cause mania and psychosis in bipolar patients, especially those with high pretreatment levels of the DA metabolite, homovanillic acid (HVA) (Goldstein et al., 1998). In a recent open-label study, imipramine was not effective for treatment of PTSD (Cassidy et al., 1998). However, contrary to commonly held clinical impressions, imipramine has reported to have therapeutic effects in a patient with sexual phobia (Kossovsky et al., 1991). Additionally, a small review contrasting the relative efficacy of imipramine and sertraline in treatment of anxiety symptoms in patients with major depression showed that a baseline Hamilton Anxiety Scale (Ham-A) score did not predict response to either drug (Kash et al., 2001), and both drugs equally reduced Ham-A total score (Ormel et al., 2001).

Reboxetine was approved for use as an antidepressant in much of western Europe, South America, and Mexico in 1998. Reboxetine is the only truly selective SSRI being marketed as an antidepressant, although U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval has recently been granted to sertraline, a selective SSRI (Blymster et al., 2002) approved for the treatment of attention deficit disorder. Reboxetine potently inhibits the reuptake of NE without having significant effects on the reuptake of 5-HT or DA. It does not inhibit MAO, nor does it bind to 5-HT_{1A}, 5-HT_{2A}, DA₁, or DA₂, or to β -adrenergic, muscarinic cholinergic, gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA), benzodiazepine, or histamine H₁ receptors. Reboxetine has primarily been studied in European trials involving about 665 healthy and 56 elderly (age >60 years) depressed patients (Barlow et al., 1999). It is administered once per day at doses ranging from 4 to 12 mg/day. The European data show that reboxetine is more effective than placebo and comparable to imipramine, desipramine, and fluoxetine for the treatment of major depression. Reboxetine has also been found to be equally effective as imipramine in severely ill depressed patients and melancholic depressed patients. One study found that while reboxetine reduced normal tension as measured on a social adjustment scale, this was did not (Dubini et al., 1997). The finding of improved social adjustment was interpreted to support the specific involvement of the SE system in "maturing stress" (Dubini et al., 1997). A recent study showed reboxetine to be highly effective in treatment of panic disorder (Novak et al., 2002).

SSRIs. The five drugs in this class are fluoxetine, sertraline, paroxetine, fluvoxamine, and citalopram (and reboxetine). All are relatively new and were developed because they are potent and selective 5-HT₁ reuptake inhibitors (Locardi, 1992). They share similar side effects and therapeutic spectrum of action, being effective in the treatment of MDE, OCD and panic disorders.

Early clinical experience suggests that while these drugs are more similar than they are different, variations are found in their side effect profiles that are unexplained by current knowledge. These include serotonin vs. activation and the propensity to cause nausea. In general fluvoxamine and paroxetine are more frequently associated with nausea and a noticeable feeling referred to as "akathisia," whereas fluoxetine and sertraline are more "activating." Increasing differences that may have clinical relevance include the potency of serotonin in blocking DA receptors (Robins, Watson, & Richardson, 1997) and in binding to sigma receptors (Tallush & Johnson, 1992), and of paroxetine for inhibition of NE₁ receptors (Owens et al., 2000). These data suggest that sertraline may be problematic in psychiatric depression and that at high doses paroxetine may be a dual 5-HT/NE reuptake inhibitor, although this is probably only seen at doses higher than the maximum recommended daily dose of 40 mg. Paroxetine is also an inhibitor of the enzyme mono-amine oxidase (Piselli et al., 2002), possibly contributing to a slightly higher rate of sexual dysfunction compared with other SSRIs (Brinstra et al., 2001).

Citalopram is intermediate in most side effects compared to other SSRIs, probably accounting for its popularity in Europe and the United States. Escitalopram, the S-enantiomer of citalopram, improves on the selectivity of the serotonergic drug by increasing potency for the 5-HT transporter (Owens et al., 2000). Studies comparing it with

citalopram support that it has equal efficacy and a similar side effect profile (Gorman et al., 2002).

Clinical Differences between SSRLs and TCAs in Depression Studies. Nelson (2000) recently published a comprehensive review of prior studies comparing an SSRI to an SNRI in patients with major depression. Sixteen studies were reviewed (Nelson, 1999). The NE selective agents included desipramine, nortriptyline, reboxetine, imipramine, and maprotiline, and SNRIs included fluoxetine, paroxetine, sertraline, fluvoxamine, citalopram, and venlafaxine. A total of 1500 patients were included in these studies. Response rates were similar, 59 and 60 percent, for the SNRIs and TCAs. When baseline symptoms that predict response were examined, there were no consistent findings across studies, although some studies have found baseline anxiety to predict preferential response to SNRIs versus TCAs (Tyree et al., 1998; Aborg-Whitbeck, 1992). The topic of whether SNRIs are as effective for anxiety symptoms/ disorders as SSRIs continues to be an important focus of debate. In part, this debate is fueled by the lack of efficacy of SNRIs for OCD (Oncusman et al., 1996; Leonard et al., 1991; Lehman and Johnson, 1996) and PTSD (Reiss et al., 1997; Dow and Klimo, 1997; Canino et al., 1998), as well as a generally held perception that SNRIs are more effective in depressed patients with moderate to severe anxiety symptoms (Blackwell, 1997). Arguing against a significant class difference in efficacy in patients with comorbid major depression and anxiety symptoms are the studies showing SNRIs to be effective in panic disorder (Keller et al., 1996; Lykken et al., 1999; Villaseca, 1995; Rudolph and Foyege, 1999; Nierenbaum et al., 2002) as well as a recent study showing that a baseline Hama-A score did not predict response to either sertraline or imipramine during treatment of depression (Jank et al., 2001).

Dual SSIG-4HT Receptive Inhibition. Approved by the FDA for the treatment of major depression in 1994, venlafaxine is the oldest of the newer antidepressants and stands out from most of the others in having minimal effects on blocking serotonin receptors. It is as potent at blocking 5-HT_{2A} receptors as imipramine, but is weaker at blocking 5-HT_{1A} receptors, making it slightly more selective for 5-HT than TCAs, especially at lower doses. It does not inhibit MAO and does not significantly bind to 5-HT_{1B}, NE, DA, muscarinic cholinergic, α₁, α₂-adrenergic, or histamine H₂ receptors (Orlitzky et al., 1993).

Venlafaxine has fared well in placebo-controlled studies and has shown efficacy in patients and outpatients with major depression and in patients with major depression with comorbidity (Foaigher, 1999; Rudolph and Foyege, 1999). In contrast to SNRIs, there is evidence for a dose-response relationship, with higher doses being more likely to lead to successful antidepressant responses than lower doses. This has been hypothesized to be due to the likelihood that at lower doses (less than 150 mg/day) venlafaxine is predominantly an SSRI and at higher doses the NE response inhibition begins to contribute to its action (Pisacane et al., 1994; Ruskett et al., 1995).

Several studies suggest that venlafaxine may lead to higher rates of response and a more "robust" profile of response (when more stringent response criteria are used)

when compared to fluoxetine, imipramine, or paroxetine (Thase et al., 2001). This is especially true in severely ill or melancholic depressed patients (Clark et al., 1994).

Venlafaxine may have as broad (or broader) an efficacy profile as SSRLs. Small open-label studies have suggested efficacy in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (Rapoport et al., 1990; Raziati et al., 1996), panic/agoraphobia (Pitkänen, 1995; Papp et al., 1998), attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (Wilens et al., 1995; Peusk & Gorczyca 1995), and social phobia (Gallego, 1995).

Duloxetin was approved by the FDA for the treatment of major depression in 2001. Like venlafaxine, it selectively and potently blocks reuptake of both 5-HT and NE. Unlike venlafaxine, the binding affinity of duloxetine for 5-HT_{1A} and NE₁ receptors suggests that it is likely to cause significant receptor inhibition of both mesocortamin at the usual clinical doses, therefore requiring less tration to achieve "dual action." It does not inhibit MAO and does not significantly bind to most 5-HT_{2A}, NE₂, DA₁, muscarinic cholinergic, α_1 , α_2 -adrenergic, or histamine H₁ receptors (Byimaster et al., 2001). It has weak 5-HT_{2A} and 5-HT_{2C} receptor binding affinities and weakly inhibits D₂A receptor (Byimaster et al., 2001), although it is unlikely that these effects are clinically significant at the usual doses.

Duloxetin had a better than average rate of success in the Phase II and III clinical efficacy trials required for FDA approval (Dekker et al., 2002; Gershwin et al., 2002). In Phase II and III trials it showed superiority over both placebo and comparative drugs (fluoxetine and paroxetine), reinforcing the message that dual 5-HT/NE antidepressants may have a more robust efficacy profile than selective 5-HT or NE reuptake inhibitors (Thase et al., 2001).

Duloxetin is taken once-daily with a usual initial daily dose of 60 mg. It shows a benign side effect profile, similar to SSRLs, with most patients tolerating the drug extremely well. When side effects occur, the most common include insomnia and edema (Gershwin et al., 2002; Dekker et al., 2002). There were no significant cardiovascular or gastrointestinal side effects, no weight gain, and sexual side effects as measured by the Adverse Sexual Experience Scale did not differ from placebo (Gershwin et al., 2002).

Duloxetin has been shown to be effective in reducing physical symptoms (back pain, shoulder pain, headache) in depressed patients as well as the core depressive symptoms (Clark et al., 2002), possibly due to its dual action on 5-HT and NE systems (Shults, 2002). These findings have stimulated a renewed interest in reevaluating the diagnostic criteria for major depression given the relative underrepresentation of physical symptoms in the DSM-IV criteria (Pava, 1998).

NE Receptor Antagonist

Amitriptyline. FDA approved for the treatment of depression in the summer of 1996, clomipramine is unique among antidepressants by virtue of the fact that it does not inhibit the reuptake 5-HT, NE, or DA. Its primary mechanism of action relates to its potent antagonism of cyclooxygenase receptors and 5-HT₂ receptors. It is also a potent antagonist of 5-HT₁ and histamine H₁ receptors, effects that influence its

side effect profile. Mianserin has no effects on DA, cholinergic, or α -adrenergic receptors (De Gier, 1985). By blocking α_2 but not the α_1 -adrenergic receptors, mianserin leads to an increase in firing rate and release of both NE and 5-HT. This is because α_2 -adrenergic receptors are localized on both NE and 5-HT neurons. On NE neurons, presynaptic α_2 receptors function as autoceptors, inhibiting the release of NE. Blocking these receptors leads to an increase firing rate and release of NE in most brain regions. NE released near the cell bodies of 5-HT neurons activate α_1 -adrenergic receptors located on 5-HT cell bodies, and since these receptors act in an excitatory fashion, the firing rate of 5-HT neurons is increased. 5-HT neurons also have α_2 -adrenergic receptors, but in this case, the receptors are localized on 5-HT terminals and function to inhibit the release of 5-HT. Blocking these α_2 -adrenergic receptors enhances the amount of 5-HT released each time the neurons fire.

Mianserin has been shown to be more effective than placebo in both hospitalized patients and outpatients, and patients with "severe" depression (17-item Hamilton Depression Scale score >25). It has comparable efficacy with imipramine (Gershon, 1993), clomipramine (Mastille et al., 1993), and clomipramine (Richou et al., 1999) and has been shown to be more efficacious than trazodone (Van Molleart et al., 1999) and fluoxetine (Whitaker et al., 1999) in severely ill depressed patients.

Monocamine Releasing Agents

These drugs are also categorized as stimulants and primarily include amphetamine, methylphenidate, and pemoline. They cause the release and weakly block the reuptake of NE, DA, and 5-HT. Amphetamine was available on an over-the-counter basis until the FDA reclassified it as a prescription drug in 1958 and further restricted its availability in 1985 due to widespread misuse and abuse (Grampaw and Huddleston, 1979).

The literature on the use of monoamine releasing agents in the treatment of depression is surprisingly large and disappointingly poorly controlled given the beneficial effects usually reported (Gershon et al., 1999). Almost all large, controlled trials were conducted before 1970, and different studies used different dosing strategies, diagnostic methods, and outcome measures. No long-term trials have been completed. More recent studies have focused on medically ill or geriatric patients with BDH (Katon and Raskin, 1986; Weiss et al., 1986; Raskin, 1986; Kudman et al., 1982).

Monoamine releasing agents are rapidly metabolized into inactive compounds and generally have relatively short half-lives (4 to 8 hr). The most common side effects are tachycardia, cholinotoxicity, restlessness, tics, weight loss, weight gain, and hypertension. At high doses these agents may cause a characteristic paranoid psychosis. These drugs are generally well tolerated in the clinical dose range (5 to 30 mg d-amphetamine/day), with most patients experiencing no side effects and insomnia being the most common side effect reported.

Hypertension and Other Alternatives

In the mid-1990s there was considerable interest in the possible use of hypertension per se (St. John's Wort) as a new treatment for major depression. Numerous

Elisaprosst studies had suggested that Elisaprosst had equal efficacy to standard antidepressant drugs but was safer and more tolerable (Whistler et al., 2003). Unfortunately, two well-designed large placebo-controlled U.S. studies failed to support the efficacy of Elisaprosst for the treatment of major depression (Stalboer et al., 2001; Hypericum Depression Trial Study Group, 2002).

Several other alternative treatments are currently under investigation. Acupuncture is currently being studied as a potential treatment for depression. Initial reports from a controlled clinical trial have been encouraging (Cheung and Allen, 2001). Exercise treatment has also shown promise (Balogh et al., 2003; Mather et al., 2002), although accomplishing a truly placebo-controlled trial is difficult.

Side Effects of Antidepressants

The pharmacological properties that underlie the side effects of antidepressants have been better characterized than the properties responsible for the therapeutic effects. While newer antidepressants have provided little additional therapeutic efficacy compared to older drugs, they are unequivocally safer and result better tolerated. In general, side effects can be divided into those that occur early in the course of treatment and those that emerge gradually over continuous use.

Frequently Occurring Initial Side Effects (First 1 to 4 weeks). The majority of initial side effects of antidepressant and antimanic drugs relate in a dose-dependent way to monoamine reuptake, histamine H_1 and H_2 , and serotonin antagonistic properties. Some initial side effects are also caused by increasing levels of S-HT or NE (see Baldwin-Watson and Richardson, 1995, for reviews). Most early side effects diminish in intensity over time, although cardiovascular side effects may not. Side effects due to receptor antagonistic properties are seen almost exclusively in the older TCA and MAOI antidepressants, while side effects seen with the newer agents tend to be related to receptor inhibition. Idiosyncratic and allergic responses also usually occur during the first 4 weeks of therapy and can occur with drugs in any of the classes.

Some of the more troubling side effects of antidepressant drugs are caused by α_1 -adrenergic antagonistic properties and include orthostatic hypotension, sedation, and reflex tachycardia. The most common drugs to cause these effects are TCAs, MAOIs, and tricyclics.

Some medications, especially the TCAs, mirtazapine, and clomipramine, have potent antihistaminic H_1 properties. This effect can cause sedation, weight gain, and in some instances hypertension. Most newer antidepressants such as the SSRIs, bupropion, venlafaxine, and clomipramine have no antihistaminic effects.

Anticholinergic cholinergic properties cause dry mouth, dental caries (due to dry mouth), blurred vision, constipation, since tachycardia, urinary retention, and memory loss and confusion. The most serious of these effects is the possibility of an anticholinergic delirious (delirious psychosis). This is usually associated with elevated plasma levels of TCA drugs but can be seen at therapeutic blood levels. Typical symptoms include impaired short-term memory, confusion, and peripheral signs of anticholinergic activity such as dry mouth, constricted pupils, and dry skin. Older patients seem to

be at much increased risk for this side effect and other anticholinergic side effects. The same agents do not cause these effects. Antimuscarinic effects induce pupillary dilation, which can precipitate significant increases in intracranial pressure in patients with preexisting narrow-angle glaucoma.

Tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs) can cause tachycardia, tachypnea, and constipation and respiratory dysrhythmias; MAIT receptor inhibition causes nausea and vomiting or sedation; DA receptor inhibition causes activation and can exacerbate psychosis.

The causes of some side effects of antidepressant drugs are less understood and are probably related to combinations of pharmacological effects. These include myocardiovascular side effects, perspiration, thirst, speech blockage, sexual dysfunction, asthenia, insomnia, and stupor. Cardiovascular effects are potentially the most serious and are most often seen with TCA and MAIT antidepressants (see Rose and Glassman, 1999). These include dose-related increases in heart rate and prolongation of ventricular conduction (dimenhydrinate, TCAs, QTCs), orthostatic hypotension, and quinidine-like arrhythmogenic effects. These may lead to increased ventricular instability and ectopy.

5-HT Syndromes. Recent 5-HT₂ receptor inhibitors are the most likely to cause rashes, myoclonus, and sometimes syncope. When these drugs are used in combination with MAOIs, a hypertensive syndrome can occur consisting of gastrointestinal distress, headache, agitation, hypertension, tachycardia, fast rate, increased respiratory rate, hypotension or hypertension, muscular rigidity, myoclonus, convulsions, coma, and often death (Shatzbach, 1991). The hypertensive syndrome reported with this syndrome closely resemble the symptoms of malignant hypertension and neuroleptic malignant syndrome, raising questions as to whether these may be manifestations of a common mechanism. Many preclinical and clinical studies have shown that 5-HT₂ receptor inhibitors have effects on the DA system, and it has been suggested that changes in DA function may be a common element to these conditions (see Beasley et al., 1993, for comprehensive review).

Because of the potential lethality of this reaction, it is recommended that MAOIs be discontinued for at least 2 weeks prior to using an SSRI, and SSRIs should be discontinued for at least 2 weeks prior to initiation of a MAOI. The exception to this is fluoxetine. Because of its long half-life and accumulation it should be discontinued for at least 6 weeks prior to using an MAOI.

Dopagent Side Effects Occurring after Prolonged Treatment (>4 weeks). Late occurring side effects with antidepressant and antimanic drugs include weight gain, myoclonus, and sexual dysfunction. Weight gain is most common with serotonin TCAs, MAOIs, mirtazapine, and clomipramine but can also be seen with SSRIs after long-term treatment. Myoclonus can occur with any of these medications but may be relatively more common with MAOIs, SSRIs, and lithium.

While sexual side effects can appear at any time, they are more often reported later in the course of treatment, possibly because they are not noticed until the patient has begun to resume more normal function in other spheres of life. SSRIs are the

most likely to cause these side effects but TCAs, MAOIs, venlafaxine, lithium, and carbamazepine can also cause them. SSRLs, MAFIs, and reboxetine are more prone to causing emesis and decreased libido while TCAs are the most likely to cause difficulty maintaining erection.

Withdrawal Reactions. Several types of withdrawal reactions have been reported to occur within hours to days following discontinuation of antidepressant drugs. Symptoms can include gastrointestinal disturbance, sleep disturbances, behavioral activation, agitation, and/or acute depressive reactions. Black et al. (1999) reported discontinuation syndrome, headache, nausea, and irritability following acute discontinuation of SSRLs. The mechanisms underlying antidepressant withdrawal reactions are not known. Withdrawal is more likely after discontinuation of drugs with short-half lives.

SOMATIC TREATMENTS FOR MAJOR DEPRESSION

Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT)

Convulsive therapy for psychiatric illness was first demonstrated by Ladislao Meduna in 1934 via amphetamine injections. In 1938, Carleton and Bell demonstrated that electrical induction of seizures was more immediate and better tolerated by the patient. Today clinicians have a choice of either right (unipolar) unilateral or bilateral placement of electrodes. In right unilateral placement the highest concentration of current is across the motor cortex, and seizures are elicited at lower energies than with bilateral placement in which the greatest current is induced in the brain's midline structures including the hypothalamus and pituitary gland (Pilk, 2001). Since a right-handed patient will usually have memory function localized to the left side, it was proposed that right unilateral placement would result in less memory loss. However, for right unilateral placement to approach the power of bilateral placement, energies of up to five times the seizure threshold must be used (Sackeim et al., 2000). At three high energies, the memory effects of right unilateral placement increase dramatically (McCall et al., 2000).

There is no widespread agreement on the underlying mechanism of action of ECT. Electrophysiological studies (Jahnsen and Sava, 1999) have shown that ECT increases the sensitivity of 5-HT₁ receptors in the hippocampus, resulting in an increased release of glutamate and GABA. However, hippocampal dialysis failed to reverse the improvement in mood seen in depressed patients after ECT (Cassidy et al., 1997) and does not support a primarily 5-HT-dependent mechanism. ECT has been shown to decrease the sensitivity of the norepinephrine and DA autoreceptors in the locus caeruleus and substantia nigra, resulting in an increased release of NE and DA (Jahnsen and Sava, 1999). Support for a noradrenergic mechanism also arises from a study showing a normalization of plasma norepinephrine receptors after a course of ECT (Wernicke et al., 1996). However, the fact that ECT has efficacy in patients that fail treatment with medication argues against ECT having a similar mechanism of action (Porsild, 1995). One of the most interesting hypotheses regarding ECT's mechanism of action relates to its potent

effects on increasing levels of brain-derived neurotrophic factor and neuronal sprouting (Duman et al., 1997, 1999).

The effectiveness of ECT in depression is proven in multiple studies and usually ranges between 80 and 90 percent for non-suicidal cases (Porsild, 1990). ECT was shown to be more effective than all currently available classes of antidepressant medication (Parker 2001).

Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation

Magnetic stimulators became commercially available in Sheffield (United Kingdom) in 1985. Transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) is currently an experimental technique and does not have an approved psychiatric indication. TMS is achieved by conduction a large current through a coil that is placed on the patient's scalp. A magnetic field is induced that passes freely through the skull and induces an electrical field in the cerebral cortex underlying the stimulating coil. TMS has been shown to preferentially activate the cortical interneurons, as opposed to the motor neurons of the cortico-spinal tract, due to the interneurons' orientation parallel to the scalp.

Activation or inhibition of the cortex has been shown to vary with the frequency of the magnetic pulses. A 20-Hz stimulation at the motor threshold (MT) over the left prefrontal cortex of depressed patients was shown to increase the perfusion of the prefrontal cortex (L. > R) as well as the cingulate gyrus and left amygdala. A 1-tHz stimulation was only associated with decreases in rCBF (Spona, 2000). The intensity of the magnetic stimulation has also been shown to affect the pattern of activation. Repetitive TMS at 120 percent MT over the left prefrontal cortex produced greater basal and evoked-state activation than stimulation at 80 percent MT (Veltman, 2001). A negative correlation between the severity of negative symptoms in major depression and rCBF in the left dorsal-lateral prefrontal cortex has been reported (Jalilipour et al., 1998). Both converging lines of evidence support a hypoactivation in the left prefrontal cortex in major depression that may be modified by rTMS and negatively explain part of its antidepressant effect.

Repetitive TMS was first shown to be beneficial in the treatment of depression by a study with daily 60 stimulations over the left prefrontal cortex at 20 Hz and 80 percent MT (George et al., 1995). Free meta-analysis of rTMS provide evidence for a beneficial acute antidepressant effect compared to placebo (see Chapter 17 for details). Attention to the stimulus parameters of frequency, intensity, and duration is indicated to avoid inducing seizures during rTMS (Pliszka et al., 1997).

Vagus Nerve Stimulation

Vagus nerve stimulation (VNS) has been commercially available in the United States with an indication for treatment-resistant partial onset seizures in epilepsy since 1997. VNS is achieved in the VNS system (Cyberonics, Houston) by coiling an electrode around the left vagus nerve in the neck near the carotid artery. A subcutaneous line connects the stimulating electrode to a bipolar pulse generator implanted in the left chest.

well. The vagus nerve is composed of 80 percent afferent sensory fibers. These sensory fibers terminate in the nucleus tractus solitarius (NTS). The NTS sends information to the forebrain, hypothalamus, and thalamus through the LC and parabrachial nucleus (George et al., 2000). Animal studies have demonstrated that the LC must be intact for VNS to achieve an antidepressant effect (Kraut et al., 1999). The role of the LC in the treatment of depression with medications has been noted above. Brain imaging studies in epilepsy patients have shown VNS to cause an initial increase in the perfusion of the ventral medulla, hypothalamus, and thalamus bilaterally and a decrease of the hippocampus, amygdala, and posterior cingulate gyrus bilaterally (Henry et al., 1998). The decrease in perfusion of the hippocampus and amygdala has been shown to be present after 6 months with chronic VNS (Van Laar et al., 2002). The decrease in perfusion in the hippocampus has been reported to differentiate a response to an active drug in the treatment of depression from a placebo response (Mayberg et al., 2002).

The first observations of the positive effect of VNS on mood were in epilepsy patients. Improvements in overall well-being were reported by the patients that were not entirely explained by improvements in seizure frequency (Bacalov et al., 1998). In a study of 30 nonresponsive patients with treatment-resistant depression, a response rate of 40 percent was obtained with 16 weeks of VNS (Bush et al., 2003). These improvements were shown to be stable over a 1-year period on the same 20 patients; 18 (90 percent) of the original responders continuing to show a response with continued VNS. Of the 18 original nonresponders 11 percent showed a response at 6 months of VNS (Mayberg et al., 2002). The most frequent side effect was voice alteration in 21 percent of the patients. No patient discontinued due to clear adverse effects, even though one patient elected to be explanted after failure to respond following 1 year of therapy, which may have been due to VNS-induced dysphoric hypoesthesia.

ANTIMANIC AND MOOD STABILIZERS

In comparison to the data available for the use of antidepressant drugs, research with antimanic drugs is more limited. In part this is because alternatives to lithium and antipsychotics have only recently become widely available and in part because clinical research involving people afflicted with bipolar disorder is inherently difficult, especially long-term studies. While there is general agreement that the neurotransmitters involved in antidepressant responses, the central systems involved in the mechanisms of antimanic drugs are poorly defined.

Drugs with established antimanic and mood-stabilizing properties have a wide variety of pharmacological properties. Attention has been focused mostly on the intracellular properties of antimanic drugs, in part because very few significant changes in neurotransmitter levels have been identified. The systems being most intensively investigated in relation to possible mechanism of action are the adenosine cytosine and phosphatidylinositol second messenger systems and the G protein coupling protein (Arenas and Salmeron, 1995; Mayaj et al., 2004). Table 8.8 lists common antimanic drugs and describes important clinical parameters.

TABLE 6.6. Common Antimanic and Mood Stabilizers.

Drug	Dose Range (mg/day)	Plasma Level (μ g/L)	Half-Life (hr)
Lithium	600–1800	0.8–1.5 (μ g/L)	14–30
CARBAMOZEPINE	400–1200	4–12 (μ g/L)	13–17
VALPROIC ACID	800–1800	0.8–2.0 (μ g/L)	6–16
LAMOTRIGGINE	50–300	—	13–17
GABAPETINE	300–3600	—	6–7
TOPRIMATE	50–400	—	10–15

TABLE 6.7. Treatment Recommendations for Patients with Bipolar Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association (2002).

Acute Treatment:

- | | |
|-------------------------|---|
| Mixed or mixed episodes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lithium plus an antidepressant ▪ Valproic acid plus an antidepressant ▪ Electroconvulsive therapy |
| Depressive episodes | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lithium ▪ Lamotrigine ▪ Psychotherapy ▪ Combination ▪ Electroconvulsive therapy |
| Rapid cycling | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Lithium ▪ Valproic acid ▪ Lamotrigine ▪ Combination |

Maintenance Treatment:

- Lithium
- Valproic acid
- Electroconvulsive therapy

A comprehensive review of the diagnosis and treatment of bipolar disorder has recently been published by the American Psychiatric Association (2002). Treatment recommendations are listed in Table 6.7.

Lithium:

Lithium was used medically as a treatment for gout, diabetes, and epilepsy in the early 1800s. It was first used to treat mood disorders in the 1970s because it was theorized that these conditions were the result of uric acid deposits in the brain. The first

Reported use in mania was in 1949 when Calle reported that it was effective. Lithium began to be widely used in the United States in the mid to late 1960s and remains the only drug currently approved by the FDA for both the acute and maintenance treatment of mania. Because of side-effects it is usually not initiated as the first treatment option.

Lithium is more effective in the acute treatment of mania than placebo or typical antipsychotic drugs (Prest et al., 1979). Response rates range from 60 to 80 percent. It may be less effective than divalproic acid in patients with dysphoric mania (mania with prominent anxiety or depressive symptoms) or rapid cycling (Post, 1982).

As with antidepressant treatments, there is a time lag in the onset of the therapeutic action of lithium, with the full effects often taking three to 4 weeks to occur. This time lag is especially important with lithium because manic patients are difficult to manage and have extremely poor judgment, making the risk of self-harm or injury to others very real. For this reason, antipsychotic medications or benzodiazepines are usually required until the therapeutic effects occur.

Lithium is rapidly and completely absorbed, is not protein bound, and does not undergo metabolism. Peak plasma levels are achieved within 1 to 4 hr and the mean half-life is 18 hr (range 14 to 38 hr) in young patients (Gershon and Schatzberg, 1991). Because lithium is filtered through the proximal tubules, changes in glomerular filtration rate will alter lithium clearance. Sodium is also filtered through the proximal tubules; therefore a decrease in plasma sodium can increase lithium reabsorption in the proximal tubule and cause an increase in plasma lithium levels. Conversely, an increase in plasma lithium levels can cause an increase in sodium excretion, disproportionately depleting plasma sodium.

Therapeutic doses of lithium are quite variable, ranging from 600 milligram to as high as 2000 milligram. Because of the potential for serious toxicity, plasma levels of lithium are routinely used to establish a therapeutic dose. The usual therapeutic range is between 0.8 and 1.2 milligram. In the acute treatment phase, plasma lithium levels between 0.8 and 1.1 milligram are recommended in order to maximize therapeutic effect. Lithium levels above 1.0 milligram are associated with fewer relapses into mania or depression but greater noncompliance due to side effects than levels between 0.4 and 0.8 milligram (Gershon et al., 1987).

Lithium can cause short-term side effects including tremor, gastric irritation, nausea, abdominal cramping, diarrhea, constipation, increased white blood cell count (up to 10,000 cells/mm³), polyuria and polydipsia, dermatitis, extrapsychotic reactions, fatigue and muscle weakness, and flaccidity of T waves, T-wave inversion, or U-waves on electrocardiogram. Long-term side effects include weight gain, hypothyroidism (5 to 10 percent), diabetes insipidus, potential kidney damage, and hence decreased glomerular filtration rate, hypertension, and hypoparathyroidism (Gershon and Schatzberg, 1991). Lithium has been reported to cause fetal heart anomalies but recent data suggest the incidence is low, so risks must be weighed versus benefits. Because lithium is recovered in breast milk in significant quantities, breastfeeding should be approached with caution.

Carbamazepine

Carbamazepine is an anticonvulsant drug structurally related to the TCAs. Like TCAs, its absorption and metabolism is variable. It is rapidly absorbed, with peak plasma levels occurring within 4 to 6 hr. Eighty percent of plasma carbamazepine is protein bound and the half-life ranges from 13 to 17 hr. Carbamazepine is metabolized by the hepatic P450IID6 system. It induces the P450 enzymes, causing an increase in the rate of its own metabolism over time as well as that of other drugs metabolized by the P450 system. This often results in having to raise the dose within 2 to 4 months of treatment initiation.

Concurrent administration of carbamazepine with oral contraceptives, warfarin, theophylline, diazepam, haloperidol, TCAs, or valproic acid leads to decreased plasma levels of these other drugs. Concomitant administration of drugs that inhibit the P450 system will increase plasma levels of carbamazepine. This includes diclofenac, cimetidine, erythromycin, metoclopramide, cimetidine/ranitidine, and propoxyphene. Concomitant administration of phenothiazine, phenytoin, and primidone causes a decrease in carbamazepine levels through induction of the P450 enzymes.

Since 1979 more than 15 studies (either of small case series or open trials) have been published evaluating the effectiveness of carbamazepine in the treatment of mania. The majority of these trials have shown carbamazepine to be equal in efficacy to lithium and neuroleptics and more effective than placebo. However, the number of patients in each study has been small, the diagnoses heterogeneous or unspecified, comedication medications have been used, and study designs have been unclear. Usual therapeutic doses of carbamazepine range from 400 to 1200 mg/day and therapeutic plasma levels range from 8 to 12 μ g/dl.

Carbamazepine frequently causes lethargy, sedation, nausea, tremor, ataxia, and visual disturbances during the acute treatment phase (Zajicek, 1990). Some patients can develop mild leukopenia or thrombocytopenia during this phase and usually do not progress. Carbamazepine has been reported to cause a severe form of aplastic anemia or agranulocytosis that is estimated to occur with an incidence of about 1 to 5/100,000. This is 11 times more likely than in the general population. While more than 85 percent of these reactions occur during the first 2 months of therapy, some cases have been reported as late as 3 years following initiation of therapy treatment. If white blood cell count drops below 3000 cells/ μ l, the medication should be discontinued.

Carbamazepine has also been associated with fetal anomalies including a risk of spine bifida (1 percent), low birth weight, or small head circumference. It has also been shown to have effects on cardiac conduction, slowing AV conduction. Other reported side effects include inappropriate secretion of antidiuretic hormone (SIADH) with concomitant hyponatremia, decreased thyroid hormone levels without change in thyrotropin-stimulating hormone, severe dermatologic reactions such as the Stevens-Johnson syndrome, and hepatitis.

Carbamazepine is associated with more side effects and potential toxicity than most other mood stabilizers. Because of the cardiac, hematological, endocrine, and

real side effects associated with carbamazepine, patients should have had a recent physical examination, complete blood count (CBC) with platelet count, liver function, thyroid function, and renal function prior to initiation of treatment. The CBC and liver function should be monitored every 4 to 6 weeks during the initial 3 to 4 months of treatment, and all baseline tests should be repeated at a minimum of yearly intervals thereafter. Any change in the above tests should warrant closer evaluation and follow-up. Carbamazepine shares with the TCAs the risk of hypotensive crisis when coadministered with MAOIs, and so this combination should not be routinely used. If it has a role, it is more likely as an adjunct in rapid cyclers and dyskinetic mania and mixed states.

Valproic Acid

Valproic acid (divalproexic acid) is currently approved by the FDA for acute treatment of manic episodes associated with bipolar disorder. While it does not have FDA approval for maintenance treatment, it has become the most widely used medication in both acute and maintenance treatment of bipolar disorder in the United States. In a large multicenter study, valproic acid did not differ from placebo in the length of time to reversion of mania or depression in patients with bipolar disorder undergoing maintenance treatment (lithium also failed in this study) (Brodsky et al., 2002). It is widely believed that this was a result of the high drop-out and noncompliance rate for all treatments in this study rather than a true reflection of lack of maintenance efficacy. Several open-label studies have shown efficacy for valproic acid in the maintenance therapy of bipolar disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2002), as discussed below.

Valproic acid is produced in various preparations including syrup, capsules, tablets, enteric coated capsules, and tablets. One of the more commonly used preparations is divalproex sodium, a compound of sodium valproate and valproic acid in a 1:1 molar ratio. Absorption is different among the different preparations and is delayed by food. However, since anticonvulsant efficacy is not related to peak levels but rather related to total daily bioavailable dose, this variability is thought to be clinically irrelevant. Peak plasma levels are achieved between 2 and 4 hr of ingestion and the half-life ranges from 6 to 16 hr. More than 90 percent of plasma valproic acid is protein bound. The time of dosing is determined by possible side effects and, if tolerated, a once-daily dosing could be employed. The therapeutic plasma levels used for the treatment of mania are the same as those used for anticonvulsant therapy (50 to 100 µg/ml.) and the daily dose required to achieve these levels ranges from 800 to 1500 mg.

Valproic acid is metabolized by the hepatic P4502D6 system, but unlike carbamazepine it does not autoinduce its own metabolism. Concomitant administration of carbamazepine will decrease plasma levels of valproic acid, and drugs that inhibit the P450 system (NSAIDs) can cause an increase in valproic acid levels.

At least 10 uncontrolled open-label and six controlled studies have been published investigating the efficacy of valproic acid in the treatment of mania. These studies demonstrate considerable efficacy for valproic acid. The first placebo-controlled comparison of divalproex sodium with lithium in 179 inpatients afflicted with mania

demonstrates equal efficacy to lithium and greater efficacy than placebo for both lithium and divalproex sodium. The rate of early termination because of side effects was significantly greater for lithium than placebo or divalproex sodium (Florblom et al., 2002).

Valproic acid appears to have the most favorable side effect profile of all available anticonvulsant drugs. Diminished and common initial side effects include nausea, drowsiness, and lethargy. Gastrointestinal and nausea can be reduced by dividing the dose or using enteric coated preparations. Valproic acid has been associated with potentially fatal hepatic failure, usually occurring within the first 6 months of treatment and most frequently occurring in children under age 2 and individuals with preexisting liver disease. Transient, dose-related elevations in liver enzymes can occur in up to 30 percent of patients. Any change in hepatic function should be followed closely and patients should be warned to report symptoms of hepatic failure such as malaise, weakness, lethargy, edema, anorexia, or vomiting. Valproic acid may produce leukopenia effects (including agranulocytosis 11 percent) and other neutropenic effects. Other potential side effects include weight gain, inhibition of platelet aggregation, hair loss, and severe dermatologic reactions such as the Stevens-Johnson's syndrome.

Antipsychotic and Atypical Antipsychotic Drugs

Antipsychotic drugs were some of the first drugs used to treat acute mania and are highly effective (Price et al., 1972). While onset of action is often more rapid than lithium, carbamazepine, or valproic acid, antipsychotics can cause various potential side effects.

A major concern with typical antipsychotics is the potential for tardive dyskinesia. Tardive dyskinesia may occur more frequently in patients with mood disorders than those with schizophrenia and also in those with intermittent exposure rather than continuous use, placing bipolar patients at higher risk (Cassano, 1997). Because of this and the availability of safer and better tolerated drugs, antipsychotic medication should only be used in the management of acute agitation, elationism, or psychosis in manic patients or in those few patients who clearly ellipse on gradual discontinuation of maintenance antipsychotics.

While only approved by the FDA for the treatment of drug-resistant schizophrenia, the atypical antipsychotic drug clozapine has been shown to be effective in the treatment of manic and depressive mania (McElroy et al., 1991; Alphs and Campbell, 2002). Eighteen percent of 14 bipolar patients with psychotic features showed significant improvement, and 7 of these patients were followed for an additional 3- to 5-year period with no further hospitalizations (Ziggyes et al., 1992). Other studies suggest clozapine is also effective in maintenance treatment of patients with bipolar disorder (Alphs and Campbell, 2002). Because of the risk of potentially fatal agranulocytosis, clozapine should not be used unless other first-line agents or traditional antipsychotic drugs have failed.

Other atypical antipsychotics that do not have a risk of agranulocytosis are now widely available. These drugs are being increasingly studied for the treatment of bipolar and unipolar mood disorders because they appear to have a lower risk of tardive dyskinesia and are associated with a lower overall side effect profile compared with older

antipsychotics. Olanzapine, risperidone, and quetiapine are all being studied as both monotherapy and as an adjunctive therapy for treatment of acute mania. Of the three, olanzapine is the best studied, with double-blind, comparative trials as well as double-blind placebo-controlled trials showing significant efficacy (Oliver et al., 1999) in acute mania. All atypical antipsychotic drugs are being widely used in the United States for the treatment of agitation and psychosis in manic or psychotically depressed patients, in spite of the absence of controlled data. Interestingly, clozapine and risperidone have both been reported to cause mania in some patients with schizophrenia, schizoaffective, or bipolar disorder. At this point, none of these drugs should be used for long-term monotherapy of bipolar disorder in patients who have been tried on other available agents since no long-term studies have been completed.

Other Anticonvulsants:

Several drugs that have been approved by the FDA as anticonvulsants have been studied as possible mood stabilizers or antimanic drugs (carbamazepine, gabapentin, and topiramate). In spite of extremely limited data on short- or long-term efficacy, their use for the treatment of bipolar disorder and refractory depression in the United States has become widespread.

Lamotrigine is the best studied of the newer anticonvulsants. While showing efficacy for treatment of depression and for maintenance treatment in bipolar patients, it may be less efficacious in the treatment of acute mania (Luddington et al., 2002; American Psychiatric Association, 2002). Along with many open-label studies, there is one large multicenter placebo-controlled trial of lamotrigine monotherapy for treatment of depression in outpatients with bipolar disorder (Calabrese et al., 1999). In this study, 500 mg/day of lamotrigine demonstrated significant antidepressant effects in over 50 percent of these patients without inducing mania or rash. Lamotrigine inhibits voltage-gated sodium channels and reduces glutamate. It is absorbed within 1 to 3 hr and has a half-life of 25 hr. Rash can occur in up to 8 percent of adults, and serious rash requiring hospitalization can be seen in up to 0.3 percent of patients. Because of the possibility of Stevens-Johnson syndrome, toxic epidermal necrolysis, or angioedema, all rashes should be regarded as potentially serious and monitored closely. Low starting doses (25 mg/day) and slow titration may help reduce the occurrence of rash.

Carbamazepine has been studied as both a monotherapy and adjunctive treatment for mania and bipolar depression (Caffarra et al., 1999), and while the initial results were generally favorable, subsequent trials failed to show efficacy. Because of this, carbamazepine is not recommended for use in mixed disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2002).

Topiramate inhibits rapid firing of voltage-dependent sodium channels, antagonizes calcium binding to the AMPA receptor, and potentiates the effects of GABA at the GABA_A receptor. In a small number of cases, topiramate addition to ongoing treatment with other drugs has been reported to be effective in reducing acute mania or refractory depression (Tollefson et al., 2002). It has a half-life of 20 hr and is usually dosed twice daily. Eighty percent of the drug is excreted unchanged in the urine.

In the presence of metabolism-enhancing drugs, it is more extensively metabolized by the liver, raising the plasma levels and half-life to dosages by up to 30 percent. Topiramate can interfere with the efficacy of oral contraceptives, therefore women of childbearing potential should be counseled and alternative forms of birth control should be considered. The most common side effects of topiramate include constipation, diarrhea, dizziness, ataxia, speech and cognitive disorders, fatigue, and weight loss. Up to 20 percent of patients experience weight loss, a side effect that has led to the use of topiramate in psychiatric patients solely for this property (Nathan et al., 2002).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

In the past 30 years a multitude of effective and safe treatments for mood disorders have been successfully introduced into the clinic. Conditions that once required long-term hospitalization for many patients are now routinely treated on an outpatient basis, and people suffering from mood disorders are more often than not able to lead relatively normal lives. Given the economic and social impact of these conditions, it is essential to improve diagnosis and provide consistent access to treatment.

During this period, the focus of psychiatric research was on understanding the role of neurotransmitters in the pathophysiology of mental illnesses. These efforts were greatly influenced by the discovery of the CNS 5-HT deficiency in patients suffering from Parkinson's disease (Ehlinger and Heninger, 1982) and the remarkable therapeutic effects of L-DOPA-like treatment (Koob et al., 1971). The discovery of a 5-HT deficiency in Parkinson's disease led psychiatric investigators to hope that the pathophysiology of mental disorders would be discovered by understanding the pharmacology of our treatments. The research of the past 30 years suggests that now, even complex models are in order. We have begun to understand that mood disorders are not simply the result of a deficiency in monoamine neurotransmitters and that we have to better understand the anatomy and function of brain circuits regulating emotion and cognition as well as the molecular events that modulate the function and viability of these circuits. As the pathophysiology of mood disorders becomes elucidated, these efforts will target disease pathophysiology, leading to more rapidly acting and effective treatments.

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NEUROSCIENCE OF SCHIZOPHRENIA

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INTRODUCTION

Schizophrenia is a debilitating psychiatric disorder that afflicts about 1 percent of the world's population. In 1990, the World Health Organization ranked schizophrenia as one of the 10 leading causes of disability with an annual direct cost of 19 billion US dollars and an additional annual indirect cost of 40 billion US dollars from lost productivity. Two-thirds of people with schizophrenia will require public assistance from government social security systems within a few years after onset. While patients with schizophrenia occupy one-third of the nation's mental hospital beds, many are homeless, and 10 to 15 percent of them will commit suicide.

Despite more than 50,000 published articles and books on schizophrenia, schizophrenia still remains an elusive disease. In this chapter, we will review our present understanding of the disease and the current technology being used to advance this understanding. We will present evidence that schizophrenia is a heterogeneous disease of developmental origin, with problems that arise early in development and span the entire lifetime of the

affected individual. The pharmacological treatment of schizophrenia will be discussed in the next chapter.

DIAGNOSIS AND CLASSIFICATION OF SCHIZOPHRENIA

Although schizophrenia is a developmental disorder with many nonpsychotic manifestations, psychotic symptoms—hallucinations, delusions, and disorganized thought and behavior—have historically been the basis of diagnostic criteria. In the Fourth Edition, Revised, of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV), negative symptoms, duration of illness, and the temporal relationship to any depressive or manic syndrome are also part of the criteria but psychotic symptoms remain central (see Table 15-1).

These diagnostic criteria may leave a misimpression that people with schizophrenia have a uniform illness. In fact, they vary greatly relative to their symptoms, course of illness, treatment response, and other factors. Statistical studies of the symptoms of schizophrenia have consistently identified four factors or groups of symptoms: (1) hallucinations + delusions, (2) disorganization, (3) negative symptoms, and (4) affective symptoms (manic symptoms, depressive symptoms, and anxiety). The multiple symptoms within a given cluster tend to show comparable severity but may differ in severity with symptoms outside the cluster. For instance, severe hallucinations are often found with acute delusions, but the severity of hallucinations + delusions does not correlate with the severity of disorganized speech.

Hallucinations are sensory experiences that occur without being caused by external stimuli. An example of a hallucination is the experience of hearing a voice when no one is speaking. Hallucinations can occur in any sensory modality; that is, they can be heard, seen, smelled, tasted, or felt. Auditory hallucinations are the most common form and usually take the form of distinct voices that only the patient can hear. These voices can be critical or hostile and may consist of commands to the patient or a dialog between two or more voices talking about the patient.

TABLE 15-1. Summary of the DSM-II (Revised) Diagnostic Criteria for Schizophrenia

1. Characteristic symptoms (at least two)
a. Delusions
b. Hallucinations
c. Disorganized speech
d. Disorganized or erratic behavior
e. Negative symptoms (stunted affect, poverty of speech, or avolition)
f. Seated social or occupational dysfunction
g. Day-to-day function
2. Absent during no major affective syndrome during active phase of illness, or the duration of active-phase affective syndrome is brief compared to the total duration of the illness
3. Symptoms are not directly due to substance abuse or another medical illness
4. If patient has a diagnosis of autism, must have persistent delusions or hallucinations

Ideas are false beliefs that are not shared by the patient's culture. The false beliefs can relate to things that do happen but have not actually happened in the patient's life—such as infidelity by a romantic partner, or being the object of ridicule—or to things that are completely unrealistic, such as being controlled by a radio transmitter placed in the patient's toolkit.

Like hallucinations and delusions, disorganized thought and behavior can be terribly impairing. The most common aspect of disorganization is called thought disorder and refers to speech that is either vague, rambling, or so disorganized that the patient cannot be understood. The behavior of some patients with schizophrenia is also very disorganized and can be so severe that the patient represents an untreated threat to himself or others.

Distinguishing schizophrenia from more other disorders with psychotic symptoms can often be difficult. The most common problem is distinguishing schizophrenia from an affective disorder (mania or depression) with psychotic symptoms. What adds to the uncertainty in diagnosis is that some forms of schizophrenia—especially the so-called paranoid form—and psychotic affective disorders share some risk factors and other clinical and neurobiological correlates.

In terms of symptoms, people with schizophrenia vary so greatly that researchers have often suggested that groups of patients with similar symptoms may have a different disorder than that found in others diagnosed with the same disease. A number of subtyping systems have been suggested, but most of these subtypes haven't proven to be stable over time; that is, a patient may belong to one subtype at one stage of the illness, then belong to another subtype a year later. Most systems for subtyping patients have also been very poor at predicting such things as treatment response. However, some systems have been more successful. The system of categorizing patients into deficit versus nondeficit schizophrenia, which built on previous attempts at classifying subtypes, has been the most successful (Kirkpatrick et al., 2001).

Research on the deficit versus nondeficit categories suggests schizophrenia consists of at least two separate diseases. Patients with deficit schizophrenia meet diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia and, of course, have psychotic symptoms, but also have other symptoms that have long been used in descriptions of the pathophysiology of this disease:

1. Blunted affect: a decrease in "body language" and a relative absence of normal variations in the pitch, speed, and volume of speech
2. Diminished emotional range: a decrease in the experience of emotion—depression, anxiety, joy, etc.
3. Poverty of speech: a decrease in the number of words and amount of information conveyed in speech
4. Diminished sense of purpose: a failure to pursue goals due to a loss of motivation
5. Diminished interests: a loss of curiosity and interests
6. Diminished social drive: a loss of interest in relationships

These symptoms and some others are often called negative symptoms. However, people with schizophrenia and many other disorders can exhibit negative symptoms, sometimes transiently, for a variety of reasons. In contrast, people with delusional schizophrenia have persistent negative symptoms that are a direct result of their disease. Nondelusional schizophrenia does not comprise a homogeneous group and is defined simply by an absence, in people with schizophrenia, of those features that define delusional schizophrenia. Other groups with important nosobiological differences may prove to exist within the nondelusional group.

ETIOLOGY

Genetic:

Humans have 46 chromosomes: 22 pairs of autosomes and 1 pair of sex chromosomes (two X chromosomes in females, and one X and one Y chromosome in males). The approximately 40,000 genes in the human genome are arranged in a precise order along the chromosomes. Each gene is located at a precise position (locus) on a specific chromosome and has two alleles, one donated from the mother and the other from the father. Those two alleles may be identical, or more commonly, they may have several variations in their sequence called polymorphisms.

The following is a summary of the research that has attempted to understand the genetic component of schizophrenia by studying its heritability, as well as chromosomes, their genes, and allelic variations in patients with schizophrenia and their families.

Heritability. While the rate of schizophrenia in the general population is approximately 1 percent, the incidence of schizophrenia in families is at least 10-fold greater, strong evidence that the disease runs in families. However, if schizophrenia was purely caused by a genetic abnormality, identical twins, who share 100 percent of their genes, should theoretically have a 100 percent concordance rate for the disease. In fact, the concordance rate for monozygotic twins is only about 49 percent, and dizygotic twins, who share 50 percent of their genes, only have a concordance rate of 13 percent. The more genes a biological relative shares with a patient, the higher the incidence of schizophrenia (see Fig. 9-1). For instance, first-degree relatives such as parents, siblings, and children, who share 50 percent of their genes, had a greater incidence of schizophrenia than second- or third-degree relatives, which only share 25 percent and 12.5 percent of their genes, respectively (Lichtenstein, 1990).

However, closer family members not only have more genes in common but generally also share social environments. To better understand the contribution of nature and nurture, several studies examined the incidence of schizophrenia among adoptees (Kringlen, 1961). The finding of higher rates of schizophrenia among the biological relatives of schizophrenia adoptees than normal adoptees is clear support for a genetic component. However, unlike primarily genetic diseases, such as Huntington's or cystic fibrosis in which the mutation of a single allele of the gene is sufficient

[Image not available in this electronic edition.]

Figure 9.1. Relation of schizophrenia lifetime risk of developing the disease as a function of degree of genetic relationship, compiled from all family and twin studies conducted in European samples between 1950 and 1987 [adapted from Kendler (1990), Figure 1 (p. 96) © 1994 by Irving J. Gottesman. Reprinted by permission of Wiley and Company, Ltd.]

to express the disorder, or recessive diseases such as phenylketonuria in which a mutation of both alleles of the gene are required to produce the disorder, the transmission of schizophrenia is more complex. The most likely explanation for the unusual genetic transmission of schizophrenia is that there are several genes that may contribute to the risk of schizophrenia, or more precisely, several alleles of genes involved, and what is inherited may not be the certainty of the disease accompanying a particular genotype, but rather the susceptibility or predisposition to develop the disease.

Linkage Studies. In linkage analysis, entire genomes are screened for the presence of allelic variations in regions of the chromosomes to identify susceptibility loci or "hot spots" that may be co-transmitted with the disease in families containing two or more affected individuals. Linkage studies thus far have failed to identify any locus of large-effect size, that is, where mutation of a gene(s) is common to most patients. This is consistent with the idea that schizophrenia is in fact a heterogeneous disease and that different susceptibility loci or combinations of susceptibility loci are necessary to predispose an individual to the disease, and that these loci vary among families. Linkage studies have revealed at least 19 susceptibility loci that have weak to moderate linkage to schizophrenia on several chromosomes² (DeLisi and Crow, 1999; Bertenthal, 2001).

²Susceptibility loci that have been linked with schizophrenia: 1q21-22, 2q, 3p26-24, 5q, 5p13, 5q, 6q, 6q24-25, 6p22-23, 7p22, 7q, 8p11, 11q25-24, 14p11-12, 15p.

Linkage studies therefore have been valuable in identifying chromosomal hot spots where disease genes can be found, without any prior knowledge of disease etiology. However, each of these chromosomal regions contains numerous genes, and in some cases, these regions contain susceptibility genes that overlap with other disorders. An excellent example of this is the deletion of chromosome 22q11 (Buxbaum and Owen, 2001). Deletions on this chromosome represent one of the highest known risk factors for the development of schizophrenia. They are also known to be associated with velo-cardio-facial syndrome (VCFS), a syndrome characterized by heart, limb, and craniofacial anomalies. Interestingly, these individuals also have high rates of psychiatric disorders with 10 to 40 percent of affected individuals developing symptoms of schizophrenia. It is not clear, however, which of the approximately 30 genes found in this region are implicated in either or both disorders. In addition, linkage studies have revealed a number of susceptibility loci that are common to both schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, a neuropsychiatric disease clinically and pathologically very similar to schizophrenia.

Association Studies. In a normal population, any gene at any locus can be present in a number of different forms called alleles. In association studies, the frequency of alleles is compared in samples of unrelated patients and controls to identify allelic variations that are associated with the disease more often than would be predicted by chance alone. Since studying undiagnosed populations in entire genomes would be prohibitively large, susceptibility loci identified in linkage studies, or candidate genes stimulated by known pharmacological or neurochemical observations are selected for study. This approach has identified potential allelic association between schizophrenia and polymorphisms in a subtype of serotonin receptors (5-HT_{2A}), and the D₃ subtype of dopamine receptors (Owen, 2000). While these findings are interesting in that these receptor subtypes may be involved in the therapeutic effects of many antipsychotics, they have not yet been replicated.

Chromosomal Studies. Evidence about the contribution of particular genes to the etiology of schizophrenia also comes from direct studies of chromosomal abnormalities. These are changes in the structure of chromosomes (as opposed to specific genes) that can be seen, using appropriate techniques, at the light microscopic level. Usually these are chromosomal translocations in which there is a break in a chromosome, and the fragment that has broken off becomes attached to another chromosome. Because it is possible to identify the point at which the break takes place, it is possible to identify the gene or genes that straddle the break point. If such a translocation is associated with a disease, this means that it is possible to identify a gene that increases the risk of the disease. Chromosomal translocations have been found that increase the risk of schizophrenia. Although in one case (22q11 and 13q12) the genes are known, to date the role of these genes in normal brains is not understood, much less the role of the genes in causing schizophrenia (Miller et al., 2000).

Triplettoctoile Repeats. Genes are made up of long sequences of nucleotides. Triplettoctoile repeats are triplets of nucleotides that are repeated in an unusually high number in the coding region of a gene. To date, more than 12 neurological disorders, including Huntington's disease and fragile X syndrome, have been shown to be caused by triplettoctoile repeat expansions, most of which involve the CAG triplet (Merglio et al., 1997). CAG triplet repeats are thought to interfere with the normal function of the protein thereby mediating the disease process. These expansions have the propensity to increase in size over generations. One phenomenon of this type of dynamic mutation, called "anticipation," is an increased severity of the disease or a decreased age of onset in subsequent generations. Studies of CAG triplets in schizophrenia have found evidence of expanded repeats. Furthermore, anticipation has also been reported in families with schizophrenia (Nasarwanji and Kapoor, 2011). In addition, a recent study found evidence of areas of eight CAG triplet repeats in two alleles of chromosome 22, the loci associated with schizophrenia and TCF4 (Sakurai et al., 2010). While more research on triplettoctoile repeats is needed, it seems possible that an abnormally high number of such repeats may play a role in some cases of schizophrenia.

Epilegenetics. There is substantial evidence that schizophrenia is heritable and likely involves mutations in the nucleotide sequence of several genes, leading to abnormal messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) (transcription) and hence abnormal protein translation. However, nongenetic factors such as stress, learning, hormones, social environment, and development can also modify the expression of a protein by altering the transcription of perfectly normal genes. This epigenetic regulation may therefore contribute to the heritable component of schizophrenia. The search for genetic mutations may therefore be only part of the story since it is proteins that ultimately define the functioning of brain cells, and protein expression can be regulated by genetic as well as epigenetic mechanisms. Measuring proteins or the transcripts that encode them may therefore be fruitful in fully understanding the pathology of schizophrenia.

Microarray analysis simultaneously can compare relative levels of thousands of gene transcripts in postmortem tissue from patients with schizophrenia and matched controls. This technology is fairly new and has only been applied by a few teams to the study of postmortem brains from people with schizophrenia. These studies have revealed changes in the expression of gene transcripts with developmental relevance including transcription factors, receptors, genes important for regulation, as well as a host of proteins involved in synaptic functioning and neurotransmission (Mintz et al., 2011). While there is good correspondence between the findings of microarray and linkage studies, this technology has also revealed many new candidates for the study of schizophrenia. More microarray studies are emerging that should rapidly advance our knowledge of the biological pathology underlying schizophrenia.

ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS

Obstetric complications

There are numerous studies suggesting that complications during pregnancy, birth, or within the first month after birth are important risk factors for at least some types of schizophrenia. Those that have been significantly associated with schizophrenia include pre-eclampsia, bleeding during pregnancy, umbilical cord complications, premature rupture of amniotic membranes, postpartum, prolonged labor, use of nonsteroidal, ibuprofen, forceps or suction delivery, abnormal fetal presentation at delivery, low birth weight, small head circumference, and low Apgar scores (McNeil et al., 2006; Lohrke et al., 2011). Postnatal abnormalities in particular, collectively called obstetric complications, have been reported in 21 to 40 percent of patients with schizophrenia. In sum, there are several obstetric complications that appear to be risk factors for schizophrenia.

Maternal stressors

A recent review of the literature suggests there is some evidence that prenatal maternal deficits may be risk factors for the development of schizophrenia (Brown et al., 1998). One study found an increased incidence of schizophrenia 20 years after a wartime famine hit a large Dutch population in 1944–1945. While these findings suggest that food deprivation during the first trimester of pregnancy increased the risk of developing schizophrenia, it is possible that maternal stress also played a role. In fact, increased risk of schizophrenia has also been significantly associated with various maternal stressors such as wartime conditions, death of a spouse, unwanted pregnancy, maternal depression during midpregnancy, and natural disasters (Lohrke et al., 2001). Other stressors during gestation that have also been associated with increased risk of schizophrenia include maternal alcohol and substance abuse and paternal life incompatibility. Increased paternal age also appears to be associated with increased risk for schizophrenia. While the precise mechanisms remain unclear, it is believed that these stressors increase the risk for schizophrenia by causing adverse neurodevelopmental effects (Kovalev et al., 2002).

Viral infections

Numerous studies have shown that in utero exposure to viruses during the second trimester of gestation is associated with increased risk of developing schizophrenia (O'Farrell, 1994). Precisely which viruses(s) may be risk factors is unknown since it is impossible to do antibody titers from a prenatal exposure that occurred 20 or 30 years before. Studies that have examined the incidence of schizophrenia following

Influenza epidemics of 1954, 1971, and 1999 in Australia and Japan have revealed positive associations between gestational exposure to flu virus and development of schizophrenia. Reports of viral diseases from 1930 to 1995 in Connecticut and Massachusetts found associations between the development of schizophrenia and gestational exposure to the measles, varicella-zoster, and polio viruses (Oliver et al., 1998). Studies have also found that individuals exposed to rubella *in utero*, during the 1960 rubella epidemic, had a substantially greater risk of developing nonaffective psychosis than nonexposed subjects (Brown et al., 2004).

There are several other risk factors for schizophrenia that may also be related to viral infections. For instance, there is an increased prevalence of schizophrenia among individuals born in late winter–early spring. Many viral infections peak at certain times of the year, and it is likely, as in the case of other seasonal diseases such as anorexia and sexual revolutions, that this can explain the seasonality of schizophrenia. Being born or raised in an urban area also increases one's chance of developing schizophrenia, which may be explained by greater exposure to infectious agents in densely populated areas (Lohrke et al., 2003).

Recently, endogenous retroviruses have also been suggested as a possible biological factor in schizophrenia. Retroviruses can infect brain cells, integrate into their cellular deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), and cause long-term alterations in brain function. Possible transcripts of these viruses have been found in higher levels in the brains of schizophrenia patients than unaffected individuals (Tollefson et al., 2005).

Understanding the causes of schizophrenia is made more difficult by several factors: our relative lack of knowledge about how the observed genetic and environmental factors function in brain development; the likelihood that schizophrenia is more than one disease—that is, more than one underlying biological abnormality may cause similar symptoms; the fact that studies of genes and studies of environmental factors are rarely done in the same people; and the evidence that what is inherited is not just schizophrenia but a range of behavioral, physical, and cognitive abnormalities [the schizophrenia spectrum]. There may be more than one “causal pathway” to schizophrenia, that is, different people may have the disorder due to different causes. Because the causes of schizophrenia are poorly understood, it remains possible that all of the following causal pathways lead to schizophrenia:

1. Everyone who has both genes *A* and *B* will have a schizophrenia spectrum disorder.
2. People with gene *A* have a schizophrenia spectrum disorder only if their mothers have a severe stress at a critical period during pregnancy.
3. If a mother has a sufficiently severe stress at the right time during gestation, anyone will have a schizophrenia spectrum disorder.

Other possibilities exist, and it is possible that each particular form of schizophrenia may have one or more of these causal pathways.

COURSE OF ILLNESS

Premorbid Period

Schizophrenia typically has its clinical onset in late adolescence to early adulthood. However, schizophrenia is a lifelong disorder, with numerous signs of abnormal development prior to its clinical onset.

Motor Physical Anomalies. Motor physical anomalies are structural deviations with little functional consequence that have been extensively studied because brain and skin are derived from the same reticulum tissue. Thus motor physical anomalies are considered markers of early neurodevelopmental abnormalities (Luhman et al., 2001). Physical abnormalities are typical of neurodevelopmental disorders such as Down syndrome and epilepsy. Individuals with schizophrenia have a significantly greater number of anomalies than normal individuals. These include low-set ears, high arched palates, curved fifth finger, diminished nail beds in the hands, excess branching of radial nerve cuttings, hyperextensibility, small head circumference, and narrowing and elongation of the mid and lower facial regions with thickening of the skull base. The configuration of skin ridge dermatoglyphics has also been found to be abnormal or asymmetric in many patients with schizophrenia, including single distal crease and abnormal finger ridge counts. The pattern of motor physical and dermatoglyphic anomalies observed in patients with schizophrenia are indicative of prenatal insult around the second trimester of pregnancy, which may also affect the cerebral migration occurring at that time.

Functional Impairments. Generally, individuals who later go on to be diagnosed with schizophrenia suffer many functional impairments throughout their lives. Numerous studies using many different approaches have been used to try to identify premorbid precursors of schizophrenia. For example, researchers studied home movies of children who later went on to develop schizophrenia. Their motor and social behaviors were different enough from other children that following several study, "blind" clinicians were able to identify the preschizophrenic children (Walker et al., 1994).

In some countries, large databases of neuropsychiatric and psychometric performance are maintained kept on children at various developmental time points. "Follow-back" studies of these databases revealed numerous neurodevelopmental, cognitive, and motor abnormalities in children that were later diagnosed with schizophrenia. For instance, during infancy, many preschizophrenics were delayed in achieving milestones such as sitting up, standing, walking, talking, and constipation (Jublanski et al., 2001). Throughout childhood, many have problems with speech, attention, memory integration, and muscle coordination, often being labeled clumsy. Preschizophrenic children are also more socially anxious and withdrawn and some studies reported a tendency to have poor scores on educational tests in school (Davies et al., 1998). Overall, these studies provide evidence that long before the clinical diagnosis of schizophrenia, these individuals have functional impairments.

Early Adulthood

It is the conventional wisdom that schizophrenia "begins" in early adulthood, but this is an oversimplification. The average age for the onset of the first clear-cut psychotic episode is usually in late adolescence or early adulthood. However, as noted above, adults with schizophrenia have cognitive and behavioral difficulties from early life, which can precede their first psychotic episode. The onset of psychosis is also variable and can come on gradually, over a period of months or relatively suddenly.

Early adulthood is when psychotic symptoms are most prevalent, and patients typically leave more hospitalizations during this period than at any other time in their lives. The severity of their symptoms, and the impairment of function that they suffer, usually plateau within the first 5 to 10 years after onset. However, a small percentage of patients has severe and unrelenting psychosis, and many are never able to return to independent function (Glantz, 1998).

Late Adulthood

On average, patients with schizophrenia have an improvement in both the severity of psychotic symptoms and their overall functioning in middle age (Egeland et al., 1992). This improvement has led to speculation that the concentrations of testosterone and estrogen, which change with aging, play a role in the severity of symptoms, and that estrogen may augment the effect of antipsychotics in women.

Although there is an average improvement in function, the cognitive impairment found in schizophrenia does not appear to improve. There may also be a small percentage of patients who develop a dementia in later life that is due to schizophrenia and is not caused by other factors such as stroke, Alzheimer's disease, or the like. The distinctive features of adult schizophrenia also fail to improve in later life, and their function remains poor. Some comorbid subjects also have very severe psychotic symptoms that do not improve.

People with schizophrenia, on average, have a shortened life span. This is due to a number of factors, especially suicide and accidents (Priebe, 2001). Patients with schizophrenia also have immunological changes as well as an increased prevalence of the metabolic syndrome, that is Type II diabetes, hypertension, other cardiovascular disease, and obesity. Antipsychotic medications certainly contribute to this problem, but it is possible that this is also a consequence of the abnormal development that causes psychotic symptoms.

NEUROPATHOLOGICAL ABNORMALITIES

One of the challenges of postmortem neuroanatomical observations in schizophrenia is that the changes that are seen are widespread and usually subtle (Harrison, 1995; Powers, 1999). There is no gross lesion that is typical of a schizophrenia brain such as that seen in Huntington's disease or Parkinson's disease. Moreover, many of the abnormalities that are detected in the brains of patients with schizophrenia are not selective and are associated with other psychiatric conditions as well. Finally, there

are many cognitive-psychiatry clues to put on the positions of the heterozygosity of the disease like onset of the illness, and treatment effects.

The heterozygote of schizophrenia has also been extensively tested by long-term genetic家系 pedigree analysis or family history or the same which can be compatible with the application of cognitive-psychiatry techniques. Recently, the neuropathology of schizophrenia has been studied more than ever before, and appears even at some discrepancy in early adult brain regions.

Caudate Nucleus Enlargement

One of the best cognitive-psychiatry biological findings in schizophrenia is brain enlargement of the basal ganglia areas in the basal forebrain structures, especially the ventral striatum and the caudate nucleus. Basal ganglia enlargements have been identified in numerous studies, as well as in imaging studies of the patients using computed tomography (CT) and magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). In a review of 586 studies, the caudate size in schizophrenic patients is 10% greater than in controls (Liddle and Abukoff, 1992). It is important to note that the results in enlargement in patients with schizophrenia is present for the group as a whole and that there is some overlap in the range of variation size between schizophrenic patients and controls. Nonetheless, one recent study (Giedd et al., 2000) shows a relationship between caudate enlargement and schizophrenia outcome in that patients with poor outcomes have on average larger caudates than patients with good outcomes (Fig. 4.2b–c'). In studies of neurogenetic transmission for schizophrenia the affected twin usually has bigger caudates (Sutcliffe and Pfeifer, 1992). The twin studies are important because they control for both genetic predisposition and environmental factors and show that hereditary neuropathological abnormality is associated with the expression of the disease rather than being associated with the quantitative genotype. However, people's genes do have an impact on the size of the caudate such that the descended from the first and have schizophrenia will have larger caudates than will other members of the family, and unaffected relatives have larger




Figure 4.2. Magnetic resonance imaging of coronal sections of the basal forebrain of schizophrenia patients (A), a patient with schizophrenia with good outcome (B) and a patient with schizophrenia with poor outcome (C). Note that patients that have schizophrenia with bad outcome have large caudates than other patients with good outcome or healthy control. Schizophrenic patients with good outcome did not differ significantly from healthy controls (adapted from Giedd, Lee, et al., 1992; Giedd, 1993; Liddle, 1992; Liddle, 1993; Liddle, 1996; Liddle, 1998; Liddle, 1999; Liddle, 2000).

restricts that that of the control population. Ventricular enlargement does not appear to be due to a neurodegenerative process since there are no obvious signs of neuronal loss and no increase in glial cells, which would normally invade to remove any degenerating cells (Selcuk and Goldstein-Babb, 1999). Rather, ventricular enlargement is likely related to changes in other brain structures, including thinning of the surrounding cortex.

Decreased Synaptic Connectivity

The cerebral cortex consists of six layers of neurons that have dense connections to each other, as well as to other neurons in different cortical and subcortical structures. The area between neurons (synaptoplasm) consists of a dense network of dendrites, dendrite spines, axons, and axon terminals, which make connections between the neurons. In patients with schizophrenia, there are several lines of evidence indicating that there are fewer connections in the neocortex, as well as the hippocampus.

Cerebral Cortex. In the cerebral cortex of patients with schizophrenia, concomitant with the increased cerebral ventricular space, there is a decrease in the thickness of the gray matter (Selcuk et al., 1993; Selcuk and Goldstein-Babb, 1999). Neuropathological studies of the density of neurons in the prefrontal cortex have found that while the total number of neurons is not changed (Selcuk, 2001), they are packed closer together (increased neuronal packing density). This indicates that the thinning of gray matter is due to a loss of neuropil, that is, the area between neurons that maintains all the synaptic connections (see Fig. 5.3A and B).

As mentioned above, microscopy studies have also revealed decreased expression of many genes involved in synaptic function (Jenikins et al., 2001). In addition, there is considerable evidence from imaging studies in live patients and histological studies in postmortem brains of schizophrenia patients consistent with this view. Measures of regional cerebral blood flow using positron emission tomography (PET) with fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG), which are in part measures of synaptic activity, reveal decreased metabolism in cortical areas as well as subcortical areas such as the putamen. Phosphorus magnetic resonance spectroscopy indicates a decrease in synaptosomal markers and an increase in markers of synaptic pruning. Neuropathological studies using markers of axon terminals [e.g., synaptophysin, γ -aminobutyric acid (GABA), and GABA transporter (GAT)] find reductions in axon terminal density in the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (Glantz and Lewis, 1999; McGaugh and Hoffman, 2000; Selcuk, 2001). Studies of Chlroglycogenated presynaptic neurons in the prefrontal cortex (Casey et al., 1994; Glantz and Lewis, 2000) reveal a reduction in the number of dendrite spines (see Fig. 5.3C–E). Dendrite spines are protrusions on dendrites that consequently provide more surface area to the dendrite, allowing for more synaptic contacts to be made. The striatum, a brain structure that receives substantial dopaminergic projections, a neurotransmitter heavily implicated in schizophrenia, also maintains smaller dendrite spines (see Fig. 5.3F and G) and alterations in synaptic density consistent with changes in several different pathways (Roberts et al., 1996; Sung et al., 1998).




Figure 2. Normal Rat Rectal Mucosa. Six sets of light micrographs of histological sections from the rectal mucosa from rat of a normal intact intact rat bear of a normal rectum (approximately 10 mm) that has never undergone rectal enema nor has ever been exposed to enemas, and thus has no previous history than the normal rectal histology from Hansen et al. (1985). Reprinted by permission from Hansen (1985). Photomicrographs of light microscopy of rectal mucosal preparations from layer 10 of the rectal mucosa from the posterior margin of a normal rectal region. In each two patients were enemas prior to death. The three patients of layer 10 are devoid of epithelial erosion or the ulcerative lesions described from Hansen and Hansen (1985). Reprinted with permission from Hansen (1985). The micrographs clearly show goblet cells within the column of luminal mucus. It is a common misconception that mucus can accumulate in the lumen of the intestinal tract (Hansen et al., 1985). For illustrative purposes, the difference in size in very numerous mucus-filled areas and numerous mucus-free areas within the space.

lengthy periods of time (greater than 20 to 40 percent shorter rectal colic following enemas) passing nothing or a relatively stable bowel is exhibited. It is interesting that the typical clinical signs of colitis/colitis syndrome appear if prolonged symptoms are associated with the completion of the enema passing that occurs

In adolescence. Consistent with this, although highly speculative, computer simulation that models normal cognitive development and pruning, including the elimination of synapses connections in the cortex, indicates that excessive pruning may lead to hallucinations, that is, speech perceptions that occur in the absence of stimulation (McClurkin and Westman, 2004).

Hippocampus. The hippocampus is a complex limbic structure that plays a role in emotion, cognition, memory, and inhibitory gating. Numerous studies from post-mortem work to imaging of live patients implicate the hippocampus in schizophrenia. Postmortem findings indicate that the hippocampus is markedly reduced in size bilaterally. Reports of cell density in the hippocampus using classical counting techniques have shown a reduction in the density of neurons, but due to these findings have yet to be replicated using more modern neurotological techniques. Metrics of axon terminals, such as synaptophysin, synaptotagmin, and SNAP-25 are decreased in the hippocampus. Moreover, markers of dendrite health as MAP2 and MAP5 show decreased staining (Beltramini, 2003). Taken together, these results support that reduced hippocampal size, like cortical thickness, may partially be the result of diminished neuronal volume, and hence a decrease in synaptic connectivity.

Changes in Cortical and Subcortical Activity

Consistent with a decrease in synaptic connectivity is a decrease in synaptic activity. fMRI studies of regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) using fluorodeoxyglucose (FDG) and functional MRI (fMRI) studies have revealed that abnormalities in numerous neural functions in patients with schizophrenia are associated with a decrease in the normal activation of various cortical and subcortical areas.

Most consistently, fMRI and fMRI studies have shown that working memory and attention deficits in schizophrenia subjects are associated with decreased activity in the prefrontal cortex, particularly the dorsal lateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) (Volkawellie and Patelis, 1996). In addition, several studies (Heckers et al., 1999; Laikei et al., 2001) have shown that patients with deficit schizophrenia have greater "hypofrontality" than patients with nondeficit schizophrenia, further supporting the concept of schizophrenia as a heterogeneous disease. Holcomb and colleagues (2000) showed that the anterior cingulate cortex is less activated in patients with schizophrenia than in normal volunteers during performance of a difficult cognitive task (see Fig. 9.4). In PET studies, patients with schizophrenia also exhibited abnormal activation of cortical areas such as the dorsal eye fields. This occurred during other functions that are known to be abnormal in this patient population, including smooth pursuit and saccadic eye movements (Ross et al., 1995; O'Driscoll et al., 1998).

Changes in brain activity have also been reported in subcortical areas including the hippocampus, thalamus, and basal ganglia. For instance, patients with schizophrenia have reduced hippocampal activation during episodic memory retrieval (Heckers et al., 1999). In PET/FDG studies, floridly psychotic schizophrenia patients show increased activation in the hippocampus and parahippocampal gyrus, which correlate significantly with the severity of their positive psychotic symptoms (Tennings et al., 1992). PET




Figure 10. Activation analysis of FDG PET showing local metabolic patterns of the entire hippocampus compared to normal control subjects. The hippocampus shows significantly lower metabolism than parahippocampal regions, including anterior, middle, and posterior hippocampus, and amygdala. Reproduced from Saksena, 1995, by permission of the author.

metabolic cerebral glucose metabolism in the hippocampus during an olfactory identification task (Clark et al., 2000). fMRI results from metabolites in the context of schizophrenia subjects, and this is mediated by memory task activation in subjects that respond to medication (Kazee & Lewis, 1998). In addition, relative metabolic studies of postmortem brains from patients with schizophrenia show a 30 percent decrease in the number of metabolizing cells in the hippocampus compared to healthy nonschizophrenic brains (Liu et al., 1995). These metabolizing studies support increased energy demands or diminished capacity in regard to energy metabolism. These data are consistent with in vivo findings that show decreased blood metabolism bilogically in schizophrenia (Buckley et al., 1992).

The decreased metabolism in control and schizophrenic cases observed in PET and fMRI studies is consistent with postmortem in cognitive activity. While these abnormalities appear more widespread, it is likely that specific symptoms of schizophrenia are related to the dysfunction of particular brain regions that are in control. These types of functionally selective regions, or circuit, normally positive and hyperactive with increased and more coherence of activity (cf., 1998). There is evidence that abnormalities in the limbic circuit-like regions (hippocampus and amygdala, which include the hippocampus, ventral forebrain tegmentum, and associated structures) are

unusual psychiatric symptoms such as hallucinations, delusions, and formal thought disorders. In contrast, blunted affect, poverty of speech, and other features typical of chronic schizophrenia appear to be due to abnormalities in another circuit that includes the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, inferior parietal cortex, and associated subcortical regions (Carpenter et al., 1990).

Loss of Asymmetry

Many structures are normally lateralized in the human brain with one or volume being consistently larger in one hemisphere or the other. Some asymmetries are related to lateralized functions such as language. Abnormal cerebral asymmetry in schizophrenia has been studied since its first observation in 1877 by Christian Breuer. Many studies of schizophrenia have shown an absence or reversal of the normal cerebral asymmetries found in controls. These disruptions in normal asymmetry are thought to reflect abnormalities during development. The main regions where this asymmetry has been noted in neuropathological studies are the left superior temporal gyrus, a reversal of the normally larger left planum temporale, and loss of the normally larger left Sylvian fissure. Moreover, certain abnormalities in the brains of patients with schizophrenia are restricted to or worse in one hemisphere (usually the left) over the other. To cite a few examples, schizophrenia subjects show thinning of the left parahippocampal gyrus, left temporal lobe enlargement, reduction in size of the left medial temporal lobe, and loss of synaptic proteins from the left thalamus (Selcuk, 2001).

Abnormal Cytosarchitecture

Investigations into the cellular organization or structure (*cytosarchitectonics*) of the brain of schizophrenia patients have reported various abnormal arrangements of neurons in several structures, although some of these studies suffer from a lack of replicability. The pyramidal cells of the hippocampus, which normally lie in an orderly layer, have been found to be disorganized in some postmortem brains of patients with schizophrenia. Several studies have also reported cytoarchitectural disturbances in the entorhinal cortex of schizophrenia patients, including bizarre irregularities of the normally smooth surface, irregularities in the normal pattern of pre-alpha-III clustering in layer 2, and misfusions of these layer 2 neurons into deeper cortical layers (Bunney et al., 1997; Arnold and Bunney, 2001).

There is also evidence for a late-migration of neurons in the parietal, paralimbic, and temporal cortices (Bunney et al., 1997). During embryogenesis, cortical neurons are born in the ventricular zone and migrate to the cortical subplate, where they wait before migrating into the cortical plate to form the six layers of the cortex. This neuronal migration into the cortex is thought to be complete by the end of the second trimester in primates. With the use of several markers (MAP2, MAP5, SOM32), a number of studies found an abnormal density of cells in the subcortical white matter of postmortem schizophrenia patients. These cells are thought to be remnants of subplate neurons and therefore may indicate an incomplete migration of neurons into

the cortex. Investigators also used NADPH-diaphorase as a marker of these subplate neurons. Normally, these neurons are found in high levels in the superficial white matter, with a smaller population found dispersed throughout the cortical layers. In postmortem studies of the prefrontal and temporal cortices, the majority of these neurons are found in the deeper white matter with very few located in the cortical matrix. This apparent "shift" in the distribution of this subpopulation of neurons is interpreted as representing an altered migration of neurons into the cortex. These findings are consistent with a neurodevelopmental disturbance occurring around the second trimester of gestation.

Altered Expression of Developmental and Other Proteins

The migration of neurons from the restricted zone to their proper positioning in the cortex is well orchestrated and requires a multitude of neural events including start signals, cell-cell recognition, cell adhesion, motility, and stop-signals. Since schizophrenia appears to involve disturbances in cortical migration, researchers have focused their attention on some of the molecules thought to play a role in this process. One such candidate is a protein called reelin. Reelin is thought to help guide newly arriving migrating neurons to their proper destination, though the precise mechanism is presently unknown. A recent study (Diapartimont et al., 1998) revealed that patients with schizophrenia only have about half of the normal levels of reelin and its transcript in all of the brain areas examined (prefrontal and temporal cortices, hippocampus, amygdala, and cerebellum). Interestingly, while reelin levels are normal in patients with other psychiatric disorders such as unipolar depression, reelin levels are also decreased in patients with bipolar disorder, a psychiatric disease characterized in part by psychotic symptoms (Galdieri et al., 2000).

Neural cell adhesion molecules (N-CAMs), which are important for the motility of neurons during migration, have also been found to be changed in postmortem studies. N-CAM levels are found to be increased in the brains of people with schizophrenia, however, more N-CAMs are found in their polyacetylated form, rendering neurons less mobile. Schizophrenia has also been associated with changes in the expression of neurotrophic factors that regulate growth, survival, and plasticity such as brain-derived nerve growth factor (BDNF), which has their maximum expression during early neuronal differentiation and migration. GDNF, a protein important for axon growth, targeting, and synaptogenesis, is also found to be altered in schizophrenia, although these results are still somewhat controversial (Suzanne, 2001).

In summary, the neuropathological evidence clearly supports disturbance in early neurodevelopment. However, neurodevelopment is not limited to perinatal life. In fact, there are many "developmental" changes that occur at different stages of postnatal life, including neurite pruning, neurogenesis, apoptosis, neurite proliferation, axonal myelination, and structural brain changes. Many of the neuropathological abnormalities observed in schizophrenia may therefore be the result of neurodevelopmental insults or insults that leave the brain more vulnerable to any number of further changes that may coincide with the "clinical onset" of schizophrenia, or acute relapses.

NEUROCOGNITIVE PROBLEMS

Patients with schizophrenia suffer from a range of cognitive deficits, which are common but vary in severity among patients. Cognitive impairments that have been extensively studied include deficits in working memory, attention, gating, executive function, abstraction, and language.

Working Memory Deficits

Working memory is the process of retaining recent information in order to perform a behavioral response after the informational cue is removed. Patients with schizophrenia have modality-unrelated deficits in working memory that are thought to arise from dysfunction in the DLPFC or from disengagement of this region by other cortical or subcortical structures (Lavy and Goldman-Rakic, 2000). During the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, a neuropsychological measure of cognitive function, normal controls exhibit an increase in regional cerebral blood flow in the prefrontal cortex, while schizophrenia patients fail to do so. Patients with schizophrenia also show numerous deficits in executive function, including poor processing of cognitive information, decreased problem-solving skills as measured by the Tower of London test, and increases in perseverative errors.

Selective Deficits

Some people with schizophrenia are easily distracted and have difficulty remaining vigilant. Latent inhibition (LI) is a measure of selective attention in which the non-reinforced presentation of a stimulus attenuates its ability to enter into subsequent associations. This latent inhibition occurs because following repeated nonconsequential presentations of a stimulus, one normally learns to ignore the stimulus, making it harder to then pair it with another stimulus. This measure of selective attention is changed in patients with schizophrenia (Day, 1998). In addition to selective attention, immediate and sustained attention skills are also impaired. Thus, patients with schizophrenia also perform poorly on measures of sustained attention, such as the Continuous Performance Test.

Gating Deficits

In a world where we are simultaneously bombarded with a great deal of stimulation, we learn to focus our attention on important stimuli, while filtering out spurious less relevant stimulation. Patients with schizophrenia not only have difficulty focusing their attention on important stimuli, they also have difficulties filtering out irrelevant stimuli, rendering them continually overwhelmed by their environment.

Pre-Pulse Inhibition (PPI) is a paradigm commonly used to measure these gating deficits in schizophrenia patients. In this paradigm, a person's excitatory response to loud stimuli are measured. Exposure to a loud stimulus will elicit a large excitatory

response. Exposure to a soft stimulus (pre-pulse) immediately before the loud stimulus will cause a much smaller excitatory response to the loud stimulus. A ratio of the size of the second response to the first is inversely proportional to the strength of the inhibition. By placing a number of electrodes at distinct locations on the scalp, an electrically positive evoked potential (P50) can be recorded 50 msec after the presentation of the loud stimulus. This P50 response to the loud auditory stimulus is normally diminished when the loud stimulus is immediately (500 msec) preceded by the soft stimulus in the pre-pulse condition. In patients with schizophrenia, the amplitude of the P50 auditory-evoked response is not diminished in the prepulse condition, indicating an inability to gain sensory information (Licht & Baile, 1999). These gating deficits are thought to be due, at least in part, to disruptions in the hippocampus since the P50-evoked potential is thought to originate from this brain region.

Interestingly, many family members of patients with schizophrenia also show gating deficits without having any clinical signs of the disease. It seems therefore that gating deficits may be genetically inherited at one of the symptoms of schizophrenia that alone may be no more than a subtle cognitive abnormality.

Oculomotor Dysfunctions

At the turn of the century, four researchers working in a psychiatric hospital in New England made the observation that patients with dementia parescens (now termed schizophrenia) had difficulty following an oscillating stimulus with their eyes. The investigation of eye movement dysfunctions in schizophrenia, which has refined in the 1970s, focuses on smooth pursuit and saccadic eye movement systems.

Smooth eye pursuit, which is evoked by slow-moving objects such as a swinging pendulum, is significantly impaired in schizophrenia patients. As mentioned above, PET scans show that schizophrenia patients with smooth eye pursuit impairments do not activate the frontal eye fields, the cortical regions involved in initiating these eye movements (Koen et al., 1995; O'Donnell et al., 1996). Patients with schizophrenia are also deficient in their ability to inhibit reflexive saccadic eye movements, which are high-adosity movements that shift the eyes from one position to the other. Interestingly, eye movement dysfunctions are also present in the clinically unaffected relatives of patients with schizophrenia (Collins and Larson, 2000). These findings suggest that eye movement dysfunction is clearly an inheritable vulnerability trait that is not sufficient to cause schizophrenia but may be important in the search for schizophrenia susceptibility genes.

Olfactory Deficits

Many patients with schizophrenia exhibit olfactory dysfunctions. They are impaired in their ability to detect odors due to an increased sensitivity threshold for detection. Their ability to identify odors, to discriminate between odors, and their olfactory memory are also significantly impaired. While the basis for this dysfunction is unclear, olfactory processing is mediated by limbic structures that have been implicated in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia, including the prefrontal cortex, ventromedial temporal lobe,

brain development, and disengagement. The few studies that have examined the neurobiology of the olfactory system in schizophrenia patients have revealed a reduced evoked potential response to olfactory stimuli, a 25 percent decrease in size of the olfactory bulb, and a decrease in synaptophysin expression in the glomerulus of the olfactory bulb, indicating a reduction in synaptic functioning of this structure (Moriarty et al., 1999). Neurodevelopment continues throughout life in the olfactory system, rendering it a good site for examining active neurodevelopmental processes in schizophrenia.

NEUROPSYCHIATRIC SYNDROMES

Most of the nongenetic risk factors of schizophrenia consist of problems during pregnancy and may have as a common thread the mother's stress response. It therefore shouldn't be surprising that the behavioral and anatomical effects of these problems (plus genetic vulnerability) are very maladaptive and include both neuropsychiatric syndromes other than psychosis and abnormalities outside of the brain.

The relationship between psychotic bipolar disorder and schizophrenia is unclear, but certainly within schizophrenia, full-blown manic episodes occur and various depressive episodes are common. These can occur either during psychotic episodes or when psychiatric symptoms are either absent or stable. The lifetime risk for major depression is very high, with perhaps a third to a half of patients experiencing at least one such episode. This problem contributes to the very high risk of suicide in schizophrenia; approximately 10 percent of patients may kill themselves.

Obstetric neuropsychiatric symptoms such as excessive checking or obsessive hand washing also appear to have an increased prevalence in schizophrenia (perhaps as much as 20 percent) and are sometimes difficult to distinguish from delusions.

Drug abuse is also much more common in schizophrenia than in the general population. Population-based estimates suggest that about a third of those with schizophrenia abuse alcohol at some point in their lives, while nearly half abuse alcohol or some other drug.

Other neuropsychiatric problems are also found in schizophrenia. With chronic use, the older antipsychotic drugs such as haloperidol and chlorpromazine cause akathisia, involuntary movements in some patients. These acts, purposeless movements are usually subtle but can be so frequent and severe that they are debilitating and interfere with the patient's function. However, similar movements also occur in some patients with schizophrenia before they take such medications. Patients with chronic schizophrenia may exhibit these spontaneous movements more frequently than nonchronic patients.

NEUROCHEMICAL ABNORMALITIES

While schizophrenia is no longer thought to be strictly due to a chemical imbalance, the vital neurochemical defects will necessarily lead to alterations in many neurochemical

systems. Pharmacotherapy of schizophrenia has been aimed at correcting these neurochemical disturbances, and this will be discussed in detail in Chapter 20. The following is a very brief overview of the neurochemical disturbances in schizophrenia.

Dopamine Disregulation

The efficacy of antipsychotic drugs, which traditionally worked through the dopaminergic system, has been the major stimulus driving the "dopamine hypothesis" of schizophrenia (Pitkänen, 1997). The evidence that antipsychotic drugs all share the ability to block dopamine receptors led to the concept that overactivity in some subcortical dopamine cells causes psychotic symptoms such as hallucinations, delusions, and disorganized thought and behavior. A more recent modification of this theory suggests that hypofunction of dopamine in the mesocortical dopamine neurons is responsible for negative symptoms such as blunted affect and poverty of speech.

The formidable evidence that antipsychotic drugs work at least in large part because they block dopamine receptors does not necessarily mean that people with schizophrenia have abnormal dopamine transmission. However, other evidence also suggests there is an abnormality in the dopamine system. For instance, dopamine agonists such as amphetamine and methylphenidate worsen the psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia, and some studies of dopamine function in living patients (using such methods as PET) have also revealed an abnormality in dopamine transmission.

Nonetheless, there are important limitations to the dopamine theory. First, blocking dopamine receptors does not relieve all psychotic symptoms; despite taking high doses of such medications, some patients' psychotic symptoms improve little. Moreover, these drugs do not improve other aspects of schizophrenia, such as the cognitive impairment or the blunted affect and poverty of speech. No one neurotransmitter can explain the intrinsically problematical features found in schizophrenia, and there is a great deal of evidence that other neurotransmitters are also abnormal in this disorder.

Glutamatergic Hyperfunction

The suggestion that a glutamatergic dysregulation may be involved in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia was derived from the observation that when individuals come into the hospital under the influence of PCP (also known as angel dust), it was very difficult for clinicians to distinguish them from schizophrenia patients. Drugs such as PCP and ketamine function by blocking the N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) subtype of glutamate receptors. Not only can these drugs induce schizophrenia in a normal individual, they can exacerbate symptoms in patients with schizophrenia. Studies of glutamate receptors in postmortem tissue have generally found decreased binding to the kainate subtype of glutamate receptors in the hippocampus and limbic cortex, and increased binding to the alpha-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolepropionic acid (AMPA) and NMDA subtypes of glutamate receptors in the prefrontal cortex (Coyne, 1996). These changes in AMPA and kainate receptor subtypes have been reproduced in microarray studies (Mimura et al., 2001).

GABAergic Hypofunction

Gamma-aminobutyric acid is the principal inhibitory neurotransmitter of the brain. There is considerable evidence for a decreased activity of the GABAergic system in patients with schizophrenia (Bunney et al., 1991; Seeman, 2001). Various studies have reported a decrease in GABA content, a decrease in GABA uptake sites, a decrease in the synthesizing enzyme for GABA (the γ -VH methyltransferase glutamate decarboxylase—GAD₆₅), a decrease in the GABA transporter (GAT), and a concomitant up-regulation of GABA_A receptors. A down-regulation of GABAergic activity may have wide-ranging effects since the columnar firing pattern of cortical neurons is determined by a fine balance of glutamatergic excitation and GABAergic inhibition. Cortical malfunction is one of the hallmarks of schizophrenia.

Smoking: Hypofunction

Patients with schizophrenia are notoriously heavy smokers, which lead researchers to examine the cholinergic system of the brain. Smoking may be a form of self-medication since gating deficits are temporarily restored by stimulation of the nicotinic receptor, specifically the α_7 -nicotinic receptor (Keller et al., 1998). There is an abnormal expression of α_7 -nicotinic receptors in the hippocampus of postmortem brains from schizophrenia patients. While this was originally believed to be simply a consequence of heavy smoking, it is now being revisited as an inherent vulnerability factor since linkage studies have found a disease-linked polymorphism at chromosome 15q12-14, the site of the α_7 -nicotinic receptor (Freudman et al., 1997).

ANIMAL MODELS

The field of schizophrenia has only been marginally impacted by the study of animal models due to the lack of our understanding of the causes and mechanisms of the disease. In addition, since schizophrenia is largely a disease of higher cognitive functioning, it is difficult to conceive that schizophrenia can be simulated in an animal of lower phylogenetic origin than primates.

While some of the proposed paradigms are not thermal or models of schizophrenia, they are nonetheless valuable tools to measure specific aspects of impaired cognition or behavior, including sensory gating and attention deficits, in pharmaceutical, surgical, genetic, and other models of schizophrenia. They are also useful for the development of new antipsychotic medications. The following will be a brief overview of these psychophysiological rodent models, as well as animal models that have been used in the study of schizophrenia etiology, pathology, neurochemistry, and genetics.

Psychophysiological Cognitive Models

Sensory Gating. Pre-Pulse inhibition (PPI) is a paradigm in which the control of gating can be studied in laboratory animals, usually rodents (Light and Root, 1995; Kilts, 2001). Similar to the human paradigm, PPI measures the response to a low-

auditory stimulus (120-dB click) when it is presented alone, as compared to when it is preceded by a soft click (15-dB pre-pulse). Animals will startle less to the loud click when it is preceded (300 msec) by a soft click than when it is presented alone. This model is very similar to the paradigm used in human EEGs that in humans, an evoked potential (P300) is measured 30 msec after the presentation of the loud stimulus through electrodes placed on the scalp, whereas in rodents it is measured 40 msec after the presentation of the stimulus (N40) through electrodes placed in the skull, or in the CxO region of the hippocampus. Most commonly in the rodent, auditory gating is measured in the same paradigm as the amplitude of startle (pre-pulse inhibition of startle) or a click in the neck musculature, or in the whole body.

L latent inhibition. The latent inhibition paradigm is used to measure selective attention in animals. Similar to the human paradigm, the noncontingent presentation of a stimulus attenuates its ability to enter into subsequent associations. In the animal paradigm, water lickers are paired with foot shock, whereas in the human paradigm continuous rattling is paired with white noise (Hirsh, 1998; Kals, 2001). Latent inhibition has face validity in that it is facilitated by typical and atypical antipsychotic agents and disrupted by drugs that worsen symptoms of schizophrenia (Meyer et al., 2009).

Pharmacological Models

Dopamine-Based Models. Amphetamine, which elevates extracellular levels of neurotransmitters including dopamine, have numerous effects in humans and animals including effects on motor activity, sensory motor function, attention, learning, and memory. In addition, low doses of amphetamine in nonhuman primates can produce long-lasting psychomotoric effects (Ungless and Weinberger, 2000; Gainetdinov et al., 2001; Kals, 2001).

Glutamate-Based Models. As in humans, moderate doses of NMDA receptor antagonists produce symptoms of schizophrenia in rodents and monkeys including increased locomotion and stereotypies, deficits in memory, going, and cognition, as well as impairments in social interaction. Furthermore, many of the abnormal behaviors induced by NMDA receptor antagonists (e.g., PCP, kainic acid) are ameliorated by atypical antipsychotic drugs (Ungless and Weinberger, 2000; Gainetdinov et al., 2001; Kals, 2001).

Models of Experimental Risk Factors

A number of factors have been identified that appear to be associated with an increased risk of developing schizophrenia. Such factors as obstetric complications, viral infections, and early childhood experiences have been examined in animals in an attempt to understand their relationship to schizophrenia etiology (Ungless and Weinberger, 2000).

As in humans, postnatal malnutrition (or protein/protein deprivation) in rats results in subtle and permanent changes in the development of the brain, as well as deficits in cognitive functioning and learning and abnormalities in neurotransmitter systems, some of these reversible changes found in schizophrenia.

Viruses have gained considerable attention as etiological factors in schizophrenia. A variety of viruses with the potential to infect the developing brain have been found to produce abnormalities in infected offspring similar to those observed in schizophrenia, long after the virus has cleared. For instance, prenatal exposure to the influenza virus has been shown to produce several neuroanatomical abnormalities including pyramidal cell dysmyelination, reduced thickness of the neocortex and hippocampus, enlarged ventricles, as well as a significant reduction in cortical cell expansion. In more infections in rats and mice with the lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus (LCMV) cause impairment of GABAergic neurons as well as excitatory amino acid neuron maturation. Exposure to the same disease virus produces abnormalities in the development of the hippocampus and neocortex. Prenatal infection with influenza appears to alter matin in the brain.

Prenatal complications such as Cesarean birth and events during birth in rats have been reported to produce changes in limbic dopamine function. However, these studies are difficult to interpret since C-section does seem to produce more debilitating effects than C-section with anesthesia.

Lesion Models

The functional and structural integrity of the DLPPC is critical for working memory. Alterations in dopamine input to, or function within, the DLPPC disrupt normal working memory. In experimental animals, lesions of the dopamine cells innervating the DLPPC, and lesions of the DLPPC increase dopamine turnover and impair working memory in ways similar to pharmacological manipulations of the dopamine system (Inabaishi et al., 1993; Murphy et al., 1994). In both rats and monkeys the cognitive deficits induced by increased dopamine turnover in the DLPPC can be prevented by treatment with haloperidol and clonidine. That, these researchers concluded that dysfunction of the DLPPC may relate to some of the cognitive deficits present in people with schizophrenia.

Lesions of the developing ventral hippocampus in animals have been found to produce a variety of schizophrenia-like abnormalities that change over the life span of the animal (Dykens and Weinberger, 2000). For instance, stochastic lesions of the ventral hippocampus initially produce social deficits, followed by motor deficits reminiscent of dopamine hyperactivity, deficits of latent inhibition and PPI, and problems in working memory. Furthermore, many of these lesion-induced behaviors are normalized by antipsychotic agents. Lesions of the ventral hippocampus also produce many neurochemical and electrophysiological changes that are consistent with schizophrenia pathology.

Other lesion models that have been less extensively characterized at this point include excitotoxic lesions of the prefrontal cortex, neuronal intracerebral infusions of kainic acid, and neuronal depletion of serotonin.

Genetic-Based Models

Generalized. Although not straightforward in polygenic diseases such as schizophrenia, transgenic animals are being created to study possible candidate susceptibility

genes. This approach can involve making knockouts (or knockdowns) of genes based on linkage analysis (Kleinman et al., 2001; Katz, 2004). For instance, three separate genetic studies have been generated that delete the gene equivalent on chromosome 16 of the human 22q11 deletion that produces VCPs, which closely resembles the schizophrenia phenotype. These mice show some cardiovascular morphology and behavior that resembles their human counterpart; however, there is tremendous variability observed in these animal models.

Models can also be generated based on their function. For example, knockouts have been generated for candidate molecules such as NCKAM. These mice have abnormal neuronal migration, altered cytoarchitecture in several brain regions, enlarged ventricles, and deficits in PPI. Knockouts have also been generated for deacetylated molecules such as dopamine acetyltransferase, the dopamine transporter, and catechol-O-methyltransferase (COMT), the major enzyme involved in the extracellular degradation of dopamine. These mice are hyperactive, clumsy, and have reproduced some of the negative and gating impairments seen in patients with schizophrenia. Knockdown mice have also been produced for the NR1 and NR2B subtype of NMDA glutamate receptors. These transgenic mice show behavioral abnormalities that are similar to those treated with NMDA receptor antagonists such as PCP, which are attenuated by antipsychotic drugs.

