

# **An analysis of TOR**

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## Introduction

In this paper we have done an analysis of the Tor blocking issues that occur with the use of the network. We will first explain in Part1 what Tor is and how it works, and then look at the challenges that Tor faces. In Part 2, we will present our findings from the analysis and compare them with the conclusions from three articles; *A bestiary of blocking: The motivations and modes behind website unavailability*, *How the Great Firewall of China is Blocking Tor*, *characterizing the nature and dynamics of Tor exit blocking*. These articles provide an overview of general TOR blocking issues, and we will show how our findings align with or differ from their insights.

### *Part I*

#### **What is TOR and how does it work?**

In the 1990s, the lack of security in the internet and its ability to be used for tracking became more and more significant. David Goldschlag, Mike Reed, and Paul Syversen at the U.S. Naval Research Lab's (NRL) answer to this was to create and deploy the first research design and prototypes of onion routing(Torproject, 2024). The goal of onion routing is to use the internet with as much privacy as possible, the idea was to route traffic through multiple servers and encrypt for each step(Torproject, 2024). TOR is an onion routing network with over 2M daily users and over 7000 supporting servers (Singh et al., 2017, p. 326).

The network is designed to provide its users with anonymity by routing internet traffic through a series of volunteer-operated servers. Each relay in the Tor network peels away one layer of encryption, making it nearly impossible to trace the original source of the traffic. Anonymity systems like Tor provide a useful service to users who wish to access the Internet without revealing their intended destination to any local monitoring, or their network-layer identity to the destination.

#### **Challenges**

The article *A bestiary of blocking: The motivations and modes behind website unavailability* address different issues regarding Tor and blocking mechanisms. These issues involve

country-based restrictions, security-motivated blocks, and more recently, GDPR-related blocks. Each form of blocking has unique motivations, and understanding them is critical to analyzing the extent of online censorship (Tschantz, M. C 2018, s.2).

### **Country Based Blocking**

Country-based blocking is one of the most recurring issues. It restricts access to content conditional to the users geographical location. Even though the article emphasizes this method is a technical approach rather than a specific motivation. It's clear that different countries have varying points of internet censorship(Tschantz, M. C 2018, s.4). An example of this is the difficulty to access uncensored content in China through TOR, due to the strict firewall policies in the country.

China's Great Firewall (CGF) blocks access to the Tor anonymity network. However, the Chinese government has developed methods to block it. CGF targets the entry points to Tor, known as entry guards and bridge relays. The firewall dynamically detects Tor traffic by searching for specific patterns of data that identify a connection as Tor-related. Once identified, the GFC initiates a scan using arbitrary Chinese computers that try to "speak Tor" to the suspected bridge. If this interaction succeeds, the firewall blocks the bridge, preventing users in China from accessing the Tor network and bypassing censorship. (Winter & Lindskog, 2012).

### **GDPR based blocking**

GDPR-motivated blocking is the second type of blocking. This arises when a website blocks incoming network traffic from the EU, in order to avoid compliance with the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This occurs more often at websites based in the U.S, as they have lower requirements for data protection than the GDPR and find it easier to block all EU-based traffic rather than reconfigure their operations to obey(Tschantz, M. C 2018, s.3). Thus, browsing through Tor with an EU exit node, many users might encounter sites that are inaccessible due to GDPR compliance concerns(Tschantz, M. C 2018, s.6).

## **Security motivated blocks**

One of the most noticeable and significant challenges that Tor faces is security-motivated due to its strong association with anonymity and perceived security risks. While Tor aims to provide users with privacy, many websites implement protective measures to guard against malicious traffic often linked to the network.

A major issue stems from the abusive behavior of some users, which leads to discrimination from online service providers. These providers argue that Tor's anonymity is frequently exploited for activities like spamming, vulnerability scanning, and data scraping (Singh et al., 2017, p. 326). As a result, Tor users are often subjected to restrictive practices, such as solving CAPTCHAs or being entirely blocked from accessing certain websites, which often leads to users encountering “403 Forbidden” or “451 Unavailable for Legal Reasons” (Tschantz, M. C 2018, s.5) .

