


# Week 2

## The self-concept, course themes, and the Class Project



The SFU Burnaby campus is located on the unceded traditional territories of the sə̓lilwətaʔɬ (Tsleil-Waututh, People of the Inlet), kʷikʷəƛ̕əm (Kwikwetlem, Red Fish up the River), Skwxwú7mesh Úxwumixw (Squamish, Mother of the Wind) and xʷməθkʷəy̕əm (Musqueam, People of the River Grass) Nations.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coast\\_Salish](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coast_Salish)

<https://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/permanent/northwest-coast/coast-salish>



# Celebrating indigenization

The return of a *pst'aan* (totem pole) to the Nuxalt Nation in the Bella Coola, BC region

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nCXHWos0bzo>

# Celebrating indigenization

More recently, a *pst'aan* was returned to Gitxaala Nation in the Prince Rupert, BC region

<https://indiginews.com/arts/gitxaala-celebrates-historic-return-of-totem-pole-as-the-first-of-many-to-come>



Photo credit: Brenna Innes

# Class overview

1. **Muddiest point**
2. The nature of the self-concept
3. 10 minute break
4. Course Theme 1: The interpersonal-intergroup continuum
5. Course Theme 2: Levels of analysis
6. 10 minute break
7. The Class Project

# Muddiest point


- You liked...
  - Thorough overview of the syllabus and class structure
  - In-class activity and interactivity
  - Using scenarios and real-world examples
  - Introduction to Intergroup Relations
- Suggested improvements...
  - Leaving more time for in-class activities, questions, etc.
  - Slowing things down
- Mixed reviews
  - Reading from my notes

# Muddiest point (cont'd)

- Questions for me...
  - What can be done to dispel misconceptions in popular discussions of intergroup relations?
  - Will we be learning about other social movements in addition to the ones listed in the syllabus?
  - When is an interaction considered “intergroup”?
  - Should I pay more attention to the lecture slides or what Maitland is saying?
- Biggest source of confusion (drum roll...)
  - Mediators and moderators

# Clarifying mediators

- Mediators are the “how or why variables”
  - $X \rightarrow Y \rightarrow Z$
  - $X$  acts through  $Y$  (*a mediator*) to exert an effect on  $Z$
  - Causally-related to  $X$  and  $Z$
- Example: buying pizza for a work party ( $X$ ) increases productivity ( $Z$ )...why/how?
  - Increases worker moral ( $Y_1$ )
  - Decreases hunger ( $Y_2$ )



# Clarifying moderators

- Moderators are the “when/it depends” variables
  - $X \rightarrow Z$
  - $W$  (i.e. moderator) *acts on the relationship* between  $X$  and  $Z$
  - Not causally-related to  $X$  and  $Z$
- Example: buying pizza for a work party ( $X$ ) increases productivity ( $Z$ )...when?
  - $W_1$ : When the employee actually likes pizza
  - $W_2$ : When the pizza party is informal/fun



# Summary of mediators and moderators

Mediators...	Moderators...
<i>...are part of the causal relationship</i>	<i>...act on the causal relationship</i>
<i>...tell you why/how a relationship exists</i>	<i>...tell you when a relationship exists</i>
<i>...are caused by X and cause Z</i>	<i>...are not causally related to X and Z</i>

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. **The nature of the self-concept**
3. 10 minute break
4. Course Theme 1: The interpersonal-intergroup continuum
5. Course Theme 2: Levels of analysis
6. 10 minute break
7. The Class Project

# What is a self-concept?

- You just defined it yourself!
- Who you think you are – your self-description
- One way to think about the self-concept is as the total collection of your self-descriptors – “**self-aspects**” or “**identities**”
  - Tall
  - Laid back
  - A brother
  - A son
  - A Canadian
  - An animal-lover
  - A gamer

# The nature of the self-concept

- The self-concept can be thought of as a ***pool of self-aspects***
- Who you are now is constructed from a ***pool of potential selves*** (or potential identities)
- This implies that...
  - The self is not a monolith; it is multifaceted and diverse
  - The self is not permanent; it is adaptive
  - The self is not infinite
  - The self changes over time and situations; coherence is (in part) imaginary



# What determines the self-aspects we use in a given situation?

1. **Salient (vs. non-salient) self-aspects:** the degree to which a particular self-aspect is relevant to your current context
  - This can be determined by the **current situation**
  - This can be determined on our **current goals and motivations**
  - This can either be conscious or (probably much more frequently) unconscious

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n74O3GXRtbY>

# What determines the self-aspects we use in a given situation?

## 2. **Central (vs. peripheral) self-aspects:** the level of *chronic personal attachment* to a self-aspect

- The strength of situational cues needed to bring that self-aspect to mind
- The frequency or regularity with which this self-aspect guides our thoughts, feelings and behaviours across situations/time
- The degree to which this self-aspect is a source of *pride* (positive self-esteem) or *shame* (negative self-esteem)
- The degree to which self-aspects guide our behaviour *unconsciously*



# Reminder of the implications...

---

1. We are multifaceted and diverse – we can be different people in different places
2. It is adaptive, and allows us to meet different demands in different situations.
3. Our pool of selves is not infinite → this is why we can feel inadequate
4. Coherence of the self is (in some ways) imaginary → “who people are” changes over time and across contexts

# Levels of the self-concept

## “Levels of identity”

Personal level	Relational level	Collective level
Those aspects of the self that make us different from others (individuating characteristics)	Our connections to specific others (our interpersonal relationships and the associated roles)	Those aspects of the self that connect us to collections of others (our group memberships)
<b>Examples:</b> tall, laid back	<b>Examples:</b> brother, son	<b>Examples:</b> Canadians, animal-lovers, gamers

# Complicating identity...

- Some “I am...” statements are not really identities...
  - Moods (sad, frustrated)
  - Physical states (tired, hungry)
- Self-aspects can be construed to represent different levels of identity
  - A brother to Pierson and Hunter (relational) vs. a brother (collective)
  - Laid back (personal) vs. Type B people (collective)
  - Love animals (personal) vs. love my pets (relational) vs. animal-lovers (collective)



# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~The nature of the self concept~~
3. **10 minute break**
4. Course Theme 1: The interpersonal-intergroup continuum
5. Course Theme 2: Levels of analysis
6. 10 minute break
7. The Class Project

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~The nature of the self concept~~
3. ~~10 minute break~~
- 4. Course Theme 1: The interpersonal-intergroup continuum**
5. Course Theme 2: Levels of analysis
6. ~~10 minute break~~
7. The Class Project

Recall: Intergroup relations occur when...

...people think, feel, and act as a member of a group ("us") and interact with others as group members ("them")

Thus, intergroup relations are *psychological*...



# Theme 1: The interpersonal-intergroup continuum

## Social Identity Theory



And this results in...



Think,  
pair,  
share



# Redefining “Intergroup Relations”

- Intergroup relations occurs when we are thinking of ourselves and others at the *collective level* (vs. personal/relational level)
- Intergroup relations occur when we are at the *intergroup-end* of the interpersonal-intergroup continuum

**Intergroup relations:** the study of how our thoughts, feelings, and behaviour are influenced by the groups we belong to (**i.e. when the relevant self is a collective self**) and how people from different groups relate to one another (**i.e. when collective identities determine our interactions**)

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~The nature of the self concept~~
3. ~~10 minute break~~
4. ~~Course Theme 1: The interpersonal-intergroup continuum~~
5. **Course Theme 2: Levels of analysis**
6. ~~10 minute break~~
7. ~~The Class Project~~


# Theme 2: Levels of Analysis



**Micro level**

Intrapersonal  
processes

# Theme 2: Levels of Analysis



**Micro level**

Intrapersonal  
processes

**Meso level**

Interpersonal  
interactions




# Theme 2: Levels of Analysis



**Micro level**

Intrapersonal  
processes



**Meso level**

Interpersonal  
interactions






**Macro level**

Societal/structural  
level processes



# Why is considering levels of analysis important?

Anti-Black police violence



**Micro level**

Intrapersonal  
processes

**Meso level**

Interpersonal  
interactions

**Macro level**

Societal/structural  
level processes



# Think, pair, share

- Consider *sexism in the workplace...*
- Take 5 minutes to generate 1-2 answers for boxes 1, 2 and 3

1.

2.

3.

**Micro level**

Intrapersonal  
processes

**Meso level**

Interpersonal  
interactions

**Macro level**

Societal/structural  
level processes



# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~The nature of the self concept~~
3. ~~10 minute break~~
4. ~~Course Theme 1: The interpersonal-intergroup continuum~~
5. ~~Course Theme 2: Levels of analysis~~
6. **10 minute break**
7. The Class Project

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~The nature of the self concept~~
3. ~~10 minute break~~
4. ~~Course Theme 1: The interpersonal-intergroup continuum~~
5. ~~Course Theme 2: Levels of analysis~~
6. ~~10 minute break~~
7. **The Class Project**

# Class Project

**My goal:** to have everyone engage in a local group, cause, or movement that uses *collective action strategies* to achieve its stated goals

- **Several related sub-goals:**

1. Tangible real-world impact outside of the classroom
2. Development of a civic identity
3. Deepened understanding of PSYC 363 concepts
4. Practice “being a social psychologist”
5. Formation of in-class friendships
6. Diversity in graded assessments
7. Experience with both sides of the revision process

# Class Project: Selecting a group, movement, and/or cause

**YOU CANNOT SELECT AN ACTION THAT IS ILLEGAL OR WILL  
PUT YOU IN DANGER**



# Class Project: Selecting a collective action

Consider some (or all) of the following questions:

1. What is the ***collective identity*** that this action stems from?
2. What is the ***collective goal*** that this action contributes to?
3. Who are the “***us***” and “***them***” in the intergroup context?
4. How does this action connect the ***micro/meso-level to the macro-level?***
5. How does this action ***differ from individual action?***

Maitland will be posting a list of possible groups, movements, causes, and actions on Canvas later this week, but feel free to get started early and/or choose something that is not on this list!

# Class Project: 5-minute check-ins (2.5% of your final grade)

- Because this is a new assignment, these check-ins are meant to ensure everyone is on the “right track”
- Link for scheduling these check-ins with Rashmi can be found on the *Canvas* homepage
- While not necessary, highly encouraged to attend!
- Come prepared with...
  1. The group, movement, and/or cause you will be getting involved with
  2. The specific action(s) you will be taking
  3. An answer to the question “why is this considered *collective action*?”

**Take place during Week 3 and Week 4**

# Class Project: Project Plan (5% of your final grade)

- 500 words (~2 pages)
- Detailed rubric in the Class Project description document (on *Canvas*)
- Should include:
  - History and intergroup context
  - Goals and methods used by the group
  - “Plan for action” – what, when and whys
  - Justification of your choice
  - Formatted in APA 7<sup>th</sup> style
- You **must** submit a Project Plan to receive a grade on your Class Project

**The Project Plan is due Thursday, June 8<sup>th</sup> @ 11:59 on *Canvas***

# Class Project: Peer Review (7.5% of your final grade)

- First draft of your Class Project will be due Wednesday, July 12<sup>th</sup> @ 11:59 PM on Canvas.
- At minimum, should include a 200-word summary paragraph
  - Of course, more feedback is welcome!
- Peer Review grade will be calculated in the following way:
  - 5% for written peer reviews (graded holistically)
  - 2.5% for in-class peer review discussion (pass/fail)
- Not submitting your first draft on time will mean you are unable to participate in the Peer Review process, and you will lose the associated 7.5% of your final grade

**Peer Review is due Tuesday July 18<sup>th</sup> @ 11:59 PM on Canvas**

# Class Project: Final paper (25% of your final grade)

- 2000 words (~8 pages)
- Detailed rubric in the Class Project description document (on *Canvas*)
- Should include:
  - Background information
  - Description of your experiences and observations
  - Description of outcomes
  - One novel research question
  - Formatted in APA 7<sup>th</sup> style
  - ***Application of psychology*** (*to be discussed in more detail at a later date*)

**The Class Project is due Friday, July 28<sup>th</sup> @ 11:50 on *Canvas***

# Next steps...

1. Find a group/cause/movement
2. Figure out what action you're going to take
3. Schedule a 5-minute check-in meeting with Rashmi ([link on Canvas homepage](#)) during Week 3 or Week 4

Tips for selecting a group/cause/movement:

1. Pick something you are interested in
2. Consider taking multiple actions/attending multiple events
3. Do this with friends

# Muddiest point


Instructions:

1. Login to *Canvas* and select PSYC 363
2. Navigate to “Quizzes” using the list of shortcuts on the left side of the screen
3. Navigate to “Surveys” and select the “Muddiest point” survey for the appropriate week (Week 2)
4. Take five minutes to complete the three questions

**And remember, your responses are anonymous**

# PSYC 363: Week 5

Prejudice, privilege, and inclusion



The SFU Burnaby campus is located on the unceded traditional territories of the sə̓lilwətaʔɬ (Tsleil-Waututh, People of the Inlet), kʷikʷəƛ̕əm (Kwikwetlem, Red Fish up the River), Skwxwú7mesh Úxwumixw (Squamish, Mother of the Wind) and xʷməθkʷəy̕əm (Musqueam, People of the River Grass) Nations.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coast\\_Salish](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coast_Salish)

<https://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/permanent/northwest-coast/coast-salish>



# Celebrating indigenization

A poem by Dylan Robinson

*I am sitting in a room. Limestone walls surround.*

*Limestone lines*

*inside and outside of the structure I sit within*

*This building, this house, this room,*

*is one of many*

*I am living in a city—“often called the Limestone City”—says the*

*City of Kingston*

*I am spending my days in limestone buildings*

*I sit inside many “of the many charming limestone buildings,”*

*says the city,*

*“many of which help tell the story of Canada”*

*These charming limestone walls—this charming city—built from*

*quarries*

*Quarried from the lands of Haudenosaunee and Anishinaabe people*

*Built from the lands of the Haudenosaunee, the Anishinaabe*

*Structured by colonial design*

*to allay anxieties of impermanence*

*I am sitting in a limestone room that hums*

*with the subfrequency of colonial quarry and cut—*

*this audible-inaudible sound—resonates my body*

*My body—xwelmexw body, swiyeqe & yes xwelitem starving person’s body—*

*in this room, these buildings, that resonate the story of Canada*

*I am listening in a limestone building, trying not to feel the story of Canada*

*resonate through my body*

*shiver through*

*I am trying instead to hear the seepage of water through stone*

*I am trying to hear the labour of quarry, cut and chisel*

*I am trying to hear if these walls are also still the land*


*I am trying not to hear these walls declare their immovability, declare their charming structure, their necessary structure,*

*I am trying to hear their structure burn down*

*while the shelter for our work remains*

# Announcements

- Project Plan (due this Thursday, June 8<sup>th</sup> @ 11:59 PM on *Canvas*)
  - Tentative actions are fine for the Project Plan
  - Posters/social media graphics
  - Cannot be point form; do not need to answer all questions in the Rubric
  - Changing your group/action may require you to submit a second (shorter) Project Plan
- MEM
  - Lecture recording
  - Directions (next slide)
- Midterm
  - Will be held during class time on June 28<sup>th</sup>
  - May be a shorter (~1 hour) lecture afterwards – will keep you posted
- Final exam
  - Will be held on August 8<sup>th</sup> at 8:30-11:30 AM ☺ in AQ 3181
  - You can check this information yourself on goSFU



# MEM directions

# Class overview

1. **Muddiest point**
2. Some review
3. The road to resistance
4. Prejudice
5. 10-minute break
6. Privilege
7. 10-minute break
8. Inclusion
  - I. Automatic inclusion and the ingroup projection model
  - II. Inclusion in physical space
9. Privilege and levels of analysis

# Muddiest point

- You liked...
  - Social comparison/Smash Ultimate example
  - Images
  - Clarifying “collective action”
  - Mentimeter activity
- You were confused by...
  - Jetten et al. (1997)
  - Difference between allyship vs. resistance
- Questions/suggestions for me...
  - Talk slower
  - How much of lecture content will be tested on the final exam?
  - Will we be learning more about collective action?
- Other things...
  - I can never get to all the questions that are asked (not enough time) – great reason to attend office hours!