Sporadic cases: Since schizophrenia may result in part from mutations present in nature, an animal with a spontaneous mutation that shows some resemblance to schizophrenia would be of interest. The *odar* mouse is a spontaneous mutant that has been around for over 30 years and has been extensively studied to understand the role of autism in development. The heterozygous *odar* mouse, which like patients with schizophrenia only expresses half of the normal levels of protein, has recently emerged as a possible model of schizophrenia vulnerability. These mice have many neuroanatomical abnormalities that resemble those found in the brains of patients with schizophrenia, including decreased neuronal volume, increased cell packing density, decreased dendrite spine density, mis-migration of NADPH-diaphorase cells, and decreased GAD₆₇mRNA and protein expression. These mice also show similar behavioral abnormalities including gating deficits (PPI), negative deficits (low acquisition rate in radial maze task), increased anxiety in the elevated plus-maze test, and olfactory discrimination deficits (Costa et al., 2002). Further study of these mice may identify them as a good model to develop new therapeutic agents for the treatment of this disease.

CONCLUSION

In popular culture, "insanity" or "madness" often has a romantic aura. The reality is quite different. Few of us would want to experience schizophrenia, the most common disorder with psychotic symptoms. Auditory hallucinations are often accusatory, insulting, or threatening, and most delusions involve a painful experience, such as being spied on or persecuted. The anxiety and depression that are so common among

people who suffer from schizophrenia are often severe, while deficit schizophrenia patients are unable to enjoy interests or relationships with other people. Aside from these more dramatic problems, there is the grinding burden of the cognitive difficulties associated with schizophrenia, which make it difficult to work or manage the problems of daily life.

Although the treatment of schizophrenia has improved with the advent of a several generation of antipsychotic drugs, not all patients respond to these medications, and the psychiatric symptoms of many respond only in part. In addition, antipsychotic drugs carry the risk of a wide range of side effects. These difficult and unpleasant side effects of drugs. Many patients find these side effects so uncomfortable that they stop taking their medications, despite the risk of the reappearance or worsening of their psychiatric symptoms. Other patients do not understand that their thinking is impaired and refuse to take medications for that reason. Even among those for whom antipsychotic medications are effective, these drugs do little or nothing for the cognitive impairment that accounts for so much of the difficulty in functioning that patients face.

The severity of the disease and the limitations in current treatments underlie the importance of furthering our understanding of this debilitating disorder. Fortunately, there is reason for hope for improvement. New treatments for psychotic symptoms and effective treatments for cognitive impairment are on the horizon. Advanced genetic screening technology, structural and functional brain imaging, sophisticated histological techniques, and other methods will be instrumental in identifying particular features of the disease. The combination of these approaches, coupled with a recognition of the heterogeneity of the disorder, will lead to greater understanding, better treatments, and eventually, prevention of schizophrenia.

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PHARMACOLOGICAL TREATMENT OF SCHIZOPHRENIA

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INTRODUCTION

Schizophrenia is a chronic, frequently life-time, recurring, and relapsing psychiatric disorder with predominant symptoms and deficits even during phases of remission (Catts and Lehman, 2001). Although there is a history of poor childhood and adolescent function in many patients, the illness is usually diagnosed in late adolescence or early adulthood when adult psychotic symptoms first appear. Persistent psychotic exacerbation (relapse) occurs throughout the course of the illness. Schizophrenia has devastating effects on several aspects of the patient's life and has been associated with a high risk of suicide (about 11 percent of patients die from suicide) and significant impairment in function (less than 10 percent of patients are fully employed and live independently). Its treatment requires a multimodal approach, including medication and psychosocial interventions, such as assistance with such routine demands of life as housing, financial maintenance, and personal relationships. The broad objective of treatment is to reduce

the overall morbidity and mortality of the disorder, decrease the frequency and severity of episodes of psychotic exacerbation, and improve the functional capacity and quality of lives of the individuals afflicted with the illness. Most patients require continuous and continuous care over the course of their lives. This review focuses on the pharmacological aspects of schizophrenia. The clinical and neurobiological substrates on which these treatments work are briefly reviewed.

TARGETS OF PHARMACOLOGICAL TREATMENT

Clinical Substrates

Schizophrenia is characterized by a wide range of symptoms, accompanied by significant deficits in function and marked diminution in the quality of life. Since no one currently exists, pharmacological treatment is directed at isolating and maintaining reduction of various symptom dimensions. Treatment-resistant domains of pathology include positive symptom delusions, hallucinations, euphoricomania, disorganized thinking, negative symptom (depersonalized speech and thinking, lack of social drive, blunting of emotional expression, apathy), cognitive and noncognitivethink dysfunction (average intelligence quotient (IQ) in schizophrenia is 80 to 84, with pronounced memory and learning difficulties), and mood symptoms (depression, anxiety). Schizophrenia presents a unique set of symptoms in each individual affected, creating considerable diversity of clinical presentation. To a large extent, the unique features of each case are defined by the relative contribution of various domains to the overall picture of symptoms. The relative severity of symptoms within these domains varies across individuals, as also in the same individual over the course of illness. The diagnosis of schizophrenia is typically made at the time of development of that psychiatric symptom.

These symptom-domains contribute differentially to impairments in function, with the severity of negative and cognitive symptoms most strongly correlated with degree of functional impairment. Pharmacological treatment is directed at the different symptom domains with the objective of reducing the severity of these symptoms and thereby improving function and quality of life. While pharmacological treatment of schizophrenia does improve most of the different psychopathological domains to varying extents, side effects associated with such treatment can worsen some symptom domains and can also independently have an adverse impact on function and quality of life. Additionally, side effects [particularly extrapsychotic symptoms (EPS)] can lead to treatment noncompliance, leading in turn to a worse course of illness; medication-free patients are three times as likely to relapse as adequately medicated patients. Consequently, the optimal pharmacotherapy of schizophrenia is one that provides the best possible control of the various symptoms while minimizing side effects from such treatment.

Active psychosis is the most common cause of hospital admission and is such an evidence of poor symptom control and relapse. A primary goal of pharmacologic treatment in schizophrenia is the elimination or reduction of positive symptoms,

Control of these symptoms is remarkably effective in reducing the need for hospital treatment, thereby allowing patients to remain in community settings. All antipsychotics are effective in the treatment of positive symptoms. Negative symptoms can improve or worsen because of parkinsonian side effects with antipsychotic treatment (Miller and Tarsis, 2000). Even with optimal anticholinergic treatment, negative symptoms tend to be present throughout the course of schizophrenia, including the躁狂和 remission phases of the illness. This combination of pervasiveness, resistant response to treatment, and enormous impact on quality of life make them a major challenge in the treatment of schizophrenia. Similarly, impaired cognition may be a primary symptom of the illness or may be a consequence of pharmacological treatment. The anticholinergic properties that are a prominent feature of many antipsychotics contribute directly to cognitive impairment, as do parkinsonian side effects (dysthyphoria) (Casey, 1985; Bilder, 1997; Harvey and Keefe, 1997). The frequent use of anticholinergic antihistamines is apt to lead to treat parkinsonian side effects further exacerbate secondary cognitive impairment, especially difficulties with memory (Tarsis, 1999).

Morbidopathological Substrate

Schizophrenia is clearly a brain disease, and numerous abnormalities in structure, function, and neurochemistry have been reported (Chapter 9). Nevertheless, although certain areas of abnormality and dysfunction have emerged as especially suspect, no clear pathologic basis for the disease or any of its component symptoms has been identified. It appears likely that the abnormalities in schizophrenia arise from an early lesion (genetic, acquired, or both), interacting with altered postnatal developmental processes to produce the symptoms of the illness.

From the perspective of neurochemistry, the dopamine hypothesis has dominated biochemical and pharmacological research on schizophrenia for four decades. In its simplest form, the hypothesis states that schizophrenia is related to a relative excess of dopamine-dependent neuronal activity (Kane and Jeste, 1994). The major support for this hypothesis comes from the efficacy of the dopamine-blocking antipsychotics in treating psychotic symptomatology and the ability of dopamine-enhancing agents such as amphetamines to exacerbate the symptoms of schizophrenia. No drugs without dopamine-blocking activity have any proven efficacy in the treatment of schizophrenia. In fact, the clinical potency of various antipsychotic drugs is directly related to their *in vivo* ability to bind to dopamine D₂ receptors (Cohen et al., 1996; Freedman et al., 1978).

Despite this body of pharmacological data supporting the dopamine hypothesis, there is little direct evidence of altered dopamine functioning in schizophrenic patients. Furthermore, while pharmacological data implicate increased dopamine activity in the pathogenesis of positive symptoms of schizophrenia, there is minimal association with negative or cognitive/neurological symptoms. These observations have encouraged a reappaisal of the role of the dopamine system in schizophrenia. A "modified dopamine model" postulates a decrease in cortical dopamine activity, and a

antipsychotic drugs is referred to as neuroleptic activity. Thus, distinguishing between negative and positive symptoms, respectively. The other approach considers interactions between dopamine and other neurotransmitters, with models of dopamine interaction with serotonin, glutamate, acetylcholine, and gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) proposed.

PHARMACOTHERAPY FOR SCHIZOPHRENIA

The class of antipsychotic drugs represents the primary pharmacological treatment of schizophrenia. There are approximately 100 antipsychotics available in the world; of these, 30 are available in the United States. From 1950 to 1990, three generations of antipsychotic medications were available over the past decade, several second-generation or "typical" antipsychotics have been introduced into clinical practice. Currently, 18 of the antipsychotics available in the United States are third-generation antipsychotics, while 12 are second-generation agents (Fig. 1).

First-Generation Antipsychotic Agents

When Paul Broca first described the concept of schizophrenia over a century ago, he asserted, "The treatment of chronic patients often, far from its intention." The introduction of chlorpromazine therapy in 1952 provided the first evidence of major mental treatment of schizophrenia; prior to that time, good outcome consisted of providing the afflicted patient with safe and supportive treatment in the form of long-term psychiatric hospitalization. Chlorpromazine was the first medication to be introduced into psychiatry. Discovery of its "soothing" effects in 1950 (Dolezal and Brodersen, 1952) led to the development of the first generation of antipsychotic medications, which constituted the primary pharmacological treatment of schizophrenia for the next 40 years. Approximately 20 such "typical" or "conventional" antipsychotics have been developed. 12 such agents are approved as antipsychotics in the United States. These medications have been very effective in controlling and minimizing episodes of acute episodes of the illness, primarily by controlling positive symptoms.




Figure 1. Antipsychotic drugs.

they are relatively ineffective, however, in treating the negative, cognitive, and mood-symptom domains of schizophrenia. Furthermore, even with regard to positive symptoms, second-generation antipsychotics are only partially effective in about 40 percent of patients, and completely ineffective in another 20 percent. While these medications (clozapine (Clozaril), olanzapine (Zyprexa), risperidone (Risperidol), trifluoperazine (Mellaril), haloperidol (Haldol), etc.) differ from one another in potency and side effect profile, they have similar overall efficacy, and all cause significant EPS and tardive dyskinesia. EPS have a pervasive negative impact on treatment, contributing to dysphoria and poor compliance, worsening of negative symptoms, and cognitive function, and increased risk of tardive dyskinesia. While appropriate use of lower doses of these agents can reduce these adverse effects, EPS and its consequences constitute the major limitation of first-generation antipsychotics (Casey, 1993; Lieben and Tamkin, 1993).

Second-Generation Antipsychotic Agents

Until the past decade, acute EPS (and its pervasive adverse consequences) and tardive dyskinesia were considered unavoidable by-products of schizophrenia treatment—in fact, it was believed that there could be no antipsychotic efficacy without EPS. Over the past decade, five “typified” or novel antipsychotic agents have been introduced into clinical practice in the United States; in chronological order of introduction, these include clozapine (Clozaril), risperidone (Risperidol), olanzapine (Zyprexa), quetiapine (Seroquel), and aripiprazole (Abilify). What principally distinguishes these newer antipsychotic agents from the older conventional agents is their ability to achieve an antipsychotic effect at least as good as that achieved by conventional agents with a much lower risk of EPS (Meltzer, 1995). In fact, this second generation of antipsychotics is called “typified” because of its better ability to express antipsychotic effects than extrapsychotic side effects (Fig. 10.2). The newer generation of antipsychotic agents thus clearly demonstrate important advantages over conventional agents in the area of EPS and tardive dyskinesia (Tamkin et al., 1999a).

In addition to possessing at least equivalent efficacy to first-generation antipsychotics in treating positive symptoms, the newer generation of agents appears to provide greater efficacy in the other domains—namely negative symptoms, cognition, and mood. Much of the greater efficacy in these domains appears to be related to their ability to achieve an antipsychotic effect in the absence of EPS (Fig. 10.3). Consequently, it is essential that typical agents be used in such a manner that they produce an antipsychotic effect in the absence of EPS, without the need for any anticholinergic or other antiparkinsonian medication, thereby preserving the broader efficacy and lower risk of tardive dyskinesia associated with their use (Kane et al., 1993; Abson and Tamkin, 2003).

Finally, in addition to their broader spectrum of efficacy and lower risk of neurological adverse effects, the newer generation of antipsychotics has greater efficacy than conventional antipsychotics in otherwise treatment-refractory patients (Kane et al., 1993). Among the five typical agents, clozapine has the best proven track record in this regard (Chakos et al., 2000).




Figure 10.2. Comparative pharmacology of atypical antipsychotic drugs. [Adapted from Schmidt et al. (1998). *Soc Neurosci Abstr* 24(2): 2127.] See ftp site for color image.




Figure 10.3. Dose-response curve: Antipsychotic effect vs. EPS. (Adapted from Jibson and Tandon, 1998.)

While the second generation of antipsychotics possesses several advantages over the first generation of conventional antipsychotics, and their introduction into clinical practice represents a significant advance in the pharmacotherapy of schizophrenia, they also have several limitations both with regard to safety/tolerability and to efficacy. Differences in the pharmacological profiles of these second-generation antipsychotics (Fig. 10.2 and Table 10.1) translate into differences in their side effect profiles (Table 10.2 and 10.3). Each available novel antipsychotic agent has a distinctive adverse effect profile; a comparison between them and two representative conventional agents (thioridazine and haloperidol) with regard to key side effects is provided in Table 10.4.




Figure 11.1. Effects of integration. (Adapted from Miles and Vining, 1994.)

TABLE 11.1. Characteristics of financial integration.

Financial products:

can improve R_1 , contribute to the integration outcome R_{INT} , improve revenue and income prediction R_2 , improve R_3 but not the related

Change in asset proportion (R_4 , R_5 , R_6 , R_7 , R_8 , R_9 , R_{10} , R_{11} , R_{12})

Reputation (R_{13}), R_{14} = capital + R_{15}

Market value (R_{16} = R_{17} + R_{18} + R_{19} + R_{20})

Profitability (R_{21} = R_{22} + R_{23} + R_{24} + R_{25})

Competitor (R_{26}), profit margin (R_{27})

TABLE 11.2. Financial implications of effects of financial integration.

Response (R_i) to option	Possible flows to	Impact (for $i = 1, \dots, 27$)
Revolving R_1 to option	long position + short short or positive negative or negative	Only relevant relevant direction (short, dynamic, static, static, static direction) Only relevant relevant direction existing positions, guarantees, new ones, changes, newly-hatched

TABLE 15-102. Clinical Implications of Blockade of Various Receptors

Receptor	Unsubstantiated Benefits	Likely Side Effects
Homomeric 5-HT receptors		
5-HT _{2A} receptor	Reduced EPS	II
5-HT _{2B} receptor	Not definitely known	Weight gain
Heteromeric 5-HT receptors	Not definitely known	Tardive, "Weight gain"
5-Hydroxytryptamine receptor	Not definitely known	Blurred vision, dry mouth, constipation, urinary retention, nose bleeds, tachycardia, tachyarrhythmia
α ₂ -adrenergic receptor	Not definitely known	Possibly hypertension, dizziness

TABLE 15-103. Conventional vs. Atypical Side Effect Profiles

	SF ^a	TFD ^b	SSR ^c	CLEX ^d	RIS ^e	OLZ ^f	QTP ^g
EPS	0 to 4+	+	+++	0 to 4+	0 to 4+	0 to 4+	0 to 4+
Overreated EPS	+	++	+++	0	++	+	0
TD tardive dyskinesia	0	++	+++	0	0	0	0
Product elevation	0	++	+++	0	++	0	0
Aggression/psychosis	0	0	0	0 to 4+	0	0	0
Anorexia/bingeing	0	0 to 4+	0	0 to 4+	0	0	0
ADHD/LT elevation	0	+	+	+	0	+	0
Hypotension	0	++	++	0 to 4+	++	0	++
Sedation	0	++	++	0	++	++	++
QTc prolongation	0	++	0	0	0	0	0
Weight gain	0	+	+	+++	++	++	++

Key: 0 = absent, 0 = minimal, + = mild, ++ = moderate, +++ = severe.

Source: Taylor et al. (1994).

COURSE OF TREATMENT

It has been suggested that the pharmacologic treatment of schizophrenia be conceptualized as occurring in three distinct phases. First, acute psychiatric symptoms must be brought under control. Second, there must be a period in which normal functions are reestablished. Third is a maintenance phase in which the gains of the first two stages are sustained, and relapse prevention becomes the predominant objective. Although there is considerable overlap in treatments offered in each stage, there are also significant differences in the goals and methods of each step. It is essential that tactical decisions that fail later treatment in the initial stage not be allowed to compromise the strategic goals of later phases.

Phase One (Acute Treatment)

The first phase of treatment begins with the mitigation of acute psychotic symptoms. By definition, these symptoms include some combination of delusions, hallucinations, and thought-disorganized. Positive symptoms can be accompanied by agitation, behavioral dyscontrol, and aggressive behavior. The primary goal of treatment in this phase of illness is the rapid resolution of these symptoms. Prompt control of psychosis will reduce the patient's and family's subjective distress, minimize disruption in functional activities such as work or school, and avoid possible danger to the patient or others. Although dosage requirements and time course of response can vary considerably among different patients, there is usually little to be gained by use of megadoses of antipsychotic drugs. Appropriate dosing of both conventional and atypical antipsychotics is critical to optimize the ratio of efficacy to adverse effects (Mueser et al., 1992). Excessively conservative doses will not reach optimal efficacy, and may lead to unnecessary augmentation or polypharmacy, whereas overly aggressive dosing leads to an unnecessary side effect burden and increased risk of noncompliance. The initial suggested dose and optimal dose range of various atypical antipsychotics and haloperidol for young, otherwise healthy, patients is summarized in Table 10.5. In first-episode patients, the low end of the suggested dose range is best utilized, whereas in more chronic patients, the upper part of the range is often more appropriate. In elderly patients, one-fourth to half of the recommended young adult dose is often optimal.

Few data are available to suggest that one agent works more rapidly than the others, although this has recently been the subject of clinical study. Most likely, clinical studies have not demonstrated any differences in speed of response among these atypical antipsychotics and conventional neuroleptics. Agitation, aggressive behavior, and manic hypomanic tend to respond to treatment within hours to days. Hallucinations and delusions typically take several days, and although these symptoms may begin to improve within a few days, a full response may require 4 to 6 weeks.

Phase Two (Transition and Consolidation of Improvement)

Once the psychotic symptoms have come under control, the second goal of treatment is to return as much of the patient's prepsychotic function as possible. In general, this

TABLE 10.5. Recommended Dosing of First-Line Antipsychotics in Schizophrenia

Daily Dose in Adult Phase (Based on Clinical Experience)
Haloperidol: 2–8 mg/day
Clorpromazine: 10–20 mg/day
Quetiapine: 200–800 mg/day
Oxypheophenone: 40–100 mg/day
Aripiprazole: 15–30 mg/day

phase of treatment involves resolution of acute-phase negative symptoms and cognitive impairments, and consolidation of improvement in positive symptoms. Negative symptoms typically improve slowly, over a period of 6 to 12 weeks, while cognitive and neuropsychological dysfunction show improvement for as much as 6 months to 1 year (Keefe et al., 1999). Critical elements of this phase of treatment are maintenance of compliance, optimization of medication dosage, solidification of a treatment alliance, and aggressive treatment of side effects. Obstacles to patient compliance include unacceptable side effects, denial of illness, lack of family and social support for treatment, and perceived social stigma associated with psychotropic medications. As noted in phase one, medications with superior side effect profiles are preferred. This is generally a period in which patients encounter significant changes or transitions in several aspects of their treatment: inpatient or partial hospitalization to outpatient, change in living situation, possible withdrawal of one or more acute-phase medications. Transitions are "dangerous times" in treatment, with a high risk of relapse, and hence should be as gradual as possible, with appropriate support provided as available.

At this stage of treatment, there may be a rational basis for selection of one atypical antipsychotic over another. As noted previously, the first-line atypicals differ primarily in side effect profile. The acute clinician will have identified the side effects of greatest concern to the particular patient by this stage of treatment and can then select the agent most favorable to the individual. A second issue to consider in this regard is the potential of antipsychotics (especially conventional agents) to contribute to negative symptoms, and for anticholinergic medications to worsen cognitive impairments. Balance must be achieved in maintaining resolution of psychotic symptoms, and in facilitating the progressive improvement of cognitive and negative symptoms. In general, atypical antipsychotics have substantial advantages over conventional neuroleptics in this phase of treatment. Gradual cross titration (over 6 to 12 weeks) from one antipsychotic to another is the preferred strategy if patients are to be switched from one antipsychotic to another (Fig. 10.5). Psychosocial interventions are an integral part of treatment at this time. Patient and family education regarding the illness and its treatment are essential to ensure compliance, promote a return to social and




Figure 10.5. Switching antipsychotics: Recommended strategy.

occupational function, and permit reasonable planning for future activities. This is also the most effective time to assess the patient's functional ability and make recommendations for social and vocational rehabilitation. Psycho-social treatment and pharmacologic interventions are interdependent for their success (Mojtabai et al., 1996).

Phase Three (Maintenance Treatment)

The natural course of psychotic symptoms in schizophrenia includes a high rate of relapse, even when symptoms have been brought under good control. Maintenance antipsychotic treatment is essential for relapse prevention (Gilbert et al., 1996; Cleary and Tandon, 1995). Furthermore, since much worsening of negative symptoms appears related to acute psychotic episodes, the most effective intervention to prevent the functional deterioration associated with those symptoms is to avoid further episodes of acute psychosis. Although no treatment at present appears capable of reversing or correcting the psychotid component of dysfunction, effective antipsychotic treatment may prevent or at least limit the abnormalities associated with the deterioration phase. Finally, since the most severe deterioration occurs during the first few episodes of illness, aggressive maintenance therapy should be initiated early in the course of illness. Thus, effective antipsychotic treatment can significantly limit deterioration and improve outcome in schizophrenia. Relapse prevention is a critical task in this phase of treatment; the risk of psychotic relapse in stabilized patients is about 70 percent within one year following drug discontinuation, in contrast to 15 to 20 percent if patients continue their prescribed antipsychotic regimen (DeQuardo and Tandon, 1996).

Long-term patient compliance is a major issue. As with other phases of treatment, unacceptable side effects, denial of illness, and inadequate social support are obstacles to treatment. Selection of an antipsychotic with a favorable side effect profile is essential. Long-standing or late-onset side effects should be addressed with the patient. Patient education is essential during this phase of treatment. A patient, with no active symptoms and no appreciation of the risk of relapse, is unlikely to continue treatment. In patients whose compliance cannot otherwise be ensured, a depot antipsychotic is the treatment of choice (Kane, 1995).

COMBINING SEVERAL MEDICATIONS

Antipsychotic Polypharmacy

Combinations of antipsychotics are widely used clinically (about 15 to 20 percent of patients, with a clear trend toward increasing popularity), though no studies of their efficacy or safety are available. Thus, although combinations such as clozapine plus a high-potency conventional drug or clozapine plus an atypical agent have been suggested, their utility remains unclear. Despite these concerns, some situations may lend themselves to the concurrent use of more than one antipsychotic. A common dilemma faced in the clinic is the patient who responds well to clozapine but is consistently

noncompliant and thus risks tolerance. A combination of clozapine plus a depot neuroleptic (as a "hedge net") may prove superior to either agent alone, by offering the patient the benefits of clozapine, yet providing some degree of protection from tolerance by the presence of the depot medication. Another common clinical situation is the patient being tapered off one antipsychotic and simultaneously titrated onto another who shows chronic improvement midway through the process on moderate doses of the two medications. There is no clear basis to decide whether to continue the cross-titration to monotherapy with the new agent or maintain the patient on lower doses of the two medications together. In this case, however, it is recommended that all patients receive a trial of monotherapy on the new antipsychotic agent with the pretension of slow dose titration over 6 to 12 months, and optimal dosing with the newest agent. As no adult controlled studies of this practice, it is important to systematically document the specific reasons for the use of multiple antipsychotics in a particular patient, describe the response of defined target symptoms, and assess adverse effects on an ongoing basis.

Adjunctive Medication

Inclusion use of additional medications may be appropriate in selected schizophrenia patients and is very frequently utilized. The basis for the use of adjunctive medications may be treatment of side effects, refractory psychotic symptoms, comorbid conditions, or specific nonpsychotic symptoms such as agitation, anxiety, depression, or mood elevation. Careful consideration of potential side effects, additive effects, and drug interactions is essential.

Anticholinergics. Anticholinergic agents effectively treat the EPS associated with first-generation "conventional" neuroleptics. The justification for the use of anticholinergics with atypical antipsychotics is more limited, as noted previously, anticholinergics may contribute to cognitive deficits, as well as to peripheral side effects such as constipation, dry mouth, urinary retention, and blurred vision. Indications for use of anticholinergics with atypical antipsychotics include akathisia, rare EPS, and excessive sedation with clozapine.

Mood Stabilizers. Most substances have long been used in conjunction with antipsychotic medications to address concurrent mood symptoms or treatment refractory psychosis (Clancy et al., 2001). Data in support of this practice are, however, sparse. Lithium has mood-stabilizing properties and can sometimes be useful for reducing mania in patients suffering from schizophrenia. Valproate and other anticonvulsants are often employed (despite modest evidence of utility); they are beneficial in cases of mood elevation and may sometimes be helpful for persistent agitation. Adverse effects and impact on antipsychotic levels need to be monitored.

Benzodiazepines. Benzodiazepines are relatively benign agents useful in the treatment of agitation, insomnia, anxiety, and delirium, all common concomitants of

schizophrenia. Some evidence suggests that in agitated psychotic patients, lower total doses of antipsychotic may be used in the presence of benzodiazepines. The primary disadvantage of these drugs is the risk of abuse and dependency. They may also have a direct adverse effect on cognitive function.

Beta Blockers. Low doses of beta blockers can be useful in treating akathisia, which occurs in up to 20 percent of patients treated with conventional antipsychotics, and somewhat less commonly in patients treated with atypical antipsychotics.

Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT). Electroconvulsive therapy should be considered in acutely psychotic patients not responsive to other treatments. ECT is of clear, though short-term, benefit in many patients (Heik and Radwin, 1996; Kalin et al., 1995). Its safety in the presence of antipsychotic medications, including clozapine, is fairly well established.

FUTURE TRENDY

The advent of the second-generation atypical antipsychotics has revolutionized pharmacological treatment of schizophrenia and other psychiatric disorders. In contrast to the first-generation conventional neuroleptics, these second-generation antipsychotic agents possess a broader spectrum of efficacy and cause fewer motor side effects, such as extrapyramidal symptoms (EPS) and tardive dyskinesia. Despite their substantial advantages, however, these second-generation agents also have significant limitations both in terms of efficacy and adverse effects. Adverse effects contribute to the major problem of medication noncompliance in schizophrenia, whereas injectable formulations of antipsychotics help with regard to this problem, no atypical agent is currently available in an injectable form (jamo or depot). While possessing a broader spectrum of efficacy than conventional agents, even atypical antipsychotics are generally unable to completely normalize cognitive function or eliminate negative and mixed symptoms. In fact, significant negative deficits and negative symptoms remain in schizophrenic patients treated with atypical agents. Although clozapine (and other novel agents to a less substantiated extent) may be effective in patients partially or completely refractory to treatment with conventional antipsychotics, these agents do not work in a significant proportion of patients. There is significant variation in the way patients respond to different antipsychotic medications, and currently there is no way of predicting which antipsychotic will work best for a particular patient and at what dose.

Finally, although our current pharmacological armamentarium has obvious limitations, it is also clear that "usual treatment" generally fails far short of the "best possible." Despite the publication of several treatment guidelines, there is significant variation in pharmacological treatment practice that cannot be explained away by "patient heterogeneity"; attempts to promote evidence-based "best possible" pharmacotherapy of schizophrenia have hitherto been unsuccessful. Efforts to address each of the above shortcomings are currently underway. While it is difficult to predict precisely when each of the following tools will become available to the clinician, some

of these antipsychotics are at very advanced stages of study, whereas others are at a very preliminary stage.

New Formulations of Currently available Second-Generation Antipsychotics

Currently, none of second-generation antipsychotic agents (clozapine, risperidone, chlorpromazine, quetiapine, or olanzapine) is available in an injectable form in most countries (chlorpromazine is licensed for parenteral administration in some countries). Injectable formulations are important because they have rapid onset of action, can be given without administration by mouth, and avoid some problems of patient resistance and noncompliance. Consequently, there are several clinical situations where first-generation antipsychotics have to be employed despite their many disadvantages.

Efforts to develop injectable formulations of typical drugs are at different stages for the different agents. With regard to rapid-acting formulations for parenteral use, intramuscular chlorpromazine and ziprasidone have been developed and tested (Smith et al., 1998; Rossi et al., 2001). Both these agents are currently being reviewed by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and are likely to become available within the next year. In patients whose compliance cannot otherwise be ensured, a depot antipsychotic is the treatment of choice. Currently, haloperidol decanoate and fluphenazine decanoate are the only agents available for such use in the United States. A long-acting formulation of risperidone is at a fairly advanced stage of evaluation and appears likely to become available by the year 2003-2004.

New Antipsychotic Agents

While several potential antipsychotic agents are at various stages of development, two agents have gone through extensive testing, and new drug applications for these agents will likely soon be submitted to the FDA for approval. While one of these agents (risperidone) has significant similarities to currently available second-generation antipsychotic agents, the other (aripiprazole) is the first agent of its type likely to become available. Other agents with distinct mechanisms of action are at earlier stages of assessment of antipsychotic efficacy.

Risperidone. Risperidone has gone through several clinical trials in a variety of conditions. In addition to the D₂ and 5HT_{2A} antagonism characteristic of currently available typical agents, it is also a partial antagonist at the alpha-1 and alpha-2 adrenoceptor receptors; the magnitude of this effect is comparable to that of clozapine. While its positive clinical profile needs further elucidation, studies thus far suggest that it is an "atypical" agent with potent antipsychotic activity and a low EPS liability (Jain, 2001).

Aripiprazole. Aripiprazole is a partial agonist at the dopamine D₂ receptor, in contrast to existing antipsychotic agents, which are all full antagonists at the D₂ receptor, albeit with different degrees of affinity for the receptor. *In vivo*, aripiprazole has

been shown to exhibit antipsychotic properties in animal models of dopamine hyperactivity and apomorphine in an animal model of dopamine hypoactivity. Aripiprazole has undergone extensive clinical testing, including studies comparing it to haloperidol and risperidone. It appears to be a potent antipsychotic with a low EPS liability (Carson et al., 2001). Although several D₂ partial agonists have previously been evaluated for antipsychotic efficacy, none has reached the stage of development of aripiprazole, which is now available in the U.S.A.

Specific Targeting of Symptom Domains Other Than Positive Symptoms

Until now, efforts to identify an effective antichizophrenic medication have been directed toward development of a broad-spectrum, disease-specific panacea that would target all relevant symptom domains. Despite the broader spectrum of activity of the second-generation antipsychotic agents in comparison to first-generation drugs, they share the quality of being more effective in reducing positive symptoms than negative or cognitive symptoms. Specific pharmacological strategies directed at each of these other symptom domains are currently under investigation. It is, however, likely to be several years before any of the following strategies (assuming they are effective and safe) will become part of mainstream practice. At this stage, these nonpsychotic domain-specific treatments are conceived as add-on or adjunctive treatments to existing antipsychotic agents.

Specific Treatments for Negative Symptoms. Persistent negative symptoms are a major reason for the significant disability associated with schizophrenia; current treatments have only limited efficacy. Several pharmacological strategies to specifically treat negative symptoms have been evaluated with limited success thus far. Over the past decade, agents that stimulate the *N*-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) glutamate receptor have shown promise in this regard (Duff and Copyle, 2001). Partial and full agonists at the glycine site have also been used in conjunction with antipsychotics with some success in reducing negative symptoms. Large-scale studies are ongoing.

Specific Treatment for Cognitive Deficits. Perhaps, to an even greater extent than negative symptoms, cognitive dysfunction is correlated with functional impairment in schizophrenia. While novel antipsychotics are generally more effective than conventional agents in ameliorating cognitive symptoms, their efficacy is only modest. While there is some suggestion that different second-generation drugs may differentially improve various aspects of cognitive dysfunction in schizophrenia (and presumably could be matched to the specific cognitive deficits exhibited by a given patient), definitive data in this regard are lacking.

While several neuropharmacological mechanisms have been proposed to explain the cognitive advantages of the newer antipsychotic agents, none is considered definitive at present. In any event, three specific pharmacological targets to ameliorate cognitive impairments in schizophrenia are currently under study. The first target is the

NMDA receptor, with both partial (α -cyclodextrin and full (cavite and glycine) agonists at the glycine site being studied; modulators of the glutamatergic AMPA receptor are also being assessed for efficacy in treatment of cognitive deficits. Cholinergic augmentation strategies (Tarsler and Crowley, 1999; Tarsler et al., 1999a and 24-IT₁, specific strategies (Kuroyoshi et al., 2001) are also currently being investigated in this regard.

Other Pharmacological Targets: In addition to glutamatergic, cholinergic, and other serotonergic targets discussed above, several new psychopharmacological treatment strategies are also being pursued in the treatment of schizophrenia. While many types of agents are being studied, cholecystokinin agonists and neurokinin antagonists currently show greatest promise.

Matching Drug and Dose to Individual Patient:

The significant recent advances in genetics and molecular neurobiology have led to considerable enthusiasm about the potential application of these strategies to improve schizophrenia treatment. Given the significant interindividual variation in response to antipsychotic drug treatment, a variety of pharmacogenetic studies are being evaluated (O'Dowd and Andelman, 2001). While many such studies have focused on prediction of response to atypical and older treatments, other molecular genetic investigations are attempted at predicting side effects of antipsychotic treatment, such as tardive dyskinesia. Efforts to predict the optimal dose of different antipsychotics based on such studies are increasingly common.

Genomic techniques also provide a powerful technique to discern the heterogeneity of schizophrenia. Most experts believe that schizophrenia is not one disease but many distinct diseases with overlapping symptomatology. Advances in genetics will facilitate the identification of gene products involved in the pathophysiology of schizophrenia and thereby enable the development of specific therapeutic agents directed at such "disease-specific" targets. While these techniques have great potential, their specific application toward improving treatment of schizophrenia is still at a preliminary stage, and it appears unlikely that any major mainstream clinical application based on this approach is likely to become available for a decade.

Evidence-Based Pharmacological Treatment:

There is marked variation in pharmacological treatment practice in schizophrenia, and it is also clear that the "usual treatment" generally falls far short of the best possible (Geddes and Harrison, 1997; Lehman and Batesworth, 1998). Despite the publication of several treatment guidelines, efforts to promote evidence-based best possible pharmacotherapy of schizophrenia have hitherto been unsuccessful (Meltzer et al., 2001). Critics of pharmacological treatment algorithms for schizophrenia argue that existing algorithms are not empirically based under clinically applicable and relevant circumstances. It is suggested that these treatment guidelines go much beyond existing data, thereby reducing their clinical utility (Kane and Prieto, 2001; Tarsler et al., 2001).

CONCLUSION

Treatment of schizophrenia involves the judicious use of multiple treatment modalities, of which pharmacology is among the most important. Second-generation atypical antipsychotics provide substantial advantages over first-generation generation conventional agents. To maximize the benefits of atypical antipsychotics, the dose of medication should be carefully adjusted to achieve as complete a remission of psychotic symptoms as possible, without accompanying EPS. The major advantage of atypicals is lost if EPS occur; the occurrence of EPS should be considered an adequate justification for a decreased adjustment in dose or change in medication. Since such pharmacological treatment regimen has its own unique range of likely benefits and side effects and these, in turn, are of very different relevance and importance to each individual patient, treatment obviously must be individualized. Optimal pharmacotherapy of schizophrenia requires a careful balance between the efficacy benefits and the side effect risks customized for each individual patient. Nonpharmacological treatments and mental health system issues (availability of care, reimbursement, access to effective treatments, etc.) also warrant attention as one strives to improve the quality of life of individuals affected with schizophrenia.

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PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER

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INTRODUCTION

The human response to psychological trauma is one of the most important public health problems in the world. Traumatic events such as family and sexual violence, rapes and assault, disasters, wars, accidents, and predatory violence may temporarily or permanently alter the organism's response to its environment. While people have evolved to be extremely resourceful and capable of surviving, and overcoming extreme experiences, certain events, particularly if they occur early in the life cycle, can overwhelm the capacity of the organism to cope with stress and permanently alter the perception of danger and the regulation of internal homeostasis.

Historical Perspectives

Awareness of the role of psychological trauma as a contributory factor in psychiatric disturbances has off and on been a subject of serious study since the later part of the 19th century. At the Hôpital du Salpêtrière in Paris Jean Martin Charcot first suggested

that the symptoms of (what was then called) "hysterical" patients had their origins in histories of trauma. His colleague Pierre Janet proposed that posttraumatic reactions are caused by "subconscious emotions" that interfere with coping capacities, that is, the incapacity to "process" the experience. As a result, sensory or affective aspects of the traumatic events are split off (dissociated) from everyday consciousness and from voluntary control (Janet, 1889, 1919/1915; van der Kolk and van der Hart, 1995). The imprints of these traumas tended to intrude in patients' lives, not primarily as memories of what had happened but as intense emotional reactions, aggressive feelings, physical pain, and bodily states in response to sensory or emotional reminders, reactions that could best be understood as elements of the original trauma response.

After two clinical rotations at the Salpêtrière, Sigmund Freud, with Joseph Breuer, noted that in case of traumatic stress: "The . . . memory of the trauma . . . acts like a foreign body which long after its entry must be regarded as an agent that is still at work. . . . If a [reco]action is suppressed [the affect] stays attached to the memory. It may therefore be said that the later which have become pathologized have persisted with such fixations and affective strength because they have been denied the normal weeding-away processes by means of alteration and reproduction in areas of unbroken dissociation" (italics in original) (Breuer and Freud, 1893, pp. 7-11).

Contemporary studies of traumatic memories have corroborated Janet and Freud's initial observations that traumatic memories persist primarily as implicit, behavioral, and somatic memories and secondarily as vague, convergent, fragmented, incomplete, and disorganized narratives. Previous work by Fox (1995) and ourselves (Hooper and van der Kolk, 2001) suggest that these memories change and become more like a coherent story as people move from their posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

In *The Traumatic Neuroses* of Eric Karlin (1941) proposed that sufferers from "traumatic neuroses" develop an enduring vigilance for and sensitivity to environmental threat, and stated, "The nucleus of the neurosis is a phobic reaction. This is present . . . during the entire process of organization; it utilizes every intermediary associatively derived, and persists in the chronic form." He described extreme physiological arousal in these patients. They suffered from sensitivity to temperature, pain, and sudden tactile stimuli. "These patients cannot stand being slapped on the back sharply; they cannot tolerate a mosquito in a sleeve. From a physiologic point of view there exists a lowering of the threshold of stimulation; and, from a psychological point of view a state of readiness for flight reactions" (p. 82). Karlin articulated the central issue of PTSD: "The subject feels as if the original traumatic situation were still in existence and engages in protective devices which failed on the original occasion. This causes us to reflect that his conception of the outer world and his conception of himself have been permanently altered" (p. 82).

In 1980 the American Psychiatric Association, faced with the necessity to create a diagnosis to capture the essence of the posttraumatic problems in Vietnam veterans, created a diagnosis, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) that was predicated on the notion that overwhelming experiences have a memory imprint that may become a survival organizing principle in the victim's life. While this definition (detailed later) highlighted how a particular event, or series of events, can alter a person's response to

subsequent stimuli. It largely ignores the recurrent observation that following exposure to traumatic life events, the organism may reorganize the way it regulates a large array of biological and psychological functions, not only in response to particular triggers but in its basic orientation to its environment. These problems include difficulty distinguishing relevant from irrelevant stimuli; problems with arousal regulation and attention; impairment in the capacity to plan and execute actions relevant to the present; difficulties potentially impairing interpersonal needs; and problems experiencing pleasure and pleasure.

Background Issues

The biology of acute stress responses and the biology of trauma are fundamentally different. Stress causes a cascade of biological and physiological changes that return to normal after the stress is gone or after the organism has established a new homeostasis. In contrast, in PTSD, the biological alterations persist well after the stressor itself has disappeared. The fundamental problem in PTSD is a "fixation of the trauma" (Janet, 1893; van der Kolk, 1993; Trickett, 2002). Thus, the critical issue in understanding PTSD is: What keeps the organism from returning to its homeostasis and returning to a nontraumatic state, and what causes those regulatory processes to break down?

Exposure to events that overwhelm the organism's coping mechanisms can disrupt the self-regulatory systems necessary to restore the organism to its previous state because of alterations in a variety of "blunting" systems in the central nervous system (CNS) that help distinguish relevant from irrelevant stimuli. As a result, traumatized individuals have difficulty engaging fully in current experiences and distinguishing between what is threatening and what is safe. This maturation produces the symptoms described in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) definition of PTSD: intrusive reliving, avoidance and hyperarousal, increased uncontrollable aggression against self and others, drug and alcohol abuse, depression, and chronic physical illnesses. Severe and prolonged childhood trauma has particularly ill consequences. Compared with normals, people with histories of severe child maltreatment showed a 4 to 12 times greater risk to develop alcoholism, depression, drug abuse, and suicide attempts, a 2 to 4 times greater risk for smoking, having had ≥ 3 sex partners, leading to increased incidence of sexually transmitted disease; a 1.4 to 1.6 times greater risk for physical inactivity and obesity; and a 1.5 to 2.0 times greater risk for ischemic heart disease, cancer, chronic lung disease, skeletal fractures, hepatitis, stroke, diabetes, and liver disease (Follman et al., 1998).

Prevalence

Traumatic events are very common in most societies, though prevalence has been best studied in industrialized societies, particularly in the United States. Kessler et al. (1995) found that in the United States at least 20 percent of the population reports having been molested, physically attacked, raped, or been involved in combat. Each

year, about 3 million children in the United States are reported for neglect and/or abuse to child protective services, with more than half of these cases later substantiated. The vast majority of the abuse and neglect faced by children occurs at the hands of their primary caregivers and people they know. Four out of five assaults on children are at the hands of their own parents. For women and children, but not for men, trauma that results from violence within intimate relationships is a much more serious problem than traumatic events inflicted by strangers or accidents. Half of all victims of violence in the United States are under age 25; 29 percent of all terrible rapes occur before the age of 11. Among U.S. adolescents aged 12 to 17, 8 percent are estimated to have been victims of serious sexual assault; 17 percent are victims of serious physical assault; and 40 percent have witnessed serious violence (Kilpatrick et al., 1997). Over a third of the victims of physical assault experienced serious injury, averaged with a quarter of victims of sexual assault (van der Kolk, 2000).

Pediatric trauma disorder now is a common diagnosis for patients in psychiatric hospitals. An examination of the records of the 284,000 Medicaid recipients in Massachusetts in 1997-1998 (Macy et al., 2002) revealed that PTSD had the same prevalence as depression—generally considered the most common psychiatric diagnoses. However, patients with PTSD spent 10 times more days in the hospital than patients with the diagnosis of depression only. There is no evidence that the 22,800 Medicaid recipients in Massachusetts who were diagnosed as suffering from PTSD suffered only from a one-time traumatic incident, such as a rape or motor vehicle accident. Most suffer from a complex constellation of symptoms that include those of PTSD. However, currently the long-term psychiatric impact of chronic, multiple trauma receives the same diagnosis (PTSD) as do the effects of a one-time incident. The inevitable multiplicity of problems seen after chronic and repeated exposure are currently described chronically as seemingly separate "comorbidity" conditions. PTSD, as a diagnosis, consistently fails to capture how complicated the clinical presentation of many traumatized individuals is and how complex their treatment can be.

Symptomatology

When people are faced with a life-threatening experience, they focus on survival and anti-predation. When their usual coping systems fail, they tend to turn to their environment to supply the resources they lack themselves. The quantity and quality of coping resources available depends on the maturity of the nervous system, as well as prior experience and training. Children and educated adults are more prone to developing trauma symptomatology than younger who live in a protective family, or adults who are well prepared (such as physicians, fire fighters or police personnel). In the immediate aftermath of a traumatic event, victims may respond with a mixture of numbness, withdrawal, confusion, shock, and speechless terror. Some cope by taking action, while others dissociate. Neither response predictably prevents or fosters the subsequent development of PTSD, though being able to maintain an intact sense of control, and utilizing problem-focused coping significantly reduces the chance of developing PTSD. In contrast, dissociation, losing track of what is going on, and losing

affective and cognitive engagement with the environment is an important predictor for the development of subsequent PTSD (Shalev et al., 1996). The longer the trauma is experienced, the more likely the victim is to react with dissociation.

The formal diagnosis of PTSD is characterized by three major elements:

1. The repeated reliving of memories of the traumatic experience. These tend to involve intrusive sensory and visual memories of the event that often are accompanied by extreme physiological and psychophysiological distress, and sometimes by a feeling of emotional numbing, during which there usually is no physiological arousal. Those intrusive memories may occur spontaneously or can be triggered by a range of real and symbolic stimuli.
2. Avoidance of reminders of the trauma, as well as of emotional numbing. Detachment and emotional blunting often coexist with intrusive recollections. This is associated with an inability to experience joy and pleasure, and with a general withdrawal from engagement with one's surroundings. Over time, these features may become the dominant symptoms of PTSD.
3. The third element of PTSD consists of a pattern of increased arousal, as expressed by hypervigilance, irritability, memory and concentration problems, sleep disturbances, and an exaggerated startle response. In the most severe forms of the disorder, this pattern of hypervigilance and avoidance may be the dominant clinical feature. Hypervigilant trauma-exposed people become easily disturbed by unexpected stimuli. Their tendency to be triggered into reliving traumatic memories illustrates how their perceptions become excessively focused on the involuntary working out of the similarities between the present and their traumatic past. As a consequence, many neutral experiences become misconceived as being associated with the traumatic past.

Complexity of Adaptation

Once people develop PTSD, the recurrent activation reliving of the trauma in visual images, emotional states, or in nightmares produces a recurrent reliving of states of terror. In contrast to the actual trauma, which had a beginning, middle, and end, the symptoms of PTSD take on a timeless character. The traumatic intrusions themselves are breifing. They interfere with "getting over" the past, while obstructing the individual from attending to the present. The unpredictable exposure to unbidden feelings, physical sensations, images, or other imprints of the traumatic event leads to a variety of usually maladaptive avoidance responses, ranging from avoidance of people or actions that seem to reminders to drug and alcohol abuse and emotional withdrawal from friends or activities that used to be potential sources of pleasure. Problems with attention and concentration keep them from being engaged with their surroundings with ease and energy. Uncomplicated activities like reading, cooking, and watching television require extra effort. The loss of ability to focus, in turn, often leads to problems with taking one thing at a time and interferes with organizing their lives in response to the trauma (van der Kolk et al., 1996a).

Trauma-early in the life cycle, particularly when it is recurrent and when it occurs in the context of an inadequate caregiving system, has pervasive effects on cognition, socialization, and the capacity for affect regulation (Clouden and Bremble, 1996; Putnam and Trickett, 1995; van der Kolk and Foa, 1995). Children exposed to abuse and neglect are at increased risk to develop depression and anxiety disorders. They have a high incidence of aggression against self and others, are vulnerable to develop disturbances in food intake, as in anorexia and bulimia, and suffer from a high incidence of drug and alcohol addiction (van der Kolk et al., 1996b; Foa et al., 1996). It is thought that early and persistent sensitization of CRH circuits involved in the regulation of stress and emotion produces an increased vulnerability to subsequent stress by means of persistent hyperreactivity of neurotransmitter systems, including corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) (Heim and Nemeroff, 2000). Pioneering animal models have shown brain and behavior changes over time and provide opportunities for working out some of the essential neurological details (Adamek, 1991; Panksepp, 2001).

PSYCHOBIOLOGY

Background Neuroscience Issues

In order to understand how trauma affects psychopathological activity, it is useful to briefly revisit some basic sorts of neurobiology. Paul McLean (1990) defined the brain as a detecting, amplifying, and analyzing device for the maintenance of the internal and external environment. These functions range from the visceral regulation of oxygen intake and temperature balance to the quagmiring of incoming information necessary for making complex, long-term decisions affecting both individual and social systems. He proposed that, in the course of evolution, the human brain has developed roughly three interdependent subsystems, each with different anatomical and neurochemical substrates: (1) the brainstem and hippocampus, which are primarily associated with the regulation of internal homeostasis, (2) the limbic system, which maintains the balance between the internal world and external reality, and (3) the neocortex, which is responsible for analyzing and interacting with the external world (McLean, 1990).

The circuitry of the brainstem and hippocampus is most innate and stable, while the limbic system contains both innate circuitry and circuitry modifiable by experience, while the neocortex is most affected by environmental input (Damasio, 1995). It therefore would be expected that trauma would most profoundly affect neocortical functions, and have least effect on structures related to basic regulatory functions. However, while this seems to be true for the ordinary stress response, trauma (stress that overwhelms the organism) seems to affect core self-regulatory functions.

Interrelation Between Regulatory Functions

One of the functions of the CMN is to take in new sensory information, categorize its importance, and integrate it with previously stored knowledge. Then, the organism needs

to determine what is personally relevant and filter out irrelevant information. The brain structures that monitor relations with the outside world and assess what known, dangerous, or gratifying (based on the traumist's hypotheses, beliefs system, and memory) coexisting together in interdependent but also hierarchical ways (Panksepp, 1998). Together, these structures need to "formulate" an appropriate plan of action following the meaningful interpretation of an incoming signal. As the CNS does this, it needs to attend to both short-term and long-term consequences of the anticipated action, which is clearly a control function (Danziger, 1999). After initiating an appropriate response and the challenge is gone, the organism needs to shift its attention. Finally, people need to be able to engage in sustained activities without being distracted by irrelevant stimuli.

A century ago William James noted that the power of the intellect is determined by people's perceptual processing style. The ability to comprehend (group, hold together, take hold of—from the Latin *comprehendere*) depends on stimulus sampling and the formation of schematic representations of reality (Pritchard, 1991). The organism needs to learn from experience and entertain a range of alternatives without becoming disengaged or without having to act on them. In order to do this, it needs to learn to discriminate relevant from irrelevant stimuli and only select what is appropriate for achieving its goals. Much of the evolution of the human brain has centered on developing the capacity to form highly complex mental images and collaborative social relationships that allow complex organization of social systems. In order to participate in this large collaborative social system, the organism needs to integrate its own immediate self-interest with a capacity to appreciate and to adhere to complex social rules (Donald, 1991).

People with PTSD have serious problems in carrying out all of these functions. There are qualitatively significant differences between the ways people with PTSD sample and categorize experience and the ways in which nontraumatized people do (van der Kolk and Foa, 1990; McFarlane et al., 1998). Failure to comprehend the traumalizing experience (i.e., to disengage) plays a critical role in making a stressful experience traumatic (van der Kolk et al., 1996a). People with PTSD tend to overinterpret danger, have trouble experiencing pleasure (engaging in ordinary tasks, have difficulty staying focused) until a job is finished, they often feel it difficult collaborating with others in situations that require maintaining multiple perspectives.

PSYCHOPHYSIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF TRAUMA

Posttraumatic stress disorder is not an inevitable outcome of stress. Only about 25 percent of individuals who have been exposed to a potential traumatic stressor develop PTSD (Foa and Cashman, 1993). Hence, the central question regarding the biology of PTSD is how to account for the failure of the organism to establish its homeostasis and return to its pretrauma state. Steele (2002) has pointed out that understanding the biological responses that occurred during the traumatic event does not necessarily address the biology of PTSD. Rather, the central issue appears to be why some people recover and others do not.

It also has become clear that PTSD is not an issue of simple conditioning. Many people who have been exposed to an extreme disaster, but who do not suffer from PTSD, become distressed when they are once again confronted with the memory of the tragedy. The critical issue in PTSD is that the stimuli that cause people to rereact may not be conditioned except. A variety of triggers not directly related to the traumatic experience may serve to precipitate intense reactions. (Pitman et al., 1991).

Abnormal psychophysiological reactions in PTSD occur on two very different levels: (1) in response to specific reminders of the trauma and (2) in response to intense, but neutral, stimuli, such as loud noises, signifying a loss of stimulus discrimination.

Conditional Responses to Specific Stimuli

Most PTSD sufferers have heightened physiological arousal in response to sounds, images, and thoughts related to specific traumatic incidents, while others have decreased arousal. Initial research on acute trauma victims found that people with PTSD, but not controls, respond to reminders with significant increases in heart rate, skin conductance, and blood pressure (Pitman et al., 1987). The elevated sympathetic responses to reminders of traumatic experiences that happened years, and sometimes decades, ago illustrate the intensity and long-lasting ways which those tragic imprints continue to affect current experience (Pitman et al., 1987). Foa and his colleagues (1986) have shown that life events play a critical role in the first episodes of major affective disorders but become less pertinent in precipitating subsequent occurrences. This capacity of triggers with diminishing strength to produce the same response over time is called *extinction*. About one third of chronically traumatized people respond to reminders of their past with decreased arousal. They appear to respond primarily with a parasympathetic reaction. This population has good and little selective memory.

Medications that decrease autonomic arousal, such as β -adrenergic blockers, clonidine and benzodiazepines, tend to decrease traumatic intrusions, while drugs that stimulate autonomic arousal may precipitate visual images and affect states associated with prior traumatic experiences in people with PTSD, but not in controls. For example, in patients with PTSD the injection of drugs such as lactate (Raskin et al., 1987) and tyramine (Southwick et al., 1989) tend to precipitate panic attacks, flashback-related reliving experiences of earlier trauma, or both. In our own laboratory, approximately 20 percent of PTSD subjects responded with a flashback of a traumatic experience when they were presented with aromatic sterile stimuli.

Hypersensitivity to Nontraumatic Stimuli: Loss of Stimulus Discrimination

Trauma may result in permanent neural changes that have a negative effect on learning, habituation, and stimulus discrimination. The effects of some of these neural changes do not depend on actual exposure to reminders of the trauma for expression. The abnormal startle response (ASR) characteristic of PTSD is one example of this phenomenon. Several studies have demonstrated abnormalities in habituation to the

ASR in PTSD (e.g., Orritz and Pyron, 1999). Interestingly, people who previously met the criteria for PTSD, but no longer do so now, continue to show failure of habituation of the ASR (van der Kolk et al., unpublished data; Praman et al., unpublished data).

The failure to habituate to acoustic stimuli suggests that traumatized people have difficulty evaluating anxiety stimuli and modulating appropriate levels of physiological arousal. Thus, the problem that people with PTSD have with properly integrating memories of the trauma, leading to get stuck in a continuous reliving of the past, is manifested physiologically in the misinterpretation of innocuous stimuli as potential threats. To compensate, they tend to shut down. However, the price for shutting down is decreased involvement in ordinary, everyday life.

Loss of Attentional Regulation

Attentional self-regulation involves an interconnected collection of neural patterns that maintain bodily processes and that represent, moment by moment, the state of the organism (Grossman, 1999). The immediate response to a traumatic experience involves dysregulation of arousal, with (a) exaggerated startle response, (b) over- or under-arousal physiological and emotional responses, (c) difficulty falling or staying asleep, and (d) dysregulation of eating, with lack of attention to needs for food and liquid. In people who develop PTSD, this pattern of dysregulated arousal persists.

Once people develop PTSD, they suffer from a bidirectional dysregulation at the brain stem level (Salter et al., 2001). The regulatory processes of the brainstem involve the noradrenergic activating system, the origin of the sympathetic nervous system, as well as two branches of the parasympathetic system, innervated by the vagus nerve: the dorsal vagal system and the ventral vagus (Fergus et al., 1999). Activation of the ascending reticular activating system stimulates attentional systems, the thalamus and cerebral cortex. The hyper- and hypoarousal seen in traumatized individuals likely involve excesses of sympathetic and parasympathetic activity, leading to a breakdown of attentional systems commonly seen in traumatized people who develop PTSD. Psychometric dissociation, that is, a breakdown of the capacity for focus and attention, at the level of the brainstem has been found to be a powerful predictor for the long-term development of PTSD (Shalev, 1996).

Currently, power spectral analysis (PSA) of heart rate variability (HRV) provides the best reliable means of measuring the interaction of sympathetic and parasympathetic tone, that is, of brainstem regulatory integrity. Standardized heart rate analysis of PTSD patients at rest has demonstrated a baseline autonomic hyperaroused state in these patients. They have lower resting HRV, compared to controls, which suggests increased sympathetic and decreased parasympathetic tone (Cohen et al., 2000a). Individuals with PTSD have less vagal control over their heart rate in response to a mental arithmetic challenge, compared with controls. While about two thirds of PTSD patients respond to personalized trauma scripts with increased heart rates (Pitman et al., 1987), at least one study found that PTSD patients, unlike panic disorder patients and controls, failed to respond to reminders of their trauma with increases in heart rate and low-frequency components of HRV (Cohen et al., 2000a). In our study, traumatized

subjects who did not develop PTSD exhibited significant autonomic response to a reminder of their trauma, while PTSD patients showed almost no autonomic response to the recollection of the triggering stressful event. Interestingly, the PTSD patients demonstrated a comparable degree of autonomic dysregulation at rest as the control subjects' reaction to a painful stimulus. They reacted to ordinary stimuli the way others reacted to reminders of traumatic incidents. One possible explanation for this phenomenon is that PTSD patients experience or great a degree of autonomic hyperactivation at rest that they are unable to modulate a further stress response to reminders of their trauma (Cohen et al., 1998). A recent study found that the HRV parameters that indicate autonomic dysregulation, which characterizes PTSD patients at rest, are normalized in responding patients by use of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) (Cohen et al., 2000a).

Hormonal Response in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder

In a well-functioning person, stress produces rapid and pronounced hormonal responses. However, chronic and persistent stress inhibits the effectiveness of the stress response and induces dysregulation. PTSD develops following exposure to events that overwhelm the individual's capacity to regulate homeostasis. Instead of returning to baseline, there is a progressive blunting of the individual's stress response. Initially only intense stress is accompanied by the release of endogenous, stress-responsive hormones, such as cortisol, epinephrine, norepinephrine (NE), vasopressin, oxytocin, and endogenous opioid. In PTSD even minor reminders of the trauma may precipitate a full-blown neuroendocrine stress reaction. It permanently alters how an organism deals with its environment on a day-to-day basis, and it interferes with how it copes with subsequent acute stress.

Early stress can alter the development of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis, hypothalamic and extrahypothalamic corticotropin-releasing hormone, neuropeptide, and gamma-aminobutyric acid/benzodiazepine receptors. Stress has also been shown to produce structural and functional alterations in brain regions similar to those seen in adults with depression. Emerging data suggest, however, that the long-term effects of early stress can be moderated by genetic factors and the quality of the subsequent caregiving environment (Kaufman et al., 2000).

A review of the neurobiological findings in PTSD to date shows very specific abnormalities in this disorder, compared with other psychiatric problems. The most prominent of these abnormalities appear to be in the HPA axis. PTSD patients show evidence of an enhanced negative feedback inhibition characterized by an exaggerated cortisol response to dexamethasone, an increased number of glucocorticoid receptors, and lower basal cortisol levels (Foa et al., 1998). These findings contrast with the blunted cortisol response to dexamethasone, the decreased number of glucocorticoid receptors, and the increased basal cortisol levels described in major depression. Women with a history of childhood abuse and a current major depressive diagnosis exhibited a more than six-fold greater adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH) response to stress than age-matched controls (Heim et al., 2000). These results show that cortisol basically

functions as an "antiterror" hormone. Through negative feedback inhibition, cortisol acts on the pituitary, hypothalamus, hippocampus, and amygdala sites initially responsible for the stimulation of cortisol release. Once the acute stress is over the HPA axis activates negative feedback inhibition, leading to the restoration of basal hormone levels (Volkow, 2002). Simultaneous activation of catecholamines and glucocorticoids stimulates active coping behaviors, while increased arousal in the presence of low glucocorticoid levels may provoke unthematized fight-or-flight reactions.

Two prospective, longitudinal biological studies of trauma survivors confirm the notion that individuals with a low initial cortisol response to stress are most vulnerable to develop PTSD. Both studies examined the cortisol response to trauma within hours after the trauma occurred. In the first (Bremner et al., 1996) the cortisol response to motor vehicle accidents was measured in persons appearing in the emergency room in the immediate aftermath (usually within 1- or 2-hr) of the trauma. Six months later, subjects were evaluated for the presence or absence of psychiatric disorder. In subjects who had developed PTSD the cortisol response right after the motor vehicle accident was significantly lower than the cortisol response of those who subsequently developed major depression. Resnick et al. (1997) collected blood samples from 20 acute rape victims and measured their cortisol response in the emergency room. Three months later, a prior trauma history was taken, and the subjects were evaluated for the presence of PTSD. Victims with a prior history of sexual abuse were significantly more likely to have developed PTSD by 3 months following the rape than were rape victims who had not developed PTSD. Cortisol levels shortly after the rapes were correlated with histories of prior assaults. The mean initial cortisol level of individuals with a prior assault history was 19 pg/ml, compared to 30 pg/ml in individuals without. These findings can be interpreted to mean either that prior exposure to traumatic events results in a blunted cortisol response to subsequent trauma or in a quicker return of cortisol to baseline following stress.

Most studies of catecholamine function in PTSD support chronic increased activation. There is also evidence for distinct changes in the hypothalamic-pituitary-thyroid and the hypothalamic-pituitary-gonadal systems (Volkow, 1998), as well as in the cycloporins opioid response to reminders-of-pastoral trauma (van der Kolk et al., 1990; Pitman et al., 1998). Finally, there is considerable evidence for a host of somatic problems in the wake of PTSD, including alterations in immune function (Wolmer et al., 1995).

Intragenerational Trauma Isolation

In a study of risk factors for the development of PTSD, Tschida and her colleagues examined the association between cortisol and PTSD in children of holocaust survivors. Low cortisol levels were significantly associated with both PTSD in parents and lifetime PTSD in subjects, whereas having a current psychiatric diagnosis other than PTSD was relatively, but nonsignificantly, associated with higher cortisol levels. Offspring with both parental PTSD and lifetime PTSD had the lowest cortisol levels of all study groups. They concluded that parental PTSD is associated with low cortisol levels in

offspring, even in the absence of lifetime PTSD in the offspring. They suggested that low cortisol levels in PTSD may constitute a vulnerability marker related to parental PTSD as well as a state-related characteristic associated with acute or chronic PTSD symptoms (Yehuda et al., 2006).

Disintegration of Experience Accompanying PTSD

In a series of studies we demonstrated that memories of trauma initially need to have four autobiographical elements: When PTSD patients have their flashbacks, the trauma is re-lived as isolated sensory, emotional, and memory implants, without much of a storyline. We have shown this in victims of childhood abuse (van der Kolk and Foa, 1995), assault, and accidents in adulthood (van der Kolk et al., 1997) and in patients who gained awareness during surgical procedures (van der Kolk et al., 2000). These studies support the notion that traumatic memories result from a failure of the CNS to synthesize the sensations related to the event into an integrated semantic memory. While most patients with PTSD construct a narrative of their trauma over time, it is characteristic of PTSD that sensory elements of the trauma itself continue to intrude as flashbacks and nightmares, in states of consciousness where the trauma is re-lived, unintegrated with an overall sense of current time, place, and sense of self. Because traumatic memories are so fragmented, it seems reasonable to speculate that extreme emotional arousal leads to a failure of the CNS to synthesize the sensations related to the trauma into an integrated whole.

These observations suggest that in PTSD the brain's natural ability to integrate experience breaks down. A large variety of CNS structures have been implicated in such integrative processes: (1) the parahippocampal gyrus integrates information between different cortical association areas (Domesic, 1999), (2) the hippocampus encodes a cognitive map that allows for the categorization of experience, connecting it with other autobiographical information (O'Keefe and Burgess, 2003), (3) the corpus callosum allows for the transfer of information by both hemispheres (Joseph, 1998), integrating emotional and cognitive aspects of the experience, (4) the cingulate gyrus, which is thought to play a role both as amplifier and filter, helps integrate the emotional and cognitive components of the mind (Devinsky et al., 1995), and (5) various prefrontal areas, where sensations and impulses are "held in mind" and compared with previous information to plan appropriate actions. Recent neuroimaging studies of patients with PTSD have suggested a role for all of these structures in the neurobiology of PTSD, though, at this point, many of the findings are quite variable and at times contradictory.

LESSONS FROM NEUROIMAGING

Symptom Provocation Studies

Rapidly evoking brain neuroimaging techniques such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) and positron emission tomography (PET) have proven useful instruments to

explore the pathogenesis and pathophysiology of PTSD. Structural abnormalities in PTSD found with MRI include hippocampal white matter lesions and decreased hippocampal volume. These abnormalities may reflect primary vulnerability to develop PTSD or they may be a consequence of traumatic exposure. PTSD, unlike PTSD opposite, Rauch, van der Kolk, and colleagues conducted the first fMRI scan study of patients with PTSD (Rauch et al., 1996). When PTSD subjects were exposed to vivid, detailed narratives of their own traumatic experiences, they demonstrated increased metabolic activity only in the right hemisphere, specifically, in the areas that are most associated with emotional appraisal: the amygdala, insula, and the medial temporal lobe. During exposure to their traumatic scripts, there was a significant decrease in activation of the left inferior frontal area—Broca's area, which is responsible for motor speech. Most neuroimaging studies have found activation of the amygdala cortex (which possibly plays an inhibitory role in response to trauma-related stimuli) in individuals with PTSD, but others have found decreases, even while using similar activation paradigms.

Amygdala Effects

It is hardly surprising that many (though not all) neuroimaging studies of PTSD find increased amygdala activation in response to traumatic reminders. A large body of animal research, mostly in rodents, has established the importance of the amygdala for emotional processes (Cahill and McGaugh, 1998; LeDoux, 1996). The amygdala initiates the initial interpretation of the nature of a particular stress and initiates the process of activating nonsympathetic and nonsomatotropin fear circuitries (LeDoux, 1992). The time frame for this response is several milliseconds. In this very short time, projections from the amygdala to the reticularis pontis nodulus/pontis will potentiate the startle response and initiate defensive behaviors that do not require direct action of the sympathetic nervous system. Projections from the amygdala to the lateral hypothalamus and then to the paraventricular nucleus (parasympathetic nervous system) and corticosteroid responses. One of the most immediate responses to stress is the coordinated sympathetic discharge that causes increases in heart rate and blood pressure, initially described by Walter Cannon as the fight-or-flight reaction. Exposure to traumatic reminders provokes autonomic activation in about two-thirds of patients with PTSD (e.g., Pitman et al., 1987), and this is likely mediated by activation of the amygdala and related structures.

Projections from the amygdala to the solitary tract initiate the parasympathetic response that controls autonomic arousal but operates independently of the sympathetic nervous system. Projections from the central amygdala to the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis initiate the HPA axis response. By way of these various connections, the amygdala translates sensory stimuli into emotional and hormonal signals, thereby initiating and controlling emotional responses.

Numerous studies have reported activation of the amygdala during early phases of memory conditions, showing that the amygdala is necessary for the establishment of conditioned fear (e.g., LaBar et al., 1998). Most of these studies have focused on face perception, demonstrating that the amygdala is important for the recognition of

case of threat or danger. For example, the amygdala is activated in response to facial expressions of fear, compared with neutral, happy, or other neutral faces, even when people are exposed to mask-like faces that may not consciously perceived (Whalen et al., 1998). Whether the amygdala is necessary for the expression of fear and whether the amygdala is the actual locus of where the learned information is stored are still unclear (see Freedman and Cahill, 2004; Flexner and LeDoux, 1999). Since Bremner et al. (1996) observed rapid habituation of the amygdala response, and since some dissociating studies of PTSD subjects fail to find amygdala activation during symptom provocation paradigm, it is likely that the amygdala has a time-limited function in the stream of affective information processing.

Hippocampus in PTSD

The hippocampus plays a significant role in the capacity to consciously recall a previous event, that is, in declarative memory. Its role in emotion and affective style has only recently started to be explored. The hippocampus plays a significant role in context-dependent memory (O'Keeffe and Nadel, 2000; Pisselow, 2004). When an animal is exposed to a cue-unconditioning procedure, where a discrete cue is paired with an aversive outcome, the animal also learns to associate the context in which the learning occurs with the aversive outcome. Lesions to the hippocampus abolish this context-dependent form of memory but have no effect on learning cue-punishment contingencies (Everitt, 2001). The high density of glucocorticoid receptors in this structure supports the idea that the hippocampus may play an important role in emotion regulation. Glucocorticoids have been shown to have a powerful impact on hippocampal neurons (Cahill and McGaugh, 1998; McGaugh, 1998). Doseous administration of large doses of hydrocortisone to humans impairs explicit memory, while more moderate amounts of cortisol may facilitate memory (e.g., Kirschbaum et al., 1996).

A number of PTSD studies have reported significantly decreased hippocampal volume in patients with PTSD (e.g., Bremner 1997, 1999; Quirin et al., 1999) and depression. For example, Bremner et al. (1990) compared hippocampal volume in adult survivors of childhood abuse to matched controls. PTSD patients had a 12 percent smaller left hippocampal volume relative to the matched controls ($p < .05$), without smaller volumes of hippocampus (region cingulate, caudate, and temporal lobes), while Quirin and her colleagues found both significantly smaller left and right hippocampi in combat veterans with PTSD compared to combat controls without PTSD and normal controls. However, several well-controlled studies have failed to replicate these findings (Org, De Bellis et al., 1999; Russo et al., 2002). In the studies in which hippocampal atrophy has been found, investigators have proposed that excessively high levels of cortisol caused hippocampal cell death, resulting in hippocampal atrophy.

All this time it appears that smaller hippocampal volume is not a necessary risk factor for developing PTSD and does not occur within 6 months of experiencing the disaster. However, it is likely that subjects with long-standing PTSD and particularly those with histories of severe childhood trauma may have smaller hippocampus. These subjects also exhibit neuropsychological abnormalities that can be associated with impaired

hippocampal functioning, such as difficulty learning from negative experiences, despite extensive emotional and biological reactivity to reminders of their trauma.

Bauchens et al. (2003) have proposed that the impact of hippocampal brain damage in psychopathology may be most apparent in the processing of emotional information and that, in individuals with compromised hippocampal function, the normal context-regulatory role of this brain region would be impaired. Consequently, individuals with hippocampal damage would be prone to display emotional behavior in inappropriate contexts. Indeed, PTSD does not involve the display of abnormal emotions per se, but the presentation of normal emotions in inappropriate contexts. Patients with PTSD behave in ways that are reminiscent of animals with hippocampal lesions, in being unable to modulate emotional responses in a context-appropriate manner.

Role of the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC)

Numerous studies that have used neuroimaging methods to probe patterns of brain activation during the arousal of emotion have reported that the ACC activates in response to emotion. Recent work (e.g., Bush et al., 2000; Whalen et al., 1998) has started to distinguish between cognitive and affective substrates of the ACC, based on the location of activation in response to cognitive versus emotional tasks. For example, dorsal ACC activation is consistently found in response to the classical Stroop task, compared to the more anterior activation to an emotional Stroop task.

Every activation study of PTSD subjects finds involvement of the cingulate. However, in some studies there is increased (Barlow, 1999a; Misiak et al., 2001; Lanius et al., 2001) and in others decreased (Buckley, 2000) activation. The mere process of activating emotion in the anterior cingulate in a laboratory environment might activate the anterior cingulate, including exposure to the stressful laboratory environment. Bush, Carter et al. (1999) have suggested that ACC activation results in a call for further processing by other brain circuits to address the conflict that has been detected. In most people, automatic mechanisms of emotion regulation are likely involved to dampen strong emotion that may be activated in the laboratory. The PTSD neuroimaging studies support that many traumatized subjects are less capable of activating the ACC in response to emotionally arousing stimuli. In our previous outcome study of PTSD (Liu et al., 1999), we found increased ACC activation after effective treatment.

Frontal Cortex

In recent years, neuropsychological investigations of PTSD have begun to shed light on cognitive related deficits in PTSD, and cognitive neuroscience studies have suggested the neural bases of these deficits. For example, using an array of attention and memory tests, Masterling (1998) found a pattern of generalized difficulties in cognitive and behavioral domains among combat veterans with PTSD compared to combat veterans without PTSD. Work in rats and monkeys in a variety of neuroscience laboratories indicates that stress response impairs cognitive functions dependent on prefrontal circuitry. Arnsen et al. (1991) used repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS)

of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) to produce temporary functional lesions that resulted in worsened performance on a working memory task; these researchers simultaneously used PET to demonstrate that performance decrements caused by rTMS were associated with decreased regional cerebral blood flow in the DLPFC.

The prefrontal structures implicated in PTSD include the left inferior prefrontal region, or Broca's area, and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Decreased activation in Broca's area in response to script-driven imagery or remembering was found in the first neuroimaging study of PTSD (Shin et al., 1999) and has been replicated in two subsequent PET studies by Shin and colleagues (1997, 1999). Decreased activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; Brodmann's areas 9/46) has been found in a functional MRI study of subjects with PTSD (Lutje et al., 2002).

Knussey, Shaw et al. (2002) used spatial distributed brain systems in PTSD patients and matched controls during performance of a working memory task. They found that the patient group was characterized by relatively more activation in the bilateral inferior parietal lobes and the left precentral gyrus than the control group, and less activation in the inferior medial frontal lobe, bilateral middle frontal gyrus, and right inferior temporal gyrus. Their procedure provided direct evidence that working memory updating was abnormal in PTSD patients relative to matched controls.

Lutje et al. (2002) found that PTSD subjects showed significantly less activation of the Brodmann, and the ventral frontal gyrus (Brodmann's area 18/11), than did the comparison subjects upon trauma exposure. In women with child abuse histories, Resnick et al. (1997a) found increases in blood flow in portions of anterior prefrontal cortex (superior and middle frontal gyrus—areas 8 and 9).

Decreased dorsolateral frontal cortex activation in response to trauma scripts provides yet another level of understanding why people with PTSD plunge into re-experiencing their trauma with limited consciousness that they are simply reconsolidating elements of experiences belonging to the past. In our treatment outcome study, subjects showed increased activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex following effective treatment (Levin et al., 1999).

A study by Carter et al. (1999) demonstrated that, consistent with a role in cognitive control, the DLPFC is more active on trials requiring inhibition of an automatic (word reading) response. Breakdowns of cognitive control in PTSD often occur in the context of "cognivitism"—between processing external information and responses appropriate to the situation, on the one hand, and processing internally generated posttraumatic information and automatic but maladaptive posttraumatic responses. More generally, the DLPFC has been implicated in capacities for deliberate reflection, problem-solving, planning, and response selection. Thus impaired DLPFC function in the presence of posttraumatic "triggers" may cause traumatized people to experience situations and respond to them as if they were "back there" in the trauma.

Davidson and his colleagues have proposed that one of the key components of affective style is the capacity to regulate negative emotion and, specifically to decrease the duration of negative affect once it arises (Davidson, 1996; Davidson and Lewis, 1999). Their studies suggest that the connections between the PFC and amygdala play

an important role in this regulatory process. They found that subjects with greater baseline levels of left prefrontal activation are better able to voluntarily suppress negative affect (Jackson et al., 2000). When subjects voluntarily regulate negative emotions, this is reflected in changes in amygdala recorded signal intensity.

Hemispheric Lateralization in PTSD

Both Rauch et al. (1996) and Trichter and his group (2002) found marked hemispheric lateralization in PTSD subjects who were exposed either to a negative memory or to a personalized trauma script. This suggests that there is differential hemisphere involvement in the processing of traumatic memories. The right hemisphere, which developmentally comes "online" earlier than the left hemisphere (Slatkin, 1994), is involved in the expression and comprehension of global nonverbal emotional communication (use of voice, facial expression, visual-spatial communication), and allows for a dynamic and holistic integration across sensory modalities (Davidson, 1998). This hemisphere is particularly integrated with the amygdala, which assigns emotional significance to incoming stimuli and helps regulate the autonomic and hormonal responses to that information. While the right hemisphere is specialized in detecting emotional reactions, it has only a rudimentary capacity to communicate analytically, in symbolic systems, or by reason (Slatkin, 2003).

In contrast, the left hemisphere, which mediates verbal communication and organizes problem-solving tasks into a well-ordered set of operations and processes information in a sequential fashion (Davidson, 1998), seems to be less active in PTSD. It is in the area of categorization and labeling of internal states that people with PTSD seem to have particular problems (van der Kolk and McFarlane, 1998). The failure of left-hemisphere function during states of extreme arousal may contribute to the devaluation and depersonalization reported in acute PTSD (Kutner et al., 1995; Shalev et al., 1998).

IMPLICATIONS FOR TREATMENT

For over a century it has been understood that traumatic experiences can have indelible emotional memories. Contemporary studies of how the amygdala is activated by extreme experiences dovetail with the laboratory observation that "traumatic memory may be forever" (Lofgreen et al., 1991). The accumulated body of research suggests that patients with PTSD suffer from impaired cortical control over subcortical areas responsible for learning, habituation, and stimulus discrimination. Hence, current thinking is that indelible subcortical emotional responses are held in check to varying degrees by cortical and hippocampal activity, and that delayed onset PTSD is the expression of subcortically mediated emotional responses that escape cortical, and possibly hippocampal, inhibitory control (van der Kolk and van der Hart, 1991; Foa et al., 1990; Shalev et al., 1992).

The early neuroimaging studies of PTSD showed that, during exposure to a traumatic script, there was decreased Broca's area functioning and increased activation of

the right hemisphere (Bremner et al., 1998). This means that it is difficult for a traumatized individual to verbalize precisely what he or she is experiencing, particularly when he or she becomes emotionally aroused. It is likely that causal or physiological arousal plays a role in the failure to "process" the trauma, causing fragments of memories to be activated in response to biometric reminders. These activate neural networks that contain the "memory" of the traumatic event, that is, the sensations and emotions related to the trauma, often without much verbal or symbolic representation of the event. When a traumatic memory is activated, the brain is "tuning" its experience, rather than processing it.

A relative decrease in left-hemispheric activation during the reliving of the trauma (Krauth et al., 2006; Toulou et al., 2002) explains why traumatic memories often are experienced as timeless and ego-alien. The part of the brain necessary for preserving memory and for the cognitive analysis of experiences (the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) is not properly activated (Lutje et al., 2001). An individual may feel, see, or hear the sensory elements of the traumatic experience, but he or she may be physiologically prevented from being able to translate this experience into communicable language. During flashbacks, victims may suffer from speechless tics in which they may be literally "out of touch with their feelings." Physiologically, they may respond as if they are being traumatized again. Particularly when victims experience depersonalization and dissociation, they cannot "own" what is happening and thus cannot take steps to do anything about it.

In order to help traumatized individuals process their traumatic memories, it is critical that they gain enough distance from their sensory implants and unassociated sensations so that they can observe and analyze these sensations and emotions without becoming hypervigilant or engaging in avoidance measures. The somatosensory feedback model seems to be able to accomplish exactly that. Studies in our laboratory have shown that SSKs can help PTSD patients gain emotional distance from traumatic stimuli and make sense of their traumatic histories (van der Kolk et al., 1995).

The apparently relative decrease in left-hemisphere activation while reexperiencing the trauma suggests that it is important to help people with PTSD find a language in which they can refer to understand and communicate their experiences. It is possible that some of the newer body-oriented therapies, dialectical behavior therapy, or DBT (Linehan et al., 2006), van der Kolk, 2002) may yield benefits that traditional verbally based therapies may lack because they do not require that the victim be able to verbally communicate the details of his or her experience.

Research has shown that making meaning—by simply talking about the traumatic experience—is usually not enough help people put their emotional responses behind them. Traumatized individuals need to have experiences that directly contradict the emotional helplessness and physical paralysis that accompany trauma experiences.

Phase-Oriented Treatment

All treatment of traumatized individuals needs to be phased according to the degree of involuntary intrusion of the trauma and the individual's capacities to deal with

inseparable. For over a century, clinicians have advocated the application of phase-oriented treatment consisting of (1) establishing a diagnosis, including prioritizing the range of problems suffered by the individual; and (2) designing a realistic phase-oriented treatment plan, consisting of:

1. Stabilization, including identification of feelings by gaining mastery over trauma-related somatic states of hyper- and hypoarousal.
2. Discontinuation of traumatic memories and responses.
3. Integration of traumatic personal schemes.

In the treatment of single-incident trauma, it is often possible to move quickly from one phase to the next; in complex cases of chronic interpersonal abuse clinicians often need to reformulate stabilization (van der Kolk et al., 1996).

In order to overcome the effects of physical hyperarousal and numbing, it is critical for traumatised people to find ways to identify bodily sensations and to name emotional states. Knowing what one feels and allowing oneself to experience uncomfortable sensations and emotions is essential in learning how to cope with them. Being able to name and tolerate sensations, feelings, and experiences gives people the capacity to "sense" what they feel. Being "in touch" with oneself (a function of an active medial frontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex) seems to be indispensable for mastery and for having the mental flexibility to contrast and compare, and to imagine a range of alternative experiences that only a recurrence of the trauma.

This capacity needs to be present before people are ready to be exposed to their traumatic memories. Dissociation, an annulation of the traumatic imprint in autobiographical memory, is not possible as long as intense emotions overwhelm the victim, just as they did at the time of the original trauma. When traumatised individuals feel out of control and unable to modulate their distress, they are vulnerable to pathological self-harming behaviors, such as substance abuse, binge eating, self-injury, or clinging to potentially dangerous partners (van der Kolk et al., 1996).

With the advent of effective medications, such as the serotonin reuptake blockers (e.g., van der Kolk et al., 1996), medications increasingly have taken the place of teaching people skills to deal with uncomfortable physical sensations. As long as the trauma is experienced with conditioned physiological responses and "fight-or-flight," victims tend to systems to react to conditioned stimuli as a source of trauma, without the capacity to define alternative courses of action. However, when the triggers are identified and the individual gains the capacity to attack words to somatic experiences, these lose some of their force (Ehlers and Peterson, 1992). Thus, the task of therapy is to both create a capacity to be mindful of current experience, and to create symbolic representations of past traumatic experiences with the goal of uncoupling physical sensations from trauma-based emotional responses, thereby lessening the associated terror.

Affective hyperarousal can effectively be treated with the judicious use of serotonin reuptake blockers and emotion regulation training, which consists of identifying, labeling, and altering emotional states. Clinically, patients learn to observe, rather than

avoiding, the way they feel, and to plan alternative coping strategies. For traumatic reminders to lose their emotional valence, patients need to able to experience new information that contradicts the rigid traumatic memory, such as feeling physically safe, while thinking about the event, not feeling they are to blame, and feeling able to cope with similar events in the future. The critical issue in treatment is exposure to traumatic insights, and at the same time experiencing sensations (of mastery, safety, etc.) that are incompatible with the fear and terror associated with the trauma.

Flooding and exposure are by no means exclusive treatment techniques. Exposure to information consistent with a traumatic memory can be reported to strengthen anxiety (i.e., avoidance) and thereby aggravate PTSD symptomatology. Flooding would may make the PTSD patient worse by interfering with the acquisition of new information. When that occurs, the traumatic memory will not be corrected, but merely confirmed instead of promoting habituation. It may accidentally foster sensitization.

CONCLUSIONS

The modern understanding of trauma as an etiological factor in mental disorders goes back only to about 1980. During this time there has been an explosion of knowledge about how experience shapes the central nervous system and the formation of the self. Developments in the neurosciences have played a major significant contributions to our understanding of how the brain is shaped by experience, and how life itself continues to transform the ways biology is organized. The study of trauma has been one of the most fertile areas within the disciplines of psychiatry and psychology in helping to develop a deeper understanding of the interrelationships between emotional, cognitive, social, and biological factors that shape human development. Starting with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in adults, but expanding into early attachment and coping with overwhelming experiences in childhood, our field has discovered how certain experiences can "set" psychological expectations and biological sensitivity. Research in these areas has opened up entirely new insights in how extreme experiences throughout the life cycle can have profound effects on memory, affect regulation, biological stress modulation, and interpersonal relationships. These findings, in the context of the development of a range of new therapy approaches, are beginning to open up entirely new perspectives on how traumatized individuals can be helped to overcome their past.

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NATURE AND TREATMENT OF PANIC DISORDER

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DEFINING THE SYNDROME OF PANIC DISORDER

The syndrome now called panic disorder was first described in the medical literature in 1950, by Raymond Peacock (1950a), under the term anxiety neurosis. His description differed from the currently accepted one in *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM IV-TR)* (APA, 2000), in that he included features of the illness other than panic attacks, including general irritability, anxious expectation, rudimentary anxiety attacks (which bear a similarity to our current conceptualization of limited symptom attacks), vertigo, phobias and agoraphobia, nausea and other gastrointestinal symptoms, and paresthesias.

In the DSM IV-TR description of panic disorder, recurrent and unexpected panic attacks are the central feature, along with persistent worry about having another attack or the consequences of the attacks, or a change in behavior in reaction to the attacks. Panic attacks are carefully defined with regard to time (abrupt development, reaching a

paink within 1 h (acute, periodic) and emotional quality (intense fear or discomfort). At least four of the following typical panic symptoms must be present: pounding heart or accelerated heart rate, sweating, trembling or shaking, sensations of shortness of breath or smothering, feeling of choking, chest pain or discomfort, nausea or abdominal distress, feeling dizzy, lightheaded, unsteady or faint, derealization (feelings of unreality) or depersonalization (feeling detached from oneself), fear of losing control or going crazy, loss of dying, paresthesias (numbness or tingling sensations), and chills or hot flashes. Panic disorder should be classified as either with or without agoraphobia, defined as fear of situations from which escape may be difficult or embarrassing or in which help may not be available in the event of a panic attack. The individual either avoids these situations, endures them with anxiety about having another panic attack, or can tolerate them only if a companion is present.

Many clinicians have expressed concerns about limitations of the DSM system of classification, including difficulty assessing early onset, atypical, and diminished frequency symptoms of the disorder. In addition, symptoms that are at a subthreshold level for the disorder have been difficult to classify and appear to affect functional outcome while causing ongoing functional impairment. A group of researchers and clinicians (Cassano et al., 1997, 1998) have proposed an alternate diagnostic system for panic spectrum disorder that allows assessment of these various symptoms. The classification system is similar to the description of anxiety nervous by Freud described above. These symptoms are described in terms of: panic symptoms, anxious expectation, phobic and avoidance features, need for reassurance, substance sensitivity, stress reactivity, and separation sensitivity and anxiety.

Panic symptoms in this classification include not just full-blown panic attacks but also limited symptom panic attacks and isolated panic symptoms that can lead to significant clinical impairment in the absence of panic attacks. Also included are less severe symptoms that can be associated with anxiety, such as numbness and diaphoresis. Anxious expectation includes anticipatory anxiety about the occurrence of panic attacks and a general state of alertness, including a sense of insecurity about one's physical and psychological integrity. Phobic and avoidance behavior may occur secondary to panic attacks or may precede the onset of panic disorder. Avoidance represents an effort to cope with panic symptoms or to reduce anticipatory anxiety. Avoidant behavior includes agoraphobia as well as a variety of phobias, including claustrophobia when associated with threats to breathing, and social avoidance to avoid fears of humiliation from panic symptoms.

Patients with panic disorder require a significant amount of reassurance due to their fears. In the view of Cassano et al. (1997, 1998), the significant relief of anxiety provided by such reassurance may lead to increasing intergenerational dependency. The patient can develop manipulative and dramatic behaviors in an effort to control reassurance from others. Other aspects of the panic spectrum include patients' high degree of sensitivity to panic attacks being triggered by substances, including medications, antidepressants, caffeine, thyroid hormones, drugs of abuse, as well as to a variety of homeopathic agents (Pihl and McElroy, 1993; Charnay et al., 1993; Dager et al., 1991; McCann and Ricouer, 1992; Neri and Lewon 1992). They also have a sensitivity

to withdrawal of substances. Stress sensitivity refers to patients' vulnerability to the impact of stressful events (Roth et al., 1992; Last et al., 1994; Wade et al., 1995). In such sensitive patients, normal daily stresses may trigger panic symptoms. Patients may ask others to help them avoid negative information to reduce their panic risk. Finally, as has been frequently used in the panic literature, but is not specifically incorporated in the DSM-IV-TR criteria for panic disorder, patients often demonstrate sensitivity to separation (Ginsburg and Klein, 1984; Daitch et al., 1986). Separation anxiety in childhood can aggregate the dependency on others for reassurance described above.

COURSE OF PANIC DISORDER

Panic disorder has been generally found to have a chronic, recurring course (Pollack and Orr, 1997; Pollack and Maser, 2000; Picard et al., 1995). There is often a persistence of subthreshold symptoms even in the absence of a DSM-IV-TR diagnosable disorder. In a naturalistic, 5-year study following 99 patients with panic disorder without any psychiatric comorbidity (Picard et al., 1995), even though full remission was achieved by only 10.3 percent of patients, while full resolution, sustained at 5 years only, occurred in 11 percent. Seventy-three percent of patients in this study experienced some improvement, but only 41 percent of these were still well at 5-year follow-up. On the other hand, many treatment outcome studies, particularly of cognitive-behavioral therapy, cite high rates of remission (Chadwick et al., 1991; Clark et al., 1984; Davis et al., 1995). It was the varying definitions of "remission" of panic disorder, ranging from a stateless view in which elimination of panic attacks signified remission, to a wider definition of panic disorder that included anxiety sensitivity, hypochondriacal and phobic concerns, and impairments in quality of life, that ultimately led to the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) Consensus Conference on Panic Disorder (Blane and Maser, 1994), in which the range of illness necessary to be measured by panic disorder outcome studies was defined.

In addition to a spectrum of anxiety symptoms, patients with panic disorder have a high rate of comorbid psychiatric disorders, many of which have been shown to negatively influence outcome, including degree of impairment and suicidality (Roy-Byrne et al., 2001). Comorbid depression has been cited as increasing the likelihood of a chronic, disabling illness (Roy-Byrne et al., 2000; Hetland et al., 1997). There is some data indicating that preceding panic disorder increases the subsequent risk for the development of major depression in both men and women, and that controlling for prior anxiety disorders accounts for 20 percent of the observed twofold increased incidence of major depression in women over men (Boszormenyi et al., 1995). The effect of comorbid psychiatric disorders on the course of panic disorder has yet to be adequately studied.

Panic patients experience tremendous distress and have been shown to have a high level of functional impairment as a result of this (Roy-Byrne et al., 2001). They report poor physical health, poor emotional health, a higher incidence of alcohol and drug abuse than normals, and a higher incidence of attempted suicide (Korenstein, 1997). Medical costs are high for patients with panic disorder, with half of all primary care

visits being precipitated by physical sensations associated with panic disorder, such as dizziness, fast palpitations, chest pain, dyspnea, and abdominal pain, as demonstrated by both epidemiological and retrospective studies (Safren, 1996). Patients with panic disorder account for 20 to 25 percent of all emergency room visits (Swanson et al., 1982; Weissman et al., 1989) and are 12.6 times more likely to visit emergency rooms than the general population (Markowitz et al., 1989).

Additionally, panic disorder has been found to co-occur with a variety of medical conditions, including mitral valve prolapse, cardiovascular, hypertension, uric acid-based syndrome, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and migraine (Gadher and Goren, 1996). Carey et al. (1992) found that the death rate in patients with panic disorder exceeded that of the general population. In their study, 20 percent of deaths in 113 female psychiatric inpatients with panic disorder followed up 15 years later were the result of suicide. Also in this study, men with panic disorder were found to have twice the risk of death due to cardiovascular disease than men in the general population.

The high mortality level in patients with panic disorder points to the importance of developing appropriate, focused treatment. As noted in the panic spectrum section, even lower levels of persistent symptoms can cause significant functional impairment and panic prognosis. Thus, strategies for treatment of panic disorder should aim for remission rather than simply symptom reduction.

BASIC MODELS OF THE ETIOLOGY OF PANIC DISORDER

Neurophysiological Models

Several lines of evidence support a neurophysiological basis for panic disorder, including genetic studies. The lithium medication hospital review (discussed in the next subsection below) has been interpreted to imply a neurophysiological etiology. Evidence for a genetic basis for panic disorder has also been derived from studies of twins that demonstrate a higher rate of concordance for panic in monozygous than dizygous twins (Torgerson, 1993; Kendler et al., 1993; Shaw et al., 1993).

Neurophysiological models of the etiology of panic disorder have developed primarily from animal models of brain functioning and studies of substances that provoke panic. The interpretation of these data by different theorists in developing models for panic will be described below. Neuroimaging studies are expected to be an increasingly important source of data.

An Overactivation Fear Network. Gorman et al. (2000) hypothesize that panic originates in an abnormally sensitive fear network, which includes the prefrontal cortex, insula, thalamus, amygdala, and amygdalar projections to brainstem and hypothalamus (Fig. 12.1). The central nucleus of the amygdala is thought to be the center of this network. Amygdalar projections to various sites appear to coordinate physiological and behavioral responses to danger, including the paraventricular nucleus (increased respiratory rate), hypothalamus (activation of the sympathetic nervous system, release of catecholamines), locus caeruleus (release of norepinephrine, increases in blood pressure




Figure 12.3. Neuromagnetic pathways of the fear network. (Reprinted from Herman et al. (2000), by permission of the American Psychological Association.)

and heart rate), and perisylvian gray region defensive behaviors). In fact, data from animal models suggest that stimulation of the amygdala produces a fear response that has significant similarities to a panic attack (LeDoux et al., 1989; Davis, 1997). Stimulation effective in treating panic disorder diminishes activity of the basolateral complex that receive input from the central nucleus of the amygdala.

The amygdala receives different input from brainstem structures and the sensory thalamus, which allow a rapid immediate response to danger, and from cortical regions involved in processing and evaluating sensory information. Neurocognitive deficits in cortical processing could result in misinterpretation of sensory information (fuzzy cues), and inappropriate activation of the fear network via misguided excitatory input to the amygdala. Gorman et al. (2000) and Ledoux (1996) postulate that psychotherapy may work by strengthening the ability of these cortical projections to assert greater control over behavioral and physical responses.

Cormier et al. (2005) interpret the data derived from substances that provide partial attacks in patients with panic disorder at a much greater rate than in healthy controls or in patients with other psychiatric disorders, as being, consistent with the serotonin 5-HT₂ network model. Rather than focusing on the specific biochemical impact of the various substances (serotonin, tyramine, noradrenaline, adrenalin, and others), they emphasize the biochemical disruptor of the various mechanisms of action. They therefore

possibly that these spots trigger panic by causing precipitous somatic distress, nonspecifically triggering the fear network.

An abnormally sensitive fear network may result from an inherited tendency to tendphobia, perhaps a nonrecognitive deficit, resulting in abnormal reactivity to or modulation of the fear network. Dimensions of early attachment and traumatic events in childhood and adulthood may lead to persistent changes in the stress system and fear networks. Gorman et al. (2001) speculate that a genetically based abnormality in the brain fear network may make the individual more susceptible to the emotional effects of trauma.

Autonomic Subception Alarm Model. Klein (1993) suggests an alternate model of a biological basis for panic disorder, a false suffocation alarm hypothesis. In this model, the brain is postulated to have an evolved suffocation alarm system that can be hyperreactive and can activate in the absence of an actual suffocation risk. In Klein's view this malice leads to an urge to flee, the onset of hyperventilation, shortness of breath, and panic. Panic, both spontaneous and carbon dioxide (CO_2) and lactate-induced, differs from a typical emergency fear response in that it includes shortness of breath as a symptom and does not activate the hypothalamo-pituitary adrenal (HPA) axis. Klein is therefore critical of cognitive theory and other literature that equate fear with panic, including Gorman's fear circuit model.

This debate recently focused on the interpretation of an experiment on susceptibility to CO_2 -induced panic in patients with various psychiatric diagnoses. Studies have shown that during inhalation of carbon dioxide, patients with panic and generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) are more likely to experience panic than healthy volunteers or patients with other psychiatric disorders (see Gorman et al., 2001). This susceptibility appears to decline after successful treatment of the panic disorder. The origins of this vulnerability could be secondary to specific abnormalities in the afferent neural pathways that respond to increased levels of CO_2 (Klein's suffocation monitor hypothesis) or to nonspecific somatic distress from CO_2 inhalation, including air hunger and breathlessness reminiscent of panic, triggering a central neural fear circuit.

Gorman et al. (2001) hoped to generate evidence with regard to these hypotheses by looking at ventilatory responses to CO_2 to see if an increase was specific to patients with panic disorder or was found in any patient experiencing panic attacks, regardless of diagnosis. Panic disorder and PMDD were found to have increased rates of panic attacks compared to controls and to patients with MDD. Measures of ventilatory response to 8 percent CO_2 , however, varied more with regard to whether a panic attack occurred than with diagnosis.

Thus, Gorman et al. (2001) conclude that there is nothing fundamentally abnormal about the ventilatory physiology of panic patients. This finding, in the view of these authors, suggests the importance of central brain circuits in panic disorder, rather than simply abnormalities in the pulmonary, peripheral, or nodal chemoreceptors. CO_2 stimulation triggers the fear circuit, including activation of the amygdala and its projection sites, in patients with panic disorder or in subjects who experience panic attacks.

In response to Gorham's study, Klein (2002) argues against Gorham et al.'s (2001) suggestion that CO₂ and lactate produce panic via homeostatic distress that induces fear, noting that other substances that trigger distress do not trigger panic. In Klein's (1995, 2002) view, carbon dioxide sensitivity is due to a deranged suffocation alarm monitor. Thus, Klein believes that panic attacks represent a hyperreactivity of a common human adaptive mechanism, a threat that is more specific than the conception of panic attacks as conditioned fear. He emphasizes his view that panic attacks are not simply equivalent to fear, noting the lack of dyspnic air hunger in the fear response, the lack of HPA activation in panic, and the fact that imipramine and other antidepressant antidepressants block panic attacks but not ordinary fear. He suggests that "real requirements such as air, food and water require distinctive perceptual/encoditional neural brain circuits that should not be subsumed under a fear circuit that, by conditioning, serves all purposes" (Klein, 2002, p. 368).

Separation Distress Systems. Panksepp (1998) suggests an alternate theory for the interrelationship of fear, panic, and neuropsychophysiology. He differentiates a PANSY system in the brain, which he primarily views as related to separation distress, from a FEAR system associated with other types of fear, including anticipatory anxiety. The separation distress system is the origin of distress vocalizations (DPVs), or isolation calls, which are primitive forms of communication by which an infant signals distress to elicit parental care. These communications are shared by all mammals and probably have a similar brain physiology. The PANSY system originates in the midbrain periaqueductal gray matter and continues in the ventral dorsophysis, the ventral septal area, the preoptic area, the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, and in higher mammals the anterior part of the cingulate gyrus, the amygdala, and the hypothalamus.

Panksepp suggests that panic attacks may arise from malfunctions of the separation distress system, thus the derivation of the term PANSY. This hypothesis was based in part on the link between a history of separation anxiety and panic disorder. In addition, tricyclics, which effectively treat panic, were found to decrease DPVs. Panksepp also notes in Klein's (1994, 1998) early work on treatment of panic, in which he found that benzodiazepines, such as clorazepate and diazepam, had little impact on panic, whereas tricyclics affected panic but not anticipatory anxiety, again pointing to a separation between these two systems.

More recent clinical studies, however, cast doubt on the pharmacological discrepancy between these systems. Benzodiazepines, such as alprazolam and clonazepam, have been found to effectively treat panic. In addition, antidepressants, such as tricyclics and serotonin, have been found to effectively treat other forms of anxiety, such as generalized anxiety disorder. The impact of these agents on anticipatory anxiety has not been well studied.

The fear circuit network, the suffocation alarm system, and the separation distress system may play a role in the onset and development of panic disorder or may play varying roles in the different forms or aspects of the panic syndrome. Further neuropsychological studies should help to clarify these factors.

Brain imaging may provide another means of assessing neurobiological factors in panic disorder. An early study by Neiman et al. (1994), using positron emission

topography (fMRI), suggested a focal asymmetry in cerebral blood flow in the regions of the parahippocampal gyrus in panic patients responsive to lactate infusion, which was not present in normals or panic patients not responsive to lactate. However, the difficulty differentiating small brain structures, such as the amygdala, and capturing an image during a panic episode have limited the utility of imaging approaches (Gorman et al., 2000). In addition, hypoxia-induced vasodilation caused by hyperventilation during a panic attack can obscure assessments of cerebral blood flow.