The discrimination arises because all Tor users share the same set of exit relay IP addresses, making it difficult for service providers to distinguish between malicious actors and legitimate users. When one user engages in harmful behavior, the shared IP address can be blacklisted, penalizing benign users as well. This collective treatment adds to the ongoing friction between Tor’s mission of privacy and the efforts of websites to safeguard their platforms.

For example, if you attempt to access certain U.S. news websites from an EU exit node, it’s blocked due to GDPR restrictions. Security-related blocking is also recurrent. While visiting e-commerce sites and even forums, the sites were regularly met with CAPTCHA challenges, which thought the traffic was wary due to the use of TOR. Even though these challenges are manageable, it does add friction to the browsing experience. Country-based blocking can be less of an issue for certain individuals, but it’s noticeable when accessing different streaming services due to its regional licensing agreements.

## **Facts**

Many websites and services proactively block Tor traffic, leading to difficulties accessing websites and services for legitimate users. Around 88% of Tor exit relays are blacklisted, compared to the endpoints of VPNGate and HMA VPN services that is at 9 and 69 %, and

discrimination is common on websites, with about 20% of Alexa's Top 500 websites blocking or restricting Tor traffic. This number is further increased by search and login functionalities with 3.9% and 7.5 % percent(Singh et al., 2017, p. 326).

Some of the websites practiced proactive blacklisting and others reactive, where proactive was blacklisting based upon the networks pre existing reputation or online service policy and reactive is the blacklisting in response to the abuse. On the research provided out of the 84 blacklists, 6 were proactive and 78 were reactive(Singh et al., 2017, p. 326).

## *Part II*

### **Methodology**

This report analyzes website accessibility using the Tor browser. Over a week, we used Tor as the main browser, logging the date, website name, link, and whether access was granted. If access was denied, we noted the specific error.

We then examined the data for patterns in access restrictions across websites and industries, identifying trends. The report also highlights issues like slow load times, access denial, and other disruptions to browsing.

### **Our findings and experiences**

To identify potential patterns, we segmented the data by types and sectors to determine if any trends emerged within these categories. The industries were e-commerce, banking, digital media, public sector, aviation, hotels, and streaming services. We found that e-commerce, aviation websites and streaming services were most prone to blocking, where 11 out of 20 e-commerce websites were blocked and half of the aviation as well. In many instances we experienced "access denied" errors, indicating that many online stores either block anonymous traffic or are more sensitive to Tor's slow speed. *LOT.com*, *Converse.com*, *HM.com*, *Lyko* and are some examples that were blocked, with access denied errors.

While browsing we also experienced irregular behavior and issues with poor performance due to latency issues. For example, the streaming site *hdtoday.tv* exhibited functionality

problems, where the site barely worked and the files did not load. The fact that this is a pirated streaming site could be the reason for this. Other websites, like *Bigordi.com*, suffered from extremely slow performance. *Chat GPT* was just a blank, static website with an input field that did not work.

### **Impact of testing location**

The data collection was done at 4 different physical locations and the data collected was more or less split equally between the faculty and each of the homes of the testers in order to see if that would have an impact on the data collected. However, the success rate of the websites did not show a clear pattern based on the testing location. Both environments experienced issues, suggesting that the problems encountered, whether related to site blocking or performance, are largely independent of the location.

### **Conclusion**

Tor's work to offer an anonymous browsing experience faces significant challenges due to the occurrence of several blocking methods. Tor users experience restricted access in several ways, from country-based restrictions to GDPR compliance and security-motivated blocks. These blocks vary depending on the exit node and the region users are browsing from, making a fragmented and sometimes frustrating internet experience. While Tor aims to provide users with privacy, many websites aim to protect themselves against malicious traffic, creating a challenge to balance both needs.