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. Some review
3. The road to resistance
4. Prejudice
5. 10-minute break
6. Privilege
7. 10-minute break
8. Inclusion
  - I. Automatic inclusion and the ingroup projection model
  - II. Inclusion in physical space
9. Privilege and levels of analysis

# REVIEW: Strategies to achieve positive distinctiveness

1. **Individual mobility:** leaving the group and joining another
2. **Social creativity:** comparing the ingroup and outgroup on a new valued dimension
3. **Collective action (or social competition):** working collectively to improve the ingroup's status

The strategy that an individual uses to achieve positive distinctiveness will depend on three key aspects of the intergroup context that we will discuss at the end of today's lecture

# The “road to resistance”

- How does an ingroup “decide” to take collective action and engage in resistance?
- Social identity theory tells us that there are three key aspects of the intergroup context that will determine when a group engages in resistance:
  1. **Boundary permeability:** the degree to which individual group members can move from a low-status group to a high-status group
  2. **Instability:** the degree to which the status hierarchy is seen as unstable and changeable
  3. **Illegitimacy:** the degree to which the status hierarchy is seen as illegitimate

# Which strategy of positive distinctiveness is best?

Strategy	Boundary Permeability?	Instability?	Illegitimacy?	Continuum placement
Individual mobility	Yes	-	-	Interpersonal
Social creativity	No	No (stable)	-	Intergroup
Collective action	No	Yes (unstable)	Yes (illegitimate)	Intergroup

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Some review~~
3. ~~The road to resistance~~
4. **Prejudice**
5. 10-minute break
6. Privilege
7. 10-minute break
8. Inclusion
  - I. Automatic inclusion and the ingroup projection model
  - II. Inclusion in physical space
9. Privilege and levels of analysis

# Defining prejudice

**Prejudice:** a judgement or evaluation of a group and its members

- Definitions often include the emotions associated with that judgement
- Prejudice can be **positive or negative**

**Prejudice** and other concepts...

- **Stereotypes** (e.g. angry and aggressive groups can be positive or negatively evaluated)
- **Emotions** (e.g. we can be angry or afraid of “bad” groups)
- **Discrimination** (e.g. we can try to control or run away from “bad” groups)

Intergroup attitudes




Image retrieved from: <https://www.shutterstock.com/search/connection>

# Is negative prejudice still a problem?

## **The good news...**

- Compared to the past, many societies have made strides towards improved intergroup attitudes
- In North America (for instance), laws/policies have made direct acts of discrimination illegal
- On many surveys, most people see direct expressions of negative prejudice as unacceptable
- Over the past 50 years, surveys show an overall decline in the number of North Americans who express openly racist, sexist, and homophobic ideas
- But...

# Prejudice is not dead!

## 1. Prejudice is *less obvious*

- Blatant “old fashioned” prejudice
  - Blatant disrespect, antipathy, discrimination, and overt expressions of negative attitudes
- Compared to blatant prejudice, modern prejudice...
  - Is much more subtle
  - Involves withholding positive emotions/feelings/evaluations
  - Involves denying inequality and/or endorsing justifications for inequality

## 2. Prejudice can also be about the *relative evaluations*


- Not just about how the outgroup is evaluated in a vacuum...
- Can also be about how the outgroup is evaluated relative to the ingroup
- Ingroup > outgroup → “ingroup bias”

# Modern prejudice in action

**Method:** asked children in a mixed-race kindergarten classroom (~40% white and ~60% Inuit) to sort pictures on the basis of positive traits (nice, smart, etc.)

- Pictures were pre-tested to be unanimously judged as white or Inuit children
- Participants did not know any of the children in the pictures

**Dependent variable:** proportion of ingroup members and proportion of outgroup members who are assigned to have positive traits



**Key takeaway:** compared to the Inuit children, the White children demonstrated “modern prejudice” through both a) withholding positive traits from the outgroup and b) more positively evaluating their ingroup relative to the outgroup

# Prejudice is not dead!

1. Prejudice is *less obvious*
2. Prejudice can also be about the *relative evaluations*
3. Prejudice can also be *implicit* (more on this during Week 9)
4. Prejudice can also be *ambivalent* (more on this during Week 11)

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Some review~~
3. ~~The road to resistance~~
4. ~~Prejudice~~
5. **10-minute break**
6. Privilege
7. 10-minute break
8. Inclusion
  - I. Automatic inclusion and the ingroup projection model
  - II. Inclusion in physical space
9. Privilege and levels of analysis

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Some review~~
3. ~~The road to resistance~~
4. ~~Prejudice~~
5. ~~10-minute break~~
6. **Privilege**
7. 10-minute break
8. Inclusion
  - I. Automatic inclusion and the ingroup projection model
  - II. Inclusion in physical space
9. Privilege and levels of analysis

# Defining privilege

As discussed in Johnson's *Privilege, Power and Difference*

**Privilege:** privilege exists when one group has something of value that is denied to others simply because of the social category they belong to, rather than anything they have done or failed to do.

- Not the same as having good things that others do not
- Requires our membership in specific groups to be *socially recognized and conferred*
- Tied to a specific local (or societal) context; but also, there are groups that are consistently granted more privileged

# Defining privilege (cont'd)

As discussed in Johnson's *Privilege, Power and Difference*

## Two “types” of privilege:

1. **Unearned advantages:** things of value that all people *should* have, but instead are restricted to certain (privileged) groups
2. **Conferred dominance:** having the ability to control others that is not tied to personal achievement or contribution; when one group is given power over another by virtue of the systems/policies/procedures that exist (i.e. by virtue of *macro-level processes*)



# How privilege relates to other PSYC 363 concepts

- Privilege is about being treated (or experiencing the world) based on your ***collective identity***
- Privilege is about ***positive stereotypes***
- Privilege is about ***positive prejudice***
- Privilege is about ***positive discrimination***
- Privilege is about ***inclusion/prototypicality*** (more on this soon)

# Privilege as a paradox

As discussed in Johnson's  
*Privilege, Power and Difference*

---

1. Privilege is received by and benefits individuals, but access to it has nothing to do with who the recipients are as individual people





# Privilege as a paradox


As discussed in Johnson's  
*Privilege, Power and Difference*

1. Privilege is received by and benefits individuals, but access to it has nothing to do with who the recipients are as individual people
2. Those who are privileged are often unaware/do not feel as if they are privileged (the "luxury of obliviousness")

# Privilege as a paradox

As discussed in Johnson's  
*Privilege, Power and Difference*

1. Privilege is received by and benefits individuals, but access to it has nothing to do with who the recipients are as individual people
2. Those who are privileged are often unaware/do not feel as if they are privileged (the “luxury of obliviousness”)
3. Being privileged does not equate to being happy or fulfilled



# Week 5: In-class activity

## Instructions:

- Take out a piece of paper (or open a document)
- Write the numbers 1-32 along the left side; you will be responding to 32 questions
- Respond to each statement with a -1 (“step back”) or a +1 (“step forward”), or by leaving it blank if the statement is not true for you
- Example statement #1: *If your parents worked nights and weekends to support your family, take one step back*
  - If this statement **is true about you**, you should write a -1 on that line because the statement says “take a step back”
  - If this statement **NOT true about you**, you should leave that line blank
- Example statement #2: *If you were born in Canada, take one step forward*
  - If this statement **is true about you**, you should write a +1 on that line because the statement says “take a step forward”
  - If this statement **NOT true about you**, you should leave that line blank

# Week 5: In-class activity

**For international students, or if you a newcomer to Canada...**

- Answer items that are about ***your current situation as you feel here in Canada***
  - e.g. *If you feel comfortable walking home alone at night, take one step forward*
- Answer items about your childhood or family life as they were **in the country you grew up in**
  - e.g. *If you felt like you had adequate access to healthy food growing up, take one step forward*

1. If your parents worked nights and weekends to support your family, take one step back (-1)
2. If you are able to move through the world without fear of sexual assault, take one step forward (+1)
3. If you can show affection for your romantic partner in public without fear of ridicule or violence, take one step forward (+1)
4. If you have ever been diagnosed as having a physical or mental illness/disability, take one step back (-1)
5. If the primary language spoken in your household growing up was not English, take one step back (-1)
6. If you came from a supportive family environment, take one step forward (+1)
7. If you ever tried to change your speech or mannerisms to gain credibility, take one step back (-1)
8. If you can go anywhere in the country, and easily find the kinds of hair products you need and/or cosmetics to match your skin colour, take one step forward (+1)

9. If you were embarrassed about your clothes or house while growing up, take one step back (-1)
10. If you can make mistakes and not have some people attribute the mistake to flaws in your racial/ethnic/gender/sexual orientation/disability group, take one step forward (+1)
11. If you can legally marry the person you love, regardless of where you live, take one step forward (+1)
12. If you were born in Canada, take on step forward (+1)
13. If you or your parents have ever gone through a divorce, take one step back (-1)
14. If you felt like you had adequate access to healthy food growing up, take one step forward (+1)
15. If you are reasonably sure you would be hired for a job based on your ability and qualifications, take one step forward (+1)
16. If you would not think twice about calling the police when trouble occurs, take one step forward (+1)

17. If you can see a doctor whenever you feel the need, take one step forward (+1)
18. If you have ever been the only person of your race/ethnicity/gender/socioeconomic status/sexual orientation in a classroom or workplace setting, take one step back (-1)
19. If you have taken out loans to pay for your education, take one step back (-1)
20. If you get time off work or classes at school for your religious holidays, take one step forward (+1)
21. If you feel comfortable walking home alone at night, take one step forward (+1)
22. If you ever traveled outside Canada, take one step forward (+1)
23. If you ever felt like there was NOT adequate representation of your racial/ethnic/sexual orientation/gender/disability group(s) in the media, take one step back (-1)
24. If you feel confident that your parents would be able to financially support you if you were going through financial hardship, take one step forward (+1)

25. If you have ever been bullied or made fun of based on something that you can't change, take one step back (-1)
26. If there were more than 50 books in your house growing up, take one step forward (+1)
27. If you studied the culture or history of your ancestors in elementary school, take one step forward (+1)
28. If your parents or guardians attended college, take one step forward (+1)
29. If you ever went away on a family vacation, take one step forward (+1)
30. If you can buy new clothes or go out to dinner when you want to, take one step forward (+1)
31. If you were ever offered a job because of your association with a friend or family member, take one step forward (+1)
32. If one of your parents was ever laid off or unemployed not by choice, take one step back (-1)

# Week 5: In-class activity

## **Instructions:**

- Take out a piece of paper (or open a document)
- Write the numbers 1-32 along the left side; you will be responding to 32 questions
- Respond to each statement with a -1 (“step back”) or a +1 (“step forward”), or by leaving it blank if the statement is not true for you
- What privileged groups are being measured in this particular activity? Make a list.
- Can you think of other groups that confer privilege to their members but are NOT included in these questions? Make a list.

# Week 5: In-class activity

## **Instructions:**

- Take out a piece of paper (or open a document)
- Write the numbers 1-32 along the left side; you will be responding to 32 questions
- Respond to each statement with a -1 (“step back”) or a +1 (“step forward”), or by leaving it blank if the statement is not true for you
- What privileged groups are being measured in this particular activity? Make a list.
- Can you think of other groups that confer privilege to their members but are NOT included in these questions? Make a list.
- Compute your total and write it somewhere on your page (Total = X)

# Week 5: In-class activity

## Mentimeter instructions

- This is **OPTIONAL**
- On your device, go to [www.menti.com](http://www.menti.com)
- Enter code **5663 144**
- Select the option that corresponds with your Total from the in-class activity
- Hypothetical scenario...
  - Imagine our class is about to engage in a 100-meter race, and that each student's Total reflects the "head start" or "disadvantage" individual students start with (for instance, -8 has to run 108m; +12 has to run 88m) – who will win this race?
  - Take 3 minutes to think about this analogy, and how it relates to privilege in the real world
  - **Write down your response**
  - Take 5 minutes to discuss your response with your neighbour

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Some review~~
3. ~~The road to resistance~~
4. ~~Prejudice~~
5. ~~10-minute break~~
6. ~~Privilege~~
7. **10-minute break**
8. Inclusion
  - I. Automatic inclusion and the ingroup projection model
  - II. Inclusion in physical space
9. Privilege and levels of analysis

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Some review~~
3. ~~The road to resistance~~
4. ~~Prejudice~~
5. ~~10-minute break~~
6. ~~Privilege~~
7. ~~10-minute break~~
8. **Inclusion**
  - I. Automatic inclusion and the ingroup projection model
  - II. Inclusion in physical space
9. Privilege and levels of analysis

# Inclusion in physical spaces

- Physical spaces can communicate collective inclusion by defining which groups are *normal and belong* and which groups are *not normal and belong less*
  - When objects in our physical space reflect our collective identities → define us as “normal” → we feel included and positive
  - When objects in our physical space DO NOT reflect our collective identities → define us as non-normal → we feel less included and negative



# Holiday symbolism as a form of inclusion

Schmitt et al. (2010, Study 2)

**Method:** SFU students were brought into the lab in November-December and completed a questionnaire. Participants were either:

- Christians (n = 47)
- Sikhs or Buddhists (n = 35)



**Independent variable:** presence of Christmas decorations

1. **Control condition:** completed the survey without any decoration present
2. **Christmas condition:** completed the survey with a Christmas decoration

**Dependent variables:**

1. **Feelings of inclusion**
2. **“Self-assurance” (strong and proud)**







*The presence of  
Christmas displays  
produced lower  
feelings of inclusion*

*Lower feelings of  
inclusion, in turn,  
explained lower feelings  
of self-assurance*

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Some review~~
3. ~~The road to resistance~~
4. ~~Prejudice~~
5. ~~10-minute break~~
6. ~~Privilege~~
7. ~~10-minute break~~
8. ~~Inclusion~~
  - I. ~~Automatic inclusion and the ingroup projection model~~
  - II. ~~Inclusion in physical space~~
9. **Privilege and levels of analysis**

# Muddiest point

Instructions:

1. Login to *Canvas* and select PSYC 363
2. Navigate to “Quizzes” using the list of shortcuts on the left side of the screen
3. Navigate to “Surveys” and select the “Muddiest point” survey for the appropriate week (Week 5)
4. Take five minutes to complete the three questions

**And remember, your responses are anonymous**



*Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 65, No. 4, 2009, pp. 859–879

## The Next Generation of Collective Action Research

**Stephen C. Wright\***

*Simon Fraser University*

*The articles presented in this volume describe part of a new generation of interest and vigor in the social psychological study of collective action. This new wave builds nicely on the foundation set by social identity, self-categorization, and relative deprivation theories but also introduces a number of important innovative perspectives and variables. In this commentary, I review some of these expansions and additions, raise a number of conceptual concerns that arise out of these new directions, and discuss more generally some novel and important directions that emerge from the work presented in the volume and in other recent work on collective action.*

Improving intergroup relations has been a central focus of social psychology and of Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues (SPSSI). A dominant strategy for achieving this goal has been prejudice reduction—reducing negative attitudes toward out-groups. Hundreds of studies have investigated the nature, causes, and consequences of prejudice (see Fiske, 1998; Wright & Taylor, 2003, for reviews). However, reducing the negative thoughts (stereotypes), attitudes (prejudice), and actions (discrimination) of individuals represents only one potential route to reduced group inequality and increasing social justice. A second approach focuses on collective action and social protest as a means of improving the status or treatment of disadvantaged groups.