Further improvements in neuroimaging technology, including the use of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), may aid in further clarifying the brain circuitry involved in panic disorder. A recent study (Lytlecky et al., 2001) comparing fMRI in six patients with panic disorder in varying levels of anxiety-provoking situations to six normal controls found increased activity in the inferior frontal gyrus, hippocampus, and the anterior and posterior cingulate, extending into the orbitofrontal cortex and to both amygdalae. The authors suggest that this is an important neural circuit in panic, related to retrieval of strong emotional events, facilitating reexperience of traumatic experiences. There is limited overlap in this neural circuit with the various models described above.

Cognitive-Behavioral Model

The central feature of the cognitive-behavioral model of panic disorder is the patient's catastrophic misinterpretation of events and/or somatic sensations leading to feelings of imminent danger associated with panic attacks (Pitcairn, 1998). Patients develop a fear of the somatic sensations associated with panic attacks, considered part of the body's fight-or-flight alarm response. Catastrophic misinterpretations of these sensations include fears of "dying" (e.g., having a heart attack or suffocating) and fears of losing control or "going crazy." Somatic sensations associated with panic attacks come to serve as cues of danger and potential panic via classical conditioning. Thus, increasing anxiety leads to increased fear of somatic sensations, which leads to increasing anxiety in a vicious cycle. Patients become "trapped" in the presence of these sensations, increasing the likelihood that experienced somatic sensations will trigger the escalating cycle and panic attacks. These panic reactions may come to be directly triggered by somatic sensations, not requiring the presence of catastrophic cognitions. In addition to somatic sensations, cues can also be associated with particular situations. This can lead to agoraphobic avoidance to avoid panic triggers. As Freud (1905a) stated: "In the case of agoraphobia, etc., we often find the recollection of an anxiety attack, and what the patient actually fears is the recurrence of such an attack under the special conditions in which he believes he cannot escape it" (p. 81).

Psychodynamic Model of Panic Disorder

In the psychodynamic model of panic disorder, anxiety symptoms are believed to be triggered by unconscious fantasies and impulses that are experienced by the individual as unacceptable, and threaten to break through into consciousness. The anxiety

also represents the failure of defense mechanisms to adequately protect against the intensity of these wishes in undissolved form. In addition, the physical symptoms of panic, as well as many other aspects of life, are a result of "compromise formations" (Freud, 1964) between wishes that are unacceptable and defenses against them very wishes. As described below, unconscious fears of loss, separation, and conflict about intimacy are important elements underlying panic attacks. Angry feelings triggered by fantasies of being uncontrolling others, or unprotected by loved ones, represent an additional threat or attachment that can trigger panic. Panic attacks in part represent partial expressions of these wishes by evoking the danger of separation, evoking conscious expressions of anger, and expressing anger directly by causing others to respond to severe anxiety complaints.

Bach et al. (1991) and Shear et al. (1993) developed a psychodynamic formulation for panic disorder based on psychological, clinical, and longitudinal observations and studies about panic patients. Beginning with the studies of temperament of Kagan et al. (1993) and Blaustein et al. (1993), the authors postulated that panic patients are constitutionally predisposed to fears/fears of unfamiliar situations early in life. This is based in part on Blaustein et al.'s (1993) finding the children of patients with panic disorder, who are likely to develop panic, are found to have a high rate of behavioral inhibition. Behaviorally inhibited children "manifested long latencies to interact when exposed to novelty, retreated from the unfamiliar, and avoided play and vocalizations, while clinging to their mothers" (Blaustein et al., 1993, p. 21). In addition, children with behavioral inhibition demonstrated higher rates of childhood anxiety disorders (Blaustein et al., 1993). Kossman et al. (1993) reported that 15 percent of children with separation anxiety at age 21 months had agoraphobia at 7 years, while only 7 percent of 21-month olds without separation anxiety developed agoraphobia. Additional evidence of early life fears/fears comes from retrospective assessments by panic patients. This predisposition leads individuals at risk to experience a sense of fearful dependency on parents to provide a sense of safety. Because these children experience narcissistic humiliation due to their fears/fears, they tend to blame their difficulties on parents, who are perceived as unreliable. Alternatively, such individuals may develop a fearful dependency through actual traumatic or frightening experiences in childhood. Patients with panic have been found in clinical observations and systematic assessments to perceive their parents as controlling, overprotective, temperamental, and frightening (Black, 1996; Parker et al., 1993; Antonoff et al., 1993).

In addition to struggling with separation fears, these fearful children feel threatened by the anger they experience toward their parents, whom they view as critical or unreliable. They fear that their anger will drive away their needed parents, increasing their sense of fearful dependency. Thus, a vicious cycle develops: anger leads to anxiety and guilt, adding to fearful dependency, eventually spiraling to panic levels of anxiety (see Fig. 12.1). Panic attacks clinicians sometimes argue, facilitate increased attachment, punish the self for guilt about angry feelings, and tend to punish others via coercing them to respond to patients' elite needs. Life events that involve actual or perceived separation, that have been found to occur at a high rate prior to panic onset, tend to trigger this vicious cycle in adulthood. In addition, aggressive, competitive wishes can




Figure 10.3. Vicious cycle of avoidance in panic disorder.

be unconsciously experienced as threats to important attachments. Thus, life events that involve trauma or an increase in responsibilities may also trigger panic. Approaches to working with these dynamics psychotherapeutically have been developed and will be described below.

TREATMENT OF PANIC DISORDER

Medications, including tricyclic antidepressants, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, monoamine oxidase inhibitors, and benzodiazepines, as well as cognitive-behavioral therapy (CBT) have demonstrated efficacy for treatment of panic disorder in multiple double-blind, placebo-controlled studies. Common concerns have also surfaced in a few of these studies (Plage et al., 1988; Neary et al., 1990, 1991; Pollak et al., 1993; Barlow et al., 2000). Because of the inherent delusion of panic disorder that was used prior to 1990 (Klerk and Klaeser, 1991), very few panic studies to date have assessed broader quality of life aspects of treatment response. Many patients have persistent, though frequently less intense, symptoms that may cause persistent morbidity and functional impairment following completion of treatment (Plage et al., 1988; Neary et al., 1991; Pollak et al., 1993). For example, in the more recent large-scale, multicenter, highly controlled outcome study of patients with panic disorder, patients treated with imipramine demonstrated only a 45.8 percent full remission rate while those treated with CBT had a remission rate of 68.7 percent (Barlow et al., 2000).

Combination treatments of antipsychotic medications and psychotherapy have shown mixed results. In the multi-center panic study referred to above, CBT imparted little additional benefit to imipramine treatment of panic disorder (Barlow et al., 2000). Other studies have found benefits from adding CBT to pharmacotherapy, but this has not yet been demonstrated in a randomized trial (Otto et al., 1998). Marin et al. (1999), in a study of benzodiazepines and CBT for treatment of panic, found that patients receiving the combination treatment did less well than those treated with CBT alone.

There is also evidence that CBT can aid in withdrawal from other medications (Oto et al., 1993).

Psychodynamic psychotherapy has undergone very little in the way of systematic study. However, in a randomized, controlled trial, Wilcox and Dahl (1994), employing a manualized form of psychodynamic psychotherapy, demonstrated that 3-months, weekly psychodynamic psychotherapy in addition to clomipramine (CM) significantly reduced relapse rate at 18-month follow-up (7 percent 18 month relapse; no-controlled odds, in comparison with patients treated with CM alone (24 percent). This study unfortunately did not control for frequency of therapist contact.

Psychopharmacological Treatments

Several antidepressant medications and benzodiazepines have been found to be efficacious for panic treatment. Currently, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) are considered first-line treatment with regard to issues of safety and tolerability (APA, 1998). Paroxetine (Ljekic et al., 1998), fluvoxamine (Hader-Sauer et al., 1997), fluoxetine (Lieb et al., 1998), sertraline (Rappaport et al., 1998), and citalopram (Weis et al., 1999) have all been found to be effective in placebo-controlled trials. Of these agents, paroxetine and sertraline are approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the treatment of panic disorder. SSRIs were originally thought to have superior efficacy to tricyclic antidepressants, but treatment trials with larger numbers of subjects have suggested they are equivalent (Oto et al., 2001). Despite their overall tolerability, SSRIs may still have troubling side-effects. These include sexual dysfunction, gastrointestinal symptoms (although these typically resolve), insomnia, and weight gain over time. Venlafaxine also shows promise for treatment of panic disorder (Puleo et al., 1996; Chrousos, 1999) but requires monitoring for blood pressure increases. Particularly important for panic patients, these medications can cause an initial increase in anxiety or agitation. Therefore, it is usually advisable to start these medications at lower doses than in major depression and/or increase as tolerated. Benzodiazepines can aid in diminishing this agitation, which usually resolves within 1 to 2 weeks. Finally, following discontinuation of the medication, patients can struggle with a withdrawal syndrome, which includes diarrhea, irritability, headache, nausea, and vertigo (Lujeyran and Ader, 1997). This typically resolves within 2 weeks and can usually be eased with a short taper of medication.

Although clomipramine, imipramine, and desipramine have shown efficacy in comparison with placebo (Lykken, 1981; Ushakishvili et al., 1998; Marinakos and Perel, 1993; Lautenbacher et al., 1991; Fallon and Klein, 1991), they all have significant side effects, high rates of intolerance, and safety concerns (Noyes et al., 1989; Papp et al., 1997). These include anticholinergic side effects (dry mouth, constipation, difficulty urinating, blurred vision), sedation, orthostatic hypotension, weight gain, and sexual dysfunction. These specific can prolong cardiac conduction and in overdose or in patients with preexisting cardiac conduction defects, a fatal arrhythmia may occur. Clinical experience suggests that although tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs) are effective in treating panic, the dietary restrictions and the risks of serious side effects (potential

hypertensive reaction, along with weight gain and constipation, greatly limit the usefulness of these agents. Some clinicians believe that MAOIs are superior to tricyclics for panic, but there is limited systematic data to support this notion, particularly given that most MAOI studies were done before the DSM-III criteria for panic disorder were developed (Sheehan et al., 1980).

Benzodiazepines remain an important class of medications for treatment of panic disorder, despite their replacement as first-line agents by antidepressants. In clinical practice, these medications can provide rapid relief of panic attacks, allowing symptom reduction while other treatments, such as antidepressants or psychotherapy, are being introduced. An important limitation to the use of benzodiazepines is their lack of specificity for panic or other commonly coexisting psychiatric conditions, such as agoraphobia, specific phobia, or obsessive-compulsive disorder. Side effects include sedation, fatigue, and memory impairment. Although these medications carry a potential risk of abuse, the risk is felt to be minimized in patients with anxiety disorders (Umbricht et al., 1989). Avoidance of these medications out of fear of abuse may be more problematic than the risk of abuse. If benzodiazepines are employed over an extended period of time, patients are at risk for increases of symptoms when they are tapered. A more rapid taper or abrupt discontinuation or tapering of a shorter acting benzodiazepine increases the risk of symptoms reemergence. Thus, a taper is best accomplished over 3 to 6 months, with a reduction in the rate of taper after the dose has reached half its original level.

More recent data suggest that some of the antidepressants may be effective in treating panic disorder. The potential efficacy of venlafaxine has been indicated in two studies (Jaschinski et al., 1995; Woodman and Meyers, 1995). Venlafaxine is generally a well-tolerated agent but requires monitoring of hepatic enzymes, and there are rare reports of hepatotoxicity. Weight gain is also a potential side effect.

Cognitive Behavioral Treatment Studies

Cognitive-behavioral treatments for panic disorder have been subjected to extensive clinical trials and have been found to be efficacious treatments for treating this condition (Lydiard et al., 2001; APA, 1998). The cognitive-behavioral approach to panic disorder generally involves components of interoceptive exposure and cognitive restructuring. Therapy consists of examining core cognitions, exposure, and learning to avoid avoidance. Patients are educated about the cognitive-behavioral model as a means for helping them to understand their illness. Therapists also work with patients to recognize catastrophic beliefs by examining them as hypotheses and testing the distortions of the risk of catastrophes occurring. Using interoceptive exposure, somatic sensations similar to panic are induced in patients with a variety of techniques. Repeated exposure to these cues in a safe setting reduces patients' catastrophic experiences of them. Patients are also taught skills for coping with these sensations. Finally, patients are taught arousal reduction skills, such as diaphragmatic breathing and relaxation techniques. Some CBT approaches to panic also include in vivo exposure to phobic situations and cue-controlled relaxation exercises.

Despite its consistently demonstrated efficacy for panic disorder, not all patients respond to CBT, nor does it provide total symptom relief for all patients who respond to it. Many long-term outcome studies of CBT for panic disorder report impressive response rates (Mataix et al., 1993; Craske et al., 1996; Clark et al., 1998; Foa et al., 1998). Nonetheless, even in the most closely controlled sample that reports the highest response rate (Mataix et al., 1993), 28 percent of patients remained symptomatic after completing their CBT trial. Despite the research success of CBT, in clinical practice many panic patients are unable or unwilling to comply with behavioral treatment (Witt, 1998; Foa et al., 1999). As many of the groundbreaking CBT studies were performed before the articulation of the MDD collaborative study on panic disorder that provided specific recommendations about domains of illness that should be monitored during panic disorder treatment trials (Hane and Mueser, 1994), few CBT studies have assessed broader quality of life aspects in response to treatment. Additionally, many of the earlier CBT studies suffered from lack of systematic assessment and tracking of concomitant severely antipsychotic medication use that likely contributed to measured outcomes. The effects of these antireactive medications became particularly important in studies that followed patients over long periods of time (Milrod and Busch, 1996).

In a novel study design using telephone responses, that assessed panic patients who had been treated with CBT over 24 months (extending longer time period than are usually evaluated using urinalysis), Resnick and Radom (1993) found that many patients experienced a fluctuating course of panic symptomatology after their CBT trial. Twenty-three percent of these 62 patients sought further antipsychotic treatment during the 24-month follow-up interval because of continuing symptoms, but the additional treatment was not helped. In this study, pretreatment panic severity was the most accurate predictor of poor response. This implies that further research on risk patients needs to be accomplished.

Very few studies have assessed the efficacy of CBT in addition to antipsychotic medication. Mataix et al. (1999) evaluated the comparative efficacy of alprazolam and CBT, both alone, and in combination in patients with panic and agoraphobia, and found that alprazolam dampened patients' response to CBT. In the recent multi-center maintained trial that extended over 7 years, CBT alone was compared with placebo, imipramine alone, the combination of both CBT and imipramine, and CBT plus placebo for panic disorder (Barlow et al., 2000). In this study, all active treatments produced responses superior to placebo, but the combined treatment cell was not significantly superior to either CBT or imipramine alone after the active treatment phase. However, the combination of CBT and imipramine conferred a substantial advantage than either treatment alone by the end of the 6-month maintenance phase of the study. The major limitation of this important maintenance study is that the patients studied had only mild to moderate agoraphobia with panic, leaving the question open as to how other patients with panic disorder would respond to these interventions. CBT has not been extensively studied in populations with combined panic and major depression, but some reports exist that indicate that it may be useful for these patients as well (Lydiard et al., 2001; Barlow et al., 2000).

Psychodynamic Psychotherapy for Panic Disorder

Systematic Psychodynamic Research. Systematic study of psychodynamic treatments for panic disorder is in its infancy. As described above, a significant minority of patients fail to respond to the more extensively empirically tested treatments, and many patients experience residual symptoms after pharmacological and cognitive-behavioral treatments (Mogg et al., 1989; Mogg et al., 1988, 1991; Pollack et al., 1993; Barlow et al., 2000). Thus, attention to psychodynamic issues may potentially provide further improvement for some patients.

Milrod and Shear (1991) found 55 cases in the literature with DSM-III-R panic disorder who were successfully treated with psychodynamic psychotherapy or psychodynamic alone. Since then, other successful psychodynamic treatments for patients with panic disorder have been reported (Milrod, 1995; Shear, 1993; Raskin, 1995; Bush et al., 1996; Milrod et al., 1996). Clinical reports cannot substitute for controlled clinical trials. Nonetheless, these reports suggest that psychodynamic treatment alone can bring symptomatic relief, as rapidly as psychopharmacologic or cognitive-behavioral interventions. This approach therefore deserves systematic study. As mentioned above, Wittenberg and Gold (1998) conducted a controlled trial of psychodynamic psychotherapy in combination with clomipramine against the usual-of psychodynamic psychotherapy in reducing relapse in panic patients treated with clomipramine.

To further study a psychodynamic approach to panic disorder treatment in a systematic manner, other authors have developed clearly defined, panic-specific psychodynamic treatments in order to facilitate outcome research. One such approach shall be described below.

Panic-Focused Psychodynamic Psychotherapy (PFP). PFP is a modified form of psychodynamic psychotherapy that maintains central psychodynamic principles (Milrod et al., 1997). These include the core idea that unconscious mental dynamics are responsible for biopsychological symptoms, such as panic attacks. The treatment makes use of listening, free association, and the centrality of the transference in effecting therapeutic change. The therapist focuses attention on all of these processes as they connect to the patient's experience of panic. Principles that have been observed to be common psychological dynamics for panic patients, such as their difficulty with separation, inform interpretive efforts. Common factors with other psychodynamic psychotherapies include techniques of clarification, confrontation, and interpretation in and outside of the transference.

An initial trial of PFP has been completed (Milrod et al., 2001, 2003). In this study, PFP followed a 30-session, psychodynamic psychotherapy program, delivered twice weekly in 45- to 50-min sessions, over 12 weeks. Twenty-one patients with primary DSM-IV panic disorder entered the treatment trial. Four patients dropped out. Sixteen of 11 patients experienced reductions of panic and agoraphobia. Treatment completers with major depression ($N = 9$) also experienced reduction of their depression. Symptomatic and quality of life improvements were substantial and consistent across all measured areas. Symptomatic gains were maintained over 8 months. While the sample size in this study was too small to draw firm conclusions, as a result of this pilot research,

the authors concluded that psychodynamic psychotherapy appears to be a promising nonpharmacological treatment for panic disorder. A randomized controlled trial of PPT conducted by the same group of researchers is currently underway. The clinical utility of this treatment approach for subpopulations of patients with panic disorder has yet to be tested. Empirical investigation must confirm these encouraging initial findings.

In summary, little attention has been paid to the therapeutic aspects of panic disorder until recently. Based on reports in the literature, clinical experience, and some promising systematic research, there is encouraging evidence that a psychodynamic approach (that emphasizes unconscious mental processes, fantasy, free associations, and interpretation of transference developed within psychotherapy) may be an important tool for optimal treatment of some patients with panic disorder. Psychodynamic psychotherapy may also be useful for residual symptoms, possibly related to early life experiences, that continue to interfere with optimal emotional well-being and interpersonal functioning.

LONG-TERM OUTCOME OF TREATMENT TRIALS FOR PANIC DISORDER

Patients with panic disorder are a highly symptomatic,帮困的 group who tend toward recurrent exacerbations of symptoms (Pollack and Otto 1991; Pollack and Marvel, 2003; Foa et al., 1998). It is therefore important to gauge not only the effectiveness of treatments over the short term but to ascertain their effectiveness over longer follow-up intervals. Useful data with regard to long-term outcome, however, has been limited thus far in the literature. In a series of follow-up studies to date, Mihnev et al. (1998) found that most did not receive concurrent monthly treatments (e.g., unstructured medication use in CBT studies or ongoing psychotherapy in medication studies) either during study treatment or during follow-up intervals. The authors concluded that there was limited evidence that patients responding to short-term treatments maintained their gains if they did not receive further treatment. Barlow et al. (1998) conducted a meta-analysis of studies that had information on long-term follow-up of treatments of panic disorder. Their analysis indicated that treatments of panic disorder show effectiveness mostly at follow-up, finding an advantage to antidepressant plus in vivo exposure over cognitive behavioral treatments. Nevertheless, the authors note that an important limitation of these findings was "The studies presented were largely little information on the type of additional treatment received, frequency of visits to therapist, and kind and amount of medication during the follow-up period" (p. 417).

Barlow et al.'s (2000) study makes a strong case for the importance of monitoring both acute and longer-term responses to treatments in determining the treatment efficacy for panic disorder. Patients in this study received either imipramine, up to 300 mg/d, CBT, CBT plus imipramine, CBT plus placebo, or placebo for a 3-month period. Patients who responded to treatment were then randomly in a maintenance schedule that provided treatment similar to what they received in the acute phase for an additional 6 months. They were then followed for 6 months after all treatment was discontinued.

After the acute phase, while all active treatments were superior to placebo, CBT plus imipramine showed limited superiority over CBT alone, but not CBT plus placebo. However, CBT plus imipramine was superior to both CBT alone and CBT plus placebo after the maintenance phase. In response to the treatment, the level of response to imipramine was found to be superior to that of CBT after the acute phase, and this trend continued after the maintenance phase. However, in the follow-up period, responders to imipramine, with or without CBT, had much higher rates of relapse than those who received CBT without medication. At follow-up, CBT alone and CBT plus placebo were superior to placebo, but imipramine and imipramine plus CBT were not. The study suggests that while medication may be a more effective initial intervention, CBT may have a more durable effectiveness, and medication may lead to a greater potential for relapse at drug discontinuation.

More recent studies are being designed more carefully to assess the nature of specific interventions the patients may receive in the follow-up period (Mithoefer et al., 2001; de Haan et al., 1997; Marinovskian and Freed, 1999; De Haan et al., 1999). For example, in a multiyear follow-up of 2 years of panic patients treated in four treatment conditions, more carefully assessed and reported interim treatment. Patients had received either the cognitive combined with exposure, placebo plus exposure, psychobiological panic management plus exposure, or exposure alone. Placebo plus exposure was found to be superior after acute treatment, but there were no significant differences between treatments at 2-year follow-up. Seventy-six percent of patients received additional treatment during the follow-up period, which the authors attributed to the incomplete impact of the acute treatment. Patients were found to have had additional benefit from the follow-up treatment.

Marinovskian and Freed (1999) treated 118 patients with panic disorder for 6 months with imipramine at 2.25 mg/day. Thirty patients dropped out during this period due to typical imipramine side effects. Fifty-six patients who remained and completed was placed into a double-blind maintenance condition ($n = 28$) or a placebo ($n = 27$) and followed for 12 months. The patients were not permitted to obtain treatment interventions outside the study. Within the study, they could obtain 1 or 2 crisis-intervention sessions, but not panic-focused cognitive or behavioral treatments. Relapse in the maintenance treatment ($n = 11$) was significantly lower than in placebo ($n = 10$). However, the authors also note that 8 patients dropped out of the imipramine group and 7 out of the placebo group, although these dropouts were clinically stable at their last assessment. Eleven patients required supportive sessions unrelated to panic (total of 13 visits).

In summary, then, both specific medications and cognitive-behavioral treatments have demonstrated efficacy in the short-term treatment of panic disorder. The chronic and recurrent nature of panic symptoms in many patients, however, may require the ongoing use of medication with its attendant side effects. Cognitive-behavioral treatments may aid in the reduction of vulnerability to panic symptoms, although this has yet to be clearly demonstrated. Psychodynamic treatments show promise but have not yet been subjected to efficacy studies. Current and future efforts should focus on which factors, neurophysiological and psychological, predispose to panic attacks, and

to determine which interventions, or sequence of interventions, reduce vulnerability to panic recurrence.

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NATURE AND TREATMENT OF OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER

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INTRODUCTION

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a complex brain disorder that affects the lives of 1 to 2 percent of children and adults worldwide without respect to cultural differences or geography. The onset of this illness can be as young as ages 2 to 4 years with approximately one-half of adults having experienced symptoms onset during childhood or adolescence (Krusco and Golding, 1990). The World Health Organization's 1990 summary of the global burden of disease found OCD to be the eighth leading cause of disease burden for adults ages 15 to 44 years in developed countries, and the fourth leading cause for women in this group. Almost one-third (38 percent) of the disease burden for all adults in this age group was attributed to mental illness, with 5 of the 11 leading causes including bipolar major depression (1), schizophrenia (4), self-inflicted injuries (3), bipolar disorders (6), and OCD (6) (Murray and Lopez, 1990).

The symptoms of OCD are not new to our society and have been present and documented in many forms throughout written history. In medieval times, individuals who displayed sexual or blasphemous thoughts were considered to be possessed and would have been "treated" with an attempt to remove the offending spirit through various forms of torture often leading to death. One of the most well-known literary descriptions of OCD is Shakespeare's *Lady Macbeth* with her obsessive guilt and ritualistic hand-washing. Scrupulosity is a religious form of OCD documented for almost 300 years throughout the writings of members of the Roman Catholic Church. The described symptoms of this condition were our current definition of OCD (O'Habery, 1966). The Roman Catholic Church conducted the first systematic survey of scrupulosity in 1927 on 400 girls in a Catholic high school and found 17% of the girls to have behaviors and/or thoughts regarding religious preoccupation and cleaning and washing habits that were considered excessive (Mullen, 1927).

Obsessive-compulsive disorder was first classified in the psychiatric literature in adults by Rapaport in 1937 and in children by Jellinger in 1958. Early reports in the literature contained descriptions of repetitive, unwanted thoughts or rituals often characterized by magical thinking. As the disorder came to be better defined, it was identified as one of the extremes rather than a symptom of neurosis. By the early 20th century the description of OCD shifted to include psychodynamic features. Freud's writings conceptualized obsessions as resulting from unconscious conflicts and associated antidepressants (Pheal, 1989, 1991). He also speculated on the similarities between the symptoms of OCD and children's play and religious rituals. However, even Freud questioned whether psychodynamic theory was sufficient to explain the symptoms of OCD.

Observations of the association between certain neurological disorders and OCD have led to the current view of OCD as a neurobiological illness. Clinical research has demonstrated an increase in obsessive-compulsive symptomatology in patients with neurological diseases known to involve basal ganglia structures, including, Sydenham's chorea (Rapoport et al., 1993), Tourette syndrome (Lockman et al., 1997), and Huntington's disease (Cummings and Cunningham, 1992). Current neurobiological research has focused on the possible localization of brain circuitry mediating obsessive-compulsive behavior and possible mechanisms for behavioral masking. This research has directly led to advancements in the diagnosis and treatment of OCD improving the quality of life and clinical outcomes for many people suffering with this illness.

EPIDEMIOLOGY

Although OCD was once considered rare in both the adult and pediatric populations, improvements in the recognition of this disorder have shown this illness to be a major worldwide health problem. The first large-scale epidemiological study to include OCD as a separate category and to provide information about its incidence and prevalence was the U.S. Epidemiologic Catchment Area (ECA) study (Robins et al., 1988). This study was conducted on 16,282 adults using the Diagnostic Interview Schedule

(DSM) at five separate sites across the United States. The lifetime prevalence for OCD in this study ranged from 1.9 to 3.3 cases per 100 across the five sites. These rates were 25 to 60 times higher than had been estimated on the basis of clinical populations (Kazdin et al., 1989).

The most comprehensive study on cross-national epidemiology of OCD combined data from seven international epidemiologic studies done in the United States (the ECA study), Canada, Puerto Rico, Germany, Taiwan, Korea, and New Zealand (Wittchen et al., 1990). The lifetime prevalence was remarkably similar among the different countries ranging from 1.9 per 100 in Korea to 2.9 per 100 in Puerto Rico, with the exception of 8.7 cases per 100 in Taiwan. It should be noted that the Taiwanese study reported lower rates for other psychiatric disorders as well (Hsu et al., 1990). The lifetime prevalence of OCD was found to be higher in women than men, with the exception of the German study, which had large standard errors in a smaller sample. In the New Zealand sample the female-male ratio was 1.8, while in Germany it was found to be 0.8. The samples from the other countries found OCD to be 1.2 to 1.8 times more likely in women than in men. The mean age at onset was found to be between 21.9 and 35.2 years across the studies (Wittchen et al., 1990).

The rate of OCD in a younger population was assessed by (Rasmussen et al., 1989) and colleagues, using trained mental health professionals and previously validated instruments to assess obsessive-compulsive symptomatology in an adolescent population. As part of a two-stage study of 3569 adolescents (Whitaker et al., 1990), the Leyton Obsessional Inventory was administered (along with other questionnaires on general mental health, anxiety, and eating-disorders) to the entire high school population of a county 80 miles from New York City (Pliszka et al., 1990). Adolescents scoring above the clinical cut-off were interviewed by child psychiatrists with extensive clinical experience with OCD. A total of 20 subjects received a lifetime diagnosis of OCD (18 current and 2 with past illness). The weighted prevalence figure (judicial evaluation) for OCD was 1.9 percent, a figure that is in close agreement with the ECA estimate for adults. A 2-year follow-up demonstrated that the obsessive-compulsive symptoms were clinically significant, as the majority of subjects remained symptomatic (Kemp et al., 1990).

In recent years, several additional epidemiological studies have been conducted in children and adolescents in the United States as well as abroad. In virtually all of these reports, the rates ascertained from direct child reports were higher than those derived from parent reports, supporting clinical data that children with OCD often hide their illness. Sensory and difficulties of utilizing key interviews may have contributed to the low (0.5 percent) prevalence of OCD found by Wittchen and colleagues (1990) in a sample of 3021 adolescent subjects in Munich, Germany. Other investigators, such as Valera-Basha et al. (1990) in the southeastern United States, Douglas et al. (1989) in New Zealand, and Zohar et al. (1992, 1990) in Israel, used mental health interviewers and semistructured clinical interviews and found more-acceptable rates of 2.9, 4.6, and 2.3 percent, respectively. A 2-year follow-up evaluation of the Israeli study found that the children who met the diagnostic criteria for OCD remained symptomatic (Zohar et al., 1992).

CLINICAL PRESENTATION

Obsessive-compulsive disorder is characterized by recurring obsessions or compulsions that cause significant distress or interference with normal routine, occupation, academics, or social activities. Obsessions can involve preoccupations with contamination, symmetry, pathologic doubting of uncertainty, harm to self and others, as well as preoccupations with sexual or "violent" thoughts, or a sense that something unpleasant may happen if a particular ritual is not performed. Compulsions include both repetitive physical behaviors and mental rituals such as repeating specific prayers or "protective" thoughts. Physical compulsions consist of ritualized behaviors such as washing, cleaning, counting, checking, repeating, arranging, or hoarding. Mental compulsions are less common but can be more problematic as they can cause significant distress and will be missed if not specifically asked about during a clinical evaluation. The majority of people with OCD have multiple obsessions and compulsions. The symptoms frequently change over time. A specific obsession or compulsion may be present 1 week and then disappear and be replaced by another, only to return after a period of 3 months or so. The obsessions and compulsions found in childhood-onset OCD have very similar content to those seen in adult-onset OCD (Table 13.1).

There is some controversy as to whether or not a compulsion can be present without an underlying obsession. The *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV)* defines compulsion as repetitive behaviors that a person feels driven to perform in response to an obsession, although the current diagnostic criteria allow a diagnosis of OCD to be made with compulsions alone. In fact 15 percent of adults and about 40 percent of children deny that their compulsions are driven by an obsessive thought (Krusz and Dahlsg, 1995; Rasmussen, 1989). Some compulsions have been described as more "tidy" in character. These behaviors require repetition until a feeling of anxiety or despair is alleviated. Frequently, these tidy compulsions are not preceded by a specific obsessive thought.

The occasional experience of "obsessive" thoughts and the performance of repetitive or ritualistic behaviors are common among both children and adults. In order to meet the criteria for OCD, these symptoms must be of a sufficient intensity and/or frequency to cause marked distress or impairment in function. For many people with OCD, impairment is minimized by their families' efforts to allow them to remain functional in their environments. These family members may not be consciously aware that their loved one is suffering from an illness that would benefit from diagnosis and treatment. A parent or spouse might wish their child's or partner's clothing every night or prepare and package food that is "safe" in order to allow the child to attend school or their spouse to continue to work outside the home.

Distress related to the intrusive nature of obsessions and compulsions is compounded by the fact that most patients retain an intact sense of insight. People with OCD are acutely aware that their thoughts and behaviors are extreme and consuming, yet they are unable to stop them. There is a great deal of shame and embarrassment surrounding the obsessive thoughts. Patients are aware that their thoughts and behaviors are "not acceptable," or violate social norms, and attempt to hide the symptoms.

TABLE 12.1. DSM-IV Diagnostic Criteria for Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder**A. Obsessions or compulsions:***(Obsessions are defined by 1A, 1B, 1C, and 1D.)*

- 1A. Obsessive and persistent thoughts, impulses, or images that are experienced, at some time during the disorder, as intrusive and inappropriate and that cause marked anxiety or distress.
 - 1B. The thoughts, impulses, or images are not simply excessive worries about real-life problems.
 - 1C. The person attempts to ignore or suppress such thoughts, impulses, or images or to neutralize them with some other thought or action.
 - 1D. The person recognizes that the unwanted thoughts, impulses, or images are a product of his or her own mind (not imposed from without) or in thought insertion.
- (Compulsions are defined by 1E and 1F.)*
- 1E. Repetitive behaviors (e.g., hand washing, checking, cleaning) or mental acts (e.g., praying, counting, repeating words silently) that the person feels driven to perform in response to an obsession or according to rules that must be applied rigidly.
 - 1F. The behaviors or mental acts are aimed at preventing or reducing anxiety or preventing some dreaded event or situation; however, these behaviors or mental acts are not reasonably related in a realistic way with what they are designed to neutralize or prevent or are clearly unnecessary.
- B. At some point during the course of the disorder, the person has recognized that the obsessions or compulsions are excessive or unwanted. Note: This does not apply to children.
- C. The obsessions or compulsions cause marked distress, are time-consuming (take more than 1 hour a day), or significantly interfere with the person's normal routine, occupational (or academic) functioning, or usual social activities or relationships.
- D. If another Axis I disorder is present, the content of the obsessions or compulsions is not restricted to a single preoccupation with food in the presence of an eating disorder (bulimia nervosa, binge-eating disorder, preoccupation with drugs in the presence of a substance use disorder; preoccupation with having a sexual liaison in the presence of hypochondriasis; preoccupation with sexual urges or fantasies in the presence of a paraphilic or sexual perversion; or preoccupation in the presence of major depressive disorder.)
- E. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiologic effects of a substance (e.g., a drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition.

Source: American Psychiatric Association (2000).

from their families, friends, and co-workers. This need for secrecy also contributes to the fact that many people suffering from significant symptoms do not seek treatment for months or even years. A recent report found that there was a 19-year delay between the onset of symptoms during adolescence and the seeking of professional help during adulthood (Hollander et al., 1998).

Current diagnostic criteria require recognition of the invasiveness of obsessive-compulsive symptoms. However, this criterion has been the subject of some debate,

Young children are exempt from this DSM-IV criterion for a diagnosis of OCD, as they often have not achieved the cognitive development required to have insight. When adults with OCD are systematically assessed on the degree of insight they have into their obsessions, limited insight was found up to 30 percent of the time (Eisen et al., 1998). In several studies of adults with OCD, it has been found that a subset of patients "believe" their obsessions at some point during the course of their illness (Brod and Akiskal, 1998; Kozak and Foa, 1998).

The differential diagnosis of OCD includes other psychiatric disorders that are characterized by repetitive behaviors and thoughts. To appropriately diagnose OCD, the content of the obsessions and compulsions cannot be completely attributed to another psychiatric illness. For example, a diagnosis of anxiety nervous should be made if a person has only obsessive worries about gaining weight and compulsions that are centered on not allowing the consumption of calorie-containing foods. By the same token, if obsessions or compulsions revolve around a fear of a specific animal, situation, or object, a simple phobia should be diagnosed. The obsessions of OCD must be distinguished from the ramifications of major depression, racing thoughts of death, and psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia. The compulsions of OCD must be distinguished from the stereotypic movements found in individuals with mental retardation or autism, the fits of Tourette syndrome, the stereotypies of complex partial seizures, and the ritualized anti-social behaviors of borderline personality disorder.

COMORBIDITY

Comorbid psychopathology is common among patients with OCD. In a recently published study of a large health maintenance organization (HMO) population in northern California, 75 percent of adults with OCD were found to have at least one comorbid psychiatric diagnosis. Major depression affected 36 percent, other anxiety disorders affected 26 percent, including panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder, and adjustment disorder affected 12 percent of the adult patients sampled (Weiszner et al., 2001). The cross-national epidemiological study done by Weissman and colleagues also found that adults with OCD were at a substantially higher risk for having comorbid major depression or another anxiety disorder than persons without OCD at all sites in the study. Unlike the California HMO study, the risk of a comorbid anxiety disorder was found to be greater than the risk for a major depression. The overall proportion of persons with OCD who had a comorbid anxiety disorder (range 24.5 to 69.6 percent) was greater than those who had a comorbid major depression (range 12.4 to 69.3 percent). In the sample taken from the United States within this study, major depression affected 27 percent and another anxiety disorder affected 49 percent of adults with OCD (Weiszner et al., 2001).

The patterns of comorbidity among childhood-onset cases are generally comparable to those for adult samples, with tic disorders and specific developmental disorders appearing more frequently in the pediatric populations. The California HMO study found that attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) occurred most commonly

24 percent), closely followed by major depression (23 percent), Tourette disorder (18 percent), oppositional defiant disorder (13 percent), and conduct disorder (10 percent) (Furman et al., 2001). The pattern of comorbidity found in this study was similar to that previously observed in the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH) pediatric OCD cohort, where only 26 percent of the pediatric subjects had OCD as a single diagnosis. Tic disorders (30 percent), major depression (26 percent), and specific developmental disabilities (24 percent) were the most common comorbidities found. Rates were also increased for simple phobia (17 percent), obsessive disorder (16 percent), adjustment disorder with depressed mood (13 percent), oppositional disorder (11 percent), attention deficit disorder (10 percent), conduct disorder (3 percent), separation anxiety disorder (1 percent), and enuresis/encopresis (4 percent) (Compton et al., 1999).

THE OCD SPECTRUM

In the past 10 years, research has begun to focus on a group of illnesses that have been labeled obsessive-compulsive spectrum (OC spectrum) disorders. People affected by these disorders have in common the symptoms of obsessive thoughts and compulsive behaviors and share a similar family history of mental illness and response to treatment. The current literature generally includes OCD, body dysmorphic disorder, hypochondriasis, and Tourette syndrome in the OC spectrum (Furman-Tobis and Neziroglu, 1994a, 1994b). Trichotillomania, eating disorders, and self-mutilation also have overlapping symptoms and some argue that they should be included in this group. Some authors also have included pathologic gambling and sexual impulse control problems within the spectrum (Hollander et al., 1995). All these conditions share a similar core in that a person performs an action or has repetitive thoughts that reduce their anxiety. This performance of a ritualistic behavior to alleviate anxiety is what maintains their disorder. Further research is needed to determine whether or not these phenomenologic similarities define a true "agreement" of disorders or merely overlapping clinical features of several distinct disease entities.

Body Dysmorphic Disorder

Body dysmorphic disorder (BDD) was not recognized as a unique diagnosis until 1987. Since that time, there has been a marked increase in systematic research into the characteristics, comorbidities, and treatment of BDD. The essential feature of BDD is preoccupation with an imagined defect in appearance in a normal-looking person or a markedly distressing concern about a slight imperfection (Allen and Hollander, 2000). The preoccupation must cause significant distress or impairment in functioning and must not be confined to another disorder; for example, preoccupation with obesity is anorexia nervosa. BDD is relatively common and has been reported to affect 1.7 percent of nonclinical samples (Rich et al., 1992) and 12 percent of psychiatric outpatients (Brennan et al., 1998). Similar to OCD, serotonin reuptake inhibitors

(SRI's) such as clomipramine, fluoxetine, and fluvoxamine) demonstrate specific efficacy in the treatment of OCD (Heimburger et al., 1998; Phillips et al., 1998). Although only a few controlled studies on psychotherapy for patients with BDD have been done, cognitive-behavioral therapy has been found to be effective (Dressler and Cash, 1993; Neziroglu et al., 1995).

Hypochondriasis

Hypochondriasis is characterized by the fear or belief that one has a serious illness with actual or perceived physical signs or symptoms. This fear or belief is not eliminated by appropriate reassurance from medical professionals or negative diagnostic evaluations. Gradually the anxiety will be reduced for a short period of time after a negative medical workup, but it inevitably recurs when another symptom is noted. Many people who suffer from this disorder experience a cycle of intrusive thoughts about illness and disease followed by compulsive checking for possible signs of illness in themselves (Fava et al., 1993). The characteristics that separate hypochondriasis from OCD are the single preoccupation with disease (rather than a shifting symptom evident in OCD), the presence of somatic sensations, and the limited insight into the irrationality of the hypochondriacal concerns (Barry, 1992). In hypochondriasis, the irrational fears are viewed as a rational concern about various signs and symptoms, while obsessive concerns about illness frequently occur in the absence of actual somatic sensations and are viewed as unrealistic (Fava et al., 1993). The literature suggests that a chronic and at times transient form of hypochondriasis exists. Acute onset has been associated with a good outcome among 48 patients studied prospectively; greater improvement was associated with a shorter duration of illness and less depression at baseline (Nguyen et al., 1994). Small case reports and clinical trials suggest that patients with hypochondriasis may be helped by treatment with one of the SADs (Fava et al., 1993, 1998).

Trichotillomania

Trichotillomania (TTM) is a complex, repetitive condition of distressed hair pulling (O'Ballou et al., 2000). There are limited data on the phenomenology of this disorder, but it appears to share many features with the other OCB spectrum disorders (Snedecor and Leonard, 1992). TTM is characterized by the recurrent pulling out of one's hair resulting in noticeable hair loss. There is increased tension immediately before pulling or when attempting to resist the urge to pull and a sense of gratification or relief after the "right" hair has been plucked. This cycle must cause significant distress or impairment in order for the diagnosis of TTM to be made (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Many people who suffer from problematic hair pulling do not meet the strict DSM-IV criteria, as they may not experience anxiety preceding the hair pulling, under sensations relieved after completing the behavior. The prevalence rate for TTM based on DSM-III-R criteria in college students was found to be 0.8 percent, but when subthreshold hair pulling was included, this rose to 1.5 percent for males and 3.4

percent for females (Christenson et al., 1991a). Hair pulling is often comorbid with other psychiatric conditions, most commonly mood and anxiety disorders (Christenson et al., 1991b). Effective treatment of TTM involves a combination of behavioral psychotherapy, psychoeducation, peer support, and/or pharmacotherapy (Keuthen et al., 1998; Manciniello et al., 1994). Although the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has not currently approved any medications for the treatment of TTM, several classes of medications, including the SSRIs, have been reported to be of benefit (O'Sullivan et al., 1999).

NEUROBIOLOGY

Basal Ganglia Dysfunction

Systematic research over the past two decades has demonstrated that OCD is associated with dysfunction of the corticostriato-thalamocortical circuitry, particularly in the orbitofrontal cortex and caudate nucleus (see Saxena and Rauch, 2000, for review). The postulated models of pathogenesis is shown in Figures 13.1 and 13.2 demonstrates that dysfunction at several different points in the corticostriato-thalamocortical circuit might produce similar neuropsychiatric symptoms.

Evidence for basal ganglia dysfunction is provided by neuroimaging studies and the association of OCD with neurologic disorders known to involve basal ganglia structures, including Tourette syndrome, Sydenham chorea, and Huntington's chorea (Cummings and Cunningham, 1992). The first description of neurologically based OCD comes from Constantine von Economo's 1931 treatise on postencephalitic Parkinson's disease, wherein patients suffered basal ganglia destruction as a result of severe




Figure 11.1. In this model, the primary area of dysfunction is in the striatum, reducing its inhibition of the globus pallidus externa (GP_E; indirect pathway), which causes the GP_E to increase its inhibition of the subthalamic nucleus, thus reducing the subthalamic nucleus' (STNs) stimulation of the globus pallidus interna/substantia nigra pars reticulata (GP_I/SN_R). This causes a reduction in GP_{I/SN_R} inhibition of the thalamus, which then can increase its stimulation of the frontal cortex (FC; substantia nigra pars compacta).




Figure 13.2. In this alternative construct, the globus pallidus interna (GPI) is the primary site of pathology. Without the GPI's inhibition, the thalamus increases its stimulation of the frontal cortex, which could produce symptoms directly, or through increased stimulation of the striatum (+ glutamate; -, GABA).

influenza infections. He noted the "compulsive nature" of the motor tics and ritualized behaviors that his patients exhibited. These patients, like OCD patients, described "having to" act, while not "wanting to"—that is, they experienced a neurologically based loss of volitional control (Van Eeckhout, 1931).

Motor and vocal tics, including Tourette syndrome, occur frequently in association with OCD. The relationship between tics and OCD is complex, as motor tics often have a behavioral component suggestive of compulsive rituals, while OCD compulsions may lack accompanying obsessive thoughts, making them look like tics if the rituals are simple, repetitive behaviors like touching or tapping. The overlap between tics and OCD is most apparent in pediatric patient populations, where up to two-thirds of children with OCD are observed to have comorbid tics (Leonard et al., 1992) and 20 to 80 percent of children with Tourette disorder report obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Lockman et al., 1997). It is unknown just how the pattern and severity of obsessive-compulsive symptoms differ between patients with Tourette syndrome and those with primary OCD, but preliminary impressions suggest that the compulsions associated with Tourette syndrome may be less severe than in nontic OCD and more likely to involve symmetry, rubbing, touching, staring, or blinking rituals, rather than washing and cleaning (Lockman et al., 1997).

Indirect evidence for basal ganglia involvement in OCD is provided by the efficacy of psychosurgical lesions that disconnect the basal ganglia from the frontal cortex, particularly capsulotomy (Mindus, 1991) and cingectomy (Dougherty et al., 2002). In capsulotomy, bilateral basal lesions are made in the anterior limb of the internal capsule in order to interrupt frontal-cingulate projections; however, the surgical target lies within the striatum, near the caudate nucleus. In order to perform a cingectomy, the anterior portion of the cingulate gyrus is lesioned, interrupting tracks between the cingulate gyrus and the frontal lobes and destroying all of the efferent projections of the anterior cingulate cortex. Both procedures result in significant reduction of obsessions

and compulsions. The success of psychotherapy is, of course, not conclusive evidence of a basal ganglia deficit in OCD, as the lesions could be anywhere ("upstream") from the site of surgical intervention (see Fig. 13.1), but it does focus interest on frontolimbic tracts (for review, see Gershberg et al., 2006).

Hormone/Transmitter Abnormalities

Serotonin. The serotonergic hypothesis of OCD is based on, among other pieces of evidence, the selective efficacy of drugs with specific serotonergic activity (Mansuetti et al., 1981; Israel et al., 1985) and challenge tests with serotonergic agonists. Challenges with sumatriptan (Bentall et al., 1999) and mCPP (methochlorophenyl-piperazine) (Slaten et al., 1997, 1998; Pigeon et al., 1991) show that OCD symptoms are exacerbated by these serotonin agonists. In contrast, metergoline, a serotonin antagonist, has been shown to protect against mCPP's behavioral effects (Pigeon et al., 1991). Medications that block serotonin receptors, such as clomipramine and the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs), fluoxetine, paroxetine, sertraline, venlafaxine, prazosin, and mirtazapine, have been shown to be the most effective pharmacologic treatments for OCD. Clomipramine is a tricyclic antidepressant that is a relatively selective and potent inhibitor of active serotonin uptake in the brain (it also blocks histamine H₂ receptors, cholinergic, and adrenergic receptors and has antikynureinic properties). Its metabolite, desmethylclomipramine, is also effective in blocking serotonin reuptake (and receptor of ramelteonines) (Mytilineou et al., 2009). The response of OCD symptoms to clomipramine but not to the equally effective antidepressant desipramine (Mansuetti et al., 1981; Israel et al., 1985; Leonard et al., 1988) indicates a remarkable specificity of effect for the serotonin uptake inhibitors for OCD. No unselected group of depressed patients, for example, would show such a differential response.

Additional evidence for the serotonergic hypothesis is provided by several studies in children and adolescents with OCD. The first demonstrated that response to clomipramine correlated with pretreatment platelet serotonin concentration (Fluornoy et al., 1986, 1987). A high pretreatment level of serotonin was a strong predictor of clinical response, and within this sample platelet serotonin concentrations were lower in the more severely ill patients. However, there were no differences in serotonin concentration from age-matched controls. A study of cerebrospinal fluid monoamines in 43 children and adolescents with OCD revealed that hydroxyindole acetic acid (5-HIAA), the major metabolite of serotonin, correlated most strongly with response to clomipramine therapy; that is, the most successful regimen had the highest levels of 5-HIAA in the cerebrospinal fluid (Bresnahan et al., 1992). A more recent study, employing positron emission tomography (PET) and serotonin ligands, found evidence for decreased serotonin synthesis in the ventral pallidal cortex and caudate nucleus in treatment-naïve OCD patients 8 to 12 years of age (Rasmussen et al., 1998). The latter study provides support for both the serotonergic hypothesis of OCD and also for dysfunction within the basal ganglia-frontal cortex circuit.

The serotonergic hypothesis is undeniably too simplistic to account for the complexity of OCD if the deficit were limited to serotonin dysfunction, clomipramine

and the SSRI's should be effective in eliminating symptoms in all patients; unfortunately, this is not the case. Partial treatment response to SSRI's is common in OCD, but up to 40 percent of patients will fail to have any significant improvement with SSRI's (Hollister et al., 2000). Individual patients also have variable patterns of response to the different SSRI's, suggesting that the nonantagonistic properties of the medications may also play key roles and that the antidepressional effect may actually result from an alteration in the balance of serotonin and other neurotransmitters under changes in receptor functions (Murray et al., 1990). Support for this hypothesis is provided by the results of meta-analyses demonstrating that clomipramine (a neurochemically relatively nonspecific or "dirty" drug) is significantly more effective than the SSRI's, fluoxetine, sertraline, and citalopram, in the treatment of OCD (Cheatle et al., 1999).

Dopamine and Other Neurotransmitters. Dopamine dysfunction in OCD is suggested not only by the obsessive-compulsive symptoms in patients with basal ganglia disorders but also by the increase in obsessive-compulsive symptoms following high-dose stimulant administration (Frye and Arnold, 1980) and occasional exacerbation of symptoms following dopamine blocking agents (Goodman et al., 1980; McHugh 1995). High-dose stimulant administration has been thought to produce simple stereotypies, rather than more complex compulsive or obsessive behavior; however, "compulsive" symptoms have been observed in children with attention deficit disorder and hyperactivity during treatment with high doses amphetamines (3 mg/kg d-amphetamine or 2 mg/kg methylphenidate) (Buckley et al., 1990). For example, a 7-year-old boy spent several hours each evening vacuuming the carpet in his home, and another played with Legos blocks for 2 days, stopping only to eat and sleep. As in OCD, the children also became overly concerned with details and exacted holes in their papers trying to get a single letter perfectly shaped. However, no psychological distress accompanied the obsessive-compulsive behaviors in the stimulant-induced cases, leading to speculation that repetitive thoughts and behaviors (obsessions and compulsions) may result from dopamine overactivity but that serotonin dysregulation is required for ego-dystonic ones. Observations in Tourette disorder appear to provide support for this hypothesis. In Tourette, tics and vocal tics are not reported to be ego-dystonic (although they may become physically uncomfortable) and appear to result from dopamine tonically overexciting mesiotemporal inhibition. In contrast, if OCD is primarily a serotonergic deficit, the disorder might arise from an inability to inhibit normal dopaminergic activity and the inappropriate release of dopaminergic-derived fixed action patterns (obsessions and compulsions). Hypodopaminergic could then be related to the primary serotonin deficit, or secondary to the loss of relational control (Swedo and Rapoport, 1990).

Neuroendocrine Dysfunction

Although most OCD investigations concentrate on behavioral abnormalities as secondary rather than primary to the disorder, case reports and anecdotal experience suggest that

hormonal dysfunction and OCD may be etiologically related (Swedo, 1992). OCD symptoms often begin during early puberty, and some female patients experience an increase in obsessive thoughts and rituals immediately before their menses. Other hints at an influence of gonadal steroid on obsessive-compulsive symptomatology include the increased frequency of OCD during the postpartum period (Kassamani and Hussain, 1992) and reports of successful antiestrogen therapy for obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Kane et al., 1996). In the latter study, 3 out of 5 patients with OCD experienced amelioration in their symptoms following treatment with cyproterone acetate, a potent antiandrogen. At the NIMH, two boys (ages 10 and 11) and a 14-year-old girl were treated with spironolactone, a peripheral antiandrogen (particularly antiestrogenic), aspirin, and tamoxifen, a peripherally antiestrogenic medication. All experienced a temporary reduction of obsessions and compulsions but relapsed within 3 to 4 months (Sahlgren and Swedo, 1992).

Lockman and colleagues (1994) have suggested that oxytocin abnormalities may be involved in OCD. The investigation site oxytocin-influenced mating behavior in animals as a possible model for some OCD symptoms (Lockman and Meyer, 1990) and found plasma concentrations of corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF)-oxytocin among a small group of children with OCD and the disorders. In a larger group of 46 children and adolescents studied at the NIMH, CRF oxytocin levels were not significantly correlated with OCD severity but were correlated with depressive symptoms (Swedo et al., 1992). Interestingly, plasma vasopressin (AVP) concentrations decreased following treatment with clomipramine (Abraira et al., 1992), although baseline concentrations had shown a negative correlation with symptom severity (Swedo et al., 1992). In adult patients with OCD, significantly increased CRF-AVP concentrations at baseline were found, and it was noted that patients secreted significantly more AVP into plasma in response to hypertonic saline than did controls (Abraira et al., 1992). These latter results are in keeping with Reutter's (1986) observations of OCD among patients with diabetes insipidus, a disorder with elevated central AVP concentrations.

At present, there is not sufficient evidence to implicate hormonal dysfunction as a direct cause of OCD. However, some intriguing data build a circumstantial case for an association between OCD and growth hormone abnormalities, perhaps through the serotonergic system. In the epidemiological study of OCD among high school students, described earlier, males with OCD were noted to be smaller and lighter than the community of normal controls (Maseret et al., 1988). This was also shown to be true of males with other anxiety disorders (Hamburger et al., 1992). There were no reductions in the height or weight of the adolescent girls with OCD. The small size of the OCD males could be due to an effervescent lack of growth hormone, or to a delay in the pubertal growth spurt, although, of course, no causality is demonstrated by the relationship. To address the issue of causality, future research might employ direct assays, hormonal challenges, or therapeutic interventions.

Genetics

Obsessive-compulsive disorder had been viewed as an inherited disorder long before recent advances in molecular biology allowed clinical researchers to isolate the genetic

incidence of illness (for additional information, see Chapter 14). Genetic factors associated with OCD have been demonstrated in a number of ways, family genetic, segregation, and gene association studies (Wolff et al., 2000). Twin studies are often the best indicator of a genetic diathesis, and the concordance rate for OCD among monozygotic twins has been reported to be as high as 65 percent (Rasmussen and Tsuang, 1986). A familial study measures the risk for OCD in the relatives of a proband with OCD to that of the general population or a control group; if this risk is found to be significantly higher in the relatives, the illness is considered to be heritable. The familial rates of OCD and subclinical OCD have been found to be 18 times higher than expected (Pauls et al., 1995; Nicolai et al., 1995), although this demonstration is not in itself sufficient to determine genetic transmission. Segregation analysis uses the pattern of illness within a sample of families to ascertain if this pattern could have been predicted from basic Mendelian genetic principles. Evidence of this nature for OCD suggests that some genes contributing major effects are associated with the transmission of this disorder (Moyzis et al., 1991; Alektrynk et al., 1999). Both linkage analyses and association studies have located genetic markers and candidate genes that appear promising in isolating persons with OCD. The next step in understanding the genetics of OCD is the replication of these studies and the localization and characterization of the genes that confer susceptibility. As with other psychiatric disorders, multiple genes are expected to play an etiologic role.

Neuroimmunological Substrates

Parallels between Systemic lupus (SC), the neurologic manifestation of rheumatic fever, and childhood-onset OCD suggest that the two disorders may have a shared etiopathogenesis (Darwy et al., 1998). The disorders have similar regional localizations, with evidence of dysfunction of the caudate-frontal-striatal circuitry in both OCD and SC. Further, over 70 percent of children with SC report that they have experienced an abrupt onset of repetitive, unwanted thoughts and behavior 2 to 4 weeks prior to the onset of their disease (Fuchs et al., 1993). The obsessions and compulsions peak in intensity concomitantly with the disease and usually wane shortly over the ensuing months. A subgroup of patients older with childhood-onset OCD was noted to have a similar symptom course. The OCD exacerbations occurred following Group A beta-hemolytic streptococcal (GABHS) infections, accompanied by a cluster of somatic symptoms, including emotional lability, separation anxiety, and attentional difficulties (Freud et al., 1998). The children were young (6 to 7 years old at symptom onset), predominantly male, and often had comorbid tics. To indicate their shared clinical features (and presumed etiopathogenesis), the subgroup was identified by the acronym PANDAS—pediatric autoimmune neuropsychiatric disorders associated with streptococcal infections (Freud et al., 1998).

The major distinguishing feature of the PANDAS subgroup is the temporal association between neuropsychiatric symptom exacerbations and GABHS infections—that is, positive (or rising) anti-streptococcal antibody titers or a positive throat culture during neuropsychiatric symptom relapses and evidence of GABHS negativity during

periods of remission (Purkerson et al., 1998). This one-to-one correlation is necessary to distinguish GAD65-triggered exacerbations of the PANDAS subgroup from the more typical "waking and waking worse" seen in Tourette disorder and some cases of childhood-onset OCD. The temporal association between GAD65 infections and neuropsychiatric symptom exacerbations suggests that prevention of the infections might result in decreased severity of the obsessive-compulsive symptoms. An 8-month long placebo-controlled crossover trial of penicillin prophylaxis was undertaken (4 months of penicillin followed by 4 months of placebo, or the reverse) (Clayton et al., 1999). The penicillin prophylaxis failed to achieve the primary objective of significantly reducing GAD65 infections (14 of 35 infections occurred during the penicillin phase), so it was not surprising that there were no between-phase differences in OCD or tic severity. However, poor compliance appeared to contribute to penicillin's lack of effect because all missed doses were frequent.

The role of the immune system in the etiology of OCD and tic disorders is unclear, but clinical observations suggest that symptoms result from a combination of local, regional, and systemic abnormalities (Hamilton et al., 2001). Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans reveal enlargement of the caudate, putamen, and globus pallidus, which points to regional inflammatory changes (Giedd et al., 1996, 2001), while local autoimmune reactions are suggested by the presence of serum antibodies that cross-react with neurons of these same brain regions (Kleisteng et al., 1994). Shaub and colleagues were the first to describe autoantibodies in Systemic lupus erythematosus. Although the antibodies were labeled "autocontrol," the investigators postulated that the antibodies must have been raised against epitopes on the GAD65 bacteria and then cross-reacted with cells of the caudate nucleus and substantia nigra. It was the cross-reactivity that distinguished the antibodies found in the SC patients from autoantibodies found in patients with systemic lupus erythematosus and other neurological disorders (Shaub et al., 1995). Several groups have subsequently reported the presence of autoantibodies in patients with childhood-onset OCD and tic disorders (Singal et al., 1998; Mordt et al., 2001).

The striking effectiveness of immunomodulatory therapies, such as therapeutic plasma exchange and intravenous immunoglobulin (IVIG) suggests that there is systemic involvement, at least among severely affected individuals. A randomized, placebo-controlled trial of IVIG and plasma exchange was conducted on 29 children in the PANDAS subgroup of the NIMH (Purkerson et al., 1999). Both of these immunomodulatory therapies produced significant improvements in neuropsychiatric symptom severity—placebo administered had no detectable effect on obsessive-compulsive symptoms at 1-month follow-up, while IVIG and plasma exchange treatments had produced mean symptom reductions of 45 and 58 percent (respectively). One-year follow-up revealed that 14 of 17 children (82 percent) continued to be "much" or "very much" improved from baseline (Purkerson et al., 1999). The effectiveness of the immunomodulatory therapies suggests that circulating immune factors play a role in the pathophysiology of the symptoms, but no specific hypothesis can be formulated on the basis of the known response because of the broad spectrum of action of both IVIG and plasma exchange.

TREATMENT

Recent therapeutic advances have stimulated a considerable increase in research on OCD. Much of this research has focused on the neuroimaging system and the neurobiology of the corticostriato-thalamocortical circuitry. Not only have changes in regional brain function been demonstrated among OCD patients responding to pharmacological treatment but also among those with a good response to cognitive-behavior therapy (Baxter et al., 1996; Schwartz et al., 1998). The finding that both behavior therapy and pharmacotherapy are able to alter biological systems is further evidence that OCD is a "brain-based" disorder.

The treatment of OCD requires an integrated approach, as it is unusual for patients to respond fully to either cognitive-behavior therapy (CBT) or medication. A combination of behavioral and pharmacological approaches provides the maximum benefit for most patients. Obsessive-compulsive disorder is a chronic condition, and long-term therapy is often required, although lower medication doses may be fine during the later stages of treatment (Mervielis et al., 1998). Discontinuation studies have shown that 80 patients of whom have relapsed by 2-year follow-up (Doherty et al., 1998), although the rate is somewhat lower among patients receiving combined CBT (Shadley and Turner, 1999). When discontinuation is attempted, tapering should be gradual, usually over several weeks. Long-term or lifetime drug maintenance is suggested after 3 to 4 relapses.

Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy

Cognitive-behavioral therapy for OCD encompasses three treatment types: (1) exposure and response prevention (ERP), (2) cognitive therapy, and (3) relaxation training. Of the three, only ERP has been shown to be consistently effective in reducing OCD symptomatology (Shaffer, 1998; Basur and Crisp, 1997; Marks, 1997). Cognitive therapy is the changing of false beliefs regarding risk and responsibility, thereby challenging the reality of obsessions and the necessity for compulsions (Kazdin and Baier, 1998). It is generally viewed as ineffective if used as the sole treatment for OCD (Neurothiglo et al., 2000), but may be helpful in facilitating participation in ERP (Shaffer and Simek, 1998). Relaxation therapy is used mainly to manage anxiety during exposure but has not been shown to have direct benefits for the obsessive-compulsive symptoms (March, 1995).

Exposure and response prevention for OCD involves (1) daily exposure to cues avoided because of their inducing discomfort and/or guilt/rewards and (2) maintaining exposure and not rituals for at least an hour or until the discomfort slowly subsides (Graet, 1998; March, 1995). A typical trial of ERP consists of 10 to 20 hours of treatment with both exposure and response prevention (Basur and Crisp, 1997), with *in vivo* exposure being preferable to imagined exposure (Paxil et al., 1998). Therapists employed must be tailored to the patient's specific symptoms. Contamination fears, symmetry rituals, counting/requring, hoarding, and aggressive urges are amenable to ERP, but the technique is not generally appropriate for pathological doubt, or pure obsessions, such as scrupulosity or violent images. Of note, obsessional slurs and swearing

symptoms are difficult to treat with either behavioral therapy or medications (Wolff and Rapoport, 1988). Exposure with response prevention has been reported to produce long-lasting benefits, particularly when booster sessions are utilized to address migrations of symptoms and relapses brought on by stress (Dixit, 1998).

Therapist-directed ERP has been shown to be the most effective means of treating OCD (Amenzette, 1998). However, the shortage of trained therapists and expense of therapist-directed ERP mandated the development of alternative strategies. Several self-help programs for behavior therapy have been developed, including computer- and telephone-administered programs (Kazdin and Green, 1997; Clark et al., 1998). Self-administered therapies have also proven successful for both adults (Van Knippen et al., 1997) and pediatric patients (March et al., 1994; March and Mello, 1994). In general, ERP appears to confer similar benefits in the pediatric population as it does for adults (March et al., 2001). The child must be old enough to understand fully the goals and requirements of treatment and to tolerate the discomfort inherent to exposure.

Pharmacotherapy

Repetitive response inhibitors have been shown to be the most effective pharmacologic treatment for OCD. If there is insufficient response to an SSRI at 10 to 12 weeks, another SSRI may be tried. Although only 50 to 60 percent of patients respond to initial SSRI treatment, approximately 70 to 80 percent will have at least a partial response to at least one of the SSRIs. To date, no baseline predictors of treatment response have been identified. Augmentation with other agents may be helpful for partial responders, particularly when somatic side effects are present (McDougle, 1997).

Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors. Clomipramine (ClU) was the first SSRI to be shown to be effective for OCD (Clomipramine Collaborative Study Group, 1991), with subsequent controlled trials documenting antidepressant effects of the selective SSRIs (clomipramine, fluoxetine, sertraline, paroxetine, and citalopram) (in order of increasing selectivity). All have been shown to be effective in multicenter double-blind trials (see Nishihara et al., 2000; for review of adult studies; Rapoport and Moff-Garnier, 2000, for review of pediatric studies).

Table 23-2 gives the dosage ranges of the SSRIs for treatment of adult and pediatric patients, as well as the half-life of the compounds. To avoid difficulties with adverse effects, it is advisable to initiate therapy with low dosages and titrate upward slowly over a period of a few weeks. Patients should be warned that the medication takes time to work and that an adequate trial is usually at least 10 weeks in duration (or maximally tolerated dosage). Patients should also be told that trials of more than one agent or use of augmenting agents may be required to achieve an optimal result.

Recent research in adults, including one placebo-controlled study, indicates that intravenous administration of ClU both speeds initial response and increases response rates even among previously nonresponsive patients (Oliver et al., 1998; Saito et al., 1998). The hypothesized mechanism of effect for intravenous ClU involves the greater bioavailability of the more serotoninergic parent compound versus the more metabolically inert clomipramine, as a result of bypassing first-pass hepatic enzyme

TABLE 13.2. Serotonin Receptor Inhibitor (SR) Treatment of OCD/Metabolite of Fluoxetine Phenotyping Activity

Drug	Adult Doseage	Pediatric/Children Doseage	Half-life
Clomipramine	Up to 200 mg/day	Controlled trials open = 0.5-10 µg, 1.5-2.5 mg/kg, up to 5 mg/kg	12-24 h
Fluoxetine	Up to 60 mg/day	Controlled trials open = 0.5 µg, 1.5-2.5 mg	40-100 h Metabolite (norfluoxetine) half-life: adult (N=PLX) = 7-10 days
Paroxetine	Up to 200 mg/day	Individualized open = 0.5 µg, 0.5-1.0 mg/day	12-24 h
Sertindole	Up to 200 mg/day	Individualized open = 0.5 µg, 0.5-1.0 mg/day	24 h
Propantheline	Up to 60 mg/day	Open trial in 9-17 yr. no pediatric indications	24 h
Clorgyline	Up to 60 mg/day indicated for treatment of depression, and OCDs	Open trial in 9-18 yr. no pediatric indications	25 h

metabolites. Following the initial intravenous (IV) infusion, clomipramine therapy is maintained orally. Experience in pediatric patients is limited, but two open trials and two placebo-controlled trials suggest that IV clomipramine may offer therapeutic benefits in children, as well (Ballek et al., 1999).

Other Medications. Clomipramine is a tricyclicamine with serotonergic properties and anticholinergic effects (Fisch et al., 1997). This medication has also been found to significantly improve symptom ratings of OCD severity when 3 to 4 mg/day was added to cognitive behavior or clomipramine therapy (Pigeon et al., 1992a). A case report of pediatric efficacy has also been published (Leverenz et al., 1994).

Bupropion is a partial agonist of the 5-HT_{1A} serotonin receptor and appears to enhance serotonergic neurotransmission. Open trials had suggested benefit of bupropion augmentation of SSRI's, but placebo-controlled trials failed to demonstrate significant benefit when bupropion was added to clomipramine (Pigeon et al., 1992b), fluvoxamine (McDougle et al., 1994), or fluoxetine therapy (Klady et al., 1993).

Neuroleptics, such as haloperidol, have been shown to be useful as augmenting agents, particularly in cases with comorbid tic disorders. Haloperidol (mean dose 0.2 to 0.3 mg/day) demonstrated significant improvements when given in conjunction with fluoxamine therapy. Fifteen of 17 (88 percent) patients randomized to receive haloperidol responded to therapy, while none of the 17 patients receiving placebo had significant treatment gains. Further, three of 8 patients with comorbid tics had a significant reduction in OCD symptom severity (McDougle et al., 1999). Pediatric experience with haloperidol has been limited in OCD, although it is used frequently in children

and adolescents with tic disorders (Lockman et al., 1997). Fluoxetine was noted to be of significant benefit among 9 of 17 patients previously nonresponsive to clomipramine therapy (McDougle et al., 1998). Because of the long-term risks of tardive dyskinesia occurring with neuroleptic administration, these should only be considered if typical antidepressants are ineffective.

Risperidone is an atypical antipsychotic medication with demonstrated benefits as an augmenting agent in OCD. Out of 18 patients with treatment-refractory obsessive-compulsive disorder maintained on an SSRI, 14 (78 percent) had a significant reduction in OCD severity within 3 weeks after the addition of risperidone (Barlow et al., 1998). Of particular interest, given the treatment-refractory nature of violent obsessive thoughts, patients with this symptom were most likely to respond and to demonstrate significant benefits after only a few days of augmentation (Barlow et al., 1998). Augmentation with risperidone to paroxetine or sertraline treatment was also found to be effective for pediatric patients with treatment OCD and tic disorders (Lockman et al., 1997).

SUMMARY

Great progress has been made in the recognition and treatment of OCD. Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors and behavior therapy techniques (particularly exposure with response prevention) provide relief from both compulsive rituals and obsessional anxiety. Advances in neuroimaging and neurophysiologic technologies have opened new vistas for understanding the biological basis of OCD, while increased knowledge of the genetics of the disorder and novel pathophysiological models hold promise for the development of better strategies for treatment and prevention of OCD. Until that time, it is important to maximize the recognition and treatment of this treatable disorder by educating parents and primary care physicians about the symptoms of OCD and mental health professionals about the wide range of effective therapies.

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BIOLOGICAL BASIS OF CHILDHOOD NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS

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INTRODUCTION

Our understanding of the biological basis of childhood neuropsychiatric disorders has improved dramatically over the past two decades. Some would argue that the advances made in understanding the biological basis of childhood disorders have outstripped those for adult-onset disorders. This improved understanding has been made possible primarily by technological advances in the fields of genetics, molecular biology, and neuroimaging. Many childhood neuropsychiatric illnesses have a strong genetic basis, and the application of the methodologies for family and genetic studies have begun to identify the precise genetic determinants for several of these conditions. In addition, the introduction of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) as a research tool in the 1980s has allowed the safe study of brain tissue in living children over time, and this has helped immensely to identify the neuroanatomical and functional correlates of disease throughout development in the majority of childhood illnesses. Finding these

genetic, molecular biological, and brain imaging studies have helped to refine clinical phenotypes that have helped guide and improve studies that employ these biologically based methodologies in the study of brain disorders in children.

No single review can cover adequately the entire range of biological findings for all childhood neuropsychiatric disorders, nor the range of therapies for these many conditions. Our aim here is therefore to provide an overview of many of the most dramatic and important advances in our understanding of the biology of these illnesses. These advances, and the research strategies that make them possible, will likely serve as models or paradigms for future biologically based research of disorders in which recent advances have not been so dramatic. Thus the conditions considered herein will be those within the broad domains of pervasive developmental disorder and specific genetic conditions (autism, Rett syndrome, fragile X, Williams syndrome, Angelman and Prader-Willi syndromes), childhood-onset schizophrenia, and disorders of impulse control (especially Tourette syndrome, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder). Whenever possible, discussion will include a review of the clinical phenotype, genetics, neurochemistry, and neurobiological substrate for each disorder. We will suggest ways in which findings in each of these domains relate to one another, so as to provide a coherent understanding of the pathophysiology of the condition. Many more references exist for the numerous findings that are cited herein; because of space constraints, only the most recent have been included.

PERVERSIVE DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS AND "SPECIFIC" GENETIC SYNDROMES

Autism

Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder. This means that autism is characterized by specific delays and deviance in social, communication, and cognitive development that are typically manifested within the first five years of life. Although often associated with mental retardation, the disturbances in these domains are both qualitatively distinct from and quantitatively disproportionate to the mental age (intelligence quotient [IQ]) of the individual who exhibits them. The diagnostic criteria for autism currently emphasize disturbances in three broad areas of developmental dysfunction. These include (1) qualitative disturbances in social interaction, such as impaired use of behavioral behaviors, failure to develop peer relationships, and poor social reciprocity; (2) qualitative disturbances in communication, such as a significant delay in the development of spoken language, or inability to sustain a spoken conversation, stereotyped use of language, or paucity of symbolic or initiatory play; and (3) restricted, repetitive behaviors and interests, such as motor stereotypies and rigid adherence to specific, nonfunctional routines or rituals. Symptoms must manifest clearly by the third year of life. The majority of outcome studies of autism support that its defining symptoms continue into adulthood, although some individuals can improve substantially in their overall level of functioning. Low IQ (especially IQs below 70), poor language functioning, and the degree of deficits in socialization are the best predictors of continuing

major disability into adulthood. A substantial minority will, however, develop autism disorders in late childhood, adolescence, or early adulthood that continue into late life.

Autism is a brain-based illness of unknown etiology. Prevalence estimates range from 0.7 to 2.1 in 10,000, with increasing prevalence reported over the past 20 years (Risch et al., 1999). Although the rising prevalence could be caused by an increasing exposure to environmental pathogens, experts generally assume that it can be attributed to improved case recognition and more inclusive diagnostic criteria. Males are roughly 4 times more likely than females to be affected.

Approximately 3 to 5 percent of individuals with autism are also diagnosed with tuberous sclerosis, and, conversely, 20 to 40 percent of tuberous sclerosis patients have autism. Siblings affect 20 to 30 percent, and 25 percent of autistic individuals are mentally retarded (Szatmari et al., 1998). Many will have physical anomalies, neurological soft signs, primitive reflexes, or nonspecific abnormalities on electroencephalography (EEG). Autism is not infrequently diagnosed in association with various specific medical conditions, such as phenylketonuria, chromosomal deletion syndromes, Prader-Willi syndrome, Angelman's syndrome, or fragile X syndrome. It can also be a consequence of prenatal or postnatal infections, such as congenital rubella (Kline et al., 1990). Environmental toxins, vaccinations, and immunological disturbances have been suggested in the etiology of autism, although evidence for these as pathogens is weak (Baird et al., 1994; Taylor et al., 2002).

Some investigators have hypothesized the presence of a single, unitary neurophysiological deficit in the etiology of autism. Proposed candidates for this deficit range from poor sensory gating, impaired attachment, and social emotional disturbances, to higher order cognitive deficits involved in "theory of mind" and "logical coherence" (Sigman and Mundy, 1999; Bacon-Cohen, 1991; Happé et al., 2001). If a unitary neurophysiological deficit does cause autistic symptoms, then it probably functions as a final common pathway to illness because the etiology of autism is almost certainly heterogeneous and multifactorial, not unitary. Indeed, autism is increasingly viewed as a spectrum of diseases that include Asperger syndrome and other syndromes that have disabilities in socialization as their core feature, although the neurobiological causes of the socialization deficits are multiple and unknown. Some conditions, such as Fragile X and Rett syndromes, can present with autistic features, although they are now recognized as clinically distinct and genetically specific diagnostic entities. No doubt other genetically specified subtypes of autism will emerge in the future from the use of powerful new molecular biological techniques.

Genetics. Twin and family studies suggest that autism is one of the most strongly genetic of all the multifactorial, neuropsychiatric disorders affecting children. Consistent twin studies in autism have shown a pairwise concordance rate of 30 percent in monozygotic twins and near 8 percent in dizygotic twins (Hibbs and Risch, 1977; Kety et al., 1998). Concordance in nontetraploid twins is even higher if older autistic spectrum conditions are considered in the concordance assessments (Szatmari et al., 1999). Family studies indicate that the risk of developing autism in a sibling of an affected individual is 5% to 25%–fold higher than in the general population, although

the actual risk for any individual sitting, at 2 to 8 percent, is still small (August et al., 1991). Family studies have not yet yielded convincing models for a single mode of genetic transmission.

Several full genome scans have failed to identify susceptibility loci with certainty, although regions of chromosomes 7 and 13 have yielded promising leads (Mazzanti et al., 2005; Skov et al., 2005; Radler and Cleaveland, 2002). The regions on 7q are near sites already identified in the production of the protein Merlin (at 7q11) (see Chapter 7), and the regions on 13q overlap with genes involved in the encoding of various gamma-aminobutyric acid A (GABA_A) receptor subunits. Other promising leads include loci on chromosomes 3, 5, 8, and 19 (Liu et al., 2005; Asztalos et al., 2002).

An additional strategy in the search for genes involved in autism has been to focus on candidate genes known to modulate social processes in animals. Thus, the promoter regions for the endogenous opiate, oxytocin, and oxytocin receptor genes are currently being investigated (Cassidy et al., 1999). Other candidate genes being studied intensively include those related to serotonergic and GABAergic neurotransmitter pathways (Anderson and Cook, 2000). Of the various genetic factors that contribute to the emergence of autistic symptoms, many may be susceptibility factors that interact with nongenetic influences, such as perinatal problems, obstetrical complications, or environmental toxins (Bodens et al., 1997).

Neurochemistry. Neurochemical systems have been studied extensively in autistic children. The majority of studies of the dopaminergic neurotransmitter system in individuals with autism have yielded either negative or contradictory findings. Homovanillic acid (HVA), a dopamine metabolite measurement in cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) and urine have been especially contradictory, whereas urinary measures of dopamine and plasma prolactin (which rises under strong inhibition caused from serial Doppler reviews) have been normal (Mistretta et al., 1992; Narins et al., 1995).

Measures of the basal functioning of adrenergic and noradrenergic systems in plasma, urine, saliva, and CSF have been consistently normal in autistic children (Bartolucci et al., 1986; Mistretta et al., 1994), whereas most studies have reported exaggerated responses of these systems and of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis to acute stress among autistic subjects (Cook, 1990; Tostijman et al., 1993). These neurochemical findings are consistent with the hyperarousal, marked hyporeactivity, and anxiety often noted clinically in autistic children in response to novel experiences.

The most consistent neurochemical findings in autistic individuals have been those suggestive of hypoarousal. Platelet serotonin [5-hydroxytryptamine (5-HT)], thought to be a good peripheral indicator of central 5-HT, is consistently and robustly elevated (by nearly a standard deviation). The behavioral significance and cause of this well-replicated finding, however, is still unclear. It appears not to be caused by altered 5-HT metabolism or by increased basal levels of 5-HT in plasma; thus the platelet's handling of 5-HT seems the most likely locus of the 5-HT disturbance. Despite intensive research on the issue, no clear abnormality in platelet uptake or efflux of 5-HT has yet been demonstrated (Thivierge et al., 2000; Anderson et al., 2002).

Human activity of the endogenous opioid system has been quantitated in autistics based on observations in both humans and animals that administration of opiate-enriched pre-

social withdrawal, self-injurious behaviors, stereotypies, and diminished pain sensitivity (Panksepp et al., 1979). Although this hypothesis suggested that opioid antagonists could be therapeutic in autism, double-blind, placebo-controlled trials of the antipsychotic haloperidol have yielded either marginally positive, negative, or contradictory findings (Campbell et al., 1993; Risiard et al., 1995; Kolomai et al., 1995; Willemsen-Smeenk et al., 1995; Willemsen-Smeenk et al., 1996; Kolomai et al., 1997). Plasma levels of the opioid peptide beta-endorphin may not be relevant to levels in the central nervous system (CNS), and findings for CSE endorphins have been inconsistent in autistic individuals (Miguelis et al., 1997). Thus, more research is needed before the role of the endogenous opioid system in the etiology of autism is fully clarified (see Chapter 2).

Neurobiological Substrates. Several animal models have been proposed for autism. One model involves bilateral lesions of the amygdala of monkey macaques. These lesions can produce social isolation, gaze-avoidance, reduced facial expressivity, and motor stereotypies that emerge gradually during later development, reminiscent of the natural history of autistic symptoms (Rutherford, 1998). These monkeys, when imaged by autoradiography, have abnormalities in the concentrations of neurotransmitter metabolites within frontal cortex and altered dopaminergic activity in both frontal and basal ganglia regions (Bertelson et al., 1992; Baumohl et al., 1992). Amygdala damage in adults does not produce these kinds of behavioral or metabolic disturbances. Findings from this animal model suggest that early developmental disturbances in the DSBH system are capable of generating behavioral abnormalities in animals that have at least superficial similarities to the symptoms of autism.

Another animal model for autistic behavior comes from rhesus macaque studies of social deprivation early in postnatal life. Total isolation of monkeys as juveniles produces self-directed oral and clasping behaviors, fearfulness, social isolation from peers, and a profound inability to initiate offspring in adulthood (Hudson et al., 1992). These isolates to some extent can be "rehabilitated" when exposed to "fostered" monkeys who promote nonaggressive physical contact (Soren, 1977). Although the neural systems that are developmentally disrupted by early social deprivation are unknown, this model has received increasing attention in recent studies of autism, as profound disturbances in social relationships have come to light in children raised in relative social isolation within Eastern European orphanages. Neurobiological studies of these children, some of whom have autistic-like symptoms, are underway (Matay et al., 1996; O'Connor, 2001).

Although postmortem studies of autistic individuals have yielded variable or conflicting results, reported abnormalities include abnormal size, density, and dendrit arborization of neurons in the amygdala, hippocampus, and entorhinal cortex (Gutman and Kemper, 1994, 1995). Also noted was a decrease in size of the cerebellum, which was attributable in part to decreases in the number of Purkinje cells and variable reductions in the number of granule cells throughout the cerebellar hemispheres (Gutman and Kemper, 1994, 1995).

In vivo human studies have provided an increasing body of evidence that overall brain size is increased in autistic individuals, measured both as exterior head

circumference (Luthert et al., 1977) and an overall brain volume in neuroimaging studies (Price et al., 1986). The brain regions that contribute most to this overall increase in brain size include temporal, parietal, and occipital cortices (Price et al., 1986), although the functional significance of the cerebral volume expansion and the timing of its origins are unknown. General origins of diseased brain development have been suggested by case reports of polymicrogyria, microgyria, and schizencephaly—morphological abnormalities that are believed to originate from abnormal neuronal migration during fetal life (Bailey et al., 1988). Volume expansion of the cerebrum could be a consequence of any number of disturbances in cellular growth, differentiation, and development, including abnormal neuronal or glial cell proliferation, neuronal migration, apoptosis, arrest, or dendrite arborization, or myelination.

Clinicopathological investigations in autism have focused largely on the morphology and function of the limbic system within the temporal lobe as the source of the profound social and emotional disturbances in the illness. Case studies have reported autistic behaviors associated with temporal lobe lesions (Gillberg, 1991; Hoos and Koenig, 1992). Tumors from inferior sclerosis, if located within the temporal lobe, are believed to be especially likely to produce autism, probably by disrupting electrophysiological function in the temporal lobe (Scheffers and Critchley, 1991). Reduced basal local activity in the temporal lobes has been reported in single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) study of autistic subjects (Mountz et al., 1985). While anatomical subregions of the temporal lobe, the possible role of the amygdala in autism has received particular emphasis, as it plays a central role in assigning significance to environmental stimuli and modulating emotional learning (LeDoux, 1986). Anatomical imaging studies of the amygdala have been small and they have employed vastly different methodologies. Their findings, not surprisingly, have been inconsistent, with both smaller and larger volumes reported (Abell et al., 1989; Aguirre et al., 1989).

Other temperoparietal regions have been implicated in the pathophysiology of autism. Functional MRI (fMRI) studies, for example, have reported that the fusiform gyrus, a specific region on the ventral surface of the temporal cortex, fails to respond fully in autistic adults to the faces fare during perceptual tasks (Critchley et al., 2000; Schmitz et al., 2000). These studies may help to clarify the neural correlate of the cognitive deficits in facial recognition, memory, and imitation that have been demonstrated repeatedly in autistic individuals (Huber, 1998; Beucher and Lewis, 1993; Klin et al., 1999).

Other brain regions, particularly frontal lobes, have been implicated by imaging studies in the etiology of autism. fMRI-based measures of phospholipid metabolism, for example, have suggested the presence of excessive membrane degradation in the dorsal prefrontal cortices of autistic individuals (Minshew et al., 1999). Blood flow and metabolism in the frontal lobe is reportedly reduced (Kinsbourne et al., 1971), as is dopaminergic activity, in medial prefrontal cortex (Inati et al., 1991). These dorsomedial regions of the prefrontal cortex are thought to subserve cognitive processes involved in socialization, including the ability to think about the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of other people (Baron-Cohen et al., 1994; Giedd et al., 1996). These cognitive capacities, termed metarepresentational thinking, or theory of mind, are required

by many as the core processes that are disrupted in the mental life of autistic people. Other brain imaging studies have suggested abnormalities in markers for neuronal numbers, metabolism, and several messenger systems that are widespread throughout the brains of young autistic children (Friedman et al., 2001).

One brain region that has long been the center of controversy in autism research is the cerebellum. A report of reduced volumes of cerebral lobules VI and VII initially presented such enrichment (Courchesne et al., 1988). Subsequent studies, however, did not replicate the findings, particularly when controlling for subject characteristics such as age, sex, and IQ (Belman et al., 1992; Fries et al., 1992). A subsequent reanalysis of data from previous work suggested that volumes of lobules VI and VII might be bimodally distributed in autistic subjects and unimodally distributed in control subjects (Courchesne et al., 1994). This bimodal distribution, if real, would argue for the existence of both hypoplastic and hyperplastic subtypes, but the matter is not yet resolved. Reported brainstem abnormalities include absent or abnormal nuclei of the cerebral nerves or the superior oliveary nucleus (Keller et al., 1996).

Rett Syndrome

Rett syndrome (RS) has a prevalence of 1 in 10,000. Although first accepted as a distinct clinical entity only in 1983, progress in understanding the pathophysiology of RS has been spectacular. The phenotype of RS falls within the autism spectrum. Unlike autism, however, the symptoms of RS typically emerge only after a period of normal development, and they affect females almost exclusively. One of the most common first symptoms is the loss of purposeful hand movements, which are often replaced by incessant hand-wringing. Other symptoms anticipate non-emergence. An arrest of language development and profound cognitive delays are seen in the majority. Play and motor skills are lost in more than half the cases. Regression most commonly occurs between 12 and 18 months of age, but it can be noted as early as 6 months or as late as 30 months (Charman et al., 2002). Growth retardation, microcephaly, ataxia, gait disturbance, and seizures are also common (Haugen, 2002). The EEG in RS children is invariably abnormal, showing focal, multifocal, or generalized epileptiform abnormalities and rhythmic slow-wave (theta) activity, primarily in frontocentral regions (Glaze, 2002).

Genetics. The genetic defect for RS has been narrowed to a region of the X chromosome (Xq27.3-Yq11). Being a dominant gene, the mutation for RS is thought to be lethal to males before birth. Females who have a single X chromosome are spared death during fetal development and later life because one of the two X chromosomes in each of the postmitotic cells is randomly inactivated, leaving a significant subset of cells with normally functioning X chromosomes (Armstrong, 2002). All known mutations that are associated with RS in this region have been shown to affect the MeCP2 gene, which encodes methyl-CpG binding protein 2, a ubiquitous cytosine-methylated (DNMT)-binding protein. MeCP2 has high affinity for binding to methylated CpG dinucleotides. When the MeCP2 protein binds to these dinucleotides within the promoter region of a gene, a complex is formed that contains the CpxII dimethylcysteine,

MycP2 protein, a co-repressor (SMAD), and certain enzymes (histone deacetylases). This complex then deacetylates histones associated with the chromatin, making the chromatin more compact and thereby repressing transcription of downstream genes (Van den Meirlierck and Zoetewij, 2002).

More than 200 mutations in the *MycP2* gene have been reported. Nonsense, missense, or frameshift mutations are detected in more than 85 percent of affected girls. More than 60 percent of the mutations cause recurrent tyrosine-to-threonine substitutions in a codon for arginine (R261) or one of 8 different mutations for spots-containing Cys1 dipeptides. In 10 percent of cases, recurrent methionine codon deletion have been noted in the C-terminal region of the gene (Van den Meirlierck and Zoetewij, 2002). *MycP2* is normally abundantly present in most neurons and in many body tissues, especially lung and spleen, and it tends to be expressed increasingly in cell culture. Most of the known mutations of the *MycP2* gene are predicted to produce total or partial loss of function of the *MycP2* protein.

The normal developmental function of the *MycP2* gene seems to be to assist maturational programs in many body tissues by silencing numerous other genes that are expressed earlier in development (Subbarao et al., 2002b). The failure of this global transcriptional repressor may allow biochemical processes earlier early in development to proceed with little regulation. This failure of gene "silencing" is thought to most easily to trigger the emergence of RS symptoms. The phenotypic variability in RS symptoms is presumably related to the many alternative ways in which the gene can be spliced, which would produce variable patterns and degrees of disruption in neural brain development. The degree of X-chromosome inactivation within the brain is also thought to be a major determinant of the clinical phenotype and disease severity (Van den Meirlierck and Zoetewij, 2002).

An alternative theory relating the *MycP2* mutation and the timing of emergence of symptoms is that compounds expressed early in brain development are not expressed as they normally would be. These compounds may actually be toxic when present in excess, and it takes time for them to accumulate postnatally. When their concentration reaches a certain threshold, they might damage neurons and disrupt normal brain function. It is at this time that the symptoms of RS would then emerge, after a period of relatively normal brain development and the attainment of normal early maturation milestones. The recent development of an *MycP2* knockout mouse that has neurological symptoms similar to those of RS should be helpful for evaluating the merits of these competing, though not necessarily mutually exclusive theories, and it may offer promise for developing genetically based therapeutic interventions (Subbarao et al., 2002a).

Anatomopathological features. Consistent with the hypothesized role of *MycP2* in repressing the expression of early developmental genes, histology of tissue from individuals with RS suggests the presence of a developmental immaturity (Belshazzar et al., 1994; Cornfield et al., 1994), including reductions of neurotransmitter metabolites and nerve growth factor (Lakkaraju et al., 1999; Ligeti et al., 2000). Histological immaturity is similarly seen in many body tissues of individuals who have RS (Armstrong, 2002).

The regions of the brain that are most dysfunctional and responsible for the generation of symptoms in RSI are unknown. Imaging studies have reported higher levels of choline and lower levels of *N*-acetylaspartate (NAA, a positive marker of neuronal viability) in RSI (Bartzokis et al., 2000; Khong et al., 2002). Regional glucose metabolism, assessed with positron emission tomography (PET), shows reduced occipital cortical and increased cerebellar activity (Vilimsky et al., 2002). Benzodiazepine (BDZ) receptor binding as measured with SPECT seems reduced in their temporal cortices (Yamashita et al., 1999).

Taken together, existing imaging studies suggest the presence of neuronal pathology and reduced metabolism primarily in frontal cortices, although additional disturbances have been reported in parietal, temporal, and cerebellar tissues. These functional anomalies certainly are involved in higher-level cognitive processes that develop later than primary sensory, memory association, and motor cortices. Such deficits are consistent with the theories of maturation arrest and toxicity caused by deficient production of MeCP2 protein early in development.

Fragile X

Fragile X, a relatively common form of mental retardation caused by a single mutation on the long arm of the X chromosome, occurs once in every 2000 to 4000 live births. Approximately 30 percent of such children exhibit autistic symptoms. Conversely, 6 percent of males and 1 percent of females diagnosed with autism carry the fragile X abnormality. This mutation alters brain development and produces a distinctive physical, cognitive, and neuropsychiatric phenotype. Clinical symptoms are insufficient to make the fragile X diagnosis. Instead, specific genetic abnormality must be evident using molecular diagnostic techniques (Hagerman, 1999).

Because it is an X-linked disorder, fragile X affects males and females differently. In boys, fragile X is associated with variable presentations of mental retardation, difficulties with visuospatial and memory functioning, gaze aversion, stereotypic behaviors, hyperactivity, and abnormal speech patterns, including echolalia, high-pitched speech, poor articulation, and dysfluency. Aggression and self-injurious behaviors are presented in some individuals. Persons with fragile X commonly have a characteristic appearance that includes an elongated face, a large protruding jaw, large ears, enlarged testicles, and accentuated secondary sexual characteristics. In girls who are heterozygous for the fragile X full mutation, the syndrome is associated with a normal physical appearance, variable cognitive functioning that ranges from normal to mildly mentally retarded, and difficulties with mathematics, attention, social communication, and the regulation of anxiety (Kaufman et al., 2000a). Because carrier females are at a high risk for autistic symptoms, they are more likely to reproduce and transmit the fragile X gene (Nelson, 1995; Owen and Halley, 1995).

Genetics. Some proportion of human cells, when grown in the absence of fetal acid, display a break point on one of the X chromosomes. Fragile X corresponds with this "fragile" site. Progression of disease severity over generations, referred to

an anticipation, was noted before the gene was identified. In 1991, the molecular basis for anticipation was discovered when the *FMR-1* gene (i.e., the "fragile X mental retardation" gene) was identified. The mutation consists of the transgenerational expansion of a so-called DNA triplet repeat, a sequence of three successive bases (identically, cytosine-guanine-guanine (CGG), a sequence encoding the amino acid arginine) repeated many times (Puccio and Brunner, 2002). It is situated within a segment of the long arm of the X-chromosome, at band Xq27.3.

Healthy individuals have between 6 and 50 repeats of these bases in their *FMR-1* gene. In affected individuals, the number of repeats typically ranges from 200 to 1,000. Repeats numbering between 20 and 200, known as premutations, are typically present in the mothers of affected probands and yield milder symptoms. Individuals with premutations have a high risk for expanding the number of repeats in subsequent generations.

The CGG triplet-repeat of *FMR-1* is located in the promoter region of this gene. All regions rich in C+G nucleotides ("CpG islands") are prone to methylation, and therefore a greater expansion of the triplet repeat is accompanied by greater methylation of the promoter region, which increasingly represses expression of the *FMR-1* gene product, a protein termed fragile X mental retardation protein (FMRP). In addition to this primary cause of fragile X, a minority of children have microdeletions of the *FMR-1* gene. Thus, different mutations in different parts of the *FMR-1* gene can produce the same clinical phenotype, a phenomenon termed allelic heterogeneity.

Neurobiological Substrate. FMRP is a binding protein for ribosomal RNA (rRNA) that associates with polyribosomes in the cytosol to form a large monopartite ribosomocomplex (Feng et al., 1999). FMRP is thought to modulate the translation of the RNA ligands that this mRNP polyribosomal complex processes. FMRP is located at the synapse, where it apparently modulates synaptic plasticity (Walker et al., 1999). The brains of individuals with fragile X as well as *FMR-1* knockout mice have abnormal morphology of dendrite spines (Cimler et al., 1991). Depression of the FMRP production in fragile X is thought to disrupt synaptic formation and plasticity, cellular processes important for development of normal learning and memory. FMRP is widely distributed throughout the mammalian brain (Hinds et al., 1993), and in humans, the *FMR-1* gene is expressed most abundantly during early development in regions of the hippocampus, nucleus basalis, and cerebellum (Abelot et al., 1999), brain areas that subserve learning and memory.

The pattern of normal expression of FMRP prompted initial neuroimaging studies of individuals with fragile X to focus on three regions (Kauf et al., 1991a, b, 1994, 1995). MRI studies have found diminished size of lobules VI and VII of the cerebellar vermis and enlarged basal ganglia in fragile X males but not other developmentally delayed individuals. Females with fragile X had similar, albeit smaller, reductions in the same brain areas (Kauf et al., 1991b). This suggests the presence of an "intermediate gene dosage effect" of the *FMR-1* mutation in heterozygous females. In girls, cerebellar volume correlated linearly with ratings of social communication and stereotypic behavior (Massam et al., 1997), and with IQ and measures of executive functioning (Mankoski et al., 1998). Volume of the hippocampus, a structure

important in learning and memory, have been reported to be larger in individuals with fragile X (Baker et al., 1994), although this finding has not been replicated (Jabado et al., 1997). These studies suggest that the abnormal expression of PMSF observed in animal studies contributes to abnormalities of brain development in fragile X and its associated cognitive and behavioral deficits.

Functional MRI studies have tried to elucidate the consequences of the PMSF mutations for human brain function. Blocked activity in fronto-limbic circuits, important for the regulation of impulse and emotion, has been reported in individuals with fragile X (Miyake et al., 1999), and PMSF levels in tissues with fragile X have been reported to correlate significantly with the magnitude of brain activation in the frontal and parietal cortices during a working memory task (Morein et al., 2000). These findings suggest that deficient production of PMSF may contribute to the hyperactivity, inattention, and perseveration that are important features of the fragile X clinical phenotype.

Williams Syndrome

With a prevalence of 1 in 20,000, Williams syndrome (WS) is a rare clinical diagnosis. Nevertheless, it is of considerable interest to clinicians and researchers because of its unique phenotype and the genetic mechanism that produce it. The phenotype of WS is almost a mirror image of the phenotype of autism. These children are often outgoing, social, and communicative, and many have a special propensity for music, dance, and simple but highly constituted forms of storytelling. Children with WS are typically small, and they often have physical facial features, including a broad forehead, prominent nose, full lips, an upturned nose, and a small chin. IQ averages about 50, but the range is considerable and in some children IQ can be within the normal range. The cognitive profile in WS children is distinctive and includes pronounced deficits in visuospatial skills. Relative strengths are seen in more verbal domains, including vocabulary, the social use of language, auditory memory, as well as recognizing and remembering faces (Bellugi et al., 1999). They have a variety of cardiovascular problems.

Genetics. Most children with WS have a large deletion of a segment on the long arm of chromosome 7 (1 to 3 Mb in the Tq11.23 region). The deletion typically occurs as a spontaneous new mutation, a consequence of an unequal crossover event during meiosis in the gametes of one of the parents (Elliott et al., 1996). Historically, the cardiovascular problems associated with WS were noted to co-segregate with a gene in the deleted region that produces elastin, an important component of blood vessels, skin, and lung tissue. The absence of elastin is thought to cause the various cardiovascular and kidney problems of WS, as well as diminished joint flexibility. Deficient elastin production probably also causes the characteristic faces of these children. Because elastin is not present in fetal or adult brain tissue, however, deficient elastin production is unlikely to cause the cognitive impairments associated with WS.

A second gene was soon reported in the same deleted region, and its sequence was observed to be nearly identical to a previously identified gene, *ZNF540*. This

second gene is expressed in the brain in high concentrations, and many believe that disturbances in its protein product will prove to be responsible for the cognitive deficits associated with WS. At least 16 contiguous genes, however, are now known to reside in the deleted region. They include CEP2, LIS, replication factor C subunit, spinafin 1A, Prkar1A, and transcription factor 21. Although the role of these genes in WS is unknown, it seems likely that the specific deletion present in any one child will produce a particular constellation of symptoms and a specific clinical phenotype.

Anatomical Substrate. The regions of the brain where expression of the protein product encoded by the WS gene are altered are thus far unknown, although it is an area of intense investigation. The relative specificity of the cognitive phenomoloxies in WS suggests, however, that the regions of altered expression will also be relatively specific. A number of imaging studies have suggested that the visuospatial deficits in these children are mediated by anatomical abnormalities in posterior brain systems.

The largest neuroimaging study of WS has come from a single cohort of young adults studied in a single laboratory. This investigation demonstrated a reduction in overall brain volume in the WS group. Volumes of the cerebellum and superior temporal gyri are relatively preserved, whereas those of the basal ganglia are disproportionately reduced, and an increased ratio of volumes of frontal to posterior lobes was noted, and volumes of white matter were reduced to a greater degree than gray matter in the WS group, with the greatest reduction in gray matter observed in the right occipital lobe (Kauf et al., 2000a). Posterior portions of the corpus callosum were disproportionately small, consistent with the overall white matter findings, and the size of the posterior cerebellar vermis was larger in the WS subjects, but only when corrected for the reduction in overall brain size (Schmidt et al., 2001a, b). Subjects with WS also exhibited significantly increased gyration of the cerebral cortex, particularly in the right parietal, right occipital, and left frontal cortices (Schmidt et al., 2001). Taken together, this series of imaging studies suggest the presence of anatomical disturbances in dorsal and posterior brain regions of individuals with WS that may account for their relatively specific deficits in visuospatial processing.