# Bibliography

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Tor project

<https://www.torproject.org/>

# Appendix

Datacollection in excel

Date	Name of website	Link	Managed to access	ErrorCode in case of no
19-Sep	VG	<a href="https://www.vg.no/">https://www.vg.no/</a>	Yes	
19-Sep	How to geek	<a href="https://www.howtogeek.com/272">https://www.howtogeek.com/272</a>	Yes	
19-Sep	.onion Wikipedia	<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion</a>	Yes	
19-Sep	Tor blog	<a href="https://blog.torproject.org/breakin">https://blog.torproject.org/breakin</a>	Yes	
19-Sep	IFI	<a href="https://www.mn.uio.no/ifi/">https://www.mn.uio.no/ifi/</a>	Yes	
19-Sep	IFI	<a href="https://www.mn.uio.no/ifi/om/hm">https://www.mn.uio.no/ifi/om/hm</a>	Yes	
19-Sep	IFI	<a href="https://www.mn.uio.no/ifi/om/hm">https://www.mn.uio.no/ifi/om/hm</a>	Yes	
19-Sep	IFI	<a href="https://www-int.mn.uio.no/ifi/live">https://www-int.mn.uio.no/ifi/live</a>	Yes	
19-Sep	IFI	<a href="https://www.titan.uio.no/andre-te">https://www.titan.uio.no/andre-te</a>	Yes	
20-Sep	Lufthansa	<a href="https://www.lufthansa.com/us/en">https://www.lufthansa.com/us/en</a>	No	Not permission based on sen
20-Sep	Ryan Air	<a href="https://www.ryanair.com/nl/nl">https://www.ryanair.com/nl/nl</a>	Yes	
20-Sep	SAS	<a href="https://www.flysas.com/en/book/">https://www.flysas.com/en/book/</a>	No	Thinks I am a bot
20-Sep	Norwegian	<a href="https://www.norwegian.no/">https://www.norwegian.no/</a>	Yes	
20-Sep	Booking.com	<a href="https://www.booking.com/search">https://www.booking.com/search</a>	Yes	
20-Sep	AirBnb	<a href="https://www.airbnb.com/">https://www.airbnb.com/</a>	No	Not permission based on sen
20-Sep	Hotels.com	<a href="https://hotels.com/">https://hotels.com/</a>	No	Not permission based on sen
20-Sep	DNB	<a href="https://www.dnb.no">https://www.dnb.no</a>	No	Not permission based on sen
20-Sep	Sparebanken	<a href="https://www.sparebank1.no/nb/s">https://www.sparebank1.no/nb/s</a>	Yes	
20-Sep	Nordea	<a href="https://www.nordea.com/en">https://www.nordea.com/en</a>	Yes	
20-Sep	Skatteteaten	<a href="https://www.skatteetaten.no/pers">https://www.skatteetaten.no/pers</a>	Yes	
20-Sep	Altinn	<a href="https://info.altinn.no/">https://info.altinn.no/</a>	Yes	
22-Sep	Harvard business review	<a href="https://hbr.org/1990/03/the-man">https://hbr.org/1990/03/the-man</a>	Yes	
22-Sep	Chat GPT	<a href="https://chatgpt.com/c/66f02355-">https://chatgpt.com/c/66f02355-</a>	No	Fikk ikke lastet inn
22-Sep	Chat GPT	<a href="https://chatgpt.com/">https://chatgpt.com/</a>	No	Hvit
22-Sep	Harvard buiness publishing educati	<a href="https://hbsp.harvard.edu/student">https://hbsp.harvard.edu/student</a>	Yes	
22-Sep	Accenture	<a href="https://www.accenture.com/us-en">https://www.accenture.com/us-en</a>	Yes	
22-Sep	Politiet	<a href="https://www.politiet.no/">https://www.politiet.no/</a>	Yes	
23-Sep	Skatteteaten	<a href="https://www.skatteetaten.no/pers">https://www.skatteetaten.no/pers</a>	Yes	





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