Although both approaches explore intergroup injustice and both are plainly implicated in major intergroup relations theories (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), research on prejudice and collective action have developed quite independently (Wright & Lubensky, 2009), and collective action has received far less attention from social psychologists. Nonetheless, social psychology's focus on the mutual influences of the social context and individual psychological processes has provided important insights into the processes that

---

\*Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Stephen C. Wright, Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University, 8888 University Drive, Burnaby, British Columbia V5A 1S6, Canada [e-mail: scwright@sfu.ca].

fuel or undermine participation in collective action (see Reicher, 2004; Simon & Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Wright, 2001, for reviews). The current volume's focus on recent and novel perspectives, as well as the implications of these ideas for policies and practices, adds nicely to this legacy. The articles provide a range of interesting investigations of the relationship between group-based inequality and/or injustice and efforts to produce (or in some cases prevent) social change. Collectively, they provide evidence of an exciting resurgence of interest in the study of collective action among social psychologists.

It would be impossible for a commentary such as this to do justice to the number of interesting issues and novel ideas raised in the pages that precede it. So, I will be unapologetically idiosyncratic about the issues I focus on. I will comment on what I see as interesting and important advances and will consider conceptual issues that could be important as we embark on this new wave of theorizing and research activity.

### *Sophistication and Precision: What is Collective Action?*

As almost all of these articles show, the psychological study of collective action has been dominated by an interest in determining when and why individuals will (and will not) engage in collective action. One of the prominent contributions of this volume is that it brings attention to a broader array of antecedents, moderators, and mediators of collective action. I will expand on this general point later, but one inevitable consequence of this expansion will be a growth in healthy debate over the relative importance of these variables. The outcome of these debates should be more sophisticated models and perhaps greater confidence in suggestions made to practitioners and policy makers (another valuable goal of this issue). However, this expansion and the resulting debates make apparent another critical, although often ignored, issue—the issue of definition. Before we can argue about what produces (or prevents) collective action, we need to try to build some agreement about what collective action is. What do we mean when we say that an individual “participates in collective action” or is “motivated to take collective action”?

The issue of definition is not trivial. If different theoretical accounts begin with different conceptions of what collective action is, it is not surprising that they will predict (and find in empirical tests) different antecedents and mediators of collective action. Unfortunately, many discussions of collective action fail to provide a clear definition. However, numerous social psychological investigations have settled on a definition that locates collective action in the psychology of the individual. A group member engages in collective action any time she or he acts as a representative of the group and where the action is directed at improving the conditions of the group as a whole (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990a). Definitions consistent with this are provided or implied in many of the articles

in this volume (Ellemers & Barreto; Louis; Postmes & Smith; van Stekelenburg et al.; van Zomeren & Iyer; van Zomeren & Spears).

This definition is consistent with the well-established recognition (Tajfel, 1982) that human behavior can be intergroup as well as interpersonal. Intergroup behavior emerges when the self and others are perceived in terms of the collective identities (in terms of their memberships in different groups), and when thoughts and actions are guided by group interests and in-group norms. In contrast, interpersonal behavior emerges when personal identities are the salient self/other-representation. Thus, by this definition collective action is a specific case of intergroup behavior that is strategic in its intent to improve the position of the in-group, and can be contrasted with individual action designed to improve one's personal position.

*It's not about numbers.* This conception of collective action is fundamentally psychological. It describes collective action as independent of the number of participants and of the specific content or eventual outcome of the action. Instead, whether an action is collective or individual depends on the actors' level of self-categorization and her/his intentions. This differs from a number of alternative perspectives that define collective action in terms of an observable group presence and group members acting in concert. For example, Stürmer and Simon appear to equate collective action with participation in social movement activities or group protests. Similarly, Drury and Reicher describe collective action as synonymous with crowd behavior, and McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, and Bonfiglio describe collective action as unified social action, both implying group members acting in concert. The psychological definition of *collective action*, as Louis points out, "does not require physical and temporal proximity of members" (p. 727). Collective action can be engaged in by a single individual acting alone.

*Collective, not individual, action.* The current definition also requires that group identity be the salient self-categorization and that group concerns motivate action. Thus, some joint actions by a large group would not qualify as collective action if the individual actors are motivated by personal self-interests. For example, Stürmer and Simon's dual-pathway model proposes one pathway to participation in "collective action" that is driven by three key motives. One of these motives involves the possibility of changing the in-group's status (the collective motive). However, the other two motives involve concerns about the possibility of personal admiration or ridicule by others (the normative motive), and concerns for personal costs or rewards, such as loss of time or money or getting hurt (the reward motive). Similarly, van Zomeren and Spears describe "individual-based collective action" in their discussion of the intuitive economists. Here collective identity and group interests appear irrelevant. The group is simply a tool to be used to acquire personal rewards or garner personal admiration from others. If collective action

is defined as actions that involve collective identities and group-based concerns, action produced by personal self-interest would not qualify as collective action. What this example is intended to point out is that when we define the dependent variable (collective action) differently, it is not surprising that we find a different set of antecedents and mediators.

*As an in-group member or on behalf of an out-group?* Finally, the current definition, which links collective action to acting as a representative of an in-group, would not include actions taken by nonmembers designed to improve the status or treatment of subordinated out-group. For example, Iyer and Ryan consider men's willingness to engage in actions in support of women, and van Zomeren and Iyer identify the growing literature investigating when members of advantaged/high-status groups will join or perhaps even instigate protests or actively support policies designed to improve the status or treatment of a disadvantaged out-group (e.g., Iyer, Schmader, & Lickel, 2007; Mallett, Huntsinger, Sinclair, & Swim, 2008). Understanding the motives and intentions of those who are willing to act on behalf of a disadvantaged out-group is undoubtedly extremely important, and has until very recently been ignored and even downplayed in the social psychology literature. However, if the advantaged group members who are participating in these actions are truly acting on behalf of a group that they recognize to be an out-group, then they are not acting as a representative of that group. Thus, this would not fit the current definition of collective action. In addition, if the actors recognize that their behavior will serve to reduce group-based inequality then these actions may, in fact, be quite the opposite of collective action as their success will undermine the relative status or power of the actors' in-group.

One solution to this is provided by McGarty et al.'s concept of opinion-based groups whereby traditional in-group/out-group distinction can be rendered mute by the formation of a categorization that includes the advantaged group member and the disadvantaged group. For example, the group "supporters of racial justice" could include Whites as well as ethnic minority group members, or "feminists" could include men. In this case, the actions fit the definition of collective action. The advantaged group member is no longer acting on behalf of an out-group but rather is acting as a representative of a newly defined in-group.

*Definitions evolve.* My general point here is that a definition provides the boundary conditions for the concept of interest. Without some agreement about these boundary conditions it is unlikely that we will develop agreement about the nature of the phenomenon, let alone establish a clear understanding of the antecedents that produce it or barriers that prevent it. In order to build a sophisticated social psychology of collective action we need greater precision in our conceptualizations of what it is.

It is certain that the definition of collective action will continue to be contested, and this is a good thing. However, an important step is for people to be clear in providing their own working definition and establishing for their readers the boundary conditions of the concept they are calling *collective action*. For my own part, I propose that we take seriously the distinctions between more specific actions like participation in a social movement or support for a particular policy or practice versus the full range of group-serving actions that could be included within a broader psychological definition of *collective action* (like the one presented in the introduction to this volume). Participation in a particular event or movement (or set of activities) may be motivated by individualistic concerns or by an interest in helping a group that the participant recognizes is an out-group. It seems valuable to distinguish this from actions motivated by collective identities, collective interests, and in-group goals.

Similarly, I think it is valuable to be clear when we are focusing on behaviors that occur during a protest or when a crowd gathers. Using more specific terms like social protest and crowd behavior make it clear that what is being considered may or may not be collective action. Also, it seems valuable to distinguish collective action from the much larger concept of intergroup behavior. I believe that the concept of collective action is being stretched far too thin if it is to refer to all actions that are prescribed by the individual's understanding of intergroup norms.

### *Elaborating the Antecedents of Collective Action*

Many of the articles in this volume find their theoretical roots in social identity theory (SIT) and self-categorization theory (SCT). Thus, it is not surprising that many consider the importance of in-group identification (Drury & Reicher; Iyer & Ryan; Louis; McGarty et al.; Stürmer & Simon; van Zomeren & Iyer; van Zomeren & Spears), perceptions of illegitimacy/injustice (Ellemers & Barretto; Drury & Reicher; Louis; Postmes & Smith; Iyer & Ryan; van Zomeren & Iyer; van Zomeren & Spears), perceived instability of the status relationships (Louis; Postmes & Smith; van Stekelenberg et al.; van Zomeren & Iyer; van Zomeren & Spears), and boundary impermeability (Louis; van Zomeren & Iyer; van Zomeren & Spears) in motivating collective action. In addition, instrumental concerns regarding potential costs and rewards also play prominently in several of the articles (Stekelenberg et al.; Stürmer & Simon; van Zomeren & Iyer). However, more interesting is that many articles expand on and extend these concepts and consider novel processes that moderate or mediate their impact on collective action participation.

*In-group identification.* The concept of in-group identification is elaborated in a number of interesting ways. Stürmer and Simon, for example, describe the particular potency of a politicized social identity as the kind of collective identity most likely to inspire participation (see also van Zomeren & Spears). Collective

action is far more likely when the identity supporting it contains normative ideological components stressing the competitive nature of the intergroup relationship and the culpability of the out-group.

Drury and Reicher and McGarty et al. both discuss another welcome forward step in their theorizing about collective action. They both describe processes by which identification is constructed, altered, and reconstructed as groups form, enact their identity through collective action, and interact with relevant out-groups. This fluid and dynamic nature of collective identities, while consistent with early theorizing about social identity and self-categorization, has not been properly explored in the collective action literature until relatively recently. However, the value of this approach in describing not only when and why collective action occurs, but how different forms of collective actions will emerge and evolve over time, suggests that this approach should play an increasingly important role in our understanding of social change.

*Instability.* We also see some attention to the importance of perceived instability. Connecting the concept of stability to related ideas like collective efficacy and instrumental concerns (and more generally to resource mobilization theories) seems a highly productive approach (McGarty et al.; van Stekelenberg et al.; van Zomeren & Spears). However, it would be a mistake to conclude that the concept of stability can be reduced to collective efficacy. Elsewhere (Wright, 2001; in press), I have described the distinction between stability and efficacy in terms of perceived collective control. In order to believe that one's group has control one must believe: (1) that social change is contingent upon behavior (i.e., that the situation is modifiable) and (2) that my group in particular can execute the behaviors necessary to produce the desired change (see also, Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999). The first judgment corresponds with perceived instability, and the second with collective efficacy. Thus, perceived collective control can be undermined by a belief that the system is unresponsive to actions (stability), or that the in-group lacks the resources or abilities necessary to effect change (lack of efficacy).

This distinction has several implications. Clearly, if the system is perceived as stable the question of efficacy becomes irrelevant. If the system cannot be changed, there is no basis for considering the in-group's capabilities. Thus, efforts to build collective action must first undermine the perceived inevitability of the current social order and build in the minds of potential participants what SIT refers to as *cognitive alternatives*; an imagined alternative social reality in which the in-group holds higher status. Although there is evidence of the importance of this kind of instability, there has been limited research on the conditions that lead people to see the current social order as malleable. One possibility is that groups are influenced by the successful collective action by other low-status groups (see Reicher, 2004). For example, successful liberation movements in Africa and India

may have provided evidence that change is possible for organizers of the U.S. civil rights movement. Similarly, the success of that movement may have influenced growth in the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa and the women's movement in North America. The success of others provides evidence of instability.

However, group members must also believe that their in-group has the resources and capacities to influence a malleable system. Here, resource mobilization theories seem highly relevant (Drury & Reicher; Louis; van Stekelenburg et al.; van Zomeren & Iyer; van Zomeren & Spears). While early resource mobilization theorists focused exclusively on the objective presence of resources and had little interest in psychological variables, recent versions (e.g., Klandermans, 1997) focus on both objective availability of resources and subjective expectation that the in-group can effectively utilize them.

*Emotions.* A number of articles explore the role of emotions such as anger (e.g., Ellemers & Barreto; van Zomeren & Spears), sympathy (Iyer & Ryan) or outrage (e.g., McGarty et al.), describing these emotions as the result perceived illegitimacy or injustice. From this perspective emotions emerge as a result of perceptions of unjust disadvantage and inspire the confrontational action tendencies that produce collective action. Stürmer and Simon propose an interesting alternative in which emotions play their part at an earlier stage in the causal chain. They hold that negative emotions directed at the oppressor play a role in developing the potent politicized social identity, and that it is this identification that is the proximal inspiration for collective action participation. Together these two ideas make apparent that one important issue for subsequent research will be to clarify the multiple roles of emotions in inspiring collective action, and to illuminate the conditions that determine when these specific roles are played.

This recent and growing focus on emotions harkens back to work on relative deprivation theory that also made the distinction between feelings/emotions associated with experienced deprivation, and the colder more cognitive recognition of deprivation (see Smith & Ortiz, 2002). However, this new generation of emotion research offers a more sophisticated theoretical framework (some based on appraisal theories; e.g., Iyer & Ryan). Thus, this new focus on emotions is likely to lead to the erroneous interpretation that collective action participation can be reduced to a kind of LeBonian irrationality. Anger or exhilaration need not replace rationality in some "oil and water" sense. Emotions are intertwined with cognition in ways that make feelings an outcome of, as well as an influence over, rational thought. Drury and Reicher provide a very nice example of their complementarity by showing the connection between positive emotions and the process of empowerment.

Another positive direction has been to expand the array of emotions that are considered relevant to collective action. Although the usual suspects of anger, frustration, and resentment are of course relevant, it seems valuable to consider

a broader range of emotions. Drury and Reicher's discussion of empowerment provides a strong case for considering positive emotions like exhilaration, and even joy. Smith, Cronin, and Kessler (2008) show that perceiving the in-group to be unjustly disadvantaged, and believing that things are likely to get worse, can be associated with feelings of sadness and fear. These emotions undermine collective action participation, leading instead to withdrawal and avoidance. In addition, recent consideration of the actions of advantaged group members has initiated a focus on emotions like sympathy and guilt (Iyer & Ryan).

It might be fruitful to widen the focus even further. For example, Drury and Reicher describe exhilaration as an outcome of successful expression of one's collective identity and achieving group goals. However, exhilaration might also be experienced when the in-group's actions cause what is seen to be well-deserved harm to the out-group or its members. The joyous collective celebrations following violent retribution against a perceived oppressor may result from successful expression of a collective identity, but also from positive emotions associated with extracting a measure of revenge for past wrongs. It is possible that the anticipation of these "positive" emotions may also facilitate collective action participation.

Similarly, while fear and anxiety are usually considered negative emotions, in some cases they can be experienced as highly positive. People climb sheer rock cliffs, jump out of airplanes, and drive exceedingly fast in order to experience the "adrenaline rush" associated with these risks. Apparently, some thrive on anxiety that is interpreted in this way. Having participated in several "high-risk" collective actions, it appears to me that at least some people participated for the same reasons that they might also mountaineer, skydive, or race a car. The fear that one could get caught and arrested (or worse) was part of the thrill of being there. Breaking the rules and facing the dangers associated with angering the oppressor can be fun! Especially when we are considering collective actions that involve real risks, I think we might be wise to consider risk taking and the associated positive side of fear as a motivator for at least some participants.

Conversely, hope is usually seen as a positive emotion, assisting one to cope with an existing negative situation, or as a basis for efficacy that one's group can change things. However, hope can also be a negative force (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990b). One can also be hopeful that things will simply get better; that the situation is changing, evolving and that we need only wait for the gears of change to grind on. This is a message often heard in reference to groups who have seen some positive change. "Things are so much better than they used to be." "Times are changing." Although these expressions should make group members feel better, they do not necessarily compel them to continue the fight. Rather this kind of hope can imply that continued change is inevitable and thus continued action is unnecessary.