The first anatomical MRI study of young children with WS (mean age 21 months) (Jones et al., 1992) reported enlarged cerebellum in the WS group, consistent with the findings in older children and adults. Finally, a magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS) study of children and adults with WS detected reduced phosphorylation in a cerebellostral region of interest (ROI) and reduced NAA (a marker for the number of viable neurons) in the cerebellum (Bao et al., 1998). Cerebellar NAA levels correlated with measures of verbal intelligence ($R = 0.67$). Whether these findings would be detected in other regions of the brain, or whether they are specific to the cerebellum, is unknown.

Prader-Willi and Angelman Syndromes

Prader-Willi syndrome (PWS), with a prevalence of 1 in 10,000, is a rare condition. Children become symptomatic soon after birth. Infants are initially hypotonic and sometimes then fail to thrive. Subsequently, within the first 2 years of life, they become

hypothalamic and, eventually, obese. Often they are mildly to moderately mentally retarded. They may be of short stature, with small hands, feet, and genitalia. Behavioral problems are common, and include obsessional-compulsive symptoms, overgiving or food-related behaviors, temper tantrums, and aggressiveness.

Angelman syndrome (AS), also rare, has a prevalence similar to that of PWS. Infants with AS are often hypotonic. They then develop motor delays, ataxia, and moderate to severe mental retardation. Only rarely do they develop speech. They often have characteristic facial features, including a wide mouth, large mandible, pointed chin, positioned tongue, widely spaced teeth, and blue eyes. Some develop the remarkable symptom of excessive laughter or of puppet-like limb movements. Seizures usually develop soon after birth, and all with AS have abnormal EEGs.

Genetics. Both PWS and AS were known by the mid-1990s to be caused by deletions in the same region of chromosome 15 (15q11-12). How the same deletion could cause two syndromes with such differing phenotypes was at first perplexing. Distinguishing investigation then demonstrated that the resulting phenotype depended on which parent donated the chromosome with this particular deletion. PWS resulted in most instances when the deleted chromosome originated from the father, and AS resulted when it originated from the mother.

Although all people had long been known to inherit half their genes from their mother and half from their father, maternally and paternally derived genes were also traditionally thought to be expressed equally in offspring. We now know, however, that the expression of genes in a child is influenced by their passage through the mother's egg and father's sperm. This epigenetic phenomenon, called genetic imprinting, occurs when certain genes become methylated within a gamete of one of the parent's germline (Davies et al., 2001). Genetic imprinting influences the expression of more than 40 genes, including the genes on chromosome 15 that cause AS and PWS.

The PWS region on chromosome 15 resides immediately upstream from the AS region. Under normal circumstances, the PWS region on the chromosome from the father is active and the AS region is inactive. In the chromosome from the mother, in contrast, the PWS region is inactive and the AS region is active. All of the known genetic defects that produce PWS or AS have in common the abnormal inactivation of one of these normally active regions (Fig. 14.1).

Three different genetic defects can produce PWS (Cassidy et al., 2000; Mankoski and Knutson, 2001). The first, a deletion of both the PWS and AS regions within 15q11-12 on the paternally derived chromosome, occurs in 20 percent of individuals with PWS. This deletion leaves the AS region of the maternally derived chromosome unnormally functioning, whereas maternal imprinting renders the PWS region on this chromosome inactive. Production of the PWS protein product is therefore deficient. The second genetic defect occurs in 28 percent of children with PWS. In this instance, the child receives two copies of chromosome 15 from the mother, referred to as uniparental disomy (UPD). UPD occurs when two chromosomes from one parent and a single copy of the same chromosome from the other parent are inappropriately passed to the offspring, resulting in a total of three chromosomes instead of the usual two. One of




Figure 11.1. Genetic mechanisms in Prader-Willi and Angelman syndromes. Upper left Under normal circumstances on the maternally derived chromosomes, the Prader-Willi-related genes are inactive and the Angelman syndrome genes are active. On the paternally derived chromosomes, the reverse is true—the Prader-Willi-related genes are active and the Angelman syndrome genes are inactive. Upper right, Paternal deletion, maternal uniparental disomy (UPD), and imprinting defects that cause Prader-Willi syndrome are represented in each of the chromosomes derived from the mother and the father. Bottom Maternal deletion, paternal UPD, imprinting defects, and the 14q34 deletion that cause Angelman syndrome are shown. The percentages represent the approximate percentage of individuals affected by each of these syndromes who have the specified genetic defect.

the three chromosomes is then lost during fertilization. An extra chromosome from the mother and the loss of the chromosome from the father results in maternal UPD. Maternal UPD provides the child with two active AS regions and two inactive PWS regions, because of reversed imprinting of both chromosomes, and thus no production of the PWS protein product is possible. The third genetic defect, in 2 percent of individuals with PWS, results from a mutation in the imprinting center. This is a region of DNA that controls imprinting by regulating the extent of methylation and compaction of adjacent chromosomes. A mutation in the imprinting center of the paternal chromosome causes an imprinting defect that inactivates the PWS region of the paternally derived chromosome, leaving no active PWS genes.

Similar genetic mechanisms produce AS. The first defect, occurring in approximately 10 percent of individuals with AS, is a deletion of 15q11-13 on the maternally derived chromosome. This deletion leaves only an active PWS region and inactive AS region (due to paternal imprinting) on the paternally derived chromosomes, and thus no AS protein product. The second defect, affecting 2 percent of individuals with AS, is paternal UPD (both copies of chromosome 15 derive from the father). Paternal imprinting of both chromosomes leaves the child with two active PWS and two inactive AS regions, and no AS protein product. The third defect occurs in another 3 percent of individuals with AS. It is a mutation of the imprinting center of the maternally derived chromosome, thus inactivating the AS region of that chromosome. Because the AS region of the paternally derived chromosome is normal and inactive, the AS regions of both chromosomes are inactive and no AS protein product is possible.

Finally, a fourth genetic mechanism causes AS in another 23 percent of children. It is a mutation of a single gene, called UBE3A, that lies within the AS region. It encodes a protein that helps to regulate the action of ubiquitin in degrading recycled or damaged cellular proteins. UBE3A and other proteins attach to ubiquitin, which then is able to target proteins for degradation by cellular proteases. The deletion of UBE3A is therefore thought to lead to the accumulation of inappropriate cellular proteins that disrupt cellular function. Incidentally, one of the genes within the AS region encodes for a subtype of the GABA_A receptor. Loss of this subtype and the subsequent disturbance in GABAergic transmission causes the seizures seen in children who have AS. These children with the single gene deletion of UBE3A do not have the GABA_A receptor subtype and therefore do not have a seizure disorder.

All of the mutations described above, except the single-gene mutation of AS, can be detected with methylation-sensitive DNA probes, because DNA methylation of the imprinting center is the methylation by which the genes for these disorders are imprinted. The induction of imprinting by methylation in specific areas of DNA often helps for the development of new genetic treatments of these disorders. Methylation possibly could be removed or reversed on the imprinting center that resides on the normal copy of chromosome 15 in these individuals, for example, thus activating the PWS or AS regions that imprinting otherwise normally inactivates.

Mice lacking IGF-I receptors. Although knockout mouse models for PWS and AS now exist, the regions of altered gene expression have not yet been identified. Isolated

Imaging case studies have not helped to identify anatomical or functional abnormalities in the brains of individuals affected with PWS or AS. Thus, the neuropathological substrate for these disorders is unknown.

CHILDHOOD-ONSET SCHIZOPHRENIA

Childhood-onset schizophrenia (COS) is a rare psychotic disorder that in certain ways resembles a particular developmental disorder. Information on its prevalence is limited, in part because diagnostic criteria have changed considerably over the last decade (Moller and Thivierge, 2001). COS is almost certainly less prevalent than autism, however, and it is often diagnosed in the presence of an autistic spectrum disorder. Males and females seem equally likely to be affected. Preonsetly, COS is associated with a number of developmental delays, including difficulties in motor, general cognitive, linguistic, and social development (Turkeltaub and Rapoport, 1998; Nelson et al., 2000). Some evidence suggests that the preonset and clinical courses of COS are more severe than those of later onset schizophrenia (Alaghband-Zadeh et al., 1999). Episodes are more acute, and on average are of longer duration, in younger compared with older children (Blasberg, 1996). The course of illness is highly variable.

Neurobiological Substrata. Knowledge of the neural systems involved in COS comes mostly from MRI studies in a small number of cohorts. These children have been consistently reported to have smaller brains and enlarged ventricles (Hendren et al., 1998; Scovell et al., 2000). One longitudinal study has reported a fourfold greater decrease in volume of the cortical gray matter during adolescence compared to healthy controls, most prominently in frontal and temporal regions (Rapoport et al., 1999). This reduction in cortical gray matter may contribute to a more rapid decrease in volume of the total brain and hippocampus and a more rapid increase in ventricular volumes during adolescence. These age-related changes in the COS group show up early adulthood (Jacobsen et al., 1996; Giedd et al., 1999). Reductions in volume of the right posterior superior temporal gyrus during this time have been reported to predict the severity of positive psychotic symptoms at follow-up (Jacobsen et al., 1999). Children with COS also have smaller thalamic and basal ganglia volumes when receiving typical but not atypical antipsychotic medications (Fraser et al., 1996; Hendren et al., 2000).

Other imaging modalities have obtained lower levels of ^{18}F fluoro- α -methyltyrosine (amino acid) visibility in the frontal lobes and hippocampus of children with COS (Bertolino et al., 1998; Scovell et al., 2000). The few existing PET studies have reported reduced frontal blood flow (Jacobsen et al., 1996), reduced metabolism in middle and superior frontal regions, and increased inferior frontal metabolism in adolescents with COS (Jacobsen and Rapoport, 1999).

DISORDERS OF IMPULSE CONTROL

Tourette Syndrome

Tourette syndrome (TS) is a disorder of motor and vocal tics. Motor tics are usually simple, nonpurposeful, and rapid movements affecting muscles of the face, neck, and shoulders, with less frequent involvement of the trunk and extremities. Vocal tics usually involve frequent and excessively forced throat clearing, sniffing, swearing, barking, and explosive, inappropriate, and nonsensical utterances. Less commonly, motor and vocal tics are more complex, in that they are more sustained and nonimpulsive in quality. Tics are usually preceded by a vague discomfort or urge to move the body region affected by the tic. This "premonitory urge" relatively builds in intensity until the individual capitulates to the urge and performs the tic. This typically brings immediate but temporary relief from the urge, only to have it build quickly again and reinstitute the cycle of tension, capitulation, and relief. Tics can be suppressed voluntarily, but not eliminated (Peterson et al., 1992).

The usual age of onset of tics is 6 years. Tics affect 10 to 20 percent of children at some time in their life, with a ratio of boys to girls of approximately 3 or 4:1 (Costello et al., 1986; Peterson et al., 2004a). Tics most commonly begin at a low frequency and with minimal forcefulness, and parents often attribute the behaviors to their child's "habit." In the majority of children, tics disappear of their own accord in a matter of weeks to months. Roughly 1 percent of all children will have tics that endure for more than a year, at which time they are arbitrarily designated "chronic." By definition, children who have the combination of chronic motor and vocal tics are said to have TS, although no phenomenological, natural history, or neurobiological evidence exists to suggest that transient tics, chronic tics, or TS differ from each other in any way other than their duration (Peterson et al., 2004a). Family-pedigree and twin studies, in fact, suggest that TS and chronic tics disorders represent continua of the same underlying genetic diathesis (Peters et al., 1993; Pausl and Lockman, 1990).

Tics that persist through late childhood and into adolescence have a characteristic course history. Follow-up studies indicate that tics on average increase gradually through the grade school years before peaking at age 11 (Lockman et al., 1998). The tics then gradually decline in average severity through adolescence until stabilizing at relatively low levels by young adulthood. Superimposed on this gradual rise, plateau, and decline in average tic severity is a fluctuation, or "waxing and waning," of baseline tic severity. Although this fluctuation is nonrandom (Peterson and Lockman, 1990), the biologically determinants of the fluctuations remain poorly characterized. Clinical experience has repeatedly shown that emotional stress, physical fatigue, and environment can reliably exacerbate tics. Neuroendocrine studies provide supportive evidence for an important role of stress in modulating the severity of tic symptoms (Chappell et al., 1994).

Genetics. Tourette syndrome, obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD), and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) commonly cooccur in clinical populations (Chapire et al., 1988; Pauls et al., 1991; Leonard et al., 1992), supporting speculation that the conditions may share a common etiology (Peterson and Raine, 1997). The strongest evidence for a shared etiology comes from family studies of clinic patients. These studies have shown that OCD is present in the families of probands who have TS more often than it is present in control families, whether or not the proband has comorbid OCD (Egeland et al., 1999). Conversely, they are present in the family members of probands who have OCD more often than they are present in control families, whether or not the proband has a comorbid tic disorder (Kaufman et al., 2001).

These findings suggest that a particular genetic vulnerability may be variably expressed as tics, as OCD, or as both disorders in combination. Although the familial transmission of ADHD in persons who have either TS or OCD is less clear (Pauls et al., 1995), some investigators regard ADHD as an additional variable manifestation of putative TS vulnerability genes (Cummings and Cummings, 1997). These disorders were significantly associated with one another both within and across three points, from early childhood to young adulthood, in an epidemiological sample (Peterson et al., 2001a), suggesting that the aggregation of comorbid illnesses in families of clinically identified probands were not likely to have been the consequence of biases associated with clinical ascertainment that could potentially affect familial aggregation (Peterson et al., 1993). Thus, family-genetic and epidemiological studies agree that tic disorders and OCD, and possibly some forms of ADHD, are etiologically related, and segregation analyses of their familial transmission suggest that this shared etiology has a genetic basis.

The genetic relationship of these conditions is remarkable, given that, superficially at least, the phenotypes of TS, OCD, and ADHD differ dramatically. The genetic relationship of these disorders raises the question of whether the phenotypes might be more intimately related than their surface phenotypes would suggest. The associations between OCD symptoms and complex tics suggest, for example, that the symptoms of TS and OCD might lie on a spectrum of "compulsory" behaviors. Those symptoms that have a prominent idiosyncratic component may belong to OCD on the one end, those with little or no idiosyncrasy may belong to the simple tics of TS on the other, and complex tics might be positioned somewhere between these two extremes. Similarly, the symptoms of ADHD share certain phenomenological features with tics. Thus, for example, can be thought of as a "hyperkinetic," and motoric hyperactivity is a predominant feature of ADHD. Furthermore, TS patients can inhibit their tics for only brief periods of time, and the impaired inhibition of impulses is a hallmark of ADHD (Barthley, 1997). Thus both ADHD and TS patients have excessive motoricity and difficulty inhibiting specific behaviors. Given the genetic relationships and phenotypic/latent similarities of these conditions, it seems likely that their vulnerability genes produce not three behaviorally unrelated disorders, but instead an entire spectrum of related semi-hybrids of behaviors.

Despite intense research and initial promising leads, genetic studies of TS have not yet yielded strong or replicable findings (Pauls, 2001). These include studies employing

a variety of genetic techniques and experimental paradigms, including genetic linkage and haplotype relative risk analyses, transmission disequilibrium tests, and sib-pair analyses. Although early segregation analyses of family data were consistent with the hypothesis of an autosomal dominant mode of genetic transmission, recent studies suggest that the mode of inheritance is likely to be considerably more complex, with the expression of genes of major effect being modified by other genes. Several exception genome scans have identified several regions of interest, but the findings thus far are neither robust nor replicated. The strongest linkage finding to date was reported in a large Canadian kindred, in which a log of the odds ratio (LOD) score of 3.28 was reported for chromosome 11 (11q13) (Morley et al., 2000).

Monoaminotherapy. The most compelling evidence for the presence of abnormal monoaminergic systems in TS has been the superior clinical efficacy of dopamine agonists in the treatment of tic disorders (Petersen and Cohen, 1999). Measurements of dopamine metabolites in the CSF, postmortem brain tissue, and urine of patients with TS, however, have yielded either inconsistent or negative results (Anderson et al., 1999). Liquid studies of the dopamine D₂ receptor (Hong et al., 1999), the dopamine transporter (Biancalani et al., 2000), and dopamine decarboxylase (Finsen et al., 1999) have yielded mostly negative results, and the rare positive findings have failed to replicate (Peterson and Thomas, 2001). Apparently the central synthesis and metabolism of dopamine in persons with TS is largely unaffected.

Evidence for altered noradrenergic systems in persons with TS includes the modest benefits that clonidine, an alpha-agonist, confers on the symptoms (Lockman et al., 1991). The largest neuroimaging studies of the CSF in individuals with TS have shown normal 3-methoxy-4-hydroxyphenylglycol (MHPG) levels but easily induced elevations of noradrenaline (Lockman et al., 1995). In addition, urine hormones in CSF, urine, and plasma indicate an exaggerated stress response in some TS individuals (Chappell et al., 1994). These findings suggest normal functioning of basal stress systems and increased responsiveness to acute stresses in some persons with TS.

Other neuromodulator studies suggest the possibility that serotonergic systems, believed to be dysfunctional in OCD, could also be dysfunctional in TS. Reductions in 5-HIT, its precursor tryptophan, and its major metabolite 5-hydroxyindoleacetic acid (5-HIAA) have been reported in a postmortem brain study (Anderson et al., 1995a). A postmortem study has also suggested disturbances in plasmaergic systems, with reduced levels of glutamate reported in the three major projection areas of the substantia nigra—the mesial and lateral segments of the substantia nigra and the reticular portion of the substantia nigra (Anderson et al., 1995a). Because the substantia nigra is important in motor control, a plasmaergic dysfunction in this system could contribute to the motor disturbances of TS.

Microbiological Substrates. The neural basis for TS is thought to consist of anatomical and functional disturbances in cortico-striato-thalamo-cortical (CSTC) circuits. These circuits loop between cortical and subcortical brain regions. They are composed of multiple, partially overlapping but largely "parallel" pathways that diver-

information from the cerebral cortex to the subcortex, and then back again to specific regions of the cortex. Although multiple anatomically and functionally related cortical regions provide input into a particular circuit, each circuit releases its projections back onto only a subset of the cortical regions contributing to the input of that circuit. Although the number of anatomically and functionally discrete pathways is still controversial (Pantazis and Blazquez, 1993), current consensus holds that CSTC circuitry has at least four components—those initiating from and projecting back to sensorimotor cortex, orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), insular and associated anterior cingulate cortices, or association cortex. The etiologies of OCD and ADHD are also thought to involve disturbances in CSTC circuits, and it may be that the common involvement of these circuits across these disorders may account in part for the common co-occurrence with TS in clinical populations (Peterson and Klein, 1997).

The basal ganglia portions of CSTC circuits appear to be centrally involved in the pathophysiology of TS. Reduced volumes of the putamen and globus pallidus (the lenticular nucleus) were initially found in adults (Peterson et al., 1993a, b) but not in children (Singer et al., 1992). Thus among identical twin pairs, the more severely affected twin was found to have smaller caudate volumes (Lytle et al., 1995). Because the twins were genetically identical, smaller caudates were presumably caused by nonshared environmental determinants, rather than by the effects of TS vulnerability genes. A large imaging study of 128 adults and adults with TS and 128 healthy controls helped to reconcile these various basal ganglia findings (Peterson et al., in press). Smaller caudate volumes were detected in both children and adults with TS, consistent with the previous twin study. Lenticular nucleus volumes also were smaller in TS adults, consistent with the prior adult study, but not in children, consistent with the previous study of children. Detection of smaller caudate volumes across age groups suggests that smaller caudate nuclei may be a good candidate marker for a trait abnormality in TS subjects. Furthermore, smaller lenticular nucleus volume may be a marker for the persistence of its symptoms into adulthood. Consistent with these anatomical findings, PET and SPECT studies have repeatedly demonstrated reduced metabolism and blood flow in the basal ganglia (Reiss et al., 1993; Moriarty et al., 1995).

One fMRI study has helped define the neural systems subserving the control of tic symptoms. Twenty-two adults with TS alternated periods of allowing themselves to tic freely with periods of suppressing their tics completely (Peterson et al., 1998). Tic suppression was associated with increased activity of the ventral portion of the right caudate nucleus and numerous cortical regions, especially prefrontal and temporal cortex. The suppression was also associated with decreased activity of the ventral globus pallidus, putamen, and thalamus bilaterally. The severity of tic symptoms correlated with the change in activity of the basal ganglia and thalamus regions, indicating that as symptom severity increased, the changes in subcortical activity during tic suppression decreased. These findings suggest that the changes in neural activity of subcortical regions—increases in the right caudate and decreases in the rest of the subcortex—participate in the suppression of tics. When these frontostriatal braking

mechanisms fail, tic are progressively more likely to escape the inhibitory influence that these circuits have on motor behavior.

The hypothesized role of prefrontal regions in helping to suppress or regulate unwanted tics to tic was supported by a direct analysis of cortical volumes in which increases in volume of prefrontal cortices were detected in the TS group relatively (Peterson et al., 2001a). Prefrontal volumes were largest in younger children with TS, less prominent in older children, and then smaller by adulthood in subjects with TS. Smaller prefrontal volumes in symptomatic TS adults were suspected to be responsible for the relatively unusual persistence of tic symptoms into adulthood. Consistent with this interpretation was the finding that orbitofrontal volumes correlated significantly with the severity of tic symptoms, suggesting that smaller volumes in these regions may provide insufficient inhibitory activity to suppress tics. The larger prefrontal volumes detected in the children with TS were suspected to represent an activity-dependent, structural plasticity that helps to suppress tics. This interpretation is consistent with numerous preclinical and clinical studies suggesting that the orbitofrontal region plays an important role in inhibitory control (Pitkänen, 1997). It is also consistent with the belief holding that prefrontal activation is required by TS subjects to suppress their tics (Peterson et al., 1999). Presumably, the chronic need to suppress tic activities and their hyperkinetic prefrontal cortices in children who have TS (Fig. 14-2).

The finding of a significant inverse association of tic severity with prefrontal volumes stands in stark contrast to the absence of association of basal ganglia volumes with the severity of the symptoms. These differing associations of symptom severity with basal ganglia or cortical volumes implies that if a predisposition to having tics is indeed represented within the basal ganglia, then prefrontal volumes are likely to be relatively more important than basal ganglia volumes in determining whether that predisposition is manifested within a given individual. Moreover, if that predisposition to tic is manifested, the cortical volumes seem to be more important than the basal




Figure 14-2. Theory of compensatory effects in tic and Tourette syndrome. The voluntary suppression of tic and tic-free frontal cortex. The need to suppress tic chronically is thought to induce hypertrophy of the frontal cortex in children, which in turn reduces the severity of tic symptoms. Failure to reduce the phasic response of the frontal cortex is thought to yield smaller volumes, more severe symptoms, and the persistence of tic into adulthood.

ganglia in determining how severe the tic symptoms are likely to be. In other words, the morphological and functional integrity of cortical neuromodulatory systems may be clinically more salient for these patients than is the quadrate hypoplasia that has been identified.

Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder

Adult OCD has been summarized in Chapter 13 of this volume. Herein we will address the childhood variant as an expression of vulnerability genes for TS and relevant brain imaging findings for this condition.

All forms of OCD are characterized by recurrent, distressing, and intrusive thoughts, images, or urges action, together with their repetitive behavioral counterparts. Usually, performance of the compulsion brings some degree of relief from the urge to action and from the anxiety associated with the imagined consequences of failing to perform the compulsion.

Several large factor analytic studies have confirmed the presence of at least four main components to OCD symptoms: (1) aggressive, sexual, religious, and stomach obsessions, and checking compulsions; (2) symmetry and ordering; (3) cleanliness and washing; and (4) hoarding (Kraus, 1994; Luckman et al., 1997). The age of onset of OCD in the general community is probably bimodal, with one mode of onset at 10 to 12 years of age and the other in early adulthood (Krausse and Tsuang, 1998; Eley et al., 1998; Valente-Santos et al., 1998; Geller et al., 1998). The childhood-onset form of OCD most commonly occurs in the context of a personal history of a tic disorder, and it occurs even more frequently in the context of a personal or family history of the disorder (this is the so-called tic-related form of OCD). The adult-onset form of OCD, in contrast, is much less likely to occur in the context of a personal or family history of tics, while the early onset form appears to be more strongly familial (Poulis et al., 1999).

The symptoms of the tic-related form of OCD are significantly more likely to be those of the first or third of the factor-based groupings listed previously, whereas the non-tic-related form is more likely to involve symmetry and ordering (Luckman et al., 1997). When present together, the symptoms of OCD and tic disorders have been shown to coexist with one another, suggesting an underlying common cumulative of severity over the short term (Lin et al., *In press*). In contrast to this, childhood-onset OCD symptoms over the long term tend more often to persist into late adolescence and adulthood, and they are usually more behaviorally debilitating than are the above (Sweat et al., 1999; Luckman et al., 1999).

Genetics. Segregation analysis suggest the presence of genes of major effect, although the mode of transmission is likely to be complex (Abrahams et al., 2002). Linkage and association studies of childhood-onset OCD have been initiated, but few findings have been reported thus far. Candidate genes related to the serotonin system have received the greatest attention, with few significant findings reported. The strongest evidence for linkage is a preliminary study of 7 families with childhood-onset

OCD was on chromosome 9 (Dy, LOD = 1.97), with weaker evidence for linkage on 19q (Blasen et al., 2002). In addition, an analysis of 17 alleles with 73 suggested significant joint effects of specific loci on 4q and 19q for developing the obsessive-compulsive symptoms of hoarding (Zhang et al., 2002).

Neurochemistry. Virtually no studies of monoaminergic or dopaminergic systems have been reported in children with OCD. Data relevant to serotonin systems derives from the efficacy of serotoninergic medications in the treatment of children with OCD (Orlitzky et al., 1998; Liebowitz et al., 2002). Studies of glutamate and glutamine have been more extensive. An MRS study has reported elevated GLX (combined glutamate and glutamine) concentrations in the caudate nuclei of treatment-naïve children who have OCD but no tics, and these caudate GLX concentrations normalized after a 12-week course of anticholinergics treatment with paroxetine (Bosenberg et al., 2000b) but not behavioral therapy (Bosenberg et al., 2002). Changes in GLX concentrations in the caudate correlated positively with changes in OCD symptom severity during paroxetine treatment, suggesting that elevated pretreatment GLX concentrations in the caudate may predict treatment response to serotoninergic medications.

Cerebrospinal fluid studies of children have suggested that neuropeptides may be inversely associated with the severity of OCD symptoms (Sodeh et al., 1992a). A subsequent study of adult men with childhood-onset OCD failed to find group differences in vasopressin but did report elevated CSF levels of a related peptide, oxytocin, in individuals with OCD (Lieckfeldt et al., 1994). Yet another study failed to find group differences in oxytocin in the CSF associated with a diagnosis of OCD (Alderman et al., 1994). Finally, intranasal administration of oxytocin in adults with OCD in a placebo-controlled crossover study did not affect OCD symptoms (Dipper et al., 1994). Clearly, disturbances in these neuropeptide systems have not proved to be reproducible, leaving unclear the role of these compounds in the etiology of OCDs.

Neurobiological Substrates. Structural and functional imaging studies implicate orbitofrontal portions of CSMC circuits in the pathophysiology of OCD. Hypometabolism and elevated blood flow in prefrontal cortices are probably the most consistent findings in subjects with OCD. Furthermore, the severity of OCD symptoms correlates positively with resting prefrontal and orbitofrontal metabolism in adults (Sodeh et al., 1992b). In response to successful antihypothalamic therapies, hypermetabolism normalizes (Rubin et al., 1995), and the improvement in symptoms correlates with the change in blood flow or metabolism in these areas (Veltkamp et al., 1991; Sodeh et al., 1992b) but not all studies (Blasen et al., 1992; Liebowitz et al., 1998). Conversely, symptom provocation increases blood flow in orbitofrontal regions (Blasen et al., 1994; Liebowitz et al., 1998). Despite these functional abnormalities in orbitofrontal cortices, prefrontal volumes seem to be normal in subjects with OCD (Kellman et al., 1999), although increased volume of the anterior cingulate cortex have been reported in children (Rosenberg and Rothman, 1991).

In the basal ganglia, the most consistent functional abnormalities reported in OCD have been elevated metabolism and blood flow in the right caudate nucleus (both at

rest (Baxter et al., 1988) and during symptom provocation (Buchsbaum et al., 1994; Baxter et al., 1996). Caudate nucleus hypermetabolism appears to normalize in response to successful antiobsessional treatment (Baxter et al., 1992; Schwartz et al., 1999). Volumetric findings in the caudate nucleus are inconsistent, but the largest and most rigorous studies report volume reductions bilaterally (Luxenberg et al., 1998; Kishimoto et al., 1999), and they correlate inversely with the severity of OCD symptoms. In adults performing an emotional task, factor-based scores for OCD symptoms associated with fear (described previously) correlated only with basal flow to the striatum (Buchsbaum et al., 1998), whereas nonfear-related OCD symptoms correlated significantly with flow in a variety of prefrontal regions, most strongly in the parahippocampal cortex. Fear-related symptoms, in other words, were associated with basal ganglia functioning, whereas nonfear-related symptoms were associated with prefrontal functioning.

Increased volumes of the thalamus, another key structure in OCBG circuitry, have been reported at pretreatment baseline in OCD children (Difesa et al., 2000). These volumes normalized after 12 weeks of treatment with paroxetine but not behavioral therapy (Bouvard et al., 2000a). Absorbed levels of *N*-acetylaspartate (NAA, a measure of neuronal stability) (Burke and Oberholzer, 1999) were localized to the medial portion of the thalamus in these same children (Pfefferbaum et al., 2000).

Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder

The validity of ADHD as a clinical diagnosis has long excited debate and controversy in both lay and scientific circles. An expert panel convened and sponsored by the National Institute of Health recently reviewed and documented extensively within a Consensus Statement the validity of ADHD as a clinical disorder, its public health importance for children and families, and the effectiveness of its treatments (NIMH, 1995). Among their many conclusions, the conference panelists concurred that ADHD meets or exceeds the standards for validity established by most other disorders defined in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV)*. Still unclear, however, is whether the disorder represents a behavioral syndrome that is qualitatively and etiologically distinct from the range of ADHD-like symptoms present in children within the general population.

Attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder comprises the symptomatic triad of inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity, although predominantly inattention (i.e., without prominent hyperactivity or impulsivity) and predominantly hyperactive/impulsive subtypes are recognized. Symptoms usually begin early in childhood, decrease gradually in adolescence (particularly symptoms of hyperactivity), and then reach a more stable level by early adulthood (Biederman et al., 2000). ADHD affects approximately 3 to 9 percent of children in the general population (Sattmar et al., 1999; Taylor et al., 1991), with boys being 2 to 8 times more likely to be diagnosed than girls. Clinical, epidemiological, and family-genetic studies have shown ADHD to be a strong predictor of conduct disorder, depression, anxiety disorders, and substance abuse both in longitudinal cross-sectional and in later life (McArdle et al., 1996; Petersen et al., 2001a). ADHD is widely believed to be a heterogeneous condition having multiple biological

subpopulations. This heterogeneity has probably helped to dilute the specificity of findings in biological studies.

Genetics. Family studies suggest that ADHD is highly familial (Biederman et al., 1992). A parent with ADHD has a 27 percent chance of having a child who also has ADHD (Biederman et al., 1999a). Adoption studies suggest that genetic factors contribute importantly to this familial predisposition (Moffitt and Stewart, 1973; Caspi, 1993), and twin studies indicate that genetic variance accounts for 70 to 90 percent of the phenotypic variance (Luby et al., 1992; Bierman et al., 1997). Quantitative analyses of family data sets have suggested a single gene model of transmission (Falconer et al., 1992). Several candidate genes have been associated with ADHD, with varying degrees of reproducibility. These include the genes for the D₁ dopamine receptor (DRD1), the dopamine transporter (DAT1) (Cook et al., 1999; Gill et al., 1997), the novel repeat allele of the D₁ dopamine receptor (DRD4) (Forstami et al., 2001; Roman et al., 2001), and recently studies of other dopamine receptors and other neurotransmitter systems (Fisher et al., 2002; Roman et al., 2002). Even if the associations of these genes with ADHD are independently established, the evidence suggests that the overall effects of these genes coding for neurotransmitter systems in ADHD are likely to be modest at best.

Despite the demonstrated importance of genetic determinants in ADHD, nongenetic influences also contribute to its pathophysiology. Preterm birth, other obstetrical complications, maternal smoking during pregnancy, postnatal head trauma, and chaotic family environments in particular are all thought to predispose to the later development of ADHD (Ginsburg et al., 2000; Roy et al., 2000).

Neurochemistry. Many studies of neurotransmitter metabolite levels in the blood and urine of ADHD children have been reported, both at baseline and after pharmacological treatments or challenges. Dopamine metabolite levels have been most extensively studied, but their variable and often contradictory findings have not yielded conclusive evidence for or against the involvement of dopamine in the pathophysiology of ADHD (Kamath and Rapoport, 1997). Baseline measures of norepinephrine in serum, as well as MHPG (a norepinephrine metabolite) in plasma and 5-HIAA in platelets do not differ in ADHD children compared with controls. Findings for the levels of these compounds in urine have been inconsistent, and responses of these levels to pharmacological agents do not seem to differ across diagnostic groups. CSF studies in ADHD are relatively rare, but likewise do not clearly indicate the presence of disturbances in these neurotransmitter systems.

Neurobiological Substrates. Animal models, human *in vivo* imaging studies, and electrophysiological studies all suggest that anatomical and functional disturbances of frontostriatal components of CTFC circuits subserve the symptoms of ADHD. These circuits, moreover, are the primary sites of action for the dopaergic properties of stimulant medication, the most robustly effective pharmacotherapy for ADHD.

Several animal models for ADHD have been proposed. One particularly attractive model is the spontaneously hypertensive rat (SHR). SHRs are hyperactive, and

they exhibit impairment on certain behavioral tasks. They have lower metabolism of their medial and lateral frontal cortices (Papa et al., 1998), and lower basal levels of transcription factors in their nucleus accumbens (Papa et al., 1997), a region within the ventral striatum subserving learning and reward. Dopaminergic activity is reduced and noradrenergic activity is increased in the frontal cortices of ADHD (Kaufmann, 2002), and catecholaminergic innervation of frontal cortices depends on prefrontal synapse density, possibly accounting for the higher prevalence of ADHD in males (King et al., 2000). Metaphysostrotx attenuates hyperactivity and inattention in these animals (Ungless et al., 2002).

Consistent with findings in this animal model, human imaging studies have most consistently reported abnormalities in the dorsal prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia of subjects with ADHD. Smaller volumes of the right prefrontal cortex have been reported in children with ADHD compared with normal controls (Castellanos et al., 1996a), a finding that has generally been replicated, although not always with regard to laterality (Gothard et al., 1996; Filipov et al., 1999). In an anatomical imaging study of 187 children with ADHD and 139 controls, cortical volume reductions were not specific to frontal regions, but more broadly generalized to all cortical regions (Castellanos and Tessner, 2002). Additionally, smaller right globus pallidus nuclei have been detected in a subset of these children (Castellanos et al., 1996).

Petrous emission tomography studies have reported reduced metabolic rates in, among other regions, the left anterior frontal area, where metabolism correlated inversely with measures of symptom severity (Zametkin et al., 1991). Functional MRI studies have reported abnormal activation of the striatum (Mulya et al., 1999; Ruita et al., 1999), prefrontal cortex (Rutishauser et al., 1999), and anterior cingulate cortex (Bush et al., 1999). SPECT studies of ADHD adults have reported marked elevations of dopamine transporter levels in the basal ganglia (Thompson et al., 1999; Krausen et al., 2000), which, after a month of daily methylphenidate treatment, decreased to control levels (Krausen et al., 2000). Additional findings in ADHD imaging studies include a smaller cerebellum (Castellanos and Tessner, 2002), a region thought to be important in attentional processing (Milner and Beck, 1994).

Electrophysiological studies support these findings from other brain imaging modalities. Event-related potential recordings during attentional task problems earlier P300s over parietal cortices, suggesting that parietal dysfunction may contribute to inattentive symptoms in ADHD (Ormanian et al., 1998). Quantitative EEG studies of large samples of ADHD children suggest abnormal activity of the frontal cortices (Chabal and Berthier, 1990). Disordered baseline innervation in ADHD is suggested by delayed latencies in components of the transcranial auditory evoked response (Laike et al., 1995).

Psychostimulants. Double-blind studies have demonstrated that psychostimulants, methylphenidate and amphetamine in particular, improve ADHD symptoms (Klein, Hill et al., 2002). Indeed, such agents improve attentional functioning even in normal children and adults. A large and definitive multisite clinical trial has shown that stimulant medications generally are far superior to behavioral management alone, and that behavioral management added to treatment with stimulant medications provides little

additional benefit (Gouze 1999a). Nonmedicinal treatments are most helpful for ADHD children who also have clinically significant anxiety symptoms (Gouze, 1999b). Many clinicians continue to believe that consistently and appropriately implemented parent management training alone can be effective for some children with ADHD, especially for younger children. Suggestions for early psychosocial interventions, including increased play, remain to be evaluated, although preliminary data from animal models are encouraging (Panksepp et al., 2002; Panksepp et al., 2003).

Stimulant medications are usually well tolerated. The most common side effects include impaired sleep, poor appetite, headaches, or irritability. Although several preliminary animal studies of these medications support the possibility of neurotoxic effects (Moll et al., 2003) or potential long-term behavioral effects (Neuhauser and Panksepp, 2002; Panksepp et al., 2003), long-term monitoring studies of children with ADHD have thus far not provided evidence of neuronal damage associated with chronic stimulant use (Castellanos and Tamishe, 2002). Moreover, behavioral studies in humans suggest that psychostimulants may reduce the long-term risks of substance abuse associated with the presence of ADHD earlier in life (Biederman et al., 1999; Barkley et al., 2004; Wilens et al., 2003). Stimulants also seem to improve peer, parent, and teacher ratings of the child's social skills (Gouze, 1999a, b). These long-term benefits of stimulant medications for children with ADHD would seem likely to have important and enduring positive effects on self-esteem and adaptive functioning.

CONCLUSIONS

What we have learned over the past two decades about the pathophysiology of childhood neuropsychiatric disorders is astounding. Each of the conditions reviewed is known to have a strong genetic basis, which clearly has helped to track their pathophysiological pathways to illness, particularly in disorders caused by single genes. Continuing elucidation of the pathophysiology of these specific genetic disorders will improve our understanding of the normal biology of neural systems within the developing CNS, and it will provide experimental and disease models by which we can better understand the pathogenesis of genetically more heterogeneous conditions.

The genetic liability underlying each of these conditions seems uniquely to affect particular neural systems in each of the disorders. Mesial temporal lobe structures that subserve socialization functions seem to be especially important in autism; arrest of development of the association cortex caused by the MeCP1 deletion may generate the symptoms of Rett syndrome; the hippocampus and other regions involved in learning and memory are important in fragile X; and disturbances in prefrontal cortices likely subserve visuospatial deficits affecting children with Williams syndrome. Abnormalities in frontal, temporal, and possibly parietal lobes likely subserve the psychosocial symptoms and cognitive disabilities observed in childhood-onset schizophrenia. Disturbances in the structure and function of particular portions of CSIC circuits seem to underlie the symptoms of Tourette syndrome, obsessive-compulsive disorders, and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder; the portions of the circuits affected, together

with the genetic subtypes of these conditions, may account for their common clinical manifestations.

Future studies will undoubtedly continue to reveal the pathophysiology of these and other childhood neuropsychiatric disorders. They will help us to understand how underlying genetic vulnerabilities contribute to disordered protein expression and altered cellular function in particular neural systems, which then produce particular clinical phenotypes. Defining these pathways to illness will in turn help to define genetic and neurobiological subtypes of these illnesses, similar to the ways in which more specific genetic syndromes have been found to produce similar symptoms. The most important future advances will likely come from combining genetic analyses, molecular techniques, imaging studies, and careful clinical phenotyping to help refine further our neurological classifications and to improve our understanding of gene-brain-behavior correlates across the many stages of CNS development, in both health and illness.

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AGING AND DEMENTIA

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HISTORY

The concepts of aging-related cognitive changes and dementia have appeared in philosophical and scientific writings since ancient times. Starting in 7th-century BC, however, many intellectuals from Pythagoras to Galen weighed in with various opinions on the nature, but few suggested causes beyond speculation. Hippocrates, for example, thought that "paroxysm," or uncontrolled mental decline, was caused by swelling and drying of the brain and was fatal (Borchardt and Connors, 1998). In the latter part of the 17th century, a resurgence of interest in unknown diseases led to the examination of brains from elderly individuals in an attempt to understand changes related to aging. For instance, the English pathologist Matthew Baillie became the first to address the concept of brain autopsy with aging and dementia when he noted evidence for enlargement in the brains of some demented individuals. In the early 18th century, the conceptualization and treatment of the mentally ill were revolutionized by the work of the French physician Philippe Pinel. Drawing on the writings of Galen, Cullen, and others in his work *A Treatise on Insanity*, Pinel (1801) supposed that mental illness was a disease that could be the subject of empirical study. Pinel also championed

more institutional treatment of the mentally ill. He was the first to use the term *senile dementia* (leading to the end of the term *senility* as a medical diagnosis) and write that this was an inevitable part of aging. Puel's student Pierre Biquard differentiated developmental dementia, or aging, from dementia, which he thought resulted from disease. He also suggested several causes of dementia, including aging, and noted that multiple forms of psychopathology could be seen in demented individuals (Berkowski and Cotman, 1988).

In the late 19th century, advances in neuroanatomy gave rise to new understandings of the brain and of dementia. Maudsley (1865) and Willis (1865) correlated a decrease in brain weight and an increase in vessel size, respectively, with aging and cognitive decline. The revelation that neurofibrillary tangles were associated with a decrease in vascular caliber in the brain preceded the seminal work of Alzheimer and Binswanger in the 1890s, which associated senile dementia disease with brain atrophy and dementia (Jersild, 1999). In 1892 Biagi and Masiello first described cerebral plaques, and by 1911 Hecker wrote that plaque was a hallmark of dementia (Jersild and Cotman, 1999). Binswanger (1911) was the first to use the term *senile plaque* and held that plaque quantity correlated with disease severity. Following on Binswanger's description of senile dementia, Alzheimer (1907) described his classic case (see below) and was the first to describe neurofibrillary tangles associated with cerebral degeneration. Given the relatively young age of his patient and the widespread tangles he noted, Alzheimer hypothesized that his patient had a previously undescribed disease that was distinct from senile dementia.

In *Textbook of Psychiatry*, David Knopf (1913) recognized and codified the use of the term *Alzheimer's disease* (AD). Knopf stopped short of stating that AD was distinct from senile dementia, though, and mentioned the possibility that it simply represented precocious senility. In discussing dementia in general, Knopf recognized its association with memory loss, language changes, personality changes, delusions, and depression as well as other forms of cognitive impairment and psychopathology.

In the mid-20th century, neuropathological studies led to increased confusion about the relationships between normal aging, AD, and senile dementia. Following on the work of Grabsch, Gellermann found that most normal elderly individuals had some brain plaques and tangles (Jersild and Cotman, 1999). The nature of plaques was debated until the 1960s when electron microscopy showed plaque to be composed of an amyloid core with surrounding cellular elements, and tangles were shown to be composed of abnormal neurofilaments. In addition, clinical and neuropathological evidence suggested that AD was no distinct from senile dementia, and the two concepts were later unified (Japet, 1983). The work of Binswanger and colleagues (1968) clarified clinical criteria used to diagnose AD and showed a correlation between disease burden and illness.

Building on the work of these pioneers, modern investigators are intensively studying the cognitive and psychological changes associated with normal aging as well as AD and other causes of dementia. Numerous advances have been made in recent years in the neurology, epidemiology, genetics, clinical characteristics, and neuromorphological and neurochemical changes of dementing illnesses, and these advances have led

to increased diagnostic sophistication and new treatment approaches. The therapeutic nihilism that has dominated scientific and popular thought since the time of Hippocrates is today giving way to new hope for dementia sufferers and their families.

Cognition and Memory in Normal Aging

Introduction

The intent of this chapter is to focus on abnormal cognitive functioning associated with aging. For example, dementia and mild cognitive impairment. However, it is useful to remind ourselves of the nature of normal functioning in the elderly in order to provide the context for abnormal conditions. Accordingly we will review briefly those changes in cognition and memory associated with successful aging.

Although we commonly think of aging as a matter of years, Moskowitz (2000) and others have noted that in a lifespan point of view, rather aging is best conceived as the interaction of time, genetics, and "nurture factors" with events that may compromise or enhance biological and psychological functioning (Moskowitz, 2000). A multidimensional concept of aging helps explain the remarkable variability observed in aging in longitudinal studies such as the Nun Study¹ (Bengtson, 2001), which cast serious doubt on the idea that intellectual decline is inevitable in old age.

Changes in Brain Anatomy

It is now well established that there are observable changes in brain anatomy associated with aging. Indeed it is common for neurologists to report that a computed tomographic (CT) or magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scan of the brain shows "changes consistent with normal aging." Neuroanatomical studies indicate that by age 80, 19 percent of one's brain weight is lost overall, and there is an average 20 percent loss in the weight of temporal lobes, which are associated with memory functioning (Sahak, 2001). These data suggest that some changes in cerebrobehavioral functioning are likely in aging. However, the majority of elderly persons continue to manage their affairs competently.

General Changes in Cognitive Functioning

Early studies of aged-related cognitive changes were quite pessimistic in that they demonstrated pervasive declines of cognitive functioning over the age span. These were typically cross-sectional group studies that suffered from two deficits: (1) they

¹In the Nun Study, a group of elderly American Roman Catholic nuns is being studied longitudinally in an attempt to determine factors that contribute risk of developing AD and other neurological conditions. Detailed medical, personal information gathered throughout the life of each study participant, diet, brain autopsy data, and neuropsychological data from postmortem examinations are being synthesized.

confused cohort-education effects with developmental effects and (2) they did not control for the higher rate of serious illness, including dementia illnesses, in elderly populations, which impeded cognitive functioning. More recent studies continue to document cognitive declines with aging, especially in persons who are 70 years or older, but the changes are considerably more delimited than initially thought.

Sensory Changes

Changes in sensory abilities with aging, especially vision, are obvious. Those over the age of 40 are quite familiar with increasing difficulty in focusing on close stimuli, which often makes reading of small print laborious (Koenig et al., 1998). Less obvious changes include diminished ability to see in dim light, decreased color discrimination, and increased visual processing time (Bielakowski, 2001; Carruthers and Blanchard-Fields, 2002). Similar changes take place in auditory abilities and other senses, including smell/taste, balance, taste, and vibration (Carruthers and Blanchard-Fields, 2002). There are also major declines in the ability of humans to identify odors after age 60 although women and men smokers retain the ability to identify odors better (Doty, 2001).

The implications of changes in sensory function for studies of cognition and cognitive changes in aging are twofold. First, the ability to perform cognitive tasks is dependent on the ability to receive, appropriate, and process basic sensory information accurately. One cannot be expected to perform a task involving spatial skills if one's vision is faulty, as demonstrated in many studies (Carruthers and Blanchard-Fields, 2002). Second, in some cases sensory-perceptual functions include simple cognitive functions. Odor identification, for example, involves evaluation of information and matching of stimuli, in addition to basic sensation. Interestingly, a standardized odor identification test developed by Doty and colleagues has been found to be highly sensitive to AD and other dementia (Doty, 2001; McCullagh et al., 2002).

Specific Changes in Cognition with Aging

In a recent review on cognitive changes in aging, Bielakowski (2001) noted that the "body of knowledge in cognition and aging is growing exponentially" and at times may seem conflicting (page 184). However, some general trends from this literature do seem to be emerging. First, while there is a general trend for cognitive performance to decline with aging, the rate of decline can vary considerably among individuals (Bielakowski, 2001; Blanton et al., 1998). Second, not all cognitive functions decline at the same rate or in the same degree. In general, the changes in cognition and memory are more in terms of speed than power.

Functions Shown to be Sensitive to Aging

The cognitive functions found to most consistently change with aging include speed of information processing, recall memory, working memory, complex attentional tasks, reasoning and executive tasks, and visuospatial processing (Bielakowski, 2001).

Speed of information processing declines have been consistently demonstrated on reaction time tests and especially choice reaction time (Carruthers and Blanchard-Fields, 2002; Flude et al., 1996). Decreases in processing speed may account for a wide variety of age effects in studies of cognition (Bielakowski, 1995), but some of these changes may reflect statistical and cognitive style artifacts (Bielakowski, 2001; Carruthers and Blanchard-Fields, 2002). For example, Fletcher et al. (2000) note that age-related declines in speed of processing may reflect preference for accuracy as compared to speed in the elderly.

Declines in memory performances are observed with aging, but primarily in recall, and particularly with speed of recall, rather than recognition. For example, using the Rey-Osterreith figure test, Perner et al. (2000) report considerable declines in recall between 20 and 70 years of age but very little change in recognition scores (see Fig. 15.1). As Hockley and Zacks (1988) have suggested, this differential decline may be secondary to the reduced efficiency of working memory and the inability to screen out irrelevant stimuli. This is supported by functional imaging studies indicating that the frontal lobes are recruited more in working memory tasks in the elderly than in younger individuals (Becker-Lopez et al., 2000). Older adults also perform less well on tests of source memory and are more susceptible to false memories (Carruthers and Blanchard-Fields, 2002).

Large-scale recent studies have confirmed a gradual decline in general memory performance after age 50, with more rapid drop in the 60s (Blautz et al., 2000). However, an interesting finding is that the primary change over the age span was in terms of the ability to recall information immediately after presentation, that is, immediate recall. The difference between immediate and delayed recall trials, as measured by percent retained over a 20- to 30-min interval, changed only slightly over the age span. In addition, the investigators also found little interaction between aging and recognition performance relative to immediate recall. Accordingly, the primary difference between young and older persons is with immediate recall. This finding indicates that the "aging effect" in memory is primarily due to differences in encoding rather than retention or retrieval. Other memory research suggests that encoding is related to executive functions. Specifically, older adults do not appear to "spontaneously cognize incoming information or establish meaningful links to old in recall as well as in others as younger adults" (Carruthers and Blanchard-Fields, 2002, page 229). Thus, the results of this large-scale study again imply age-related changes in frontal influences on memory, which may be more significant than changes in the temporal lobes.

Complex attentional tasks, including divided attention, selective attention, and vigilance, are sensitive to aging effects (Bielakowski, 2001; Scandberg and Salthouse, 1982). However, complexity is a key variable in these findings. Less complex attentional tasks show little change over the age span (Carruthers and Blanchard-Fields, 2002). Given the close relationship of working memory and complex attention, declines in these two areas of functioning may be related to common brain mechanisms, that is, the frontal lobes and associated subcortical circuits. Frontal-subcortical circuits and working memory are also implicated in the decline in performance that is commonly observed in tasks involving reasoning and executive functioning (Bielakowski, 2001; Powell, 1994).




Figure 15.1. Recall versus recognition scores over the age span on the complex figure task. (From Fazio et al., 2000. Reproduced with permission.)

Misconceptual tasks are typically more sensitive to aging effects than verbal tasks. Why this is the case is not entirely clear, but novelty may contribute because verbal tasks are typically more familiar to subjects than misconceptual tasks. When younger and elderly persons are familiarized with misconceptual tasks, their performance becomes similar (Walster-Worley and Poortinga, 1994).

Other Functional Changes Associated with Aging

While verbal test generally appear more resistant to aging than misconceptual tasks, aging may be associated with benign changes in language functions such as naming difficulties, comprehension problems, difficulties with naming, and reduced verbal fluency (although these findings could indicate prefrontal dementia or be a

function of limited education as well). Behavioral changes such as a decrease in drive, decreased novelty- and challenge-seeking, decreased goal setting, and a tendency to rely more strongly on first impressions in interpersonal situations also accompany normal aging (Cavanaugh and Blanchard-Fields, 2002). These changes may represent a more general example of the specific cognitive changes noted above, especially reduced speed of information processing and less proficient executive abilities.

Functions Showing Little Change with Aging

Fortunately, not all of the news regarding aging and cognition is bad. Several cognitive functions are relatively impervious to aging. Vocabulary, verbal comprehension, and recognition memory are preserved well into the later years (Bellakalas, 2001; Kaufman, 1990). Accuracy of recall is more similar among older and younger persons than is speed of recall (Bellakalas, 2001). In addition, elderly subjects do not show rapid forgetting when allowed to learn tasks to predetermined criteria (Stryacyk et al., 1987), and they perform well on tests of implicit and autobiographical memory (Cavanaugh and Blanchard-Fields, 2002; Reischman and Gabrelli, 1994). In addition, performance of familiar, that is, crystallized, tasks is better preserved than performance of novel or unfamiliar tasks. Simple attention is also typically well preserved in older adults (Cavanaugh and Blanchard-Fields, 2002). While some behavioral changes are common in aging, basic personality structures are quite stable over time (Cavanaugh and Blanchard-Fields, 2002). Finally, younger and older adults demonstrate equal ability at solving everyday life problems based on practical knowledge and experience, a skill described as "wisdom" (Baltes and Staudinger, 2000).

Implications for the Study of Dementia

The neuropsychological picture of dementia and normal aging differ considerably and not simply as a matter of degree. AD patients show declines in most declarative memory functions, including recognitions, as the disease progresses. Thus, the functions that best distinguish the young and elderly are not the ones that best distinguish the normal elderly from those with dementia. Thus dementia is a group of diseases associated with aging and not a disease of accelerated aging.

MILD COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT

Introduction

With the graying of America, the classification of memory difficulties has received increased attention. Currently, clinicians encounter patients with memory and other cognitive problems, ranging from short-term memory slips to various other difficulties with routine living skills, but who do not carry the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual*

of Mental Disorders, Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) criteria for dementia. On formal neuropsychological evaluations, they show mild deviations from normal cognition but do not show the striking memory deficits or problem-solving difficulties associated with AD and other forms of dementia.

However, it is critical to know when an abundance of such "mild moments" begins to reflect the development of a progressive neurodegenerative illness. The growing need to address such issues has led to the development of additional categories to classify cognitive impairments that do not meet diagnostic criteria for dementia.

Various terms have been suggested to describe these conditions, including age-associated memory impairment (AAMI), age-associated cognitive decline (AACD), and mild cognitive impairment (MCI). The first two terms imply that the cognitive changes are associated with aging per se rather than any disease process. Thus, they might lead clinicians and investigators away from other causes of cognitive impairment or decline. In addition, AAMI focuses exclusively on memory rather than cognition in general. As such, AAMI and AACD carry fewer criticisms, and MCI becomes the preferred term to describe persons who manifest changes in cognition and functioning that place them between normal individuals and those suffering from mild dementia (Petersen et al., 2001). Because MCI is believed to be a significant risk factor for the eventual development of dementia, and especially AD, the early identification of this syndrome as an entity separate from normal aging may be important for early intervention. Presently, its identification may also assist patients and their families with planning end-of-life issues. In the following section, definitions of MCI will be discussed, and the relationship of MCI to dementia and other conditions associated with aging will be reviewed.

Definition of MCI

Mild cognitive impairment is used to characterize individuals who do not meet criteria for dementia but are experiencing substantial difficulties with memory that do not interfere with routine daily functioning. In a report of the American Academy of Neurology (AAN), Petersen et al. (2001) defined MCI as the state of cognition and functional ability between normal aging and very mild dementia and provided the following diagnostic criteria: (1) A memory complaint, preferably corroborated by an informant; (2) objective memory impairment; (3) normal general cognitive function; (4) intact activities of daily living; and (5) the patient does not meet criteria for dementia.

It should be noted that this definition still focuses on memory impairment and assumes the preservation of other cognitive functions including executive functioning, visuospatial abilities, praxis, language, and recognition. Thus, this definition might be criticized as narrow in focus at this AAMI. However, others have suggested that difficulties may be evident in domains other than memory. According to this definition, MCI may represent a more heterogeneous disorder with various possible outcomes. In any case, despite the focus on memory in most definitions, the concept of MCI is relatively general and has not been associated with standardized diagnostic criteria (Hagan and McGrath, 2001). Further revisions in the concept are likely.

Etiology of MCI

Given the preliminary and general nature of the concept of MCI, a clear and conclusive list of possible etiologies is unlikely although systemic diseases likely account for some cases. Clearly, a significant percentage of the cases represent early stages of dementia, most commonly AD. Petersen et al. (2001) reviewed six longitudinal studies of patients who fit the general description of MCI and found that the annual rate of conversion to a diagnosis of dementia ranged from 6 to 22 percent, with the majority of the studies falling in the range of 12 to 15 percent. This is higher than the annual incidence of dementia, which ranges from 1.1 percent for 60 to 64 years of age to 6.7 percent for individuals who are 95 years or older (Andreasen et al., 1990).

Some authors have theorized that the progression of MCI varies depending on the specific cognitive domains impaired at the time of initial presentation. Individuals with impairment in multiple cognitive domains may progress to AD or vascular dementia or show no progression. Purely amnestic MCI is believed to progress to AD. In contrast, MCI that presents with persistent deficits other than memory may develop into a frontotemporal dementia, dementia with Lewy bodies, primary progressive aphasia, Pick's disease, or AD. In the case of dementia with Lewy bodies, an initial presentation of amnesia MCI may be less likely than nonamnestic MCI because individuals with diffuse Lewy body disease (DLB) demonstrate relative preservation of the hippocampus in comparison to those with AD (Petersen et al., 2001).

Given the association between MCI and subsequent diagnosis of AD or dementia in general, the AAN has recommended that persons who meet the basic criteria for MCI be monitored clinically. However, it should be emphasized that not all cases of MCI develop into dementia. Indeed, according to data reviewed by Hooper and McKeeon (2001), the majority of persons identified with MCI do not convert to dementia within the first 2 to 3 years after identification (Bartels et al., 2000).

There appear to be several causes of MCI in the elderly population other than preclinical dementia. The association between several systemic disease states common in the elderly and MCI is well known. For example, several studies have demonstrated that hypoxicemic chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD) results in cognitive dysfunction that is measurable with neuropsychological instruments and that the severity of the cognitive dysfunction is related to the severity of hypoxemia as well as quality of life (Gross et al., 1987; McEvoy and Lubchik, 1996). However, the nature of the cognitive dysfunction associated with hypoxicemic COPD is different than that associated with AD and most other forms of progressive dementia. Rather than prominent memory deficits, individuals with chronic hypoxemia demonstrate impaired complex perceptual-motor learning and cognitive flexibility (Gross et al., 1987). Other studies have demonstrated associations between MCI and obstructive sleep apnea, nondementing cerebrovascular disorders, and other health problems (Jacova et al., 1996; Rostra and Adams, 1998). In addition, depression, which is common in the elderly, is sometimes associated with memory difficulties, although this is by no means universally true, and depression associated memory deficits appear to be quite different than those observed in AD (Bengt and Caine, 1998).

In summary, while MCI is certainly associated with progressive dementia, it is not specific to dementia, and a diagnosis of MCI is a poor predictor of dementia risk over a 5-year period following initial identification (Bibbey et al., 2001). The fact that MCI is not specific to dementia has led to some controversy regarding the AAN identification and monitoring recommendations cited above. As Hogan and McKeith (2001) have pointed out, there are significant psychological and social problems associated with being labeled "at risk" for dementia, including personal distress and avoidance of driving (paraphrases). Accordingly, more specific indicators of dementia risk and longitudinal studies of MCI as a risk factor are needed.

Mild Cognitive Impairment and Early Markers of Dementia

Some patients with MCI go on to develop the syndrome of dementia. Research with AD and other forms of dementia makes it clear that the cascade of events that eventually leads to dementia is well under way by the time clinical signs of a dementia are detected. This is most clearly the case with neuronal痴mato conditions such as Huntington's disease. It is also apparent that in sporadic AD, the formation of abnormally aggregated hyperphosphorylated tau precedes the development of clinical dementia, perhaps by several years (Cummings et al., 1998). Thus, it is likely that the most effective approach to treating AD and other forms of progressive dementia is early identification of persons known to be at risk.

Marilyn Albert and colleagues have conducted multiple studies of potential pre-clinical markers of AD (Albert and Mass, 2002). They collected data from normal elderly control subjects, persons with "questionable" AD who did not convert to a later diagnosis of AD, and persons with questionable AD who eventually converted to a diagnosis of probable AD. Although the authors did not use the term MCI in their studies, their definition of questionable AD, which is based on a score of 0.5 on the Clinical Dementia Rating Scale (CDR; Hughes et al., 1982), appears broadly comparable to MCI.

Employing data from multiple sources including neuropsychological tests, neuroimaging, and genetic assessments, multivariate analyses indicated that the best predictors of eventual conversion from MCI to AD included measures of learning and executive functioning, atrophy in the entorhinal cortex, superior temporal area, and ventral anterior striatum as revealed by SPECT, and hypoperfusion of the hippocampus-amygdala complex, portions of the anterior and posterior cingulate, and the anterior thalamus as revealed by single-photon emission computed tomography (SPECT) (Albert and Mass, 2002). Interestingly, knowledge of the apolipoprotein E (APOE) status did not enhance the prediction of later conversion to dementia beyond similar neuropsychological testing or neuroimaging. In a related study, Langa et al. (2002) also found APOE status not to be a useful predictor of eventual AD, while impairment in verbal memory was useful.

Studies of other predictive approaches are also underway. For example, a Mayo Clinic group (Kantarci et al., 2002) is using magnetic resonance spectroscopy (MRS) to study brain metabolites as possible predictive predictors. While not all measures have

produced positive findings, the ratio of [β -acetyl]tau to myo-inositol (NA $/$ MI) may predict cognitive dysfunction in MCI as well as AD.

In summary, current studies suggest that a combination of neuroimaging and neuropsychological data are likely to provide the best prediction of which patients with MCI are likely to eventually develop the clinical syndrome of AD. Future studies of preventive treatment approaches might focus on those patients who have positive prodromal findings to determine if the pathological process of AD can be halted or even possibly reversed.

Possible MCI Therapies

Most attempts to treat MCI in the elderly focus on the possible conversion of MCI into AD. Multiple potential treatment alternatives are under investigation. Estrogen, modulators of glutamate receptors, nicotinic agents, anti-inflammatory agents, antioxidant agents, monoaminergic enhancers, vigil substances, memantine, and cholinergic agents are some of the possible treatments being evaluated. Large trials are underway with cholinesterase inhibitors, GABA-2 inhibitors, and vitamin E (Shah et al., 2006).

Using estrogen as a treatment for memory difficulties has been debated in the literature for a number of years. The hippocampus and basal forebrain produce estrogen and progestin receptors that are believed to play a role in memory. Basic science research has shown that estrogen increases the formation of dendrite spines and new synapses in the ventromedial hypothalamus and hippocampus. Estrogen may also facilitate the growth of cholinergic neurons by influencing nerve growth factor (NGF), which is synthesized by the hippocampus and transported to the basal forebrain where it promotes neuronal growth (Barbour, 2000). Estrogen may also have a role in inhibiting lipid peroxidation, acting as a free radical scavenger and limiting the toxicity of beta-amyloid (Korpi et al., 2001).

Despite promising basic science research, estrogen has not consistently shown benefits in treating or preventing cognitive disorders. The data currently do not support the use of this agent for the treatment of AD. In one metaanalysis (Elliott et al., 2001) examining nine randomized controlled trials and eight cohort studies with respect to the role of estrogen and cognition, women with menopausal symptoms showed improvement in verbal memory, vigilance, reasoning, and motor speed but no benefit in other cognitive domains. Asymptomatic women did not improve. Likewise, clinical trials have failed to demonstrate benefits for coronary artery disease, cerebrovascular disease, osteoporosis, and cognition. Further, its long-term use may be contraindicated in women with breast ulcers due to the potential risk of endometrial hyperplasia, endometrial cancer, gallstones, and breast cancer.

Glutamate, a major excitatory amino acid (EAA) neurotransmitter in the mammalian brain, is also believed to affect cognition. The N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) receptor, which binds glutamate and other neurotransmitters, is involved in learning, memory, and hippocampal synaptic plasticity. Studies in animals support that facilitating NMDA receptor functioning should improve cognition.

There are two NMDA receptor agonists that have been used for memory enhancement: alpha-amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-4-isoxazolepropionic acid (AMPA) and NMDA.

Direct activation of NMDA receptors can lead to neurotoxicity; therefore, glycine-like agents, which indirectly activate NMDA receptors, are desired more promising. In our study of minamycin, mildly positive but equivocal results were observed, suggesting improvement in memory (Schwartz et al., 1992).

Ginkgo biloba has received attention in the lay press and the medical literature. Initial reports appeared promising. However, over recent controlled studies have been negative when ginkgo was compared to placebo in the normal elderly, as well as patients with MCI or dementia (Belcaro et al., 2002; van Dongen et al., 2001).

Vitamin E can ameliorate oxidative stress, and a primary event in AD pathology is believed to be oxidative stress involving the production of free radicals. Postmortem examinations of individuals with AD have revealed oxidative damage in neurofibrillary tangles and tangles as well as pyramidal neurons. Vitamin E is a lipid-soluble antioxidant that interacts with cell membranes, traps free radicals, and inhibits beta-amyloid-induced cell death. So far, trials have produced mixed results. One placebo-controlled study revealed benefits in treating moderately impaired AD patients with vitamin E (alpha-tocopherol) at 2000 IU/May. This yielded delays in functional decline, particularly in terms of the need for placement in long-term care facilities (Sano et al., 1997).

Cholinesterase inhibitors are being investigated in large multicenter trials for the treatment of MCI. Loss of neurons in the nucleus basalis of Meynert and other basal forebrain cholinergic nuclei is correlated with cognitive deficits in MCI and AD. Acetylcholinesterase inhibitors prevent the enzymatic breakdown of ACh, enhancing cholinergic transmission and thereby improving cognition. As discussed below, cholinesterase inhibitors are currently the only Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved medications for treating AD. Can cholinesterase inhibitors also benefit MCI patients earlier prevent their conversion to AD? These questions are currently under investigation in a large-scale, multicenter study conducted by the National Institute on Aging comparing donepezil with vitamin E or placebo (Sano et al., 2003).

Our understanding of MCI has increased greatly over the last decade, but implications for the early detection and prevention of dementia require further clarification. A comprehensive review of the current state of knowledge is available (Petersen, 2000).

DEFINITION OF DEMENTIA

Current scientific definitions of dementia focus on a loss of ability to comprehend information or one's environment as well as a lack of ability to act in a fashion that is appropriate to one's circumstances. In addition to incorporating the concept of a loss of cognitive function from a presumably normal potential state due to a biological cause, most current definitions indicate that the affected subject retains relatively normal consciousness. In this report, the definition offered by the International Neuropsychological Society dictionary (Loring, 1999), is typical: "Generalized loss of cognitive functions resulting from several disease in clear consciousness (i.e., in the absence of confusional states)."

Consistent with the contemporary emphasis on quality of life in medical research and practice, many current definitions also note that the deterioration in mental functions disrupts the ability of the affected individual to carry out everyday life functions. Thus, according to Bondi et al. (1998, p. 155), dementia is "an episode of acquired intellectual impairment of sufficient severity to interfere with social or occupational functioning that is caused by brain dysfunction." Similarly, Moenham (2000, p. 444-445) defines dementia as "a chronic and usually progressive decline of intellect and/or memory which causes a gradual restriction of ordinary daily living activities unrelated to changes of alertness, mobility, or orientation." In contrast to dementia, MCI has persistent abilities that do not significantly affect everyday life functions. The most widely used definition of dementia in North American clinical practice is that offered by the American Psychiatric Association (2000) in the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual-IV-TR*. The DSM-IV defines dementia as a syndrome characterized by multiple cognitive deficits including memory impairment (an inability to learn new material or a loss of previously learned material) and at least one of the following deficits: aphasia (a disturbance of language); apraxia (an inability to carry out learned movements despite intact sensorimotor functioning and comprehension of the task); agnosia (an inability to recognize something despite intact sensation), or executive dysfunction (problems with higher-order functions such as planning, initiation, sequencing, monitoring, stopping, and organizing). These cognitive deficits must be severe enough to cause significant impairment in occupational or social functioning and must represent a decline from a previously higher level of functioning. A diagnosis of dementia is not made if the cognitive deficits only appear during the course of a delirium. The DSM-IV requires that a dementia be related to a general medical condition or central nervous system (CNS)-active substance, and several etiologies of dementia are specified.

While widely used in clinical work and research, this definition of dementia is not without criticism. A requirement of functional impairment decreases the sensitivity of the DSM-IV diagnosis of dementia. In highly functioning individuals, dementia illnesses often do not cause significant functional impairments early in their course, and even poorly functioning individuals in supported living situations may not show functional impairment until a dementia illness is severe. The DSM-IV requirement that memory impairment be present also decreases the sensitivity of the definition. Patients who do not develop obvious memory problems until late in the course of their illness (e.g., frontotemporal dementia patients) would not be regarded as demented in the early or middle stages of illness.

In an attempt to circumvent these problems, Cummings and Boron (1992) have put forth an alternative definition of dementia. They suggest that dementia is a syndrome characterized by acquired and persistent abnormalities in at least three of the following five domains: memory, language, visuospatial skills, personality or mood, and executive functioning. This definition of dementia does not require memory impairment, functional impairment, or a medical/physiological etiology and therefore has a higher level of sensitivity than the DSM-IV definition. A lower threshold for classifying early dementia may be important now because treatments are available that

can slow the progression of some of the more common dementia illnesses discussed below.

DIAGNOSIS OF DEMENTIA

Once a patient is found to have the syndrome of dementia, it is necessary to identify the etiology. Numerous illnesses can cause dementia as broadly defined (see Table 15-1). Differentiation of these illnesses is important because some of them are reversible and some can be arrested. It is also important to identify the diseases that are neither reversible nor arrestable (e.g., neurodegenerative diseases) because more disease-specific symptomatic and non-symptomatic treatments are now available and are discussed below.

Evaluation of a demented patient should always begin with a good history and examination. History of cognition, neuropsychiatric, and functional impairment can be elicited from the patient, his or her caregivers, and medical records. Knowledge of patterns and timing of impairment greatly aids in establishing an etiology. Through

Table 15-1. Some Representative Causes of the Dementia Syndrome

Reversible Dementia without Pernicious Deficit	Reversible Dementia with Pernicious Deficit	Progressive Dementia
Hypoxia	Nonspecific dementia	Alzheimer's disease
Hypoxia (e.g., from anemia, decreased cardiac output, lung disease)	Alcoholic dementia	Post-stroke dementia
Histochemical imbalance (e.g., hypothyroidism)	Tauopathy (e.g., dementia, cognitive decline)	Frontotemporal dementia
Hepatic insufficiency	Dyslipidemia (e.g., general dementia)	Frontotemporal dementia
Endocrine disorder (e.g., hypopituitarism, Addison's disease, Cushing's disease)	Genetic neurodegeneration (e.g., tau)	Diffuse Lewy body disease
Neuroleptic-induced (e.g., chlorpromazine)	Big-dose deficit (e.g., long-standing)	Multiple sclerosis
B12 deficiency (e.g., of strict vegetarians)	Second primary hydrocephalus (e.g., long-standing)	Cripplefield-Jakob disease
Normal pressure hydrocephalus (e.g., of strict vegetarians)	Pseudoneurological dementia	Human immunodeficiency virus dementia
	Alcohol dementia	Progressive nonfluent aphasia, progressive nonfluent aphasia, lateral sclerosis

Adapted from Whate and Cummings (1996).

cognitive, neurological, and general medical examinations give objective evidence of deficits and also greatly aid in diagnosis.

The history and examination should guide the choice of medical tests in patients with dementia. Medical testing can be helpful with (1) identification of any preventable or treatable illnesses that may be causing or worsening the dementia, and (2) identification and staging of non-preventable/un治able illnesses for the purpose of appropriate treatment selection.

Laboratory studies are mainly done to screen for preventable and treatable causes of dementia. The AAN and the American Physicians Association (APA) have published dementia practice guidelines in which appropriate laboratory screening studies have been suggested (AAN, 1997; Koepsell et al., 2004a). Tests for uncommon causes of dementia such as heavy metal intoxication are not recommended unless the patient's history or exam suggest that this should be done. Lumbar puncture (LP) for analysis of cerebrospinal fluid is likewise not routinely done but should be considered when indicated by the history or exam. Standard surface electroencephalography (EEG) is probably not useful as a screening tool in the evaluation of dementia but should be used in certain circumstances, for example, if the patient's history suggests seizures, or if the patient may have a disease with a characteristic EEG pattern such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.

Structural neuroimaging, using nonconcentrated CT or MRI is a mainstay of the dementia evaluation. Structural imaging can reveal preventable and treatable causes of dementia such as space-occupying lesions (hematomas, tumors, hydrocephalus, etc.). In patients with neurodegenerative diseases, structural imaging can sometimes reveal patterns of atrophy and other changes that can help with diagnosis. Functional neuroimaging using SPECT or positron emission tomography (PET) scanning measures cerebral blood flow and cerebral metabolic rate, respectively, and can reveal patterns of dysfunction characteristic of certain illnesses.

A formal neuropsychological evaluation can be used to delineate a patient's cognitive deficits and quantify their severity. A profile of relatively preserved and relatively impaired functions can be essential in differential diagnosis, particularly in the more borderline or difficult cases or when cognitive deficits are subtle or complex. Neuropsychological findings are also useful in addressing (including practical needs, selecting treatments, and monitoring the patient's progress over the long-term). Table 15.2 summarizes the recommended procedures for a dementia evaluation.

SOME MAJOR CAUSES OF THE SYNDROME OF DEMENTIA

Introduction

As already noted, there are many brain diseases that can cause dementia. In this chapter we are primarily interested in the dementia diseases associated with aging and will focus on the five most common dementia diseases: Alzheimer's disease, frontotemporal dementia, vascular dementia, and dementia with Lewy bodies.

TABLE 15-2. The Dementia "Work-up"

• Studies that should be done routinely in all patients	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. History and physical exam 2. Neurological exam 3. Mental status testing 4. Eye test 5. Urine fraction test 6. Neuroimaging (CT or MRI)
• Studies commonly done in clinical practice, but cost/benefit not established by research	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Complete blood count 2. Basic chemistry (electrolytes, renal function tests, liver function tests) 3. Fasting blood 4. Autoimmunity screen 5. Neuropsychological assessment 6. Functional neuroimaging (SPECT, etc.)
• Studies that can be helpful with differential diagnosis but may not be commonly available outside referral centers	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Amyloid scan 2. HIV test 3. Hereditary screening 4. Cerebral spinal fluid analysis (e.g., for A4-β protein associated with Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease) 5. EEG (e.g., in patient with suspected seizures) 6. Genetic testing (e.g., APOE genotyping) 7. Cerebral spinal fluid analysis for AD-specific biomarkers (e.g., beta-amyloid and tau)
• Studies mainly of interest in research/clinical conditions that have not been established by research	

ALZHEIMER'S DISEASE

History

In 1907, Alois Alzheimer, a Munich neuropathologist and clinician, published a report of a woman in her 50s who died from Frischer seuche after a 14-year illness. Alzheimer wrote that the patient's illness was characterized by progressive cognitive decline (memory and language dysfunctions, getting lost) as well as neuropsychiatric symptoms (psychosis, screaming, carrying and biting objects). On postmortem examination of the patient's brain, Alzheimer noted atrophy as well as large blood vessel arteriosclerosis. Using microscopy and the histopathology silver stain, Alzheimer also found neuronal loss, plaque, gliol proliferation, and neurofibrillary tangles, a previously unknown phenomenon. Given the relatively young age of his patient, the unusual clinical features, and the unique neuropathological findings, Alzheimer hypothesized that he had discovered a disease distinctive from senile dementia (Alzheimer, 1907).

TABLE 11.2. Fact Summary—Alzheimer's Disease

Typical age of onset:	65–85 years
Sex ratio:	Women ≥ men
Primary clinical/functional features:	Progressive memory and cognitive deficits
Primary brain regions affected:	Mental temporal lobe, hippocampus, entorhinal areas
Neuropathology:	Atrophy, neurofibrillary tangles, neuritic plaques
Neurochemistry:	Loss of acetylcholine
Primary treatment:	Cholinesterase inhibitors

By the 1960s and 1970s, the concepts of Alzheimer's disease (AD) and senile dementia had been unified as discussed above. Following this conceptual shift, clinical (McKhann et al., 1984) and pathological (Ghebremedhin, 1988; National Institute on Aging, 1997) criteria were established for the diagnosis of AD.

When studies of the neuropathology and neurochemistry of AD revealed cholinergic (e.g., Whitworth et al., 1981) and other abnormalities, the stage was set for the development of pharmaceutical treatments. Almost 10 years after Alzheimer's seminal case report, clinicians continue to be confronted with patients clearly manifesting the disease in dementia, and such patients and their family members eagerly await the results of continuing research being done on this devastating disease (see Table 11.3).

Age, Gender, and Epidemiology

The prevalence of AD increases with increasing age. AD is present in about 1 percent of individuals in the 60 to 65 year-old age group, this number increases to 40 percent in the 85 or older age group (Fox, Strauss, et al., 1999).

Most epidemiological studies have suggested a higher risk of AD for females. However, recent results from the Mayo Clinic Study of Older Americans indicate the risk for men and women is approximately equal (Jolland et al., 2002).

Epidemiological studies have consistently implicated AD as the most common form of dementia in the elderly. Findings from the Nuns Study (Schoenborn, 2001; Sano and Matthews, 1999) suggest that approximately 40 percent of confirmed dementia cases are due to AD alone and another 34 percent are due to AD combined with vascular causes. Thus, AD may be implicated in the majority of dementia cases.

Riskiology

Age is the most important risk factor for AD. While AD can be diagnosed in patients as young as 40, it is mostly a disease of the elderly. The prevalence of dementia doubles every 5 years after age 60 (Fox et al., 1999), and some more U.S. studies have similarly shown that the incidence of AD doubles every 4 to 5 years in the elderly (Koren et al., 2000; Buchman et al., 1999). It is not clear whether rates continue to increase or level off in the oldest age groups. Some recent studies suggest an increase in the risk of developing AD into the mid-80s and a decrease in risk thereafter (Fox et al., 2001).

for example, reports that 40 percent of the autopsy brains of participants in the Nun Study who died between the ages of 85 and 99 showed marked Alzheimer's pathology whereas only 22 percent of brains from persons who reached at least 100 years before death showed such pathology.

Genetic predisposition plays a predominant role in cases of early-onset AD and interacts with environmental and life-history factors to produce late-onset cases. A number of dominantly inherited genetic mutations can cause early-onset AD, but such cases account for less than 1 percent of the total AD population. Mutations in the presenilin 1 gene on chromosome 14, which codes for one of the enzymes that cleave the amyloid precursor protein (APP), account for 30 percent or more of the dominantly inherited, early-onset AD cases (Selkoeberg et al., 1992). Most individuals with trisomy 21 (Down syndrome) develop cortical amyloid plaques consistent with AD by age 60 as a result of carrying an extra copy of the APP gene, which is found on chromosome 21. Patients without Down syndrome who have APP gene mutations can likewise develop AD and account for about 1 to 2 percent of the dominantly inherited, early-onset AD cases (Saint George-Hyslop et al., 1992). Mutations in the presenilin 2 gene on chromosome 1, which code another enzyme that cleaves APP, cause about 3 to 10 percent of the dominantly inherited, early-onset AD cases (Leydy-Lilien et al., 1993). The apolipoprotein E (APOE) gene on chromosome 19 codes for apolipoprotein E (apoE), which plays a role in cholesterol transport and possibly in neuronal repair and neuroplasticity. There are three alleles of this gene. The E3 allele is by far the most common in all populations, and this is followed by the E4 and E2 alleles. It has been shown that the various APOE genotypes alter the risk of late-onset AD. The E2 allele seems to decrease risk, and the E4 allele seems to increase risk in a dose-dependent fashion. E4 gene dose is likewise inversely related to age of disease onset, with about all 64-64 homozygotes developing AD by age 80 (Corder et al., 1993; Mayeux et al., 1993; Perneczky et al., 1994).

In recent years a cognitive reserve hypothesis has been developed that holds that individuals with greater preexisting intelligence, language abilities, and educational achievement are more effectively compensated for losses caused by AD than individuals with lesser abilities (Borod, 2000; Snowden et al., 1996). Functional imaging studies have supported the reserve hypothesis by showing that, at a given level of dementia severity, patients with higher preexisting intelligence quotients (IQs) and levels of education have more severe deficits on imaging than patients with lesser abilities (Alexander et al., 1991; Stern et al., 1992). Studies examining brain size (which correlates positively with both IQ and education) have similarly found that increased preexisting brain mass may have a protective effect against the clinical manifestation of AD (Schoenberg, 1999).

Studies examining the relationship between head trauma and the subsequent development of AD have yielded conflicting results. Traumatic brain injury could increase the risk of AD by decreasing brain reserve or by playing a facilitative role in the pathogenesis of AD. Brain trauma can cause an increase in the deposition of beta-amyloid, the main constituent of AD plaques, in the brain. An interaction between head trauma and APOE genotype has also been noted (Jordan, 1997; Mayeux et al.,

(1995) wherein the APOE 14 gene does correlate positively with the manifestation of AD after brain trauma.

Sapolsky and colleagues (McEwen and Sapolsky, 1995; Sapolsky, 1996) have demonstrated that stress and subsequent hyperactivity of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis may lead to cell death in the hippocampus. While this process seems to occur in individuals with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), traumatic stress victims have not been shown to be at increased risk for AD.

Recent large-scale studies conducted in Finland (Kivipelto et al., 2002) and the United States (Kangasuo et al., 2001) suggest that many of the risk factors for cardiovascular disease and vascular dementia, including diabetes mellitus, high cholesterol, and hypertension, also increase the risk of developing AD. Indeed, the increase in risk for these factors, which are treatable, appears to be greater than the increase in risk provided by the APOE 14 allele (Kivipelto et al., 2002). These findings provide hope that medications currently used in primary care may have a preventive effect with respect to AD. Initial results with statins appear promising and argue that control over risk factors for cardiovascular (CV)-disease is one way to substantially reduce the risk for AD (Suzuki and Davis, 2003).

Morales (2000) has integrated data regarding the etiology of AD into a "neuroplasticity failure" hypothesis that posits that the genetic, environmental, personal health, and life-history risk factors compromise neuronal repair mechanisms that would otherwise inhibit or prevent the neuropathological cascade leading to AD. Accordingly, effective treatment and prevention of AD will involve reducing neuroplasticity burden and/or enhancing plasticity mechanisms.

Clinical Features

Cognitive

Memory. Multiple studies have demonstrated that the most chronic, consistent, and usually the earliest neuropsychological finding in AD is an anterograde amnesia characterized by problems in declarative memory (Brown et al., 1996; Dunn et al., 2000). Episodic (recent) memory difficulties may be apparent earliest but declines in semantic (familiar) memory soon follow (Dunn et al., 2000). Indeed most experts of declarative memory are impaired in AD. Hallmarks of the memory deficit in AD include poor learning and retention as well as a rapid rate of information loss over time (Bartore et al., 1999; See, 1999). Thus, a percent retention measure after a delay ranging from 3 to 30 min is often favored by clinicians in the assessment of patients with suspected AD. However, Dunn et al. (2000) found a Paired Associate Learning task to be particularly sensitive to AD.

Patients with AD are relatively sensitive to interference effects and thus make erroneous induction errors on multiple simultaneous tasks. Although recognition may be preserved early, as the disease progresses AD patients show difficulties on both recognition and recall measures, indicating that the primary memory deficit in mid-to-late-stage AD is one of storage failure and information loss rather than retrieval failure. This sets AD apart from some other dementias, especially frontotemporal dementia.

Encoding appears to be impaired as is performance on some tasks of implicit memory, with the exception that procedural memory, for example, skill learning, appears to remain relatively intact in AD; especially when compared to subcortical disorders such as those associated with Parkinson's disease or Huntington's disease (Bentler et al., 1999). Working memory also appears to be relatively preserved in the early stages of AD, although subtle deficits may be observed on formal neuropsychological batteries.

Poor retrograde memory is also observed in AD, albeit usually later than deficits in anterograde memory. There appears to be a temporal gradient in recall in early stages of the disease such that recently learned information is recalled with more difficulty than recently learned information. However, this gradient flattens as the disease progresses and AD patients eventually have general difficulty recalling events from all decades of their lives, including autobiographical information (Bentler et al., 1999; Dunn et al., 2000). Spatial with emotional content are generally recalled better than nonemotional stimuli. However, this effect appears to be absent or greatly reduced in AD patients (Bentler et al., 1999).

Cognitively Asymmetrical. Other cognitive functions are also impaired relatively early in AD. Albert et al. (2000) found measures of executive functioning and cognitive flexibility to be the most sensitive to early AD. Following memory measures, McPherson et al. (2002) report that this executive dysfunction is linked to the nonverbal apraxia syndrome of spatial memory observed in AD (see below). Helversen and Oei (2002) found that tests of visuospatial function were most sensitive after memory tests. Thus, the AD patient typically will have trouble copying detailed figures. Families of patients may report that a patient has gotten lost in public, or even at home, in midstage AD.

Deficits in language functions are also reported, especially categorical fluency and naming (Albert et al., 2000; Albert and Blane, 2002; Borsig et al., 1996; Nelson, 1997). In early to middle AD, patients often have "empty speech," full of vague pronouns, or speech lacking in information content. Patients with AD may make paraphasic errors (i.e., substitute incorrect sounds or words for intended sounds or words) in speaking and in writing. With disease progression, AD patients develop comprehension difficulties. As the disease becomes severe, aphasia, paraphasia, and anomia ensue. The language deficit in AD appears to be primarily semantic, that is, related to the ability to comprehend and communicate meaning. Syntax, or grammar, is retained (Nelson, 1997). Simple attentional skills, including focusing and shifting, are usually retained early in the disease but more complex attentional tasks, such as divided attention, are impaired (Borsig et al., 1996; Nelson, 1997). In addition, problems with performing calculations are commonly seen early in the course of AD. While patients with AD have little trouble using concrete objects, they do demonstrate ideomotor apraxia, that is, they have trouble demonstrating actions when the appropriate object is not available ("Show me how..."). (See, 1999).

Zalsman et al. (1998) have performed a meta-analysis of studies on the cognitive effects of AD and frontotemporal dementia. Their results, as adapted by Cullum et al.




Figure 15.2. Profile of neuropsychological testing in Alzheimer's disease and non-demented controls. The results are displayed in terms of Z -scores based on normal elderly norms. AD = Alzheimer's Disease; Digit = digit naming; Verbal = verbal functioning; Visual = visuospatial functioning; Learn. = learning; Mem. = memory. (Adapted with permission from Cullum et al., 2001, based on data from Sultzer et al., 1999.)

(2005), which are displayed in Figure 15.2, allow the reader to contrast the cognitive profiles of the two diseases.

Object Identification and etc. Although not typically considered a cognitive function by neuropsychologists, color identification appears to be quite sensitive to AD (Duffy, 2001). In addition, it has the advantage of being less confounded with education than most cognitive measures (McGinnity, 1992; McGinnity et al., 1991). Instead, two studies suggest that a simple color recognition test is equal to measures of memory in terms of sensitivity to AD (McCaffery et al., 2000; McElwain et al., 1994). Even more impressive is a study by Moagan and Murphy (2002) that achieved perfect classification of elderly normals and AD patients using a combination of an object identification test and olfactory event-related potentials. These studies buttress the utility of olfactory measures in the assessment of AD although, as noted below, other dementia diseases can also result in anosmia.

Personality Changes: Personality changes are frequently seen in patients with AD. Apathy, or a loss of interest and motivation, can be an early manifestation of AD. Disinhibition and social inappropriateness are often seen in the earlier stages of AD, and agitation and aggression can complicate the later stages (Mega et al., 1993).

Many AD patients with apathy are mistakenly thought to be depressed (Lamy et al., 1998). Severe depression is actually unusual in AD. About 50 percent of AD patients are developing some depressive symptoms such as sadness and tearfulness; this rarely includes profound depression, though. Suicidality is very rare in AD (Durnings et al., 1987).

About 25 percent of AD patients will develop delusions. Delusional concerns about infidelity of the spouse and self are common, as is the "phantom hearing" delusion (*i.e.* belief that unfamiliar individuals are living in the house) (Kempler and Mayeoff, 1990).

Examination and Test Findings

An extensive office or bedside cognitive examination will reveal difficulties with recent memory, language, visuospatial abilities, and calculations as discussed above. As AD progresses and the frontal lobes are affected, executive dysfunction will also be seen. The neurological examination in AD is normal until the disease becomes advanced. Parkinsonism can be seen in the later stages of the illness. In the late stages of AD, the posture becomes markedly flexed and the limbs rigid, leading to contractures.

Biochemical studies will reveal no abnormalities specific for AD and are usually done only to rule-out other causes of dementia. Measurement of cerebrospinal fluid levels of beta-amyloid, tau protein, and phosphorylated tau as well as other proteins may aid in the diagnosis of AD but is not yet done in routine clinical practice (Bennett and Vasquez, 1998). The issue of genetic testing for AD is complex. Tests for genes known to increase the risk of AD are available but are generally only clinically useful in families with early-onset, autosomal dominant disease. It is known that APOE genotype influences the risk of developing AD, but because this risk is in turn modified by many other factors, the predictive value of an individual's APOE genotype is unclear. For this reason, APOE genotyping should not be used in routine clinical practice at the present time (Post et al., 1997).

The standard EEG will often be normal in patients with early AD. In middle and later stages, quantitative EEG (QEEG) can demonstrate an increase in slow-wave activity (beta and theta power) that correlates with disease progression (Hagel and Möller, 1997).

Structural imaging (e.g., MRI) usually reveals atrophy. Atrophy is particularly seen in the hippocampus and other medial temporal lobe structures. Medial temporal atrophy occurs early in the illness and can precede clinical signs and symptoms of dementia (Buck and Brook, 1993). Studies have shown that medial temporal atrophy can discriminate AD patients from those without AD (OTterlo, 1995), but because medial temporal atrophy can also be seen in other disease states, this finding can only be used to support a diagnosis of AD. Functional imaging (e.g., PET) usually demonstrates hypometabolism in the affected temporal, parietal, and posterior cingulate cortices. Because the sensitivity of PET in AD is high, it can be useful in detecting the illness at an early stage when treatments that slow the disease process may be most helpful. The specificity of the temporal/parietal pattern of hypometabolism is also high, making PET a useful adjunct in the differential diagnosis of dementia (Bennett et al., 1995). A PET study using a radiolabelled ligand that binds to plaques and tangles has shown that this technique can be used to locate and quantify disease burden in living patients with AD (Shengji-Labat et al., 2002). Imaging methods that more specifically determine beta-amyloid are in development (Bacskai et al., 2002). When further refined, this approach could be helpful with the diagnosis of AD and could be used to monitor effects of treatments that interrupt the biochemical processes of AD.

Neurophysiological assessment will demonstrate the cognitive abnormalities discussed above and can quantify these abnormalities for the purpose of diagnosis, monitoring disease progression and/or monitoring effects of treatment.

Neuropathology. In gross examination, the brains of AD patients typically demonstrate shrinkage (see Fig. 1*A,B*). This is manifested as flattened gyri, increased sulci width, and hippocampal heterotrophies or crypts. When viewed postmortem, the brains of AD patients typically show an enlargement in the region between the hippocampus in the medial-temporal lobe and the amygdala (called the lateral ventricle). AD pathologically affects the medial temporal structures hippocampus and amygdala as well as the hippocampal junction. These frontal lobe microhemorrhages often occur, involvement of the primary consciousness pathways and subcortical connections is limited, especially early in the disease.

The most common plaque, which should be differentiated from other types of plaques in the brains of older adults, is one of the telltale histological features of AD. Plaques are aggregates of amyloid protein, extracellular membrane-associated, oligodendrocyte cell processes, and microglia. In normal plagues, no dense core of amyloid surrounded by a halo of cells and cell processes forms. In AD, plaques dramatically become the path of neurodegeneration (e.g., the hippocampal area) and in the cortical layers containing pyramidal neurons.

Neurofibrillary tangles (NFTs) are the other telltale histopathologic finding of AD, although they are also observed in other neurodegenerative disorders and in a more limited distribution (Westerman et al., 1998). NFTs are found in a wide variety of locations in AD including the cortex, medial temporal structures, subcortical white matter, corpus callosum, and anterior horns of Mollaret. NFTs are aggregates of hyperphosphorylated proteins and are composed mostly of paired helical filaments. There are two or three nested concentric spindle-shaped structures, and these may become




Figure 1. Magnification analysis of regional brain atrophy in Alzheimer's disease. (From Westerman et al., 1998; Reproduced with permission from *Journal of Neuropathology and Experimental Neurology*.)

extracellular. The concentration of tangles provides an index of the regional synaptic loss and functional decline in the cortex due to AD. Braak and Braak (1991) have provided a staging system for characterizing the severity of NFT pathology as the disease progresses that is now commonly used by other investigators.

Neuronal loss in AD is most prominent in the frontal and temporal lobes and hippocampus. A decrease in the amount of synaptophysin, a protein associated with presynaptic nerve terminals, is noted in the frontal, temporal, and parietal lobes (Bhatnagar et al., 1989). Neurons are also lost from subcortical structures including the nucleus basalis of Meynert, locus caeruleus, and raphe nuclei.

Other neuropathological changes characteristic of AD include reactive astrocytosis and microgliosis, granulovacuolar degeneration, Hirano bodies, amyloid angiopathy, and areas of white matter hypodensity and atrophy (Jacova, 2002). It should be noted that granulovacuolar degeneration, Hirano bodies, and amyloid angiopathy are, like plaques and tangles, seen in other disease processes as well as normal aging (Jellinger, 2000).

Neurodegeneracy. The fact that deposition of beta-amyloid precedes the formation of plaques and tangles as well as the development of microglia and astrocytosis suggests a central pathogenic role for this molecule. The chemical composition of senile plaques has been characterized. In addition to amyloid, AD plaques have been found to contain apolipoprotein E (apoE). The different isoforms of apoE bind amyloid with different affinities. Also associated with AD plaques are amyloid precursor protein, neurogranin, neurotrophin-3, chaperoneins, ubiquitin, substance P, and a number of other molecules.

Neurofibrillary tangles are associated with the protein ubiquitin and tau. Tau is a microtubule-associated protein that plays a role in assembly and stabilization of microtubules. It is characteristically hyperphosphorylated in AD. The relationship between the formation of plaques and tangles is unclear (Whitwell and Lovestone, 2002).

Loss of cell life from the nucleus basalis of Meynert and other cholinergic basal forebrain nuclei results in a marked decrease in cholinergic input to the cortex (Whitlock et al., 1991). Atrophy of the locus caeruleus, raphe nuclei, and substantia nigra result in decreased noradrenergic, serotoninergic, and dopamine activity, respectively.

Natural History

The rate of progression of AD varies both within and between patients. AD shortens survival, particularly in men, patients over age 70, patients with more severe dementia, and patients with more severe functional impairment (Hock et al., 1996). Patients with AD become bedridden in the late stages of the illness; death usually results from dehydration, malnutrition, or acute infection. Aspiration pneumonia is especially frequent.

Treatment

Recognition of the cholinergic deficit associated with AD has given rise to a number of medications that facilitate cholinergic neurotransmission. Benefit demonstrated by giving intravenous physostigmine, a short half-life inhibitor of acetylcholinesterase

(AChE), below the development of longer half-lives, orally administered AChE inhibitors (AChEIs). These medications have been shown to significantly improve cognition when compared to placebo, and this effect can be maintained for years. AChEIs are also useful psychotropic drugs in patients with AD; improvements in apathy, hallucinations, and other neuropsychiatric symptoms have been shown (Kutneraga, 2008).

Tacrine was the first AChEI to be widely used clinically. Tacrine is a nonspecific rAChEI, because it inhibits both AChE and butyryl ester esterase, the cholinesterase predominant outside the central nervous system. Tacrine is associated with significant cholinergic side effects including nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea. Another significant side effect of tacrine is hepatotoxicity; this necessitates close monitoring of the drug in some users, but users developing this side effect can be rechallenged with the drug. Significant side effects, four times a day dosing, and newer AChEIs have relegated tacrine to a secondary position among the AChEIs. Donepezil is a more selective inhibitor of AChE and can be taken once daily. Rivastigmine, a derivative of physostigmine, is also a more specific inhibitor of AChE. Cholinergic side effects necessitate slow titration (over weeks) when starting patients on rivastigmine. Rivastigmine is dosed twice daily. Galantamine is both an AChEI and an allosteric modulator of the muscarinic cholinergic receptor; Galantamine is given twice daily.

A number of pharmacological approaches to AD have focused on intervention in the disease process itself. In women, estrogen is probably a neurotrophin that facilitates synaptogenesis and learning. Studies have suggested that postmenopausal estrogen supplementation in women can decrease the risk of developing AD, but other factors present in the estrogen-exposing population confound these results. It is unclear if estrogen is helpful in women who have developed AD (Chotiner et al., 2002). Several epidemiological studies have likewise suggested that chronic use of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) may decrease the risk of developing AD. However, clinical trials of corticosteroids and COX inhibitors have not supported this finding (Posteill, 2002). Lipoprotein oxidation and subsequent cellular membrane damage has been posited as a pathogenic mechanism in AD, and the use of copper-free radical scavengers such as vitamins E and C has been investigated. In a study of the effects of Vitamin E, illness progression in AD patients was noted to be slowed (Gore, 1997). An rebound in the usefulness of estrogen, NSAIDs, and vitamin E still evolving; general recommendations regarding the use of these substances cannot be made at this time.

The potential utility of N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA) antagonists in the treatment of AD has been suggested by the binding of the excitotoxicity of NMDA receptors by glutamate in neurodegenerative disorders. One NMDA antagonist, memantine, has demonstrated significant clinical benefit in the treatment of moderate to severe AD (Reisberg et al., 2003) providing hope for treatment of the disease in its later stages.

FRONTOTEMPORAL DEMENTIA

History

From 1892 to 1906, Arnold Pick reported a series of cases in which patients developed cognitive and behavioral abnormalities in association with focal frontal and temporal

TABLE 15-15. Fact Summary—Frontotemporal Dementia

Typical age of onset	50–62 years
Sex ratio:	Men > women
Primary clinicoanatomic feature:	Progressive deterioration of behavior and loss of executive functioning
Primary brain regions affected:	Frontal lobe and anterior temporal lobes
Neuropathology:	1. Astrocytosis with or without Pick cells and Pick bodies 2. Microvascular pathology
Neurochemistry:	Loss of serotonin
Primary treatment:	Selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (proposed)

lobe atrophy. In 1911, Alzheimer discovered argyrophilic intracellular inclusions in similar cases and named these structures Pick bodies. In 1926, Pick's students Gruen and Spatz coined the term Pick's disease to describe patients with frontotemporal atrophy and Pick bodies.

Interest in this subject waned until the 1980s when groups in Manchester, England (Neary et al., 1986), and Lund, Sweden (Braak, 1987; Gustafson, 1987), re-discovered a dementia occurring from focal frontal atrophy. These groups found on microscopic examination that the characteristic changes of Alzheimer's disease were absent in their patients and that multiple histological pictures (including Pick bodies in a minority of patients) could be found in patients with frontal atrophy. The Lund and Manchester groups coined the term frontotemporal dementia (FTD) to describe the syndrome seen in these patients and developed clinical criteria for the diagnosis of this illness (Braak et al., 1994; revised by Neary et al., 1998).

Mummery (1962) described interest in cases of focal left temporal lobe atrophy with his description of primary progressive aphasia (PPA), a dysfluent language disorder. Snowden et al. (1989) described a third frontotemporal syndrome, semantic dementia (SD), a fluent language disorder marked by a loss of ability to appreciate word meaning and primarily associated with temporal lobe atrophy. More detailed descriptions of these three syndromes are available in Snowden et al. (1998) (see Table 15-16).

Age, Gender, and Epidemiology

Unlike many other causes of dementia, FTD often manifests in middle age. The mean age of onset is 50 to 62 years and is significantly lower than the age of onset for AD (Gronwall, 2002; Snowden et al., 1998). Most patients with FTD develop the illness between ages 45 and 62 with a range of 21 to 79 years.

Frontotemporal dementia in general and PPA specifically are seen in men as commonly as in men. SD is more common in women (Snowden et al., 1998).

Early clinical population-based studies (Neary et al., 1988) estimated that FTD accounts for about 20 percent of all cases of presenile dementia. Neary et al. (1998) found a prevalence of 1.2 per million population in the 50 to 40-year-old age group.

and a prevalence 24 per million population in the 60 to 79 years-old age group. These findings show that FTD is not rare but it is much less common than AD.

Patients with FTD make up about 15 percent of the PTD population. FTD comprises about 10 percent of the FTD population, and patients with primary progressive aphasia, another variant, account for about 2 percent of the population.