In summary, the current more sophisticated look at emotions as antecedents to action (be it a proximal cause or as a contributor to politicizing identity) and as consequences of successful collective actions, seems extremely valuable. I believe the field will benefit from widening the focus, not only to consider the multiple roles played by emotion but also to consider a wider array of specific emotions that may inspire, accompany or emerge as a result of collective action.

### *Broadening the Array of Antecedents and Motivations*

A number of the articles in this volume also explore motives and conditions less directly tied to the SIT tradition. I have already described one of these in my earlier discussion of the definition of *collective action*. If collective action is equated with participation in a joint social action, or with membership in a social movement, or with being part of a crowd, then personal self-interest may also be an important motivation (e.g., Stürmer & Simon; van Stekelenburg et al.; van Zomeren & Spears). Participation (or intention to participate) in joint action with other in-group members (e.g., social protest) might result because the individual is seeking personal approval from others, or the opportunity for personal rewards.

*Intragroup concerns.* In an interesting extension, Postmes and Smith point out another level of motives that, although primarily self-interested, also involve a salient collective identity. When one engages in actions directed at an out-group in order to enhance or solidify one's personal position within the in-group (intragroup concerns), collective identity is clearly relevant. Postmes and Smith focus on these intragroup concerns as the advantaged group members to discriminate against the disadvantaged group. However, they appear to dismiss the importance of this kind of self-interest for disadvantaged group members by describing the "negative interdependence between the interests of the individual and those of the collective" (p. 774). Clearly, this is often the case. Collective action can involve personal costs for participants that can, at times, be extremely high (e.g., economic losses, imprisonment, even death).

However, I would argue that dismissing intragroup concerns as a motivator for disadvantaged group action incorrectly equates direct personal costs with intragroup costs and benefits. Vigorous engagement in actions that are not endorsed by the advantaged out-group can result in substantial personal costs. However, when these actions are endorsed and supported by the disadvantaged in-group, those who suffer these personal costs may gain enormous esteem within the in-group. Thus, direct personal losses may be high while intragroup benefits are also high. The most extreme case of this is the martyr who suffers the ultimate personal cost but gains the highest level of intragroup acclaim. In a much less dramatic example, being the one who is arrested and jailed at an antiwar protest can be a source of considerable acknowledgement, even adoration, among other protestors.

The discomfort of a night in jail, the possibility of a criminal record that could undermine future opportunities, and even the bruises from the handcuffs can all be worn as “badges of honor” in later interactions with the in-group. Thus, when we distinguish between the personal costs and intragroup status concerns it would seem that intragroup concerns could quite easily play a critical role in collective action participation for disadvantaged group members as well as members of privileged groups.

The idea that participation in collective action may be inspired by interest in garnering the approval of others is also reflected in Stürmer and Simon’s description of the normative motive (i.e., Klandermans’ [1997] *social motive*). However, although the label “normative motive” implies intragroup concerns, the description seems more about concerns that are interpersonal in nature. It “derives from the expected reactions of significant others to one’s participation in collective action (e.g., ridicule or admiration by friends or family)” (p. 682). This appears to imply that it is the approval or disapproval of others with whom one has a personal relationship, rather than the collective (normative) approval of one’s in-group. Again, we see subtle, but nonetheless important, differences in the level of identity that is being described as relevant.

However, even though intragroup concerns represent an “intermediate” level between interpersonal and intergroup concerns, the primary motivational push at this level is not improving the in-group’s status, but rather securing one’s personal position within the in-group. Thus, similar to motivations based entirely on personal concerns, it is questionable if actions that result from intragroup concerns should be considered collective actions at all.

*Ideology.* One exciting trend in the new wave of interest in collective action involves the reintroduction of the concept of ideology. Van Zomeren and Spears and van Stekelenburg et al. describe ideological convictions and discontent about violation of cherished, even sacred, values as a key motivator of collective action. Like Hornsey and colleagues (2006), these articles describe participation in group action that is motivated by principle, contrasting this motivation with more economic self-interest and expectation of personal benefits. However, van Stekelenburg et al. focus on ideology as a “personal set of values” and describe the principles (values) that drive action as quite personal/individualistic. By this account, participation in group protests is motivated by a desire to publicly express one’s personal values.

Van Zomeren and Spears, on the other hand, describe ideology in terms of a set of “sacred group values,” values and beliefs that are shared (normative) among members of the in-group. Thus, it is not personal values that are expressed or defended by participation in the group action, but rather values that are understood by the participants to be important (even sacred) to all members of the in-group. Again, these two different analyses bring into focus the issue of level of identity.

Both describe group action as ideologically driven, but they differ in level of identity that is seen to be central, with van Stekelenburg et al. focusing on personal identity (individual values) and van Zomeren and Spears on collective identity (group values).

I (see Wright, *in press*) share with van Zomeren and Spears the view that Skitka and colleagues' concept of moral conviction provides a valuable analysis of the role of ideology in collective action. Moral convictions—the “strong and absolute belief that something is right or wrong, moral or immoral” (Skitka & Bauman, 2008, p. 31)—compel action more so than other strongly held beliefs, because they describe what one “ought” to do. When something carries the mark of immorality, no other explanation is needed for opposing it, considering alternative perspectives will be strongly resisted, and failing to oppose it in favor of other considerations (e.g., personal preferences, normative conventions, potential costs) will evoke regret, shame, or guilt. Thus, if the current in-group position or treatment can be framed as a moral violation or the outcome of an immoral act by the out-group, taking action to rectify the situation becomes a moral mandate, making other concerns (e.g., stability, efficacy, personal costs, etc.) less relevant.

McGarty et al. make perhaps the strongest case for ideology, describing opinions (shared ideological beliefs) as not only the motivator of collective action but as the basis for the shared collective identity around which the action is organized. In this case “the cause” not only motivates group members, but is the defining feature of the collective identity as well.

*Affirming collective identity.* Collective action provides an opportunity to demonstrate and instantiate a valued collective identity “as a living agent, a locus of possibility” (Drury & Reicher, 2005, p. 54). Collective action can affirm the existence and legitimacy of the relevant collective identity, and these affirmations can, in and of themselves, be enough to motivate action. Collective action can also serve to identify the in-group as a distinct entity and affirm its dissimilarity from the offending out-group who unjustly mistreats or oppresses the in-group. The general point is that collective action can raise the psychological meaning and the perceived status of the in-group by demonstrating that it is a viable agent, distinct from the oppressive out-group, even when these actions have no discernable impact on the actual status, resources or the physical realities of the group (see Drury & Reicher; Louis; Simon, Trötschel, & Dähne, 2008).

*Psychological coping.* Similarly, some forms of collective action may serve primarily as a means of coping with the psychological stress associated with being a member of an oppressed minority (e.g., Outten, Schmitt, Garcia, & Branscombe, 2009). Here I am reminded of an Ethiopian proverb; “When the great lord passes the wise peasant bows deeply and silently farts.” We might not usually consider a “silent fart” to be collective action. However, this kind of small, even invisible, act

may be an important form of resistance. In Klandermans' terms (see van Zomeren & Iyer), these acts position the person as part of the mobilization potential; that they recognize the illegitimacy of their current disadvantage. In addition, such minor acts of resistance may also be a tool to build stories of resistance that can be quietly shared with other members of the group. Finally, these acts can be a source of pride and psychological empowerment for the actor, as they represent a source of self- and in-group-affirmation. I suspect that a social psychological analysis of these "hidden" forms of collective resistance could be quite rich and valuable.

*Influencing others: "Rallying the troops" and third parties.* Hornsey and colleagues (2006) point out that some collective actions, while in service of the long-term goal of improving the status of the in-group, may have a specific short-term goal of inspiring in-group members to join or continue the fight. Actors may realize that the current action stands little chance of creating real change but nonetheless expect that it will inspire in-group members to become part (or to remain part) of the movement. This view that some collective actions are actually designed to inspire future larger collective actions is reminiscent of the concept of consciousness raising (e.g., Taylor & McKirnan, 1984) where the intention is to influence the beliefs and feelings, and thus future actions, of in-group members.

In addition to targeting the in-group (rallying the troops), some collective actions may be designed to influence the thoughts and feelings of the out-group in an attempt to persuade them to voluntarily reduce the intergroup inequality. Further, recognizing that social change often involves more than the two primary groups, Simon and Klandermans (2001) point out that some collective actions may be attempts to influence a currently uninvolved third party (e.g., the general public, the international community, etc.), who might then throw their weight behind efforts to force the out-group to give up some of its power and/or improve its treatment of the in-group. This idea is described in some detail in van Zomeren and Spears' description of political motives. The general idea that collective actions can, at times, represent strategic efforts to influence others is an important addition to the literature. In addition to explaining collective actions that occur when there is little chance that they will have any immediate impact on current group status difference, this analysis could also serve as an avenue for connecting theorizing about collective action to the broader (and larger) social psychological literature on social influence.

*Intergroup competition versus conversionary collective action.<sup>1</sup>* This idea that collective action can also be a social influence tool can be expanded even

---

<sup>1</sup>This idea was one of the topics of discussion in a seminar titled Dilemmas in Social Change at the Third International Graduate College Summer School in Luckenwalde, Germany June, 2004. I would like to acknowledge the contributions of all of the participants in that seminar for helping to elaborate this idea.

further to consider the possibility that collective actions might be divided into two major classes—competitive and conversionary. The dominant view of collective action in social psychology has been tied to Tajfel and Turner's (1979) idea of social competition. Put simply, when members of a group recognize their group's disadvantages, see group boundaries as impermeable (movement into a higher status group is impossible), and recognize the illegitimacy and instability of this situation, they will then be prepared to take direct competitive action to try and improve the status of their group relative to the more advantaged comparison out-group. The idea here is that collective action is in service of a competitive goal of improving the relative status of the in-group.

This model of collective action works quite well to describe many examples, including the civil rights movement in the United States, or the women's movement, or the actions of First Nations groups in Canada or Aboriginal groups in Australia. In these cases, African Americans, women, First Nations, and Aboriginal peoples (and others supportive of the movement) engaged in collective actions to raise the group's status relative to White Americans, men, White Canadians, and White Australians. The success of these actions was determined by the degree to which they reduced intergroup inequality. This model also works well in describing some regional or international conflicts which involve people from one group acting to improve the relative status of their country/region/group relative to a neighboring country/region/group.

However, the representation of collective action as a struggle for relative group status does not fit quite so well for other large collective movements. For example, the collective actions of environmentalists are much harder to fit into this model. In this case, the broad goal is not to improve the status of the in-group relative to some out-group per se, but rather to convert as many nonmembers as possible to join the in-group and to take on the in-group's normative worldview. Of course, environmentalists at times identify out-groups (e.g., big industrial polluters, the oil industry, particular political parties, etc.) and some collective actions are directed at reducing the power or status of these out-groups. However, for the most part the general message put forward by the movement is that "everyone should be an environmentalist," and not that "environmentalists should be treated better."

One critical element of the difference between these two types of collective actions involves perceptions boundary permeability. Competitive collective action requires the perception that the boundaries between groups are impermeable. The concern is with out-migration; That group members who believe that they can move out of the disadvantaged in-group to join a more advantaged group will choose individual mobility over collective action. There is little concern in this model for the issue of in-migration, but we might assume that if group boundaries are impermeable, then they are impermeable in both directions. Thus, competitive collective action requires a clear boundary between us and them,

where one of us cannot become one of them and assumedly one of them should not become one of us. Conversionary collective movements, on the other hand, are particularly focused on in-migration and are highly interested in (in fact, they are often dedicated to) making them into one of us.

This also implies differences in the likely representation of the out-group. Competitive collective actions is best served by identifying the out-group as the villain responsible for the in-group's disadvantaged position. Competitive collective action is associated with negative stereotypes about the out-group (Reynolds, Oakes, Haslam, Nolan, & Dolnik, 2000) that justify collective conflict (Stott & Drury, 2004) and may be critical to the development of a politicized identity that leads to collective action (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). As a result of this representation of the out-group, competitive collective action is associated with emotions like anger and resentment. However, conversionary collective action requires a more compassionate representation of the out-group. They must be seen as misguided or naïve and in need of education so they will come to see the error of their ways and come to endorse the "correct" worldview. While patronizing and even sanctimonious, this representation of the out-group is certainly less negative than the one required from competitive collective action. Thus, while conversionary collective actions may be just as passionate and emotionally charged as competitive collective action, negative emotions must be tempered with the extension of an open hand.

Some of the flavor of this idea of conversionary collective actions is reflected in McGarty et al.'s discussion of opinion-based groups. In fact, it may be that opinion-based groups are more likely to have a conversion orientation as their collective identity is build on shared opinions. Presumably, some of these groups would understand that opinions can be changed (group boundaries are permeable), making out-group members potential recruits. However, I do not think this is necessarily so. When opinions harden into ideologies, they can become essentialized in the sense that the out-groups "wrong-headed" opinion are seen to be part of their essence, their character. Those holding these beliefs are seen to be dogmatic, inflexible, immoral, and even evil. They are no longer targets of conversion but rather they must be controlled, defeated, perhaps even eliminated.

These two possible perspectives are vividly represented in historical examples of religious conversion. For example, Spanish Catholics during the early colonization of the Caribbean, attempted to convert the "Indians" to Catholicism. When these attempts failed, dissenting Native People were often killed. The paternalistic perception of the out-group as uncivilized, childlike, and in need of conversion to the in-group's worldview was replaced with a representation of them as subhuman sinners. A less dramatic example of this evolution can often be seen in the contemporary North American political process. As election time nears, members of opposing political parties are first seen as potential converts. Each party engages in conversionary collective actions designed to attract members of out-groups (as

well as individual thought to be unaligned) to the in-group. When these attempts have “run their course” competitive collective actions follow and out-group members are vilified and their political beliefs described as defects in their very essence (e.g., they are stupid, selfish, arrogant, tyrannical, even evil).

### *Forms of Collective Action*

We have seen evidence in this volume (and elsewhere) of considerable advancement in our understanding of what leads group members to (or away from) collective action. However, social psychological research to date has given far less attention to the form that collective action might take. Collective action can range from mass protest, to joint action by small ad hoc groups, to individuals acting alone. Behaviors can range from education and consciousness raising, to lobbying, negotiation and voting, to writing a protest letter or signing a petition, to disruptive strikes, violent riots and even bombings. To date, social psychologists have either focused on one specific form of collective action (e.g., participation in a protest) or measured a variety of self-reported actions (or action intentions) and combined them. However, it seems fairly obvious that there should be differences in the antecedents leading one to sign a petition versus burn a flag at a protest, or to attend a rally versus set a bomb. It seems a rather important task for collective action theorists to develop a clearer and more elaborated framework that can capture key distinctions among these many different forms of collective action.

*Normative versus nonnormative action.* One distinction has received some attention—the distinction between actions that disrupt and violate the rules of the current system and actions designed only to alter the position of groups within that system. Louis provides a very interesting discussion of this distinction and details a number of hypotheses regarding the effectiveness of actions that are rule breaking and those that are rule conforming. Nearly 20 years ago now, my colleagues and I (Wright et al., 1990a) proposed a very similar distinction between actions that conform to the rules of the larger social system and those that do not.

This perspective is consistent with SCT’s observation that relations between groups are defined and structured within a larger shared superordinate category (Turner et al., 1987). Thus, relations between ethnic groups are defined and understood within the values and rules of a larger social category—often a nation or collection of nations. For example, the relations between Blacks and Whites are understood in terms of their shared membership in the American nation. It is the norms of this superordinate category that define actions by subordinate groups as normative or nonnormative. Thus, while actors may perceive their actions as appropriate, legitimate or moral based on norms within their subgroup, they will also know when their actions are inconsistent with the norms of the

inclusive category. For example, suicide bombings may be legitimate and normative within a subgroup engaged in the practice. However, members of these subgroups also know that this action is outside the norms of larger social system. Note also that this normative/nonnormative distinction is not simply the distinction between nonviolent and violent action. Nonviolent civil disobedience, for example, can be nonnormative, while in some intergroup contexts (e.g., a hockey game) violence is a normative and welcomed intergroup behavior.

Nonnormative actions are, by definition, more disruptive than normative action as they challenge not only the current intergroup status inequalities, but also the structure and the rules (the means) that determine group status. Thus, while normative actions provide tacit support to the social order, nonnormative actions communicate to in-group members, to the out-group, and to third parties a clear message that the actors perceive the current social order to be illegitimate. Thus, participation in nonnormative actions may require firmer convictions about the injustice/immorality of the out-group's actions. Finally, as Louis clearly points out, nonnormative action, because it is novel, disruptive, and questions the broader social order, will draw greater attention from the advantaged out-group and will demand a response.

Normative collective action can also evoke resistance. However, it usually involves less risk of a vigorous and potentially harmful response than nonnormative action. Thus, when a normative avenue is available, it is likely to be engaged first (Wright, 2001). Strong endorsement of normative collective action also seems likely when in-group status is thought to be determined by legitimate means but is also unstable. For example, political parties in a functioning democracy who lose an election are likely to engage in vigorous normative action, because (for the most part) their acceptance of the rules by which group status is determined (the election process), but also believe that the current position of their party can be changed. However, if normative tactics prove ineffective or the advantaged group is seen to be engaging in nonnormative actions to maintain their power (see Drury & Reicher), the perceived legitimacy of the system is compromised and normative actions may give way to nonnormative action.

Drury and Reicher (see also Reicher, 2004) provide a valuable model of the fluid and dynamic relationship between the content of the groups collective identity, the actions of the out-group and the form that collective actions will take. Militancy and disruptive action result from changing in-group norms attached to the group's evolving collective identity, and the specific collective identity that will emerge is, in part, determined by the actions of the out-group. For example, the escalation of crowd behavior to include violence can result because the actions of the police serve to redefine the crowd's collective identity. Arrests and aggressive police tactics define the crowd's actions as nonnormative. Those who were initially moderate protesters may accept this proffered self-representation and respond to police "provocation" with increasingly disruptive actions. However, should the

police act in ways that provide an alternative self-definition (as “engaged citizens” perhaps), these same protesters should remain relatively moderate and their actions quite normative. Thus, the actions of the out-group play a major role in shaping the collective identity of the actors and, thus, influence the type of collective action that they take. Drury and Reicher’s contribution to this volume strengthens the model by introducing the concept of collective empowerment as a critical mediating process.

These are interesting advances in our efforts to understand how and why different forms of collective action emerge. However, the normative/nonnormative distinction is only one of numerous possible distinctions that might be used to organize the many specific actions that a group member could take. For example, we might consider the psychological underpinnings of collective actions engaged in on one’s own (e.g., letter writing) compared to participating in an organized protest event. Similarly, we might consider the example of the lone protester in Tiananmen Square who stood alone in front of the row of tanks. What inspires a single individual (or smaller subgroup) to deviate from the group action and perhaps to alter the course of the group (see Louis, for a related discussion of subgroups within social movements)?

*Broadening the array of actions we consider and connecting to other literatures.* Social psychology’s current focus on a limited set of collective actions may also limit the degree to which collective action research can easily connect to other research domains within the field. As already mentioned, when we consider that many collective actions are actually efforts to influence particular audiences (the in-group, the out-group, or a neutral third party), it may be very useful to consider the large literature on social influence as a tool for considering the particular influence processes that are at work and to understand when and why particular collective actions do (or do not) achieve the goal of enlisting the support of the relevant target group.

Similarly, as mentioned previously, some kinds of collective action, may serve as forms of group-based psychological coping. If this is the case, it may be that collective action theories could benefit from consideration of ideas from the literature on psychological coping. For example, Outten et al. (2009) utilize ideas from Lazarus and Folkman’s (1984) cognitive theory of stress and coping, describing collective action as an “intergroup problem-focused coping strategy.” They find that use of this strategy partially mediated the positive relationship between in-group identification and psychological well-being among members of disadvantaged group.

In addition, Postmes and Smith point out a very interesting connection that could be made between collective action research and the much larger literature on motivations for discrimination. There is nothing in the definition of collective action dictating that the in-group need be disadvantaged or that the target of the



PROJECT MUSE®

---

## The Colors of Poverty

Harris, David R., Lin, Ann Chih


Published by Russell Sage Foundation

Harris, David R. and Ann Chih Lin.

The Colors of Poverty: Why Racial and Ethnic Disparities Persist.

Russell Sage Foundation, 2008.

Project MUSE. [muse.jhu.edu/book/15023](https://muse.jhu.edu/book/15023).



➔ For additional information about this book

<https://muse.jhu.edu/book/15023>

# *Chapter 3*

---

## **Justifying Inequality: A Social Psychological Analysis of Beliefs About Poverty and the Poor**

**Heather E. Bullock**

**A** news story reports that 12.6 percent of the United States population was poor in 2004. No demographic information is provided. Who do you think the poor are?

You watch a television program about low-income mothers trying to make ends meet. One of the mothers featured says that employers don't want to hire her because of her Spanish accent. Who is responsible for her situation?

While visiting the city, you give a homeless man a dollar. Your friend tells you that handouts only encourage laziness. Do you regret giving him money?

When you were growing up you believed that with hard work anyone could move up the socioeconomic ladder. At your child's high school graduation, though, you notice that a lot of the graduates who aren't going on to college are black and from poorer families. Is there a level playing field for everyone?

Each of these scenarios raises everyday questions about inequality. Our answers, and the beliefs that inform them, play an important role in justifying or challenging economic disparity. This chapter examines the ideological foundations of inequality in the United States, particularly how beliefs about individualism, meritocracy, and opportunity influence understandings of poverty. It also explores how *classism* (attitudes and stereotypes that derogate poor and working class people), *sexism* (attitudes and stereotypes that devalue women), and *racism* (attitudes and stereotypes that devalue people of color) constrain upward mobility and have a cumulative impact on disadvantage.

## THE IDEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF INEQUALITY

In the United States, ideological support for economic inequality rests on two deeply cherished beliefs: individualism and the possibility of upward mobility. Individualism refers to a cluster of beliefs emphasizing independence, the pursuit of self-fulfillment, and individual responsibility for achievement. The prominence of individualism over collectivism in the national identity and political thought of the United States and other Western nations is amply documented by cross-cultural research (Oyserman, Coon, and Kemmelmeier 2002). As Juri Allik and Anu Realo (2004) observed, “it was in the United States where individualism obtained the status of a system that secures, guards, and encourages free competition and capitalism and any attempt to subordinate individuals to the primacy of society as a whole is perceived as an inevitable route to totalitarianism” (30–31). Individualism is evident in many aspects of public life in the United States, including popular culture (advertisements proclaiming “just do it”) and cultural narratives (the character Rocky and his triumph over adversity).

Individualism is also evident in the tendency to view poverty and wealth as reflecting merit and personal effort. Dominant attributions for wealth and poverty illustrate how social class, unlike race and gender, is regarded as an achieved or earned status rather than an ascribed characteristic (Weber 1998). In one of the first large U.S. studies of attributions for poverty, Joseph Feagin (1975) found that the role of characterological flaws in causing poverty (laziness, substance abuse, lack of thrift) were supported more strongly than structural causes (discrimination, inferior schools, low wages) or fatalistic attributions (bad luck, unfortunate circumstances). This finding is indicative of a national inclination toward viewing poverty as a sign of personal and moral failure (Katz 1989; Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, and Tagler 2001; Shirazi and Biel 2005). As the poor deserve their economic status, so do the rich: individualistic explanations for wealth—drive, ability-talent, willingness to take risks, hard work—enjoy greater support than structural attributions—economic bias, political influence, inheritance (Hunt 2004; Kluegel and Smith 1986; Smith 1985; Smith and Stone 1989).

The high value placed on personal accomplishment is tied to the belief that individuals can shape their destiny and that with hard work and perseverance upward mobility is possible. Indeed, the belief that anyone can advance, regardless of their family of origin, economic status, or ethnicity, is so central to our national identity that it is the heart of the so-called American dream, “the promise that all Americans have a reasonable chance to achieve success as they define it—material or otherwise—through their own efforts, and to attain virtue and fulfillment through success” (Hochschild 1995, xi). From this vantage point, economic disparity is acceptable as long as mobility is possible. Alexis de Tocqueville aptly described this fundamental tenet when he asserted that “what is most important for *Démocratie*, is not that there are no great fortunes, but that great fortunes do not remain in the same hands” (cited in Schleifer 1980, 268).

## The Colors of Poverty

Rising inequality has not detracted from the belief that upward mobility is possible. Although such mobility has not increased over the past thirty years, and economic disparity has reached historic levels (David C. Johnston, "Richest are Leaving Even the Rich Far Behind." *The New York Times*, June 5, 2005, 1.1.), findings from national opinion polls underscore the extent to which inequality is accepted and normalized. More Americans today than twenty years ago believe it possible to move from poverty to affluence through hard work (Janny Scott and David Leonhardt, "Shadowy Lines that Still Divide," *The New York Times*, May 15, 2005, 1.1). Some public opinion data suggests that tolerance for inequality has grown as disparity itself has risen: between 1974 and 1984, the number of Americans believing that money and wealth in this country should be more evenly distributed dropped by 20 percent, and has held steady at 63 percent (McCall 2003). Even among adolescents, belief in the possibility of financial success is firmly entrenched. A Charles Schwab (2007) poll of 1,000 teenagers found that nearly 73 percent of respondents believed they would earn "plenty of money" and 53 percent expected to surpass their parents financially. Boys expected to earn \$174,000 annually and girls \$114,200, far exceeding national median incomes for full-time male and female workers.

The broader context of these beliefs is demographic inequality that reinforces race, gender, and class-based stereotypes. The hardship of poverty falls disproportionately on ethnic minorities and female-headed households. In 2005, 24.9 percent of blacks and 21.8 percent of Hispanics lived below official poverty thresholds compared to 11.1 percent of Asians and 8.3 percent of non-Hispanic whites (U.S. Census Bureau 2006). Households headed by single mothers are also especially vulnerable, with the highest rates of poverty found among black (45.3 percent) and Hispanic (44 percent) female-headed households. These concentrations of disadvantage are transformed into causes: into characterizations of poverty as a minority problem (Gilens 1999; Quadagno 1994) or a reflection of weak sexual mores and the decline of the nuclear family (Lind 2004; Orloff 2002). Characterizations including laziness, sexual promiscuity, irresponsible parenting, disinterest in education, and disregard for the law intersect in stereotypes about the poor, people of color, and women. This fusion is especially pronounced for certain subgroups of the poor, such as welfare recipients and the urban poor (Gans 1995; Henry, Reyna, and Weiner 2004). Shorthand terms such as *underclass*, *Cadillac queen*, and *trailer trash* call to mind specific ethnic groups, further illustrating the association of class, race, and gender in popular discourse and public consciousness.

Such biases are likely to develop early in life. Children make judgments about class at an early age, and as they grow older their conceptualizations become more consistent with dominant stereotypes (Chafel 1997). In research with youth ranging in age from six to seventeen, Robert Leahy (2003) found that as children grew older, their descriptions of the rich and poor shift from emphasizing physical characteristics (appearance, possessions) to personal characteristics (abilities, traits). Similarly, the perceived legitimacy of inequality and individualistic attri-

butions for poverty and wealth become more common with age. By age eleven, the belief that the poor could not work harder had increased substantially, and thereafter inequality was less likely to be seen as a problem that could be solved by having the rich give to the poor (Leahy 2003).

In adolescence, class-based stereotyping is common, particularly among white middle class teens. After showing photographs of poor, neutral, or wealthy strangers to a predominantly white sample of middle class adolescents, Dianne Skafte (1989) asked them to rate the target on a series of characteristics. Although poor strangers were rated as working harder and as more generous, they were also judged to steal more often, feel worse about themselves, and make friends less easily than neutral or wealthy strangers. Wealthy strangers were perceived as being more intelligent, more likely to be successful, and happier than poor or neutral strangers. Although poor strangers of both sexes were evaluated less favorably than their wealthy counterparts, poor girls received the lowest ratings, suggesting that some subgroups of the poor are judged more harshly than others.

The media plays a key role in the transmission of stereotypes about the poor. News stories exaggerate the relationship between minority status and poverty by overrepresenting African Americans in features about poverty (Gilens 1999). In Rosalee Clawson and Rakuya Trice's (2000) content analysis of photographs published in five major news magazines between 1993 and 1998, African Americans were pictured in 49 percent of stories about poverty but made up only 27 percent of the poor. Conversely, whites were significantly underrepresented, appearing in only 33 percent of stories but making up 45 percent of those in poverty. Hispanics were underrepresented by 5 percent and Asian Americans were invisible. The absence of images depicting Asian Americans in poverty may reflect their stereotypical association with industriousness and intelligence, just as stereotypes about the weak work ethic of African Americans may contribute to their overrepresentation (Clawson and Trice 2000). These findings speak to the importance of examining the prevalence and content of media representations of diverse low-income groups, and looking carefully at potential real world consequences. For instance, visual representations may intersect with and reinforce racial biases. After viewing a videotaped vignette, Franklin Gilliam (1999) found that white respondents were less likely to recall seeing a white than a black welfare recipient.

Theories of the ideological underpinnings of stratification and symbolic racism ground these findings (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Bobo and Hutchings 1996; Kinder and Winter 2001; Schuman and Krysan 1999). Ideology-based theories draw their evidence from the relationship of anti-welfare attitudes to individualistic attributions, belief that equality of opportunity is preferable to equality of outcomes, and the notion that inequality is an inevitable consequence of meritocratic democracies. Theories of symbolic or modern racism explain white opposition to welfare policies as "racial hostility that is vented indirectly, for example, agreeing with statements such as 'the government pays too much attention to blacks,' or 'blacks who receive welfare could get along without it if they tried'" (Bobo and Kluegel 1993, 446).

## The Colors of Poverty

Researchers have tried to tease apart the relative predictive power of beliefs about poverty and opportunity and symbolic racism by pitting them against each other in regression analyses. However, if beliefs about gender (promiscuity), race (laziness), and poverty (lack of work ethic) collectively fuel antiwelfare sentiment, models assessing relative importance may be less useful than those examining the intersection of beliefs. Although feminist conceptions of intersectionality focus primarily on the navigation of multiple identities, the underlying message of this scholarship, that complex social constructs cannot be easily isolated, is applicable here as well (McCall 2005). As such, references to welfare recipients and welfare policy must be analyzed in terms of their potential to activate intersecting, not solo, biases. The following section delves deeper into these intersections, and their interaction with social location.

## INTERSECTIONS OF IDEOLOGY WITH RACE, CLASS, AND GENDER

Stereotypes do not exist in isolation from other belief systems, nor are they universally endorsed across groups. Just as rates of poverty are distributed across race, class, and gender groupings, belief in dominant ideology also varies. Research examining support for dominant ideology indicates that people of color are more likely to see systemic inequities and express skepticism about equality of opportunity than whites (Hochschild 1995). This trend is reflected in demographic variability in beliefs about poverty and wealth. Joseph Feagin (1975) found that White Protestants and Catholics, people with middle-income earnings, and those with moderate levels of education have been found to favor individualistic explanations for poverty. African Americans, low-income earners, and those with less education were found to favor structural explanations (Feagin 1975). Greater support for structural causes of poverty has been found among women than among men, liberals than conservatives, and welfare recipients than those who have not received public assistance (Kluegel and Smith 1986; Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, and Tagler 2001; Hunt 1996; Bullock 1999). Even among children, low-income and African American children express greater concern for the poor and willingness to challenge the economic structure than their white middle class peers (Leahy 2003). Similarly, Judith Chafel and Carin Neitzel (2005) found that children with low socioeconomic status (SES) and black or biracial children were more likely to talk about the need for more humane treatment of the poor than financially secure white children.