Etiology

It is believed that there is a strong familial component in about 40 percent of cases of FTD, and the pattern of inheritance appears to be autosomal dominant in 90 percent of familial FTD cases (Brown et al., 1999).

A number of knock-out mice with autosomal dominant FTD have been shown to have abnormalities of the chromosome 17 gene coding for tau (Foster et al., 1997). These families show clinical heterogeneity. In addition to the characteristic findings of FTD, psychosis, atrophy, muscular wasting, and parkinsonism are variably present in patients with these tau gene mutations. This heterogeneity is thought to arise from the fact that different gene mutations affect tau processing and functioning differently.

Other lines of evidence suggest that tau mutations may be sufficient but not necessary for the appearance of an FTD syndrome. Some of the chromosomal 17 families do not seem to have a tau mutation, and one Danish kindred with an autosomal-dominant FTD has been found to have an abnormality on chromosome 9 (Brown et al., 1999). FTD associated with motor neuron disease has been linked to chromosome 9 (Jucker et al., 2000).

The apolipoprotein E genotype does not appear to influence the risk for FTD. No social, occupational, geographical, or environmental factors have been found to correlate with FTD.

Clinical Features

Cognition. The basic neuropsychological profile in FTD can be most and contrasted with the AD profile in Figure 19.2. Diminished executive functions are a hallmark of the cognitive profile in patients with FTD. Difficulties with planning, organizing, and problem solving may be reported by a patient's caregiver. Speech output characteristically decreases with time, and FTD patients can demonstrate verbal perseveration and stereotypy, echolalia, and eventually mutism. Overall performance on neuropsychological tests may be diminished by slowing of response initiation as well as by relatively low effort. Calculations may be impaired secondary to general lack of effort as well as impaired problem-solving skills (Brown et al., 1999).

Memory is often impaired in FTD. A typical frontal lobe patient is critical in which the primary difficulty is one of retrieval rather than loss of information or a failure to form associations between stimuli as is the case in AD. Specifically, FTD patients are disorganized and inefficient in their retrieval strategies. Thus, FTD patients perform better on recognition than recall and improve on memory tests when given a hint or

case wherein AD patients do not benefit from cues, particularly in the mid- to late-disease stages. FTD patients also show less difference in performance on immediate and cued/delay recall tasks than is typical of AD patients (Snowden et al., 1996).

Visuospatial perception and constructional praxis are usually preserved until late in the illness, although the reproduction of complex figures may be disorganized and show perseverative elements (Snowden et al., 1996). Some FTD patients show remarkable preservation of spatial abilities and related artistic abilities. Drawings by FTD patients may be quite complete and detailed although usually not original or creative. Miller and colleagues (1999) have reported on three patients with FTD who continued to develop and apply their artistic skills even after they were institutionalized. This would be unusual in AD and most other dementia.

The primary cognitive finding in the PPA variant of FTD (also known as progressive nonfluent aphasia) is a nonfluent expressive language disorder that includes agnosias, phonemic paraphasias, and anoma in the early and preserved stages (Dronkers, 2001). Impaired word retrieval and repetition as well as reading comprehension have also been reported. Semantic fluency tests are reported to be better performed than those involving initial letter-word generation. As might be expected, verbal memory is more impaired than nonverbal memory, and PPA patients have higher Performance IQ than verbal IQ scores on the Wechsler intelligence scales. Snowden et al. (1996) report that PPA patients show better preserved executive skills early in the disease than most FTD patients. Like other FTD patients, PPA patients show preserved spatial abilities until quite late in the disease.

Patients with SVD show a loss of ability to appreciate meaning, especially in language. Associative agnosia is common (Koscikowski, 2002). Speech is fluent with preserved syntax and phonology. However, it may lack meaning and be marked by semantic paraphasias. Unlike the case with PPA, initial word generation is superior to semantic category word generation (Snowden et al., 1996). SVD patients demonstrate a unique pattern of memory deficits in which recent autobiographical memory is preserved but semantic memory is impaired. A reversed temporal gradient may be observed in which the patient is able to recall what happened the day before but is not able to recall major historical events from their earlier years (Snowden et al., 1996).

Like other FTD patients, SVD patients show good visuospatial skills. They may be able to produce detailed and accurate reproductions of pictures but may not be able to describe what they have drawn (Snowden et al., 1996).

Ametropic/Hypospatial: The most marked changes in patients with FTD are in the emotional/behavioral realm. Patients early in the course of an FTD may demonstrate anxiety, depression, and hypochondriasis. Personality changes are a hallmark of FTD. Passivity, inertia, and emotional blunting develop in patients with FTD. Problems with social interaction are frequently seen. FTD patients commonly lose social awareness and inhibitions and becomeverbose and intrusive. Aggression and antisocial behaviors as well as dramatic changes in personal, political, and religious beliefs are also reported leading to a suggestion that FTD is a disease that alters the concept of "self" (Miller et al., 2001; Hyndkack et al., 2001). There is some evidence that the changes in social

behavior that are characteristic of FTD, and particularly Pick's dementia, are observed much more often in patients with greater deterioration in the right frontotemporal regions as compared to the left (Mylakow et al., 2001).

Atypical motor behaviors are also frequently seen in patients with FTD. Grooming, pacing, and wandering are common as are perseverative, stereotyped, and compulsive behaviors. Utilization behavior, or the automatic manipulation of objects in the environment, can be seen in FTD patients. Hyperactivity (a tendency to play instead of objects in the mouth) can be seen in FTD patients, and denial by hypoesthesia has been described (Blenner and Fox, 1997). Dietary changes are also commonly seen in FTD patients; overeating, food "addiction" (an excessive focus on certain foods), and a preference for sweets can be noted. Recurrent use of tobacco and alcohol also frequently occurs.

Examination and Test Findings

On cognitive examination, patients with FTD will characteristically show executive dysfunction. Various office or bedside tests will reveal perseveration, stimulus-boundness, and problems with planning, sequencing, and organization. When asked to interpret pictures, or when given pairs of objects and asked to find the objects' similarities and differences, FTD patients will show an impairment in abstracting abilities. Averbal impairment is also seen.

The neurological examination may reveal primitive reflexes, that is, frontal release signs. These reflexes include the snout, root, root, galantoid (John's contraction to hand irritation), and grasp reflexes. Pupil dilation and signs consistent with motor neuron disease may also be seen. Asymmetry is sometimes noted in the physical findings in patients with FTD.

Blood laboratory studies and the EEG will be unrevealing. Structural neuroimaging (CT or MRI) can demonstrate atrophy of the frontal and/or temporal lobes. Functional neuroimaging will demonstrate hyperactivation/hypoactivation in the frontal and/or temporal lobes. Asymmetry can be seen.

A neuropsychological evaluation can confirm the presence of cognitive dysfunction as noted above. The evaluation should include tests of executive function and cognitive flexibility as impairment in these areas is a key characteristic of FTD. Memory testing can clarify whether reported memory problems are characteristic of FTD or of the PPA or SCD variants. In addition, language testing can be used to detect the nonfluent language disturbance in PPA or the fluent aphasia and loss of word meaning in SCD. Finally, assessment of visuospatial skills can help differentiate FTD from AD and other dementia disorders in which these abilities decline.

Neuropathology. On gross anatomical examination, the brain of an FTD patient will characteristically show atrophy of the frontal lobes, anterior temporal lobes, and/or striatum (see Fig. 15.4). On microscopic examination, approximately 60 percent of FTD patients will be found to have Pick's disease type pathology. In brains with microvascular pathology, loss of neurons and spongiform changes in the superficial




Figure 2A. Neuroimaging analysis of regional brain atrophy in frontotemporal dementia. Petersen et al., 1993. Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 1993 image.

frontal lobe areas of FTD patients (Fig. 2) have the Pick type of FTD with loss of neurons, gliosis, and rare and irregular positive reactions to Lewy bodies; other pathologic areas in FTD patients include those changes associated with motor neuron disease (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis or ALS) or associated with other pathological changes found also in the frontal cortex of AD, MCI.

The cognitive behavioral pattern seen in patients with FTD contrasts with the anatomical pattern of disease. Patients with the semantic form of FTD usually have pathologic changes in the subcortical regions and anterior temporal lobes. The apraxic form of FTD is usually associated with pathology in the dorsolateral frontal cortex. Patients with the language form of FTD usually have primary disease in the striatum and temporal lobes. FTD patients with progressive changes in social behavior, personality, have a predominance of disease in the right hemisphere. Patients with the AD variant of FTD characteristically have memory loss disease. Patients with FTD have disease in the left hemisphere (language area), and patients with primary progressive aphasia characteristically have nonverbal disease. While the clinical syndrome coincides with the anatomical pattern of disease in patients with FTD, it usually does not predict histological type (Petersen et al., 1993).

Neuroimaging assessment of the neurology system has been demonstrated in FTD. A 40 percent increase in the number of ventricular regions has been demonstrated in frontotemporal demented (FTD) and Alzheimer's disease subjects. Binding has been demonstrated in the frontal and temporal lobes in FTD in the hypofrontal (Cronquist et al., 1997). Impairment is

the nigrostriatal dopaminergic system has been reported in FTD (Kins et al., 2002). Nigrostriatal and AMPA receptors are decreased in number in the frontal and temporal cortices in FTD patients and may be differentially decreased in various pathophysiological subtypes of FTD (Brooker, 2004). Multiple studies of the cholinergic system in FTD have failed to demonstrate an abnormality of cholinergic function. The locus caeruleus is likewise spared in FTD.

Natural history

Frontotemporal dementia usually begins insidiously and progresses gradually. The mean duration of illness is about 8 years for all forms of FTD, with a range of 2 to 20 years (Gorno-Tempini et al., 2002).

Treatment

Following on studies demonstrating serotonergic abnormalities in FTD, Miller and colleagues (Miller et al., 1990) have demonstrated that selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) may be helpful in the treatment of these patients' psychopathology. In one small study, patients treated with paroxetine showed significant improvements in behavioral symptoms, reflected by a reduction of "anger" items (Miller et al., 2002).

As no abnormality of the cholinergic system has been demonstrated in FTD, there appears to be no role for cholinesterase inhibitors in the treatment of FTD at this time.

VASCULAR DEMENTIA

History

Building upon the work of Binswanger and Alzheimer, Kraepelin in 1896 differentiated arteriosclerotic from senile dementia (Buchwald and Cotman, 1998). Despite this, in the first half of the 20th century硬化的动脉 was considered to be the most common form of dementia, and AD was considered to be a rare illness of younger people. It was thought that hardening of the arteries led to decreased cerebral perfusion and that this led to the formation of cortical plaques and tangles. By 1970 it had been shown that the correlation between vascular pathology and plaques and tangles in dementia is weak and that plaque and tangle disease is much more common than arteriosclerotic disease (Terbrugge et al., 1970). Hachinski coined the term multi-infarct dementia and pointed that actual brain tissue destruction and not hypoperfusion is necessary for the manifestation of dementia (Hachinski et al., 1974). Today, the term vascular dementia (VaD) has supplanted multi-infarct dementia in clinical usage to recognize the fact that vascular syndromes other than multiple infarcts strokes (e.g., hemorrhagic stroke) can also cause cognitive and neuropsychiatric impairment (see Table 15.3).

TABLE 15-5. Fact Summary—Vascular Dementia

Typical age of onset	Over 60 years
Sex ratio	Men > women
Primary clinical behavioral feature	Migrating cognitive impairment
Primary brain regions affected	Nonfrontal cortex
Neuropathology	Multiple lacunar infarcts
Neurochemistry	Normal cholinergic systems
Primary treatment	Treatment of stroke risk factors

Age, Gender, and Epidemiology

Vascular dementia is usually thought to be the second most common cause of dementia after AD. However, pure MCI may, in fact, be relatively uncommon. Koscik and Sano (2000) concluded that pure MCI is less than half as common as combined VaD/AD. Findings from the Nun Study indicated that pure MCI was quite rare, accounting for only 2.8 percent of patients with dementia in that population compared to 34 percent of patients with coexisting VaD and AD (Snowden, 2001; Snowden and Markham, 1999). Because it is now known that risk factors for cerebrovascular disease also increase the risk of AD, and the presence of lacunar brain infarcts influences the maturation of AD, "mixed" AD/VaD and the boundaries between these three diagnostic entities are receiving increasing attention (Rabin, 2002). Instead, some authors have suggested that the diagnosis of VaD may be outdated (Snowden, 2001) or should be discarded altogether (Snowden and Hochwald, 2000).

Etiology

Cerebrovascular disease is most prevalent in men over the age of 60, but it can present in others with vascular risk factors as outlined below. A number of risk factors are known to predispose individuals to cerebrovascular disease. Systemic conditions such as hypertension, hyperlipidemia, and diabetes mellitus are well-known vascular disease risk factors. Hypotensive events, for example, due to cardiac arrhythmias, can also lead to cerebral damage via hypoperfusion. Coronary artery disease and myocardial infarction also correlate with cerebrovascular disease. Atrial fibrillation and other risk factors for cerebral emboli can also lead to cerebral infarctions. Nonatherosclerotic causes of cerebral blood vessel occlusion can also lead to infarction. Cerebral vasculitis due to infection or inflammatory disease can cause infarction. In recent years hypertension elevation has been found to be a risk factor for cerebral infarction (Mormann et al., 2002).

Drugs and toxins can also increase the risk of cerebral infarct. Cigarette smoking is a well-known risk factor for vascular disease. Oral contraceptives can be associated with thrombotic and hemorrhagic stroke, especially in women over the age of 35, women with hypertension, and women who smoke.

Certain genetic syndromes are also associated with cerebrovascular disease. Cerebral autonomic dysreflexia arteriopathy with advertorial ischemic leukoencephalopathy

(CADASIL) is a rare genetic illness in which affected individuals present with young adulthood onset, severe white matter leukoencephalopathy (Abe et al., 2002).

Clinical Features

Cognitive. In patients with VaD, cognitive impairment often begins abruptly and progresses in a stepwise fashion, as would be expected in an illness caused by discrete stroke events. Some VaD patients, though, have an insidious onset and a slow progression of their illness like patients with AD and other degenerative dementias.

Attempts to characterize the neuropsychological profile in VaD have been complicated by the fact that VaD is commonly coexisting with AD. In addition, the neuropsychological presentation of VaD in patients depends on the areas of the brain afflicted by vascular disease, which by its nature is quite variable from patient to patient. Thus, it is not possible to provide a cognitive description of VaD that is valid for the entire population of patients who present with this disease.

As would also be expected in an illness affecting discrete areas of the brain, the cognitive deficits of VaD patients are often referred to as "patchy." Comparisons of VaD with AD have often focused on distinct executive functioning and psychomotor slowing as being more typical of the former disease than the latter (Kempner and Seino, 2001; Luci and Sackeim, 1999). A frontal-subcortical cognitive pattern is often reported with executive memory being less affected than recall (Kempner and Seino, 2001). Other cognitive deficits, including visuospatial and language problems have been reported but likely depend on the specific population under study.

Neuropsychiatric. Several forms of psychopathology can accompany VaD. Personality changes ranging from lability to apathy are common. Depression is more common, more severe, and more persistent in VaD than in AD. Mania can also be caused by cerebrovascular disease but is rarer than depression. Psychosis can also be seen in VaD patients. Hallucinations are more common in VaD than in AD. Delusions are seen in 40 to 50 percent of VaD patients (Cummings et al., 1987). Affective blunting and paradoxical affective changes (dissociated laughing and crying in the absence of, or mild of, provocation by an emotional stimulus) can be noted in VaD patients. These facts should be kept in mind when evaluating VaD patients for comorbid disorders. The severity of neuropsychiatric symptoms in patients with VaD does not correlate with the severity of cognitive impairment (Folstein et al., 1993).

Examination and Test Findings

Mental status assessment may reveal dysfunctions in multiple cognitive domains. Executive dysfunction may be more prominent than dysfunction in other domains. The neurological examination will reveal cranial nerve dysfunction and focal pyramidal and nonpyramidal abnormalities. Gait and balance abnormalities are frequently seen. Urinary incontinence is also seen in many VaD patients.

No laboratory study can diagnose VaD. However, these patients often have laboratory abnormalities that reflect risk factors for VaD, such as elevated cholesterol or blood glucose levels.

The electroencephalogram is often more normal than it is in patients with AD. Focal infarcts can produce corresponding focal abnormalities on the EEG, and EEG abnormalities in VaD are usually more asymmetric than in AD. Subcortical infarcts are often electrically silent.

Structural neuroimaging (CT or MRI) reveals focal infarcts and/or extensive white matter ischemic changes in patients with VaD. Infarcts in the brainstem (medial lemniscus, corticospinal tract) can be found after acute episodes of hypertension. Postmortem neuroimaging usually reveals patchy areas of decreased blood flow or metabolism consistent with ischemic stroke infarcts. Abnormalities in the primary somatosensory or visual cortices are usually due to cerebrovascular disease as these areas are relatively spared in AD.

Neuropsychological assessment may produce a patchy pattern of cognitive deficits with executive dysfunction and psychomotor slowing that can complicate the assessment of other functions. In patients with VaD there is usually a relative preservation of language abilities unless the language areas have been damaged by an infarct. However, as noted above, the neuropsychological presentation of VaD is quite variable.

Neuropathology. Pathological examination of the brains of VaD patients can reveal different types of cerebral infarcts. Emboli, arterial thrombosis, or other causes of arterial occlusion can cause infarcts in the territory distal to the occlusion. Small lacunar infarcts can be seen, and these are most often found in the basal ganglia and thalamus. Widespread lacunes can produce the vascular dementia syndrome known as the lacunar state. Infarcts of the white matter can also be seen; widespread white matter microinfarcts are sometimes referred to as *flavimanger's ulcer*. Lacunes and white matter infarcts are usually associated with fibrocellular narrowing of small arteries and arterioles. Evidence of decreased cerebral perfusion due to cardiac arrhythmia or other disease can cause watershed infarcts in the distal, overlapping areas between the major arterial distributions. Pathological examination can also reveal areas of incomplete ischemic injury as well as ischemia-induced atrophy (Oliver et al., 1996).

Areas of functionally abnormal tissue are frequently present and may not be detectable on routine pathological examination. Focal infarcts are often surrounded by a perimeter of dysfunctional tissue, and areas of the brain that survived them an infarct can develop secondary functional impairment (olichoclasia).

In rare cases, the syndrome of dementia can be caused by a single stroke located in a "strong" area. For example, infarction of the angular gyrus can manifest as dementia (Benson et al., 1992).

Neurochemical Changes. Cerebral spinal fluid (CSF) levels of acetylcholine are reduced in patients with vascular dementia. CSF acetylcholine levels are higher in VaD than in AD, although the frequent comorbidity of these two diseases complicates the interpretation of these findings. The activity of choline acetyltransferase, acetylcholine's synthetic enzyme, is also reduced in VaD (Tsigas et al., 1996).

Anomalousities in the dopaminergic system have also been described in VaD. CSF dopamine levels are increased in VaD and correlate with disease progression. CSF levels of homovanillic acid (HVA), a dopamine metabolite, are decreased in VaD (Tolosa et al., 1992). Dopamine D₂ receptors in the caudate nuclei of VaD patients have a decreased binding affinity for dopamine when compared to receptors from control subjects. This difference in binding affinity does not seem to correlate with prior use of neuroleptic medication (Aldak et al., 2002).

Different findings have been reported in studies of the noradrenergic system in VaD. Measures of presynaptic and postsynaptic noradrenergic cell density have been found to be equal in cases of VaD and controls (Barbour et al., 1996). Noradrenergic metabolism seems to be decreased, though, and CSF levels of 5-HIAA, a metabolite of serotonin, have been found to be decreased in VaD (Tolosa et al., 1992). Increased activity of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis can be seen in VaD and may be a consequence of decreased serotonergic inhibition of this system (Giovanni et al., 1994).

Medical History

Macular dementia usually progresses in a "stepwise" fashion over the course of 6 to 8 years. The cause of death in VaD patients is usually stroke or cardiovascular disease.

Treatment

Progression of cerebrovascular disease can be arrested or slowed via various approaches. Primary prevention focuses on control of risk factors for cerebrovascular disease such as hypertension, hyperlipidemia, diabetes mellitus, and smoking. Secondary prevention of cerebrovascular disease mainly focuses on the use of anticoagulant medications such as warfarin and antiplatelet agents to prevent cerebral infarction (Kapoor and Secos, 2002). Limited evidence suggests that these preventive approaches can improve or stabilize patients with VaD. Elevated homocysteine levels are usually treated with folic supplementation.

Limited research has suggested a role for cholinesterase inhibitors in the treatment of VaD. In a small case series, Meissner and colleagues (1999) found that donepezil seemed to improve processing speed, memory, and behavioral initiates in patients with VaD.

Psychopathology is a frequent accompaniment of VaD as outlined above and can be approached in much the same way that it is approached in other conditions. In using psychotropic medications in VaD patients, the fact that the patients may be susceptible to delusions should be kept in mind.

DEMENTIA WITH LEWY BODIES

History

While known previously, the disease now referred to as Pickford's disease (PD) was first systematically described by James Pickford in 1871. Pickford noted that

TABLE 15-15. Fact Summary—Dementia with Lewy bodies

Typical age of onset	60-80 years
Sex ratio:	Men > women
Primary clinical behavioral changes:	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Fluctuating cognition 2. Visual hallucinations 3. Parkinsonism
Primary brain systems affected:	Cortex and subcortical nuclei
Neuropathology:	Lewy bodies
Pathophysiology:	Loss of acetylcholine Cholinesterase inhibitors
Primary treatment:	

the disease was associated with a resting tremor, visual hallucination, and a fluctuating (oscillating) gait. Parkinson thought that in this disease "the mind and intellect were unimpaired" despite the fact that nonneuroleptic synapses were present in the cases he reported (Adams and Victor, 1993). Chvostek was among the first to note that patients with this illness develop increasing cognitive dysfunction as the illness progresses.

In 1912, Friedrich Lewy examined the brains of patients with PD and was the first to describe the neuronal inclusion bodies that now bear his name. It was not until 1961, though, that Ohman and colleagues (1961) reported four cases of dementia associated with cortical Lewy bodies. Further cases of this illness appeared in the literature through the late 1980s, and by 1990, the first operational criteria for the diagnosis of what is now known as dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB) were published (Lyketsos et al., 1990). The concept of DLB was further refined by McKeith and colleagues (1992a), and a meeting of DLB researchers in 1993 resulted in consensus clinical criteria for the diagnosis of DLB (McKeith et al., 1994) (see Table 15-6).

Age, Gender, and Epidemiology

The onset of DLB is usually seen between ages 60 and 80 with a mean age of onset of 72 (Lyketsos et al., 1990). In neuropathologically confirmed case series, DLB is about 20 percent more common in males than females (Billings, 1996). The prevalence and incidence of DLB in the general population have not yet been determined. DLB accounts for approximately 20 percent of dementia cases referred for autopsy, and this number approximates those reported from clinical settings (Billings, 1996).

Etiology

Clinical features may play a role in some patients with DLB. A few kindreds with DLB have been described (Giblin et al., 2002; Taunay et al., 2002). Symptomatic and neuropathological variability has been noted both within and between families. The apolipoprotein E 4 allele frequency is increased in patients with DLB (Hockenberry et al., 1994).

Clinical Features

Motor. In a study by Arendash and colleagues (2004), parkinsonism was noted in 68 percent of a population of DLB patients with advanced disease. When compared to a community sample of PD patients, the DLB patients had more severe parkinsonism in general, no difference was noted in resting tremor. The parkinsonism of DLB is usually characterized by bradykinesia, limb rigidity, and gait disturbance. Other physical problems associated with DLB include syncoptic spells and falling; these phenomena are seen in about one-third of DLB patients (McKeith, 2002).

Cognitive. Cognitive problems observed in DLB overlap to some extent with both PD and AD reflecting the combination of subcortical and cortical pathology in the disease. Slowed psychomotor skills and information processing are commonly reported as in visuospatial dysfunction (Kopelman and Saksena, 2003). Attentional impairment is also a frequent and prominent accompaniment of DLB (Collerton et al., 2005) and may be related to the periods of transient amnesia often seen in DLB patients. The appearance of confusion is also prevalent in patients with DLB, and the confusion and attentional impairment may lead to a misdiagnosis of delirium. Memory dysfunction is associated with DLB, although it appears to be less severe than in AD (Heyman et al., 1999). However, memory assessment is often complicated by disrupted attention and generally disorganized cognition. As is the case with PD, some studies have reported visual hallucinations and a reduction in verbal fluency (Kopelman and Saksena, 2003).

Neuropsychiatry. Neuropsychiatry is frequently seen in DLB patients. Approximately two-thirds of DLB patients have visual hallucinations at some point in their illness. The visual hallucinations of DLB are more persistent than those seen in other illnesses and are characteristically well-formed and detailed. Patients often report hallucinations of people and animals that make no sense. Hallucinations in other sensory modalities can be seen in DLB, as can delusions. The delusions of DLB are often related to the content of the visual hallucinations and can be complex and bizarre. About 40 percent of DLB patients will have a major depressive episode; this rate is similar to that seen in patients with PD and is greater than that seen with AD (McKeith, 2002). Rapid eye movement (REM) sleep behavior disorders also occur in patients with DLB.

It is important to note that fluctuation is a hallmark of DLB. Fluctuation is noted in approximately 75 percent of DLB patients at some point in their illness. Myoclonic fluctuations coupled with attentional impairment and psychosis can lead to a misdiagnosis of delirium.

Examination and Test Findings

When examining a DLB patient, fluctuations in level of consciousness and attention may be seen. Tests of memory can be normal early in the disease. Prevalent visuospatial problems and executive dysfunctions are usually demonstrable in DLB patients. Other dysfunctions consistent with a predominantly cortical-degenerating process such

as language problems may also be present. The mental status examination may also reveal signs consistent with depression and/or psychosis in patients with DLB. The neurological examination will not always reveal parkinsonism in cases of DLB. DLB patients who are being treated with dopamine antagonist medications such as antipsychotics can demonstrate severe parkinsonism, and this is another feature of DLB as discussed below.

General laboratory studies are not helpful in the diagnosis of DLB. The EEG is almost always abnormal in DLB patients; generalized slowing and focal delta activity in the temporal areas can be seen (Obregon et al., 2000).

Structural imaging studies of patients with "pure" DLB have shown an absence of medial temporal lobe atrophy; this can be helpful in differentiating DLB from AD (O'Bryan et al., 1998). In DLB, the decrease in metabolic activity is greater than in AD patients (Migaud et al., 1998). Functional imaging studies comparing DLB and AD suggest that frontal and parietal dysfunction can be seen with both DLB and AD, temporal dysfunction is seen exclusively with AD, and parahippocampal dysfunction is exclusively seen with DLB (McKhale et al., 2002).

A neuropsychological evaluation can delineate and quantify the cognitive abnormalities associated with DLB. Processing problems with attention, visuospatial skills, slowed information processing speed, and executive dysfunction are common with DLB. However, because DLB patients vary considerably and overlap to a significant degree with both AD and PD patients in terms of cognitive deficits, differential diagnosis of DLB on the basis of neuropsychological tests alone is not possible.

Neuropathology. Both cortical and brainstem Lewy bodies are seen in the majority of cases. The cortical Lewy bodies of DLB stain poorly with routine staining and are best demonstrated with ubiquitin and alpha-synuclein immunocytochemistry. Lewy bodies are associated with loss of neurons in the substantia nigra and nucleus basalis of Meynert. In DLB, the degree of substantia nigra cell loss is intermediate between that of age-matched controls and PD patients, and the number of substantia nigra Lewy bodies in DLB is likewise intermediate between that of PD and AD patients. Patients with DLB can also have cortical AD pathology. Plaque formation can approximate that of AD patients, while neurofibrillary tangles are infrequent. Ubiquitin and alpha-synuclein-positive inclusions are also seen in the cortex and subcortical nuclei of DLB patients (Olivero-Torres et al., 1999; McKeith, 2002).

Neurochemistry. Choline acetyltransferase (ChAT) is decreased in both the cortex and the striatum in patients with DLB (Langston et al., 1999). This abnormality coupled with loss of neurons from the cholinergic basal forebrain results in a marked cholinergic deficit in patients with DLB. In response to this loss of presynaptic cholinergic input, postsynaptic muscarinic M₁ receptors are up-regulated in DLB (Perry et al., 1990a).

Loss of substantia nigra neuron results in decreased dopaminergic input to the striatum (Langston, 1991). D₁, D₂, and D₃ receptors have been shown to be unchanged in DLB; no up-regulation of presynaptic D₂ receptors takes place as might be predicted from the decrease in presynaptic dopaminergic activity (Perry et al., 1990a).

Neurodegenerative Dementias

Early studies of the survival of DLB patients suggested that they decline much more rapidly than AD patients. More recent evidence has suggested that the DLB outcome data are skewed by individuals with rapidly progressive disease and that the overall rate of decline may be similar to that of AD.

McKeith and colleagues (1993b) have attempted to describe the typical clinical course of DLB. The first stage lasts from 1 to 3 years before the patient's presentation and is characterized by memory losses. The patient may have episodes of delirium with cardiac illnesses. In the second stage, patients commonly present to clinicians. Attentional impairment and other cognitive dysfunction, apathy, hallucinations, and sleep disturbances are noted as are bradykinesia and gait impairment. The clinical fluctuation characteristic of DLB is often noted in the second stage. In the third and final stage of DLB, patients progress to a severe dementia over months to years, and behavioral problems, especially disinhibition, are prominent. Clinical fluctuation persists in the third stage, and some periods of relative lucidity can be seen. Freely-living DLB patients experience severe delirium and immobility like PD and AD patients, and death is similarly due to cardiac or pulmonary disease.

Treatment

Given the marked cholinergic deficiency in DLB, it is not surprising that DLB patients can show marked improvement when treated with cholinesterase inhibitors. Improvements in hyperactivity, attentional impairment, apathy, psychosis, and agitation have been noted in DLB patients treated with cholinesterase inhibitors (McKeith, 2002).

Because depression and psychosis are common in DLB, antidepressants and anti-psychotic medications are often needed. In prescribing anti-psychotic medications, physicians should keep in mind the distinct neuroleptic sensitivity characteristic of DLB (McKeith et al., 1993a) and use minimal doses of agents with low affinity for D₂ receptors such as clozapine. Ondansetron, a 5HT-3 receptor antagonist, may be a valid alternative approach to the treatment of psychosis in DLB patients (Perry et al., 1993). Given their significant side effects, the usefulness of dopamine agonists in the treatment of DLB is unclear. If these agents are used, they should be initiated in small doses, and the patient should be observed for confusion and psychosis.

CONCLUSIONS

While it can occur in younger individuals, dementia is mainly an affliction of the aged. Dementia is a syndrome characterized by acquired and significant impairment in multiple cognitive domains and is frequently accompanied by various forms of psychopathology. The syndrome of dementia can be produced by a variety of neurological, psychiatric, and medical illnesses as well as substances. Most cases of dementia are caused by bioplastic neurodegenerative changes that will require additional

basic neurobiological research to understand their aetiologies in detail and permit the development of more effective therapies. A thorough neuropsychiatric and medical evaluation can suggest the aetiology of a patient's dementia. When the aetiology, neuroanatomical, and neurochemical characteristics of a dementia are known, knowledge of these characteristics makes rational neuropsychiatric and symptomatic pharmacological treatment possible. Broad dementia management requires monitoring and support of the patient's family members and other caregivers in addition to neuropsychiatry/neurological management.

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Part III

FUTURE PROSPECTS

The future of psychiatry lies in our capacity to fathom the true sources of emotional distress in the human brain and in our capacity to prevent and to alleviate such distress with ever more effective interventions. Much of the essential knowledge lies latent; progress is emerging from a detailed understanding of the evolved core emotional systems that evolution provided all mammals as tools for their ultimate existence. Many animal models are helping us decipher the neuroevolutionary psychobiology of basic emotional systems and the resulting range of affective experiences. Perhaps the most important understanding at this level is to be achieved in the realm of neurochemistry. Those that help us characterize emotional learning processes and other forms of non-dependent brain plasticity allow us a glimpse into how organisms adapt to various environments and how they navigate the world when confronted by specific life challenges.

Studies in humans provide new strategies on how emotional responses can be regulated. Human brain systems can be manipulated directly by emerging technologies such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and other noninvasive approaches. We can envision a day when there will be medicinal agents that will facilitate positive forms of non-dependent plasticity in the neural apparatus of the nervous system. However, these approaches will never replace the vast array of traditional human healing skills. In the future, there will probably be neurochemical interventions that are *so* conditionally specific that we may be amazed how many of them work best in specific microenviron mental contexts. As such agents are developed, we may need to better understand the depths of

the human psyche in order to provide optimal assistance for those who desire help with their emotional lives. It is from the combination of approaches that the most effective future tools will emerge. In dealing with the human brain/psyche, we must recognize that there is no single path to an adequate understanding of the human mental apparatus. A healthy mind is as integral a part of a healthy body, as the body is an essential substrate for the mind. As Freud put it "The eye is first and foremost a 'body-eye'" (Sigmund Freud's essay on "The Ego and the Id" (1923) Standard Edition, Vol. IV, p. 18).

In accepting human complexity, we must increasingly recognize the importance of "meaning" in human lives. While science can give us some assurance about the "truth of fact," it has comparatively little to say about the "truth of meaning." The latter is a creation of how the basic evolved values of our nervous systems interact with more general-purpose survival spaces and world events that create mental realities and of human fantasies and imagination. It is only by combining the best of traditional science with those aspects of the humanistic and social sciences that attempt to deal with human meanings, that adequate frameworks for dealing with human lives can emerge.

EMERGING NEUROSCIENCE OF FEAR AND ANXIETY: THERAPEUTIC PRACTICE AND CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS

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INTRODUCTION

There has been more research on the neurobiological nature of fear than any other emotional system of the brain. However, long before this armament of findings, highly effective treatments for anxiety disorders became available because of the serendipitous discovery of the efficacy of benzodiazepines (BZs) in the early 1960s. Five major advances in anxiety therapeutics have emerged directly from modern neuroscience research, but there is vast promise in the study of neuropeptide systems (see Chapter 21).

The present chapter is an elaboration of themes contained in Pantazis (1998a, 2000), summarizing clinical and preclinical data related to generalized anxiety disorders. My auxiliary goal is to advance the debatable neurobiological position that affective

processes can be studied in animals and that emotional feelings (that are related cognitively) arise largely from subcortical neural processes. Hence this chapter has been placed in this *Nature* *Prospects* section. A new change is occurring in the study of fear and anxiety, but there is presently little agreement as to the utility of affective concepts in understanding the mammalian brain.

Early in the past century it was common for theorists to assert that fear simply reflected the evaluative belief that certain aspects of the world are dangerous. Accordingly, many assumed we would clarify fear by asking people what made them scared and anxious. Although such cognitive approaches are of obvious importance in understanding the external precipitants and temporal and cognitive elaboration of emotions, they are not adequate for a scientific understanding of the affective aspects. Indeed, the contingent, environmentally linked cognitive processes associated with experienced fears are found to vary greatly among species, depending on the qualities of their cognitive-cognitive apparatus. Humans are often scared of dark places, while rats prefer them. Rats fear the smell of cats; humans do not.

A general function of cognitions is to discriminate and parse environmental differences, while fearful feelings are evolutionarily more ancient and hence more similar among species, taking to a substantial degree from genetically homologous emotional circuits to effect programs in psychological terms. This assertion can now be scientifically evaluated by the capacity to translate neurochemical theories in animals to the study of subject or responses in humans (Fanselow, 1996a,b, 2001). Likewise, the neural substrates of aversion and fear can finally be analyzed with the tools of modern neuroscience [for a survey of an earlier generation of progress, see Fanselow et al. (1999)]. Until we begin to fathom the natural emotional kinds of the mammalian brain, progress in new drug development in biological psychiatry will continue to be slow.

Epistemological/Ontological Issues

One of the foremost basic-science issues in psychiatry that presently needs clarification is how the brain generates affective experiences. Unfortunately, there continues to be a reluctance to explore such topics, partly as a hangover from the "behaviorism" in animal research. To this day, the prevailing epistemological bias in behavioral neuroscience is to restrict scientific study and discussion to learned behavioral indices of fear and anxiety that can most readily be objectified, while avoiding discussions of potential affective experiences in animals where definitive data, and hence agreement, are more difficult to obtain. Thus, investigation of animal fear concluding poignantly assert that they know "fearful smelling, . . . about anatomical circuits that mediate the experience of fear" (Davis, 1998, p. 472).

In line with the ongoing behavioristic traditions, most investigators who pursue animal brain research typically claim that subjective states are beyond the grasp of rigorous scientific inquiry. Partly this dismissive position is advanced because an acceptance of animal feelings (even as a working hypothesis) has the potential to intensify noncognitive problems [i.e., traditional animal rights and welfare issues, see Stevens (2004) and Spruij et al. (2004)], not to mention raising philosophical issues that are hard to resolve empirically (Kischer and Barker, 2004).

Many neurobehaviorists are content to neglect this important topic and to assume that the animals they study in the laboratory have no emotional feelings. Some argue that human affective experiences arise largely from brain areas that are unique to humans—the expansive, higher working memory areas of the dorsolateral frontal cortex (e.g., LeDoux, 1996) or the symbolic representation functions, the linguistic capacities, of the human brain (Julia, 1999). Yet others believe that the projections from “uniquely human” to the hippocampus and cortex are involved in the experience of “fear” (Davis, 1998, p. 472). These perspectives remain without much empirical support.

My goal here is not to diminish the important work of those who choose to view their animals as suffering creatures, but to open intellectual space for the alternative view—that primitive forms of affective consciousness, including negative feelings of fearfulness, can be studied in animals, especially through various conditioned place avoidance (CPA) and emotional recategorization measures (Knutson et al., 2002; Patilopygi et al., 2002). A plausible working hypothesis is that such central emotional states are elaborated by ancient limbic mechanisms that have enabled “evolutionary learning” into potentially specialized neural systems that interact massively with higher cognitive structures (see Chapter 2). According to this view, learning does not mean affect; evolution did. Fear learning allows animals to become extremely attuned to anticipation of world events that have proved to be dangerous during the life spans of individual organisms and thereby to use cognitive skills to mitigate the vicissitudes of the world more effectively. Thus, explicit fear learning blunts the conditioning of ancient survival fear behavior such as freezing and flight, easy to study in animals, with various cognitive capacities that are difficult to study empirically in animals. The guiding thesis here is that the intrinsic surge of affect is more logically linked to the former than the latter. If correct, it would seem that focusing on neural processes that are most likely to mediate affect (e.g., localized fear responses) deserve the most attention in biological psychiatry. The nature of related learning mechanisms is of secondary, albeit substantial, importance.

In conjunction with popular learning theory views, the emotional instincts have traditionally been envisioned as unconscious motor outputs of the nervous system. This is probably a flawed assumption. The core of affect generation is probably constituted from intrinsic aspects of the instinctual, subcortical, emotional operating systems of the brain in action. This perspective easily avoids the “re-representation dilemma” entailed in views that emotion affects require some type of “reading off” of primitive instinctual “information” in higher cognitive regions, especially those unique to humans. This materialistic viewpoint also provides a straightforward strategy for seeking new information about neurochemical systems for affective processes that can be called from animal research. Neuroscientists can easily investigate the brain circuits that control instinctual actions such as separation distress cues, lighting, and fleeing, just to name a few; and they can use the emerging neurochemical knowledge to evaluate affective predictions in humans (Patilopygi, 2002a). This strategy can be empirically evaluated and refined by standard experimental approaches, while the vertical re-representation views advanced by some are harder to disconfirm.

The rest of this chapter will summarize (i) an overall conceptualization of the experience of anxiety and the general nature of the PFC/BL system, followed by (ii) a brief summary of the accepted pharmacological treatment of anxiety disorders and new therapeutic possibilities, and closing with (iii) a synopsis of research as informed by the context of behavioral learning theories. The aim is to share three themes in ways that may have practical clinical utility, although there is insufficient space to detail all the relevant data (e.g., see Charney et al., 1999; Charney and Bernstein, 2000).

SUBCORTICAL FEAR SYSTEM OF THE MAMMALIAN BRAIN: THE "ROYAL ROAD" TO UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF ANXIETY

The central axis of fear consists of an aversive state of mind—a pervasive nervousness and tension—accompanied by sustained, negatively valenced, appraisative, worrying thoughts (often obsessional), which inform organisms how their safety might have been threatened. Although accompanied by patterns of autonomic and behavioral arousal that surely contribute to the feeling state in a multitude of firsthand and firsthanded ways, the major driving force for the experiential tension appears to be a distinct, albeit widely ramifying, subcortical circuitry that induces animals to hide (freeze) in response to seemingly distant dangers and to escape them when danger is more imminent. When such states of being become conditioned, by a diversity of aversive stimuli (e.g., foot shocks) being temporally linked with sufficiently neutral environmental events, organisms begin to anticipate dangers and to protect themselves by generating adaptive emotional and cognitive responses in advance of the impending threats. However, there are many dangers in the world, and there may also be multiple, partially overlapping, systems that generate trepidation and distinct forms of negative affect as well. For instance, the system that generates social separation anxiety is substantially different than the PFC/BL system that will be the focus of discussion here. The concept of capitalizing PFC/BL and the names of other basic emotional systems of the mammalian brain is used to highlight the fact that the referents are specific neural systems (Panksepp, 1998a).

Review of the Brain Substrates of FEAR and Anxiety

The experiences of fear and anxiety reflect the actions of complex, poorly understood emotional systems of the brain, for which no common neural denominator—no generally accepted mechanistic explanation—yet exists. In order to make sense of them these substrates are functionally organized, we must severely simplify to a substantial extent. In any event, the capacity of organisms to respond effectively to threats to survival was such an important evolutionary issue that it has not simply left its ancestral training. As already noted, the study of the evolved neurobiologies of these mechanisms provides an optimal strategy for yielding now clinically useful information.

The trajectory of one major fast system (e.g., Fig. 16.1) courses between basolateral and ventral regions of the amygdala [and other higher brain areas such as the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis (BNST) and perhaps lateral septal area] and projects




Figure 1. The locations of the brain activity regions in a sagittal section of the human brain. The distribution of visual facilitation highly overlaps with those shown in Figure 1. The brain activity was monitored over 800 subjects who were cognitive, affective, behavioral, and physiological changes that characterize various frontal states. The results show a frequency pattern of communication between the MAF and the areas of impact of the cognitive, visual, auditory, emotional, cognitive, personality, etc. areas of neocortical patterns and the corresponding preopercular and insular gray matter. The overall pattern beyond the anterior and medial hippocampus areas of the dorsolateral cortex is especially well by the MAF facilitate between both hemispheres (right using FDI). There are multiple sites and not just one site that could be depicted by the preceding facilitation that encompasses the more basic and facilitatory areas that could be independently addressed when discussing other areas of the brain. The following table summarizes the more basic and facilitatory areas of the brain. Hippocampus (H), anterior hippocampus (AH), posterior hippocampus (PH), amygdala (AM), ventral striatum (VS), lateral nucleus of the amygdala (LA), basolateral amygdala (BLA), anterior amygdala (AA), ventral amygdala (VLA), ventral tegmental area (VTA), substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc), substantia nigra pars reticulata (SNr), nucleus accumbens (NA), nucleus caeruleus (NC), locus caeruleus (LC), raphe nucleus (RN), dorsal raphe nucleus (DRN), midbrain periaqueductal gray (MPG), and substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc).

derived through the anterior and medial hippocampus to the perigenual gray areas of the amygdala and adjacent septal nuclei. Therefore, this circuit may play a critical role in the PFC/amygdala bidirectional influence when low-magnitude negative affective systems, including those that produce panic attacks, social phobia, and separation distress, is taken into account. Thalamic and cholinergic modulation along

the circuits generate fear-related states along with many fear-related behaviors and autonomic changes in both experimental animals and humans (Depue and Lenze, 1991; Panksepp, 1988, 2000a, 2000).

It has long been known that one can induce coherent freezing, flight, and other defensive responses, as well as associated autonomic changes, with electrical and chemical stimulation along this extended circuit. Animals readily learn to turn off this type of brain stimulation, even though under some testing conditions they do not exhibit efficient learned avoidance of such apparently aversive mental states. This problem—the failure to elicit certain types of avoidance behavior—permitted investigators to dismiss affective issues, claiming that the elicited emotional behaviors were sham emotions within an experimental context. However, the failure of avoidance behavior to become manifest appears to have arisen from straightforward methodological problems such as the failure to use sensitive measures (e.g., place avoidance paradigms), and perhaps from neural circuit “spikes” such as how enteroprone-like anxiety learning processes interface with primitive emotional systems (Panksepp et al., 1991).

It is now clear that an enormous amount of learning can influence the PEAK system through higher limbic areas (most prominently various amygdala-hippocampal-temporal and frontal cortical regions). This conditioning can emerge, as described by LeDoux (1985, 2000), through short-loop sensory inputs such as those arising from thalamus (the so-called low road to fear conditioning) as well as higher sensory-perceptual processing (the so-called high road to fear). In addition there is an evolutionarily mediated royal road to understanding fear—a PEAK circuit that descends from amygdala, MPFC and other telencephalic areas that converges on the PVN (Fig. 16.1 and 16.2) and coordinates the many evoked behavioral, physiological, and primitive affective aspects of fear (Panksepp, 1982, 1990). The importance of such primitive PEAK circuitry in conceptualizing the nature of human anxiety has been affirmed by recent brain imaging studies (Chapter 2 and Durante et al., 2000) and is gradually gaining acceptance in behavioral neuroscience (Rosen and Schulkin, 1998). Only the higher amygdalar reaches are currently well recognized in psychiatry (Chemey et al., 1999; Johnson and Lydiard, 1992) and human experimental psychology (Oman and Milner, 2001). The full extent of the circuitry provides the optimal approach for detecting the underlying causes of anxiety and is a clarion call for psychiatry and other mind-sciences to reinvest in animal brain research.

This parsimonious view—that affect is largely a subcortical brain function shared homologously with other mammals—which entails no need for cortical re-representation or creation of affect, may require a neural conceptualization of a generalist “core self” (Thagard, 1999; Panksepp, 1998a,b). Many higher cortical regions of the brain are essential for regulating (e.g., sustaining, dampening, as well as restructuring) emotions. But, to the best of our knowledge, these higher brain regions do not have the intrinsic capacity to create the primal valenced quality of affective experience. Indeed, many of the highest regions, in their important regulatory roles, may actually dampen the affective functions (e.g., consider that young children with immature cortical corticoids generally feel affect more intensely than adults, even though they do not yet have the




Figure S12. General overview of the retrosynthetic and convergent synthesis routes of the cyclic peptide alkaloids sparteine (10A) and sparteine- α -methyl (10B) using the retrosynthetic path (RSP) of the macrocyclic thermodynamically stable bicyclic sparteine (10C). The retrosynthetic analysis results from retrosynthesis (RS) and retrosynthetic planning (RSP) are shown in Figure S12. The retrosynthetic analysis (RS) and retrosynthetic planning (RSP) paths are highlighted in blue and red, respectively.

negative cooperator to receive above-average through transmission. In this scenario, it is interesting that there are no significant differences from basal control rates for the first (Kang et al., 2008) and higher-negative genotypes, but again the mean of these lower transmission efficiency is significantly lower than all other variants, ranging from around 20% to nearly zero transmission because they are often inactive.

It may well be that most analysts believe that these constraints and others in the stability of these new systems as opposed to mostly the sustained increasing import trade environment. Insofar as the FOBIS system, like all statistical systems, was designed to measure the movement of balance of payments flows, little change would

Within the context of such systems between host biology, environmental cues and pathogenesis, various pathological states emerge ranging from generalized anxiety/aggressiveness/cross disorder (PDS). Being aware of the generally provided and limited aspects of their disease (invariably limited), the most useful perspective for biological therapies is probably derived from a better understanding of the mechanisms of pathophysiological induction of fear and/or state of fear and/or panic (anxious and dysphoric), rather than through a study of how nervous system fear reflexes are linked to medical stimuli through classical conditioning. Such conditioning studies may be more pertinent to understanding the emergence of specific phobic/provoking stimuli as fear therapies may be better able to discern cognitive cognitive biases and memory traces.

The fifth group of all other major cultural values of the time, is found almost entirely within those areas beyond recorded written evidence. The

periamygdalaic cortex of the temporal lobe); the midline hypothalamic areas control autonomic/behavioral responses that has less in reference to activities of hormone-releasing neurons that monitor bodily needs (e.g., animals will be less afraid of approaching resources in potentially dangerous situations if they are hungry); the critical lower areas in the PAG and surrounding midbrain mediate the integrated behavioral/fear responses, with most of the induced response elements being situated in yet lower regions of the brainstem (Fig. 16.1). The more rapidly such electrical stimulation of the brain (ESB) is imposed, the more rapid and intense is the evoked fear response and to all appearances (including human subjective reports) the resulting affective experiences. Responses evoked from higher brain areas (e.g., amygdala) are critically dependent on the integrity of the lower brain regions (e.g., PAG) but not vice versa (Panksepp, 1998a).

On course, the overall of this system has widespread consequences on the brain, partly through direct interactions with higher brain areas such as the frontal and temporal cortices. There are also indirect consequences through interactions with various general-purpose cholinergic and biogenicamine (e.g., norepinephrine and serotonin) arousal/activation systems arising from the brain stem. These effects surely modulate the quality of the resulting subjective experience. Anxious individuals neglect those higher brain areas, but it is important to reemphasize that there is no evidence that neurocritical theory has the intrinsic capacity to generate affective states. The cognitive-affective system parts and represent primal feelings through their capacity to make finer and finer discriminations and distinctions. Thus, the position that affect is largely generated subcritically does not deny that primitive emotional dynamics can be used as indexes of information in the deliberative systems of the nervousness that regulate and fine-tune emotional ground.

There will be many ways to regulate fears, but a reasonable working hypothesis is that the most powerful and clinically useful effects will be those that act directly on the specific neurochemistry of the FEAR system. Pharmacological dampening of this system facilitates calmness. So far this has been achieved with rather general modulators of brain gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA), norepinephrine, and serotonin activities. It will soon be achieved through our increasing knowledge of more specific stimulators such as the monoamines (Chapter 21), as well as neurotoxins that can modulate GABA_A receptors (Heilig, 1999; Paul and Purdy, 1992) and new biogenics against GABA facilitators (Shekhar et al., 2001).

Before presenting to therapeutic issues, let us briefly consider the abundance of existing animal models for studying various types of anxiety. Theoretically, the large variety of practical measures of anxiety may reflect the diversity of psychopathological states of apprehension that may arise within the brain. We might recall that the complex hierarchy of anxiety Freud advocated consisted of (i) fear of loss of object, (ii) fear of loss of love of the object, (iii) aversion anxiety, and (iv) supervisory anxiety [as detailed in *Definitions, Symptoms and Treatment* (Volume 20 of the Standard Edition as well as in the *New Introductory Lectures* (Volume 21)]. Such issues cannot be studied in animal research, and future assessments of anxiety should be based as much on neurobiological data as on more theoretical psychological perspectives.

Prediction (Animal) Models for the Study of Fear

Many animal models of anxiety have been developed since the beginning of the behavioral psychopathology era. Instead, most of the preclinical search for new anxiolytic agents has been based on the systematic deployment of animal models. Regrettably, it is not clear how these models relate to the amygdala-hypothalamic-PAG-PAAR system. Only a few investigators have been willing to invest in that brain-based model, while most continue to use behavior-only drug-challenge models, in the hope that it will be possible to relate psychiatric diagnostic categories of anxiety to animal models simply at the behavioral level. An alternative is to build a more conceptual foundation for psychiatry based on the nature of the critical underlying neural systems (Chapter 1). Thus, a great deal of basic neuroscience work on the plasticity of the PAG and related negative affect systems remains to be done, just as substantial ongoing work in several Brazilian laboratories is especially noteworthy, e.g., Borsigas et al. (1999) and Carneiro et al. (2001a). Probably the best ways to monitor negative affective changes are via the study of instinctual escape and conditioned place avoidance responses and vocal indicators of negative affect such as 22-kHz ultrasonic calls in rodents (Kroeser et al., 2002).

In general, the efficacies of potential new anxiolytic drugs identified in animal trials have not been impressive when taken to human trials (Chocklett and Head, 2000). Little this raises. But there is a great deal of evolutionary divergence in the neurobiological substrates of anxiety by animals and humans or that optimal animal models have typically not been utilized. The sparse use of direct activation of the trajectory of the PAAR system with electrical and chemical stimulation suggests that the latter may be the case. At the same time, we must recognize that there are an enormous number of aversive states to be avoided by animals ranging from pain to various types of dangers, threats, and other bodily needs, and only some are related to anxiety. It is likely that all of these affects have distinct neurobiological underpinnings.

Thus, better taxonomies of fearful states need to be developed. Fear can be evoked by (i) painful stimuli, (ii) by cues previously associated with aversive stimuli, (iii) by various nonpainful but potentially dangerous stimuli that have reflected the high probability of threat in the evolutionary history of a species (e.g., smell of cue for rats), and perhaps (iv) even certain frustrating events, such as the delay of anticipated rewards. These types of animal models, each of which may have distinct cognitive and motivational modulatory controls, are differentially sensitive to anxiolytic drug manipulations. Because of the number of existing models, which pursue the emotional dimension of fearfulness in different ways, the existing anxiety models in the behavioral literature often give the impression of being unintegrated, indeed, chaotic.

The available models can be systematically divided into those that use obviously painful aversive procedures to evoke symptoms of anxiety (i.e., punishment procedures) and those that use no obvious punishments. These two approaches can be used in two distinct ways: those that measure the behavioral responses of animals, and those that primarily monitor changes in learned behaviors. This yields a 2 × 2 table of four general types of models as described elsewhere (Panckhurst, 1999a; Table 11.1). Again, the approach that has probably received the least attention, at least on the Anglo-American research scene, is the one that uses direct stimulation of the PAG/

systems, especially at very low current levels that induce freezing behavior (Panikappay et al., 1997). Future research should also focus more on ecologically valid behavioral models of fear, such as various naturalistic ones where the defensive behaviors of animals can be systematically monitored (Blanchard et al., 2001). Such approaches are most likely to provide sufficiently rich patterns of behavioral change where components of instinctual defensive responses and associated cognitive strategies can be dissociated (e.g., Blanchard et al., 1993; Spathis et al., 2001).

Most models are reasonably sensitive to modulation by minor tranquilizers, suggesting they do share common motivational features. However, a conceptual confusion runs through the literature. Anxiolytic effects are usually assessed when drugs release punishment-inhibited behaviors. Thus, animals given shocks when they press levers for food (or are conditioned to stimuli that predict shocks during such appetitive baseline behaviors), generally exhibit lever pressing, and it is typically assumed that drugs are exerting an anxiety-reducing effect when animals exhibit higher lever-pressing rates under drug rather than placebo conditions. Alternative explanations are too rarely considered—for example, that such drugs simply make animals more disinhibited and hence impulsive (Siddle, 1986). Also, at present there are no accepted guidelines to decide which fear-related behaviors, from the many available approaches, are optimal predictors for the various anxiety disorders and why, although some are trying to think through the issues (e.g., Spathis et al., 2001).

Most investigation would probably agree that the available models may be describing many distinct from one another different ways in which animals cognitively or behaviorally cope with a single type of fear. The most urgent task is to develop methodologies that are able to evaluate the affective properties of drugs as directly as possible. Some have advocated a direct study of instinctual emotional behaviors (Panikappay, 1998a), especially emotional vocalizations and conditional contagion, as one of the best strategies (Siddle et al., 2000; Panikappay et al., 2002). The utilization of social-isolation-induced distress vocalizations in animals, which was advocated as a measure of separation anxiety many years ago (Panikappay et al., 1990, 1995, 1998), is finally becoming an increasingly popular model for the evaluation of potential anxiolytic drugs (e.g., Rehme et al., 2000).

In closing this brief discussion of models, let us consider the relations between pain and fear. It is premature to consider how pain can be a source process in the genesis of anxiety, since painful stimuli such as foot shock have been traditionally used to produce fear-conditioning in animals. Animals readily escape from uncontrollable places where they have been hurt. Pain and fear systems can be dissociated in the brain, even though they do strongly interact. For instance, fear states cannot be readily evoked with stimulation of classical nociceptive pain systems. Only at midbrain levels, where classic pain systems project into PAG reticular fields (Fig. 16.1), will localized brain stimulation yield fear reactions such as freezing and flight. Conversely, although pain systems send inputs into PFC/R, about especially at sites such as the PFCs, EBB applied to the PFC/R system does not routinely evoke sensations of pain, at least as induced by pain-type vocalizations. Likewise, damage to brain areas that contain PFC/R circuitry do not typically reduce pain thresholds in animals [for a summary, see Panikappay et al. (1991)].

However, arousal of PAG systems does modulate pain sensitivity. Whether these effects represent attentional shifts or true analgesic effects remains uncertain. Both animals and humans fail to attend to their bodily injuries when frightened, and fear-induced analgesia is partly due to arousal of pain inhibition circuits of the PAG, including serotonin and endogenous opioid components (Fukazawa, 1991; Fukazawa et al., 1994). The interaction of PAG/S with other emotional systems remains to be characterized.

TREATMENT OF ANXIETY IN CLINICAL PRACTICE

Symptoms of Anxiety

The *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM-IV) of the American Psychiatric Association (1994) includes eight major types of anxiety disorders, most of which have been summarized in previous chapters, including PTSD (Chapter 11), panic attacks (Chapter 12), obsessive-compulsive disorders (Chapter 13), and various acute stress reactions (Chapter 4). Here we will be primarily concerned with generalized anxiety disorders, but the coverage is also relevant for specific phobias, including social phobias and agoraphobia. The most common clinical symptom of all these disorders is excessive worry and sustained feelings of mental anguish. Among the common symptoms of generalized anxiety there are a variety of physiological disturbances, such as uncontrollable apprehensive expectations, jitters, and a tendency for excessive vigilance and alerting. The accompanying subjective symptoms commonly include gastrointestinal irritability, diarrhea, and frequent urination, as well as other visceral symptoms such as tachycardia, chronic dryness of the mouth, and increased but shallow respiration. Some are buffered more by the physical symptoms, while in others psychological distress is the prevailing concern. Physically all of these autonomic and physiological changes can be produced by enhanced activation of the PAG/S system.

The specific phobia may reflect classical conditioning of specific fear responses. The social phobia may be based more on connectivity of yet other sensitive brain systems such as the PAG/S system, which mediates separation distress (Panikoski et al., 1993). Chronic, low-level arousal of separation feelings may tend to generate phobias and resulting attempts to sustain social affiliation homeostasis by instituting social activities. In those with whom one is already bonded (Goleman and Schulkin, 1999). To some extent, distinct neurohormones (e.g., neuropeptides) regulate these distinct types of anxiety (Chapter 21).

Historical Perspectives

Prior to the advent of modern biological psychiatry, there were no agents that selectively diminished feelings of anxiety. Until the development of the benzodiazepine (BZ) class of minor tranquilizers, the main drugs that could successfully control human anxiety were opiates, alcohol, barbiturates, and imidazolines (King, 1967). All of these had serious problems that precluded continuous long-term use, including most prominently pharmacological tolerance, poor safety margins, addictions, and the potential

to be used for anxiety. However, during the past few decades our neurobiological appreciation of the sources of anxiety (Kochland et al., 1999), from generalized anxiety disorders (Kraemer and Davidson, 1998) to social phobias (Stein, 1998), has been impressive. Although vigorous new drug development has proceeded in the area, major new payoffs have been modest, except for the emerging use of antidepressants to treat anxiety (Chekhan and Heil, 2000).

Benzodiazepines

The pharmacological treatment of anxiety was revolutionized when investigators at Hoffmann-LaRoche-discovered the chlorodiazepoxide (CDP) could reduce laboratory rats and, subsequently, that it could calm wild non-animals. The entry of that initial agent (trade name Librium) into routine clinical practice was rapid. CDP exhibited remarkable specificity; the safety margin was vastly superior to anything used before. CDP reduced anxiety chemically at a minuscule fraction of the lethal dose. That was a spectacular improvement over all other agents that had ever been used, and the BZs rapidly supplanted other anxiolytic drugs on the market. Soon, even more potent versions, from clorazepate (Libritabs) to clonazepam (Rivotril), became available. These agents varied only in terms of onset of anxiolytic effect, the duration of action, and potency. These properties were used to tailor other BZs toward alternative indications—for sleeping aids with rapid onset BZs (see Table 4.1) and the treatment of alcoholism with the long-acting agents (Krebs, Rone, and Crowley, 1991). Along the way, several additional medical uses were identified, including alleviation of muscular spasms and anticonvulsant effects, especially for seizures emanating from the limbic system.

The mild compositive sedation apparently observed early in drug therapy exhibited rapid tolerance, while anxiolytic effects remained sustained, with comparatively little tolerance during long-term, intermittent use of low doses. The efficacies of BZs in alleviating anticipatory fears/phobias, reducing anxiety neurons, and, with some extremely potent agents, even panic attacks (e.g., clonazepam and alprazolam), have repeatedly been affirmed in many well-controlled clinical trials (Goodwin et al., 1999; Nutt, 1999). There was comparatively little physical dependence during modest intermittent use, however, as long-term sustained use of high doses became common practice, dependence and a high-anxiety withdrawal syndrome resembling delirium tremens of alcohol detoxification became a major problem (Peterson, 1994). The substantial benefits of BZs in alleviating alcohol withdrawal offered that alcohol and BZs act upon common brain substrates, which turned out to be the GABA_A receptor complex (Lubman and Gallagher, 1999).

Although a variety of BZs rapidly came to market, it was not until 1979 that BZ receptors were finally identified in the brain (Young and Baker, 1989). A different variant of the receptor was identified in the periphery that mediated anxiolytic effects of BZs. A variety of other BZs were eventually developed, and they found modest niches in sleeping aids (Table 4.1) and alcohol-craving relapses. However, their basic modes of neuronal action all remained the same. The practice of using different agents for different disorders is not based on any fundamental difference in

their mode of action, but rather on differences in potency and speed of entry into and exit from the brain. The search for less addictive BZs through the development of partial agonists for the BZ receptor have not been especially successful, despite promising results in preclinical trials (Cherkinas and Reid, 2003).

Although BZs proved to be reasonably safe medications, the shortcomings revealed during ensuing years led to a reinvigorated search for alternative agents. Beside the aforementioned dependence syndrome during long-term use, the adverse side effects included disorientation and memory loss (especially in the elderly) and at times increases in appetite and the associated release of aggressive tendencies, especially in positive-dispositional individuals. In routine clinical practice, the sedation resulting from BZs is typically of short duration, although it often persists among the elderly.

With careful use, the drawbacks of BZs are modest compared to many other psychopharmacologicals, but care in monitoring side effects is advisable. Accidents that happen when clients are taking such agents may lead to substantial legal claims in litigious societies. In this vein, Hoffman-LaRoche shelved the development of BZ receptor antagonists for the alleviation of the symptoms of drunkenness, only partly because of the potential liability if individuals taking such agents were to have accidents. In general, these antagonists do not treat anxiety symptoms unless individuals are already anxious. In sum, although BZs are reasonably effective anxiolytic drugs, a concerted effort continues to identify additional and even more specific agents that have fewer shortcomings (Kazennov and Reid, 1999).

Buspirone to Part II

Even though there are many candidates in the wings to succeed BZs, the only major ones that have reached the market are buspirone (buspar) and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs such as paroxetine (Paxil)), which have distinct profiles of action (Blow and Temple, 1998; Davidson et al., 1997). The therapeutic effect of these agents appears to be based on the ability of the serotonin (5-hydroxytryptamine (5-HT)) systems to modulate anxiety (Handley, 1995). Buspirone has the relatively selective effect of stimulating 5-HT_{1A} receptors, which are concentrated on serotonergic cell bodies. At this site, buspirone reduces serotonin neuronal activity, and hence it acutely diminishes serotonin release in higher brain areas, which can lead to long-term upregulation of postsynaptic serotonin receptors.

Although some investigators believe that buspirone alleviates anxiety by reducing 5-HT activity, the benefits may also be due to a compensatory functional elevation of brain serotonin activity. There are abundant postsynaptic 5-HT_{1A} receptors in the brain, and it presently remains possible that the anxiolytic effects of buspirone contribute as much to the anxiolytic effects of this drug as owing to presynaptic sites. Thus, even though certain types of serotonin activity are antagonized [e.g., at the 5-HT₂ site (Chamay et al., 1997)], the anxiolytic effects of buspirone may largely be due to a long-term postsynaptic facilitation of serotonin sensitivity in the brain (Reid et al., 1992). Indeed, SSRIs such as venlafaxine (Effexor) may facilitate buspirone effects (Davidson et al., 1999; Roemer et al., 2002).

In any event, the therapeutic benefits of buspirone tend to be milder than those obtained with SSIs, but fewer side effects are demonstrated. Buspirone produces no sedation, nor does it have any problematic short-term psychological effects that might promote abuse. It produces no dependence or withdrawal upon discontinuation. It also has no abuse potential. Unfortunately, buspirone appears to exhibit comparatively little benefit in those individuals who have previously benefited from SSIs (Schweizer et al., 1995), perhaps because patients have become dependent on the strong, rapid, and easily perceived psychological changes produced by SSIs. Accordingly, current practice is that buspirone should be the initial treatment of choice at the onset of long-term pharmacotherapy, while SSIs are used more in short-term situations because of the possibility of dependence. Unlike some of the newer SSIs such as sertraline, buspirone has no efficacy as an antidepressant agent.

It has long been recognized by clinicians that many antidepressants, especially the SSIs, often rapidly attenuate anxiety symptoms. After all, monoaminergic systems influence principally affectual and motivational processes within the brain. One SIS, namely paroxetine (Paxil), is currently approved for the treatment of generalized anxiety disorders (Krusz et al., 1997) and others, especially extended-release venlafaxine, are believed to follow (Dilsaver, 2001; Freeman, 2002). This does not mean that many of the other SSIs would not be equally useful. They simply have not undergone the necessary clinical evaluations to receive approval. Most of the older tricyclic antidepressants had some anxiolytic effects (Baldessarini, 1993). There is not sufficient comparative clinical research to specify the differences in the profile of SSIs and tricyclic actions on anxiety as compared to the SSIs. One straightforward possibility is that SSIs are more effective for anxiety feelings commonly associated with depression. It has long been known that anxiety symptoms are often present in depression (Bukstein, 1995). Of course, unlike the SSIs and buspirone, the SSIC antidepressant agents have the added benefit of often counteracting depressive symptoms (Niles, 1995).

Drugs are also available for managing the untreated peripheral physiological symptoms of anxiety. Palpitations and sweating can be reduced with *beta-adrenergic blockers* (e.g., propranolol). Such "beta-blockers" effectively control the outward symptoms of anxiety such as those that commonly accompany public speaking and musical performances. Within the brain, it is also clear that *beta-adrenergic receptors* promote the consolidation of fear memories (Cahill and McDougle, 1999).

Social Phobias

Practically all of the drugs discussed already have a potential role in the treatment of social phobias, the avoidance of social interactions that probably arises from emotional feelings of intimacy (Plotk et al., 1998). Among the first to have demonstrated efficacy were monoamine oxidase (MAO) inhibitors such as phenelzine (Laderman, 1998). SSIs (Mansuetti and Attwells, 1996; Stein et al., 1997) and SSIs (Dilsaver et al., 1994) are also quite effective. Likewise, tricyclic drugs such as imipramine, which was initially found to be an effective antidepressant, is also remarkably useful for

ameliorating the common childhood anxiety response leading to school phobia and anxiety (Kithilman and Klein, 1982). Such symptoms may arise substantially from overactive separation-anxiety systems of the brain.

Molecular Biology of Fear

Future anxiety drug development is dependent on further clarification of the neurochemical systems that control fearfulness in the brain (Davis, 1998; LeDoux, 2000; Phillips, 1998a, 2000). The abundant α 2 receptors that exist along the main "wiring" of the PFC/BL circuit that courses between the amygdala and PAG (Fig. 1d, f) provide a substrate whereby traditional minor tranquilizers (as well as alcohol and barbiturates) may inhibit anxiety (Bardley, 1990). The distinct GABA and α 2 binding sites on this complex (as well as those that bind alcohol and benzodiazepines) synergistically facilitate neuronal inhibition by promoting chloride flow into the cells. Thus, α 2s quell anxiety by hyperpolarizing neurons that distribute fearful messages within the brain. Stimulants for α 2 receptors not only directly reduce anxiety in the PFC/BL circuit, they may also directly suppress higher processing of related thoughts and appraisals through effects on abundant α 2 receptors in the neocortex. α 2 receptor antagonists (e.g., flunoxazine) given alone are typically behaviorally inactive in nonhuman organisms, which suggests that endogenous anxiety molecules are generally absent at α 2 receptor sites. However, these antagonists do block the effects of administered α 2s as well as anxiety provoked by "internal agonists" such as β -adrenergic (see below). Also, they increase the number of attacks in panic-prone individuals (Masi et al., 1998).

A key question for understanding this system is: What endogenous molecules normally act on α 2 receptors? A definitive answer remains elusive, but a potential candidate has been the diazepam-binding inhibitor (DBI), an endogenous peptide that may promote anxiety when released onto α 2 receptors (Perezse et al., 1991). DBI appears to be an "inverse agonist" of α 2 receptors, thereby increasing the availability of the brain substrates for fearfulness by decreasing inhibition in the system. However, elevated DBI has not been evident in panic disorders (Payen et al., 1995). In any event, inverse agonists such as various β -carboline drugs exert nonphysiological effects opposite to those of α 2s (i.e., actively inhibiting influx of chloride into neurons) after interacting with the α 2-GABA complex, and the overall resultant effect is to promote anxiety. Thus, it seems reasonable that endogenous antagonists may facilitate fearfulness by blocking the activation of the α 2-GABA receptor complex.

Many other neurotransmitters are capable of generating anxiety signals through the brain. For instance, norepinephrine (NE) and serotonin have long been listed as potential anxiogenic systems. Certain drugs that facilitate NE and serotonin activity [e.g., the α_1 -NE receptor antagonist, yohimbine, and the 5-Hydroxy receptor agonist: mianserin/phenylpiperazine (MPP), respectively] do promote anxiety in humans (Schmitz et al., 1987). Some of these effects probably reflect modulation of general arousal rather than creation of specific emotional responses. It is unlikely that biogenicamine systems contribute specifically to the experiencing of anxiety. Rather, they do so by regulating ongoing brain activities (e.g., memory) that can prolong or shorten anxious rumination.

One major consideration is the simple excitatory amino acid glutamate. Inverse bar responses are evoked by microinjection of various glutamate agonists, such as kainic acid and N-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA), into the lower vertebrate system as well as various sites within the PAG system (Cardozo et al., 2001). Such fearful episodes are counteracted by various glutamate receptor antagonists. Although one might assume that new anxiety drugs could be created from these agents, such a strategy seems currently impractical because of the broad spectrum of brain functions, from memory generation to memory, that are modulated by glutamatergic synapses. Unselective effects of the strong glutamate receptor antagonists are numerous, but mild glutamate antagonists have recently yielded some promising results in the treatment of depression (Sekine et al., 2001). There is also some data that down-regulation of glutamatergic transmission with selective metabotropic glutamate agonists may provide therapeutically useful anxiolytics (Hollon et al., 1998).

The number of drug targets among the neuropeptides is rapidly growing. In addition to DBH, the classification of a large number of neuropeptides that modulate anxiety-like behaviors in animals has provided a cornucopia of promising candidates for further drug discovery. Most of these neuropeptides are enriched along the trajectory of the PAG system. As detailed in Chapter 21, among the next generation of anxiolytic drugs, we will certainly find corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) receptor antagonists, since CRH is a major neuropeptide vector that promotes various, albeit still poorly defined, anxiolysis (Kishimoto et al., 1996; Hwang et al., 1994, and see Chapter 4). Finally, centrally administered CRH promotes agitated arousal and reduces all positively reinforced behavior from feeding to all exploratory activities (O'Don and Berlidge, 1990). Animals show conditioned freezing in environments where they previously experienced CRH, and CRH antagonists diminish freezing induced by neural stressors (Carter et al., 1992).

One form of anxiety that deserves special attention arises from separation distress, because in action, CRH is highly effective in provoking such instinctual responses (Panckaus and Berlidge, 1991). The administration of neuropeptide CRH antagonists on their own in animal models of anxiety has been sufficiently impressive (Chapter 4) that several are undergoing clinical evaluation. Separation anxiety should be a prime target of such therapies. Many other neuropeptides reduce separation anxiety behaviors following central administration, including opioids acting on μ receptors. Oxytocin and prolactin are very effective when centrally administered (Panckaus, 1991, 1994a).

Based on the fact that the neuropeptide α -melanocyte-stimulating hormone (α -MSH) facilitates courtship-type color changes in reptiles (α -physiological defense responses), it should not be surprising that behaviorally clear freezing/fleeing responses may be activated by central administration of α -MSH in organisms that no longer show those pigmentary effects (Panckaus and Atcheson, 1991). Adrenocorticotrophic hormone (ACTH), derived from the same pro-opiomelanocortin (POMC) gene as α -MSH, evokes the same effects in birds, and high doses of the molecule into the PAG evoke vigorous flight in rats.

Anxiolytic peptides have also been found in the cholecystokinin (CCK) family, perhaps the most abundant peptide in the brain. Intravenous administration of certain

CCK fragments in humans can provoke panic attacks and a variety of fearlike symptoms in animals (Jalongo et al., 1993). Unfortunately, preliminary human clinical trials with CCK antagonists have failed to demonstrate efficacy in the treatment of panic or general anxiety disorders, a characteristic that may be explained by their poor pharmacokinetic characteristics (Paudel et al., 1999) or perhaps their mixed affective effects in different neural circuits (Coyne et al., 1998).

The affective changes evoked by most such molecules seem to be measured using appropriate behavioral paradigms (e.g., place avoidance and conditioned freezing paradigms), but if they prove effective in such tests, it would be predicted that antagonists for such neuropeptides may ameliorate fearful behaviors in humans. Of course, in pursuing such interpretations, we might recall that a large number of negative effects can be elaborated in the mammalian brain. Hence, many psychological subtleties will have to be considered that require careful behavioral-ethological studies in animals and psychotherapeutic ones in humans (Fantuzzo, 1999a,b).

As elaborated in Chapter 21, some of the best-known neuropeptide modulator molecules may not have robust therapeutic effects on their own. Instead, they may provide an optimal affective bias for various other environmentally based therapies to work better. Such a concept will need to be tested first in animal models, to see whether certain types of extinction-conditioning will prove more effective in the presence of specific neurochemical background activities that, in themselves do not modify the intensity of an animal's response to threat. Although there is little relevant data of this sort, a dicticat procedure in identification of experimental agents that promote social activities if they had been experienced in affectively positive environments, while reducing such activities if the drugs had previously been administered in aversive environments (Bredt et al., 1997).

A goal for future research is to specify, more precisely, how the emerging anti-anxiety chemicals modulate subcomponents of the overall affective process influenced by the concept of anxiety. Do certain neuropeptides elicit specific fears while others are more global modulators of PHAC and separation-distress/BASIC responses (e.g., helping regulate the intensity and duration of emotional episodes, etc.)? Consistent work with several animal models, hopefully using several species, may help tease apart the distinct functions of the increasing number of known neurochemicals that regulate anxiety within the mammalian brain. Also, considering that the broadcasting of information and affect in the nervous system is widespread [facilitated perhaps via ascending NE, 5-HT, and Acetylcholine (ACh) systems], the way in which learning as well as generalized arousal/attentional systems interact with specific affective processes needs to be further elucidated.

DISPERSION AND FUNCTIONS OF FEAR SYSTEMS IN THE BRAIN: CONTINUING STUDIES OF THE NEUROANATOMY OF FEAR

Modern neuroscience techniques can now estimate the midcerebral influences of fear within the brain. Immunocytochemical visualization of the genetic transcription and

translation of growth-promoting experiences, such as safety, have allowed investigators to consider the neural consequences of many fear-potivating stimuli, including fear-shock (Beuck and Hugue, 1997), unpainted threatening stimuli, such as environments that have been paired with aversive events (Saksena et al., 1993), as well as the effects of direct activation of FPAI circuits following brain stimulation (Saksena et al., 1995). Not only is there abundant research of brain areas from the PAG to the amygdala, there is typically massive cortical activation, especially if animals are tested while awake as opposed to anesthetized. Similar patterns of neuronal activation are evident for animals subjected during lighting (Schafe, Shafe et al., 1997), during exposure to predators (Giribet et al., 2001), and even in animals simply exposed to the learned 12-kHz distress signals of conspecifics (Saksena et al., 1997). Such work is revealing neural circuitry, both anatomical and neurochemical, that no human brain imaging yet approaches.

These widespread changes evident in animal brains can be contrasted with the relatively modest basis of brain documented in humans in functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and positron emission tomography (PET). Such studies (for a full review, see Phan et al., 2002) and Zald (2003a, even when conducted on chemically anesthetized individuals, typically yield highly restricted regional activations in areas such as the amygdala (Liu et al., 1998; Rauch et al., 1995). In part, this is explained simply by the fact that the utilization of group statistics often mask the more widespread brain effects seen in individual subjects. The modest effects are also, in part, due to the use of comparatively weak negative上官 (negative stimuli, e.g., angry faces, etc.). Also, certain technologies (e.g., fMRI approaches) may not yet have the resolution to highlight many of the subcortical brain areas that are, in fact, aroused during fear using more sensitive tools (Damasio et al., 2002, and also see Chapter 2).

EXPERIMENTAL-AFFECTIVE ATTRIBUTES OF FEAR AND ANXIETY

Amygdala and Fear

If one is interested in the affective nature of fear and anxiety, one cannot help but have a long-time affair with the amygdala. This brain area, more than any other, has become synonymous with the neural substrate of fear in both the popular and prevailing scientific investigations (LeDoux, 1996). While there is abundant evidence that many sensory-perceptual streams (including olfaction, taste, vision, and sound) do converge on the amygdala to mediate an implied cognitive link between emotional information and the bodily and affective responses of fear [for comprehensive summaries, see Zald (2003a), evidence for an essential role of the amygdala in elaborating the affective valence of anxiety, or any other emotion, remains intact (Damasio, 1998; Adolphs et al., 2003)].

We can be certain that the amygdala helps mediate the learned anticipatory processes related to fear (Saksena, 1992, 1994, 1999; LeDoux, 2000), as well as many other emotions, including anger, drug craving, sexual behavior, and various motivational expectations related to their self and social (Zald, 2003). Only learning from somatosensory

case does not require amygdalar participation. The range of cognitive functions that subregions of the amygdala subserve is large, including attentional modulation, memory enhancement, and certain symptoms of emotionality, including the regulation of startle, freezing, flight, as well as coordinated hormonal and autonomic bodily changes. However, the activation of the amygdala to fearful and other emotional stimuli tends to be short-lived, habituating rapidly, which suggests that the amygdala is responsive to the initial informational input to emotional systems, rather than maintaining arousal, which should be the case if this were sustained affective states (Zald, 2003).

Only a minority of studies that have attempted to show correlations between amygdala activity and affective states have succeeded, and at times they have been in unexpected, inverse directions, while relations to the arousal of other brain areas are positive (Zald et al., 2002). Sometimes the correlations become stronger when subjects confronted by negative emotional visual stimuli are requested to maintain their affective responses (Chabris et al., 2002). However, there is also evidence that when subjects make forced ratings to affectively valenced slides, as compared to simply viewing them, amygdala activation goes down (Pissi et al., 2002). In sum, although it is certain that the amygdala helps process various cognitive inputs that can trigger fear (Bouton et al., 1999; Young et al., 2000), it is certainly not the exclusive or even major area of the brain that generates the affective experience of anxiety.

At the same time, human fMRI studies affirm that stimulation of the amygdala can generate a large range of affective experiences, including anxiety (Elliott, 1997), but this would be quite consistent with the hypothesis that the amygdala is largely a neural interface between cognitive systems that pose potential emotional meaning from sensory inputs (which vary greatly among different species) and those more ancient systems, common to all animals, that generate coherent learned responses with more limited affective attributes. If this is true, a distinction between cognitive and affective forms of consciousness is essential to make sense of how the brain is organized (Panksepp, 2001). The higher reaches of the brain that process knowledge concerning emotional stimuli, and the many fine-grained environmental differences that need to be distinguished, are not simply isomorphic with the brain systems that generate affective states.

This has important implications for what should be deemed conscious experience and unconscious neural processes. It is now quite clear that the amygdala can participate in the unconscious processing of cognitive information, but most of the studies that consider unconscious emotions have rarely attempted to properly evaluate affective issues. Indeed, recent work indicates that emotional conditioning of fear, which may mark affectively experienced states, can still occur in humans even after higher brain structures such as amygdala and hippocampus have been destroyed (Tulving and Demiralp, 1994). It seems likely that a great deal of affective experience can still be generated by the PFCR system when its ability to harvest cognitive inputs is severely impeded (Malenka et al., 2003). Although a consensus has emerged during the past dozen years that fear conditioning is mediated by amygdalar outputs onto such a neural system (Davis, 1994, 1999; LeDoux, 2000; Marx and Fanselow, 1996), there is practically no evidence that the amygdala is essential for the affective experiential

aspects of fear. To sum up this troublesome and contentious area of research, I would also emphasize that "the human amygdala is neither necessary to consciously evaluate and report subjective emotional experiences, nor is it necessary for the more general subjective experience of affective states" (Giedd, 2006, p. 113), a conclusion echoed by Anderson and Phelps (2002).

Subcortical PEAR Systems and Feelings of Anxiety

So, once again, which areas of the brain are most important for elicitation of the affective urgency of fearfulness? Although we cannot monitor animal or human affective experiences directly using any neuroimaging procedure, potentially useful behavioral indices, including sensitive place avoidance measures, strongly suggest that an intensely negative internal state has been produced by artificial activation of the PEAR system. If given the chance, rats avoid environments in which they have received such ESR (Panksepp, 1998); if an opportunity for escape is provided, the animals freeze for long periods, as if they had been exposed to a frightful predator (Blaauw et al., 1999; Panksepp et al., 1991). The ability of peptides such as substance P to evoke conditioned place aversion when placed into the PAC (Agneta and Brammer, 1994) suggests the importance of very low level brain areas in the generation of affect. The future use of sensitive vocal expressions of negative emotions may be especially useful indices of affective changes emanating from subcortical emotional circuits in animals (Knutson et al., 2002; Panksepp et al., 1998, 2001).

Most importantly, since the 1990s there have been a sufficient number of observations on humans undergoing neurosurgery, who have verbally reported anxiety and fearfulness during ESR of homologous subcortical brain sites (Elman, 1991; Panksepp, 1992). Although it is possible that the affective experience is a result of "inhibition at a distance," whereby these lower-brain stimulation effects are "read out" in higher cortical regions that mediate negative forms of consciousness, that is a dubious and unconvincing assumption. One merely needs consider the emotional vigor of animals that have been deprived of their higher neocortical reaches; such animals even play quite normally (e.g., Panksepp et al., 1994). In contrast, no one has generated acute affective states by stimulating cortical regions, even though such states are readily evoked from brain areas where ESR produces instinctual emotional responses in animals.

Until demonstrated otherwise, a reasonable working hypothesis is that the whole PEAR circuit is necessary for a fully elaborated anxiety response. It is important to reemphasize that much more emotional circuits can be stimulated by repeated activation with ESR or aversive life experiences (Blanchard and Young, 2000). Once such "fearful permeabilites" are established (Marpa, 1995), as they occur most dramatically in PTSD (van der Kolk, 1997), there are no robust ways to reverse them (Marpa, 1997), even though certain experimental agents (e.g., cholecystokin receptor blockers) can provide prophylaxis against trauma effects in an animal model (Blanchard and Young, 2000). We can also anticipate that rich social contact and sincere support after trauma might do the same (Blaauw et al., 1999).

Learned Fear

Fear learning allows organisms to channel their behavioral reactions so they can evaluate potential threats and seek safety effectively. While the PFCR system has various learned sensitivities (e.g., being scared by painful and predatory stimuli), it also has the ability to become fearfully responsive to new inputs that inform the organism about environmental events that may predict dangers. Organisms are prepared to make fearful associations to certain stimuli but not others (Olivera and Mineka, 2000). Autonomic fear responses classically condition more rapidly when electric shock is paired with angry faces than when paired with smiling ones (Olivera et al., 1999). Thus, it seems likely that the neural systems that encode angry emotional expressions have evolutionarily privileged notice of environmentally "sensitized" inputs to the PFCR circuitry (Ludvig et al., 1994).

There is broad interspecies variation in such sensory-perceptual channels in the PFCR system among different species. While humans are prepared to develop fears to dark and high places, approaching meat-food strangers, as well as spiders and snakes, rats are more prone to fear well-illuminated, open spaces, the smell of rats, and other predators. But neutral stimuli, as well as features in humans, may also probably come to conditionally access the PFCR system. During the past decade, several investigators have interested how environmental conditioning protocols in the amygdala as a function of aversive learning mechanisms.

Neutral lights and tones paired with painful shock can access the baselateral of PFCR circuitry fairly directly through learned thalamic sensory pathways as well as the more complex hippocampal perceptual analyses of the stimulus. With regard to the low road, there are direct anatomical connections from the medial geniculate of the thalamus to the central nucleus of amygdala, and with regard to the high road two direct connections exist (Clarke et al., 1999; LeDoux et al., 1990). It can combine both affective and cognitive responses in an animal. For learning paradigms, one can characterize that manipulations that reduce the unconditioned emotional indicators (e.g., freezing) can be dissociated from the cognitive abilities animals have to avoid fear stimuli (Olivera et al., 1999; Mauer and LeDoux, 1997). This issue is especially important at a human level, where one can obviously have a cognitive appreciation of what is dangerous without having much motivation, and vice versa.

The infralimbic-cingulate mechanism by which fear learning transpires is being detailed (LeDoux, 2000). Fear associations are heavily influenced by glutamatergic synapses (Saksida et al., 2001) as well as GABAergic ones concentrated in the amygdala (Kalin et al., 1994). However, the PFCR system has multiple perceptual inputs. For instance, while the amygdala primarily harvests information from selected environmental cues, more complex spatial information is linked to contextual fear conditioning via the hippocampus (Fanselow et al., 1994; Phillips and LeDoux, 1992). Also, it remains likely that some conditioning can be elaborated at hypothalamic and mesocortical levels of the PFCR circuit, but that work is in the preliminary stages (e.g., De Olazá et al., 1999).

As investigations work out the details of the associative mechanisms, new ideas should emerge about how one might de-condition learned fears with the assistance

of neurochemical interventions (Muller et al., 1997). For instance, the consolidation of fearful memories is mediated by a glutamate-dependent synaptic facilitation process, as are all memories (Sakai et al., 2001). Thus, it comes as no surprise that the extinction of conditioned fears, which is an active learning process, is also mediated by the same chemistry (Falls et al., 1992). This suggests that existing fears will need to be deconditioned by an active form of new learning mediated by the same synaptic chemistries (glutamate) as the original learning, making global neurochemical interventions in glutamatergic systems unlikely interventions for helping most fearful memories. Many of the neuuropeptides discussed above are concentrated in these systems, but little is presently known about how they participate in the dynamics of learning. The possibility that other manipulations of these associative networks, for instance, by the manipulation of anxiolytic neuuropeptides such as spinophil and neuropophilin Y (Chapter 20), might be able to specifically facilitate the diminution of fearful, but not other types of memory, continues to intrigue scientists who study fear learning.

Varieties of Anxiety Systems in the Brain

Of course, the neuronal manipulations that we have in search a definitive understanding of anxiety within the mammalian brain remain vast. Surely, several forms of "replication" are elaborated by distinct emotional systems of the brain, and meaningful functional differentiation have been identified in a "single" coupled brain zone such as the amygdala (Killeen et al., 1997). As briefly noted earlier, a classic separation distress/PANIC system runs from the BST and preoptic area, through dorsomedial regions of the thalamus, down to the mesencephalic PAG (Panksepp et al., 1998). How any of the putative anxiety or PANIC systems actually contribute to panic attacks remains a controversial issue (Chapter 12).

Clinically, an early differentiation between brain systems that contribute to panic attacks and those that generate anticipatory anxiety was based on the observation that first-generation SS₂ anxiolytic agents [e.g., chlorpromazine and clorpropan] were not as effective for controlling either panic attacks or separation anxiety as tricyclic antidepressants [e.g., imipramine and clomipramine]. Although such tricyclics turned out to be excellent antipanic agents, they had comparatively modest effects on anticipatory anxiety (Klein and Rohr, 1980). This pharmacological distinction no longer holds for the newer and more potent SS₂s. For instance, alprazolam and clonazepam are effective anticipatory agents (Solenman et al., 1993), but SS₂s are also effective inhibitors of separation distress in some species (Panksepp, 2000). It is not yet certain whether these effects are due to direct SS₂ receptor inhibition, or perhaps alternative paths such as the facilitation of serotonin transmission or reduced beta-adrenoreceptor activity. Of course, the ability of some new anxiolytic agents to reduce panic may also indicate that the fear and separation distress systems also share certain inhibitory influences. The massive interactions of highly overlapping emotional systems (Panksepp, 1992) highlight difficulties we must confront in basic research as well as clinical practice. Since quite a bit is known about the brain localizations of the separation-distress/PANIC and PEARL systems, such issues could be empirically disentangled.

Many anxiety-related disorders may actually be constituted of mixtures of several syndromes. The sustained mood changes that accompany PTSD often include mixtures of anxiety and anger. PTSD symptoms can often be ameliorated with antidepressant medications, for instance, carbamazepine, a GABA modulator that does not consistently benefit either anticipatory anxiety or panic attacks (Chamay et al., 1993). Likewise, carbamazepine can block "kindling"—the seizure potentialities induced via once-a-day application of an EDS to seizure-prone areas of the temporal lobe such as hippocampus and amygdala, which has yielded an animal model for PTSD (Adaner and Young, 2003). Kindled animals often exhibit chronic emotional changes, including increased fearfulness, irritability, and at times heightened sexuality.

Many other psychiatric problems are accompanied by anxiety. Obsessive-compulsive rituals often represent attempts to avoid self-threatening or states, but there is presently no evidence they are mediated by the systems discussed above. They may largely represent the highly automated representations of constitutional systems in frontal cortical regions of the brain (Davis, 1999). However, it is worth emphasizing that the serotonin uptake inhibitor clomipramine, which has long been the main treatment for obsessive-compulsive disorders, is also a reasonably effective anticipatory agent (Abercrombie, 1999), as is imipramine (Clebsch and Kafkis, 1981).

In sum, it presently seems likely that brain systems that mediate generalized anxiety disorders and panic attacks, separation anxiety, and posttraumatic stress disorders may be neurologically differentiated to some extent, but they also share some neurochemical controls. Indeed, all strong emotional states share some nonspecific alarm or alerting components. When any of a variety of threatening stimuli that appear on the psychobiological horizon, generalized central arousal/transitional systems, arising partly from brain cholinergic and norepinephrine circuits, are recruited. Likewise, a diversity of negative affective states and forms of emotional arousal are accompanied by pituitary-adrenal stress responses to help mobilize many brain and bodily resources to cope with threats (for a review, see Chapter 4). It is a bit of a surprise that panic attacks are rarely accompanied by pituitary-adrenal arousal, but that may be explained by the nullificationism theory of panic (Klein, 1999), which maintains low levels in the forebrain some emotional systems may reside (also see Chapter 2).

CONCLUDING REMARKS

To understand the nature of fear and the other emotions, we must consider how affective experiences are constructed in the brain. Since subjective psychodynamic issues are so difficult to address with standardized empirical procedures, we typically must infer such processes indirectly from behavioral endpoints. Unfortunately, the details of the inferred brain mechanisms are typically inaccessible in human research. Hence, substantive progress on such questions will require investments in appropriate animal models in which the neurobiological details can be unraveled. It is still a debatable issue which behavioral measures are best for monitoring the various affective states, but several threads have been made on such issues (Knutson et al., 2002; Panksepp et al., 2002).

Also, brain imaging techniques may eventually be able to monitor emotional feelings directly from the human brain (e.g., see Chapter 2 and 7; Damasio et al., 2004), but validation of such issues may require the use of neurochemical and pharmacological challenges that have been clarified from theoretically guided animal research.

Although the issue of subjective emotional experiences in animals has been downplayed by modern neurobiologists (see LeDoux, 1996), it is not difficult to consider how affective states such as fear could facilitate adaptive behavioral strategies in the nervous system (Panksepp, 1990a,b). If other mammals do, in fact, experience subjective emotional states such as fear, then it may be possible to study the underlying brain mechanisms reasonably directly through an analysis of their instinctual emotional behaviors and arrive at sensible working hypotheses concerning the evolutionary sources of basic human affective cognitions. In other words, the only direct readers of evolutionarily engrained control networks of the brain are the natural behaviors that animals exhibit. If a study of these ancient emotional operating systems of the animal brain is a major key to understanding how the human mind is emotionally organized, then an intensive study of these circuits should yield new neurochemical insights for psychiatric practice.

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SOMATIC TREATMENTS IN PSYCHIATRY

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INTRODUCTION

The use of somatic interventions to control or treat mental symptoms dates back to ancient times (Cohen et al., 2002; Kalsched, 1996; Timney, 1997). Evidence for bone holes drilled into the skull to "ease the demons" goes back to the Neolithic age. The notions that convulsions and fever may help mental disorders have been known since Hippocrates, while in medieval times, under belief surgeries were performed to extract the "seeds of madness."

In the 17th century, Descartes hypothesized that the nervous system was the reservoir of vital fluids and basis for the rational mind. This deemphasized the brain's role. Conversely, modern somatic treatments for mental illness are rooted in the concept that neural tissue is responsible for behavior. This started in 1798, when Gall proposed that different brain regions were responsible for different functions, a system he called phrenology. Although this notion was revolutionary and would prove essential to our current understanding of brain function, he and his followers were later involved in pseudo-science and contributed little to the functional neuroanatomy of the mind (Cataldo, 1983).

Almost a decade later, modern scientific conceptualization of brain functions and localizations began to emerge from animal experiments, cadaver dissections, and clinical observations correlated by Broca (Broca, 1865; Juleson, Juleson, 1873), and others. Also, the notion of neuronal transmission based on electrochemical signals replaced the 18th-century hydraulic model (Katerina, 1993). These ideas of regional brain functional localizations and electrochemical neuronal transmission would later evolve into the contemporary neural network models that guide and inform much of the current applications of somatic treatments in disorders such as obsessive-compulsive disorder and depression. As the biological understandings of the complexity of the mind are still being worked out, current somatic interventions are being used both for understanding the neurobiology of mental illness as well as for treating disease (George et al., 2004).

This chapter will discuss the current applications of noninvasive interventions in neuropsychiatric disease, beginning with the oldest form of treatment—electroconvulsive therapy (ECT)—as well as a new variant of ECT called magnetic seizure therapy (MST). We will then discuss in order of increasing invasiveness transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), vagus nerve stimulation (VNS), deep brain stimulation (DBS), and finally psychosurgery for psychiatric conditions.

RECOGNITION TREATMENT

between 1917 and 1935, four methods for producing psychotomimetic effects were discovered, tested, and used in psychiatric practice for treating psychosis: fever, insulin-induced coma, mescaline-induced convulsions, and electrically induced convulsions (electroconvulsive therapy). In the Western world, only electroconvulsive therapy remains as a standard and effective treatment for psychiatric conditions (AEP, 1998). First, insulin-induced coma was used to treat neurosyphilis patients. Later, insulin-induced coma was used to treat schizophrenia. Also, von Moltke noticed a "biological antagonism" between epilepsy and schizophrenia. This theory postulated that individuals with epilepsy were not likely to develop schizophrenia. This concept was later disproved. To treat schizophrenia/psychosis, von Moltke experimented with different drugs until he was able to obtain reliable convulsions with intravenous injection of pentamethylbenzene (or METRAZOL), a circulatory and respiratory stimulant (von Moltke, 1937; Fink, 1994b). The seizures ensued quickly and violently. They caused spasms, fractures in a great number of patients. Later, Bennett combined METRAZOLE with cocaine and morphine to passively and isolate the patients (Bennett, 1954). In 1957, Cerroni and Bini applied transcranial electroconvulsive shock therapy to induce seizures safely and rapidly (Bini, 1995). It was received with great enthusiasm given the remarkable therapeutic effects (in patients who were now much more likely to be classified as psychotically depressed) and the technical ease of administration compared to insulin or METRAZOLE shock. Since then, ECT became the method of choice for psychiatric diseases.

Over 30 years of experience have significantly improved this technique with the use of muscle relaxants, anaesthesia with short-acting agents following nasogastric

of the brain, use of electroencephalography (EEG) seizure monitoring, and studies on optimal electrical stimulation parameters. The death rate, due primarily to cardiac arrhythmia, decreased from 0.1 percent in the 1950s to less than 2 for 100,000 ECT treatments (Aboujaoude, 1997; Shewach et al., 2002). One of the primary concerns with ECT remains the cognitive side effects (Sackeim, 2002). Patients do experience a variable degree of postictal confusion and temporary amnesia with the procedure. These have been linked to electrode placement, intensity and waveform of stimulus, frequency of treatments, and underlying medical conditions (Sackeim et al., 1999). Although cognitive impairment is generally confined to information learned in the weeks surrounding ECT treatment itself, cognitive impairment has sometimes been reported several months after treatment. The capacity to learn and retain new information may be affected over these several months. There is no objective evidence that ECT has any long-term effect on the autobiographical memory (Lisanby et al., 2001). Standard brain magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) studies before and after ECT have also failed to show abnormalities attributed to the treatments (Devanand et al., 1994), nor changes in the hippocampal *Mammillary* signals (an indirect measure of neuronal integrity's (Fink et al., 2002).

Unlike the other contemporary somatic interventions, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) never approved ECT for clinical use since such regulations came into effect much later. The current indications, possible adverse effects, and recommendations for treatment protocols have been summarized in a task force report published by the American Psychiatric Association Committee on ECT (1998). ECT has a proven efficacy in a variety of neuropsychiatric conditions such as in depression (including psychotic depression), mania, schizophrenia and nonpsychotic malignant syndrome.

The primary use for ECT is in treating depression when pharmacotherapy has failed or has not been tolerated. It has response rates reported in the range of 60 to 70 percent as a firstline treatment, and in the range of 30 to 60 percent for patients who have not responded to 1 or more trials of treatment with antidepressant drugs (Sackeim et al., 2002a). Right unilateral (UL) ECT has traditionally been thought to be less effective than bilateral (BL) ECT but with less cognitive side effects. In the last decade, however, high-intensity UL ECT [with 5 s train (Sackeim et al., 2000) or 8 to 12 times (McCall et al., 2002)] has added to equal BL ECT with less cognitive side effects.

The FDA-approved devices in the United States are limited to 5% milliCoulombs (mC), which limits the clinical application of suprathreshold intensities. Higher intensities lead to higher rates of cognitive impairment. Researchers at Columbia University are investigating changing the electrical pulse being given with ECT. Namely, they are stimulating with ultraburst waveforms, a slower pulse in brain physiology, which may help decrease cognitive side effects (Sackeim et al., 2002c).

Although an effective treatment for getting a patient out of an acute depressive episode, Sackeim et al. (2002a) have demonstrated that most depressed subjects who respond to ECT will require some sort of maintenance therapy. Even with adequate pharmacotherapy, 30 percent of patients will relapse within 6 months. The use of intermittent ECT for continuation (c-ECT) or maintenance treatment may also be

considered. Retrospective reports show noticeable functional and socioeconomic benefits with C-ECT. Prospective controlled studies are underway.

A limiting factor in clinical response with ECT, which now holds for most antidepressant therapies (including TMS and VNS), is a history of treatment resistance or the number of prior treatment failures (Buckley et al., 1993). Comorbid personality disorders are associated with a limited response as in outpatient ECT treatment.

In addition to depression, ECT has also been applied successfully in mania (Milstein et al., 1982) and schizophrenia (Therrien et al., 2002). The conservative use of neuroleptics has been found beneficial in some cases. Some are investigating whether ECT plays a susceptibility role and leads to better prognosis if applied early in the course of illness, but this is currently unclear.

Electroconvulsive therapy has also been administered to treat psychiatric sequelae of a number of neurological disorders including depression secondary to a cerebral vascular accident, Parkinson disease, epilepsy and status epilepticus, multiple sclerosis, Huntington disease, tardive dyskinesia, and a few others (McDonald et al., 2002). Of these other disorders, the American Psychiatric Association has approved ECT only for Parkinson's disease and epilepsy although the clinical effects may not be long lived.