Other researchers have conducted more fine-tuned, predictive analyses to examine how demographic variables influence the causal beliefs of diverse ethnic groups. For instance, Matthew Hunt (1996) found that income was a stronger negative predictor of individualistic explanations for poverty among African Americans than European Americans or Latinos, education was a stronger predictor of individualistic attributions among Latinos and whites than African Americans; and being a woman was a stronger predictor of structural attributions for whites

than Latinos. Different life histories and experiences can also shape attributional patterns. Among first-generation Mexican American farmworkers, support for structural attributions may be rooted in the recognition of widespread poverty and discrimination, whereas individualistic beliefs may be a way of acknowledging the personal resolve needed to survive immigration (Bullock and Waugh 2005).

Beliefs about wealth have received less attention in the research literature than beliefs about poverty, a bias that may indicate the tendency to see poverty, not wealth, at the core of inequality. In one of the few intergroup comparisons of Latino, African American, and European American beliefs, all three groups preferred individualistic to structural attributions for wealth (Hunt 2004). This “remarkable consensus” (Hunt 2004, 841) did not extend to structural attributions for wealth which received greater support from African Americans and Latinos than whites. Among all three groups, structural attributions for poverty were favored over individualistic causes, but again African Americans and Latinos expressed stronger support for structural explanations than whites.

One set of explanations for these group differences focuses on attributional bias. The most notable is the actor-observer effect, where individuals attribute their own (negative) outcomes to situational factors but the (negative) outcomes of others to personal causes (Jones and Besbitt 1972). Overall, difference in support for individualistic and structural attributions among the poor (actors) and nonpoor (observers) reflect this discrepancy. This type of explanation, however, overlooks the contextual and power-based dimensions of these patterns. That those who hold more social power are more likely to attribute poverty to laziness than to discrimination has significant implications for the maintenance of inequality. As Emily Kane and Elise Kyrrö (2001) observed, “by masking the existence of inequalities, defining them as good, or construing them as inevitable, ideologies and the beliefs derived from them can legitimate and perpetuate unequal relationships between social groups” (710).

Critical race theory (CRT), critical race feminism (CRF) (Delgado and Stefancic 2001; Wing 2003), and theories of social control (Piven and Cloward 1993) offer theoretical frameworks for analyzing the relationship between power, ideology, and group-level differences in beliefs about how resources should be distributed. Both CRT and CRF treat race as a social construct that is (re)created to maintain and regulate white economic and political power. Theorists from this tradition call into question whether stereotypical characterizations are best understood as benign misperceptions or as hierarchy-enhancing beliefs (Augoustinos, Tuffin, and Every 2005; Limbert and Bullock 2005). Similarly, social control theories highlight how stigma inhibits identification with devalued groups. The stigma associated with welfare receipt may keep eligible poor and working class people from applying for benefits, particularly publicly visible forms of aid such as food stamps. It also makes low-paying jobs appear more desirable than public assistance, a function that benefits businesses and corporations, not service and other low-wage workers (Piven and Cloward 1993).

Viewed through these theoretical lenses, attributions for poverty are part of a larger, interrelated network of hierarchy enhancing or attenuating beliefs. Corre-

## The Colors of Poverty

lational research in social psychology supports this perspective. Individualistic attributions are correlated with belief in a just world (Cozzarelli, Wilkinson, and Tagler 2001), the Protestant work ethic (Wagstaff 1983), social dominance (Le-mieux and Pratto 2003), political conservatism (Zucker and Weiner 1993), and stereotypes about welfare recipients (Bullock 1999). Conversely, structural explanations are correlated with political liberalism and the rejection of beliefs that situate responsibility on the individual.

The following section delves more deeply into these relationships and their differential impact on the poor and the nonpoor. In each case, I show how ideology contributes to disadvantage and cumulates differently across race, gender, and class.

## HIERARCHY-LEGITIMIZING BELIEFS AND THE NONPOOR

Among groups that hold significant social and economic power, individualistic beliefs and stereotypes about race, class, and gender are likely to influence perceptions of the access and treatment the poor should receive in major institutions. Ideological biases may be used to justify policies and structures that further restrict prospects for mobility and deepen disadvantage, particularly for low-income minorities. The effects of dominant ideology and stereotyping on classroom bias and welfare policy are offered as two illustrations.

### Dominant Ideology, Stereotyping, and the Construction of Educational Disadvantage

Stereotypes about race-ethnicity, class, and intelligence as well as discriminatory treatment from teachers, other relevant authorities, and peers can influence educational goals, school involvement, and, ultimately, the persistence of inequality (Hauser-Cram, Selcuk, and Stipek 2003; Lott 2001). According to what is known as the Pygmalion effect, teachers act on classist and racist expectations about student competence; in response, student performance confirms these lowered expectations, creating a self-fulfilling prophecy (Ferguson 2003; Rosenthal and Jacobson 1968; Rosenthal 2003). Stronger effects have been observed among African American students and low SES students (Smith, Jussim, and Eccles 1999).

Despite widespread popular belief in this phenomenon, numerous scientific critiques of self-fulfilling prophecies have been raised. The magnitude of expectancy effects tends to be small (Jussim and Harber 2005), calling into question the robustness of this phenomenon. Other researchers assert that the alleged power of self-fulfilling prophecies is grounded in the accuracy of teachers' perceptions, not their bias. Methodological debates about the costs and benefits associated with naturalistic versus experimental studies of teacher expectancy also

plague the literature. In spite of these caveats, concern about teacher expectancies remains high.

Rather than trying to document the self-fulfilling or cyclical nature of stereotyping, other research suggests that even if teachers do not act on biased attitudes, deep-rooted prejudice may compromise fairness in the classroom (McCombs and Gay 1988). An experiment by La Vonne Neal and her colleagues (2003) vividly illustrates this point. One hundred and thirty-six teachers watched videotapes in which student ethnicity (African American versus European American) and walking style ("standard" erect posture versus a stylized "stroll" associated with African Americans) was manipulated. Male students of both races with an "African American stroll" were rated as lower in achievement, higher in aggression, and more likely to need special education than students of either ethnicity with a "standard" walk. These findings reflect dominant beliefs that associate "acting black" with intellectual inferiority and laziness, and are indicative of the biases low-income youth and students of color may confront. Interviews with poor minority students of color indicate that young people themselves regard teachers as having lower academic expectations for "bad kids" or kids "who start trouble" (Rosenbloom and Way 2004).

Despite being largely discredited by the scientific community, genetic arguments about the intellectual inferiority of minorities and the poor still make their way into public discourse (Herrnstein and Murray 1994; Rushton and Jensen 2005). In Herrnstein and Murray's controversial but widely read book, *The Bell Curve* (1994), arguments about the racial and class heritability of intelligence are used to justify eliminating Head Start programs. Attacks on affirmative action in education have a similar structure (Augostinos, Tuffin, and Every 2005). Cultural deficit models also locate responsibility for the achievement gap within individuals, but the focus shifts from nature to nurture. Deficit models (culture of poverty, cultural underclass) contend that poor whites and ethnic minorities do not endorse values, such as respect for education, common in mainstream culture. The transmission of these values from parent to child is seen as perpetuating low educational and occupational achievement (for a comprehensive review of cultural models, see Lamont and Small, chapter 4, this volume). From this vantage point, the devaluation of education by poor people of color is the source of low achievement, a perspective grounded in individualism.

These stereotypes, independently and through their interactions with structural disparities in the public schools (overcrowding, high student to teacher ratios, and teacher turnover), deepen the disadvantage that low-income and minority students of color face (Hochschild 2003; Kozol 2005). The highest numbers of deficiencies are reported in schools that serve more than 50 percent minorities or 70 percent poor students (National Center for Education Statistics 2000a). It is unlikely that high rates of basic shortcomings (non-functioning toilets, broken windows) would be tolerated in more affluent schools. Such inequities convey the same message as racist and classist stereotypes: white, middle class students are more deserving of resources than poor and minority students.

## Dominant Ideology, Stereotypes, and the Social Construction of Welfare Policy

The influence of dominant ideology and stereotypes on the nonpoor, particularly the white middle class, has been most closely examined in relation to attitudes toward welfare policy. The most recent large-scale illustration of antiwelfare mobilization occurred in the 1990s among voters who resonated with then presidential candidate Bill Clinton's pledge "to end welfare as we know it" (1995, 80). Before passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA), welfare was among the most unpopular social programs (Jacoby 1994; Weaver, Shapiro, and Jacobs 1995). A study by Susan Fiske and her colleagues (1999) examining the perceived warmth and competence of seventeen commonly stereotyped groups illustrates this unpopularity. Of the groups that were examined, including migrant workers, feminists, and blacks, only welfare recipients were both disliked and disrespected. This low regard is further illustrated by polling data showing greater support for assisting the poor than for welfare, leading Tom Smith to conclude "that which we call welfare by any other name would smell sweeter" (1987, 75).

What accounts for welfare's unpopularity? Part of the answer lies in the long tradition of categorizing the poor in terms of their deservingness (Katz 1989; Piven and Cloward 1993). Historically and today, these distinctions are grounded in dominant beliefs about individualism and personal responsibility for poverty (Weiner 1995). Widows, children, people with disabilities, and veterans are considered among the deserving poor, while single mothers, welfare recipients, people with substance abuse issues, able-bodied men, and high-school drop-outs constitute the so-called undeserving poor. Experimental studies document how policy preferences are affected by this differentiation. For example, Lauren Appelbaum (2001) found that participants were more likely to recommend no benefits when targets were from undeserving groups and when their poverty was attributed to personal causes. Survey research similarly finds that individualistic attributions for poverty are correlated with opposition to welfare spending and progressive welfare policies (Kluegel and Smith 1986).

Individualistic judgments about poverty are consistent with the stereotype that welfare recipients, unlike the poor, prefer welfare to work (Henry, Reyna, and Weiner 2004). This perception situates welfare recipients as violating dominant ideology that equates work with morality and individual initiative and poverty with personal shortcomings, a view that undoubtedly shapes policy attitudes. For instance, unlike proposals to expand welfare benefits, initiatives to increase the minimum wage enjoy strong support among the general population (Pew Research Center 2005), a difference that may be partially attributed to their perceived associations with work.

Among European Americans, the "outsider" or "other" status of welfare recipients is furthered by both racism and sexism (Neubeck and Cazenave 2001; Smith 1987). Indirect and direct effects of racism on white opposition to welfare under-

score this point. For instance, one analysis found that the impact of antiblack attitudes on opposition to welfare was mediated by the stereotype that welfare recipients are personally responsible for their poverty (Henry, Reyna, and Weiner 2004). Other studies find direct effects. Various measures of racism, mostly focusing on European American attitudes toward African Americans, are positively correlated with antiwelfare attitudes (Kinder and Sanders 1996). In Martin Gilens's (1999) analysis of national survey data, stereotyping blacks as lazy and the poor as undeserving emerged as the strongest predictors of white opposition to welfare, followed by conservatism and individualism. Stereotypes about black welfare mothers were nearly twice as strong in predicting antiwelfare attitudes than stereotypes of white welfare mothers (Gilens 1999). These biases are manifested in the real world adoption of restrictive welfare policies, such as family cap regulations, in states with higher percentages of minority recipients (Soss et al. 2001).

Poverty and racism are not solely white versus black phenomena: research paradigms must be expanded to examine attitudes among and beliefs toward majorities and minorities at national, state, and local levels. In states such as California, ethnic attitudes toward Latinos may have a stronger influence on whites' policy preferences than attitudes toward other ethnic minority groups. Cybelle Fox's (2004) contextualized analysis of stereotyping, ethnic context, and antiwelfare attitudes underscores this point. In areas of the United States with fewer Latinos, whites stereotyped Latinos as having a poor work ethic, and opposed welfare spending on these grounds. In states with a higher percentage of Latinos, whites perceived Latinos more positively; however, these favorable attitudes did not translate into greater support for welfare programs. Instead, the more hardworking Latinos were perceived to be, the less whites wanted to spend on welfare. Similar findings did not emerge for African Americans, who were viewed as lazier than Latinos, regardless of ethnic context. To explain the counterintuitive relationship between perceived industriousness and opposition to welfare spending, Fox drew on comparative processes, speculating that Latinos may be the model minority against which African Americans are judged. She asserted, "since Latinos can make it without welfare, so the logic goes, so can blacks, and therefore spending on welfare should be decreased. Alternatively, whites may fear that Latinos will follow what they see as the path of blacks and become lazy if the welfare system is allowed to grow too large" (616).

These findings illustrate what could be characterized as stereotype spillover: how stereotypes about diverse racial-ethnic groups reinforce, negate, or interact with each other. As Fox's findings make clear, marginalized groups do not exist in isolation, nor do social judgments about them. Thus, it is not only how antiblack stereotypes affect the treatment of African Americans but also how these stereotypes influence the treatment of other ethnic groups. Examining these interactions will not only yield a more multifaceted understanding of intergroup relations, it will also yield a more sophisticated understanding of how stereotypes contribute to disadvantage across diverse groups, eventually shaping policy preferences across different racial-ethnic contexts.

In its most simple form, economic practicality would suggest that those who

## The Colors of Poverty

are less likely to draw on social programs organize against them (Bobo and Kluegel 1993; Kinder and Winter 2001). Indeed, across racial groups, support for welfare programs decreases as earnings increase. But the greater support found for welfare spending among middle-income voters of color, relative to their white counterparts, speaks to the necessity of more complex constructions of self-interest, particularly those that take group belonging into account. Legitimizing ideologies have different social and political implications across diverse groups: in some instances, group loyalty or identification, regardless of direct personal benefits, has proven a stronger explanatory variable than simple group membership (Luttmer 2001). This point is further illustrated by research examining the impact of dominant ideology on the poor.

## HIERARCHY-LEGITIMIZING BELIEFS AND THE POOR

Although low-income groups have considerably less social power and authority over policy decisions and the distribution of resources, the endorsement of dominant ideology among the poor still has important consequences. Two areas, welfare stigma and stereotype threat, illustrate the potential social and economic repercussions of these beliefs among low-income groups.

### Concentrating Disadvantage Through Welfare Stigma

Disidentification from stigmatized social groups, such as welfare recipients, may lead even those who would benefit from more generous assistance programs to oppose them. In William Epstein's (2004) review of national polling data, even the poorest respondents share the upper quintiles' preference for personal responsibility, limited welfare payments, restrictive reform initiatives, and hostility toward welfare recipients. In twenty-one years of polling between 1973 and 1998, only 23.2 percentage points separated the poorest and wealthiest quintiles on approval for the statement, "We're spending too much money on welfare." This difference, which is relatively small in light of the sizable resource gap between these groups, illustrates that simple self-interest alone is not a sufficient explanatory variable.

The humiliation and degradation associated with welfare receipt or welfare stigma may lead recipients to disidentify from others receiving aid (Seccombe 1999) and even facilitate disidentification from the poor among those who are not aid recipients. The psychological underpinnings of social distancing are illustrated in Michelle Fine and Lois Weis's (1998) analysis of poor and working class white men experiencing the consequences of deindustrialization. Explaining that he "never had to" apply for public assistance, Ron revealed a personal history of food stamp use while distinguishing himself from other recipients:

You know, we look at welfare as being something less than admirable. . . . I think it [falling back on the government] is more common for black people. . . . I mean social

services, in general, I think, is certainly necessary, and Sheila [wife] and I have taken advantage of them. We've got food stamps several times. . . . But you know, as soon as I was able to get off it, I did. (Fine and Weis 1998, 26)

Other qualitative studies with low-income participants find similar distancing, typically by disparaging the work ethic or integrity of welfare recipients (Seccombe 1999). Grounded in individualism and racism, such interpretations of economic hardship are apt to weaken the formation of strong interracial alliances among the poor, to deepen community and neighborhood tensions, and to legitimize scapegoating of low-income people of color.

Strongly held convictions about personal responsibility and belief in upward mobility through hard work among low-income groups, most notably African Americans, may also temper structural critiques of inequality (Hochschild 1995; Fine and Weis 1998). Seemingly incongruent individualistic and structural beliefs often coexist (Hunt 1996, 2004). In Heather Bullock and Wendy Limbert's (2003) study of welfare recipients enrolled in an educational program for low-income individual and families, poverty and wealth were attributed to structural sources and income inequality was regarded as unjust, but American dream ideology was also supported, and respondents expressed confidence in their own prospects for upward mobility.

The perceived permeability of class boundaries and the belief that poverty is transitory may also contribute to social distancing and the blunting of structural critiques of inequality. Belief in personal mobility can be self-protective, allowing individuals to find hope in the midst of economic hardship and to negotiate institutional discrimination. The denial of personal discrimination (Crosby 1984), or the tendency for disadvantaged individuals to perceive less discrimination against themselves personally than against the groups to which they belong, helps explain why marginalized groups believe in personal advancement even when formidable barriers are present.

The concept of dual consciousness is also used to explain the simultaneous belief in personal agency and structural inequality, particularly among ethnic minorities (Hunt 1996, 2004). Although research finds stronger support for structural than individualistic attributions among people of color, support for individualistic causes is often relatively strong as well. This pattern may allow disadvantaged groups to maintain a sense of control over their economic situation while acknowledging the role of larger structural forces in the maintenance of inequality.

Collectively, these studies underscore the importance of studying perceptions in all their complexity and contradiction. Social judgments are rarely binary and should not be treated as such. Beliefs serve multiple functions: they can legitimate or disrupt class and race hierarchies, allow someone to retain a sense of personal control over hardship, or create distance between oneself and economically similar others. These responses cannot be stripped of the context in which they exist; they must be examined with an eye toward the interests served by the acceptance of widespread belief in upward mobility, individual responsibility for poverty, and the permeability of class boundaries. Doing so will provide a more sophisticated understanding of welfare stigma as well as the conditions that facilitate it.

## CONCENTRATING DISADVANTAGE THROUGH STEREOTYPE THREAT

Some of the most compelling evidence regarding the impact of stereotypes on people of color and the poor comes from research on stereotype threat. As a phenomenon driven by racist, classist, and sexist stereotypes about intellectual inferiority and poor work ethic, stereotype threat is situation-specific. Claude Steele (1997) described stereotype threat as

the social-psychological threat that arises when one is in a situation or doing something for which a negative stereotype about one's group applies. This predicament threatens one with being negatively stereotyped, with being judged or treated stereotypically, or with the prospect of conforming to the stereotype. . . . And for those who identify with the domain to which the stereotype is relevant, this predicament can be self-threatening. (614)

The possibility of confirming negative stereotypes may impair performance or lead to disidentification with the area in which the stereotype is relevant, such as school. In part, stereotype threat is believed to be such a powerful and problematic phenomenon because individual endorsement of negative beliefs is not necessary; simple awareness of their presence in society causes the effect.

Support for stereotype threat comes from experimental studies documenting diminished math scores for women and reduced standardized test scores for African Americans and students from low socioeconomic backgrounds (Spencer, Steele, and Quinn 1999; Croizet et al. 2001; Régner, Huguet, and Monteil 2002). In a series of related studies, Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson (1995) asked black and white college students to complete a test of difficult GRE items. When the test was described as ability-diagnostic, black participants did less well than white participants; however, when the test was described as nondiagnostic, blacks and whites performed equally well. In another experiment, the same pattern of results emerged when participants reported their race on a demographic questionnaire immediately before taking the test: identifying their race was sufficient to depress the performance of black students. Parallel findings have emerged for socioeconomic status: when low SES students were led to believe that the test could measure their intellectual ability, they answered fewer items correctly, but they performed just as well as high SES students when they thought the test was nondiagnostic (Croizet and Claire 1998).

These performance effects interact with and magnify long-standing educational inequities. Significant differences on standardized tests and classroom performance continue to divide across race-ethnicity and class lines (McLoyd 1998; Suzuki and Aronson 2005). High school completion rates also differ, with students who live in low-income families leaving high school at four times the rate of their peers in high-income families (National Center for Education Statistics 2006). Ethnicity is also associated with rates of secondary school completion. In

2006, 63.2 percent of all Hispanics between the ages of twenty-five and twenty-nine had completed secondary education, compared with 93.4 percent of whites and 86.3 percent of blacks (National Center for Education Statistics 2007a). For those who complete high school, significant barriers to higher education remain. Of all undergraduate students, only 26 percent are from low-income families (National Center for Education Statistics 2000b) and only 32 percent are racial-ethnic minorities (National Center for Education Statistics 2007b). For marginalized groups, the activation of stereotype threat may well contribute to the widening of these gaps.

Just as negative stereotypes clearly harm the performance of some groups, “positive” stereotypes may confer benefits. As so-called “model minorities,” Asian Americans are stereotyped as “being untroubled and compliant, excelling in math and science and succeeding in spite of racial barriers and discrimination” (Asher 2002, 268). It can be argued that even when valued qualities are posited, stereotyping is not a positive phenomenon. Nevertheless, cultural assumptions touting the skills of ethnic groups such as Asian Americans and Indian Americans may confer a stereotype “boost”. In a study documenting both stereotype boost and threat, Margaret Shih, Todd Pittinsky, and Nalini Ambady (1999) found that Asian American women performed better on a math test when their ethnic identity was made salient, but worse when their gender identity was activated, compared with a control group for whom neither identity was activated.

At best, however, stereotype boost is a highly conditional and relatively limited phenomenon. Unlike Shih and her colleagues (1999), Sapria Cheryan and Galen Bodenhausen (2000) found that focusing Asian American participants’ attention on their ethnicity created difficulties with concentration, not improved test performance. Procedural differences used to make ethnicity salient in these two studies appear to underlie these disparate outcomes. In the Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady analysis (1999), subtle, indirect prompts, such as asking about language use, were used to promote private reflection about one’s ethnicity, whereas Cheryan and Bodenhausen (2000) encouraged participants to focus on public perceptions of their ethnic group. Discussing their findings, they explained:

This focus presumably led them to contemplate the possibility of failing to exhibit the positive quantitative skills commonly expected of Asians. Just as fear of confirming a negative stereotype can undermine performance, so can fear of failing to confirm a positive stereotype. However, the latter effect appears to be limited to conditions in which public expectations of success are salient. (401)

Fear of not living up to widespread public assumptions about “model minorities” appears well founded. Colin Ho, Denise Driscoll, and Danielle Loosbrock (1998) found that a hypothetical Asian American student who performed poorly on math assignments was awarded fewer points by “unmotivated” graders (those who worked quickly or were not instructed on accuracy) than a European American target with identical scores.

These findings not only highlight the potential of stereotypes to enhance or de-

## The Colors of Poverty

flate test performance, but also the importance of examining stereotype boost and threat in terms of multiple rather than single identities. Most empirical studies of stereotype threat and boost examine a single identity, such as race, gender, or class, but people possess multiple intersecting identities. Research examining stereotype boost inadvertently risks reifying monolithic constructions of so-called model minorities if diverse experiences of ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and immigration histories are ignored (Asher 2002).

Many questions remain about the pathways through which stereotypes inhibit or enhance performance. Beyond stereotype threat, subjective understandings of and responses to dominant ideology by marginalized groups need more study. A growing body of ethnographic and qualitative research examines the intersections of race, gender, and class is filling this gap in with literature (Bettie 2000; Fine et al. 2004; Jones 2003; Weis 2003). Socially embedded analytical strategies like these are advantageous because low-income informants-participants are active agents in the construction of identities and beliefs, not passive receptacles of dominant conceptions. As such, beliefs about poverty may emerge as a potential source of shame and humiliation, or a site of critical resistance.

This point is illustrated by two conceptually and methodologically different studies, both of which raise provocative questions about the meanings low-income youth attach to dominant beliefs about poverty. In the first study (Weinger 1998), low-income youth between five and twelve years of age were shown photographs of a rundown house and a suburban style ranch house. They were then asked a series of questions about what they imagined the children and adults who lived in each house were like. Low-income children were acutely aware of class, describing poverty in terms of crisis and hardship: meeting basic survival needs like food and confronting social rejection. Middle class status, by contrast, was described as relatively worry-free. The majority of low-income children spoke about family closeness, strong coping skills, and other positive characteristics when speaking about the poor, yet a small but potentially meaningful percentage of participants talked instead about stereotypical characteristics such as lacking intelligence. These findings highlight the stigmatizing aspects of poverty and, albeit inconclusively, suggest that negative beliefs may be internalized among a minority of the poor.

Constance Flanagan and her colleagues' (1997) study of students attending inner-city (poor), urban ring (blue collar), and suburban schools (affluent) offers an alternative perspective, illustrating the importance of critically examining the context and function of beliefs. They found that inner-city adolescents were more likely than their urban and suburban peers to make dispositional attributions for poverty and wealth. Urban ring and suburban youth were more likely to make structural attributions or to give explanations that included both structural and dispositional causes. Compared to their peers, inner-city youth also perceived the school system as more alienating and reported receiving stronger message from their families about the importance of self-reliance and academic success.

Flanagan and her colleagues conclude that systemic blame poses little threat to

suburban adolescents because institutions tend to work for them, whereas adopting structural explanations could imply limited prospects for those living in economically depressed communities. Emphasis on self-reliance and dispositional explanations can be interpreted as belief that it is "incumbent on the individual to create his or her own success and that those who rely on the system may be disappointed" (Flanagan et al. 1997, 62). As with adults, the adoption of individual-centered explanations may serve an important self-protective function allowing poor adolescents to hold long-range career and education plans in the face of adversity. As these authors observe, "although minority youth from poor neighborhoods may be aware of the system's failures, it may be necessary for them to disregard those failures in order to remain committed to education and the American Dream" (1997, 61).

In sum, the research reviewed here points to the significant impact that dominant ideology and stereotypes have on the poor. It is important to keep in mind, however, that differences in social position or power cannot be rectified through attitudinal change alone. For this reason, researchers must remain focused on the interface of structural inequities and beliefs, attending to the social landscape as closely as they attend to cognitive interpretations of these structures.

## REDUCING PREJUDICE AND STEREOTYPING: POSSIBILITIES AND CHALLENGES

Many attempts have been made to reduce racial prejudice and improve intergroup relations through cognitive restructuring (breaking down "us" versus "them" distinctions or fostering inclusive multiple social identities; see Dovidio, Glick, and Rudman 2005; Oskamp 2000) and enhancing empathy for disadvantaged groups (Batson et al. 1997). Theories of intergroup contact, however, have received the most attention by researchers. At the heart of this body of work is the notion that intergroup contact, if carefully constructed, can reduce negative affect and stereotypes. A number of optimal conditions for successful intergroup contact have been identified, including equal status between the groups, a common intergroup goal, and a context that promotes cooperation (Pettigrew 1998).

The very nature of these conditions belies the difficulty of creating successful intergroup contact situations outside of carefully controlled experiments. Unequal status, for instance, is the very core of race and class inequality: not easily manipulated or controlled in real world situations. For this reason, contact-based interventions are usually tested in readily controllable settings such as the classroom, with improved interpersonal relations as the desired outcome. Thus, the development of interracial friendships is more likely to be the goal of contact-based interventions, and it is a more probable outcome than deep-rooted structural or institutional change. Yet as chapters 2, 8, 10, and 11 of this volume document, persistent inequality is best redressed through structural change. Concern regarding the generalizability of positive attitudes across situations and from individuals to groups raises further questions about the promise of in-

## The Colors of Poverty

tergroup contact, as do critics' claims that ethnic hatred or animosity is not the root problem.

Despite these limitations, positive effects of contact on the reduction of prejudice are well documented by psychological and sociological research (Dovidio, Glick, and Rudman 2005; Pettigrew 1998). Intergroup contact is used as a strategy for attitudinal change in a wide range of everyday settings: desegregated classrooms, university service learning programs that provide opportunities for inter-racial and interclass interactions, and "walk a mile in my shoes" programs that partner welfare recipients with nonpoor community members. Such strategies include learning about the outgroup (Pettigrew 1998) or generating affective ties (McClelland and Linnander 2006). In a large meta-analysis of 515 studies investigating the effects of intergroup contact, Thomas Pettigrew and Linda Tropp (2006) found that greater intergroup contact was associated with lower levels of prejudice. Although the effect sizes of these effects are only small to medium, the large number of samples included in the study make these findings robust.

The positive outcomes associated with intergroup contact are compellingly illustrated through specific examples. For example, in Stephen Wright and Linda Tropp's (2005) study of intergroup contact in classrooms, white children in racially integrated, bilingual classrooms were found to hold more positive attitudes toward Latino children and to select Latino children as best friends. English-only classrooms, whether integrated or segregated, do not show this effect. Clearly, contact alone is not enough for reducing prejudice across all contexts. Tropp (2003) found that even a single experience of prejudice negatively influenced how members of devalued groups felt in intergroup settings and their expectations for future interactions. Perceiving oneself as a target of discrimination reinforced these negative outcomes, and having close relationships with outgroup members facilitated more positive attitudes toward cross-group interactions. These findings are a powerful reminder that contact must be studied from multiple vantage points; though the focus of prejudice reduction efforts necessarily remains on dominant groups, individual and social consequences of contact on marginalized groups should not be overlooked (Tropp and Pettigrew 2005).

Beyond contact-based approaches, targeted, context-specific interventions also show promise, particularly in terms of reducing the negative consequences of stereotyping on marginalized groups. For instance, in two randomized field experiments, Geoffrey Cohen and his colleagues (2006) tested whether completing brief in-class writing assignments reaffirming personal adequacy and self-integrity could lessen the effects of stereotype threat on the academic performance of African American students. This brief exercise was associated with a significant increase in black students' grades, resulting in a 40 percent reduction in the racial achievement gap among study participants. These impressive findings should not be interpreted as either a quick fix or a solution to persistent educational inequities, however. As the researchers note, their findings rest "on an obvious precondition: the existence in the school of adequate material, social, and psychological resources and support to permit and sustain positive academic outcomes" (Cohen et al. 2006, 1309). This interpretation again affirms that attitudes, beliefs,

# Collective Action and Social Change

Stephen C. Wright

## ABSTRACT

Social psychology's primary approach to improving intergroup relations has been prejudice reduction. However, this chapter reviews the discipline's contributions to an alternative approach – collective action and social protest. Informed by Relative Deprivation Theory and rooted in Social Identity Theory, the chapter describes four psychological processes that underpin collective action: collective identity, perceived boundary permeability, feelings of legitimacy/injustice, and collective control (instability/agency). These four emerge through a process of mutual influence to motivate collective action or to steer the individual towards inaction or individual efforts to improve one's personal position. In addition, brief discussions will highlight several recent important additions to the literature, and the chapter concludes by contrasting the psychology of collective action with that of prejudice reduction.