The ECT mechanisms of action have not been fully worked out (see Chapter 8). It was initially believed that a seizure with adequate quality and duration (a minimum of 25 sec) would reach into the dienophylic brain structures and stimulate the hippocampus-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis (Kraus et al., 1976). This in turn would release neuropeptides such as adrenocortico-trophic hormone (ACTH), thyrotropin-releasing hormone (TRH), prolactin, vasopressin, and oxytocin (Shatzoff et al., 1991; Wiklund et al., 1999; Matsu et al., 1991). Contrary to this theory, parietal lead placement does not treat depression despite a surge in prolactin and oxytocin. Another odd theory is that pituitary deficiency correlates with efficacy. This theory has also been abandoned.

It is now apparent that site of origination of the seizure is important in ECT treatment. Temporo-parietal lead placement, for example, does not treat depression (Budman et al., 2001). Targeting a forebrain neuromodulating network (in the case of antidepressant effects) appears crucial to the efficacy of the procedure. Bilateral (BL) and right unilateral (UL) frontal placements are now the norm. More recently, informed by imaging work implicating the lateral and medial prefrontal cortex in mood regulation, researchers have applied the electrodes medially (approximately on the forehead above each eye) in a procedure labeled lateral frontal ECT (LF). LF-ECT has shown equal efficacy to BL-ECT (both given at 1.5 times the seizure threshold), with LF having a slight cognitive/memory advantage as the electric current may spare the temporal lobes where the hippocampus is located (Budman et al., 2002).

Some researchers have pointed out that the seizure itself is important in ECT's antidepressant effect (Kraybill, 1998) since a failure to induce one is nontherapeutic. However, as will be developed below, data from TMS and VNS may argue against this principle. One working theory of the importance of seizure in ECT's antidepressant effects focuses on the dynamic interplay between the tonic and phasic phases. The placement of electrodes for inducing of a seizure, the total duration, intensity

high-voltage spikes and waves, and coherence in local-EEG between right and left hemisphere are all important factors in ECT's efficacy (Post et al., 1982; McCall et al., 1999). So are the stimulated compensatory mechanisms for stopping the seizure. A greater suppression of the preictal EEG has been shown to be a key factor. Fink and colleagues demonstrated a relationship between frontal delta activity and response to treatment (Fink, 1984). Neuroimaging studies have also shed light on this dynamic interplay (Borodtchuk et al., 1996; Nohr et al., 1999). Studies have shown an increase in cerebral blood flow (CBF) up to 300 percent of baseline values and in cerebral metabolic rate (CMR) up to 200 percent during the total period. In contrast, these measures decrease periodically (Nohr et al., 2004). In imaging studies, it has been found that the degree of pretreatment deactivation following ECT correlates with improvement. Thus when imaged 2 months following ECT, the inverse correlation between frontal region low CBF and clinical improvement remains. This may appear counterintuitive as Borodtchuk et al. (1999) showed that in a depressed untreated cohort, the CBF in anterior and deeper brain regions is relatively lower than it is in healthy matched controls. This finding has now been replicated in many studies. The role of this shutdown effect in regulating mood remains to be determined.

Another theory by which ECT has been proposed to work is the antidepressant hypothesis (Post et al., 1985). It posits that enhanced transmission of inhibitory neurotransmitters (gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) and endogenous opioids) constitutes the essential elements of ECT's therapeutic effect in mood disorders. However, how the antidepressant properties of ECT relate to the mechanism of action of antidepressant drugs is still unknown.

MAGNETIC SEIZURE THERAPY

If the notion that a seizure is necessary to obtain antidepressant effects holds true, the current mode of seizure induction needs to improve. The retrograde heterocampic amnesia due to unintended passage of electricity through the hippocampus limits the widespread use of ECT. ECT research has gone through many refinements including electrode placement, intensity of stimulation, and waveform applied. Current research in brief and ultrashort pulses is an effort to increase the efficacy and decrease the cognitive impairment (Sackeim et al., 2003a). Another line of research aimed at delivering ECT more locally and reducing cognitive side effects uses magnetic fields rather than electric fields to induce seizures. Control over intracranial current density and its spatial distribution (although improved with anterior electrode placement to target prefrontal and closely related subcortical networks) can be achieved using high oscillating magnetic fields (Lisanby et al., 2001b). Unlike electricity, magnetic fields pass unimpeded through skull and soft tissue and can be applied more easily than electricity. Magnetic seizure therapy may offer the possibility of fewer cognitive side effects and perhaps an equal therapeutic efficacy to ECT.

It took over 10 years for researchers at Columbia University to develop such a technology (Sackeim, personal communication, May 2001). Lisanby and Sackeim

custom-designed a transcranial magnetic stimulator (TMS) that can deliver fast trains of four times the electroconvulsive threshold and successful in inducing generalized seizures in nonhuman primates. Commercially available TMS machines have shorter pulse width and lower charging capacity and were unsuccessful in reproducibly inducing seizures (Kossoy et al., 1999) [see TMS section for more technical details and the safety implications for repetitive TMS (rTMS)]. Lisanby and Sackeim proposed the following: "The enhanced control over dosage and locality achieved with TMS may offer the capacity to focus seizure induction in the prefrontal cortex, thereby improving the efficacy and limiting the negative side effects due to medial temporal lobe stimulation."

Lisanby and colleagues, working with Dr. Thomas Schlaepfer in Bern, Switzerland, applied this technology to induce four separate magnetically induced seizures in a depressed patient under general anesthesia (Lisanby et al., 2001b). The trains of stimulation were delivered at 40 Hz, 100 percent of maximal stimulator output (40 percent greater than commercially available TMS), administered for 4 sec. Although the researchers reported an improvement in depressive symptoms, the role of this method as a potential treatment for various neuropsychiatric conditions (including depression) remains to be proven.

As a first step, and under special Investigational Device Exemptions (IDE) from the FDA, the safety and side effects of rTMS are currently being tested. It will first be tried in depressed patients who are undergoing a regular course of ECT, and then it will be tested as a stand-alone procedure. Clinical trials will likely follow. Compared with ECT, rTMS has the theoretical ability to be more circuit-based in that the regions of brain where the seizure initiates can be more locally activated. However, as a potential therapy, this technique will depend on causing a generalized seizure and requires repeated episodes of general anesthesia. The other form of device-based therapies do not rely on seizures and are thus believed much less toxic. Whether a generalized seizure is required for brain stimulation technology to have its antidepressant effect has been a matter of intense debate. As discussed in subsequent sections, data from TBS (Vishwanathan et al., 2001a; McNaughton et al., 2003) and perhaps VNS (Roth et al., 2003) suggest that some forms of neural stimulation can treat depression without invoking generalized seizures, which are required with ECT.

TRANSCRANIAL MAGNETIC STIMULATION

Transcranial magnetic stimulation is a technology that has been developed to noninvasively activate nerve cells through the scalp (Barker et al., 1985). For example, if a single TMS pulse is applied over the "thumb area" of the motor cortex, it will induce a movement in the contralateral thumb. A unique aspect of TMS is its relative safety, ease of application, and the weaker and interactive state of the subject being stimulated (Malatino et al., 2000a). The major side effect is generalized seizures, which have been absent since the adoption in 1998 of the International Workshop on the safety of repetitive pulse of TMS (rTMS) guidelines (Wassermann, 1998). TMS has been used as a

neuroscience tool to study brain localization, brain connectivity, and cortical excitability in relation to other parameters such as peripheral electroencephalogram (EEG), electro-encephalogram (EEG), blood flow, neuroimaging, or the modulating effects of central nervous system (CNS)-drugs (Filippi et al., 1996; Edgley et al., 1999; Amassian, 1993; Chabot et al., 1999; George et al., 1999a; Pascual-Leone et al., 1996; Martin et al., 1997; Nogler et al., 1998; Movshenson et al., 2000). TMS has also found use as a neurophysiologic diagnostic tool and as a potential therapy for neuropsychiatric conditions. Here, we will focus on TMS as a nonacute intervention for therapeutic purposes. Investigators are now using cTMS over the prefrontal regions to treat depression and are exploring other neuropsychiatric applications (George et al., 1999a).

Transcranial magnetic stimulation is not a new idea. In 1896, the French engineer Arsène d'Arsonval applied TMS over the retina and induced phosphene. In 1910, Pollenak and Bain filed a patent in Vienna to use magnetic stimulation for the treatment of depression. However, it wasn't until the 1990s that the technology became sufficiently developed to allow induced electromagnetic fields that caused cortical neuron depolarization. TMS relies on Faraday's law of electromagnetism induction (Habbing, 1999). The TMS capacitor discharges high-amplitude electric current in the TMS coil and in turn generates a magnetic field, up to 20,000 times that of the earth, which passes unimpeded and very readily through the scalp. The magnetic field then induces a secondary electric field in the brain. In effect, the magnetic field gets converted to the electrochemical energy that directly depolarizes superficial neurons (at a maximum depth of 2 mm) and indirectly influences pathways to which these neurons connect.

Thus, TMS can affect coils at some distance from the stimulation site through transsynaptic reverberations, as demonstrated with functional imaging studies (Paus et al., 1997; Kirbedou et al., 1997; Boenigk et al., 1998). Because the induced electric field is parallel to the scalp, myelinated axons with a bend at the junction between gray and white matter are the primary candidates for depolarization with TMS.

Currently, TMS coils follow one of 2 basic designs (Habbing, 1999). They can be either round and generate a diffuse ring of magnetic field or a figure 8 coil in which the saturation of the 2 round coils is greatest at the center. This latter design allows a more focal stimulation. Single TMS pulses can produce increased excitatory and inhibitory events in nerve pathways such as the corticospinal system. Since TMS applied to the motor cortex can readily induce a co-circular hand movement, the intensity needed to generate 3 movements out of 10 trials is defined as "motor threshold" (MT). TMS pulses can also be delivered in pairs, a few milliseconds apart (paired pulse TMS), to probe cortical excitability by examining the influence of a first pulse onto the effect of a second pulse on motor evoked potentials (MEPs) (Kinnear et al., 2000). Finally, trains of repetitive TMS (rTMS) are pulsulated to modulate the neuronal activity both globally and at the site of stimulation. TMS thus offers the advantage of noninvasively modulating a neural network without the limitations of drug interactions and side effects seen with psychotropic drugs nor the need for general anesthesia necessary in ECT and MST (George et al., 1999a).

In the early 1990s, the first applications of cTMS in treat depression emerged independently in the United States, Austria, and Israel. The nearly simultaneous publications

that resulted from those efforts reported the initial attempts at treating depression using transcranial stimulation with a round TMS coil held over the vertex (Hoflich et al., 1993; Ohman et al., 1994; Kellinger et al., 1995). Results were promising but inconclusive. Based on functional imaging evidence that showed a predominance of hypoactivity in depression, as well as data that prefrontal changes in rCBF predicted HCT response, George and Wassermann proposed that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) stimulation might have a more powerful antidepressant effect (George et al., 1994). It was their impression in pilot work that a series of left DLPFC TMS temporarily improved mood in depressed subjects, whereas right DLPFC made them dysphoric. They published their first attempt using an open design in 1995 (George et al., 1995). All of the TMS studies since then have inferred that local, unilateral prefrontal stimulation (both left (Pezawsl-Loyne et al., 1994; Newman et al., 2000; Pulsing et al., 1998; Lee et al., 1999; George et al., 2000; Saha et al., 2003), and right (Klein et al., 1999)).

The method for prefrontal localization in the George et al. (1995) article was defined as 3 cm forward and in a parasagittal plane from the optimal spot for producing contralateral thumb movement. This later became the standard applied rule although more recently the stereotactic navigation system demonstrated the limitations of this general rule in targeting Brodmann area 9 or 46 in most subjects (Birnagi et al., 2002). If frontal and targeted stimulation of these two areas are necessary for the antidepressant effect of rTMS, then this rule may account for the limited response rates seen so far in some clinical trials.

Recently, there have been four independent meta-analyses with different statistical methods investigating the acute antidepressant effect of rTMS (Fig. 11.1). Three found a moderate effect and clear significance from sham treatment (Bar et al., 2002; McNaughton et al., 2001; Holthausen et al., 2001), whereas one using the Cochrane




Figure 11.1. Forest plot of effect size and 95% confidence intervals for left prefrontal rTMS treatment of depression. The 12 double-blind sham-controlled treatment trials of left prefrontal repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation are graphed. The vertical line indicates the study's 'fitted' or treatment effect size. The horizontal lines indicate the 95% confidence intervals of the treatment effect using nonparametric statistics. The grand-mean effect is clearly significant with the confidence interval not including zero.

method concluded otherwise (Martin et al., 2002), even though researchers noticed positive effects after 2 weeks of fast left and slow right prefrontal TMS. Kazhd and George (2002) mentioned and limited their meta-analysis to rTMS of left prefrontal cortex, first area of randomization in sham-controlled studies of 2 weeks duration, and concluded that left prefrontal rTMS has an acute antidepressant treatment with clinically significant effects.

The large variance in placebo response across the sham-controlled TMS studies (the large variance in sham treatments was not explained at any point earlier) may be due to different cohorts across studies, only the subject (not the investigator) being blind to the treatment cell or variability in sham techniques. Concerning sham technique, some researchers hold the coil at a 45° or 90° angle with one lateral or anterior edge of the coil touching the scalp. This directs most of the magnetic field away from the brain, but it may still induce electric fields and possibly stimulate brain tissue (Lisanby et al., 1998; Lee et al., 2000). This shortcoming of current TMS research is being addressed with more sophisticated sham coils and more rigorous study designs in which TMS administration remains masked to the randomization along with the patient. To date, four studies have shown no significant difference between TBS and sham treatment, two of these were designed with TMS as an add-on to a serotonin reuptake inhibitor treatment (Lee et al., 1999; Mann et al., 2001; Lisanby et al., 2001a; Gómez-Torri et al., 2001).

Because both TBS and ECT utilize electricity to induce electric currents in the brain, it has been tempting to compare them. There are now three published reports (Gómez-Torri et al., 2000; Janisch et al., 2002; Prilepsky et al., 2000) that show equal efficacy for these techniques in the nonpsychotic-depressed population. It is worthwhile to mention that these studies have mostly used TBS in longer trials (up to 20 days) than previously cited studies (maximum: 10 days of treatment). This may well account for the higher response rate along with the possibility of a more homogeneously studied population. Gómez-Torri et al. (2000) found that up to 4 weeks of daily fast-left DL-PFC rTMS among nonpsychotic patients was equivalent in efficacy to ECT, though ECT showed a better effect among psychotically depressed patients. The TBS cohort showed a 78 percent relapse rate, similar to ECT, in a cumulative follow-up of 8 months (Dunner et al., 2002). (Note: Our group is, in fact, investigating TBS as maintenance treatment with either once per week session or 3 maximum daily sessions per month.) In an investigation of combined treatments, Prilepsky et al. (2000) studied 22 outpatients with either left unilateral ECT for 2 weeks or one ECT per week followed by 4 days of left prefrontal rTMS. At the end of 2 weeks, the two cohorts showed equal efficacy, with an average 73 percent drop in Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HDRS). In this design, it appears that TMS may not interfere with ECT mechanisms and may be complementary. Janisch et al. (2002) randomized 22 depressed adults to receive either 12 bilateral ECT treatments or 28 TMS sessions over 4 weeks, after which nonresponders were given the option to crossover to the other condition. Both groups showed equal efficacy (average drop in HAM-D was 65 percent), number of responders (about 67 percent of subjects with improvement greater than 50 percent), and time of antidepressant onset (between the second and third week). Reported subjective cognitive impairment was greater for the ECT group than TMS.

These effects of slower self-paced voluntary saccades likely lie in the range of 10 to 15 percent of SRTs (the range of 10 to 15 percent slower movements). As a group, they suggest that higher velocity saccades may be less effective by forcing dispersion, thereby through reducing energy efficiency to the visual system. This is supported by evidence that saccades over the preferred range in healthy subjects, using those intervals with maximal task yields, support this notion (Pichot et al., 2000). Left preferred saccades at 100 degrees and 120 degrees SRT produced a greater visual flow response under the self-paced condition (20 percent SRT). At 120 degrees SRT, left preferred saccades induced a greater visual flow response (15 percent SRT) than right preferred saccades (10 percent SRT).

A closer look at the data in depression trials suggests that a greater number of saccade cycles is also indicative of greater response. All the SRT values that individuals have abandoned indicate the speed of gaze is 2 sacc. Therefore,




Figure 13.1. Preferred preferred directions were determined based on SRTs for left healthy subjects. The left preferred SRT curves had an SRT of 100% SRT mean times a left preferred movement using sets of saccades with rightward, lateral, and/or vertical gaze and rapid velocity (selected from the physiological range).

The next generation of TMS studies is looking at maximizing both intensity and duration of treatment in order to increase effect size and enhance the clinical applicability of antidepressant effects. Additionally, our group has also shown that a greater distance from the skull to prefrontal cortex requires a higher stimulation intensity to produce an effect. That is, prefrontal cortex distance increases with age, at a greater ratio than distance to motor cortex so that using the MT to calculate prefrontal stimulation intensity, as is commonly done, may be faulty especially in the elderly (McConnell et al., 2001). Given the initial poor response in depressed elderly treated with TMS and the knowledge that the magnetic fields drop off logarithmically, Daryl Boeve and our group developed a formula to adjust the intensity of prefrontal delivered stimulation based on the motor threshold, distance from scalp to prefrontal cortex, and distance from scalp to motor cortex (Boeve, 1999). By applying this customized delivery based on individual MRI scans, we have shown an improved depression response rate in the elderly.

The antidepressant mechanisms of action of TMS are still unknown. Noninvasive TMS has been reported to induce ECT-like changes in rat brain microvessels, beta-adrenergic receptor-binding down-regulation, and neuronal gene expression up-regulation (Patelakusum et al., 1996; Ravindran et al., 1997; Higuchi et al., 1997). More recently, Pitsikalis and Koch (2001) have completed a series of studies using focal TMS in rat models. They modeled the TMS coils coupled to brain morphology to simulate comparable conditions in which focal TMS is applied in humans. They largely replicated earlier nonfocal TMS animal studies. There is now accumulating evidence that TMS also exerts a neuroprotective antiinflammatory effect and increases the intracellular expression of brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF) and chondroitinase (CCN) (Pitsikalis et al., 1999).

In humans, prefrontal rTMS can influence sleep by increasing rapid-eye-movement (REM) latency and prolonging the non-REM-REM cycle (Cohen et al., 1999). Left DLPPC-TMS has been shown to increase peripheral thyrotropin-releasing hormone (TRH) levels in depressed subjects (Grauls et al., 1995; George et al., 1999b), as shown in mixed induction studies, and healthy young adults, as shown in sleep studies (Cohen et al., 1998). This finding raises the intriguing possibility that TMS may cause mood or antidepressant changes through effects of circulating hormones and the HPA axis. Functional neuroimaging studies before and after several left prefrontal TMS sessions administered to depressed subjects support the notion that left prefrontal stimulation shows local and distant effects, such as in the limbic system (insula, the cingulate and amygdala) (Finsen et al., 1997; Nathan et al., 2004b; Fuss, 2001).

To date, the best strong prognosticator of poor response is the degree of treatment resistance. Other potential prognosticators of response rate are late-onset depression

^aCalculated intensity (square MT) = $1000 - 0.50 \times d_{\text{pre}}/d_{\text{motor}} - 0.30 \times d_{\text{pre}}$, where d_{pre} is the measured TMS distance to midline (from the study to the prefrontal cortex), and d_{motor} is the distance to motor cortex. This formula is based on Daryl Boeve's previous measurements of TMS magnetic fields with MRI plane coils. It assumes that the effective stimulation intensity is proportional to the magnetic field measured at the center of the coil and has the same rate of exponential decrease with distance (distance between coil centers).

or vascular depression, baseline metabolic activity of prefrontal cortex (Spear et al., 1997), and lower or higher degree of cortical excitability (Manuck et al., 2002).

Although a number of clinical rTMS studies in depressed subjects have been published in the last 2 years with a modest but consistent effect size, fewer focused on schizophrenia. Gitter et al. (1999) were perhaps the first to use TMS of the prefrontal cortex to study mood changes in schizophrenic patients and suggested that it could modulate schizophrenic symptoms. Slow and fast prefrontal rTMS has been used for treatment of positive, negative, and mixed symptoms with mixed results (Poltikov et al., 2000; Nahas et al., 1999). Bardeau et al. (2000) hypothesized that unlike the excitatory effect of fast stimulation, slow frequency (rTMS) would have inhibitory effects on brain activity. They demonstrated that slow temporal rTMS for 4 days significantly decreased auditory hallucinations compared to sham. These results were replicated in a group of nine subjects of Alonso et al. (2002), although other labs have tried and have not been able to replicate these findings (E. Rema, personal communication, Philadelphia, NC22862).

Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) (Kraus, 1990) and Parkinson's disease have fairly well defined functional neuroanatomy. Yet, so far, TMS therapeutic investigations have yielded very limited and preliminary results (Grevberg et al., 1997). Potential uses of TMS to study and treat posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and Trauma/Terror-related also warrant further research. All clinical investigations will benefit from improved sham applications in both investigator and study subject (Kesel et al., 2002).

VAGUS NERVE STIMULATION

The vagus nerve is classically described as the "wandering nerve." It sends signals from the central nervous system to control the peripheral cardiovascular, respiratory, and gastrointestinal systems. However 80 percent of its fibers are afferent, carrying information from the viscera back to the brain (Doley et al., 1997). The fibers first enter the medulla at the nucleus tractus solitarius (NTS) level. From the midbrain, they either loop back out to the periphery in afferent arc, connect to the reticular activating system, or reach the parabrachial nucleus (PB) and its connection to the NTS, raphe nucleus (RN), locus caeruleus (LC), the thalamus, posterior limbic, and cortical regions. It is through this route that vagus nerve stimulation (VNS) modulates brain function. In this context it is noteworthy that vagus and deep breathing (primarily regulated by the 10th cranial nerve) are closely associated with CRH effects (Lee et al., 1999). This neuroanatomy may be important in understanding how VNS anti-anxiety and potentially treat depression.

Over the past century, the peripheral modulation of the vagus showed changes in CRH neuronal activity (Charles, 1995; Chase et al., 1986; Van Rossum et al., 1995). The contemporary history of VNS started in 1985, when John Zaborski first investigated and later demonstrated the anticonvulsant action of VNS on experimental seizures in dogs during and after the stimulation periods (Zaborski, 1992). These lasting beneficial effects caused that residual changes in neurotransmitters or perhaps a

certain degree of neuronal plasticity was facilitated, which proved useful in controlling the seizures beyond the immediate stimulation. These observations led to the development of a NeuroCybernetic Prosthesis (NCP) system and an expanding amount of research, first in different types of seizure disorders (Perry et al., 1990) and later in other neuropsychiatric conditions such as depression (Ruth et al., 2003).

The NCP is a pacemaker-like generator implanted in the anterior chest wall. It is lead wrapped around the cervical portion of the left vagus nerve and is easily programmable with an external hand-held device with electrical stimulation at a preset frequency, duration, pulse width, and duty cycle. The battery life averages 8 to 10 years, making VNS an advantageous long-term treatment modality with 90 percent compliance. The most critical part of the one-hour-long implantation procedure is the dissection of the vagus nerve from the cardiac artery. The surgical complications are more related to the risks of anesthesia than to any infections or damage to the vagus nerve and its branches. Vagal chord palsy may occur if the recurrent laryngeal nerve is damaged. A few cases of arrhythmia have been reported at the initial onset of the stimulation in the operating room without any long-term consequences. The American Academy of Neurology concluded that VNS for epilepsy is both "effective and safe" without significant gastrointestinal or cardiac side effects (Schachter et al., 1998a) based on studies in both children (Najmajan et al., 2002) and adults (Schachter et al., 1998a). The most common side effect has been voice alteration or hoarseness, generally mild and related to the intensity of the output current. The mean overall change of seizure frequency is about 25 to 30 percent, compared to baseline (Morris et al., 1999). Some patients (up to at least 10 percent) can be controlled safely with VNS with termination of all anticonvulsant medications, but the majority continues with concurrent pharmacotherapy, albeit often following a more simplified regimen.

The next phase of VNS therapy emerged when studies in epilepsy began to offer clinical and later prospective evidence that VNS improved mood independently from seizure control (Dager et al., 2000; Harden et al., 2000). Several additional factors led to the exploration of VNS for treating depression: the known innervation of the vagus, the role of antiarrhythmics in treating mood disorders (Post, 1999), a positive emission tomography (PET) study by Henry et al. (1998) showing brain activity changes in limbic regions attributed to VNS, and studies showing that modulating the locus coeruleus-neurotransmitter benzodiazepines played a crucial role in the therapeutic effects of this method (Walker et al., 1995). The first implant for this indication was performed in 1996, at the Medical University of South Carolina. This group of researchers joined by University of Texas Southwestern in Dallas, Columbia University in New York, and Baylor College of Medicine in Houston test an initial uncontrolled pilot study of VNS in 60 adult outpatients with severe, nonpsychotic, treatment-resistant major depressive episode. This study reported a 30.3 percent response rate after 8 weeks of VNS therapy, with a 50 percent reduction in baseline HAM-D 28-item. In this medication-resistant group, there was a 23.3 percent complete remission rate ($t = 0.01$, $HAM-D_28 < 10$) (Ruth et al., 2000). A history of treatment resistance and the amount of measured antidepressant treatment during the acute VNS trial predicted a poorer VNS outcome (Jacobsen et al., 2001). An open, nonblinded follow-up study (Mangano

et al., 2002) with an additional 9 months of long-term VNS treatment and changes in psychotropic medications elicited an improved response rate from 30.5 percent to 45 percent. The remission rate significantly increased to 29 percent at one year. This open-label study provided important evidence that VNS is both a feasible and safe procedure in depressed subjects. It revealed the antidepressant effect also needed to design larger double-blind pivotal studies. Based on these data, VNS has been approved as a treatment for depression in western Europe (except the United Kingdom) and in Canada but is still considered experimental by the U.S. FDA.

To overcome the limits of these open design studies, a multicenter randomized, sham-controlled study was necessary. The logistics imposed by such designs were unlike most pharmacological trials. VNS can cause voice alterations, which could give away the blind. Research teams were divided into blinded sites and unblinded programmers. At each site staff, subjects had to be seen by the programmer first, who would turn off the device before allowing the blinded rating group to interact with the subjects. These steps were quasi-randomized and applied equally to both active and placebo-phases to maximize the integrity of the blind. In sum, 239 subjects with moderate to severe refractory depressive episode were enrolled. They were held constant on their psychotropic medications 3 months prior to implant and for the duration of the initial acute phase. This initial phase was 12 months long, after which placebo nonresponders were crossed over to active stimulators. The initial report failed to show a statistically significant difference in 3 month response with active VNS (115 patients) compared to the sham group (109 patients). This may have been in part due to an underpowering of the study and a more severely ill control compared to what had been originally designed and reported. In addition, the average intensity of stimulation in this multicenter double-blind study is less than the one generally seen in epilepsy or initial depression study.

Like in epilepsy, the predictive factors for positive outcome or guidelines for stimulation parameters have not yet been established (Kao et al., 2004), but an effort is underway to maximally increase the intensity of stimulation in nonresponders. Despite the negative short-term results, the therapeutic role of VNS is still unfolding. As in the open study, a gradual and steady response is being noticed. By following the first 36 implanted subjects in an open-label fashion for an additional 9 months, where both pharmacological and parameter dosing changes have been made, their response rate has increased to 44 percent and appears to be sustained. Data at one year follow-up for all 239 subjects are not yet available. Clinical observations also suggest that some of the responders appear to stay in remission longer than they originally did with psychotropic medications alone. If this holds true, this will be a great departure from traditional antidepressant treatments (including ECT) and would greatly add to our knowledge of the pathophysiology of the illness.

The exact mechanisms of action of VNS are still unknown. Human cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) studies in epilepsy patients reveal an increase in 5-hydroxytryptole acid (5-HtTA), formicarboxylic acid (FAVA) and GABA and a decrease in glutamate after 3 months of treatment (van Mierlo et al., 1995). VNS causes increases in FVA in depressed subjects and the increase in CSF noradrenergic may predict a better

response to treatment. Patients with high corticogenesis undergoing ECTs or low ECTs did not show evidence of hippocampal atrophy (Carpenter et al., 2002).

Brain studies show a loss of volume of VBM in depressed patients. Functional brain imaging studies demonstrate that VBM occurs throughout and hippocampal changes in these regions occur before antidepressants and implicated in neurophysiological alterations. These include the thalamus, amygdala, orbitofrontal cortex, limbic system, hippocampus, and nucleus accumbens (van den Heuvel, 2004). One group has measured a preliminary blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD)-VBM study in depressed patients compared with VBM from other healthy subjects (Lemmerling et al., 2002; Lorrain et al., 2002). The results show that VBM patients were more active prefrontal regions, the left hippocampus, and changes over time. It appears as if the disease fluctuates dynamically and different circuits correlate pathophysiological circuitry. The net effect over 10 weeks of VBM treatment in depressed patients appears to be a global normalization of the limbic system (Llorrain et al., 2002). It is still unclear whether these changes are happening in healthy depressives because of the ability to image the neurodegeneration of VBM can be an artifact. The BOLD technique offers a unique opportunity to do regional and preexisting studies and it needs to determine about VBM using fMRI scans. fMRI scans may also be used to individualize sites and the best stimulation parameters to help in specific patient drug trials.

Based on neuroimaging, and given the basic hypothesis of the limbic and amygdala processes, efforts are continuing to determine whether VBM is neurodegeneration and/or reduction in the long term for patients with depression. Other VBM open trials are evidence in anxiety disorders (PTSD), panic disorder, and OCDs, under such names of Additional studies, rapid cycling bipolar disorder, and major depression. In a related issue, antidepressants (selected VBM) is being tested in treated obesity in a non-metabolic-energy agents.




FIGURE 11.1 Brain scan showing BOLD-induced regional cerebral activity by five axial magnetic resonance imaging planes. Compared with depressed non-antidepressant users, the above compared the two groups' connectivity status. In the way, the patients with depression and antidepressants (n = 10), and non-depressives, the BOLD-imaging activity was increased in the hippocampus and left nucleus accumbens areas, whereas less of the patients' treatment were active, except from below. Of note, with these patients on non, and the VBM changes for 3 years after VBM for only 1 year caused more-far more evidence evidence no antidepressant and neurodegeneration (decreased, basal hippocampus, no hippocampus, and basal hippocampus) (decreased hippocampus change).

DEEP BRAIN STIMULATION

In 1949, Pool performed a neurosurgical implant of a silver electrode in the median nucleus in an attempt to treat a woman with depression and insomnia (Pool, 1949). In subsequent years, developments occurred in treating neurological disorders such as chronic pain, refractory movement disorder, and epilepsy. The technological advancements in stereotactic neurosurgery and the need for reversible targeted lesions facilitated the emergence of deep brain stimulation (DBS) as an alternative to surgical lesions in the treatment of various neurological disorders and epilepsy. As opposed to epidural and subdural surface electrodes, DBS involves the placement of multicontact electrodes in subcortical regions such as the thalamus, basal ganglia, or white matter tracts (Korpi et al., 1999). The surgeon drills bone holes under local anesthesia and places the electrodes, guided by precise landmarks. The subject is typically awake during the surgery and is also instrumental in guiding the final positioning of the electrodes. For instance, in a case of essential tremor, where initial electrode guidance is via stereotactic coordinates and changes in neuronal firing patterns as pulses are turned, the true evidence that a subthalamic target is reached is when the electrodes are activated and the tremor stops. Typically in a second surgical phase, the surgeon places the generator subcutaneously in the chest wall and connects it to the electrodes in the brain. An intracranial hemorrhage is reported in 3 to 4 percent of the cases with a mortality rate up to 1.5 percent. Other complications include hematoma, infection, especially around the hardware, sometimes leading to permanent neurological sequelae.

The mechanisms of action of DBS are not known (Benabid et al., 2000; Ashby et al., 2000). One prevailing hypothesis stipulates that high-frequency stimulation (> 100 Hz) avoids a depolarization blockade of excitatory neural bands. This continuous stimulation effectively mimics a lesion but is reversible, which makes this approach especially appealing since comparative studies with irreversible surgical lesions are quite favorable. Researchers have also found supportive evidence to suggest that DBS may act by reducing the activity of GABA and not block them, suggesting that the effect is mediated by stimulation of local GABAergic axon terminals. A third possibility may be reestablishing normal patterns of temporal activity and synchronization within the basal ganglia in movement disorders (Cools, 1999).

Deep brain stimulation is now routinely performed for refractory Parkinson's disease (PD), essential tremor, treatment-naïve and various chronic pain syndromes. There are three main targets used to treat PD (substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc), globus pallidus internus (GPI), and subthalamic nucleus (STN)) (Limousin et al., 1998). The FDA has more recently approved all three sites. The detailed knowledge of the motor circuitry and the pathophysiology of PD are an achievement for researchers in psychiatric disorders to emulate. Since their original description by Alexander and DeLong in the mid-1980s, the various basal ganglia-thalamo-cortical loops have offered a framework for study disorders (Alexander et al., 1986). In PD, there are two overlapping loops, the motor and the associative. The loss of dopaminergic input to the striatum due to substantia nigra degeneration results in dysregulation in basal ganglia function. The net effect is an excessive inhibitory influence of the GPI on the ventral and ventrolateral anterior thalamic

model. Stimulating the STN or GPi with DBS results in a diminution of the inhibitory influence and reduction of fluid movement.

By comparison, the functional neuroanatomic circuits of the psychiatric illnesses are not as well understood. This makes the specific targeting of DBS problematic. Hence, one of the disorders more readily evaluated for such a treatment is OCD. The neuronal architecture of the disorder is based on functional imaging studies, clinical similarities and genetic linkages between OCD and Tourette's disorders. It implies a dysregulation in the basal ganglia/thalamic/striatal circuits that modulate neuronal activity in and between the posterior portions of the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and the dorsomedial thalamic nuclei (Baxter, 1998). Obsessive-compulsive symptoms may be linked to a decreased activity in the striato-pallido-thalamic loop or an abnormally increased drive in the orbitofrontal-thalamic loop. A modulation of these loops by stimulating or inhibiting the appropriate regions could possibly restore normal behavior and alleviate the negative emotional charge associated with producing the behavior.

Given the success rate of gamma-knife lesions of the anterior limb of the internal capsule in OCD patients, Martin et al. (1999) reported a case series of four patients with long-standing and anti-resistant OCD where chronic electrical stimulation of the internal capsule was performed instead of a bilateral capsulotomy. In three of the subjects beneficial effects were observed. Ongoing open studies at Brown University and Cleveland Clinic are testing DBS of the anterior limb of the internal capsule in OCD. Subjects seem to show slow but significant improvements in obsessive-compulsive symptoms and also positive mood effects. Given the limited numbers of patients enrolled in these studies and the long-term course for expected benefits to be observed, these findings must be deemed encouraging but preliminary (Dresner, personal communication, November 2002).

Bojani et al. (1999) have published a dramatic case report of mood induction with DBS in a subject without any prior history of depression. When the electrodes, implanted slightly below the STN, were activated, the subject experienced a severe dysphoria that remitted when stimulation was interrupted. Although not therapeutic, this case illustrates a modulation of a mood-regulating network. With a better understanding of the mechanisms of action of DBS, one can imagine that the reverse effect may be obtained. Our group is currently studying the role of GPi and STN DBS in treatment of depression in Parkinson's disease subjects. This study is coupled with fMRI to further understand the local and distributed effects of such stimulation and how this may correlate with clinical symptoms. This therapy is still very experimental and probably several years away from any clinical applications in mood disorders.

PSYCHIATRIC NEURO SURGERY

Of all the somatic therapies in psychiatric practice today, psychiatric neurosurgery requires the most knowledge about functional neuroanatomy since it is the most radical and irreversible of all interventions. It was only in the last years of the 19th century that rational approaches to psychosurgery were first tried, pursued to well-publicized

clinical case like Phineas Gage whose frontal lobe lesion in a mining accident showed that frontal lesions could alter a person's personality. In 1886, a Berlin surgeon named Klüverbach performed an operation to selectively destroy the frontal lobes of several psychiatric patients in an effort to control their symptoms. Subsequently, Flourens and Julescien reported that frontal ablation lessened anxiety in chimpanzees. From these observations, Moniz (1937) argued that by severing the connections between different brain regions, one could free impulses and thoughts to "run-amok" and in effect, "wash the brain in "forgetfulness".

This preexisting conclusion about brain organization in the late 1800s launched frontal lobectomy as a treatment for psychiatric disorders. Overextended mental asylums and the use of highly morbid electroshock therapy at the time also aided the popularity of lobectomy. Moniz (1937) and Lister's lobectomy technique was to incise about in the bilateral frontal lobes of asylum patients. They reported "improvement" in 14 out of 20 subjects. They later developed the leucotomy (a tool to interrupt white matter tracts) and described a rather large surgical target in the frontal lobes. Moniz was the first psychiatrist to receive the Nobel prize in 1949 for his contributions in treating psychosis with lobectomy.

Walter Freeman and James Watts introduced the procedure to the United States. They modified it so the disconnection was carried out through bilateral burr holes placed in the inferior frontal region at the level of the zygomatic nerve. The leucotomy update was introduced blindly and swept back and forth. Freeman later devised the so-called "ice-pick" transnasal leucotomy, performed typically on patients who were psychotic from ECT. He inserted a sharp blade under the eyelid through the thin bone into the infratemporal fossa. Many of the patients were reported to be improved although a great number of them were observed to have become anarthric and to have lost their capacity to be emotional (McLaney et al., 1949). This crude intervention was anxiously promoted by Freeman himself and is likely the source of many of the controversies and stigma surrounding neurosurgery for psychiatric conditions.

Currently, the practice of psychiatric neurosurgery is much more restricted and regulated. Candidates are evaluated by multidisciplinary teams and must meet stringent criteria for severe resistance to conventional multimodal therapies. The majority has either refractory OCDs, anxiety, or mood disorders. Treatment of schizophrenia with this modality has fallen out of favor. Current surgical procedures are much more refined and specific in their targets. There are four distinct stereotactic approaches that continue to be used: cingulotomy, subcallosal tractotomy, limbic leucotomy, and anterior capsulotomy. They are primarily performed bilaterally and share similar complications and risk profiles. These include rarer symptoms such as bruxism, low-grade fever, delusions, and isolated seizures. The most serious complication (posterior reversible encephalopathy) is rare (0-4 percent in some cases). Mortality directly related to any of the procedures is very low. Lesions, personality, cognitive, and behavioral changes are more specific to each intervention.

The aim of a cingulotomy is to isolate the cingulate fasciculus with thermocoagulation approximately 2 to 2.5 cm posterior to the tip of frontal horns, 7 mm lateral to

the midline and 1 cm above the ventricular roof. It is the most reported non-surgical procedure for psychiatric disease in North America and likely the safest. Studies show a range of 50 to 60 percent of significant improvement with affective disorders demonstrating the highest rate of response and OCD the lowest (Jeppe et al., 1992).

The goal of a cingulotomy thalamotomy is to interrupt the fibers from the orbitofrontal cortex to the thalamus. This intervention was designed to minimize cognitive and personality impairments. The target is the subgenual, anterior white matter beneath the head of the caudate. The lesion is created with radiofrequency coils with a half-life of 60 hr. The target area lies at the antero-posterior level of the planum spiculatum, extending from 5 to 15 mm from the midline, being 20 mm long in an extra-posterior direction. Studies have shown significant relief in up to 45 percent of severely ill subjects. Affective disorders are more likely to respond, although OCD symptoms also improve (Halgren et al., 1992).

Limbic leucotomy is a combination of the two previous procedures. Three 8-mm lesions are placed in the posterior inferior medial quadrant of each frontal lobe, along with one lesion in each cingulated gyrus. Results in OCD have shown up to 60 percent improvement up to 10 months postoperatively with improvement in cognitive function in some patients.

Finally, the aim of anterior capsulotomy is to disconnect fronto-thalamic fibers as they pass through the anterior limb of the internal capsule, between the head of the caudate and putamen. One of the earlier indications for this procedure was schizophrenia, but this has fallen out of favor. Recent reports indicate greatest response in OCD and depression. Interestingly, a mean 10 percent weight gain is common (Jeppe et al., 1992).

Clinical improvement with all four interventions is progressive over several months. Unfortunately, given the limited use of standardized rating scales across different sites and the open nature of these reports, it is hard to compare results. A recent review (Cognetti et al., 1992) used the "much improved" clinical outcome measure and found that in OCD reoperation was 47 percent effective followed by limbic leucotomy (31 percent), cingulotomy (26 percent), and subgenual thalamotomy (20 percent). In mood disorders, limbic leucotomy was 78 percent effective; subgenual thalamotomy was 68 percent effective, cingulotomy was 63 percent effective and finally anterior capsulotomy was 23 percent effective. With the advent of deep brain stimulation, all these areas are potential candidates for neuromodulation with "reversible lesions." Theoretically, one could expect double-blind controlled studies with load-in sham arms where the implanted wires are not activated.

FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Treating neuropsychiatric conditions with cognitive neuropharmacological approaches is rooted in early 20th-century exploration of the mind as a complex interplay of neuronal networks. Recent advancements in neuroimaging, neuroimaging, and better understanding of basic functions allow for more empirically based and precisely targeted neuromodulations. The 21st century is likely to witness a refinement of the interventions

highlighted in this chapter, as well as many new therapies (Aptekar et al., 2002). The introduction of genetic information or genetically modified cells for functional augmentation, reduction or ablation is becoming feasible (Anderson, 1998; Bremner et al., 1997; Thompson et al., 1999). The discovery of CNS neurotrophic agents and the perfection of delivery systems could lead to implantable pumps and novel drug delivery devices (Kapiloff et al., 2002). New neuroprostheses are now conceivable (Cleland, 1998; Tanaka, 1994). We may gradually be entering a new land of psychiatric interventions where the mind and brain are treated as a unified but multifaceted entity.

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PSYCHOANALYSIS AND PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: ART AND SCIENCE OF COMBINING PARADIGMS

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INTRODUCTION

Sigmund Freud, the founder of psychoanalysis, anticipated current theory about brain substrates of human psychopathology. What Freud called *subconscious drives* can be described in modern terms as the basic emotional operating systems that are mediated by subcortical structures. These are modulated in turn by ego functions, which can now be defined as cortical capacities such as intelligence, reasoning, logic, organizing skills, frustration tolerance, capacity to defer gratification, and the like. The psychoanalytic method was designed to enable patients to overcome symptoms that Freud saw as stemming from unresolved intrapsychic conflicts: "Where id was, there ego shall be." (Freud, 1913, p. 60). The more developed our cortical capacities to modulate subcortical processes, the more control we have over our feelings, behavior, relationships, and productivity. Though never truly fully defined this way, psychopharmacology has always had as its

and the sculpting of subcortico-cortical functions via the relationship between analyst and patient.

In his earliest efforts to formulate a psychopathology, Freud postulated a quantitative factor, which, in *Project for a Scientific Psychology* (Freud, 1895) he designated Q. This quantitative factor may be roughly translated as a physical energy factor. It has been compared to the SIEBELINI system developed by Panksepp (Panksepp, 1998; Silverin, 2004). Freud persisted to the very end with the notion of a quantitative factor in his subsequently elaborated metapsychology. In the *New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis*, Freud referred to the unquantifiable factor that in 1895 could not be approached directly:

Our analytic experience that [various phenomena] can be causatively influenced, if the theoretical precipitating cause and incidental auxiliary factors of the illness can be dealt with, has led us to regard the predominant factor in our therapeutic practice, and in my case we can do nothing about it, but in theory we might always bear it in mind. (Freud, 1956, pp. 151–152)

Later, in his posthumously published *Outline of Psychoanalysis*, Freud speaks of the probability that definitive cures of mental illness would be achieved by medication — not along with psychoanalysis but presumably instead of it:

But there are cases associated with therapy only in so far as it works by physiological means, and for the time being we have no other. The future may teach us to achieve a direct influence, by means of particular chemical substances, on the amounts of energy and their distribution in the mental apparatus. (Freud, 1968, p. 152)

Freud treated patients with a wide range of pathology, some with severe mental illnesses. Since no effective somatic or pharmacological treatments were available to him (beyond an early brief inflation and dislocation and will consider), it is not surprising that Freud questioned the effectiveness of the psychoanalytic method in these cases and looked to future advances in psychobiology to address their needs. He did not anticipate that psychoanalysis and its derivatives might someday be used together with medication treatments, but one suspects that he would have championed this combined approach.

DEFINITION OF PSYCHOANALYTIC CONCEPTS

Psychoanalysis is a theory of human psychology and a treatment method based on several basic principles, including: The dynamic unconscious, that is, the existence of mental contents that we are not aware of due to the process of repression, or the keeping of certain mental contents out of awareness. Freud emphasized the conflict between id (primal instinctual wishes pressing for gratification) and superego (the result of the multiple conflicts in which the young child accepts the superior strength and power of the normative parent and begins to identify with parental prohibitions) as the pathway

to development of ego, the reasonable, adaptable, reality-oriented part of the self. Late theorists (Hofstader, Anna Freud, and others) feel that humans are endowed with ego functions from birth and that some of these functions are primary and unconscious (cognition, ability to manipulate tools, capacity for language, capacity for relationships to other humans, appreciation of humor, curiosity, reflectiveness, and others) rather than developed out of the id-ego-ego struggle.

The process of separation of primitive mental material is accompanied by the development of the ego mechanisms of defense (Freud, 1946), various observable behaviors that serve to keep problematic issues out of awareness. The defense mechanisms are listed in developmental levels from immature to mature, and range in their demand for distorting versus acknowledging reality from psychotic to healthy. The analytic process is based on the concept of transference, or the development of intense feelings appropriate to important people from the individual's past that are experienced toward people in the present, in this case, the analyst. Transference feelings develop in all human interactions; for example, feelings about one's supervisor may have more to do with how one experienced one's father than the specific characteristics of the supervisor. These feelings become observable in the analytic situation in which patient and analyst meet several times per week, and through the use of free association, the requirement that the patient say whatever comes to mind during the session, also known as the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis. By analyzing transference feelings, unconscious mental contents become recognizable and the patient gains conviction about their existence.

Resistance (resistance) refers to the predictability with which humans repeat certain patterns of behavior without recognizing their part in bringing these situations about. For example, a woman with an alcoholic father marries a man who is an alcoholic. The phenomenon of repetition compulsion reflects the impact of the past on current behavior through the unconscious. If unconscious wholeness becomes conscious through the analytic process, individuals may be able to make healthier choices in life.

Resistance is another important concept. Invariably, despite the best intentions of the individual to cooperate with the analyst by saying whatever comes to mind, behavior comes to hinder the process. This represents the individual's defensive efforts to avoid painful awareness of unacceptable wishes and fantasies. Analysis of resistance is a key part of analytic technique; the therapeutic alliance between analyst and patient enables the analyst to help the patient see how "perfectly reasonable" behavior may serve resistance. As an example, a woman in her third year of analysis, coming into greater awareness of the full impact of her competitive and hateful feelings toward the analyst, reflecting similar feelings toward her mother, interviews for a job in another city since she uses a number of reasons why her present job may become untenable. She was unaware of the implicit meaning, specifically, that she is planning to undermine and leave the analyst, until the analyst brings it to her attention for further investigation.

Determining which psychotherapeutic technique will benefit which patient is unfortunately neither an art nor a science; the decision is most often based on the therapist's theoretical persuasion and preference for a particular form of treatment. Analytic

(see below) patients are also suitable for psychoanalytic psychotherapy, which is typically conducted up to three times weekly with the patient sitting up and face-to-face with the therapist. Psychoanalytic psychotherapy may utilize similar techniques such as analysis of transference and resistance, but may also focus more on current life events and utilize greater amounts of support and advice. In modern practice, many patients seen in psychotherapy are treated with medications for anxiety and depression, and when medication is effective, many benefit from less intensive treatment processes. Since psychoanalysis is typically conducted four or five times per week, money and time factor into the decisions about the intensity of treatment.

Analyzability, though difficult to define objectively, refers to the set of characteristics of individuals thought likely to benefit from psychoanalysis. It is important to note that analyzability is impossible to predict, and that outcome studies over the past 30 years have shown that benefit from analytic treatment is always greater than in nonanalytic, i.e., even "unanalyzable" patients make considerable gains with analytic and psychoanalytic psychotherapy. These gains are largely achieved through the more supportive aspects of treatment (Pflessner, 1990). This list typically includes average or high intelligence, capacity for self-observation, ability to verbalize one's feelings and thoughts, capacity for coping human relationships, motivation to engage in a lengthy therapeutic process, a sense of hopefulness about the future, capacity to defer gratification, adequate employment or adequate means to pay for treatment (no money and payment have many important meanings), and the lack of any serious psychiatric illness. This last is an obvious source of controversy since there is complete overlap between the symptoms of depression in patients with psychological conflicts that are amenable to analysis and in patients with depression who are not analyzable: "in patients who are analyzable, such things as sleep disturbances, loss of appetite, despondency, and so on, come and go and are part and parcel of what I am analyzing rather than being a function of physiological imbalances that I have to attend to with different means" (Freudian, 1992). While depressed patients who are either not analyzable or not in analytic treatment are typically treated with antidepressants, patients in analytic treatment with symptoms of depression that do not respond to analytic investigation may also require medication.

CHALLENGE OF COMBINING PARADIGMS

Contemporary psychoanalysis and biological psychiatry have traditionally had different goals. Biological psychiatry has focused on developing accurate nosology and effective medication treatments for relief of the symptoms of mental disorders; functional improvement is the goal and persistent psychic change is not expected. The goal of psychoanalysis is not mood and behavior change, but rather the uncovering of unconscious mental contents, leading to new self-understanding, psychological autonomy and mental freedom. Change in mood and behavior may result from these new capacities but is not the goal of the analyst.

Thus the polarization of biological psychiatry and psychoanalysis is understandable, but it has (1) served both patients and trainees in various mental health fields

Biological psychiatry, abetted by the managed-care industry, has made possible "relationship psychiatry" (Gardner, 2001) in which patients are "managed" by non-psychiatrist (nurses and) therapists and given prescriptions by psychiatrists who, at times, barely know them. Proponents of traditional psychoanalysis have maintained that mental states have a psychological background that, if analyzed, can lead to symptom reduction but have largely failed to enhance the use of standard nosologic diagnosis, or to openly question the use of medication in alleviating symptoms. The combining of medication and psychotherapy by practitioners who understand both depth psychology and psychopharmacology represents a significant advance in the evolution of psychiatric practice. If one this approach falls between two very different paradigms, it calls for the willingness to adapt our psychoanalytic traditions and biological knowledge to the real needs of our patients.

Given the lack of controlled studies of psychoanalytic psychotherapies, (Hubble et al., 2002), this practice must proceed on the basis of well-informed clinical judgment rather than results of definitive multicenter trials. Therapeutic thinking that bridges traditional paradigms will be illustrated in this chapter with descriptions of psychoanalytic cases.

Psychoanalysis, Medication, or Both?

Psychoanalysis is indicated for patients with adequate ego-strength who experience recurrent problems in relationships and work that are related to neurotic conflict rather than to significant psychiatric illness. The analyst strives to avoid the typical "medical" role of authoritative healer in an effort to optimally maintain the patient's ego autonomy over the course of a long and intensive relationship. In traditional psychoanalytic practice, the use of medication (or any other form of symptom relief such as education, advice, or support) has been considered a parameter, or a deviation, from standard analytic process necessary to maintain the therapeutic environment, and to be dispensed with as soon as it is possible to return to the analysis of transference (Finsler, 1993). This stance derives from experience with unambiguously analyzable patients who present with symptoms of depression or anxiety. In such cases, symptoms may arise in the context of deep conflict stirred by the transference. Further psychoanalytic work, in theory, should lead to resolution of the conflict and the elimination of these symptoms without use of medication.

On the other hand, despite heroic efforts made in the mid-20th-century to apply psychoanalysis to severe disorders such as pedophilia, alcoholism, and psychosis (Stern, 1991), mainstream analysts have come to terms with the limitations of the analytic method for these disorders, and analyzability guidelines typically recommend excluding patients with severe psychiatric illnesses (Winnick, 1990). Nonetheless, patients with severe mental illnesses treated with intensive psychoanalytic psychotherapy did derive significant improvement (Wolkenstein, 1990) even if they did not meet the usual analyzability criteria or achieve the usual goals of psychoanalysis. For example, some of these patients would today meet criteria for substance-abuse disorder, a mixture of mood and psychotic symptoms, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and major depression, all diagnoses now treated primarily with medications.

The enormous range of pathology among patients seeking psychiatric treatment demands a flexible approach and willingness to use a multitude of techniques to enable patients to achieve optimal improvement. In fact, psychoanalysis now routinely treat psychiatrically ill patients (Fogel et al., 1994) and are prescribing medications for them (Dworkin and Rieca, 1993). The availability of effective and tolerable psychotropic medication has made the situation even more complicated: How do we tell what symptoms are neurotic in origin and treatable with psychotherapy and which demand pharmacological intervention?

Even without definitive proof that psychotherapy is effective for the treatment of specific mental disorders (Kazdin and Fonteyn, 1995), there is widespread use of various forms of psychotherapy for typical problems presenting to mental health professionals, whether or not medication is prescribed. Based on expert consensus, the American Psychiatric Association has recommended a combination of psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy for the treatment of major depression, eating disorders, bipolar affective disorder, and borderline personality disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002). A recent randomized, controlled trial demonstrated that the combination of pharmacotherapy and a form of cognitive behavioral therapy was significantly more efficacious for chronic depression than either treatment alone (Keller et al., 2002). While supportive therapies combined with medication may be adequate for many patients, some individuals require psychoanalytic psychotherapy or analysis for definitive treatment of their problems.

Case Example: Medication and Psychoanalysis Can Work Synergistically
Dr. A, a 29-year-old male medical student, entered psychoanalysis for long-standing difficulty maintaining intimate relationships with women and ambivalence about his future career choices. He was the older of two sons. His father was a successful attorney who had divorced his mother when he was a teenager. His chronically depressed mother had often seen benefit from a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressant. Dr. A responded and was given an SSRI antidepressant, which improved his mood somewhat. Despite the antidepressant and analytic sessions, he gradually worsened. He became unable to concentrate or sleep, nubilated constantly about being worthless, and had trouble leaving his apartment; he began missing work, and contemplated dropping out of his training program. At that point, Dr. A was referred to a psychopharmacologist for evaluation, who suggested to increase the dose of SSRI, add a second antidepressant, trazodone, and eventually, an atypical antipsychotic, quetiapine.

With this medication regimen, Dr. A was able to sleep, could concentrate better, and was able to get back to work. He stopped the quetiapine and SSRI within 6 months, but remained on trazodone for the subsequent 1½ years, and made significant progress in analysis toward understanding the severe depression he had experienced. In past, depression was his biological inheritance as grandfather and mother both had severe bouts of depression. In addition, he had long struggled with enormous anger and resentment toward his father for leaving his mother, and guilt about leaving his mother behind himself, as he had been her constant both before and after his father's departure. He paid for the satisfaction he derived from his promising career with depression that

kept him psychologically close to his mother. Even getting treatment made him feel that he was a defective like his father, and cause him to be undervalued as a reason for his initial negative response to analysis.

Dr. A came to better terms with his fantasies regarding his role in his parents' lives and dealt with his fear that leaving the female analyst would be experienced by her, as by his mother, as a defection, resulting in her emotional withdrawal from him in retaliation. He developed a mutually satisfying relationship with a woman physician in another training program at the hospital and got married prior to ending his analysis. He accepted a postgraduate fellowship in another city. He and the analyst agreed he should continue hisopin, and Dr. A planned to consult a psychiatrist once he arrived regarding the question of ongoing need for medication.

Dr. A derived dramatic benefit from medication, which in turn made it possible for him to use analytic treatment more fully. He had a family history of depression in several maternal relatives, as in common in patients presenting with symptoms of major depressions. While it is now universally agreed that schizophrenia is a heritable brain disorder rather than the result of faulty parenting, there are many diagnostic categories, like the depressions (Dr. A, suffered), that remain to be so clearly defined. Wilcox (2002) has addressed the contrasted psychoanalytic explanation for schizophrenia as a confirmatory role, what we feel sure of can reinforce confirmation: "thus" then the consulting room that provides the "proof" for someone theory and practice. The assumption that Dr. A's neurotic conflicts were the sole origin of the symptoms of depression and thus would respond to psychoanalytic treatment alone, might have exposed him to unnecessary morbidity, and even mortality.

Essentially, there is a two-part process for the analytic practitioner: a diagnostic evaluation that determines the absence or presence of significant psychiatric illness and a treatment plan that may include medication for that illness, and concurrently, an assessment of analyzability. A patient presenting with a severe depression may be analyzable once treated effectively with medication. While some patients presenting with severe depression are analyzable and might have resolution of their symptoms with analysis alone, the standard of care in psychiatry would hold that psychoanalysis is not a treatment for major depression, bipolar affective disorder, schizophrenia, and other Axis I disorders. The analyst would be well advised to inform the patient about all available treatments for the diagnosed disorder, and to obtain informed consent to use analysis without medication, if medication treatment is the standard of care for that disorder.

Does Medication Interfere with Motivation for Psychodynamic Treatment?

Some analysts express concern that medication treatment will eliminate the symptoms that motivate patients to enter and continue psychotherapy. There is no question that provide pain motivates patients to seek treatment, and relief of that pain will eliminate the motivation to attend psychotherapy sessions for some patients. Fifty years

ago, in the heyday of psychoanalysis, and in the absence of effective alternatives, many patients passed psychoanalytic treatment for anxiety and depressive disorders. It is not clear how often analysis was the indicated, or ideal, treatment, or how often it was effective for these symptoms. For many patients, combined medication and supportive therapy is quite effective, and sometimes a preferable alternative to depth psychotherapy. Sometimes very concrete instructions show a new capacity for insight once symptoms are effectively treated but may never need extensive psychotherapeutic investigation to maintain optimal functioning.

While interpretation and self-understanding have unquestionably been deemphasized and devalued in modern culture, in the author's experience, patients who are so inclined do not lose interest in pursuing psychological understanding when they are successfully treated with medication. Patients who are interested in self-exploration engage in psychotherapy whether they are given medication or not. Many patients taking medication express the wish to learn about and master the conflicts that caused symptoms in hopes of making medication unnecessary in the future. Patients attempting to minimize awareness of dependency much are able to keep those needs out of awareness when they are given medication that relieves symptoms. Not every patient has the capacity for or interest in achieving self-understanding, and medication makes it possible for many to function at their highest level. It is the responsibility of the analyst prescribing medication to maintain a reflective, analytic stance, and to make clear the benefits of psychoanalysis beyond the gains from medication; analyzable patients who feel well with medication and no longer want psychotherapy will be more likely to return for further work if they feel the analyst does not need them to stay and does not disapprove of their decision.

Must Medication Be Discontinued for Psychoanalysis to Be Successful?

If medication is to be used with patients in analysis, must medication be stopped in order to demonstrate analytic success? While effective analysis leads to greater capacity for self-understanding and emotional regulation (see below), it remains unclear whether this prevents from the recurrence of Axis I disorders. Patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder gain relief of symptoms with medication but typically tolerate some medication. Most evidence suggests that psychoanalytic therapies are not helpful for obsessive-compulsive disorder, although there is evidence for benefit from cognitive-behavioral strategies (Fox and Franklin, 2000). Patients who have had more than one episode of major depression have a risk of recurrence in excess of 50 percent, and medication treatment generally prevents recurrences. The benefits of psychoanalysis or analytic psychotherapy might offer protection against such recurrences, but there is no data as yet to support this theory. No studies have been carried out using long-term depth psychotherapy or psychoanalysis in patients with depression or other non-epileptic disorders. A definitive answer to the question could come from use of structured diagnosis, and prospectively collected long-term outcome data regarding whether successfully analyzed patients with a history of major depression or obsessive-compulsive disorder have a lower risk for recurrence compared with a control group of unanalyzed patients with the same diagnosis.

Benefits of Psychoanalysis Compared with Benefits of Medication

Medication and psychoanalysis are indicated for different aspects of mental disorders. Psychoanalysis and psychoanalytically oriented psychotherapy help individuals identify "the nature of psychic pain," become "familiar" with their own life histories, and gather the loss of previously missing knowledge that also predisposes them to repetitive failures in relationships and productivity. In psychoanalysis this is accomplished largely through the development and analysis of the transference relationship, while in psychoanalytic psychotherapy, there is less emphasis on the transference and more use of defense-building strategies, education, and support.

Medication relieves basic functions such as sleep, appetite, concentration, and energy, stabilizes mood, and relieves anxiety or psychosis. Thus, benefits of medication are quite different in nature from the benefits of analytic treatment. Medications reduce current turmoil but do not address the underlying etiology of that turmoil, or the maladaptive defenses that predispose to symptoms. Psychoanalysis leads to greater awareness and tolerance of ideas and affects, and analysts gain better emotional and behavioral adaptability. Early on in treatment, however, analysts may become more symptomatic as they become aware of material that had been avoided or repressed.

Emotional modulation is an important benefit of psychoanalytic therapy. Emotional modulation may be defined as the capacity to identify one's preconscious emotional reactions and make appropriate adjustments to maintain mood, energy, and motivation. Psychologically healthy (or successfully analyzed) individuals are able to tolerate inevitable adverse life events by using reflection, self-analysis, sublimation, and other mature coping skills. Some of this capacity is learned through contact with the analyst, who models a calm reflective state, and while it is not acquired through use of medication, can probably be enhanced by antidepressants, anxiolytics, and mood-stabilizing medications.

Example. Ms. A learns that she has not been invited to a party given by a friend and feels a change from a light-hearted mood to a somber one, followed by reflection about the last several interactions with the friend, and how to cope with having been excluded. She thinks over whether to talk to her friend about it, ignore it, or exclude the friend from her own future guest lists, and she eventually requires a neutral mood. Ms. B, an individual with significant narcissistic vulnerability, experiences the same news by becoming overtly depressed and irritable after realizing for some time about being unlovable and worthless and engaging in fantasies of revenge. She did not make a connection between the depressive reaction and the experience of rejection. At her next session, Ms. B reports to her psychiatrist feeling more depressed without identifying any precipitant for the worsening; the psychiatrist might then assume that the medication is not working, and prescribe another medication to better suppress the negative effects, rather than talk with Ms. B about strategies for coping with rejection.

Medications work through a variety of mechanisms affecting mood, anxiety, and vegetative functions such as sleep, energy, and appetite for food and sex. Serotonergic facilitation, via SSRIs such as fluoxetine, sertraline, paroxetine, and others promote

relaxation and sleepiness, while suppressing all the basic emotional systems and motivation, general improvement in mood and decrease in anxiety may promote pleasurable relating to others, though sexual functioning is often diminished. (They is described in animals (Panksepp, 1998) and it is not unusual for patients taking SSRI medications to report that they feel emotionally blunted, unable to either laugh or cry (Inothachari et al., 1991; Garland and Berg, 2001). Selective serotonin-reuptake-inhibitors (SSRIs) such as reboxetine, nefazodone, and trazodone are designed to overcome this blunting effect by increasing a reliable activation in midbrain serotonins.

The anticipation of rewards as well as the experience of some forms of pleasure in humans and other mammals is mediated in part by dopamine neurons in the ventral striatum (including the nucleus accumbens), which can be stimulated physiologically by eating, sex, or exercise and by substances such as cocaine, alcohol, or cocaine. (Koob and Panksepp, 1998) (Serotonin is involved in the pleasurable effects of methylphenidate/ethylbenzethonium, also known as Ecstasy or MDMA, a popular drug of abuse among young adults at raves or marathon dance parties. MDMA causes release of serotonin and dopamine stores and blocks serotonin reuptake, all of which contribute to the rewarding effects of this drug. Users report an ecstatic feeling of aliveness in others and increased interest in being with the social group but diminished sexual interest or responsiveness. There is evidence for long-term neurotoxic effects of MDMA in humans.) Serotonergic facilitators used in psychiatric practice do not tend to stimulate all these reward- and pleasure-related brain areas and may in fact reduce the desire for various rewards. Thus many patients treated with SSRIs antidepressants report lack of energy, enthusiasm, and motivation. The antidepressants venlafaxine (Effexor), nefazodone (Serzone), and trazodone (Desyrel) are all referred to as selective non-phosphodiesterase inhibitors, or SNRIs, and are designed to increase brain norepinephrine as well as serotonin transmission, with the objective of overcoming this blunting effect of the SSRIs. The only currently marketed antidepressant thought to increase dopamine levels is imipramine (Tofranil); due to its lack of serotonergic effect, imipramine does not quiet anxiety to the same extent as the SSRIs or SNRIs, so must be used in patients without severe anxiety, or adjunctively with other serotoninergic medications.

Also note that through antagonism of one of the serotonin receptors ($5-HT_{2A}$), the typical antipsychotics and some of the antidepressants (such as nefazodone and mirtazapine) may also increase dopamine transmission, contributing to their positive effects on mood.

Who Prescribes, Analyst or Psychopharmacologist?

The psychotropic armamentarium has been greatly expanded in the past few decades and will expand further with the addition of medicines targeting the hippocampus-pituitary-adrenal axis, glutamate receptors, neuropeptides such as substance P and enkephalins, cytokines, and other approaches that move beyond the traditional monoamine hypothesis of depression. The serotonin antidepressants, mixed stabilizing antidepressants, typical antipsychotics, dopamine agonists, stimulants, and opiates

are now more commonly used than the still-effective tricyclics, serotonin selective reuptake inhibitors, and conventional neuroleptics due to their superior safety and side effect profiles.

The analyst should be familiar with these medications and the conditions they are used to treat, or investigate the indications for referral to a psychopharmacologist. This decision is straightforward for conventional analysts who feel their patients require medication but remain controversial among medical analysts. Since psychopharmacologists use many of these medications "off-label," that is, for indications other than the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)-approved ones, lack of extensive personal experience with psychiatric medications can lead to inadequate psychopharmacological strategies and deprive analysts of the conviction that patients can really benefit from medications. This may perpetuate the conviction that medications are unnecessary or not helpful. Some (Wylie and Wylie, 1999) argue for sending the patient in analysis for consultation with a psychopharmacologist in order to preserve an analytic stance and avoid contamination of the therapist. Some (Barn and Russo, 1994) argue for sending the patient to a psychopharmacologist to avoid inadequate medication decisions since inquiring directly about the effects of medication and side effects, and answering patient questions about medications leads to a disruption of the analytic process and an abandonment of technical neutrality. Still others prefer to prescribe and have found that the discussion about medications and the symptomatic changes can become a positive part of the complex fabric of the analytic relationship (Dobrov, 1996). The decision is less controversial in the case of psychodynamic psychotherapy, though some continue to assert that medication always corrupts the process of psychotherapy (Bengtig, 1997). When the analyst does prescribe the medication, the termination process must include discussion of how medication prescribing will be handled after termination.

Medication as Part of a Treatment Relationship. Patients given medication in the absence of a supportive therapeutic relationship with the prescribing clinician may get less benefit from it than expected. The same medication that fails when given without a stable treatment alliance may work well in the context of a trusting relationship. And conversely, medication that has maintained symptom relief may fail when the relationship with the prescribing psychiatrist is disrupted.

Example: Reaction to Separation from the Therapist. Dr. B, a single college professor, was treated with lithium for a childhood onset bipolar illness. Repeated attempts to stop the lithium led to episodes of hypomania and depression; so Dr. B and his psychiatrist agreed to continue it indefinitely. This was lived by a sensitive, exploratively angry father and furious with the loving but ineffective mother who could not defend him against his father's rage. Dr. B could not tolerate exploration into feelings about his past and demanded that the psychiatrist allow him to control the topics addressed in sessions. Though quite impaired in interpersonal relationships, Dr. B managed fairly well professionally as long as he had a session with his psychiatrist every month, where he discussed current issues concerning his sexual performance with women and anger with his department chair. When the psychiatrist left for a 3-month maternity leave,

Mr. B developed severe depression and a blood sugar of over 850 mg/dL that required intensive insulin treatment and psychiatric hospitalization. Once his psychiatrist was back in her office and available to see him regularly, his blood sugar returned to normal, where it remained for the next 8 years without need for oral hypoglycemics or insulin, and the lithium again worked to control his mood cycling.

Dreams and Medication

Dreams occupy a privileged position among the various types of mental contents reported by patients in analysis, as they frequently illustrate ideas that are not fully defended against in waking life. Traumatized patients often present with recurrent nightmares about the traumatic situation, and depressed patients often report troubling dreams. In some patients with chronic anxiety and depression, the presence or absence of nightmares parallel their state of distress. Orlow (2002) suggests using dreams to help identify subtle changes in mood that may not be reported, as a guide to benefits of medication or need for additional intervention. A patient who is unaware of distinct mood improvement with medication may report dreams that reflect a lowered level of anxiety and distress; alternatively, the recurrence of nightmares may herald a relapse of depression or anxiety requiring attention. It is important to note that several of the SSRI and SNRI antidepressants (primarily fluoxetine, sertraline, and venlafaxine) reduce sleep onset latency and may have other effects on the dream-generating mechanisms. Patients on these medications frequently report that their dreams are much more bizarre, vivid, and "real" than before.

One must be aware of the meaning of the symptoms (as with Dr. A) that can interfere with response to medication. There are many determinants of the failure to respond to medication, including noncompliance due to the fear of medication causing loss of control or intolerable side effects, covert use of alcohol or other drugs, and ongoing use of problematic defense mechanisms that lead to ongoing dysfunction and depression. Some patients may cling to their symptoms as a means of thwarting the doctor's efforts to treat symptoms, as a resistance, or as a manifestation of an important relationship from the patient's past. All such possible reasons for poor medication response are essential to explore with analytic patients and can lead to important new understanding, just as would discussion of any other interactions between analyst and analysand (e.g., reactions to fee increases or vacation schedules).

Clinical Presentations

Some patients want only symptom relief and have no intrinsic interest in self-understanding. They are best treated with a straightforward psychopharmacologic approach that includes education to improve adherence. Others, aware that painful affects have important psychic determinants, can be engaged in psychotherapy but develop resistance to deepening the process, especially once symptoms are under control. Some enter psychotherapy or analysis already on medication for severe symptoms, and others develop problematic symptoms in the course of psychotherapy or analysis that require treatment. The following cases will illustrate some issues involved in each situation.

Case Example: Combined Psychotherapy and Medication Treatment as a Prelude to Psychoanalysis. Dr. R., a 55-year-old mathematician newly appointed to a university faculty, was referred to a medical analyst by a social worker he had consulted for treatment of a lifelong depression. He had been treated with a number of antidepressant medication regimens prescribed by internists and general psychiatrists over the previous 15 years, with widely varying success. He felt subject to unpredictable changes in his mood that sometimes left him literally unable to function. Medications that seemed to work for a few months could suddenly have no effect, and he descended into a deep depression from which it took months to emerge. His superior intelligence and capacity for hours of sustained effort had made it possible for him to finish his doctorate, and he had been married to a devoted and loving wife for 8 years. They were reluctant to have children because of his precarious emotional state. He had never engaged in intensive psychotherapy but had seen a number of social workers for brief supportive therapy.

Dr. R. was the youngest of five children born to parents who accumulated considerable wealth through the father's ruthless business acumen. As a child Dr. R. had been the object of much sadistic emotional and physical abuse not only at his father's hands, but also by his older brothers, who were unsupervised by their alcoholic mother. He does not remember sexual inappropriate, but is troubled by a recurrent dream of being penetrated from behind by an older man who seems to trick him and ridicule him. Among his siblings only Dr. R. was able to leave the family emotionally in a substantiated way. He had essentially ended contact with his father and had only brief, painful contacts with mother who was usually inhibited and always highly self-absorbed. Family visits left him in a depressed, overwhelmed state.

Over the course of several years of weekly and twice-weekly sessions, Dr. R. developed a strong alliance with his analyst who helped him begin tolerating more awareness of the impact of his childhood and the relevance of childhood patterns to current relationships. At one point the analyst raised discussion of converting the treatment to analysis, but Dr. R. declined. The analyst felt Dr. R. might be unsuccessfully protecting himself from the awareness of negative transference, which he couldn't afford. He needed to maintain a positive transference to the good maternal figure he had found in the analyst but also began bringing in dreams and attempting to make connections between childhood events and reactions in his current life.

After several more mixed cycles that seemed unresponsive to the effects of psychotropic medications, Dr. R. and the analyst came to understand his bursts of high energy as the episode of a manic phase of manic-depressive illness, a condition likely affecting other family members. With the addition of valproate and clonazepam to an SSRI and a stimulant, Dr. R. had a brief period of stability that was interrupted by the development of an inability to finish a paper that threatened his chance for promotion. This inattention was clearly related to earlier conflicts about success and competition. At this point Dr. R. understood fully the limits of medication treatment and the risk of losing his job due to unresolved psychological conflicts; he asked about entering psychoanalysis. It was agreed that the long history of supportive treatment with the prescribing analyst would make it difficult to switch to an analytic format. He

was given a referral to another analyst for analytic treatment so that the prescribing analyst could maintain the medication treatment.

This case illustrates the common presentation of depression complicating underlying neurotic conflict and the impact of childhood trauma. Dr. R was quite fragile and initially resistant to pursuing psychotherapy. He had hoped to gain control of his symptoms with medication. He had no history of euphoria or overtly manic behavior, but as a result of regular contact with his analyst, it became apparent that he cycled between depression, mild hypomania, and instances of the two that may have been masked more by antidepressants and stimulant treatments. (A common but frequently unrecognized point is that one or both of Dr. R's parents may also have bipolar mood instability, with environmental triggers influencing on their capacity to parent. These both nature and nurture factors play a role.) With time, he came to feel safe enough with the analyst to touch on painful memories he had long avoided and became convinced of the power of these memories as his dreams kept pace in illustrating the issues discussed in sessions.

In the analyst's opinion, Dr. R was not initially prepared to deal with the full force of these forces given the nature of his childhood experiences and the bipolar mood disorder that was difficult to control. The combination of medication and psychoanalytic psychotherapy gave him both the necessary mood stability and the conviction that it would be safe for him to investigate his mental life more fully in analysis.

The effectiveness of medication is always a function of the context of the patient's emotional life. The same medications that maintain euthymia under ordinary life circumstances may no longer work when the patient is under extreme stress. There is also the issue of setting realistic goals for medication: maintaining adequate sleep, energy, concentration, and appetite are reasonable expectations, but medication does not teach individuals how to recognize what they are feeling or how to modulate their emotional responses to the world. In the case of Dr. R, he had looked to medication to keep his mood stable and his energy level high while avoiding awareness of the impact of childhood trauma (and ongoing derivations in adult transference relationships) that permeated his life. His resistance to hospitalization from a senior family member attempting to block his processes made clear the entrenched roots of his "swapping into depression" as a response to his father's vicious emotional abuse and his mother's absolute incapacity to protect him. Previous psychiatrists had overdiagnosed the impact of childhood history and its effects on his adult functioning. Closer contact with the analyst raised the possibility of bipolar mood fluctuation and led to improvement in the pharmacologic treatment approach, while also creating the opportunity for Dr. R to investigate the past that haunted him.

Case Example: Requiring Medication after Starting Psychoanalysis
Ms. M, a middle-aged married woman with two teenagers, sought treatment for lifelong depression that interfered with her capacity for pleasure and intimacy. She was evaluated by a biologic psychiatrist who found that she did not meet criteria for any Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) disorders and referred her to an analyst for psychotherapy. The analyst found that Ms. M had serious impairment in relations with

her husband and children and that her narcissistic vulnerability had tragically limited her capacity to realize her considerable potential. She has suffered from gastrointestinal distress and felt vulnerable much of the time but claimed problems with sleep, appetite, or energy level.

Mrs. M entered analysis with only vague awareness of the impact of her considerable history of neglect and abuse in childhood. The opening phase was marked by a struggle to free associate (say whatever was on her mind) and the bringing in of photographs and scrapbooks as a means of telling the analyst the story of her painful history. As memories of sexual abuse by her grandfather came into focus, she developed severe abdominal pain, suicidal preoccupation, and hypochondriasis that all served to strange her. Just as she had felt toward the mother who neglected her, Mrs. M felt the analyst was judgmentally subjecting her to these humiliating feelings that interfered with her ability to maintain the little bit of equilibrium she had gained in life. Efforts by the analyst to work interpretively with the intense negative transference did not quiet the symptoms that threatened to end the therapy, and antidepressant treatment was offered. This led to enough good stability that Mrs. M could continue the analysis, which was eventually quite helpful to her.

Like Dr. R., significant childhood trauma leading to symptoms of depression and complex posttraumatic stress disorder, contributed to Mrs. M's presentation, and led her to consultation with a biologic psychiatrist in an effort to attain awareness of the full scope of childhood history. Although Mrs. M would be considered analyzable by most standards, the effects of childhood trauma limited her capacity to use traditional analytic treatment. Traumatized patients have difficulty maintaining the "as-if" quality of the treatment relationship and may need pharmacologic help in managing the negative aspects of the transference. This is essentially a *paracure*, used to help the patient regain effective ego strength. Dulcan (1996) has noted the "surprising rigidity" shown by patients who require medication, but feels that nonetheless, the procedure often has benefits.

Many clinicians have concluded that even if a patient is judged analyzable, the outcome is unpredictable (Wolpestein, 1996). Some "good neurotics" like Mrs. M cannot tolerate the rigors of traditional analytic treatment, while many severely ill patients fare benefit greatly from psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Considerable differences exist in analysts' beliefs regarding which symptoms can be addressed with psychotherapeutic means and which require medication. Medication treatment does not confer the capacity for emotional modulation, though by alleviating overwhelming depression and anxiety it might make it possible for an individual to enjoy the therapy that would lead to the development of this capacity.

Case Example: Starting Psychoanalysis with a Patient Already on Medication. Mr. A, a 50-year-old married computer scientist, came for treatment of depression and insomnia that developed after the death of his mother. Despite lifelong alcohol dependence, he had had a successful career, but his marriage and other relationships were impaired by narcissistic impulses that he made little attempt to disguise. He was now

in a major depressive episode, with suicidal thoughts, sadness, poor concentration, loss of appetite, and intense dysphoria exacerbated by the drinking that once soothed him. Treatment with mianserin, a sedating antidepressant, helped a little, and he was able to abstain from alcohol, but eventually venlafaxine, a more stimulating antidepressant, was added, leading to distinct improvement and cessation of the suicidal preoccupation. Mr. J entered analysis after 12 monthly sessions spent adjusting medication and investigating his history and current problems.

Mr. J worked well with dreams, which evolved over the course of the analysis from essentially neutral landscapes devoid of people to interpretations involving people. For the first time in his life he could begin to identify feeling states in others. The analysis enabled him to successfully deal with hostilities in his work environment and enabled him to accept the limitations of his marriage and his part in creating them. He was able to deal straightforwardly with his father's death some years later. He has remained on antidepressant medication, prescribed now by his internist.

Specific Psychopharmacologic Considerations

The art of matching medications to individual patients requires experience with the agents themselves, ideally gained through prescribing them for nonanalytic patients, along with careful attention to the sources of the patient's symptoms compared to side effects. In starting psychotropic medications, there is a high likelihood of unwanted side effects, and these may permanently affect the patient's willingness to use medication in the future. Therefore, the basic rule is to use the smallest available initial dose, very slow titration, and to encourage the patient to raise any questions or concerns rather than discontinue the medication.

Many of the antidepressants will have side effects that become troublesome at some specific dose for each patient. Early in the course of treatment, sleep disturbances and nausea are common, and later emotional blunting, loss of libido, and various gastrointestinal effects may emerge. For this reason, combining two medications at small to moderate doses may be more tolerable and effective than using a single medication at high dose. SSRI s may be combined with SNRIs, tricyclic antidepressants (TCAs), bupropion, mood stabilizers, antipsychotics, and benzodiazepines. The decision to add a second drug is usually made when there is not full remission and limiting side effects are incompatible with the first drug.

Antidepressants that affect noradrenergic and/or dopaminergic transmission (such as bupropion, reboxetine (at doses above 15 mg), nefazodone, mianserin, tricyclics, and monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs)) may exacerbate the sedation and blunting caused by SSRI medications. Many patients feel more energy and motivation when three medications are used alone or in combination with the SSRIs. In some cases, the stimulant medications such as methylphenidate (Ritalin, Concerta, Focalin, Metadate), and others, and amphetamine (Adderall, Dexedrine, Desoxyn), and others are necessary to overcome the lack of motivation, apathy, and fatigue caused by either the underlying depression or the anxiolytic medications used to treat it. Direct dopamine agonists such as pramipexole (Mirapex) have also been addressed as an augmentation strategy for depression (Quint et al., 2000; Spero et al., 2000; DeBellis et al., 2000).

The mood stabilizers and atypical antipsychotics are extremely useful as augmenting medications added to an inadequate antidepressant dose that is not fully effective. Patients need not be psychotic or manic to benefit from the addition of these agents. The atypical antipsychotics are quite useful for nonpsychotic patients in acute depressive and anxiety states, with insomnia and agitation that do not immediately respond to antidepressants (Kopala, 2002). These medications carry a much smaller risk of extrapyramidal motor system side effects or tardive dyskinesia than do the conventional antipsychotics since they occupy the dopamine receptors only transiently. The risk of tardive dyskinesia is estimated to be approximately 0.3 percent for these atypical agents.

Sedation can be a significant initial side effect of quetiapine or olanzapine, though patients frequently develop tolerance to this effect. Weight gain occurs in most patients given clozapine or olanzapine, which can precipitate insulin resistance and type II diabetes. These side effects can be used to advantage with patients with insomnia, agitation, or anxiety. Orlow (2002) has reported successful treatment of insomnia with clozapine.

Case Example: Use of Atypical Antipsychotic to Augment an Antidepressant for Anxiety and Agitation. Mr. D is a 55-year-old accountant who began treatment for depression in childhood and who has been in psychotherapy for most of his life. He has been in once-monthly treatment with the same analyst who prescribes antidepressant medication for 12 years. Both parents are clinically depressed and his mother experienced a severe post-partum depression after his birth, heralding a childhood of considerable emotional deprivation. Despite superior intelligence, Mr. D had inadequate social skills and high levels of generalized anxiety even as a young child; his interpersonal difficulties at school limited his ability to derive satisfaction from his studies, and later from his work. He experiences mild-to-moderate generalized anxiety that he can reduce 2 pads of cigarettes per day in order to manage it. This anxiety becomes nearly overwhelming when he is faced with interpersonal conflicts. He has tried using benzodiazepine tranquilizers added to his tricyclic antidepressant that has been most effective for his depression but becomes too sleepy to work and worries about becoming addicted. Quetiapine 25 mg at bedtime was added to his antidepressant leading to marked relief from his elevated anxiety level. Eventually a total dose of 75 mg at bedtime was necessary to maintain this benefit.

Mood-stabilizing medications work (in theory) by modulation of excitatory and inhibitory amino acids via ion channels. Lithium and carbamazepine are well-known anticonvulsants, both require monitoring of blood levels, blood count, liver and renal function, and thyroid status. While these medications stabilize mood changes, they do not function as antidepressants. Valproate, lamotrigine, and some of the atypical antipsychotics seem to have intrinsic antidepressant effects. In this regard, these mood stabilizers are better choices for patients with depression complicated by significant agitation and aggressiveness, a history of problems with impulse control, or dysphoria induced by the use of antidepressants. Topiramate has been somewhat helpful with

mania, depression and posttraumatic stress symptoms in various small case series and has the significant advantage of weight loss as a side effect.

Case Example: Appropriate Medication Treatment for Bipolar Affective-Bipolar Personality as Depression

Bipolar Personality as Depression. Dr. L., a married female internist, had experienced lifelong insomnia, agitation, and moodiness that were exacerbated by hormonal interventions associated with attempts at *in vitro* fertilization. She had a history of serious childhood emotional and physical trauma, with aspects of both neglect and abuse at the hands of her self-absorbed mother. Dr. L. had coped with this history by devoting herself to her studies/work, by entering into nonromanticistic relations with others that relieved the relationship with her mother, and via her fantasies of giving birth to and raising her own children in a healthy, loving environment. The infertility and lack of success with *in vitro* fertilization led to a serious suicide attempt using overdoses of the two anti-depressants she had been prescribed.

From this vantage point, it became clear that her difficulties were not only the result of an untreated depression, but that her agitation, insomnia, and moodiness reflected a bipolar mood disorder. (Again, her mother's emotional instability, previously conceptualized as borderline personality disorder, may have been in part unmasked bipolar affective disorder.) Dr. L. had tried tons of antidepressants daily and had a working relationship with her therapist, yet even increasing the frequency of sessions did not stabilize the depression. The antidepressants were discontinued and Dr. L. was started on carbamazepine, which enabled her to sleep regularly for the first time in years. She noted relief from the agitation but eventually required lamotrigine and quetiapine added to the carbamazepine for ongoing depression.

Concurrently with the medication treatment, Dr. L. was encouraged to pursue adoption, something she and her husband had previously ruled out. Within a year they adopted a baby girl, which led to further improvement and stability in Dr. L.'s mood. She was able to return to full-time practice, take part in social activities, and deal with her daughter's needs effectively, even as her responsibilities required a decrease in the number of sessions to once every 2 weeks.

FUTURE PROSPECTS

The controversy regarding the use of medication with psychoanalysis or psychodynamic psychotherapies may continue into quiet and unquieted, much like the concept of the "irrigating mother" causing subsuperior in her child. Psychotropic medications are both an enormous boon to those of us who strive to relieve suffering and distressingly banalistic in their capacity to manipulate psychological processes even as we come to understand these processes at neurochemical and neurophysiological levels of analysis. New medications are constantly being introduced and our theoretical theory will be supplanted with more sophisticated approaches over time. Our understanding of pharmacodynamics (the specific ways that drugs interact at receptor sites in individuals) and pharmacogenomics (the genetic patterns that affect how individuals

respond to drugs will eventually make prescribing medication for a given individual a far more accurate prediction. Once this engineering (the invention of genetic material necessary to cure a disorder) may someday make drug treatment unnecessary for certain illnesses, but given the huge complexity of psychiatric disorders that involve mood, affect, cognition, and behavior, specific genetic causes for most psychiatric illnesses will be difficult to identify. The role of life events in the etiology and progression of psychiatric disturbances must not be minimized.

The Salks opened the way to a new conceptualization of depression as a medical illness that can be treated much like diabetes can be treated with insulin, but psychoanalytically oriented psychopharmacologists know this is far from either a simple or adequate solution. In fact, whether treating depression or diabetes, the relationship with the doctor is primary and remains a key to optimal therapeutic practice. Medications often have variable effectiveness; it is the medication plus the relationship that maintains well-being. Psychoanalysts understand and accept this principle, and those who are interested in working with medications (whether prescribed by themselves or others), while remaining open-minded about theory, are commonly the most effective. Psychoanalysis has much to gain from investigation of growing knowledge from the neurosciences about brain function, and psychoanalytic theory can continue to contribute to make account of these advances (Sofronoff and Tambellini, 2002).

CONCLUSIONS

Patients with straightforward neurotic problems should not require medication treatment through the course of an analysis, but many analysts will be assessing patients with a wide range of psychopathology who may need a variety of treatment approaches. The use of standard nosologic diagnosis (DSM-IV) in addition to psychoanalytic diagnosis helps clarify the possible treatment options, and the use of appropriate medication treatment will increase the range of patients who can make use of psychoanalytic psychotherapy and psychodynamic therapy (Gray, 1995).

The medical psychoanalyst interested in learning to use medication is encouraged to use standard antidepressant, antianxiety, and mood-stabilizing medications with patients who are not in analysis to gain experience and confidence in prescribing. These patients will require medication in order to engage in analysis, and the medical psychoanalyst must determine higher level of control in prescribing for patients in analysis. The author recommends dealing with medications as one would with any other piece of data in analytic treatment. Move to clarify and address the patient's views of the use of medicine, fears and concerns about taking medication, and the transference regarding of medication. Like physicians in primary care and general psychiatry, the analyst may experience considerable relief and even justification in seeing patients get better with medications. For the internist or general psychiatrist, the relief from symptoms means the goal has been achieved; for the analyst, the work is just beginning.

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DEPTH PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF BRAIN DAMAGE

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INTRODUCTION

It is clear that a wide variety of psychiatric changes can occur after brain damage or disease, including mood and anxiety disorders, auditory psychotic symptoms, as well as a range of cognitive and behavioral disorders. It has also become increasingly clear that classifying together such disorders under the broad umbrella of organic does no justice to the diverse causes of psychological changes that occur after brain damage and disease.¹ The personality changes seen after frontal lesions, for example, differ dramatically from those seen after right hemisphere lesions. Indeed, the changes seen

¹The clearest example of this was the category called Organic Mental Syndrome described in DSM-III-R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987), which referred to disorders due to "transient or permanent dysfunction of the brain" (1987, p. 91). This category included disorders as diverse as dementia, delusions, and the manic syndrome—but, of course, not disorders such as schizophrenia and bipolar mood disorders.

after lesions to different regions within the frontal lobe (between, say, the medial, orbital, and dorsolateral surfaces) can themselves be vast. Moreover, there is often diversity in the clinical presentation within one class of lesion site. For example, in this chapter we will discuss the various ways in which damage of the right hemisphere may present either as an assessment of deficit (anecdotical) or an objective derived in deficit coupled with a history of the patient's or affected individual's life (episodic). Closer investigation of the cause of the psychological changes in such patients has demonstrated that deficits are often more complex than they first appear and that a depth psychological investigation of such patients can greatly facilitate our understanding of the underlying nature of the neuropsychological deficit.

What has led to this increased understanding of the psychological consequences of brain damage? In part, it has followed from developments in basic neuropsychology. The past several decades have seen an increasingly sophisticated understanding of the diversity of psychological deficits in neurological patients, in domains as diverse as language, perception, and executive function. This growth in interest in neuropsychology began in the 1970s (Heaton and Albert, 1978; Luria, 1973; Weisz, 1978), steadily increased through the 1980s (Ellis and Young, 1988; Hollingshead and Vaughan, 1983; Shallice, 1988), and appears to have continued its expansion through the 1990s (Bashir, 1997; Bradshaw and Martingay, 1999; Cicerone, 1997; Coltheart and Whitaker, 1990; McCarthy and Warrington, 1980; Patalin, 1990; Martin, 1999). We now know an enormous amount about the way in which psychological function, especially cognitive function, is disrupted by damage to the brain. Indeed, part of this progress is a direct result of models of psychological function developed by cognitive psychologists in the 1960s and 1970s, which led to the rapid growth of the field of cognitive neuropsychology beginning in the 1980s (e.g., Ellis and Young, 1988, and several others, as cited above). However, while these developments have been highly informative about the way in which cognitive abilities are organized within the brain, they have not been enormously helpful in explaining the neural organization of the psychological functions of greatest interest in psychiatry. One exception has been the recent development of a so-called cognitive theriopsychiatry, which has attempted to tackle issues of psychiatric interest (see Hollinghead and David, 2001). However, it might well be argued that a cognitive neuropsychiatry will always make limited progress in understanding psychiatric problems, if it continues to ignore the domain of emotion (see Bamford, 2001, for more on this issue).

The second source of change has been more recent, dating only to the early 1990s (see D�lin and Turnbull, 2002). Following the gradual decline of behaviorism, the advent of functional brain imaging technologies, and the emergence of a molecular neurobiology, topics such as cognition, motivation, and personality have suddenly

This behavioral design of test could have injured the white matter, for example, but no equivalent—so directly opposite position—leading to the administration that “all psychological processes . . . depend on brain function” (Feld, p. 38). The double meaning that neurological disorders might be cognitive, and psychiatric disorders (which was always claimed to follow)—and the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) may contain this chapter Delusions, Dementia, and Amnesia and other Cognitive Disorders (2000, p. 125).

emerged from the shadows and assumed center stage in many leading neuroscientific laboratories around the world (Damasio, 1994, 2003; Le Doux, 1996; Panksepp, 1998; Rolls, 1999). Not surprisingly, this has produced an explosion of new insights into the neural laws that govern our inner life. Because these laws are of central concern to psychiatry, and also because major psychiatric symptoms (including delusions and hallucinations) involve disturbances of core emotional systems (Panksepp, 1993, 1998), developments in neuropsychology have had the greatest impact on psychiatry over the past decade.

After a brief review of methodology, this chapter will address the "softer" (cognitive) neuropsychology issues surrounding the consequences of brain disease and damage, beginning with a review of the prevalence of psychiatric changes in the overall population of neurological patients. There follows a review of the range of "classic" neuropsychological deficits of greatest interest to psychiatry: the several disorders of cognitive function seen after frontal lesions, and the typical changes seen after lesions to the right and left amygdala. In each case we review the basic neuropsychological features of the problem, that is, the cognitive deficits commonly associated with the disorder, and cognitive models of the "psychiatric" disorder itself.

Thereafter, we review the depth neuropsychology² features of such disorders, with a brief discussion of individual case histories. By depth psychology, using the terminology of Freud (1915, p. 114), we refer to a part of the mental apparatus that is central to generating motivations and emotions, but that often lies outside of conscious awareness. In investigating these psychological functions, therefore, we are attempting to bring the observational techniques of psychoanalysis to bear on matters of prime concern to cognitive neuroscience. A detailed account of the way in which this might be done is beyond the scope of this chapter (though see Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000; for detail; or Solms and Turnbull, 2002, for a review). However, a brief account of this method is described below.

DEPTH NEUROPSYCHOLOGY AND ISSUES OF METHODOLOGY

In order to properly conduct a depth neuropsychological investigation, a worked tract be developed/untilized to allow one and the same thing to be simultaneously studied from both the psychoanalytic and the neuroscientific perspectives, so that the two sets of observations and the resultant theoretical accounts refer to the same reality. Only this enables us to link the subjective and objective approaches in neuroscience rather than merely serendipitously correlate. One suitable approach is the well-established clinico-anatomical method, familiar to those with experience of the theoretical underpinnings of internal medicine in general, and clinical neurology in particular. This method was explicitly introduced into neuroscience some 120 years ago, by Jean-Martin Charcot, the world's first professor of neurology, famous for his work at the

²The term depth neuropsychology has also come to be used interchangeably with the term neuropsychoanalysis.

Neurological therapy in Ptsd. The method involves assessing clinical conditions of compensated neural functions with associated therapy to particular areas of the brain. The goal is to stimulate normal, efficient functional conditions between the different neural functions and the different parts of the brain. This approach facilitates the overall mission in neuropsychiatry to many parts, measuring the basic neurobiological outcomes of psychological functions as related to language, memory, and executive functions.

What is required, for the purpose of a depth neuropsychiatry, is the application of this method to psychological functions beyond cognition. In many respects, this is simple neuropsychiatry. People who suffer from depression, anxiety, substance abuse, and other, with well developed personality, complex functions, and their normal results. Since these things are the sum of psychological needs, patients can be studied neuropsychiatrily or not necessarily. If this very basic clinical-neurological evidence cannot assess, directly linking psychopathology concepts with neurological ones and thereby integrating them with each other via a valid empirical, rather than speculative basis, by taking neurological patients into psychopathological assessment and therapy, one can determine whether and in what way a particular function of the neural system has been attacking a brain disease. A thorough "neurological thinking" can simultaneously help them come to terms with what has happened to them, clinical diagnosis then to correlate with the brain abnormalities neurologized. This reveals the condition that the part of the brain in question must be the organization of the neural function. It, however, requires that patients with neurological functioning changes to understand the nature of their psychopathology toward self explanatory process addition to prevent that one might disorder in neurobiotic neurology to that of excessive regulation of functions, we may reasonably hypothesize that this psychopathological function is an excessive inhibitory neurophysiological function of the neuronal neural region (see Fig. 14.1).



Figure 14.1. Lateral view frontal lobe.

This assumes that the correlation between the observed lesions and the observed mental change was not simply a coincidence. That assumption is tested by checking one's observations in the individual case against analogous observations in as many similar cases as possible. In this respect neuropsychological research is no different from any other branch of neuropsychological research. By investigating small groups of patients, it is possible to discern reliable patterns of associations between brain regions and mental functions of psychological interest. Kaplan-Solms and Solms (2000) describe three small groups of this sort, for three separate brain regions. The results appear to be quite reliable, but this research tradition is still in its infancy (see Solms and Turnbull, 2002).

PRIVALENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGES IN NEUROLOGICAL PATIENTS

Psychological functions can be altered in diverse ways after brain damage or disease. Here we will focus on several studies that discuss the incidence of such psychological changes. Psychiatric changes are common after focal brain disease and brain injury. For example, a number of studies have investigated the consequences of traumatic brain injury, where depression appears to be the most prevalent psychiatric outcome. Recent studies have estimated that clinical depression affects a majority of traumatic brain injury patients in the period immediately after their brain injury (e.g., Dahl et al., 2000; Hales et al., 1991; see Hales and Yehuda, 1993, for review). At 12 months postinjury clinical depression was still prevalent in more than 20 percent of patients (Dahl et al., 2000; Ryckoff et al., 1992), frequently persisting beyond 24 months (Rao and Lytle, 2000). Similarly, anxiety disorders, including posttraumatic stress disorder and obsessive-compulsive disorder, are common after traumatic brain injury (George, 1993; Koss et al., 1995; Van Hasselt et al., 2000), as are a range of psychiatric disorders (Klimes and Tchelidze, 1991, pp. 252–262). Indeed, a coalition of the effects of traumatic brain injury and psychosis has led to some confusion in the literature, as that studies have demonstrated disorders classified as psychosis, schizophrenia, and schizoaffective disorder in patients whose major explicit problem has been traumatic brain injury (e.g., Wilson and Sclaroff, 1987; see Hales and Yehuda, 1991, for further cases). Unfortunately, such studies focus more on epidemiology than neuropsychiatry, as the traumatic brain injury (i.e., take one instance of pathology) is viewed as a unitary pathological category. In practice, several brain regions are typically damaged in closed-head injury, the orbital frontal lobes, the anterior temporal lobes, and the upper brainstem all may be involved. In addition, there are frequent lesions in regions that are quite inconsistent across cases, making this pathology notoriously unreliable for the purposes of clinical-neurological correlation (Bartram, 1992). Epidemiological studies typically fail to investigate the consequences of lesion in specific brain regions, much less the particular psychological mechanisms, which contribute to the psychiatric changes in such cases.

Such studies do little justice to our current understanding of the way in which psychological functions are organized within the brain. Why are these patients depressed,

anxious, and psychotic after their brain injury? Is it a simple consequence of well-understood cognitive deficits sustained in the accident? For example, are they depressed because they are now amnesic or aphasic? Could it even be a consequence of physical and (i.e., nonbrain) injuries to the body, as anyone might become depressed following a brutal physical injury or facial scarring after a motor vehicle accident? When one systematically investigates the effects of focal brain lesions, it becomes clear that specific sorts of psychological change reliably follow these particular brain sites. For those working in cognitive neuropsychology (and cognitive neuropsychiatry) it is of no consequence whether the lesion is caused by stroke, head injury, or tumor—providing it disrupts the brain region or psychological function of interest. Measures of epidemiology are also of no great concern, with scientists showing a clear preference for collecting at least partially pure cases. As a result, the field has been dominated by single-case investigations or the multiple single-case approach (Casavant, 1996; Baddeley, 1998). It is from this tradition that the work in this chapter derives.

In our first example of depth neuropsychological changes, we briefly discuss one class of lesions site, that of disorders in the lateral surface of the left convexity, where patients suffer substantial cognitive deficits—primarily in the domain of language, though also extending to the domains of voluntary action and some classes of visuospatial ability. Such patients quite commonly also suffer a right hemiparesis. Their psychological response to such losses is of great interest. As one might expect from a situation in which individuals have lost a range of important abilities, they are often overcome with feelings of loss and are frequently depressed. However, they cope with these problems in precisely the same way that neurologically normal individuals would cope with them: that is, they gradually come to terms with their loss through a period of mourning. In the course of this process, they begin to rebuild a life that takes account of their new circumstances.

We discuss some cases of this sort at the beginning of this chapter because such resultant brain damage or disease are not universally found in neurological patients, as will become clear in the later parts of this chapter, where one sees (for example) a denial of deficit, with the patient adopting a distorted view of his or her cognitive circumstances (i.e., of reality). Such changes in the very fabric of the person appear to follow from lesions to parts of the brain that lie closer to the core of the personality—probably because they impinge on systems centrally involved in the regulation of emotion and motivation (Goleman and Tunstall, 2002).

LESSONS TO THE LEFT CONVEXITY

Patient Who Loses Her Thoughts¹

Mrs. M was a patient who sustained a hemorrhage in the midtemporal area of the left hemisphere. Initially, when Mrs. M awoke in hospital, she showed the classic features

¹See Kaplan, Nelson, and Adams (2002) pp. 401–410 for a detailed description of this case, or Tunstall et al. (in press) for a quantitative investigation of the emotional state of this patient.

of a Wyndham's aphasia⁵, feeling as though everyone was speaking a strange, unfamiliar language that she could not understand, where in fact she had a deficit of language comprehension ability. The cognitive basis of such disorders is comprehensively covered in any basic neuropsychology text (e.g., Katz and Whishaw, 1999; McCarthy and Warrington, 1998). In essence it appears to involve a disruption to the system that differentiates the perception of phonemes (e.g., *p* vs *b*) from each other. This ability forms the basic foundation of all (possibly) language comprehension; its loss makes familiar speech sound as unintelligible as a foreign language.

Mrs. M intermittently feared that she might be in heaven, especially as she began to recall what had happened to her. However, she rapidly made better sense of her environment. Although she could not understand what anyone said to her, it was evident from the appearance and behavior of the people around her (nurses, doctors, and other patients) that she was in a hospital. Mrs. M's phonemic hearing was recovered, and she began to comprehend what was said to her, so long as people spoke in short sentences. She was then suffering from a typical disorder of audio-verbal short-term memory, known, in Luria's (1973) terminology, as association-memory aphasia (again, for more detail see the short-term memory section of any basic neuropsychology text). As a result, she was unable to hold in mind anything that people said to her for more than a brief moment.

This was associated with a curious subjective state. Mrs. M kept "losing" her thoughts. A thought would occur to her, but before she was able to do anything with it, it was gone. Just as she was unable to hold on to what other people said to her, so too she was unable to retain what she "knew" to herself. It was as if her memorial consciousness had become a dream. The same thing happened when she tried to converse with other people. She would formulate the words that she wanted to say, but before she could utter them they had vanished, leaving her speechless and confused.

The severity of this condition increased. Occasionally, Mrs. M noticed that her whole mind had gone "blank"—all her thoughts were lost—not just those related to things she had heard or wanted to say. This state of mind, in which she could not think consciously of anything, was undoubtedly frightening and disorienting. She responded by trying to find and waiting for her thoughts to "come back", which they typically did after several weeks and months. When Mrs. M was at home during weekdays, she would frequently withdraw from social interaction and sit privately in her bedroom, waiting for her "mind to come back," as she put it.

In cognitive terms it is understandable that her thoughts would disappear in this way. This patient sustained damage to the midtemporal region of the left hemisphere—a region responsible for holding strings of words (or other audio-verbal sounds) in short-term (or frame-like) memory. Damage to this system not only affords the ability to hold in mind the words that one hears but also the words that one generates in one's own consciousness. This is because the same audio-verbal "buffer" is used for words that are generated internally as for words that are externally perceived. Since

⁵For those unfamiliar with communication and neuropsychological terminology, a glossary is available in Tsvetkov (2002).

the patient's audio-verbal system could not sustain her internally generated thoughts in working memory, these thoughts would disappear. In passing, it is of some note that this seems to confirm Freud's proposal (and that of many others) that we communicate our thoughts to our conscious selves by clothing them in words.

What of Mrs. M's psychiatric status? Did she develop a set of psychotic delusions? As suggested above, she did not. There is abundant evidence that her ego functions were fundamentally intact: Despite her difficulties, her behavior continued to be governed by rational and reality-based thinking. For example, she tested her (unconscious) delusional belief that she was in heaven against the evidence of her colored perception, and this mental work resulted in the subordination of her fantasies to realistic perceptions. Similarly, when she lost her thoughts, she was rational enough to return to her bedchamber, waiting for her mind to return—a perfectly sensible solution to the problem. Clearly, this patient had not really lost her mind; all she had lost was the capacity to represent (or retain) her thoughts in extended consciousness. Her mind (her ego, and perhaps, see Kaplan-Aleman and Rehm, 2000) continued to exist and continued to govern her behavior successfully. She had lost only a highly specific aspect of ego functioning that lies far from the core of personality.

Patient Who Cannot Express His Thoughts in Words¹

Although he was only in his 20s, Mr. J suffered a stroke caused by bacterial endocarditis, affecting Broca's area and surrounding regions. As a result, his speech (dysarthria), although fluent, is telegraphic in its fragmentation features, and he could say very few words (i.e., a Broca's aphasia). The disorder suffered by Mr. J which is now thought to represent a range of underlying language deficits (again see basic neuropsychology texts) disrupts systems that control language output at the phonetic, phrase, and sentence level. His disability, which also included hemiparesis (i.e., palsy/paralysis of the right side of his body), had dramatically affected his life, as one would expect. He lost his job, his romantic partner, and most of his friends. He understandably feared that he had the future prospects. All that he had previously taken for granted in life was slipping away. It was a tragic situation, and Mr. J was filled with anger, sadness, and loss.

When he was offered psychotherapy, he eagerly grasped the opportunity. There was much that he wanted to discuss, even though he no longer had the words to do so. One of the many things he wanted to tell his therapist was that he now felt like "half a man." He communicated this by drawing a stick figure of a man, bisecting it vertically, and saying "man... half... half." This communication was programmatic reasoning. It conveyed the essence of his emotional situation, and it simultaneously linked them symbolically with his neurological hemiparesis condition. He had lost his masculinity and the self-esteem that was anchored upon it. However, he worked extremely hard in his psychotherapy to come to terms with these losses, and ultimately he was able to construct a new, viable life for himself, built on revised premises and priorities.

¹For more detail, see Kaplan-Aleman and Rehm, 2000, pp. 78–86, or Turnbull et al. (2002) more a qualitative investigation of the emotional lives of the patient.

In short, this was a patient who was almost literally overflowing; and yet he was able to make productive use of psychoanalytic therapy—the so-called talking cure—to negotiate the painful process of mourning and gain new insights about himself that enabled him to endure, with great courage, circumstances that would defeat many people with perfectly intact brains. We may conclude, as a provisional hypothesis, that the case of the personality of such patients, that is, systems involved in the generation and regulation of emotionalized ratios, remains intact, at least to a first approximation. The same is not true for neurological patients with lesions to other brain areas.

VENTROMEDIAL FRONITAL LESIONS

The celebrated case of Phineas Gage illustrates the prototypical example of personality change after lesion to the frontal lobe. In the 1840s Gage was employed, in a supervisory and highly responsible role, laying railway tracks in the midwestern United States. He was passing down a charge of dynamite into a rock formation, using a tampering rod, when the charge exploded, raising the rod to shoot through his head, then underwent his check into the frontal lobe of his brain and out the top of his skull. Partly because the rod passed through an air cavity, probably cushioning the tissue on its way, the damage to Gage's brain was not widespread; only a relatively small area of frontal tissue was affected.¹ Gage did not retain loss consciousness, and he made a rapid physical recovery.

His physician, however, observed some interesting changes when he reported the case in a local medical journal a few years after the accident. Despite the good physical recovery and relatively small extent of the brain injury, Dr. Harlow noted that this patient was radically changed as an individual: His personality was changed. Before the accident Gage had been the foreman of his team—a position of some responsibility—he was regarded as a reliable character, and he was highly valued by his employers. However, this is what Harlow said about Gage after the accident:

His physical health is good, and I am inclined to say that he has recovered . . . (but) the equilibrium or balance, so to speak, between his intellectual faculties and moral propensities, seems to have been destroyed. He is still, however, judging of these in the greatest probability (which was not previously his custom), manifesting but little deference for the former, impudent of rebuke or advice when it conflicts with his desires, at times (particularly obstinate, yet supine and vacillating, deriving many plans of future operation, which are no sooner arranged than they are abandoned . . .). In this regard his mind was radically changed, so decidedly that his friends and acquaintances said that he was "no longer Gage" (Harlow, 1868, p. 32).

Distinguishing the now quaint language, the message of this physician's description still comes through clearly: As a result of his brain damage, Gage was "no longer Gage." The inescapable conclusion is that Gage's personality—his very identity—was

¹See Damasio et al. (1994) for a precise description of the extent of the brain injury in this case.

somewhat dependent upon the few cubic centimeters of brain tissue that were damaged in his accident. Today we know, from observing countless similar cases, that damage to this brain tissue almost always produces the very same type of personality change as it did to Gage. There is some variability, depending above all on the preexisting personality, but these patients are typically "titillated and interested, showing little deference for others, impudent of advice, especially if it conflicts with their desires," and so on. These are some of the cardinal features of what is now known as the *frontal lobe personality*. Practicing neurologists have summarized literally hundreds of Phineas-Gages, all with damage in the same part of the brain. This suggests that there is a predictable relationship between specific brain events and specific aspects of who we are. If any one of us were to suffer the same lesion in that specific area, we would be changed in much the same way that Gage was; and we, too, would no longer be ourselves.

Emotion-Based Learning

Neurological patients such as Phineas-Gage had long been a puzzle to the neurophysiological community. The disorder is most commonly seen in cases of closed-head injury. Such patients often show relatively normal intelligence, and near-normal performance on a range of tasks specifically designed to test frontal lobe function. However, in spite of this, they choose unsuitable friends, enter inappropriate relationships, and engage in inappropriate activities (Bechara et al., 2000). This behavior typically leads to financial losses, career termination, and loss of affection of family and friends. The role of emotion, and especially emotion-based learning, has recently changed our understanding of the behavior of such patients. It appears that their poor judgment and decision-making abilities follow from an incapacity to use emotion-based learning systems, which provide information about the likely outcome of future decisions (see Damasio, 1994, 1996). Consistent with this claim, participants perform poorly if the task does not have direct emotional consequences for them (Tunbridge et al., 2003).

This literature has suggested a biological basis for the substantial role of emotion in cognition, and this aspect of mental life can now be reliably assessed using the Iowa Gambling Task (Bechara et al., 1994). In this task the subject is faced with four decks of cards and asked to choose any deck, in any sequence. The subject wins or loses money with each turn and should learn to choose the decks that offer the best financial return. Some decks have frequent high gains but also occasional substantial losses. Sustained playing of these decks leads to overall financial loss. Other decks have more modest payoffs but lead only to small and infrequent losses, so that sustained playing of the decks leads to small but consistent gains. The game is complex, and participants do not appear subjectively to understand the contingencies of the game. Nevertheless, participants quite rapidly develop a "feeling" about which decks are good or bad. This probably derives from small activations of emotion in the seconds preceding the choice of a high-risk "bad" deck — when the participant is contemplating which deck to choose (see Damasio, 1994, 1996). Activation of the autonomic nervous system is the physiological correlate of this emotional experience and can be directly measured using

changes in skin conductance (Guy-Davidis, 1994, 1998). In other words, participants reverse "differential warning" of the consequences of their actions, coded in terms of emotion, allowing them to avoid negative consequences (Buchanan et al., 1994).

Participants typically choose the risky decks in the early stages of the game, but neurologically normal participants (young adults who regard themselves as "gamblers") rapidly shift to decks where they will receive the smaller amounts of money over longer periods. Neurological patients with lesions to the ventromedial frontal lobes also show a strong skin conductance response after a bad choice has been made, indicating that they will feel emotion, but have no ability to develop the adverse warning effect that could alert them of a potentially poor-outcome choice. As a result they do not develop an avoidance of bad choices, and consistently lose money (Buchanan et al., 1994). This inability to predict the likely emotional outcome of their actions is probably the cause of their many difficulties in everyday life.

Acquired Sociopathy

There have also been, in the last few years, some interesting suggestions about the role of the ventromedial frontal lobes in childhood. This work is based on patients injured in serious falls or car accidents—where the injury occurred under 3 years of age (Anderson et al., 1999). Unsurprisingly, because of lesions to their ventromedial frontal lobes, these individuals behave much like the adult patients described above. Thus, they consistently do badly in relationships, their general social interactions are poor, and their career progression is far from normal. This aspect of their presentation comes as no real surprise to us.

However, an additional factor appears in these neurological patients in that they fail to develop other core psychological abilities. In particular, they seem to lack empathy, and on formal tests of social and moral judgment and reasoning they do very badly. The claim has been made that these represent instances of "acquired sociopathy." Anderson et al. (1999) discuss the case of a young woman who had been run over by a vehicle at the age of 15 months. From the age of 3 she was noted to be "largely unresponsive to verbal or physical punishment" (p. 1832). By her teenage years she would have met many of the criteria for a diagnosis of conduct disorder and was isolating from her family and peers, had a conspicuous lack of friends, lied chemically, and had a history of multiple arrests. She had frequent unprotected sex and gave birth to a child, but "there was no evidence that she experienced empathy, and her material behavior was marked by a dangerous insensitivity to the infant's needs" (p. 1832). As in other cases of this type, the patient becomes manipulative and by virtue of poor environmental circumstances or the acquisitional attachment relationships that sometimes occur in dysfunctional families (see Schore, 1994, for more on the importance of the ventromedial frontal lobes for affect regulation). Rather, their behavior seems to result from an absence of the biological structures that underpin empathy. This conclusion is bolstered by functional imaging work investigating the size of the frontal lobes in psychopaths/sociopaths, which suggests that they have smaller than average frontal lobe volume (Blair et al., 2000). We should not conclude from these data that all cases of

incoherence result from brain damage or disease, but this developing literature points to the biological basis of this class of psychiatric disorder.

CONFABULATION AND THE NEUROBIOLOGY OF EMOTION SYSTEMS

Adults who have no history of psychiatric disorder show a range of features closely resembling those of psychosis when highly specific brain regions are damaged (e.g., Burgess and McNeil, 1999; Conway and Twells, 1998; Saksena, 1990, 1998; Milligan et al., 1996). These patients are typically described as showing confabulation. Localization is not well-established (see Damasio et al., 1994), but the patients typically have lesions to the ventral and/or medial frontal lobes and associated subcortical structures. The breakdown of reality monitoring becomes a typical symptom (Finkenberg, 1991; Saksena, 1997, 1998). That is, thoughts are interpreted as real perceptions, beliefs are thought to be important (Capgras delusion, see Hirshfeld and Ramachandran, 1997), and dreams are mistakes for real experiences. This remarkable phenomenon (and localization of its associated lesion site) has been described in isolated neurophysiological reports for a number of years (Hallard, 1984; Whitty and Lewis, 1985; see Berrios, 1998, for historical review). Recent investigations suggest that simple "integrative systems" accounts may not fully explain the nature of the disorder (e.g., Burgess and McNeil, 1999) and that motivation/activation systems may shape the nature of the false belief in such patients (e.g., Conway and Twells, 1998; Pitsopoulou et al., under review; Milligan et al., 1996). The importance of this brain region in false belief is also consistent with the effect of anti-dopaminergic drugs, such as aripiprazole, which can produce hallucinatory states (Perry and Perry, 1993), and the paranoid delusions that are part of a dopamine-modifying etiologic psychosis (Menzelsson and Melis, 1998).

Recent studies have investigated a small group of these patients in psychoanalytic psychotherapy (Kopelman and Saksena, 2000; Saksena, 1998) and has produced a range of evidence favoring a cognition-based explanation of confabulation. In the language of cognitive neuroscience, the false beliefs in these patients were caused by the excessive influence of emotion and motivational systems over cognitive processes (see Pitsopoulou et al., under review; Tavakoli et al., in press). However, the account has also been cast in psychoanalytic terms, as the excessive influence of the systems unconscious (Kopelman and Saksena, 2000).

Freud outlined four principal properties of the systems unconscious in his study "The Unconscious." There are: the replacement of external by psychical reality, clinging from mutual contradiction, mobility of cathexis (or primary process thinking), and disassumption. From mutual contradiction are self-evident. Mobility of cathexis is best understood using the transference concept by which the attitudes and feelings associated with one person can be directed toward another. The replacement of external by psychical reality can reasonably be understood as arguing that these patients accept views of external reality that are congruent with affective states. In the basic scenario, they are likely to accept versions of reality that lead to positive affective consequences and

reject views of causal reality that lead to negative affective consequences. The clinical series of Kaplan-Solomon and Solomon (2002) appeared to present with false beliefs that met all the criteria described by Freud (1915), and these are briefly discussed below.

Description from Mutual Contradiction

One patient was an English gentleman in a neurological rehabilitation unit who had lived abroad for some years. Like all the other cases described in this section, he had bilateral spatial frontal lesions (see Kaplan-Solomon and Solomon 2002, pp. 299–302). A close friend of his had died some 20 or 30 years previously, while they were both living in Kenya. One day he excitedly informed the staff that he had met a friend of his in the hospital. "Can you believe it," he said, "Phil Adams" is here in the same unit as me. You know the chap I told you about who died in Kenya 20 years ago. It's wonderful to see him again." When questioned as to how Phil Adams could be in the hospital if he had died in Africa 20 years before, the patient stopped for a moment and said "Yes, that must cause interesting legal problems... being dead in one country and alive in another." He was quite capable of accepting two mutually exclusive facts as being simultaneously true. In relation to an encyclopedic account of constellations, there are clear affective advantages to meeting old friends (even dead ones) when you are in hospital.

Timelessness

A second patient (a woman who suffered from damage in the same brain region) had experienced several instances of medical difficulties prior to the stroke for which she had been admitted on this occasion. One was a deep vein thrombosis in her leg, another a hysterectomy. To this woman, her current hospitalization was one and the same as the others. She would speak as if she was in the neurological ward for the purposes of a hysterectomy, but in virtually the next sentence she would suggest that her admission was due to a deep vein thrombosis, and then again, also, for a stroke. Indeed, she even seemed to think she was hospitalized at all the locations of the previous admissions simultaneously—so that she was in King's College Hospital, the Royal Free Hospital, and the Royal London Hospital, all at the same time. A series of separate temporal events had thus become merged into a single experience.

Timelessness of a different kind was displayed by the gentleman with the dead friend, described above. His wife always came to visit him at 3 p.m., which was visiting time. No doubt in the hope that his wife would soon arrive, the patient was constantly of the opinion that it was 3 p.m.—even straight after breakfast or before lunch. During one luncheon, when his error was being corrected by a staff member for the unspoken time, he noticed a No Smoking sign on the wall, which took the form of a red circle with a diagonal line through it. Noticing this sign for a short, he retorted: "Look ... it is 3 o'clock!" As in the example mentioned above, hospital visiting hours offer the patient certain affective advantages.

*No individual name, all subsequent names are also changed, to protect the identity of the patients concerned.

Replacement of External Reality by Psychological Reality

In these cases, the demands of the internal world of the disease take precedence over the constraints of external reality, and inner wishes displace outer perceptions. An example of this kind of error is the above-mentioned case where the No smoking sign became a clock showing 5 p.m., because this accorded with the patient's wishes. His inner reality dominated over his external perception in a way that we do not normally allow. In the same way, his wish to meet his dead friend (or to be among friends) distorted his perception of a stranger in the hospital (someone whose features probably reminded him of his friend). Even when he realized the fact of his friend's death, the external evidence could be put to one side in the service of maintaining the wish.

Primary Process (Mobility of Cathexis)

Situations in which feelings invested in one object are transferred to others are apparent in the example where the patient confuses a stranger with his long-dead friend. However, a better example comes from another patient, who clearly recognized her husband when he visited her in hospital and kissed him as much. Yet, when he was not there, she regularly referred to the man in the bed next to hers as being her husband and behaved accordingly toward him. Again, the wish-filling properties of such confusions are clear. She wanted her husband to be there. When he was, that was fine; but when he wasn't, it was not at all difficult to ignore or modify her conception of reality to fit with her requirements.

In these cases, then, it appears that the false beliefs seen in neurological patients are, at least in part, explained by an emotion-based model. Additional studies (e.g., Potegalow et al., under review; Turnbull et al., in press) that have investigated patients of this sort in a more systematic and quantitative way are certainly consistent with this emotion-based account (though they have revealed a range of issues that merit further investigation). For example, the false beliefs of these patients almost invariably transform their current situation into a more affectively pleasant one, in which family and old friends come to visit, or the hospital ward is presented as a hotel, or is now directly attached to the living room of their home.

An emotion-based account of confabulation is of direct relevance to issues within psychiatry. For example, such an account offers some interesting insights into the possible neurophysiological foundations of false beliefs—especially the suggestion that the successive influence of core emotion systems over cognition might account for patently incorrect opinions about the world being held in the lack of sustained argument. It is of no small interest to psychiatry that the brain regions implicated in neurological patients with false beliefs are the same medial frontal sites as those implicated in schizophrenia. Indeed, the link between the two conditions becomes even clearer at the pharmacological level because poor regulation of a dopamine-based emotion system may lie at the core of false beliefs in both schizophrenia (e.g., Opler, 1991; Meier et al., 1999; Whittemore and Lipska, 1995) and other classes of false belief phenomena, such as delusions (Selby, 1997, 2000). More extensive discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this chapter (see Selby and Turnbull, 2002, Chapters 4 and 6 for more detail).

LESSONS TO THE RIGHT HEMISPHERE

The right hemisphere is conventionally said to be specialized for spatial cognition (De Renzi, 1982). Where damage to association cortex in the left hemisphere produces disorders of various aspects of language, damage to the equivalent parts of the right hemisphere produces disorders of a range of spatial, or *visuo-spatial*, abilities. These patients cannot draw a bicycle without missigning the component parts; they cannot copy a simple construction made with children's blocks; and they cannot learn the route from their bed to the toilet (for a detailed review see De Renzi, 1992) or for more general coverage see basic neuropsychology texts). However, some right-hemisphere functions do not sit easily under the heading of spatial cognition. This is readily apparent from the syndrome that most typically occurs with right parietal lobe damage. This pattern of signs and symptoms, often described as the *right hemisphere syndrome*, has three cardinal components. One of the components comprises the *anomia*—visually spatial deficits just described (such as constructional apraxia and topographical disorientation), but the two other components of the syndrome are more complex. These go by the names *neglect* (or hemispatial neglect, or hemineglect) and *anosognosia*.

Neglect

Patients with this condition neglect, that is, ignore, the left-hand side of space (see Robertson and Marshall, 1993, for a review). If, for example, you stand to the right of such a patient and ask "Who am you today? Mrs. Jones?" she is likely to reply "Who, thank you." If you stand to her left and ask the same question, she is likely to simply ignore you. This is not because she fails to see or hear you. We have known for some time (see De Renzi, 1992, for historical review) that neglect is a disorder of attention rather than perception—for example, because such patients can see objects on their left side, provided that they are sufficiently salient (i.e., bright, flashing, moving, etc.). This problem affects not only objects in external space but even the left half of the patient's own body. Such patients frequently shave only the right-hand side of the face, dress only the right-sided limbs, and eat only the food on the right-hand side of the plate.

Anosognosia

Anosognosia means unawareness of illness. When Mrs. Jones says she is "fine, thank you" she really means it, even though, as a patient with a substantial right-hemisphere lesion, she is actually paralyzed down the left side of her body. Although they cannot walk and need to use a wheelchair to get around, these patients claim to be fine and insist that there is nothing wrong with them. Their lack of awareness of their impairment and their rationalizations concerning their problems extend to the point of delusion (see Ramaekers, 1994; Ramaekers and Blakemore, 1998; and Umholtz, 1997, for detailed examples). If, for example, you question a patient who claims that she is able to run why she is in a wheelchair, she might respond, "there was nowhere else to sit."

When you ask her why she is not moving her left arm, she might say: "I dropped it a lot earlier today, so I'm letting it." These patients seem prepared to believe anything, so long as it excludes admitting they are ill. Not uncommonly these patients make bizarre claims about their paralysed limbs, such as denying that the paralysed arm belongs to them, and saying that it belongs to someone else, a syndrome called *metamorphopsia*. They also frequently express intense dislike and hatred toward the paralysed limb, try to remove it, and may even physically assault the limb themselves (psychopatologists, bladder care suffer from *urodiplopia*, where patients do not truly deny that they are ill but never informed or uninterested about it. They acknowledge their deficits intellectually but seem unaware of the emotional implications.

Understanding the Right-Hemisphere Syndrome

The range of symptoms just described cannot be reduced to disorders of spatial cognition. Although there is a spatial component to these symptoms, some aspects of the right-hemisphere syndrome could just as well be described as disorders of *emotional cognition*. The emotional functions of the right hemisphere are now generally recognized, and many aspects of the problem have been comprehensively studied. The same applies to the attentional functions of the right hemisphere.

Various theories have been advanced in recent years that attempt to account for the nonspatial aspects of the right-hemisphere syndrome. The first of these is the *attentional asymmetry* (see Heilman and Valenstein, 1979; Rasmussen and Milner, 1970). According to this theory, the right hemisphere attends to both the left and the right sides of space, whereas the left hemisphere only attends to the right side. Accordingly, when the left hemisphere is damaged, bilateral attention is preserved, but when the right hemisphere is damaged only unilateral attention remains. This model accounts for neglect and the attentional aspects of metamorphopsia but explains little else about the syndrome (see Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2000; or Turnbull, 1997, for some of these arguments).

A second theory attempts to account for the emotional aspects of the syndrome but ignores the spatial aspects. This might be called the *negative emotion hypothesis* (Davidson and Irwin, 1999). According to this theory, the right hemisphere is specialized for negative emotions, whereas the left is specialized for positive emotion. Damage to the left hemisphere thus reduces the negativity for positive emotion, causing depression and so-called catastrophic reactions such as onset of crying, moments of petrification, etc., which are more common with left- than right-hemisphere lesions. Damage to the right hemisphere has the opposite effect: The patient is inappropriately happy. Although this simple dichotomy between positive and negative emotions may seem rather oversimplified (cf. Solms and Turnbull, 2002, Chapter 4) it has been seen as offering a reasonable account of the basis of anomia.

Goleman (1994) has proposed a third theory, the *somatic monitoring hypothesis* (see also Heilman et al., 1998). This theory is based on the idea that the right hemisphere is specialized for somatic awareness, that is, awareness of the body as a "thing." Thus, emotion is generated—in part—by awareness of one's bodily state; right-hemisphere damage impairs emotional awareness. This theory is more sophisticated

than the previous two, and it appears to accommodate all the major features of the right-hemisphere syndrome (spatial, emotional, and attentional), but we shall soon see that it offers at least one major difficulty.

It is interesting to note the simple reasoning behind all these theories. Initially, investigators observed that right-hemisphere lesions cause deficits of spatial cognition, so they hypothesized that the right-hemisphere might be specialized for spatial cognition. Then they observed that right-hemisphere lesions also cause deficits of attention, so they added that the right hemisphere might be specialized for attention as well. Then they noticed that right-hemisphere patients are inappropriately unconcerned about their deficits, so they added that the right hemisphere may be specialized for negative emotions. Thus, in order to account for the fact that right-hemisphere patients are unaware of the state of their own bodies, they hypothesized that the right hemisphere is specialized for somatic monitoring. All of these hypotheses are fully simplistic from a psychological point of view. The underlying reasoning is typical of the clinico-anatomical method (see Balon and Turnbull, 2001, Chapter 2): If something is clinically deficient due to brain damage, then the damaged tissue must have been specialized for producing that non-deficient function.

Psychiatrists have learned to mistrust this type of reasoning when it is applied to the emotional life of human beings, which is viewed as a dynamic consequence of complex interactions. Psychiatrists are therefore not surprised to find that the underlying mechanisms of a disorder often turns out to be the very opposite of what it appears to be. A patient might appear to be inappropriately happy, not because he cannot generate negative emotions but because he cannot tolerate them.

Psychanalytic Perspective

The observation that right-hemisphere patients are inappropriately unconcerned is not based on deep psychological investigation. It is based on simple bedside evaluations of mood or psychometric pencil-and-paper tests such as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) or Beck Depression Inventory, which rely on the patient's own assessment of his or her mood. Our group has carried out an investigation that bypasses such explicit approaches. A series of five patients with damage to the posterior convexity of the right hemisphere were investigated in psychanalytic psychiatry (see Kaplan-Bolton and Zilberman (2000, Chapter 8, for details, or Turnbull et al., 2002 for a quantitative analysis of the emotional life of these patients).

The first two patients exhibited typical features of the right-hemisphere syndrome—they were incompletely aware of their (functional) cognitive and physical deficits and they neglected the left-hand side of space (including the left side of their oral bodies). They also displayed classical emotional indifference to their disabilities. However, this "indifference" was quickly observed to be a highly fragile state. In their psychotherapy sessions, both patients burst into brief moments during which they seemed to be overwhelmed by emotions of the very kind that are normally suppressed by their absence. This gave the impression of suppressed sadness, grief, dependency fears, and the like rather than a true absence of such feelings.

For example, one of these patients—Mrs. M—found herself suddenly having lots uncontrollable tears while reading a book (see Kaplan-Soltes and Soltes, 2000, pp. 161–172). She then regained her composure and continued reading. When asked the next day by her therapist what she had been reading when she started to cry, she couldn't remember. All that she could recall was that it had something to do with a court case. On further investigation, it turned out that she had been reading about a court case involving parents who were fighting for compensation for a thalamic child. Mrs. M, who had suffered a severe stroke during childbirth and lost the use of her left arm and leg, had clearly identified her own disability with that of the thalamic child. However, she was completely unaware of this connection. Mrs. M also (who was of Eastern European, Polish descent) burst into tears repeatedly while watching the *Miss Hitler* on the *Reel*. It would clearly be erroneous to claim that this patient could not experience negative emotions; more accurate would be to say that she could not tolerate them, particularly feelings of loss.

The second case was a man (Mr. C; see Kaplan-Soltes and Soltes, 2000, pp. 148–152). He too was paralyzed by a right hemisphere stroke but “unaware” of his deficit. Accordingly, his physiotherapist was unable to enlist his cooperation in trying to teach him how to walk again. He seemed oblivious of his deficit and totally unconcerned about it. When recounting the relevant events to his physiotherapist the next day, however, he suddenly burst into tears. When she probed the underlying feelings, Mr. C blurted out, “but lost all my arms, what am I going to do if it doesn’t recover, how am I ever going to work again.” He then regained his composure and reverted to his typical “indifferent” state. This behavior is not consistent with the somatic monitoring hypothesis. Mr. C was not unaware of the state of his body. Rather, he had suppressed conscious awareness of the state of his body. Amnesia is not an emotionally neutral function. As with Mrs. M, such occurrences were common with this patient. They were also not very difficult to understand. Both of these cases were bereft of the depressive feelings associated with their loss (which they were certainly unconsciously aware of), and they were therefore unable to work through these feelings by the normal process of mourning.

Failures in the process of mourning take many forms. In the well known “Bleeding and Melancholia,” Freud (1917) contrasted the normal process of mourning with the pathology of melancholia (i.e., clinical depression). He argued that, in mourning, a person gradually comes to terms with loss by giving up (separating from) the lost love object, whereas in depression this cannot happen because the patient denies the loss. You cannot come to terms with a loss if you do not acknowledge its existence. Freud argued that this was particularly apt to happen if the original attachment to the lost object had been a symbiotic one, in which the separateness of the love object is not recognized but rather treated as if it were part of the self—in contrast to object love, a more mature form of attachment, where the independence of the love object is acknowledged. Freud argued that in melancholia the patient denies the loss of the love object by identifying himself with it, by literally becoming that object in fantasy. The depression itself then results from the internalization of the feelings of resentment toward the object that has been abandoned (so that

the narcissist attacks the internalized object with all the ruthless voracity of a lion (as noted).

This explanation also seems to fit the third case of right-hemisphere syndrome that was investigated psychoanalytically. This case, Mrs. A (see Kaplan-Soltes and Soltes, 2000, pp. 173–179), suffered severe spatial deficits, neglect, and amnesia but, at the same time, she was profoundly depressed. This is unusual for right-hemisphere patients, producing a paradoxical situation in which the patient was unaware of a loss (neglect) and yet simultaneously displaying severe depressive reactions to it. She was constantly in tears, lamenting the fact that she was such a burden to the medical and nursing staff, whose generous attention she did not deserve since she was not fit to live, and so on. The psychoanalytic investigation revealed that Mrs. A was in fact, unconsciously very much aware of her loss, but she was denying it by means of the introjective process described above. Unconsciously, Mrs. A did have an internalized image of her damaged, crippled self, and she attached that image to the point of Paré attempting to kill herself. In this case, the patient was overwhelmed by feelings of the same type that the previous two patients managed (for the most part) to successfully suppress. In the final (true) case, the situation was more complicated still.

A further patient, Mr. D (see Kaplan-Soltes and Soltes, 2000, pp. 187–187), was anything but unconscious and indifferent about his deficits. He was absolutely obsessed by them and displayed a symptom-motivated action-eusthenia (labeled *l'absurde* by Lacan). Mr. D had only a mild paresis of the left hand, and he would have been able to use it if he had tried. However, he refused to use the hand and actually demanded that the surgeon cut it off because he disliked it so much. This patient came because he cringed at his hand, he smashed it against a radiator, claiming that he was going to break it, he pinched and beat the bits of flesh in an envelope to the neurosurgeon who had operated on him. This reaction conveys vividly the emotional state of these patients.

It is interesting that the same basic idea can produce such opposite (quasi-opposite) reactions: unawareness of a limb and denial of its deficits versus obsessive hatred of a limb and its imperfections. This state of affairs almost demands a psychodynamics (or at least some other form of dynamic) explanation. The psychoanalyst who treated these two patients said to the clinician that their underlying psychodynamics were very similar to those of Mrs. A: they too attacked their internal awareness of their loss, but rather than attempt to kill themselves (like Mrs. A), they reacted by trying to literally dislodge the hated (damaged) image of themselves—or parts of themselves—from the real, in order to protect their intact selves.

No doubt, other permutations are possible.¹ What all of these cases have in common is a failure of the process of *maturing*. Underlying the range of clinical presentations was this common dynamic mechanism: These patients could not tolerate the difficult feelings associated with coming to terms with loss. The superficial differences

¹Miles and Turnbull (1996) described a 10-year-old child, with the classic right-hemisphere syndrome, who exhibited bizarre signs of denial (autoaggressive—self-inflicted encephalitis in relation to his left hand). Refusing the painful when he found it, he said that he wanted to have that one surgically removed and replaced with the left arm of his mother.

between the patients is attributable to the fact that they defended themselves against this intolerable situation in various ways.

A. *Reinforcement*

"We are now in a position to integrate some of the findings described above. In strictly cognitive terms, it is well known that the right parietal lobe is specialised for spatial cognition. In psychoanalytic terms, it appears that damage to this area undermines the patients' ability to represent the relationship between self and object accurately in theories that is, of course, a form of spatial cognition. This may in turn undermine object relationships in the psychoanalytic sense. Object loss based on a realistic conception of the separateness between self and object collapses, and the patients' object relationships regress to the level of narcissism. This results in narcissistic defenses against object loss, making these patients incapable of normal functioning. They deny their loss and all the feelings, including emotional perceptions associated with it, using a variety of defenses to shore up this denial whenever the intolerable reality threatens to break through."

The psychoanalytic argument relating to anergia, presented in the previous section, was initially developed in the context of the standard psychoanalytic method. However, there has recently been a series of quantitative investigations of the behavior of anergics (Turville et al., 2002), and those attempts thus far are quite consistent with the original claim. For example, the data suggest that patients with anergia appear to have some form of implicit awareness of their deficit, and also that anergics appear to be aversive with one class of emotion—feelings of separation and loss (Turville et al., 2002). These data are entirely compatible with the psychoanalytic claim that an inability to come to terms with loss forms the basis of the disorder. Whether this is the sole basis of the denial of deficit in these patients will clearly require further research.

CONCLUSION

Psychoanalytic investigation of the lives of neurological patients clearly has much to offer us. In each instance described above, it has been able to throw important light on a number of syndromes that non-syndromic theories cannot fully explain due to their failure to accommodate the psychological complexities of human emotional life. However, psychoanalytic hypotheses are no less prone to error than cognitive ones and therefore need to be subjected to the same rigorous empirical tests. Though detailed discussion of such investigations has been beyond the scope of this chapter, some progress has recently been made in investigating the various classes of disorder reported above with greater empirical rigor than is possible in the context of the conventional psychoanalytic setting. When appropriate investigations have been performed, it appears that the data from the more tightly controlled studies are consistent with the earlier, purely clinical, investigations (Turville, 2003; Turville et al., in press c).

It also seems appropriate to point out that our research has focused only on a few of the many psychiatric disorders that may follow from brain damage. To take the narrowest of examples, we have described the confabulatory states that are seen after bilateral medial frontal lesions. However, the depth psychological issues that follow these lesions in other frontal sites such as disinhibition or dysymaptic require far closer scrutiny than we have been able to offer thus far. On a broader scale, there are a range of disorders that follow from lesions (and excitatory states involving limbic regions) that clearly require further investigation. These include the personality changes seen after the viral encephalopathies (such as herpes simplex encephalitis) that target the medial temporal lobes. Similarly, there are fascinating issues related to the personal experiences of those with epilepsy (especially complex partial epilepsy), not to mention manifestations of material personality in those whose seizures are not fully controlled. A range of interesting changes to personality also occur after lesions to the thalamus, not only in Korsakoff's syndrome, but also after disruption to the various hypothalamic emotion and motivation systems. We could easily extend this list of brain regions of interest to a depth psychology. Indeed, it is becoming apparent that an extraordinarily wide range of brain regions (perhaps even the majority) play some role in motivation, emotion, and personality.²

It is clear that we stand at the dawn of an exciting new era in psychological science. All sorts of possibilities are opening up. We appear, at last, to have within our grasp the possibility of studying the biological basis of a range of psychological and psychiatric phenomena that were poorly understood even a decade or two ago. In understanding the way in which local brain disconnection affects the mental apparatus, we appear to be gaining a much clearer understanding of the "psychiatric" presentation of many neurological patients. In addition, we now also appear to better understand how mental disorders in general arise. Perhaps the clearest example would be the fact that the confabulatory states of patients with ventromedial frontal lesions might be similar to those of traditionally psychiatric individuals with psychosis. With a better understanding of the biological basis of psychiatric disorder, we will be able to target our therapies to those who can benefit most, and in the ways that work best. We may even extend our clinical reach to previously undreamt-of situations.

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²Dehaene (1994) suggests that "there are aspects of the brain dedicated exclusively to cognition and others to emotion . . . [such that] the shading between reason and emotion that has been proposed through the ages is a distinction that is not honored by the architecture of the brain" (p. 9).

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SOCIOPHYSIOLOGY AND EVOLUTIONARY ASPECTS OF PSYCHIATRY

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"[Diseases] are not entities but rather . . . represent the course of physiological phenomena under altered circumstances." Daniel S. Plessman, 1982, when President of the American Psychiatric Association, about psychiatric disorders (citing with Rudolf Virchow who stated the same about medical disorders more generally).

INTRODUCTION

When examined closely, psychiatric diseases fundamentally entail social communication problems for those afflicted. Sociophysiology represents a useful concept that refers to internal (and local) brain-body systems malfunctions, ranging from autonomic to affective to cognitive-emotional patterns that become disordered in psychiatric illnesses (Gardner, 1997). An excellent example from animal studies would be the severe effects of social defeat

on the physiology of the laboratory rat, including loss of body weight, testicular involution, adrenal hypertrophy, and altered fecundity. In wild animals such effects can often be reversed dramatically by the availability of friendly social contacts (e.g., Bush et al., 1999). One could anticipate that positive social interactions soon after traumatic events could do much to limit the long-term negative consequences of similar stressors in humans.

Even though stress-induced disorders reduce health and well-being, their high epigenetic prevalence suggest these brain, bodily, and behavioral changes were adaptive in the past (for a summary of stress physiology, see Chapter 4). Using this as a "jump-off point," we examine psychiatric disorders from the perspective of the normative evolutionary order that they depict. Our analysis follows the work of Charles Darwin (1859) who initiated much of our present understanding as to how living forms attained their characteristics, including various behavioral attributes.

This chapter emphasizes how psychiatric disorders arise from the sociophysiological alterations of evolved communication repertoires among conspecifics (members of a same species). Evolutionary biology studies how behavior has developed in animal species by making across-species contacts and comparisons and making inferences about ancestral species. An evolutionary focus on behavior takes a central position in this view of biological psychiatry that extends beyond cellular and molecular mechanisms underlying functional drug actions. The chapter (1) briefly surveys relevant evolutionary concepts, (2) reviews general sociobiological factors of ultimate causation, (3) examines psychiatric pathogenesis in terms of communicational biology, (4) examines research that models sociophysiology in substance abuse and social talk hierarchies, and (5) finally considers preliminary theoretical implications of a "social brain" paradigm.

RELEVANT EVOLUTIONARY CONCEPTS

Charles Darwin discussed the word *evolution* because in his time it implied a personified goal of perfection, like an unfolding flower, or some kind of heavenly design. By contrast, although Darwin (1859) used the word *selection*, he noted the term away from a designing God. He borrowed the term *selection* from breeders of domesticated plants and animals but applied it to his new ideas on how life forms had descended, emphasizing "natural" selection to indicate biological adaptation to environments. It explained many phenomena previously given religious rationale. Selection, the term ultimately adopted, no longer connotes unfolding perfection because Darwin's meaning has now gained full scientific acceptance. Despite scientific acceptance, however, the old and perhaps lingering flat meaning of evolution may contribute to a general lack of perception that psychiatric disorders may be, in part, products of evolutionary mechanisms. How can something have "evolved" that gives such pain, distress, and reduced life quality for patients and relatives?

Cairns (1987) described natural selection as its core feature as a general process ("the Darwin machine") with six parts: (1) an event pattern (2) that possesses

a copying mechanism (3) with some variant copies (4) that cannot infinitely coexist in (2) a multifaceted environment that influences the competitive outcome with differential variant survival (selection). (5) The process repeats in closed repeating loops for mutation and selection. An individual must survive long enough to reproduce in order to be "fit" in the sense that genes transmitted survive in the next generation and beyond. Helping one's progeny beyond birth increases such "fitness" when they themselves thereby have more of healthy offspring. Some short-term gains ultimately reduce fitness, for example, altruistic慷慨性 (generosity) helps related individuals "survive" but may cost the overall system if the related person perishes, thereby leaving illness and reducing offspring numbers of chronically stressed individuals. However, if progeny live forth despite such problems, and if these progeny themselves in turn produce fruitful offspring, then fitness does not decline. This contrasts to the common uses use of the term *fitness* to imply good individual health. McClintock and Tratalos' textbook (1998) on Darwinian psychiatry hinges on the evolutionary principle that individual variations act at the center of evolutionary change, yielding genetic mechanisms that can help produce, under various social pressures, phenotypes sufficiently unusual as to be deemed atypical. The end result is that many major psychiatric problems emerge at an appearance rate of 1 to 10 per 100 as opposed to 1 to 4 per 10,000 of population, which is true of most neurological illnesses (Wilson, 1997).

The human brain evolved from precursor animals as the Darwin machine drove nervous system evolution and formation. Yet most of the human brain's sociophysiological functions cannot be completely preprogrammed as there are too few genes. Rather, structures are built from a phylogenetic template that empirically recognizes itself via growth factors and growing processes in responding consistently to use patterns. Apoptosis (pruning) is cell shrinkage and disappearance without inflammation. Both Galvin and Gerald Rubenstein (1987) have suggested that selective pressure operates to ensure formation in a process Rubenstein called assisted Darwinism. McFarland and Norcross (2000) noted that cell parts or neurons (e.g., dendrites and synapses) might also require pruning to increase cognitive capacity, accuracy, efficiency, and speed of learning at the expense of flexibility. They suggest schizophrenia might in part result from insufficient pruning of course, many other variables also likely operate in this illness as discussed in Chapter 19. In any event, operation of the Darwin machine in the brain's phylogeny and ontogeny helps explain the large number of neurons and patterns generated despite the many fewer genes in the human genome.

The gene idea helped formulate Darwin's concept of variability. After the rediscovery of Mendel's experimental demonstration of inheritance factors, variability could be examined as a function of specific genes. This concept—new in the 20th century began and synthesized by the then new term gene—fueled modern genetic theory extending presently to the major genomic projects. Indeed, scientific practice focuses on individual differences. Modern molecular biology provides a major foundation for body correlation in how deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), ribonucleic acid (RNA), and protein structures dynamically function.

Genomic "basic plans" are evident as the nervous system reflects, in part, stages of sociophysiological evolutionary selection, for instance, as various practically ingested

neurofunctional functions of the brain and body. Indeed, much of the human genome is derived from ancestral species. Hence many similar genomic traits persist and function in higher animals and some in even all life forms. Moreover, all organisms share a number of genes, as dramatically evidenced by homology across multiple genomes presently being decoded and compared. Current estimates show that some 10 percent of human genes clearly relate to particular genes in the fly and the worm, ranging from the arthropoda to the cognate human central nervous system (Pabo, 2001). Thus, human bodies derive from evolved basic plans not unique to our species through displaying some, uniquely human features. For example, skin protects the body from the environment for many species, but humans apply grooming and cosmetics to it in culturally determined ways to enhance status and mating opportunities.

The Mouse Genome Project represents a useful exemplar of human-creature similarity. Although this genome is about 10 percent smaller than the human, over 90 percent of it and human genes, can be partitioned into corresponding regions of conserved synteny, reflecting segments in which the gene order in the most recent common ancestor has been conserved in both species (Mouse Genome Sequencing Consortium, 2002). Not surprisingly, diverse genome projects have begun to alter earlier theories of behavior. That core genetic feature stem from ancestral forms to all living species is a fact of modern neurobiology. Sarah Hock (1999, page 6), a specialist on evolutionary biology as it pertains to reproduction, states, "I see the world through a different lens than most people. My depth of field is millions of years longer, and the subjects in my viewfinder have the curious habit of spontaneously taking on the attributes of other species: things, playthings, metropolitans." Nobel Laureate David Baltimore (2002) suggests "our genes look much like those of bacteria, worms and even plants ... genes that encode the basic functions of life—for people, flies, worms and even bacteria—are only a few hundred to a few thousand." In contrast, however, the human brain outweights that of the chimpanzee by a factor of 3 despite their identity of the two genomes.

As a part of this, signal-system codes stem from phylogenetic precursors. Non-human brains, in registering signals from experience, rely on a basic plan apparently already preadaptively old before the chordate split from invertebrates. Subsequent mammalian and primate evolution greatly elaborated this apparatus. Changes come to overlay and modify but not replace earlier systems that organize experience and relationships (Searcy and Pica, 1995, 2000). Evolutionary processes act more like influences than implants, "wrapping" earlier structures in later ones. Functions. The tongue first evolved for tasting and eating, not its more secondary role in speech.

The Research Committee of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (GAP; Bullock et al., 2002, p. 205) suggests "Brains, including human brains, derive from ancient adaptations to diverse environments and are therefore repositories of phylogenetic adaptations. In addition, individual experiences shape the brain through epigenesis, i.e., the expression of genes is shaped by environmental influences." Illustrating this, Palkovits (1999) notes that present-day rapid eye movement (REM) dream sequences may give insight to ancient modes of awareness, deriving this from the brainstem location for REM generation. He suggests, that what is now the REM state

was the original form of waking consciousness in early brain evolution, an ancient form that may have had to be suppressed entirely for higher brain evolution to proceed effectively. If true, then all humans (and nearly all other mammals) retain this primitive consciousness in each night's sleep as most people experience vivid dreams characteristic of the REM brain state. Even further down in the brain stem (and presumably even more anciently derived), certain olfactory neural systems pace body systems such as respiration and running. Though ancient and fundamental, these functions also continue to exert present conscious experience as they function in concert with more recently elaborated frontal cortex but likewise illustrate localized adaptations that first arose in deep time. In a striking example of this, panic attacks appear to be strongly influenced by ancient brainstem suffocation alarm mechanisms (Gorets, 1999).

Paul MacLean (1990) pioneered study of the brain and its complex functions through the lens of evolutionary history, deriving his conclusions from ancient sources as well as earlier work by Brown and Papez. He posited a triune brain. In succession above the vegetative base he described (i) the R-complex (R referring to "reptilian"), including prominently the basal ganglia, (ii) the paleoanthropic system, and (iii) then the neoanthropic system. Major elements of reptiles and early mammals neurophysiology are preserved in human brains, notably the R-complex. MacLean also demonstrated that humans retain many communication features evolved in earlier vertebrate selection. Human communicational repertoires such as ownership and mating or more general social and territorial signals exemplify ancient programs evident in the classical studies of squirrel behavior. Such communicational propensity seems retain very ancient manifestations from much earlier animal evolution with complex connections and modifications that extend between these structures and those more recently evolved such as the cerebral cortex (Dobro and Cummings, 1999).

Symptoms of some psychiatric disorders stem from disturbance of R-complex communications. The 19th century neurologist, J. Hughlings Jackson, used clinical evidence to deduce that the brain evolved in a hierarchical sequence. He noted dissociation of abilities after organ damage that perhaps reflect a phylogenetic history discussed in Taylor (1998). As any medical student learns, clinical signs of frontal lobe impairment feature the "unmasking" of ancient plans for behavior after cortical injury (e.g., infantile grasping and sucking reflexes; Balloring et al., 2001). Apparently these represent ancient patterns embedded in the genome that are usually active in subtle ways that fit smoothly into conversational and other communication settings. But when frontal cortical damage occurs, many "reptilian" communications such as shrewdly initiative responses to another individual's postural involuntarily cover (polygraphy) or initiator's may be repeated (perseveration), similar to patterns seen in present day lizards, as in ownership. Another symptom, rebuking, repeating another person's words in obligatory fashion, characterizes co-option of cortical language functions for the dictates of the ancient response formula. Fibers project dorsomedian from frontal cortex to the caudate nucleus, and lesions there may also produce parallel reptilian stereotypies. Obsessive-compulsive symptoms and repetitive syndromes experienced by patients with streptococcal induced autoimmunity damage to the basal ganglia may result from similar pathogenesis (Bilgic and Pike, 1998; Sohal, et al., 2002).

The limbic system underlies familial and other affiliative functions. MacLean (1990) highlighted a level of organization evolutionarily subservient to the R-complex, focusing on Freud's "limbic system." In the 19th century Brissac named the complex for its circumscribed location but did not speculate on function. MacLean, following earlier theory by Papez, suggested emotions serving social life achieved a new organization in early mammals in the form of fossilized amnioteocyst. Insects, birds, and fish also care for families as many did across the discussed, no MacLean's early mammals probably did not completely "originate" or "inherit" limbic structures. Advanced reptiles and mammals endowed humans with much of the core communication-macrophysiology. Siegel (1999) points out that for humans, attachment is based on collaborative communication and that secure attachment involves contingent communication, in which the signals of one person are directly responded to by the other.

Most of these major affective systems reside in prefrontal levels. Panksepp (1998) notes that many of the ancient evolutionarily derived brain systems all mammals share still serve as the foundations for the deeply experienced affective precursors of the human mind. Such ancient brain functions evolved long before the emergence of the human neocortex with its own cognitive skills. Deliberately using ventricular terms, Panksepp labels: (1) an appetitive, motivational SEEKING system that fosters energetic search and goal-directed behaviors, (2) a RAGE system aroused by threatening experiences correlated with frustration, (3) a PEACE system that minimizes bodily detection, (4) a LOVE system with separation distress to enhance bonding, (5) a LUST system, somewhat different for males and females, that enhances mating and reproduction, (6) a maternal CARE system for nurturing infants, and (7) a roughhousing PLAY system to provide youngsters with skill-building opportunities. In the human species each of these involves interactions with other people so that emotions can be viewed as communication states. Moreover, neural circuits crucial to emotional communications arise considerably earlier than did the telencephalic amygdala typically implicated in fear conditioning.

In the current research environment, emotions are studied for their brain features but not for their communicative value. For example, Ekman and Davidson (1994, p. 4) state in a critical update of emotion research that, "the only question raised ... involved the expression of emotion... because there are, regrettably, only a few scientists working on the many remaining questions about expression." Baltes (2003) noted that most theoretical and research treatments of emotions simply ignore the communication value, despite the implicit assumption that messages are important. His affiliation-conflict theory suggests emotions result from thwarted action states in the brain and body as negative emotions correlate with frustrated anticipation and positive ones with its relief. The message for biological psychiatry suggests that many emotional concerns that people deal with may clarify if communicative issues receive additional emphasis. For instance, most marital problems and satisfactions may boil down to the extent that couples tend to import each other's autonomic-emotional responses negatively or positively (Gottman et al., 2002). If so, effective therapeutic interventions may attend to macrophysiological dimensions that promote autonomic nervous system harmony via corticoligual regulation of lower brain emotional systems.

The size and accessibility of the six-layered cortex greatly expanded its later mammaloprimates. The famous "split-brain" experiments of Gazzaniga and Sperry (1967) showed the two hemisphere operate in a coordinated but different fashion. Moreover, the cortex seems more substantially advanced—*even human*—capacities such as analytic, perceptual, organizing, and planning executive operations, but these systems can also regulate lower automatic modes of the brain.

Many impulses that originate in ways not controlled by the retinal self seem correlated with damage in these massive structures. When frontal lobe damage occurs, impulsivity with sexual or aggressive displays often results to the frequent contamination of other people. Some people excessively use their verbal functions for acquiring drugs that affect mood such as caffeine, nicotine, and numerous illicit drugs that act in various brain sites, but notably in mesial basal ganglia. Thus, even though certain emotional aspects of addictions gel in subcortical areas, such as in dopamine circuitry, the accompanying strategic aspects are related more to higher cortical functions.

That the human brain is much larger than that of the other primates, even in terms of relative body size, may relate in large part to increasingly complex human sociability (Dunbar, 1998). Although other great apes live, hug, and connect with potentially communative interindividual bonds, Dunbar calculated a correlation between primate group size and the ratio of neurons to the total brain size and found that it accounts for 40 percent of the variance. Group size refers to bonded individuals—*cooperatively friendly to one another and linked genetically related to several others*. Allman (1999) confirmed his finding, even after adding the previously omitted, less primate, orangutan to his analysis. Dunbar suggested the “gossip”—reciprocal boasting small talk in which humans extensively participate—largely replaced interindividual grooming typical of nonhuman primates; he suggests that such verbal-auditory communication provides greater efficiency of bonding because more individuals can interact per session.

Other signs of sociability figured strongly in human-centered cortical evolution. Milner (1998) suggests that language first evolved to handle social information, and that it remained relatively “a social language.” He further notes that intellectual success is correlated with social success, and if social success means high biological fitness, then any favorable trait which increases the ability of an individual to outwit his fellows will soon spread throughout the gene pool. In another work on the origin of human specifically abilities, Deacon (1997) notes that our intelligence triumphed over the unique demands of reproductive competition and cooperation.... Two and a half million years of sustained selection maintained by unprecedentied communicational and cognitive traits have taken humans far from their beginnings, both in the physical changes in the brain that resulted and in the mental and cultural world that coevolved with it. He suggests human groups “should not rule,” such as they are in complexity and work given predictions that the evolution of communication of other animals would imply. That they nevertheless do exist stems in part from the development of linguistically based and increasingly socially “tribalized”—cultural stories dramatically retained over many thousands of generations in a code that fosters precultural and cultural accumulation

of explanation and, eventually, wisdom sufficient to allow the rise of complex societies and institutions.

In summary, the human genome has been sculpted for millions of years and has given rise to the human brain as an organ of layered neurocortical associations. Many communication functions reflect deep and ancient genetic plans that allow the higher reaches of the brains of highly social organisms to bring their ancestral skills to bear epigenetically and uniquely upon its multifaceted encounters with the world. Now, we turn to sociobiology, population genetics, and factors of ultimate evolutionary causation.

SOCIOBIOLOGICAL FACTORS OF ULTIMATE CAUSATION

Evolutionary biologists distinguish between proximate and ultimate or evolutionary factors in understanding inferred traits at two levels of evolutionary causality. Proximate research deals extensively with immediate details of a mechanism (i.e., physical structure including the molecules involved), or on whole organism levels, specific circumstances that elicit behavior. Ultimate research addresses adaptive features defined from intergenerational and genomic mechanisms. Both levels of causation are inextricable sides of a same coin, but, thus far, evolutionary psychopathology/psychiatry has largely taken up issues of ultimate causation.

The relatively new field of sociobiology (Wilson, 1975) concerns itself with molecular processes from ultimate causation to proximal expression. It is deeply rooted in the behavior genetics, developmental psychobiology, and sociobiology that preceded it (e.g., Bussell, 1989; Scott and Fatus, 1986). The impact of Wilson's contributions was tempered by male chauvinism including a rebuke from Gould and Lewontin (1979) that evolutionary "just so" stories were unsupported by research data and should be avoided. Segalowitz (2000) comprehensively reviewed the sociobiology field and concluded that by deploying scientific rules of evidence, sociobiological research has resulted in a solid body of data, earning its legitimacy as it moves beyond the rather political considerations of early critics.

Biology is a related approach. Biologists examine animal behavior via Tinbergen's four perspectives: (1) mechanistic—neural, physiological, or psychological elements underlie expression and regulation, (2) ontogenetic—development in an individual's life, (3) functional—how a given trait helps survival and reproduction, and (4) phylogenetic—how ancestral and contemporary features overlap or diverge. Biology and sociobiology complement one another and are also compatible with psychiatry. They may assist the pathophysiological formulation of its conditions. The emergent field of evolutionary psychology has focused on selected features of this intellectual arena, reflecting how ultimate evolutionary theoretical findings and more proximal empirical analyses can cross fertilize each other.

Much work labeled as evolutionary psychology centers on altruistic behavior and inclusive fitness. Reciprocal altruism refers to exchange mechanisms ("I do for you and in return you will do for me") and does not represent altruism in the sense of losing or risking something for seemingly little gain (like losing one's life to rescue another

parent). Social insects present the outward paradox that nonproducing members of the colony (e.g., helper ants, worker bees) work hard for the group yet their individual genes do not directly descend to subsequent generations. Pondered about how such insects evolved, evolutionary geneticist William Hamilton (1964) recognized that gene transmission is relatives resemble each other proportionately more than do those of less related individuals (relatedness = "the same genes") and, hence, indirect reproduction was possible via selection within an inclusive fitness.

Dawkins (1976, 1989) popularized Hamilton's ideas using the "selfish gene" metaphor—an organism manifestly embodies an ancestral gene that never dies or lingers in the reproductive line generation or until mutation occurs. Hamilton's formula brings up genetic relatedness and reads $C > B/r$ [where C represents the costs to a giver, which must be less than the fitness benefit (B) obtained by helping an individual whose degree of relatedness is indicated by value r].

Hamilton's reasoning and formulas have been applied widely in evolutionary psychology to explain altruism in many species, including humans, and at various physiological levels ranging from germ cell to the human body. Daly and Wilson (1980) predicted that benefit and hostility to others would occur in proportion to kinship, and they demonstrated that closer genetic relatives display greater benevolence and less deadly hostility toward each other with respect to familial violence. Spouses, in-laws, and step-children die more often in family violence by a factor of 10, compared to parents, siblings, and genetically related relatives. Moen et al. (2002) tested similar Hamiltonian thinking for their findings on sperm behavior of European door mice. Some sperm "paved the way" for others in the same ejaculate so that the latter gain more rapid access to the uterus. This "investment" allowed the first ejaculate to mature sperm from other males mating near the same time. Since the helper sperm lose their capacity to bind to the zona pellucida and fertilize, they displayed altruistic behavior from an inclusive fitness perspective.

Darwin's (1871) proposals on sexual selection likewise remain central to evolutionary thinking with increased interest in male-male competition on one hand and female selectivity on the other. Females possess greater investment from the greater time and body resources (e.g., ovulation, lactation) devoted to offspring, as well as a lower level of possible fecundity. This contrasts with males who sometimes invest only ejaculate with no ensuing parental concerns. Due to sexual constraints, fathers can never invest as much affiliation as mothers. This dichotomy of paternal investment (Petersen, 1972) explains why females often discriminate attractiveness about prospective mates—comparing which candidate will produce better quality offspring, examining, for instance, fighting ability, cleverness, and health (that of animals may be assessed through red skin or appendages). The peacock illustrates another violation of norms, for example, when she evaluates the "vibrancy" of the peacock's tail. If fancy tails indicate male healthiness, the cost afford such "luxury". The better his offspring would be with his genes, it has been suggested that human evaluations of "fancy" link to such fitness detection concerns (Miller, 2000).

Likewise, numerous authors (see Daly, 1999) note infanticide in many species practiced by a male newly competing with the mother. He does this so that, in ultimate

cavation terms, his own gene's coster have access to the female's reproductive efforts and also to help assure that his own effort is not "underfunded." In many species females quickly become fertile upon no longer nursing the young of the previous father. Also, maternal infanticide can result from a mother's estimation of poor resources. For example, a woman only in life may kill her children, but later if married well, typically displays model maternal attachment. Some human cultures have sanctioned the culling of infants that may not thrive. Probable mechanisms overcome ultimate goals. Hrdy (1999) points out that efficient primate carehavers sometimes sacrifice the optimal relational, inclusive-exclusion calculations of Hamilton, Trivers, and others. For instance, humans and other primates exhibit one such placement-primitivity in the form of allo-mothering—infant care by other females ("nannies") or by adoptive parents.

Trivers (1974) suggested parents and offspring feel different values according to their roles, which explains many sibling and parent-offspring conflicts. For example, siblings commonly compete even though parents typically hope that they not; each sibling wishes to gather as many resources as possible, but the parents wish to apportion them equally, given that each child carries on an equal number of parental genes. Starting from this tradition, Haig (1996) noted some genes even within a body might compete with others, as with eye color. Alleles with a gene from each parent express only one (dominant versus recessive). Examining imprinted genes confirmed separately from mother and father, Haig investigated facets of pregnancy and fetal growth and concluded that certain of the father's genes seem to exploit the mother continually for as many offspring as possible while her work to conserve her resources to do a better job on fetus. Even body parts may derive from one parent instead of the other; for instance, the elements of cerebral cortex may derive more from maternally imprinted genes, while development of subcortical areas (*i.e.* *midbrain*) are influenced more by paternal ones (Keverne et al., 1999). Since subcortical areas facilitate emotional neurophysiology while cortical areas facilitate more cognitive abilities, it may be that paternal genes influence the more behavioral-emotional aspects of reproductive skills while maternal genes are more important for cognitive-affective decisions.

The scientific paradigm that "selfish motives" operate in organisms and their subparts (e.g., genes) via robustly mechanism selection originally arose to counter earlier ideas that individuals perform altruistically for the "good of the group." This clicked powerful subtexts related on precise application of Hamilton's kinship selection formula. But in recent point-counterpoint contributions, commentators suggest models by which tightly bonded groups can indeed be considered "organisms" or adaptive units, wherein altruism operates at the level of group selection (as distinct from the direct kinship selection that drives bonding selection). Therefore self-sacrifice and altruism may merit more complex explanations (D.S. Wilson, 2002).

All humans are related to one other in the sense of sharing compatible genes, but this does not prevent formation of competitive subgroups, often and antagonistic to one another (Waddington and Petersen, 1998). For example, human laughter facilitates inter- and intra-group cooperation. Bonding laughter concerns in-group relations, but mocking

heighten emphasize the rejection of alien individuals (Dob-Dobrovitz, 1989). Obviously, mate, parenting, and those powerfully act in human emotional interactions and sociophysiological processes that can promote mental disease.

LoCayo and Moller (2000) summarize evolutionary psychological perspectives from the human vantage point, whereas Whiten and Peterson (1999) use a comparative primate perspective in a book preservatively titled *Domestic Males*. Chimpanzees and humans display similar male-bonding and warfare strategies; for instance, the climatically contrast to bonobos, where females are far more influential perhaps in part as this allows them greater social time dedicated to sexual communication with less hostile aggression.

Psychiatric symptoms can sometimes represent prominent endocrinological or mechanisms implicitly deployed. Evolutionary psychiatrists have speculated that, if an individual's conversationalical evaluations are stimulated at a time and place other than that which spurred its ultimate "thought," then the person may develop a disorder. This relates closely to mismatch theory, which holds that mechanisms evolved for life in previous eras may not suit the present time (Barley, 1999). In technical terms, this may reflect an aspect of genetic phenotypic plasticity. Along with Harmskjaer and colleagues (2000), Ghans and Franco (2000) utilized mismatch theory to formulate guidelines for an approach they called *Evolutionary psychopathology*.

Darwinian gene theory represents another powerful heuristic, particularly as population geneticist Maynard Smith (1992) specified evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) to analyze how individuals compete for heightened reproductive fitness in each generation. For example, a K-reproductive strategy entails much attention to the well-being of offspring, whereas another, r-reproductive strategy, entails fortifying as many females as possible but investing little or nothing in those produced so that quantity gains emphasis over quality. Medley (2000) elaborated how sex differences represent different developmental and evolutionary strategies. One of the most striking examples is male homosexuality with its characteristic selflessness and exploitation.

Over a century ago, Robertson (1890) suggested the symptoms of disease need to be traced to the functions of health, and that both need to be carried back to their origin in evolution. The next section deals with how this suggestion results in pathogenetic formulations for psychiatry. How has psychiatric disorder deviated from usual sociophysiological order?

PSYCHIATRIC PATHOGENESIS AS COMMUNICATIONAL DISORDER

The IASP Research Committee (Baldwin et al., 2002, p. 115) suggested that the concept of the brain as an organ that manages social life provides significant power for psychiatry's basic science. This committee defined the social brain by its function, namely,

... the brain is a body organ that mediates social interaction while also serving as the repository of those interactions ... between brain physiology and the individual environment. The brain is the organ most influenced on the earliest level by social factors across development; in turn, the expression of brain function determines and arranges an

individual's personal and social experience. The social brain framework . . . helps explain and explain all psychopathology. A single gene-based disorder like Huntington disease is expressed in a large number of mental dysfunctions. Conversely, numerous genes have directed impact on the brain as does the socially intensive process of psychotherapy.

The group further suggested that burgeoning developments in neural and genetic areas put added demands on the conceptual structure of psychiatry, and that findings from such work must be juxtaposed and correlated with the behavioral and representational facets of psychiatry to give it a true biological foundation. Psychiatry's full and unified entry into the realm of theory-driven and data-based medical science has been evoked, but the social brain concept allows psychiatry to utilize pathogenesis in a manner parallel to practice in other specialties. The social brain concept:

ultimately adds to:

- unify the biological, psychological and social factors in psychiatric illness,
- classify components of illness into meaningful functional subsets that deviate in distinctive ways from normal physiology,
- improve diagnostic validity by promoting testable-clinical formulations from behavior-based social processes.

This section first defines the broad nature of human communication and then notes that psychiatric disorders display problems in social interaction from observational-attributional viewpoints. We suggest that pathogenesis formulations profit from socio-physiological considerations. A new method for understanding psychiatric pathogenesis entails across-species contrasts and comparisons. When humans and other animals exhibit homologous similarities, a common ancestor can be inferred with genomic and body elements identical in humans. When on the other hand, humans contrast with other animals, the observer can infer that the origins occurred in the unique evolution of humans from precursor primates. Examining communicational gregariousness as features that humans share with other species helps establish their antiquity in deep time; indeed, animal models of disorder become possible when correlations are shared (Kaufman and McKinney, 2001). Contrariwise, when structures and mechanisms contrast between humans and other animals, as with verbal language and bimodality human disease processes, animal models provide less relevance.

The brain mediates many functions, but conspecific communication accounts for a large proportion of its activity. This can be appreciated by considering, for example, the amount of cerebral cortex devoted to verbal and nonverbal communication including pattern recognition and pattern generation required for writing, as well as facial recognition, planning behavior, and suppression of impulses originating from lower centers. Verbal communication of course reflects an extraordinary human capability utilized to using detailed stories for informing, planning, boasting, gossip, and entertainment.

Neurology frequently notes aphasia and other language disruptions as "communicational" disturbances, but such linguistic impairments represent only a subset of communication-related disorders. Social interactions entail much more than words alone

and long preceded language in the phylogeny of mating signals and other intraspecific exchanges. Humans share many of the circumstantial abnormalities evident in primateity with other animals so that ancient roots can be inferred. On the other hand, humans as a highly gregarious species provide help to their fellow compatriots and contribute to other animals by exhibiting more cooperativeness and helpfulness to others, frequently strangers. Indeed, this may represent a core ingredient of psychotherapy (Wampold, 2001), further developed in the last section of this chapter.

Communication is an intrinsic function of the social brain that occurs when an individual encodes signals so that at least one other conspecific might receive, interpret, and act upon the contents of the message. Posture, emitted behavior, tone, volume, emotional, and other modulated signals may augment or replace vocalizations (Smith, 1977). Burgoon et al. (1994) assert that no one exists in a vacuum, and that "Everyday behavior is a spiraling hierarchy of interdependent levels, family, groups, and organizations. The pervasiveness of communication in this hierarchy is but one indication of the importance of this process in our lives." Animals link with each other not only for reproduction and offspring care but for joint foraging, warmth, and protection from predators. Broadly construed, individuals use signals to space themselves most appropriately from one another. Solitary species exist that are as discrete as the monogynous spiny oysters (oviparous) and primate orangutans, but of course numbers of both link for mating.

Communication among conspecifics is an important an attribute of animal life—the basic and ancient genomic programs encode it. Basic genomic elements probably originated with the master control genes (*tau*, *forkhead*, or *forkotic*), the regulators that regulate body plan template common to vertebrates and nonvertebrates (Edelman, 1995). Signal systems encoded in the genome and, developing over millions of years, have influenced the social organizational patterns of many descendant species. For instance, the promoter region of the neuropeptide receptor gene influences the degree of sociability that field mice exhibit and genetic engineering of this region increases social responsiveness in mice with social temperament (Young et al., 1999).

To summarize, communication pervades human experience and virtually all psychopathology entails abnormal social signals. Our research and clinical challenge hinge on understanding what causes abnormalities to occur and how they can be remedied. Patients exhibit the imperative nature of some circumstantial propensity states (depressions, mania, depressions, obsessions, and compulsions). An emphasis on propensity stems from the observation that while no certain signal can be predicted when an individual experiences such a state, the general range of the signal can; thus, charismatic leaders and visionaries tend to push an agenda of controlling others, normally appealing and depressed people signal relative worthlessness, and members of discriminated-against-minority groups and patients with paternostic delusions feel suspicious and fearful of harm from others. Consistency of delusional details may vary even in the same patient during an illness, but the force of conviction and perceived veracity do not vary until the condition recedes. This may arise from the lower brain location of neurons (more anteriorly ventral) that brought about or propagated the aberrant reaction. Information from psychopharmacology has amply demonstrated that the actions

of many drugs that affect psychiatric states also influence linguistic syntax availability or function of synapses. Also, these models—that focus on neurotransmitter and neuromodulator agents—have been tested using across-species contrasts and comparative methodology.

Communicational propensity states typify many psychiatric disorders in that these states resemble normal signal patterns but may be exaggerated at the wrong time or place, or are expressed too strongly, or stem from incorrect social assessment or other idiosyncrasies. Of course, since people who defensively or adaptively feel and express how self-esteem is best expressed or stabilized in a way that helps survival and welfare, for an across-species comparison, dogs may get along better when they behave submissively and if they feel guilty for transgressions. In addition to providing unverifiable arguments, such guilt and shame responses possess adaptive functions, allowing competing individuals to coexist more peacefully. Examples follow of psychiatric disorders that may also represent communicational disorders.

Distorted suspicions hold with great tenacity characterize persecutory delusions. A pathogenetic formulation suggests that patients feel the object of out-group hostility that would be rational were they in the territory of another. Whangwan and Peterson (1996) note xenophobia or hatred of out-group individuals characterizes both human and chimpanzee populations. If an individual belongs to a hated subgroup and shows up in the wrong territory, he or she would do well to display what a person with persecutory delusions experiences: bias, suspicion of persecution, great anxiety, and great resistance to reassurance. Hence, a defining characteristic of psychosis, belief of belief, might present like it stimulated at the right time and location. Antipsychotic medications consider these attitudes in the psychiatric setting where the feelings outweigh the reality. They dampen dopamine receptors and operate on both very ancient and more recently evolved receptor types.

When depressed patients are observed, they exhibit under-submissiveness and self-aggression. This can be characterized as approach/avoidance displays that would be adaptive should a punishing authority in fact be in-charge (Price, 1987; Price et al., 2004). This underlines the observation that affects contribute powerfully to social communication. Submissive displays characterize group living throughout the animal world.

Urge effects to dominate and influence other people typify mania (Gurley, 1992) as well as antisocial personality-disordered patients. Intuitive and aggressive behaviors denote the diagnosis of conduct disorders of children and sociopathy in adults. Of course, taking an aggressive or leadership role may be highly adaptive given prehistoric circumstances, as may persistence in *in patere*. That these conditions are more easily accounted with frontal cortical brain damage finds that human evolution provided suppressive factors for such expression, as when also enhanced by high concentrations of the inhibitory gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) in the cerebral cortex, the most parsimonious neurotransmitter in this brain region.

Domineering sexual and aggressive behaviors characterize both elevated testosterone and mania with some similarity in clinical presentation. This similarity helps define pathogenetic models and methods of investigating neurophysiological pathogenesis

some of which are detailed below. Pedophilia entails unconscious attraction to children, and the term rape labels inappropriate sexual advances. Both entail forced mating. Of course, mating behaviors entail extremely ancient competitive communications.

Other communication features can also be seen in psychiatry. For instance, social distancing represents a feature of schizotypal, narcissistic personality disorders, and autistic disorders. Of course, at times, being alone can benefit the person, as with creative artists (Shaywitz, 1988). People with schizotypal personality disorders and early schizophrenia tell of experiences that are quite "odd" or atypical experiences via a vicarious norm. Yet at times such experiences have high social value as they may be prized by other group members, who consider them to reveal religious insights. A common "theory of the other person's mind" seems to characterize autistic patients—the patient can't feel, think, or act as another person does and therefore looks "queer."

Unkind attention to devaluable appearance represents a partial factor in restricting rating disorders as well as in tightly held convictions about body形象 in body dysmorphic disorder. Persons with dependent and borderline personality disorders work to elicit nurturance but accomplish it in a devious way that typically alienates others, causing them to be regarded as "problem patients." Still worse, borderline patients often tell of troubled hereditarian backgrounds with the communication problems of boundary violations, abuse, and ambivalent nurturance. The idea of psychiatric syndromes as communication pathology seems clearest when maladaptive social signaling persists despite the punishing results of alienation from others, loss of esteem, incarceration, disability, and even the risk of death, or from suicide. Social anxiety obviously entails competitive communications. Abnormal fears as in this and other anxiety disorders often value a friend (often family) to nearly. Value of this kind seems to characterize social animals, certainly humans.

In summary, viewed pathophysiologicaly, psychiatric patients emit verbal and nonverbal communications that evolved to be adaptive, but failing, circumstantial, and persistent may make them maladaptive. Regarding competitive competition, Price and Horan (1987) suggested escalating and dissociating strategies that accomplished winning or losing, respectively, and that these relate to affective spectrum disorders such as mania and depression. Indeed, affective or mood disorders can also be viewed as communication disorders (Luthar, 1988) in the course of which patients signal excessive social dominance or submissiveness to others. This does not trivialize the feelings involved because social rank issues obviously provoke powerful affects, such as those that accompany defeat, submission, and loss on the one hand and victory and triumph on the other. Communications expressed by patients can be adaptive in certain contexts, but not in the context in which the psychiatric disorder has emerged.

In the following, research findings illustrate neurophysiological and neurochemical attributes of various levels of the social brain. They investigate research formulations that may elaborate sociophysiological pathogenesis. For example, D.S. Wilson (2002) notes that the effects of cocaine illustrate the stimulation of Price's mesolimbic

and depressive/deactivation strategic social rank hierarchy competitive behaviors. That is, cocaine actions in the brain mimic both manic and depressive symptoms. Amphetamine increases synaptic dopamine that then mediates raised and anxiety. Ten chronic overstimulation of D₁ receptors eventually induces down-regulated physical dependence (Pax et al., 2002). Similarly, abrupt cessation of cocaine depletes dopamine and induces acute agitated depression. A reverting chronic syndrome of anhedonia, dysphoria, lethargy, somnolence, and apathy may last a year or more.

Resuming cellular molecular research on the origins of neuroinhibitors and neuromodulators relates to communication biology relevant both to the action of psychiatric drugs on the one hand and to across-species contrasts and comparisons due to neurophysiological pathogenesis on the other hand. The major classes of neurotransmitters originated remarkably early in intracellular messengers of unicellular organisms (BIB, Wilson, 2002; Smith, 2002). Neuropeptides seem to have functioned first as intracellular signals and then acquired capacities for intercellular communication and hormonal action as well—still retaining intracellular roles. Proteins and finally all molecules exhibit these uses. Free prokaryotes share a saliently diverse catalytic enzyme, monooxygenase oxidase. Catecholamine receptors developed from primordial monooxygenase tyrosylidines receptors before arthropod and chordate lineages diverged. Dopamine probably emerged as the first but with functions limited to metabolic activity because all chordates exhibit its presence, but it probably was later re-assigned to neurotransmission given its location in neuronal groups higher in the nervous system than either noradrenergic or serotonergic. Serotonin may have originated in chordate gut tissue (Indeed, 90 percent of human serotonin resides in the gut, but cyclosporine (anergy) brain tissue shows its greatest density establishing its neural role at about the choroid-ventricular interface).

With vertebrate evolution, further neurotransmitter and receptor variations evolved to mediate basic neurophysiological repertoires, such as fear (already described as anxiety). These appear to have elaborated further to serve conspecific relations, as they vary with social rank hierarchies. Serotonin and dopamine co-varied in the course of brain as they mediated increasingly complex neurophysiological pathways of social rank hierarchy regulation. Owsenkamp and Reich (1995) depict molecular analytic techniques that allowed recent fuller appreciation of how dopamine and serotonin work in an orchestrated fashion, often with seeming reciprocity. As these substances play important roles for psychoactive drugs, their normal metabolism provides conceptual models for how drugs act, and equally importantly for the central thesis of this chapter, furnishes empirical insights for the underpinnings for how psychiatric disorders may represent alterations of normal neurophysiology.

In addition to pathogenesis, neurophysiology also provides apt metaphors for illness-treatment explanations, in themselves important components of doctor and patient decision making, as will be developed later. Interestingly, among Sigmund Freud's underlying conceptual legacies, that of transference and countertransference, is intrinsically one of social communication. Next we turn to research efforts that model neurophysiological research integrating whole organism biology (behavior) with cell biological data.

RESEARCH ON SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND SOCIAL RANK HIERARCHY

A major problem for psychiatry's basic science is a clear need for a comprehensive integration of parallel biobehavioral phenomena—from organ and cell levels up through to the level of individual and group behavior. Research efforts often assume that clinical phenomena "empirically" are best studied in individual subjects—as though they existed in isolation. This has worked against pathophysiological formulations. Addiction research has recently provided encouraging data, however. It studies the human propensity to seek and use reinforcing drugs with consequent drug craving. Society finds drug addiction pervasively troubling. Behaviorally, addicts go to great lengths to acquire drugs. While a "comorbidational problem" may seem counterintuitive because the person seems to act out a "personal need," drugs stimulate feelings that relate to social roles, such as enhanced sense of power after initiating alcohol (Newlin, 2002). Twelve-step and other social programs play integral roles in reversing maladaptive thinking and other drug use, suggesting social processes are broadly involved in the tendency to develop addictions. More specific evoked sociophysiological formulations may underlie the epigenetic risk of substance abuse (Wilson, 1989). The "abuse" may have arisen not as an addiction per se but from adaptive qualities (Shore and Berndt, 1991). Addiction obligatorily requires culture for its realization, although its mechanisms predate culture. Therefore, addicts may have latent but important genetically encoded sociophysiological attributes. This aspect of addiction may keep careful psychiatric investigations.

A variety of neurophysiological systems subserve this sociophysiology. For example, opiates operate in the central nervous system by stimulating endogenous opiate receptors in affected subjects' well-being, and alcohol facilitates DA/DA₁ receptor activity as do benzodiazepines and barbiturate-sedatives (though alcohol, uniquely among sedative-hypnotics, also blocks a glutamate receptor thereby causing greater intoxication). Cocaine increases synaptic levels of dopamine, serotonin, and norepinephrine via inhibition of preexisting reuptake transporters to induce arousal while amphetamine action is primarily via direct cell entry that causes monoamine release and synaptic excitability. Nestler (1999) uses these diverse receptor actions within an overarching model as the pathways extend up the neurons from the posterior forebrain to include hypothalamic nuclei and converge on the mesocorticolimbic dopamine system with resultant reinforcement for continued drug usage.

In addition to the more accepted dopaminergic systems, Newlin (2002) implicates the posterior locus coeruleus in addiction mechanisms. He suggests addicts evolutionarily pursue a self-preserved survival fitness strategy. Acute intoxication causes the person to feel physiologically engaged with the world but leaves chronic psychopathology as it both facilitates and constitutes a neural system vulnerable to temporary, artificial activation by drugs of abuse.

Electrostimulation of this system causes individuals to seek, self-stimulate. In some rodent models the switch is self-activated many times per second. Panksepp (1998) has argued that this should not be labeled "reward" as earlier investigation did because the reward in fact involves the appetitive arm of an appetite-activation cycle. As this

appetitive engagement process differs considerably from the reward associated with sexual or food satisfaction, he labeled the overall neuropsychological system as *allo-*
ISO and emphasized how it enhances inhibited interest in and exploration and curiosity
of the environment.

Additional complementary data come from substance abuse research. Morgan et al.
(2002) linked dopamine systems to social rank hierarchy. Using positron emission
tomography (PET), investigators evaluated the self-administration of cocaine on D₂
receptor occupancy in Rhesus monkeys with different ranks of social dominance. High
dominance produced evidence of heightened dopamine activity in the basal ganglia
compared to when the same animals were socially isolated or in contrast to subdominant
status. Indeed, dominant animals atop ranks in groups of three showed no interest
in cocaine (for whom it had no reinforcement value). This was not true of the lowest-
ranking subordinates, however, who universally showed great interest. The negative
correlation for drug use and status accounted for 25 percent of the variance.

Human social rank hierarchies can be examined by the manifest behaviors of
other psychiatric conditions. For example, mood disorders (manic versus cyclothymic)
distinguish leadership. On the other hand, normal leaders exemplify "alpha" behavior,
presumably via a physiologically sustained apparatus of social rank modulation. Presi-
dent Lyndon Johnson, though not functionally nor technically "mama," displayed core
characteristics of mama—extraordinary energy, sociability, planning behavior, strong
hands, and a commanding manner (Cain, 2002). Is this the reflected activation of an
alpha communication property also key to effective leadership? The neurophysi-
cal apparatus can become dysregulated, however, particularly as to threshold, rate,
and arousal factors that influence triggering, exhibition, and/or under social pressur-
e (Gardner, 1982). Thus, clinical presentation can be read into emotional and
subsyndromal components that may lend greater understanding to clinical problems as
well as naturally adaptive features.

A related study compared manic patients and normals (Gardner, 1982) according
to features of their communicational propensity score. That is, nearly all manic patients
were assessed using an "alpha scale" derived from the core social dominance characteris-
ticization of mama as listed in the form of a 12-item checklist in a leading manual for the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual, Third Edition (DSM-III). Their scores did not
differ statistically from those of healthy community leaders matched for age and sex;
the two groups did differ, however, from other rated groups: healthy low-profile
community citizens and bipolar patients (patients from lithium treatment). Members of
the two latter groups did not differ from each other on the alpha scale nor from a
large introductory psychology class. This can be understood as reflecting a system for
alpha communication (among dominants). Dominants in most animal groups have
more mating privileges. This and related phenomena are often seen in high-ranking
humans, as well (Pengelham and Petrone, 1999). Such propagation evolved initially
to facilitate preadult competition for mating and other resources, only later influencing
other functions, such as parenting in mammals, and ultimately in humans, such roles as
breeding and political position.

To date, researchers have poorly appreciated the biology of social rank hierarchy. Some male rhesus, for example, change sex in response to social subordination. From the standpoint of evolutionary genetics, "sex" genes may then be transmitted to progeny after "sex" comes with the dominant male (Koenigswald, 1979). Social rank choice, related ranks rats, and New World monkeys also directly supports sexual reproductive physiology when occupying subordinate positions in the social hierarchy (Alfonso et al., 1990). Sapolsky (1994) distinguished between dominant and subordinate baboons by measuring stress hormones linked to the pathophysiology of anxiety and anxiety disorders. Biological profiles of subordinates differ from those of more dominant animals in many species (Sapolsky, 1994). Moreover, hormone levels in both dominants and subordinates animals vary as a function of group stability, but social rank instability affects individuals differently, both with respect to directional trends in rank (going up versus down), as well as basal temperatures (Sapolsky, 1994). Sociophysiological feedback in the natural environment largely determines dominance-subordination relationships. Moreover, pharmacological probes emphasize differences between dominant and subordinate animals. For example, rhesus monkeys given amphetamines react according to rank. Dominants show augmented threat, chase, and attack behaviors, but subordinates increased submissive behaviors. For example, five primates and human assays (D.R. Wilson, 2002). A female rhesus monkey given amphetamines showed marked differences in the way from one group to another. A low ranking in the first group, she behaved in an isolated fearful way, and amphetamines characteristically aggravated this. But when in the new group, where the alpha male is replaced by thereby elevating her status, she changed behavior accordingly and under the influence of amphetamines she threatened even more effectively and repeatedly.

In raged rhesus monkey colonies of both sexes, serotonin levels reflect ranks in males (Roldagh et al., 1994). Serotonin blood levels persistently increase twice higher in dominants compared to their subordinates (the same effect exists in humans but less dramatically; perhaps because human social rank represents a more complicated story). When removed from the cage and alone, the alpha rhesus's serotonin blood levels fall over time while that of one of the subordinates remaining behind rises, as he newly assumes alpha status. Restoration of the formerly dominant male to the colony results in renewed increases in serotonin levels correlated with his renewed status as dominant (this doesn't happen with a sufficiently delayed reunion, which diminishes rank continuity). Use of the serotonin reuptake inhibitor, fluoxetine, caused subordinates to achieve elevated alpha status (Roldagh et al., 1994).

Interestingly, discussions of basal ganglia physiology characteristically focus on movement disorders from the unoward effects of neuroleptic drugs. To such discussions may benefit from MacLean's focus (1996) on those processes that function in part to mediate ancient communicational repertoires that developed in deep time as part of the 8-circuits. Postural effects with communicational impact stem from increased-expansive in the basal ganglia; thus, the precursor molecule levodopa used as a treatment for parkinsonism may produce an expanded posture when the dose exceeds therapeutic levels (Cross and Glaros, 1992). Ethological observations in many species

show that dominance correlates with the animal exhibiting larger postures and submissive yielding with a smaller pose. The levodopa-induced arm-knee extension resulting in a body-expander resembles that assumed by a person exerting dominance. In contrast, people with parkinsonism exhibit abnormally low levels of dopamine in these structures and typically show a broad shoulder posture similar to a person submitting. Of course, these social rank postures are normally deployed in more distinct, socially communicative forms, that is, throwing the shoulders back and raising the arms when showing authority versus bowing and lowering when submitting or supplicating.

Skin hormones also reflect social context and rank, in many species including humans. Androgen levels in both men and women vary depending on their degrees of sexual competition or cooperation and also with success in competitive games (Kemper, 1984). Increases occur in even nonphysical competition such as chess. Thus testosterone and androsterone production not only reflect features of social status, affect, and trust but link directly to reproductive biology itself.

D.B. Wilson (2002) integrates social dominance research within the theme hierarchy in a review that summarizes current knowledge of the phylo-ontogeny of neuroincentivization and neurotransmission. Notably, avian-like reptilian algorithms for dominance and submission remain active and there still exist mammalian complexes such as thermoregulation, motherhood, parenting pair bonding, support of life, play, and emotional affiliation (deClerck, 1990). Vertebrate brains, notably those of humans, seem able to integrate a range of self-schemas from various sources. Illustrating a theme underlined elsewhere in this chapter, self-esteem not surprisingly rises and falls on the basis of reciprocated signals (Bil-Hibaishi, 1995), self-esteem being linked to the rank the individual perceives in the eyes of conspecifics. Expression and regulation of such signals originate from phylogenetically old, deeply enrooted sociophysiological systems bequeathed to any individual from inherited genetic elements that regulate behavior. Subsequent mammalian and primate evolution greatly elaborate these sociophysiological repertoires; novel elements overlap but do not wholly replace more primitive features. Reactions therewith often modify and integrate using primate-mammalian sociophysiology. For example, later Leslie, vertical, reenforced tissues (and neuroendocrine innovations) interact with simpler functions that assess status.

Despite the primary limitations of animal forms, however, the human capacity for experiencing communication states can be quite plastic. Thus, if one deliberately chooses to be subordinate, then interestingly one becomes "in charge" of that new position so that it can be assumed "conflict free." This can be distinguished from "inevitable" subordination, for instance, that may represent cognitive appreciation of the necessity to submit, but another level still holds out for winning. This, of course, is hardly unique to humans (e.g., dogs seem very satisfied with subordinate roles, though they also exert control over masters). And of course, the use of language in fostering more considerable submissive states demonstrates part of the power of this human "invention."

Table 20.1 illustrates how MacLean's (1990) demonstration of the theme hierarchy of brain levels helps organize such complex sociophysiology. Simply rendering these three levels in matrix form across the two social modes (modeled by gene

TABLE 20.1. Evolutionary Sociophysiology: "Hawk" and "Dove" Game Theory Models at Three Brain Levels

Three Brain Levels, Neural Node, and Responses and Cognitive, Behavioral and Neurophysiological Aspects	Two Social Modes	
Primitivization Circuit (SAFP) Sensory-Cognition/SACP Cognition (in) active $D_1 + D_2 = D_3, 4 + D_3$ Activated neurokininotransmitter A: peptides	"Hawk" / interactive Optimistic behavior Mimic sociopathy $D_2, D_3, 4$, and NHP high	"Dove" / divisive Pessimistic and shamed Depressed and obstinate D_1 low, $D_3, 4$ and NHP
Promotion/Punishment Aggressive—nonaggressive Alert > cognition $S_1 > S_2, D_3, 4 > D_1$ Primitive neurokininotransmitter and peptides	Central SACP Control + inter Aggressive and mimetic $S_1, S_2, 4$ and NHP high	Dominated Downcast looks Marked and maniacistic $S_1, D_3, 4$ and NHP low
Reptile Midbrain (RM) Territorial—territorial/AB Intrinsic vs. other vs. aggression $D_2 \ll D_3 \ll D_4 \ll D_5, 6$ Few neurokininotransmitter and peptides	Fighting Bottom and strong Violent and vicious D_1 and NHP high/VI	Floating Cowering and weak Frightened, abular D_1 and NHP low/VI

Hawk = evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS); sociophysiological expression = dominant.

Dove = evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS); sociophysiological expression = submissive.

SAFP = situated agency behavior.

SACP = sensor holding potential.

AB = aversive behavior.

VI = ventrilo subcortex (by numbered type, if applicable).

VI = aggressive subcortex (by numbered type, if applicable).

NHP = nonpathologic subcortex (by numbered type, if applicable).

theory yields an illustrative template in which a variety of neurophysiological, cognitive-behavioral, and other sociophysiological information can be correlated. For example, the three levels each display a different evolutionarily stable strategy that entails varying ratios of instinctive, cognitive, and rational behavioral responses that may be perceived to have evolved in serial assemblies. These begin with the more primitive situated agnostic behavior (SAFB) of the reptile midbrain, sensor holding potential (SHP) in the paleo-primate/paleolimbic system and social-anterior holding potential (SAHP) in the emotional neocortication, mesolimbic, and amygdala regions (Uhlir, 1992). Likewise, as a working hypothesis based on an array of existing data, the three levels may exhibit unique variations—phylogenetic mality—of peptidergic and neurokininotransmitter subtypes, normal and pathological expressions, and other behaviors for evolutionary selective advantage (Wilson, 2002a). Moreover, these serial

levels such modulate sociophysiological communications in a bimodal fashion with differential expression of phylogenetic repertoires for dominance and submission and associated neurobiological or behavioral markers and clinical phenomenology.

The above summarizes research illustrating how levels of analysis can be sociophysiologically integrated. Of course, the field of neuroscience labors in just an arena that it almost defines coherent conceptual modeling. But a precisely focused basic science rubric for psychiatry may foster research creativity and levels of integration. In particular, the application of evolutionary wisdom with its basic tools of Darwinian analysis should promote a comprehensive perspective beyond the current inclusive program of "micro-blendism," and additionally, lend foundational depth and comprehensiveness to human behavioral capacities and dysfunctions.

PRELIMINARY TREATMENT IMPLICATIONS

Since all psychiatric disorders reflect disturbances in communications, and both the brain and body direct much metabolic action to mediating social behavior (behavior features of which correlate with psychiatric illness), the study of communicational sociophysiology will foster more illuminating across-species comparisons. Such studies will generate robust evolutionary information, particularly on the operation of conserved versus emergent features of basic behavioral systems in specific clinical problems.

All psychiatric treatments hinge on communication. Of course, this is the prime mission of psychotherapy, but psychopharmacology also requires effective communication in that patients must disclose systemic phenomena and physicians must elicit cooperation via informed consent. In addition, pharmacological agents impact communicational propensity states, functions, and outcomes. Also, akin to psychotherapy, placebo effects represent the benefits of interpersonal communication and cultural expectation. The patient responding to be helped feels helped and indeed often is, for reasons other than the intended effects of the agent in question (Brown, 1998).

Sont (1999) has suggested that conspecifics regulate each other in that physiology may be affected more or less directly by factors in the ecosystem and in social systems. An individual's behavior can also affect a social system or ecosystem, but effects are usually much more evident in the reverse direction, from the higher levels down. Communication behaviors generated by the body influence the bodies of other conspecifics, for example, the stress-producing effects of a hostile put-down on the one hand, or the restorative effects of a mother on a distressed child on the other. Hinde (1994) working with rat pups and their mothers noted that the mother regulates infant homeostasis. Both Harlow (McKinney, 1988) and Bowlby (1998) documented the importance of attachment for primate infants. The salutary effects of people on one another stretch well beyond childhood, affecting outcome health and outcome effects of stressors throughout life (Weil and Brink, 1993).

MacLean (1990) also documents how the cortex itself may have altered and increased its role as a neuroregulatory communication device because its older component—the cholinoregulatory system—mediated the number-elevating disease

call that emerged at some indeterminate point around the squirrel-monkey transition. Dr. B. Wilson (2002) emphasizes how the molecules that release bonding, and indeed all neurotransmitters, originated in deep time and persist into the present with phylogenetic lineage of breathtaking specific derivation. Via chemicals of parenting and motherhood such as oxytocin and arginine-vasopressin, babies respond thermally and cognitively to adult parental attention and attachment (Holt, 1999; Harris, 1989; Siegel, 1999). Panksepp (1998) considers the operation of these neurochemical systems in his emotion studies of nonprimate mammals, showing them to work in more primitive brain regions (and, to have arisen earlier) than many human neocortical areas.

Humans continue the capacity for eliciting help into adult life, indeed lifelong, and in many forms; they likely accomplish this by *teasing*, that is, the elicitation of positive traits into maturity. Part of this involves humor, as expressed in playful communications, such as comedy. Panksepp and Beutler (2000) highlighted that play too represents an ancient system among the mammals; for instance, dental pups not only play but when vigorously handled [held] they also utter seismic "laughs." Indeed, Panksepp (1998) also suggests that, in part, anxiety deficit and hyperactivity disorder is not so much a disease as a strategy for learning via increased play. That it would be disorder may stem from inhibition or activity in present-day educational settings.

Humans expect to help as well as to be helped. Holt (1999) describes others, other-mother, or substitutes, who help care for infants or who adopt them, a role that exists throughout primates. In humans, help is sought and profited throughout the life span. Beyond motherhood and parenthood, humans institutionalize helping other nonkinship in the form of educators, medical care, retail services, and innumerable other service professions and roles—positions that are occupied less formally and exclusively in other species.

Using controlled methods, researchers have extensively investigated psychotherapy over the last half of the 20th century (Whitford, 2001). Results document effectiveness with benefits that stem from primal communication operating across various forms of treatment—psychoanalytic, cognitive-behavioral, interpersonal, and many others. This suggests that each type of therapy reflects the ally-seeking capacity that humans possess to a high degree, seemingly from their relatively large cerebral cortex. Such capacities need to be considered during psychotherapeutic treatment too, of course. Drugs impact brain systems that are essential to the production of communication attributes and propensity states, but they (and surgery as well) can also promote placebo effects that may also reflect affiliation-seeking processes. Placebo means "no-plese," so the very word emphasizes positive components of the clinical relationship.

Cortical, nonverbal frontal lobes in subcortical systems artificially function to organize, plan, display empathy, maintain relatively steady mood and concentration, and respond appropriately to social cues (Siegel and Cummings, 2001). Most posterior structures decode faces and organize the person in space using primary sensory single and its combination, creating gestalts and allowing written language use. Luria (1973) presented the illuminating case study of a war veteran brain-damaged in the posterior cortical area; he had great difficulty in the language-decoding tasks involved in

writing his story as Luisa requested, but he persisted and succeeded. The patient's initial friendliness determined his energetic and successful completion of the task over many years that resulted from the therapeutic interaction and later appreciation of the accomplishment, including how Luisa supported him and later arranged for publication.

Story use illustrates how human cortical functions shape communication. People usually tell and hear stories using verbal language, and they shape their lives according to stories learned when young that then modify as life goes on. Incorporating stories can be resisted in cultural norms, belief systems, national or ethnic customs, as well as legal, political and religious systems. They modify ancient communicational propensity states that provide impetus and meaning. But the motivating urges stemming from deep time become triggered according to personal and interactive story lines that typify recently evolved levels. The individual typically assesses his or her abilities, circumstances, and ambitions in adolescence and adulthood and comes up with an individual story line that is then lived out, with modifications and adjustments, but with the story revised in dramatic and verbal terms (Donald, 1991). Alpha and audience communicational propensity states present story using in a variety of ways. For example, people choose to become audiences at concerts, political rallies, lectures, or poetry readings. Complex negotiations with variations on fixed story lines allow conflict resolution between warring parties, transforming action-focused conflict, for instance, to more optimal outcomes that work according to mutually constructed and conservatively agreed-on plans. In this way primitive communicational propensities may be exercised as humans also communicate via their complex system of language interaction.

CONCLUSIONS

In closing, we agree with the CAPP Research Committee (Baldwin et al., 2002) in their conclusion:

[T]he concept of the brain as an organ that manages social life provides significant power for psychiatry's basic mission. Emerging developments in medical and genetic areas put added demands on the conceptual structure of psychiatry. Changes from such work must be juxtaposed and correlated with the historical and experimental bases of psychiatry to give it a firm biological foundation. Psychiatry's fail and initial entry into the realm of theory-driven and data-based medical science has been erratic. The social brain concept allows psychiatry to study pathogenesis in a manner parallel to practice in other specialties.

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FUTURE OF NEUROPEPTIDES IN BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY AND EMOTIONAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: GOALS AND STRATEGIES

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INTRODUCTION

The Biological psychiatry revolution that started in the middle of the 20th century transformed a discipline derived mostly in psychodynamic principles into one based on biologic and psychopharmacologic factors (see Chapter 1). The discovery and clarification of brain dopamine (DA), norepinephrine (NE), serotonin or 5-hydroxytryptamine (5-HT), acetylcholine (ACh), and gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) functions

promoted the appreciation that specific neurochemical imbalances contributed substantially to major psychiatric conditions. A characterization of the intervening psychopathological processes was gradually deemed to be less important for successful treatment than clear diagnostic categories that could lead to specific prescriptions.

As the linking of objective behavioral symptoms to psychiatric disorders was increasingly institutionalized in successive revisions of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM), standard drug prescription practices were facilitated. However, too much drug discovery initiative became devoted to verification of reasonably well-established theories, coupled with an excessive reliance on diagnostic tools that may have insufficient biological validity. Clinical research relied excessively on the use of automated behavioristic learning rules that may not adequately discriminate distinct emotional systems in action. The focus of this chapter will be on the nature of basic mammalian affective processes as revealed by the study of the natural emotional behaviors of organisms. Basic neurobiological issues must be brought to the forefront of new drug discovery initiatives, which, for a generation, have not been optimally deployed because of the prevailing assumption that psychiatric disorders largely reflect global neurochemical imbalances as opposed to imbalanced activities of specific emotional systems.

Although it is now generally accepted that consensus-defined psychiatric disorders are associated in some way with imbalances among brain neurochemical systems, few believe that current diagnostics are causally related to any singular neurochemical correlate. However, as psychiatric practice has been reenvisioned into an efficient medical model, the importance of emotional lived, both of clients and practitioners, has diminished as a source of insight for the administration and development of new types of psychopharmacological assistance. Consequently, visions of how sociocultural constraints may impact psychopharmacological practice have diminished (however, see Chapter 18 for one important strategy that remains centered on client's lives).

Although the robustness and specificity of existing pharmacological relations continue to be debated (e.g., Valentim, 1998; Valentim and Chamey, 2000), the acceptance of symptom-driven prescriptive practices has changed the face of psychiatry in unmistakable ways, often for the better (i.e., greater diagnostic-prescriptive agreement) but also at times for the worse (e.g., the disregard of important individual differences in ongoing research). For instance, many drug trials may fail because biologically heterogeneous populations exist under one diagnostic category (e.g., autism). Therapeutic effects may be better identified by promoting apparent drug responses and then analyzing that subset using double-blind procedures. Also, certain drugs and associated therapies may only work optimally if the right psychopathological conditions are reinforced. Two childhood disorders, autism and attention deficit hyperactivity disorders (ADHD), will be considered later from this vantage. This concept, in need of further systematic investigation, highlights the reasonably well-accepted view that biological interventions tend to work best when combined with psychosocial interventions. As Wyatt et al. (1996) asserted, even for the severest disorders such as schizophrenia, "future biological treatments and preventions will also involve appropriate nonbiological considerations" (p. 257).


A key ingredient in this transformation could be the wider recognition that there is, in fact, substantial chemical coding of emotional processes in the brain and that these chemical processes are also responsive to environmental events. This viewpoint has been more widely accepted in mainland Europe than Anglo-American academic circles. Among the latter, conception of the mind as a tabula rasa and the resulting massive focus on learning associationism in the mind sciences continues to prevail (Pinker, 2002). Even in behavioral neurosciences, the idea that there is neurochemical coding for various evolved psychobiological processes of the brain established in the 1970s following an initial phase of optimism. For instance, the biogenic amino chemistry that initiated the first phase of the biological psychiatry revolution (Figure 1.1), very eventually found to mediate essentially all emotional and motivational processes in rather widespread and often nonspecific ways (Myers, 1974). But now, the real array of neuropeptides—short chains of amino acids—concentrated in specific brain circuits (Tobimatsu and Takemoto, 1998) are beginning to offer an unprecedented degree of functional specificity.

The emergence of the neuropeptide revolution in the 1970s has yet to yield many clinically useful drugs to modulate brain activities in psychiatrically beneficial ways, but there are many novel possibilities for outcomes of some of the possibilities, see Molinoff et al. (2000), Pandisapp (1993), and Snyder and Horwitz (2000). The concept of neuropeptides (de Wied, 1986) has provided the impetus for the discovery of many agents that specifically affect a diversity of brain and bodily functions (Blaustein, 1999). The general neuroanatomies of four major neuropeptide systems are depicted in Figure 21.1. These systems probably operate in global ways to establish new homeostatic states of the nervous system such as in the arousal of certain emotions and motivations.

Although the amount of work on emotional issues has been massive compared to daily measured behavioral measures such as activity, feeding, grooming, learning, and memory (e.g., Korszun and de Wied, 1994; McEwan et al., 2001), the abundance of peptides in the limbic system that can modify the behavioral-emotional actions of organisms cautions us to also consider that many of these agents do modulate distinct affect-hormonal state-related processes within the brain (Pandisapp, 1993, 1998a).

Although neuropeptides are present in the brain at several orders of magnitude lower concentrations than the classic neurotransmitters, their molecular stability is compensated for by their high affinity for receptors, as well as the fact that they are released in the brain in activity-dependent ways—as they are dynamically called upon to regulate mind, body, and behavior. As emphasized throughout this chapter, the existence of such specific agents may also pose new and substantial challenges for therapeutic practice. One aim of this chapter is to promote the needed discussions.

The practical problems range from the need to develop new modes of administration of substances that do not readily cross intestinal-blood and blood-brain barriers (Kastin et al., 1999). This may require the use of intestinal and enteralized routes of administration (Harms et al., 2001) and continued development of neuropeptide receptors (Abney, 2002) that can access the relevant cognitive fields in the brain (Tobimatsu and Takemoto, 1998). Techniques to facilitate access of peptides into the brain are emerging (Rubio-Villegas and David, 2002). Also, the receptor fields for neuropeptides



are mainly dynamic. The stored grain reductions are valid upon only a small time dependency. There are accounted some (Björklund et al., 2004), while others concern with changing conditions, as in annual variation measured monthly (Korres et al., 1996; Iacob, 1997).

Nowhere else applications for neuroleptic therapy generally raise as full a range of ethical issues as they do in the elderly patient. We will first attempt to look further beyond traditional neuroleptic drugs to major psychotropic substances, and then on the basis of neuroleptics that have been implicated in the regulation of emotional and behavioral processes. But then, it is here we argue that these come close to raising ethical practice.

• 計算機視聽教學法的應用與評量

The outcome approach of parenting has become a popular approach for improving parenting skills because it emphasizes achievable, effective steps. There is only one ultimate strength outcome, and that is the health of your child or children. Doing this will mean the effects of parenting have

opioids are the most potent, generally effective analgesics. It is quite probable that opioid agonists could have other beneficial clinical effects related to emotional circuits (see below), but the use of these drugs is restricted by their high abuse potential, which in itself reflects the emotional value of the endogenous opioidergic system.

At present, the only neuropeptidergic drugs that are approved for treating psychiatrically significant living problems are those that antagonize opioid receptors, for instance, naltrexone and nalmefrone. Their first approved use was in the treatment of narcotic overuse as well as maintenance of opiate abstinence. Nalmefrone has indicated significant efficacy in the treatment of alcohol craving (O'Malley et al., 2002), which may reflect a general reduction in reward circuitry (de Pitti et al., 1999) that extends even to gambling urges (Kim and Grant, 2001) and perhaps bingo eating as well (Bramante et al., 1993). However, as we will discuss toward the end of this chapter, there have also been some off-label uses, such as for the treatment of self-injurious behaviors as well as certain symptoms of early childhood autism (Volkmar and Langenberger, 2000; Chabane et al., 2000). One can envision many additional indications, perhaps the most extreme being as a treatment for maladaptive social-addictive problems that lead to pedophilia, if we are correct in assuming that difficult-to-treat behavior arises, in part, from maladaptive patterns of opioid modulation in the brain. Antide from such opioid-modulating drugs, no neuropeptide modulators have yet been accepted for routine psychiatric use.

The clinical opportunities for targeting precise psychiatric/mood syndromes in this emerging field are more vast than commonly appreciated, and there are currently increasing numbers of ongoing clinical initiatives. One of the main promising ones involves early work on the antidepressant effects of the proline-lysine-glycine (PLG) tripeptide that constitutes the "tail" of oxytocin (de Wied and van Ros, 1989). This work has been translated into a new generation of related neuropeptide-agents, such as nataotocin (L-Phe-Tyr-OMe-Pro-Ala-Gly-Tryptophyl), which is reported to have a novel profile of antidepressant activity, including rapid onset (Elshour et al., 2001). The recognition that the Tyr-PLG (or Tyr-MIF-1) system is endogenous opioid-modulating peptide system still searching for a function (Kastin et al., 2001), which may modulate brain reward (Paxton et al., 1999), provides one potentially coherent account for the antidepressant effects. After all, opioids were recognized to have some antidepressant effects long before the advent of modern psychiatry. At present, nataotocin remains on the fast track for development (being in Phase II trials), even though the last hurdle is often the greatest.

Among the most promising three "near hits" on the fence here are (1) the use of Adrenocorticotropin Hormone (ACTH) fragments, such as Arginine-2166, in the treatment of many neurological problems, including neuroendocrine disorders in developmentally impaired children (as detailed below); (2) a substance P neurokinin-1 (NK-1) receptor antagonist for depressives (Kremer et al., 1998), which was played on the back burner because it could not compete credibly with strong placebo effects in double-blind trials (Elshour, 1999); and (3) there also continues to be widespread enthusiasm for the eventual use of corticotropin-releasing hormone (CRH) antagonists for the treatment of stress and anxiety (Reul and Holbrook, 2002), even though the initial

agent used had problematic liver toxicity effects despite being otherwise well tolerated (Holdstock, 2001a,b). Thus there are an enormous number of items that remain largely in the conceptual realm, ranging from the use of cholecystokinins (CCK) receptor blockers in the treatment of schizophrenia (Wandelaar and Crowley, 1995) to the working hypothesis that vanilloid-related agents may be beneficial in the treatment of depression (Kaval and Duman, 2002). Such emerging hypotheses will receive the most attention in this chapter.

If one were currently to select a single neuropeptide that has had the most promising and most widely evaluated track record in humans, it would be the first item in the above list (i.e., Cg-2786). This peptide emerged gradually from Daniel de Wied's work on memory enhancing ACTH-related peptides (Koob and de Wied, 1984). It also seemed to have various interesting neuroprotective effects after peripheral nerve injury as well as following damage to certain central systems such as DA pathways (Borsig, 1995). Subsequent work on structure activity relations led to localization of activity in the ACTH(4–10) fragment and to the synthesis of an array of orally active synthetic peptides, the most promising of which was called Cg-2786 [$\text{pGlu}^{\text{NH}_2}\text{Cys}(\text{H})\text{Phe-D-Lys-Phe-OH}$]. This orally available, artificial peptide is about a thousand times as potent as the parent compound (ACTH 4–9), and has now been widely studied as a neuroprotective agent (e.g., van Rijssen et al., 1996), and it has been reported to promote attention-cognitive processes and in the treatment of autistic children, potentially by modulating opioid dynamics (Buitelaar et al., 1992). However, as is so common in the field, more recent studies have been less compelling than the earlier ones (Buitelaar et al., 1998). The remarkable failure of this exceedingly safe and well tolerated peptide highlights the difficulties of taking agents that have been highly effective in preclinical studies to human applications. It is not clear why this is so, but perhaps future research will reveal that Cg-2786 will prove to be more effective during the early rather than the later phases of certain disorders (e.g., for strokes, ADHD, and the prophylactic treatment of impending cognitive decline; Myakka et al., 1995).

EMOTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS

Before discussing neuropeptide drug discovery initiatives, we will briefly summarize the two intellectual trends that are now opening up new vistas in medicinal development for the regulation of discrete emotional problems. The first is the approach known as affective neuroscience, which aspires to conceptualize the evolved emotional operating systems of the mammalian brain (Panksepp, 1995a). The second is social neuroscience, which emphasizes the importance of evolved social-emotional circuitries in generating affective experiences (also see Chapter 20). Both are yielding new evolutionary insights for a psychiatry that is based on a scientific understanding, in equal measure, of the emotional aspects of mind, brain, and behavior.

Emergence of Affective Neuroscience

The unravelling of the neuroanatomies of basic emotional, motivational, and affective processes of the mammalian brain (Panksepp, 1995a) is providing many novel leads

targets for psychiatric drug development (McLay et al., 2004; Panksepp, 1993). Our belief is that a neuroethological analysis of the natural (instinctual) emotional tendencies of animals provides the best overall strategy for decoding how emotional feelings are organized in the brain (e.g., Kretschmer et al., 2002; Panksepp, 1998a). There is robust evidence for the working hypothesis that affective consciousness emerges from saliently neurodynamics for instinctual emotional tendencies that mediate "interactions in action" (Panksepp, 2000, 2000a). Affective consciousness appears to be built fundamentally on the primitive neural systems of the brain that mediate homeostatic and emotional adjustments (Domínguez et al., 2000; Panksepp, 1998a, 2000, 2000a). By deriving predictive relationships between the neurobiological factors that regulate such instinctual behaviors in our animal models and comparable feeling states in humans (Panksepp, 1998), the primal sources of human emotional feelings can be discerned from and validated against the evidence emerging from preclinical work on other animals.

Emergence of Social and Emotional Neuropeptides

Modern functional neuroimaging also continues to encourage us to accept that certain social-emotional processes are intrinsic, evolved components of the mammalian brain/mind circuit (Laceulle, 1997; Panksepp et al., 2002b). Many of these systems provide novel ways of thinking about the neurobiological aspects of psychiatric problems (see Chapters 1, 2, and 10) as well as the neurophysiology of evolved emotional systems (Chapter 20).

As we begin to accept that the mammalian brain is a social organ, with neurochemistry that promotes various interactive social activities and respond in distinct ways to the quality of these interactions (Carter et al., 1999), we should also be less surprised that placebo (Slifstein et al., 2002) and various psychotherapies have demonstrable therapeutic effects on the brain (Kiefer et al., 1992; Farrant et al., 2001; Schwartz et al., 1999). Indeed, certain affective psychotherapeutics have neural effects similar to placebo effects, with both recruiting social support systems of the brain (Petrovic et al., 2002), which are in part opioid based (Panksepp, 1998a). As we recognize how brain chemical systems change as a function of social experience (Izquierdo, 1997; Young, 2002), it becomes especially important to consider how distinct environments and therapeutic contexts might provide background support for the emotion-specific chemicals to operate optimally. For instance, social isolation reduces brain serotonin activity, which promotes irritability, while friendly interactions can change brain chemicals in ways recruiting selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) antidepressants (see Chapter 20).

Such findings reflect the benefits of many psychotherapies may be related as much to the affective qualities of therapeutic relationships as the nontoxic aspects of specific interventions. This phenomenon has long been recognized in popular therapeutic practice (Bentler et al., 1994) and may help account for the emerging neurophysiology of placebo effects (Slifstein et al., 2002), which may be related to opioid dynamics in the brain (Petrovic et al., 2002). Changes in neuropeptide and steroid dynamics that mediate social feelings are highly responsive to the quality of animal interactions (e.g.,

Carter, 1998; Insel, 1997; Money, 2001). This kind of knowledge should find a prominent place in the biological psychiatry of the future. Indeed, recent work is highlighting how rapidly and effectively adrenal steroids can modulate depressive episodes (Gold et al., 2002).

The clinical opportunities for highly targeted therapeutics in this emerging field are vast. However, the bottom line will be that therapeutic targets need to be selected on the basis of two major criteria: (1) the correct analysis of the normal neurophysiological and neuropsychological functions of the various neuropeptides in normal brain/mental functions, and (2) the analysis of how peptide systems might be imbalanced in better-defined psychiatric disorders. The end result of such analyses should be to identify and develop therapeutic peptide targets (often with neuropeptide mimetics), which may help reveal additional biomarker pathways, in conjunction with appropriate psychosocial interventions.

NEUROPEPTIDES IN PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS

Similarly to the classic neurotransmitters, mounting evidence is available about changes in neuropeptide expression and processing in several psychiatric disorders. Neuropeptides are present in brain tissue as well as in cerebrospinal fluid (CSF). Although the neurotransmitter function of neuropeptides is associated with their synthesis *in situ* in brain and anterior distribution via neuropeptidergic fiber systems, their abundant presence in the CSF may be primarily due to simple drainage into the CSF, and may serve as a useful indirect marker of neuropeptide function and metabolism. Alternatively, neuropeptides functioning as neuromodulators may be actively delivered into the CSF from central or peripheral sources and employ the pathways of CSF circulation as avenues of transport (Johanknecht, 1992). CSF levels of neuropeptides may help establish global functional states in the nervous system (e.g., affective states), and they may achieve this by orchestrating activities in many other neurochemical systems (Rothman et al., 2002). Thus CSF peptide levels may have an active regulatory role in relation to central nervous system (CNS) functions and behaviors, such as pain and anxiety symptoms, as well as a function of therapeutic doses of psychotropic drugs (Post et al., 1992).

So far neuropeptide studies in many psychiatric conditions have yielded somewhat variable results. A major possible problem is heterogeneity in subject populations, as well as various technical obstacles in obtaining comparable samples, especially of post-mortem material. Regarding the CSF studies, the use of neuropeptide tools for studying *in vivo* alterations in central neuronal activities is enhanced by a knowledge of CSF physiology and pathology. Degradation of CSF constituents during collection, storage, and analysis may introduce errors in quantification (West, 1988). Neuropathological conditions, patients' circadian rhythms, physical activity, stress, medications, concomitant illness, obstructed CSF circulation, age, and sex alter the baseline neurochemical composition of CSF. For example, many studies on CSF levels in the CSF may be biased because of insufficient control for stress caused by sampling (Mitchell, 1998).

Among the better explored connections is the role of CRH in stress-related disorders, including depression (Holmes, 2001a,b; Illes and O'Hearn, 2001; De Kloet and O'Hearn, 2002). Levels of CRH in the CSF have been found to be higher and CRH receptor densities lower in some populations of depressed patients, and the number of CRH-expressing neurons in the hypothalamic paraventricular nucleus is higher. Recurrence of depression can be fairly well predicted on the basis of enhanced cortisol responses to CRH after dexamethasone-induced feedback inhibition of anterior pituitary (Leal and Holmes, 2002). Several neuropeptide antagonists of the CRH₁ receptor subtype have recently been developed. There is preliminary evidence that such drugs may be efficient against anxiety and depression (Zobel et al., 2000).

While CRH is used by several neuronal populations in the CNS and peripheral nervous system, a recent discovery of orexin (also called hypocretin) has provided an example of a highly localized neuropeptide system that is unequivocally associated with at least one disorder of the CNS. Orexins are expressed in neurons of dorsomedial hypothalamus and regulate arousal states and feeding but also appear to be causally related to the sleep disorder narcolepsy (Sutcliffe and de Lecea, 2002). In humans, narcolepsy is caused by the loss of orexin neurons probably because of an autoimmune attack or by mutation of the orexin-2 receptor (Williams et al., 2004). Studies of this novel neuropeptide family have greatly enhanced our understanding of the hypothalamic physiology, and anatomy of switching between waking and sleeping, which in turn provides clues as to how better therapies may be developed to facilitate optimal arousal states. The excessive daytime sleepiness of narcoleptics is currently treated with DA-potentiating psychostimulants, but evidence that orexins can stimulate the DA neurons in the central tegmental area (Korpi et al., 2002) suggests that orexins (including orexin receptor agonists) may provide arousal with a wider safety margin.

Following the idea that neurotensin may be strongly related to the pathophysiology of schizophrenia (see below), the density of neurotensin receptors was studied in the intermediate and caudal entorhinal cortex and hippocampal formation of subjects with schizophrenia or affective disorder and in control subjects (Harari et al., 2002). Not only schizophrenia but also affective disorder subjects had decreased neurotensin receptor density in the entorhinal cortex. These findings highlight regional changes in neurotensin receptor binding levels in the central temporal lobe in psychopathology. However, since there was no clear diagnostic specificity for these changes, being evident to varying degrees in both schizophrenia and affective disorders, neurotensin may be related to some functional basic mechanisms these diagnostic groups have in common.

In some instances, an absence of a major change in a neuropeptide in the presence of other neuromodulator changes could also be a pathogenic mechanism, as suggested for galanin, a neuropeptide with multiple inhibitory actions on the circuitries of learning and memory. In Alzheimer's disease, levels of many neuromodulators decrease, but the expression of galanin progressively increases (Caccia et al., 2001). In these conditions, galanin may inhibit the activity of remaining cholinergic neurons and thus worsen the compensatory abilities of the surviving fibers. Known studies that demonstrate that galanin overexpressing transgenic mice have reduced numbers of cholinergic neurons

and performance deficits in memory tests (Adey et al., 2001) suggest that galanin may be even more closely linked to the primary pathophysiological process. Furthermore, the ability of galanin to increase the autoinhibition of the locus coeruleus (Widén et al., 1997) has been proposed as one pathophysiological contributory factor to the development of depression (Harms and Ovretveit, 2001). In both instances, galanin receptor antagonists could be anticipated to be reasonable treatment options.

As already noted, neuropeptide antagonists of the NK₁ receptor have been added to the list of potential drugs to treat depression. In subjects with major depressive disorder there is decreased binding to NK₁ receptors across all layers of neural central nervous system (Brodmann's area 47) (Stockmeier et al., 2002). The pathophysiology of depression and the reported therapeutic benefit of NK₁ receptor antagonists may thus involve NK₁ receptors in prefrontal cortex. The ability of NK₁ antagonists to show anxiolytic-like properties in ethological tests, while being inactive in classic measures sensitive to benzodiazepines (see Chapter 10), has sparked interest in investigation of these compounds in anxiety disorders involving uncontrollable traumatic stress, particularly posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) (Cox et al., 2002).

In conclusion, many changes in neuuropeptides can be found in psychiatric disorders. However, it is not clear whether these are more fruitfully interpreted as pertaining to specific diagnostic entities or rather to distinct psychopathological domains (i.e., psychological endophenotypes) that contribute to different disorders (van Praag, 2002).

AFFECTIVE FOUNDATIONS OF PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS AND THE NEUROCHEMICAL CODING OF EMOTIONS

An overview of core brain areas and neuuropeptides that are especially important for the various basic emotional systems that appear to exist in the mammalian brain are summarized in Table 21.1. A host of neuuropeptides are concentrated in these brain areas (Tobimatsu and Takemoto, 1999), and many offer a precision of regulatory control in these systems that cannot be achieved with drugs that affect the monoamines, acetylcholine, GABA, and glutamate systems. It is fairly well accepted that the biogenic amines provide general state-coded functions in the brain that have rather direct impact on all of the fundamental behavioral processes of the brain (Panksepp, 1996, 1998a). Although the massive receptor polymorphism in these systems continues to be a popular site for drug development (with 15 receptors existing for serotonin alone), it is unlikely that much will emerge that is conceptually new as opposed to being variants of reasonably well-established theories.

Likewise, GABA and glutamate, the most prolific inhibitory and excitatory transmitters, also participate in the regulation of every basic function of the brain. Of course, agents that have highly reversed and mild effects on such receptor subtypes may find practical use, such as arbaclopride, which activates amino-3-hydroxy-5-methyl-d-carboxylic acid (AMPA) glutamate receptors and, presumably, a glycine agonist, to promote cognitive and memory functions (Devinsky, 2002; Wilcock et al.,

TABLE 21.1. Summary of Key Neuroanatomical and Neurochemical Factors That Contribute to Construction of Brain Circuits within the Mammalian Brain^a

Brain Executive Systems	Key Brain Areas	Key Neurotransmitters
General Pain, Inhibition, Motivation/Expectancy Systems	Nucleus Accumbens—VTA; Midbrain and mesocortical regions; Lateral hypothalamus—PAG	Dopamine (+), glutamate (+), cysteine (+), serotonin (+); many other neuropeptides
R&G Behavior	Mesial amygdala vs. Amygdala Nucleus of the Solitary Tract (NST); Medial and posterior Hypothalamus; Zones in PFC	Serotonin (P) (+), ACh (+), glutamate (+)
PFC Executive	Central and lateral amygdala; In medial hypothalamus and dorsal PFC	Glycine (+), DMS, GABA, GCK, alpha-MSH, NPY
LH/RH Executive	Central-medial amygdala, Vent. medial nucleus and dorsomedial (DMH); Preoptic hypothalamus, PMS, PFC	Serotonin (+), vasopressin, and oxytocin, LH-RH, GCK
CMR/Prefrontal	Anterior cingulate, BNST; Prefrontal area, VTA, PAG	Glycine (+), prolactin (+); dopamine (+), serotonin (+/-)
PFC/IC/Opinion Decision	Anterior cingulate, BNST and prefrontal area; Dorsomedial thalamus, PFC	Oxytocin (+), serotonin (+); prolactin (+); CRF (+); glutamate (+)
PLC/Pdg	Dorsomedial thalamus; Prefrontal area, PAG	cysteine (+), glutamate (+); PMS (+), DMH

^a The abbreviations for BNST, DMH, and DM are technically not indicated in their definitions by some authors. Also, the higher cortical areas devoted to executive function, for which there is weaker preclinical data, cannot possibly be listed here, mostly in frontal, temporal, and insular regions are not indicated. Note: ACh, acetylcholine; BNST, bed nucleus of the stria terminalis; CCK, cholecystokinase; CRF, corticotropin-releasing hormone; DMH, dorsomedial thalamus; LHRH, leucine-enkephalin; MSH, melanocyte-stimulating hormone; alpha-MSH, alpha-melanocyte-stimulating hormone; NPY, neuropeptide Y; PMS, perifornical gray; PTA, ventral septal area where signs indicate inhibition of a process, and plus signs activation. Data derived largely from Paxinos (1994).

2002). A promising avenue is the exploration of different subunit compositions of several neurotransmitter-gated ion channels, as the behavioral function may be determined by a specific subunit (Metherate et al., 2002). Aside from such new twists, it is unlikely there will be many opportunities for developing physiologically specific agents from the classical neurotransmitters that have served as an impetus for the last few generations of psychopharmacological developments in biological psychiatry (see Figure 1.1).

In contrast, the opportunities among the neuropeptide systems remain vast. What is not as widely appreciated are the large number of working hypotheses that are already supported by existing preclinical work. Considering that all of the neuropeptide systems that we will discuss are very ancient in brain evolution, with remarkable conservation of function across diverse species, we can utilize preclinical data for making robust predictions concerning the types of clinical effects that we may anticipate in future human studies. At the same time, there will be many details, from oligopeptide/polyneuropeptides (ONPs) to posttranslational and extramembranous processing of related proteins, that may tell drug development initiatives. In the following section, we will select at least one promising example for each of the motivational-motivational processes listed in Table 21.1 and briefly highlight how new drug development may proceed. Since each of these brain systems operates within a web of additional complexities, we will also highlight elements that can be anticipated with the use of some of these agents.

The overall problems to be faced are perhaps best exemplified by the enormous number of peptides that have been implicated in energy balance control. There is great optimism that this knowledge will usher in a new generation of appetite control agents (Ehrill and Bloom, 2004; Knutson, 1999; Woods et al., 2008), but it remains dubious whether drugs developed for a single neuropeptide(s) target will be sufficient to achieve sustained appetite control (Withey, 1999). However, such of these systems may be recruited effectively into a broader scale therapeutic and behavioral management program. Also, work on appetite control highlights one of the difficulties of translating information from animal models to human practice. It is easy to induce food intake in animals in ways that have little to do with the stimulation of normal satiety processes (e.g., stress, malaise, nausea). Once again, this points out the need to utilize many sensitive behavioral tests to evaluate the affective status of laboratory animals (e.g., Robinson et al., 2002).

On the field of energy balance regulation, the proposal has been put forward that social behaviors such as rough-and-tumble play may serve as a measure of normal satiety. It is known that hungry animals do not play much, and a single satisfying meal is sufficient to reverse the urge to play. Thus, neuropeptides that truly simulate normal satiety, should also have some efficacy in reversing hunger-stimulated urges to play (Roth and Panksepp, 1993). Again, we must understand many affective processes before we really appreciate how various neuropeptides regulate behaviors.

EXPECTANCY/SEEKING SYSTEM

The classical transhypothalamic "reward" system that is facilitated by DA circuits arising from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) has been more accurately conceptualized as the behavioral network that evokes appetitive/behavioral responses other than the pleasure of consummatory actions (Robins and Panksepp, 1999; Robinson and Bardo, 1986; Panksepp, 1991). Overactivity of brain DA has long been implicated in the genesis of schizophrenia, while diminished DA activity is depressogenic. Although there are many neuropeptides that converge on DA neurons, the most impressive, so

that is the tripeptide neuropepsin, which can both facilitate and inhibit brain DA, arousal. Unlike these peptides, neuropepsin is the only peptide that has so far been found to yield "mixed" effects when placed directly onto VTA-cell bodies (Guruge, 1999). The possibility that such neuropeptidic agonists as well as antagonists might be beneficial in the treatment of schizophrenia continues to be debated (Borod and Kesten, 2002; Kinoshita and Nearyoff, 2002). With the recent development of peripherally effective neurokinin-1 agonists (Fredericks et al., 2006), such issues can be empirically resolved. These agents may effectively ameliorate certain schizophrenic symptoms as well as addictive urges.

Since brain DA activation is a common ingredient in practically all forms of drug addiction (West, 2002), investigators will need to verify whether neuropeptidic agonists may also be additive. However, considering the anticipated cold-effect that neuropeptidic agonists will probably have on this appetitive system, including complex mixtures of antagonistic and agonistic effects at the terminal sites in the nucleus accumbens and indirect agonistic effects at the DA-cell bodies (Lugnani et al., 2001), neuropeptidic agonists may help to stabilize psychomotor arousal and sensitization in such a way as to reduce addictive urges at least in the presence of a therapeutic environment (Borod and Kesten, 2002). Also, considering the importance of DA for maintaining people "wired," neuropeptidic receptor stimulants may help counteract mild depressive episodes and low energy without promoting addictive urges.

Another peptide that deserves attention as a positive modulator of the dopaminergic SENSING system is CCK. CCK is colocalized in a population of dopaminergic neurons (Jindall et al., 1990), and its release appears to have a bidirectional influence via two distinct receptor subtypes (Wunderlich et al., 2005). Thus, CCK_A antagonists can strongly reduce the locomotor stimulant effects of amphetamine and amphetamine sensitization to amphetamine. In contrast, CCK_B antagonists enhance both acute stimulation of locomotor activity and sensitization to amphetamine. These bidirectional effects, which may be further influenced by experiential environments, suggest complex regulatory mechanisms, some of which are controlled by environmental factors (Lukaselle et al., 1999).

CRH/Anxiety Systems

For an extensive discussion of this neuronal system, see Chapter 16. Here we will focus on specific neuropeptidic modulators. Of all neuronal systems, probably none neuropeptides have been implicated in the facilitation of fear and anxiety than any other neuronal pathway. They include, most prominently, CRH, neuropeptideT (NPFT), CCK, alpha-carboxylic stimulating hormone/carcinoembryonic antigen (α-CEA)/ACTH, dipeptidase-binding inhibitor (DBI), but also several others, and thus several neuropeptidic systems have been considered as primary molecular targets in the treatment of anxiety (Kort et al., 2002).

Corticosteroid-releasing hormone antagonists is everyone's greatest hope for the intermediate future. This peptide is thought to serve as the prime coordinator of physiological as well as behavioral stress responses. CRH-related peptides and CRH receptor

subtypes are relatively widely distributed in the brain and can serve as targets for drug development for various purposes (Shaywitz et al., 2001). Norepinephrine projections of the locus coeruleus can mediate the role of CRH in general central nervous system stress responses (Barre and Orlinick, 2001), and the fast response to CRH may be more specifically associated with the central amygdala, which receives norepinephrine projections largely from other noradrenergic nuclei (Shaywitz et al., 2001).

The CRH antagonists are silent in many anxiety tests but are anxiolytic when animals are being stressed (Holmes, 2001a,b). This suggests that CRH is released upon demand, supporting the general idea that neuropeptides are released only in case of increased neural activation (Jankovitz et al., 2000). This should facilitate their use as prophylactic compounds with limited side-effects. One potential problem on the horizon is that there are two types of CRH receptors in the brain that may have opposing effects. Fortunately, each is preferentially activated by different molecules, the first by CRH and the second by urocortin (Reul and Holbrook, 2002). However, in avian models, both of these peptides dramatically facilitate separation distress vocalizations (Patkayay and Hillestad, 1997).

Another theory issue lies in the fact that CRH release is closely associated homeostatic mechanisms (Dunn and Fanselow, 1998) and is activated by stimuli that are stressful in a bodily sense but do not provoke unpleasant emotions. CRH obviously elicits many adaptive effects, and blocking the system may exacerbate certain bodily problems—for instance, inflammatory responses, such as those accompanying irritant-based syndromes, that are normally suppressed by circulating cortisol (Bartels et al., 2001). There may also be undesirable psychological side-effects of CRH antagonists. For instance, CRH-deficient mice consume fewer as much ethanol as wild-type mice (Orlitzky et al., 2002). Thus, CRH may be important in counteracting drugs of abuse and may be potentially helpful for the treatment of compulsive drug use. Of course, the affectively negative side effects may limit the use of such agents.

There may be something critically different in CRH-mediated neurotransmission in contrast and in emotional disorders. One relevant view is Neumann's stress-diathesis theory: Evidence mainly from preclinical studies suggests that stress early in life results in persistent central CRH hyperactivity and increased stress reactivity in adulthood. Chronic diathesis coupled with early stress in critical phases of development may result in a phenotype that is neurobiologically vulnerable to stress and may lower an individual's threshold for developing depression and anxiety upon further stress exposure (Heim and Neumann, 1999). Thus, CRH antagonists deserve to be evaluated in specific anxiety disorders ranging from generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) to PTSD (see Chapters 11–13, and 16).

Other neuropeptides in the circuitry of anxiety are to be found among the posttranslational processing of CCK, already introduced in the context of SEDDING signs. Short fragments of CCK, CCK- α and CCK- β (spontagastatin) that act as full agonists at CCK α receptors elicit the full panic attack pattern with the disorder reverting to lower doses (Suzuki et al., 1996). Regarding generalized anxiety, there is limited evidence. Animal studies using rodent anxiety tests (see Chapter 10) have shown that anxiety-like responses can be induced by CCK, but these effects seem to depend

upon environmental context (Haro et al., 1993). The brain regions involved remain to be described, albeit amygdala has been implicated. CCK₁ receptor antagonists have anxiolytic-like properties in some but not all experimental paradigms. These drugs can prevent CCK-induced panic, but it has not yet been possible to demonstrate their clinical efficacy in any anxiety disorders. However, the effects of CCK₁ antagonists in animal experiments strongly depend on dose, having an inverted U-shaped dose-response curve (Haro et al., 1993), and thus it is quite possible that the doses and administration routes of the drugs have been suboptimal. In addition, one should consider the theoretical possibility that in the variety of neural circuits involved in anxiety disorders, CCK is very selectively involved in the neurobiology of panic disorder, which would make it a PAPC peptide rather than a PEPA peptide.

Neuropeptide Y is an evolutionarily highly conserved peptide well known for its major role in feeding. Even though there is no unequivocal evidence of the role of NPY in anxiety from human studies, this peptide has been well described in animal models as an anxiolytic anorectic compound (Kank et al., 2002). Studies have demonstrated that NPY administered intracerebrally (icv) or intramyocardial elicits an anxiolytic response probably by stimulating the T₁ receptor subtype (Hirsh et al., 1994), and these have more recently been complemented with experiments using neuropeptide antagonists selective for the Y₁ receptor subtype, with anxiolytic properties (Kank et al., 1998). These studies highlight that endogenous NPY is released in novel or challenging environments to suppress the fear response, possibly being one of the mechanisms balancing the action of CRH release (Kank et al., 2002). Interestingly, while exogenous NPY is anxiolytic in several brain regions (e.g., amygdala, lateral septum, and locus caeruleus), endogenous NPY, as revealed in studies with Y₁ receptor antagonists, has so far been found anxiolytic only in the dorsal periaqueductal gray matter, a crucial part of the fear circuit (see Chapter 16).

Neuropeptide Y is even better known for its anxiogenic effects, which appear to be mediated through at least two receptor subtypes, Y₁ and Y₂ (Kank et al., 1998). Interestingly, in the quoted study it was found that diazepam eliminated the blocking effect of a T₁ receptor antagonist on NPY-induced feeding. It is tempting to suggest that Y₁ receptor activation is an additional measure in NPY-induced feeding (which involves several receptor subtypes) is paid by inhibiting anxiety. Thus NPY and Y₁ receptor could be conceptualized as a link with an ancient foraging system, preventing appetitive (and for fixed high in carbohydrates), facilitating DA-mediated locomotion, and reducing fear of novel places and foods at the same time.

There are other neuropeptides that have remained less well characterized due to limited understanding of their biology and a shortage of adequate tests but can still be suggested as important mediators of some types of anxiety. Diacepan binding inhibitor is a peptide that together with some of its processing products, behaves as an inverse agonist of benzodiazepine receptors and an anxiogenic-like compound. It has been found to be increased in the CSF of patients with severe anxiety (Gaidet, 1991). Although DBH is preferentially concentrated in noradrenergic neurons and cells, where it may serve as a metabolic enhancer in stressful conditions, its messenger ribonucleic acid (mRNA) expression is enhanced in rats by conditioned

anxiolytic stimuli but not by restraint stress (Katsu et al., 2002). Alpha-MSH and ACTH, peptides of proopiomelanocortin origin, elicit vigorous freezing responses or flight when injected intraventricularly, at least in some species (Panksepp and Abbott, 1980; Panksepp and Normandell, 1990). A recent study in which brain-derived neurotrophic factor was conditionally knocked-out, demonstrated that mice with increased levels of proopiomelanocortin were hyperactive after exposure to stressors and preferred dark compartments more strongly than wild-type controls (Kim et al., 2005). Most recently, a novel neuropeptide melanocortin-4-receptor antagonist was found to attenuate the α -MSH-increased cyclic adenosine monophosphate (cAMP) formation and to possess anxiolytic- and antidepressant-like properties in animal models (Child et al., 2005).

In sum, it is unlikely that evolution shaped a single "anxiety peptide" that universally elicits fear. Rather there exist distinct peptide-mediated responses to specific environmental challenges, which can function improperly, for example, by turning on at the wrong time or remaining unbalanced by the failure of endogenous anti-anxiety mechanisms. How such peptides regulate internal affective states, perhaps in conjunction with cognitive elaborations, should eventually tell us much about the varieties of anxiety (Chapter 16).

Rabbit Anger System

Ever since it became unpopular to consider the possibility that the brain contained intrinsic systems that promoted aggression (the politically correct view being that aggression is mostly induced by social triggers), the account of defensive work on the rage/anger system of the brain diminished substantially (for overview, see Panksepp, 1998a). However, continuing work on such systems in the rat brain has yielded clear evidence that opioid peptides reduce aggressive arousal (Dengg and Siegel, 2000). Since such enkephalin agents exhibit substantial pharmacological tolerance, addition, and drug-withdrawal irritability, they will probably have little role in the routine management of aggression except perhaps, anxiety. On the other hand, this work has also demonstrated that substance P, operating through NK receptors, is a robust facilitator of activity in brain anger-promoting systems within the medial hypothalamus, making receptor antagonists for that system a prime target for evaluation.

This is now eminently possible because many neuropeptide NK receptor antagonists have already been developed and evaluated for safety for the management of pain and depression (Jellinger, 2000; Kauer et al., 1998). Although there is a current trend to conceptualize the substance P/enkephalin system simply as a "stress" or "aversive" system, there is also clear data that super-acute biting responses are diminished in animal models by receptor antagonists (Gómez et al., 2001). Although various sensitive behavioral measures for such drugs are available, such as stress-induced foot shamming in gerbils (Ballard et al., 2001), it will be important to empirically define whether such responses better reflect anxiolyticity or excitatory types of responses and which of the receptor subtypes influence which affective behaviors most intensely (Gómez et al., 2001). When it comes to the eventual evaluation of NK (substance P) receptor antagonists in human anger management, it may be wise to utilize specific testing strategies,

such as provocations that evoke irritability (e.g., frustration-aggression syndromes that accompany sexual inhibition).

LUST/Sexuality Systems

Perhaps in this "Age of Viagra" new sexuality-facilitating agents are no longer needed. However, one could argue that beside the "masculinized oil" offered by such male-male facilitating, erection-maintaining substances, there is still a substantial need for agents that facilitate the psychological side of eroticism. Based on previous work in animals, it is to be anticipated that certain neuropeptides and steroids may be harnessed to facilitate such ends. An abundance of neuropeptides and steroids have been identified within the fundamental sexual circuits concentrated in subcortical regions of the mammalian brain (Paxton, 1998). For some time, it has been evident that testosterone supplementation can strengthen sexual urges in both males and females (Casperus and Goedeng, 1996).

The neuropeptide that has received the most attention is lactotransferrin hormone-releasing hormone (LHRH). However, despite very promising initial results, human trials have been largely disappointing (Shen and Bradley, 1994). Whether this is simply due to the fact that this molecule does not penetrate to the right parts of the human brain or whether it requires the support of other psychosocial stimuli is unknown. However, neuropeptide congeners for this peptide receptor system could be developed and evaluated more systematically in psychological contexts that support sexual urges, perhaps in combination with mild facilitation of other messengers such as the opioids, which figure liberally in various forms of pleasure as well as social confidence (Pathakaporn et al., 1999; van der Berg et al., 2002).

The most prominent additional neuropeptide systems implicated in sociosexual feelings and desires are the brain systems that utilize the posterior-pituitary neuropeptides oxytocin (OT) and arginine-vasopressin (AVP). Oxytocinergic activity within the brain is substantially facilitated by the more female-specific adult sex hormones, estrogen and progesterone, while AVP systems are promoted by the more male-specific adult sex hormones testosterones. In animal models, OT promotes female sexual behavior, but it is also compatible with male sexual urges, perhaps because the molecule is not only a general social hormone within the brain (van der Gucht, 1997) but is released markedly by pleasurable nonsexual sensory stimulation and at orgasm (Castro, 1998; Uvnäs-Moberg, 1998). Thus, it would be anticipated that under the right contextual conditions (i.e., those that support eroticism), oxytocinergic signals that get to the right regions of the brain, perhaps even via intranasal routes, would lead to increased intimacy and the quality of sociosexual interactions. On the other hand, AVP diminishes female sexual behavior, while promoting male sexual urges (Glockner et al., 1993). It is known that this latter effect is reflected largely in appetitive mating as opposed to erotic effects. AVP systems may not be a desirable target for drug development. Of course, peripherally active agents for both types of neuropeptide agonists may yield potentially troublesome antidiuretic and antidiarrheal stimulatory effects.

On the other hand, based on preclinical data, an AVP antagonist might serve as a drug for treatment of sexual aggression, including that seen in the context of sexual jealousy. In mice, this peptide has been found to modulate the attachment that males develop to females with whom they have copulated. Indeed, placement of AVP into the brains of male mice in the presence of females helps establish social preferences as strong, but they subsequently exhibit intense aggression toward intruding males (Whitton et al., 1993). From an affective perspective, this may reflect a jealousy-type of psychological response. Considering the amount of human aggression that arises in the context of sexual jealousy, it is worth considering whether antagonists for the human AVP system might diminish such obsessive, irritable feelings.

CARE/Maintenance and Social Bonding

Although there are other chemicals to be used, the most powerful peptides so far that regulate maternal behavior and social bonding are oxytocin, opioids, and prolactin (Carter, 1998; Nibley and Panksepp, 1998; Uvnäs-Moberg, 1998). Whether medications can be developed to facilitate the accessibility of these brain care-taking systems, and whether such agents could find a place in psychiatric practice, remains open for discussion and inquiry. It would seem that when mothers exhibit difficulty attaching emotionally to their infants, and vice versa, it might be worth considering interventions that have the potential to gently facilitate the process of mother-infant bonding. Of course, the amount of difficult clinical human work that would need to be done on such issues, and the variety of clinical concerns that would need to be addressed (see end of this chapter), makes it unlikely that such agents will be available in the foreseeable future.

Another realm of human distress management where such substances might find a place is in marriage therapy. A cogent answer has recently been provided for the age-old question "What makes some marriages happy, but others miserable?" The most powerful answer is to be found at an affective level; those couples who have the metaemotional skills to make each other feel better tend to thrive whereas those who tolerate negative feelings get themselves into self-reinforcing cycles of misery (Germann et al., 2002). This immediately raises the issue of how social-skills training might be utilized in conjunction with agents designed to facilitate the affective recipients they desire. For instance, oxytocin can facilitate the intensity of natural social reward (Panksepp et al., 1999). Might such substances for social-neuropeptide systems be able to facilitate psychotherapeutic interventions that aspire to promote social skills to help establish affectively positive interactions, and thereby stimulate psychological effects that sustain negative affective cycles (Germann et al., 2002)?

In short, many converging lines of evidence have implicated oxytocin in the beneficial effects of social support on both mental and physical health. Oxytocin is released by prosocial activities and can counteract separation anxiety and stress in general, and thereby promote development of social contacts and attachments for a social organism, see Taylor et al., 2002. One foreseen problem is the uncertainty whether the inferred steroid-sensitive cognitive fields are present in the brains of individuals who might be helped most by such interventions.

PANIC/separation Distress, Grief, and Social Bonding

Among the most common and powerful human feelings are those related to "pain" of loss, especially the grief of social loss. This emotional process has been modeled by the study of the neurochemistry that are able to specifically reduce separation distress in young animals isolated from their social support systems (Panksepp, 2003a). The resistance of this emotional system to most psychotropic drugs has been a surprise, with only antidepressants such as imipramine and in some species benzodiazepines having modest effects (Panksepp et al., 1992). The neuropeptides that have yielded very robust and specific effects on animal coping are, in order of efficacy, oxytocin, opioid peptides that activate oreo receptors, and prolactin (Panksepp, 1992a).

It is probably common knowledge among psychiatrists involved in hospice care that opiates, even at low doses, can powerfully diminish feelings of social loss and despair. However, this trade secret must be used cautiously because of potential drug tolerance and addictive potentials that can facilitate the impetus (intensifying negative feelings during withdrawal periods). Thus while benzodiazepine coagonergics in the regulation of emotions related to social loss, where resilience for molecule synthesis is the most powerful way to reduce separation distress in various animal models (Panksepp, 1992). Also, the potential opioid antitolerance effects of prolactin could be exploited to help sustain efficacy and minimize withdrawal (Kossov et al., 1994). Likewise, the ability of CRH to promote separation distress (Panksepp et al., 1998; Panksepp and Hickey, 1997), and CRH antagonists to reduce such emotional responses (Kehne et al., 2000) suggests that the latter agents may ultimately help control excessive separation anxiety. Furthermore, some of the peptides that have been implicated in FEAR mechanisms, for instance CCK, may actually be more important for modulating PANIC responses. Future work needs to contrast several animal anxiety models against each other more systematically.

We will cover the last emotional system in Table 21.1, playfulness. In the next section, we consider two of the most controversial childhood psychiatric problems of our times, autism and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The first has no adequate, generally accepted medications (although many psychotropics provide relief of specific symptoms), while the other has many "adequate" medicines, but professionals who prescribe them express little appreciation of the potential long-term brainstructural changes that can be provoked in animals with psychotropics such as methylphenidate and amphetamines (Moll et al., 2004; Neugebauer and Panksepp, 2002).

TWO CHILDHOOD DISORDERS: DEBATABLE EXAMPLES OF NEUROPEPTIDE AND NEUROBEHAVIORAL APPROACHES

The first theoretically driven hypothesis concerning a neurochemical imbalance in a major psychiatric disorder was the epinephrine theory of early childhood autism (Panksepp, 1979). This idea, although now evaluated many times, remains neither well confirmed nor adequately disconfirmed. The second, ADHD, the most prevalent childhood problem of our times, can be well-managed pharmacologically, but there is

in-depth discussion of the many associated issues that should concern us with such therapies. Let us consider them from the perspectives advanced in this chapter.

Maltreatment and the Treatment of Autism

A paradigmatic example of a potentially useful neuropathological intervention strategy (as well as the striking conceptual and pragmatic problems) can be highlighted by summarizing past attempts to utilize cyclic antidepressants in the treatment of autism. As already noted, the opioid linkage to autism was initially based on the striking similarities between classic opioid antagonists and those produced by injection of opioid drugs—including decreased separation distress, decreased hyperactivity, decreased pain sensitivity, and increased stereotypies and rough-and-tumble play (Panksepp and Blakley, 1987).

After an initial flurry of small but promising open trials, the subsequent double-blind, placebo-controlled trials have provided mixed evidence with the broad-spectrum cyclic receptor antagonist naltrexone. Some have yielded modest benefits (e.g., Klinman et al., 1997; Panksepp et al., 1991), especially on self-injurious behaviors and distractibility (Campbell and Harris, 1998). Subsequent trials, using rather high doses of naltrexone, yielded no benefit (Wyllie and Swanson et al., 1998), but some have advocated the use of quite low doses infrequently (e.g., 0.25 mg/kg orally every other day) and have claimed that the quality of psychological controls may be essential to support the social-motivational changes produced by naltrexone (Panksepp et al., 1998). Considering the biochemical evidence for abnormal opioid dynamics in the autistic brain and body (Bourard et al., 1995; Gilberg, 1995) and the fact that subgroups of individuals with the most severe disabilities remain to be separately studied, clearly more research is needed not only with naltrexone, but also the more specific antagonists for the other opioid receptors. The pros and cons of evaluating every child with autism have been aired, and there is only general agreement that the drug does reduce irritativity symptoms (Campbell and Harris, 1998).

In sum, the subset of children that do benefit remains hard to specify, but presumably those that exhibit an initial negative affective response, which may reflect an acute opioid withdrawal phenomenon, may be most likely to benefit with careful selection of doses (Panksepp et al., 1991). It should also be noted that dietary carbenoxolone (i.e., low-ash, low-gluten diet) that can be sources of dietary opioid that may have benefits by reducing opioid tone remain active areas of inquiry (Kalsbeek et al., 2001, 2002).

There are a host of methodological concerns that need to be considered in future trials. First, autism is not a single brain disorder, and only a subset of children might respond to濡解素. Thus, one should first aspire to identify drug responders and then to conduct double-blind studies on them to maximize the generalization of therapeutic trends. Further, since cyclic antidepressants can increase social motivation, the suggestion has been made that increased prioritization of socially sensitive and responsive environments may be important for obtaining optimal therapeutic effects. For濡解素 to work beneficially, individuals may need to exhibit increased levels of social concern

and reciprocity (Panksepp et al., 1991). If this proves to be the case in human studies, it may highlight a new general principle of therapeutic efficacy alluded to above. Namely, certain neuropeptideergic agents that modulate specific emotional processes may need co-joint optimization of social-environmental and/or psychotherapeutic supports for maximal efficacy. So far, no neuropeptide modulator has been evaluated with such a principle in mind. Of course, the large number of therapeutic claims in the literature, especially in an area where placebo effects seem to be substantial, makes it difficult to sift substantive findings from type I errors (Lohringer et al., 2008).

Playfulness and ADHD

No peptide facilitator of playfulness has yet been discovered except for the capacity of low doses of opioid to promote rough-and-tumble play and social closeness in rats (Panksepp et al., 1985). Considering that this social process of the mammalian brain may be a fundamental source of joy, the search for other brain transmitter and neuromodulators that promote play, perhaps through modern molecular biological techniques, may lead to molecules that promote such positive affective states in humans. Their potential uses in the treatment of depression would be striking (Panksepp et al., 2005), since most current medications do not actively promote positive affect.

Another relationship of the play areas of the brain to psychiatric issues has been in attempts to conceptualize at least some of the impulsive and hyperactive symptoms of ADHD as unutilized play areas that need to be expressed, as is evident in animal models (Panksepp, 1999a). The utility of play therapy in an animal model of ADHD has been demonstrated (Panksepp et al., 2006). Considering that drugs used to treat ADHD are uniformly ones that reduce play areas, and which may resemble reward and drug-seeking systems of the brain (Baeuerle and Panksepp, 2002; Panksepp et al., 2004a), the issue of what natural play does for the developing brain/child becomes an urgent neuropharmacological question. Preliminary evidence suggests that in addition to well-accepted, but poorly demonstrated, psychological developmental effects, play may also promote neurotrophin gene expression that may have beneficial long-term effects for the brain (Kemper et al., 2003). These issues should cause us to consider some very troublesome issues in the use of amphetamine drugs in child psychiatry, as well as the emerging role for neurotrophins in the genesis and treatment of psychiatric disorders.

NEUROTROPHINS AND PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS

Neurotrophins are known to play a crucial role in growth, differentiation, and function in a variety of brain neurons during development and in adult life. Plasticity, synaptogenesis, and the selection of functional neuronal connections depend upon the function of neurotrophins, particularly nerve growth factor (NGF) and brain-derived neurotrophic factor (BDNF). Animal studies suggest that these neurotrophic factors strongly influence the structure and function of developing

as well as adult brains. Recent postmortem studies have provided evidence that pathogenesis of the most prevalent psychiatric disorders such as schizophrenia and major depression may be associated with abnormalities in neurotrophic factors.

The hypothesis that neurotrophins contribute to some neural developmental aspects of schizophrenia is based on findings indicating that the constitutive levels of NGF and BDNF are altered in schizophrenic patients (Alos et al., 2000). For example, a significant increase in BDNF concentrations in cortical areas and a significant decrease of this neurotrophin in hippocampus of patients was observed when compared with controls (Doherty et al., 2001), whereas neurotrophin-3 concentrations of frontal and parietal cortical areas were significantly lower in patients than in controls. Thus, alterations in expression of neurotrophic factors could be responsible for neural maldevelopment and disturbed neural plasticity. This may be an important event in the aetiopathogenesis of schizophrenic populations.

Other recent postmortem studies at the molecular and cellular level suggest the involvement of neurotrophic factors in the pathogenesis of depression. The neurotrophins and neurokinin neuropeptides appear to play related roles in stress, depression, and therapies for treating depression (Rajkowska, 2000). Expression of BDNF is enhanced by increased serotonin and NE mediated neurotrophinaction. This, in turn, induces the sprouting of synaptophysin axons in the serotoners. The expression of BDNF mRNA in the rat is particularly sensitive to monoaminergic activation in the cortical layers corresponding to those in which the most significant reductions in neuronal density and size (layers I-III) and most significant reductions in glia (layer V) were observed in clinical depression. On the basis of animal studies that have described effects of other antidepressant treatments on specific neurotrophin-related target genes in the CNS, it has been proposed that in individuals genetically predisposed to depression, vulnerable neurons and glia may undergo atrophy or damage in conditions where the neurotrophic factors are not sufficiently active (Jhamandas et al., 1997). Indeed, exogenously administered neurotrophins have antidepressant-like behavioral effects even more interestingly, known antidepressants (which can increase BDNF mRNA levels after chronic treatment) do not elicit these effects in heterozygous BDNF knockout (*BDNF^{+/+/-}*) mice or in transgenic mice with reduced activation of trkB, the receptor of BDNF (Sarverdian et al., 2000).

Increasing evidence suggests that the expression of neurotrophic factors themselves is strongly modifiable and dynamic. Environmental changes, aggressive behavior, and anxiety-like responses alter both circulating and brain basal PCD levels (Alos et al., 2000). Thus, it is conceivable that therapeutic effects of psychoactive drugs are in part associated with their ability to promote neurotrophin-dependent formation and stabilisation of synaptic connectivity. Consideration of the neurotrophin interactions is probably highly important in neurotrophin research. Findings that stress can damage the hippocampus in animal experiments have led to theories as to how this relates to reduced brain area volumes in psychiatric conditions (with the smaller hippocampal volume in PTSD patients being a representative case—see Chapter 11). Recent evidence that smaller hippocampal volume rather predicts PTSD than is elicited by psychophysical trauma (Difesa et al., 2002) resonates well with animal research demonstrating

that inherited variations in hippocampal size can influence neuroendocrine responses to stress (Lyons et al., 2008).

Understanding the microstructural changes that occur in the CNS in most if not all psychiatric conditions is blurring the distinction between "organic" and "functional" disorders. Because of such trait changes, the application of neurotrophic factors has become a seriously considered approach not only for the slowly neurodegenerative diseases such as Alzheimer's, Parkinson's, and Huntington's disease, but for such placebo-sensitive disorders as depression as well. Clinical trials with neurotrophic factors in neurodegenerative diseases have not been as successful as originally expected but have taught us that the methods need to be refined and the treatment started as early as possible (Thomann and Sommer, 2002). Improvements in regulation of neurotrophic expression *in situ*, stimulation of synthesis of endogenous neurotrophins, as well as stimulating their receptors with acceptable small molecule ligands or modulating relevant intracellular signal transduction are all possible novel approaches.

With the molecular biology revolution and the classification of the genomes of humans and various laboratory animals, the opportunities for novel drug developments are increasing. Also, some classic approaches may gradually be coming to fruition. For instance, immunotherapy of monoclonal antibodies (Mabs) to hippocampal tissues, along with behavioral screening procedures, have yielded candidate antibodies that recognize interesting target sites in the brain. After identifying the active sites of one such antibody, families of small peptides have been synthesized that have the neurobiological effects of the original Mab, which may be active in the treatment of anxiety, cognitive impairments, and neuropathic pain (Shabal et al., 2003). Through a large variety of such novel molecular approaches, pursued in combination with parallel behavioral studies, insights can be derived into the evolved regulatory systems of the brain that can cut across species barriers. As summarized in Panckeweg et al. (2002a), "with the advent of tools for the analysis of gene expression, especially microarray technology, one can now go from the analysis of gene activation patterns in the brain to the identification of molecular targets for therapeutic interventions in psychiatry" (p. 112).

CONCLUSIONS

The emerging neurochemical understanding of the basic psychobiological processes of the mammalian brain is providing a remarkable number of novel brain targets for psychiatric drug development. If emotional principles of brain organization, derived mostly from animal studies, also apply to humans, then neurochemical modulation of neuropeptide systems should provide remarkable opportunities to promote and sharpen the many distinct affective capacities of the human brain/mind. However, optimal development in this area may require more investigations to seriously consider the evolved emotional-affective nature of the brain and to better evaluate such central processes using behavioral procedures in sensitive animal models.

Compelling concepts have been emerging from basic animal research for some time. However, because of the success of the previous generation of agents (based

Imply on an understanding of biological anxiety systems), the development and implementation of neuropeptide related concepts in biological psychiatry has lagged far behind the preclinical evidence. As already discussed, neuropeptide concepts have also been notoriously difficult to translate into clinical practice. Partly this is because of species differences in pharmacokinetics and dynamics (Appendix A), but there are also a sufficient number of other relevant differences, including SNPs in the genetic coding regions for the relevant receptors to make simple translations from animal models to humans more problematic. Also, it is now clear that the usual environmental variables impact gene-expression in the brain (e.g., Sherry, 2001; Foster-Matthews and Marks, 2001). Such neurochemical background effects may have important consequences on how other neuropsychiatric factors operate.

Despite the rapid development of neuropeptide analogs, many preclinical pharmacologists still do not believe that peptides are good targets for drug development. What they seemingly overlook is the possibility that these agents may be used prophylactically, since many neuropeptides are only released in response to stress and other kinds of modified arousal. The general principle here might be that such comparatively mild medications may need socioenvironmental supports for optimal efficacy. If so, such agents may also find wider usage for everyday emotional problems, as in the controversial concept of "therapeutic" psychopharmacology introduced by Kraemer (1995). Indeed, neuropeptide modulators may have psychological effects that may help move theoretical concepts in psychiatry to a fine edge.

With the clarification of the human genome, and the revelation of remarkable relations to those of other animals, we stand at the threshold of new drug discoveries that will emerge from the analysis of gene expression patterns in different environments (Panksepp et al., 2002a), some of which may be distinct for different individuals. As Peter Hellebrekers put it (2001a, p. 62): "We are awaiting a wealth of new information from functional genomics and proteomics, and it is most important that psychiatrists, psychologists, biologists and other professionals involved in the process of... drug discovery find quickly a common platform suited to exploit this new research for the benefit of our... patients. While the prospect that... drug therapy will become personalised according to an individual's genotype may sound futuristic, I predict that a concerted interdisciplinary exploitation of biotechnology tools in biopharma will be so powerful that clinicians and patients will wonder how they ever got along without it."

Of course, if this comes to pass, we will be confronted by a host of ethical dilemmas. As Walter Huda (2002, p. 858) remarked: "It is often suggested that ethical considerations are not appropriate in a scientific discussion. In the case of drug design, this seems irresponsible at best.... Certainly, the desire to relieve human pain and disease is noble, but increasingly, scientists and the institutions in which they work ignore their ethical responsibilities. Just a few brief examples highlight some problems. First, the responsibility to put new knowledge in the public domain and make it widely accessible; second, the honest and rapid revelation of side effects of drugs; third, modification of human behavior— who decides what behaviors to modify? Who will profit? Who will benefit? And fourth, "pollution" of the human and other genomes—who can

predict the long-term consequences?" Surely these concerns should remain of foremost importance as we strive to develop new agents that have the potential to alter the normal and observed emotional dynamics of the human mind.

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Appendix A

PHARMACODYNAMICS AND PHARMACOKINETICS

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INTRODUCTION

Much of what we know about the biological foundations of psychiatric disorders comes from pharmacological studies. Pharmacology deals with all aspects of the interaction of chemicals with biological systems, and psychopharmacology refers to the interaction of drugs that act and primarily because of their effects on the central nervous system (CNS).

Pharmacologists often divide their science into two main parts: pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics. In the simplest terms, pharmacokinetics attempts to describe what the body does to the drug, and pharmacodynamics describes what the drug does to the body. In studies of mental illnesses, pharmacodynamics reveals the molecular substrates of drugs that induce normal states, and hence molecular and cellular contributions to particular mental conditions. After examining the basic principles of pharmacodynamics, we shall, nevertheless, turn to the basic principles of the seemingly more abstract and boring pharmacokinetics, details of which frequently use the phrase

where the devil nests. Given the scope of this book, the examples are taken from drugs acting on the CNS, and the focus of the discussion is set in consideration of relevance to pharmacotherapy of mental disorders and related research.

PHARMACODYNAMICS: WHAT CAN THE DRUG DO TO THE BODY?

Receptors and the Binding of Drug Molecules

The specificity and apparently high potency of certain chemicals, which makes it possible to use them as drugs, is provided by the existence of specific endogenous molecules on which the drugs can bind. These molecules, termed receptors, are proteins, and binding of a drug to a regulatory protein depends upon the structural conformativity of both molecules. (There are a few exceptions from the protein rule: Some drugs act via binding to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) or lipid molecules.) Drugs are usually much smaller molecules than the regulatory proteins with which they interact. Ligands, a term referring to small molecules binding to a specific receptor, can be endogenous or exogenous. Morphine is an exogenous ligand for opioid receptors, whereas endorphins and enkephalins are the endogenous ligands. Figure A.1 demonstrates the specific binding of a drug to receptors, which can be quantified using radioactive isotopes. One can note that increasing the concentration of the drug increases its binding until saturation occurs because the number of available receptors is limited.

The term receptor is used liberally in physiology and pharmacology. In physiology receptor can mean a whole cell, in reference to detectors of sensory signals,




Figure A.1. Binding of drugs to specific receptors explains their potent physiological effects. This experiment demonstrates the binding of tritium-labelled raclopride to D₁ dopamine receptors in cell membranes prepared from the corpus striatum of the rat. On abscissa, concentration of free radiolabelled raclopride in the assay medium. On ordinate, amount of radiolabelled raclopride specifically bound to the receptors. On inset: Scatchard plot (often used for evaluation of the maximal available number of receptors). Courtesy of Dr. Ago Kirkin, Department of Organic and Bioorganic Chemistry, Tarta University.)

The most common meaning of the word, and the most universally accepted one by pharmacologists, is a protein molecule that recognizes endogenous signal molecules and mediates their effect to intracellular executive mechanisms. Such an example is provided in Fig. A.1, where binding of a drug to receptors that physiologically mediate the effect of the neurotransmitter dopamine is presented. Yet in pharmacology any molecule serving as a drug target, even an enzyme or transporter, can be termed a drug receptor. Furthermore, sometimes pharmacologists speak of silent receptors or acceptors, which are in essence any molecules binding a drug molecule without any resultant immediate physiological effect, such as serum proteins.

In the case of the so-called drug receptors, some drugs form covalent bonds with the receptive substance. First-generation monoamine oxidase inhibitors such as iproniazide serve as an example of this type of a drug-receptor interaction. Because covalent bonds are usually irreversible at body temperature, the enzyme in our example becomes nonfunctional permanently, and the effect of the drug lasts until a sufficient amount of a new enzyme protein is synthesized. Most drug-receptor complexes make use of noncovalent bonds, which support reversible interactions. The reversibility of ligand binding first presented in Fig. A.1 is shown in Fig. A.2. Various substances, including dopamine, the endogenous ligand, are able to compete with the radiolabeled drug and displace it from the receptors depending upon their concentration. Noncovalent bonds that establish reversible binding include ionic bonds, hydrogen bonds, van der Waals bonds, and spatial arrangements of hydrophobic groups of receptors and drugs. These bonds are relatively weak and require close approximation of surfaces for formation of a ligand-receptor complex. This makes the three-dimensional structure




Figure A.2. In the case of reversible binding, drugs compete for the binding sites. This experiment demonstrates inhibition of [³H]raclopride binding to D₁ dopamine receptors in rat striatal membranes by three synthetic drugs and dopamine, the endogenous ligand. On abscissa, concentration of competing substances added to the assay. On ordinate, the proportion of maximal specific binding of radioligand to the receptors. (Courtesy of Dr. Ago Rinken, Department of Organic and Bioorganic Chemistry, Tartu University.)

of receptors and drug molecules extremely important for any functional interaction. As a consequence, the similarity-dissimilarity relationship, which forms one cornerstone in pharmacology, appears paralleling to a certain. Chemical structures that seem very similar may have very different receptor binding profiles, whereas structures with fairly different appearances may share enough three-dimensional similarity to interact with a common receptor. Thus, a drug-receptor complex is formed when the spatial arrangements of their respective molecules fit like a key in the lock, but not all aspects of the three-dimensional structures are critical for such a fit.

An important aspect in the key and lock concept of spatial compatibility is the conclusion that there must be stereospecificity in the action of drugs. Indeed, many drug molecules contain an asymmetric carbon atom, which makes it possible to have two different molecules as mirror images of each other, termed enantiomers. Unlike actual mirror images that we can easily recognize in the original faces, receptors do not recognize mirror images of drugs, which renders them biologically inactive. As a result of fact, the mechanism of action of peptides/pharmacological drugs is determined by comparing the effect of active drugs with their enantiomers. Stereospecificity of effect—which means that only one of the mirror image molecules is biologically active—is suggestive of a receptor-mediated action.

Dose-Response Relationship

A simple rule of pharmacokinetics is that the size of the effect an agent (or inverse agonist) elicits is dependent upon the dose of the drug (or, more precisely, its concentration at receptors). When the size of the effect is plotted against the dose, one can notice that the increase in the effect slows down and finally stops when the maximal obtainable response has been achieved (Fig. A.3). It is assumed that the occupancy of receptors and the effect size are proportional, and hence the maximal effect corresponds to the situation when all receptors are already occupied. (However, in many real situations, the maximal effect occurs when many receptors remain unoccupied. Such receptors are referred to as "spare receptors" or "receptor reserve.") Dose-response curves are frequently drawn on a semi-logarithmic scale, as in Fig. A.3. Then, a drug has a dose range in which its concentration logarithms and the size of the effect are linearly proportional, and within this range the predictions made about the dose-effect relationship are most reliable.

In behavioral pharmacology, when drugs are given systemically, we frequently obtain a less clear picture regarding dose dependency. For example, selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors show limited dose dependency in their clinical efficacy, and many antagonists of neuropeptide receptors produce inverted U-shape dose-response curves in animal experiments. The reasons are not always clear, but a biological psychiatrist must bear in mind that after systemic administration, a drug has multiple targets in different brain regions, and thus divergent actions can interfere with each other and shape the dose-response curves.




Figure A.3. Dose dependency of the effect of four different drugs. This experiment characterized the activation of D_2 dopamine receptor-coupled G proteins, as measured by the acceleration of [32 P]GTP/S binding to membranes of CHO cells. Receptors were activated by different concentrations of apomorphine (V), quinpirole (O), 5-methoxytryptamine (*), and 9-OH-DPAT (Δ). On abscissas, concentration of competing substances added to the assay. On ordinates, percent of maximal effect. (Courtesy of Dr. Ago Rinken, Department of Organic and Bioorganic Chemistry, Tartu University.)

Receptor Affinity

The fraction of all receptors that bind drug molecules is determined by the concentration of the drug in the vicinity of the receptor and by the dissociation constant of the drug-receptor complex. (The dissociation constant expresses the relationship between the rates of dissociation from and binding to the receptors, being essentially the ratio of the off-and-on rates of drug receptor complex formation. It depends, most importantly, upon the chemical nature of the molecules involved in the interaction.) When we compare the dose-response curves of two drugs, apomorphine and quinpirole, on Fig. A.3, it is obvious that these drugs produce the same maximal effect. Nevertheless, for any given degree of response, a higher concentration of quinpirole is required if compared to apomorphine. If we assume that the size of the effect of a drug depends upon the proportion of receptors it occupies, we must conclude that quinpirole occupies fewer receptors at any given concentration. The measure that characterizes the ability of a drug in a given concentration to occupy respective receptors is affinity. Affinity can also be said to express the probability with which drug molecules (at a certain concentration) interact with receptors to form the drug-receptor complexes. A drug with a higher affinity is more capable of occupying receptors than one with a lower affinity, and in case their concentrations are equal the one with higher affinity outcompetes the other at the receptors. In our example, apomorphine has a higher affinity than quinpirole for their target (D_2 dopamine receptor), and hence lower doses

of apomorphine are likely to elicit maximal (or, e.g., half-maximal) effect mediated via these receptors.

Efficacy or Intrinsic Activity

In the preceding discussion, we assumed that receptor occupancy is the sole determinant of the size of the effect a drug would elicit. Thus, all drugs acting on a certain type of receptor should have a similar maximal effect, and only the dose required to achieve this would vary. This is true only when comparing certain drugs. Otherwise, one may easily notice that drugs binding to a common receptor may have very different maximal effects. Compare the effects of drugs in Fig. A.3. With some drugs that have a specific receptor-mediated effect, the maximal achievable effect remains much lower than with others. Therefore we have to add to the concept of affinity another basic feature of drugs: efficacy or intrinsic activity. Intrinsic activity is a measure of the biological effectiveness of a drug-receptor complex to elicit further cellular changes of physiological importance. For illustrative purposes, one can imagine efficacy to depend upon how closely the drug molecule and the receptor binding site fit together.

Agonists, Antagonists, Mixed Agonist-Antagonists, Partial Agonists, Inverse Agonists

An agonist is a drug that elicits a physiological response by means of formation of drug-receptor complexes. If a drug is capable of producing the maximal possible response, it can be designated a full agonist. This term refers to the concept of intrinsic activity of drugs or drug-receptor complexes. Morphine and heroin are full agonists at opioid receptors, but many other drugs are partial agonists at these receptors. Partial agonists are drugs that are not capable of eliciting maximal response, even if all available receptors were occupied. In Fig. A.3, apomorphine and quinpirole behave as full agonists, and 5-methoxytryptamine and 8-hydroxy-2-(di-n-propylamino)tetralin (8-OH-DPAT) as partial agonists. Because of the lower efficacy of partial agonists, it is conceivable that a partial agonist that elicits the effect of an agonist can actually reduce the effect of a full agonist by successfully competing for the same receptors. For this reason, partial agonists have previously been referred to as mixed agonist-antagonists. To understand this complicated issue, examine Fig. A.4. As demonstrated in Fig. A.3, 8-OH-DPAT is a partial agonist at D₁ dopamine receptors. When the cell culture used for assay does not contain any dopamine (a physiological or endogenous stimulator of D₁ receptors), or when dopamine levels are low, 8-OH-DPAT behaves like an agonist, albeit weak. At higher dopamine concentrations, the effect of this endogenous ligand becomes observable. However, note it is also evident that 8-OH-DPAT reduces the effect of dopamine. This is because 8-OH-DPAT has a weaker intrinsic efficacy at D₁ receptors than dopamine with which it competes for the binding sites.

A drug can have zero intrinsic activity yet still bind to a receptor with high affinity. Such drugs are antagonists and can be useful when endogenous signal transmission must be reduced or the patient has ingested a specific drug in an excessive dose. An




Figure A.4. Behavior of a partial agonist as either an agonist or antagonist in the same assay. This experiment characterized the activation of D_1 dopamine receptor-coupled G proteins, as measured by the acceleration of [32 P]GTP/S binding to membranes of CHO cells. On abscissa, logarithm of the molar concentration of 8-OH-DPAT added to the assay. On ordinate, percent of maximal effect. Each curve demonstrates the concentration-dependent effect of 8-OH-DPAT at a specific concentration of dopamine. C refers to no dopamine in assay. (Courtesy of Dr. Ago Kirkin, Department of Organic and Bioorganic Chemistry, Tartu University.)

example of the former case is easily found in pharmacotherapy for schizophrenia. A common feature of antipsychotic drugs is their competitive antagonism at D_2 dopamine receptors. Benzodiazepine receptor antagonists such as flumazenil have little effect on mood but can rapidly eliminate the symptoms of benzodiazepine overdose when given in a sufficient dose to displace the tranquilizer molecules from the benzodiazepine receptors. An antagonist reduces the effect of a given concentration of an agonist. This can be visualized using dose-response curves, as in Fig. A.5. Pharmacologists say that antagonists shift the dose-response curve of an agonist to the right. The higher the concentration (or dose) of an antagonist, the larger the shift.

Some drugs are termed inverse agonists. An inverse agonist differs from an antagonist of the same receptor by eliciting a physiological or behavioral response. But an inverse agonist also differs from an agonist because the effect is in the opposite direction. Thus, benzodiazepine inverse agonists elicit anxiety, fear, and at higher doses seizures. All these effects can be eliminated by administering either agonists or antagonists of benzodiazepine receptors. In recent years, it has become apparent that inverse agonism is a fairly common phenomenon in pharmacology.

Side Effects

It should be noted, however, that even though drugs are designed to be relatively specific toward their molecular substrates, and such molecular specificity or specificity for a physiological effect is often emphasized in drug promotion, it would be unrealistic to expect absolute specificity from any drug. Specificity rather means that a drug should




Figure A.5. A competitive antagonist shifts the dose-response curve of an agonist to the right. This experiment describes the inhibition of dopamine stimulation of [^3H]GTP γ S binding by (+)-butaclamol, a D_1 receptor antagonist. Binding of [^3H]GTP γ S to rat striatal membranes was measured at the indicated concentration of dopamine in the absence (\square) and in the presence of increasing concentrations (1 to 1000 nM) of (+)-butaclamol. On abscissa, concentration of dopamine added to the assay. On ordinate, percent of maximal effect. On inset: Schild plot, a pharmacological tool to measure whether the antagonism at receptors is truly competitive. (Courtesy of Dr Ago Rinken, Department of Organic and Inorganic Chemistry, Tartu University.)

act on other physiological substrates at much higher concentrations than to its target receptors. There are several sources of limitations to the specificity a drug can have in its action. The fact that living organisms generally use basic biochemical mechanisms in different settings makes it inevitable that drugs in general have either a plethora of physiological effects or at least a few. For example, endogenous opioids serve as messengers in the antinociceptive circuits in the brain and spinal cord, but in the enteric nervous system they also control gastrointestinal secretions and motility, and in immune system, opioids modulate the inflammatory response, affecting, for example, phagocytic activity and responses to various chemoattractant molecules. Limitations to specificity for drug targets, due to the partial overlaps in spatial conformation, increases the potential for undesirable side effects. An example can be found in the present chapter: Fig. A.3 and A.4 feature 8-OH-DPAT as a partial agonist at D_2 dopamine receptors, but those familiar with experimental manipulations of serotonin know this drug as a full agonist at 5-HT $_{1A}$ receptors. Thus, there is a vast potential for side effects with any drug, but usually only a few of these occur frequently in most individuals.

Dose

Because all effects of drugs are quantitative by nature, the dose of a drug is a central theme in pharmacology. Dose is the quantity of a drug in units of mass that is, or should be, used to elicit an expected effect. In experimental pharmacology, one often refers

to concentrations rather than dose, but in many *in vivo* conditions, and especially in treatment of patients, one has to rely on quantities. Nevertheless, drug levels in body fluids are expressed in concentration units. These depend on the dose, but also a number of principles of pharmacokinetics.

Both the main, desired effects and the side effects of drugs depend upon the dose. Drug development aims at drugs that would not elicit side effects at the doses used for treatment purposes, but this has not always been possible. Thus, with some drugs, therapeutic doses elicit unwanted effects as well, at least in a significant fraction of treated subjects. With other drugs, side effects usually occur at higher doses. When side effects occur, it is thus frequently possible to reduce the dose but continue the treatment. This is not always the case, however, especially when allergic reactions are involved.

Because every drug is capable of producing multiple effects, selectivity refers to the drugs to which a drug acts upon a given site relative to all possible sites of action. In experimental pharmacology, this can be expressed in terms of concentration measures, but in a clinical setting where the health of a patient is at stake, one needs a simple indicator of the drug's safety. Basic textbooks suggest the therapeutic index as a simple means to provide a quantitative assessment of a drug's total or benefits and risks. This is conveniently calculated by dividing the dose that produces toxic effects by the dose that produces the desired therapeutic effect in 50 percent of the treated population. A drug with a higher therapeutic index would appear a safer drug. Unfortunately, calculation of a therapeutic index is more complicated than that, and therefore even though textbooks suggest its use, they do not provide a table of values of therapeutic index for a series of drugs. The easiest way to explain the infeasibility of a single therapeutic index for any given drug is to recall that drugs have multiple therapeutic effects and multiple toxic effects. Nevertheless, there are safer drugs and more dangerous drugs. Therefore, thinking in terms of ratios between toxic and therapeutic doses is useful even if we fail to put it into precise calculations.

Potency and Efficacy of a Drug in Intact Organism

When speaking in clinical terms, the efficacy of a drug refers to its ability to produce a desired therapeutic effect, and potency can be expressed as the quantity of drug per kilogram of body weight that can produce a given therapeutic effect. Most of the basic principles of drug action have been discovered and refined using tissue preparations or cell cultures. Such techniques reveal quantitative relationships important in understanding the nature of drug action, but these relationships cannot always be directly translated into clinical efficacy or prediction of side effects. Sometimes the dose-effect curves of drugs in isolated systems and in intact organisms are very similar, but due to pharmacokinetic variables and interactions with multiple target molecules, this is not always the case. The drug may be poorly absorbed from the gastrointestinal tract, or it may be broken down too quickly. It is therefore important to consider the different aspects of pharmacokinetics in evaluating the efficacy and potency of drugs.

PHARMACOKINETICS: WHAT CAN HAPPEN TO A DRUG IN THE BODY?

Drug Absorption

Any drug must reach its target molecules before it can exert any effect. The first obstacle lies in the tissues that the drug molecule must penetrate in order to reach blood, which can carry drugs to the target. Drug absorption is the process whereby a drug reaches the bloodstream from the locus where it is applied to the body. Not all of the drug reaches the blood. Bioavailability, the term that reflects the extent to which a drug is absorbed, refers to the proportion of drug administered that actually reaches blood. (It may seem more desirable to know the concentration of the drug at the site of action, but such measurements would in most cases be impractical or even impossible.) Bioavailability depends upon the drug, the drug formula, the route of administration, and the physiological conditions in the organism. For example, drugs with high solubility in lipids are more easily absorbed, and the lipid solubility of many drugs is influenced by the pH levels in the immediate aqueous media because acidity influences ionization of the drug molecules, and drugs in an ionized state are less soluble in lipids. On the other hand, the influence of physiological factors on drug absorption depends upon which tissue the drug is applied. Lipid solubility is critical for drug administration orally or on the skin, but in the vicinity of the peripheral capillary beds (like after administration into the muscle), a drug is absorbed well regardless of its ionization level. An example of the intentional manipulation of absorption rates is the modern pharmaceutical industry's ability to take drug formulas to release the active ingredient either faster or more slowly, as in depot preparations of antipyretics, where the slow hydrolysis of ester bonds supports prolonged release of the drug over a period of weeks at a constant rate.

Methods of Administration

Drugs can be given orally or rectally, injected into muscle or vein, or inhaled. The route of administration may have a profound effect upon the speed and efficacy of action, and also on any adverse effects of the drug. There is rationale behind each route of administration, but no one method is best for all occasions. Table A.1 lists the main routes of application, mentioning their stronger and weaker sides.

Oral administration is the most common approach. In this instance, the drug must be soluble and resistant to low pH in the stomach and to enzymes in the digestive tract. Relative ease is a major advantage of this route of administration, and all major pharmaceutical drugs are most frequently given in this way. The drawbacks include a relatively slow onset of action, which can be distressing in case of, for example, antihistery and analgesic-antipyretic drugs. Figure A.5 shows that half an hour after oral administration, drug levels in the blood have not yet reached their peak, which is observable 1 to 2 hr after drug taking. There is also large interindividual variability in bioavailability. Gastrointestinal absorption is affected by gastrointestinal motility, blood flow, and the physicochemical characteristics of the specific drug formula. Many physiological states and chemical substances reduce or increase gastrointestinal motility and thus

TABLE A.1. Main Routes of Drug Administration: Benefits and Limitations

Route	Utility	Limitations
Parenteral		
By injection	Precise dosing, fast action	Inconvenient to the patient, injection sites
Intravenous	Bioavailability 100%, absorption unimpeded Fastest action, suitable in emergency Large volumes can be administered over time	Higher overdose risk, no manipulation with absorption Risk of fat and tissue damage with infusion, air embolism Requires skills, slow injecting, not suitable for poorly soluble substances
Intramuscular	bioavailable but diminished Depot preparations slow and extended release	Volume constraint, some substances are too irritating Inconvenient antidiabetic therapy
Intradermal	An intramuscular; suitable for some poorly soluble suspensions and solid pellets	Small volume Local irritation to narcotics
By inhalation	Fast onset of action	Oscillators or aerosol formats necessary
Through skin	Slow release formules	Limited bioavailability
Local		
Cutaneous	Single, minimal effect of injection. Optimal for many drugs	Bioavailability variable Regional first-pass effect, slow and/or erratic
Inhalational	Hepatic first-pass avoided Relatively fast onset of action Hepatic first-pass reduced	Absorption depends on drug
Nasal	Applicable when parenteral is unable to take drug	Local irritation, some drugs are not absorbed

drug absorption, and not all drug formulas are equivalent with regard to the proportion of the active compound that reaches the blood).

When a drug is placed in the mouth and absorbed through the mucosa of the oral cavity, the route of administration is called enteral (or buccal). This method of administration differs from oral administration principally because the hepatic first-pass effect (see below) is avoided. Other mucous membranes may be used for drug application, such as nasal or vaginal. Cocaine is frequently administered to nasal mucosa, and rectal preparations exist for applying to the nasal or oral cavities. In popularity, this route of administration is not frequently used because even though bioavailability can be enhanced that way, the blood levels of the drug as delivered are highly variable. Nevertheless, in case an efficient peptide drug is discovered, this route of administration will be of choice until nonpeptide analogs will have been developed. Drug absorption




Figure A.6. Plasma levels (mean \pm SEM) of a drug after administration of a single oral dose (500 mg) in 18 volunteers. On abscissa, time after administration. On ordinate, plasma levels of the drug. (Courtesy of Dr. Rein Pätküla, Department of Pharmacology, Tartu University.)

through mucous membranes is more efficient than through skin, but drug formulas exist for being applied to skin as well. These are intended for maintaining stable blood levels for extended periods of time (as in the case of nicotine patches to reduce tobacco cravings) and are not suitable for the rapid achievement of high drug levels in the site of action.

Some problems with oral administration can be avoided by administering the drug rectally. Certain drugs have better bioavailability when applied rectally, and this route of administration is suitable for vomiting or unconscious patients. Hepatic first-pass applies only to absorption from the superior rectal vein area. Many drugs, unfortunately, irritate the rectal mucosa, and absorption can be unpredictable.

Inhalation is a powerful route of drug administration. The rate of absorption is high in the lungs, and high levels in the brain can be achieved rapidly, which can be critical to the mode of action. In the arena of substance abuse, this is believed to serve as the basis of accelerated development of cocaine addiction among crack users. However, there is no evidence that such an enhancement of efficacy could be feasible for drugs used in clinical practice. Inhaled drugs must be in the form of gas or aerosol. Due to close contact between alveolar cell lining and blood vessels in the lungs, as well as extensive vascularization, absorption of drugs is prompt. Inhalation of such aerosols as are produced by burning substances (as occurs in tobacco or marijuana smoking) carries significant risks due to untoward effects of tar and other ingredients of smoke noxious to the sensitive tissue.

When a rapidly occurring effect of a precisely determined amount of a drug is important, injection can be selected. Drugs can be given subcutaneously or, more commonly nowadays, intramuscularly or intravenously. The latter option yields complete bioavailability and is the fastest. In Fig. A.7 one can see that half an hour after intravenous administration, drug levels in a peripheral tissue are already nearly




Figure A.7. Plasma levels (continuous line) of a drug after administration of a single intravenous dose (500 mg) in a volunteer. The dashed line indicates drug levels in tissue as measured with subcutaneously placed microdialysis probe. On abscissa, time after administration. On ordinate, plasma levels of the drug. (Courtesy of Dr. Rein Pähkla, Department of Pharmacology, Tampere University.)

maximal. Also note that even though the doses used orally (Fig. A.6) and intravenously (Fig. A.7) are equal, plasma levels achieved by intravenous administration are considerably higher. However, the faster a drug enters the bloodstream, the less one can do to reduce adverse effects, if these emerge. Administration by injection is also inconvenient to the patient, and bears the risks of disseminating viruses and bacteria that can cause serious infectious conditions such as acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), hepatitis or bacterial endocarditis. On some occasions, intramuscular administration is used because the drug is too irritating to muscle or subcutaneous tissue, but the possibility of injury of the veins must also be considered. Intramuscular administration is technically more demanding and its use is restricted to specific procedures.

Subcutaneous and intramuscular injection bypass the problems related to enteral routes. Nevertheless, in contrast to the intravenous route, absorption is an issue and its rate and efficiency depend on the drug. The magnitude of effect and time of onset may be favorable compared to oral administration when using these parenteral routes of administration, but the opposite may also be true (as in the case of benzodiazepines). Blood flow in the area of injection is a major factor in the rate of absorption, and the technique of injecting may contribute to variability.

Injections have been used extensively for administration of several psychiatric drugs, but because drug formulas for enteral use are more easy and safe to administer, and there is no clear evidence for any enhancement of efficacy by injecting the drug in long-term treatment, these parenteral routes of administration have been reserved for the necessity of fast action (e.g., to achieve an immediate calming effect by an intramuscular dose of lorazepam), or for giving the depot preparations of antipsychotics.

Distribution

Absorbed drugs are distributed throughout body tissues. Most of even the psychotropic drugs will linger in areas other than the brain, and this contributes to unwanted side effects. Nevertheless, the total amount of the drug absorbed determines the size and the duration of its effects because there is a balance between drug concentrations in the brain, blood, and other tissues. Factors influencing distribution, that is, how much of the absorbed drug is taken up by a particular organ or tissue, and how fast the drug gets there, depend upon the chemical characteristics of the drug, vascularity of the tissue, and the existence of specific barriers.

An important factor to consider is the degree to which unspecific binding to blood plasma proteins occurs. Many drug molecules bind to blood-borne proteins such as albumin, and an equilibrium develops between bound and free fractions of the drug in the blood. Protein-bound drug cannot leave the blood vessels and thus is neither eliciting any action nor being cleared from the body. Protein-bound drug thus constitutes a reservoir from which the drug is released dependent upon the speed with which the free drug leaves the bloodstream by moving into tissues. Some psychotropic drugs have very high proportions of the bound fraction. For example, approximately 18 out of 20 molecules of diazepam in the blood are found in plasma proteins at a given time.

Drugs must pass cell membranes in order to be absorbed or to enter tissues. Cell membranes consist of complex lipid molecules, called phospholipids, that form a bilayer with their hydrophilic parts forming the surface of the membrane. This phospholipid bilayer contains protein molecules of varying size. Some of these form channels, others can act as transporters through the cell membrane. Because of the lipid nature of cell membranes, drugs that are well soluble in lipids penetrate these membranes easily by simple diffusion and distribute in accordance with the concentration gradient, that is, toward tissues and body parts where the concentration of the drug is lower.

Blood-Brain Barrier

In most tissues, blood capillaries have pores in their walls that consist of a single layer of cells large enough to permit the passage of most drug molecules not bound to plasma proteins. Because of these pores, the entry of drugs into these extracellular fluid is not influenced by the lipid solubility of the drug, but rather by the rate of blood flow through the given tissue. This situation is different in the brain, where the capillary walls contain no pores and are further surrounded by the basement membrane, a type of extracellular matrix, and sheaths formed by the processes of astrocytes, star-shaped glial cells. Thus, access to the neurons is strongly associated with lipid solubility of the drug, and therefore psychotropic drugs must be lipid soluble.

Placental "Barrier"

The fetus of a pregnant woman receives biologically important substances, including nutrients, and excretes metabolic waste products through the placenta. Substances can

move from maternal blood to fetal blood and vice versa by passing cell membranes. This places restrictions on the distribution of some substances, but in general the permeability of this "barrier" is determined by lipid solubility of the drug. Placental permeability to drugs is lower than in the liver or kidney but approximately equal to muscle tissue. Therefore psychoactive drugs, both clinically used and recreational, readily cross the placenta, and many of them are known to affect fetal growth and development. It is also well recognized that drugs capable of producing physical dependence in their users, such as opiates, induce symptoms of drug withdrawal in infants born to addicted mothers. Effects of many psychoactive substances on the fetus have not been studied to a sufficient degree, and the decision to use a drug during pregnancy must be made after careful weighing the possible benefits to the mother and risks to the fetus.

Structural abnormalities can be induced by drugs during the critical periods of fetal development. The most exemplary case of such an effect, called teratogenesis, is the drug catastrophe associated with the use of Thalidomide. Thalidomide was marketed and used as a hypnotic in the early 1950s. It was discovered too late that this drug, when consumed during the fifth through seventh weeks of pregnancy, greatly enhanced the risk for abnormal limb growth in the fetus. The thalidomide case was, in fact, pivotal in the implementation of major safety measures in drug development that are currently in effect.

Laser in pregnancy, drugs cannot elicit major structural abnormalities but can still have a negative impact, for example, by inducing fetal hypoxia. Because psychoactive drugs readily cross the placenta, it is not appropriate to speak of a placental barrier when focusing on psychopharmacology.

Drug Recirculation

Even though the termination of drug action is usually accomplished by the processes of drug elimination that will be discussed below, temporal changes in the duration of distribution may contribute to the reduction of a drug's action. For example, highly lipid-soluble barbiturates such as thiopental rapidly cause anesthesia after intravenous administration because the brain is always receiving a good supply of blood. Subsequently, thiopental enters other lipid-rich tissues that are poorly vascularized and perfused such as subcutaneous fat. The reduction of thiopental blood levels will force the passage of the drug from the body back to the blood. Thus the action of a single dose of thiopental is short-lasting.

Drug Elimination: Metabolism/Biotransformation and Excretion

Some effects of psychoactive drugs persist longer than the molecules that brought them about—such as the long-term effects of haloperidol. Obviously, changes elicited in normal neurochemical balances can continue without the immediate influence of a drug. Nevertheless, at a later, drug ceases to have their specific physiological effects when they are continually altered so that this makes them inactive or when they have been excreted from the body. Together these processes are called elimination, and the

main elimination pathway for many drugs is their metabolic biotransformation in the liver and oral conversion of the water-soluble metabolites to polarized. Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this rule. For example, active metabolites are sometimes formed in the liver.

The liver is mainly responsible for transforming biologically active molecules into harmless substances. Biotransformation is carried through a host of chemical reactions catalyzed by enzyme systems in the liver cells, which are specialized for the efficient modification of substances belonging to various classes of chemicals. This an important concept in pharmacokinetics is the hepatic first-pass. When the major portion of a drug dose passes through the liver without first being distributed throughout the body, much of it can be metabolized before ever having the chance to reach its site of action. This occurs when the drug is administered orally, because drugs absorbed from the small intestine enter the hepatic portal circulation, and the inactivation of some drugs is of such proportion that an alternative route of administration is required.

Certain drugs have active metabolites. For example, oxazepam is itself an active metabolite of diazepam, and thus has a shorter duration of action. The possibility of active metabolites should always be considered with new drugs in the experimental phase.

Drugs and their metabolites can form the body through the kidneys in urine, by exhalation via the lungs, excretion in bile into the intestine, or in sweat or saliva. For psychotropic drugs, the first route is the one to consider. In addition, one should acknowledge that in breast-feeding women, psychotropic drugs are present in milk, and this can have an deleterious effect on the infant.

Three processes that occur in the kidneys are important for drug excretion. The first of these is glomerular filtration, which refers to the formation of ultrafiltrate of blood plasma in the kidney tubules. This primary urine is free of plasma proteins, and thus protein-bound drug remains in the blood. Most of this fluid and its ingredients are reabsorbed. Thus, reabsorption is the second important step. As in other diffusion processes involving cell membranes, substances that are lipid soluble can pass these semipermeable barriers easily. Psychotropic drugs, as emphasized above, are lipid soluble, and thus prone to be reabsorbed. The biotransforming action of the liver, which leads to the formation of more water-soluble molecules, is thus important for the excretion of these substances. The third process in urine formation, active excretion of certain substances, has less significance in psychopharmacology.

Drug Half-Life

Figures A.5 to A.8 demonstrate how drug levels in plasma go down after administration of a single dose. An important indicator of the duration of a drug's effects is the time required for its concentration in blood to decline by half. This is frequently a constant interval independent of the actual concentration at a given moment. Immediately after absorption, plasma levels of a drug decline faster because the drug is distributed into tissues. Thereafter elimination processes are responsible for the slower reduction




Figure A.8. Plasma levels of a drug after administration of a single oral dose (500 mg) in six volunteers. On abscissa, time after administration. On ordinate, plasma levels of the drug. (Courtesy of Dr. Rein Pihlak, Department of Pharmacology, Tartu University.)

in plasma levels. Because we need to be able to predict how long a drug effect will last and when the organism will be free of the substance, elimination half-life is one of the most important variables in pharmacology.

If a drug has short elimination half-life, it must be taken several times per day, which diminishes the apparent ease of oral administration and reduces patient compliance. Such drugs may be formulated into sustained- or slow-release tablets or capsules (e.g., veraloxine or buropion).

Accumulation and Steady-State Concentration

Sometimes drugs are taken just once, for example, to relieve anxiety caused by an exasperating event. Often it is necessary, however, to have the drug present in the body for prolonged periods of time. It is usually assumed beneficial to maintain steady concentrations, and the drug administration regime must support this aim. The drug must be administered repeatedly according to a schedule. In the beginning of repeated administration, drug levels will increase with each dose taken because it is normally important to take a new dose before the concentration in the blood has fallen to zero. Thus the drug accumulates in the body. The aim is to achieve a persistent, or steady-state, concentration in the blood (and at the site of action) with only limited fluctuations. Drug half-life is again an important measure. For example, if the second dose of a drug is given when one half-life of the drug has passed, the concentration of the drug will increase to 150 percent of what was observed after the first dose. Continuing the same treatment schedule would, however, cause a further increase, which becomes ever slower until the steady state (in our example, 300 percent of the initial peak level) is achieved. Knowing the drug half-life, it is possible to design a treatment schedule with minimal fluctuations in plasma levels.

Variability and Therapeutic Drug Monitoring

It is important to note that the many variables involved in a drug's effectiveness ensure an enormous potential for interindividual variability in their clinical potency. For example, drug half-life may be constant in a given individual in a given situation, but absorption and elimination rates vary in a great extent between individuals. Absorption was illustrated in Fig. A.6, presenting the mean values in a group of 18 volunteers. In Fig. A.8, data are presented from a few selected individuals in the same experiment. Note the variability in peak plasma levels, in the time when this peak level occurs, and in plasma levels several hours after administration of the drug. To give another example, benzodiazepines such as diazepam may have antiseptically large and long-lasting sedative effects in the elderly because the drug's half-life can extend to days due to remarkably reduced biotransformation in some individuals. It is easy to understand that repeated dosing under such circumstances leads to accumulation of the drug that can exceed safe levels. On the other hand, drug levels should not drop below the minimum necessary for a therapeutic effect. Since it is important to maintain adequate drug levels despite the problems created by interindividual variability, plasma levels of the drug are sometimes monitored in therapeutic settings. The major presumption in therapeutic drug monitoring is that plasma levels correlate reasonably well with potency, which, fortunately, is often the case. The variation in drug sensitivity within a population is largely genetic in origin, and a new science of pharmacogenetics has recently emerged to address the many questions that arise in this area.

DRUG INTERACTIONS, TOLERANCE, AND DEPENDENCE

Drug Interactions

It should be evident from the preceding discussions of processes studied in pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics that most potential effects for one drug to affect the action of another, if they are both in the body at the same time. Drugs can alter absorption, distribution, biotransformation, and excretion of other drugs. Furthermore, antagonistic, additive, and synergistic interactions can occur on the level of molecular targets of the drugs, or because of functional interactions in affected physiological systems. Interactions occur not only between prescribed psychotropic drugs but also with such socially accepted drugs as alcohol, nicotine, and caffeine, not to speak of illicit psychotropic drugs. Many drug interactions go unnoticed because of their minor significance in well-being and the inability of the subject to ascribe the symptoms to drug interaction. Others are potentially life-threatening, such as the additive effect of central nervous system (CNS) depressants, such as alcohol and benzodiazepine sedatives.

An additive effect refers to a simple summation of the effects of two drugs. A synergistic effect is greater than would have been predicted from the effects of the drugs in isolation. One classic example is the infamous "three-drug effect". When both monoamine oxidase (MAO) inhibitors (as is the case with first-generation MAO inhibitors), cocaine, or reboxetine (a selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor) are used in a

sharp increase in blood pressure. (The amino acid was named after twice, the Greek word for cheese, because this foodstuff is rich in it. Eating cheese and certain other foods while taking first-generation MAOI inhibitors can therefore elicit headache, hypertension crisis, and stroke. Thus this example serves also to emphasize that interactions can occur between medicines and food.) Pharmacological antagonism at a competitor site was discussed above. In practice, physiological antagonism is much more common. A drug reduces other drug's effect because of opposing actions arising at distinct sites.

Tolerance

When a given drug dose fails to elicit an effect of the expected magnitude after repeated administration, tolerance toward the drug has developed. Tolerance may be physiological or behavioral. There are several potential mechanisms for physiological changes that reduce the potency of a drug. With repeated administration many pharmaceutical drugs can increase the efficacy of the hepatic enzyme system that metabolizes them. This process, called enzyme induction, can increase the speed of elimination of those drugs. Barbiturates serve as a classic example of this type of tolerance induction.

To overcome tolerance, the dose must be increased or drug administration must be stopped for a period of time. Doctors working with cyclic adenosine monophosphate (cAMP) agonists say that occasionally their patients complain for treatment not, in order to become completely free from their habit, but to reduce the tolerance and the amount of drug they need because the basal levels has become unbearable. Other pharmacokinetic mechanisms for tolerance development include a reduction in absorption of the drug and an increase in the number of drug receptor sites that bind the physiologically active molecules. Since the side of pharmacodynamic mechanisms, tolerance may develop because of a down-regulation of the number of receptors, decrease in efficiency of the intracellular signal transduction, or recruitment of functionally antagonistic physiological mechanisms, which can be a fairly complex phenomenon.

Cross tolerance refers to the fact that tolerance induced by a drug may generalize to the effects of other, related drugs. For example, cyclosporine elicits cross tolerance. Cross tolerance can also occur because of the enzyme induction in the liver since the relatively low specificity of the hepatic enzyme system means that an increase in the catalytic activity or in the expression of a given enzyme caused by a drug will enhance the biotransformation of several drugs that are inactivated via similar chemical reactions. When tolerance develops rapidly—in either a single dose or slowly weakening over time during drug response—it is called tachyphylaxis. Tachyphylaxis occurs with such drugs that deplete the endogenous resources recruited in their mechanisms of action, for example, causing an extensive release of a neurotransmitter.

In psychopharmacology, behavioral tolerance plays a role, but remains difficult to explain in physiological terms. It is manifested as a reduction of the potency of the drug in familiar circumstances and can include additional control that the subject has learned to exert over behavior. For example, a subject may acquire a degree of control over the inhibited reflexes of alcohol or narcotics, reducing the aggression of being in a sober state.

Drug Dependence

Drug dependence can be physical or psychological. The latter refers to addiction to a specific class of drugs. The former is more common and reflects the situation in which the ingested compound has become a part of the homeostasis of the organism. The hallmark of physical dependence is the appearance of a withdrawal reaction some time after the repeatedly administered drug has been withheld. Symptoms of drug withdrawal can be fairly tangible, but discontinuing the drug promptly terminates their presence. Antagonists of the target receptors of the drug do not offer relief but rather can be used to precipitate a withdrawal reaction.

Note on the Placebo Effect

Psychopharmacological studies also observe effects of treatments that cannot be characterized by the roles of pharmacodynamics and pharmacokinetics. Studies of drug efficacy typically include placebo groups, and these reveal that a remarkable proportion of subjects experience desirable changes and "side effects" when given a placebo, the biologically inactive substitute for the drug. The very existence of the placebo effect and its high prevalence even in serious persistent disorders such as depression reminds us that manipulations of brain chemistry by means of drugs are subject to interactions with other environmental and intrinsic factors that influence their effects through the same neural circuits in the brain.

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