## COLLECTIVE ACTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE

As the title of this section of the handbook – ‘Combating bias’ – reveals, one goal of research and theorizing on prejudice has been to uncover ways of reducing it. An underlying assumption of this work is that reducing individual prejudice will spur broader reductions in social injustice; that improving intergroup attitudes can lead to social change. However, reducing the negative thoughts (stereotypes), attitudes (prejudice), and actions (discrimination) of individuals represents only one potential route to increase social justice. This chapter reviews social

psychology's contribution to an alternative approach focusing on collective action and social protest.

Although both approaches explore intergroup injustice and both are plainly implicated in major intergroup relations theories (e.g., Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987), research in the two areas has developed quite independently (Wright & Lubensky, 2009). Also, collective action has received far less attention than has prejudice reduction from social psychologists (at least those working in the dominant tradition of ‘psychological social psychology’ rather than ‘sociological social psychology’). Nonetheless, social psychology's focus on how the

social context influences individual psychological processes has provided important insights on the processes that fuel and direct or undermine participation in collective action (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Reicher, 2004; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008; Wright, 2001a, for reviews).

Social psychology has increasingly settled on a definition that locates collective action in the individual participant's intentions. Thus, a group member engages in *collective action* any time they are *acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group* (Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990). This definition is consistent with the recognition that human action can be intergroup as well as interpersonal (Tajfel, 1982). Interpersonal behaviour results when the self and the other are perceived in terms of their unique personal identities (characteristics that distinguish us as unique and separate from others). However, intergroup behavior occurs when the self and the others are perceived in terms of their collective identities (their memberships in different groups). Collective action is a specific case of intergroup behaviour that is strategic in its intent to maintain or improve the ingroup's position, and can be contrasted with individual action, which involves efforts to improve one's personal position.

The issue of definition is not trivial. First, this definition differs from perspectives that describe collective action as necessarily involving people acting in concert and in a similar way. The current definition sees collective action as based on neither the number of participants nor the specific content or eventual outcome of the action. Thus, collective action can be engaged in by a single individual as long as the intent is to create change for the collective. Conversely, joint action by a large group where each individual is motivated by personal self-interest would not qualify as collective action.

This has important implications for several theories of collective action participation. For example, Stürmer and Simon's (2004) Dual-Pathway Model proposes that one pathway to participation results from three motives

(Klandermans, 1997). One of these motives is the possibility of positive change in ingroup status (the *collective motive*). However, the other two broad classes of motives focus on the personal concerns about admiration or ridicule by meaningful others, and direct personal costs or rewards, like loss of time or money, getting hurt, or having fun. Hornsey and colleagues (2006) add another personal concern that can motivate participation; the desire to publicly express one's personal values. Thus, one might participate in a group action to meet personal goals or improve one's personal situation. However, the more participation is motivated by these individualistic concerns, the less it is actually *collective* and the less it meets the current definition of collective action.

The current analysis also differs in important ways from the sociological perspectives which tie collective action to participation in *social movements*. A social movement represents a specific form of collective action, marked by sustained and organized action by a fairly large group of people (see McAdam, McCarthy & Zald, 1996). Although an analysis of collective action, as defined here, is clearly relevant to understanding participation in social movements, the present analysis also considers episodic, normative, and spontaneous actions, and action engaged in by single individuals or small groups. At the same time, this analysis will not consider the additional specific conditions and resources necessary to build and sustain a social movement.

## BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Group-based inequality is a near ubiquitous feature of social life. Some groups hold positions of power and advantage while others are stigmatized and disadvantaged. Although some members of dominant groups feel guilt and even outrage about their privilege and may support efforts to reduce inequality (see Leach, Iyer & Pedersen, 2006), the dominant response of those with privilege is to defend it (see Morton, Postmes,

Haslam & Hornsey, 2008; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Tajfel, 1982). Even advantaged group members who support social change are often inspired by appeals from the subordinated group. Thus, it is largely the province of the disadvantaged to initiate social change. Although illegitimate subordination is almost always met with some kind of resistance (Reicher, 2004; Reicher & Haslam, 2006), dramatic rapid social change often results from disruptive collective actions.

Most early discussions of collective action reflected sentiments made famous in Le Bon's (1895/1948) analysis of crowd behavior. Group action was described as devolution into irrational, instinctive, antisocial behaviour, with participants losing the self-control that constrained individuals acting alone. Although most social psychological analyses have abandoned this view (see Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Reicher, 2004), it remains common in popular representations of social protests and political demonstrations.

Research dating back to the classic study of Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star and Williams (1947) demonstrates that rather than *objective* disadvantage, it is the *subjective* experience of disadvantage that best predicts dissatisfaction and subsequent action. This recognition lead to the development of Relative Deprivation Theory (see Walker & Smith, 2002) and a focus on social comparison as the engine driving collective action. That is, assertive action on behalf of our group results from the feelings of deprivation that accompany comparisons we make with better-off outgroups (e.g., Mummendey, Kessler, Klink & Mielke, 1999; Smith & Ortiz, 2002). Research on Relative Deprivation Theory also explored the cognition/emotion distinction, showing that collective action participation is more strongly influenced by emotions like anger, frustration, and resentment that emerge from feelings of injustice, than by the mere recognition of group deprivation and cold evaluations of injustice (e.g., Smith & Ortiz, 2002, see also van Zomeren, et al., 2008).

However, the most significant advance in the social psychology of collective action was provided by Tajfel and Turner's (1979)

Social Identity Theory (SIT). Although the *Social Identity approach* and theories like Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; Turner, et al., 1987) that emerged from it have had a powerful impact on a range of topics, describing the psychological underpinnings of collective action was a primary theme of the original theory. SIT continues to provide a clear and coherent framework on the topic and has inspired numerous valuable elaborations over the last 30 years.

## **ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF KNOWLEDGE**

While group-based inequality is nearly universal, direct collective action is relatively rare. The explanation for this can be found in the complexity of psychological mechanisms that must align to overcome the barriers to direct action.

### ***The psychological determinants of collective action***

This section of the chapter will describe an organizing framework that is based in SIT, and includes the key components of much of the theorizing and research that has followed (see Stürmer & Simon, 2004; van Zomeren et al., 2008; Wright 2001a). In this framework, collective action is seen to emerge from the dynamic interplay between four critical psychological processes. The first is *collective identity*. By definition, taking action on the ingroup's behalf requires that the actor have a sense that membership in the group represents a meaningful aspect of the self. However, in addition to this sense of collective identity, the decision to engage in collective action is also impacted by the individual's assessment and the individual's assessment of three *socio-structural variables*.

Since one response to membership in a disadvantaged group is to ignore group interests and attempt to improve one's personal position, collective action is much more likely when individuals are unable or unwilling to move across the boundaries between

the groups. Thus, *perceived boundary impermeability* is a key predictor of collective action. Both Relative Deprivation Theory and SIT describe the *assessment of the legitimacy* of the ingroup's lower status and the resulting feelings of injustice when that position is thought to be illegitimate as a critical determinant of collective action. Finally, SIT proposes that collective action is most likely to emerge when the illegitimate status differences between the groups are perceived to be *unstable*. Others have expanded on the concept of instability utilizing the concepts of collective efficacy (see van Zomeren et al., 2008) or collective control (see Wright, 2001a), but it appears that endorsement of collective action is often associated with the belief that meaningful change is possible. This section reviews the literature on each of these four critical psychological processes, but it will also describe ways that they interact in a dynamic and complex relationship of mutual influence.

### *Collective identity*

By definition, action on the ingroup's behalf requires recognition of one's group membership and some sense that membership represents a meaningful aspect of the self. That is, the group must provide a meaningful collective identity. When this collective identity becomes the primary self-representation, a process of depersonalization occurs such that *me* as independent individual is replaced with *me* as interchangeable exemplar. My thoughts and actions now reflect my understanding of the normative values, beliefs and actions of the ingroup. This change should not be misunderstood as some kind of loss of self. Collective identities can be experienced as profoundly meaningful self-representations. What changes is not the degree to which the self is meaningful, but which meaningful self – the collective or the personal self – guides thought and action. Collective action, therefore, requires that the relevant collective identity eclipse personal identity as the current self-representation.

The process by which this happens is constrained not only by the strength of one's

personal identity, but also by the strength of other competing collective identities that provide alternative self-representations. Not only are there numerous domains of collective self-representation (e.g., tribal, political, national, occupational), within each are numerous levels, including smaller *subcategories* and more inclusive *superordinate* categories (Turner et al., 1987). At times, identification with subcategories can undermine interest in collective action, while at other times it enhances interest. For example, Condor (1986) found that women who identified with the subgroup 'traditional women' showed little interest in collective action on behalf of women. Conversely, Stürmer and Simon (2004) showed that identification with the subgroup 'gay activists' was a better predictor of action to advance gay rights than was identification with the broader gay community.

Self-representation as a member of a superordinate group that includes both the disadvantaged and advantaged groups can also influence collective action. Encouraging members of two groups to identify with a superordinate category can reduce intergroup prejudice (see Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). For example, inter-ethnic prejudice can be reduced when members of different ethnic groups focus on their shared national identity. However, this can also reduce collective action by the disadvantaged group (Wright & Lubensky, 2009), as the superordinate national identity replaces identification with the disadvantaged ethnic group.

A collective identity alone, however, is not sufficient to inspire collective action. As defined here, collective action represents a specific form of group-based behavior. It is a response to perceived group disadvantage or threat – collective action involves efforts to improve the relative status of the ingroup or to ward off perceived threats to the status of the ingroup. Thus, collective action requires the recognition that the ingroup is threatened or disadvantaged in some way. This recognition often results from a process of group-based social comparison where the ingroup's current situation is compared to that of a higher

status outgroup or to the ingroup at a time when the current threat did not exist. The discussion that follows considers first how it is that one specific ingroup can become one's primary self-representation, and second how social comparison processes can lead us to perceive that collective identity as threatened, or not.

Tajfel (1982) described two factors: the degree to which current environmental cues make that self-representation salient, and the chronic accessibility of the group membership for the particular individual. Self-Categorization Theory (SCT; e.g., Turner et al., 1987) describes these factors in terms of category *fit* and *accessibility*.

**Fit** Fit represents the degree to which a given categorization simplifies and organizes the social context. Thus, a given self-representation will become salient to the degree that the situation makes that collective identity *apparent* and *useful*. For example, many highly-publicized examples of disruptive collective action appear to follow 'trigger events.' These events are seldom the true *cause* of subsequent protest (see Klandermans, 1997). However, when group leaders or the media *frame* these events in intergroup terms, as a case of collective injustice, this heightens the salience of the relevant collective identity. Thus, *consciousness raising* (e.g., Taylor and McKirnan, 1984) or *identity framing* (Gamson, 1992) involves (through political rhetoric or social action) efforts to frame negative events as examples of collective injustice.

**Accessibility** The relevance of a given collective identity is also influenced by its accessibility in the individual's mind. Accessibility can be *temporarily* increased by frequent use, or when that self-representation is relevant to current goals. However, *chronic* accessibility results when the individual strongly *identifies* with the group; when the group has enduring psychological significance for the individual. Chronically accessible ingroups can become the dominant

self-representation in a wide array of circumstances.

Ingroup identification has been shown to be critical prerequisite to collective action among a wide range of groups, including ethnic minorities in the United States (Deaux, Reid, Martin & Bikmen, 2006; Wright & Tropp, 2002), the women's movement (Condor, 1986), the Gray Panthers, the fat acceptance and the gay rights movements (Stürmer & Simon, 2004), union members (e.g., Blader, 2007), citizen groups (Drury & Riecher, 2005), and laboratory created groups (Blair & Jost, 2003). As summarized nicely by Doosje and Ellemers (1997), "'die-hard" members are more predisposed to act in terms of the group, and make sacrifices for it, than are "fair-weather" members' (p. 358).

**Fit and accessibility** Although the conceptual distinction has proven useful, fit and accessibility are intimately related. For example, enduring features of the intergroup structure influence a group's ability to attract strong identification. A group's relative numerical size, for example, influences its current salience and ability to attract identification. Minority status (e.g., being the lone women in a room full of men) can make group membership temporarily salient. Also, a group whose size allows it to simultaneously meet competing needs for differentiation from others (distinctiveness) and inclusion with others (belongingness) can attract strong identification (see Brewer, 2009).

A group's relative status also influences its capacity to attract identification. Generally, we seek to be part of groups that compare well with other groups in order to enhance our self-esteem. Thus, high status groups can attract strong identification, creating a dilemma. Groups most in need of disruptive collective actions – low-status groups – contribute less positively to self-esteem, making them less able to attract strong identification from members. However, it is clear that low status does not preclude the possibility of strong ingroup identification. Schmitt and Branscombe (2002) provide compelling evidence that perceiving

# Chelsea Vowel writes...

“If we think of territorial acknowledgments as sites of *potential disruption*, they can be *transformative acts* that to some extent undo Indigenous erasure. I believe this is true as long as these acknowledgments discomfit [or make uncomfortable] both those speaking and hearing the words. The fact of Indigenous presence *should force non-Indigenous peoples to confront their own place on these lands.*”

native-land.ca

# Celebrating indigenization

The story of λugʷaləs K'ala'ask Shaw

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u2MAEJVA3Hk>

# Celebrating indigenization

- Indigenous art exhibits in the local community:

<https://vancouversun.com/entertainment/local-arts/art-scene-exhibits-shine-spotlights-on-everything-from-climate-change-to-indigenous-matriarchs>



Understory I, by artist Stephanie Taylor

# Class overview

- 1. Introductions**
2. Course Housekeeping
3. What do we mean by Intergroup Relations?
4. What do conversations about intergroup relations get wrong?



# Introductions

Instructor:


Maitland Waddell

Teaching Assistants:

Marissa Traversa

Rashmi Weerasinghe







# Office hours

- Maitland's office hours  
**Monday @ 12-1:30 PM** on Zoom (link on Canvas and in syllabus)  
**Wednesday @ 5:30-6 PM** (after lecture)
- Rashmi's office hours  
**Thursday @ 9:30-10:30 AM** on Zoom and by appointment only
- Marissa's office hours  
**Tuesday @ 2:00-3:00 PM** on Zoom and by appointment only

**All Zoom links and scheduling can be found on the *Canvas* homepage**



# Office hours (cont'd)

- I am available this week (after today's class). Rashmi and Marissa will begin next week.
- Rashmi will be grading the Project Plans and Midterms
  - Visiting Rashmi during the **first half** of the term may be particularly useful
- Marissa will be grading the Class Projects
  - Visiting Marissa during the **second half** of the term may be particularly useful

**In my experience, a highly effective way to increase your chances  
of success in the course!**



# Class overview

- ~~1. Introductions~~
- 2. Course Housekeeping**
3. What do we mean by Intergroup Relations?
4. What do conversations about intergroup relations get wrong?




# Canvas

- Things you'll find on the Canvas page include...
  1. Course syllabus and policies
  2. Class Project (next week)
  3. Office hour information (including links to schedule appointments)
  4. Announcements and reminders
  5. Weekly modules (lecture slides, other materials)
  6. Links to Course Readings
  7. Submissions and grades
  8. Other helpful resources




# Monday announcements

- Each Monday I will make an announcement on *Canvas* that will summarize important deadlines, assignments, etc.
- Please enable *Canvas* to send you email updates of these announcements...
  1. Login to *Canvas* and click your Profile icon (icon with your picture at the top of the ribbon on the left hand side)
  2. Select “Notifications”
  3. Ensure that the “Announcement” row is set to “Notify immediately” in the column with your primary SFU email address



# Class readings and media

- Academic articles
  - Accessible on Canvas under Course Readings
  - 5 in total, most in the first half of the course
  - Will be tested
- Textbook: Eberhardt, J. L. (2020). *Biased: Uncovering the hidden prejudice that shapes what we see, think and do*
  - Why this book?
  - Second half of the course (but you can certainly start now!)
  - Can find it for cheap on Amazon
  - Will be tested
- Other media
  - Videos, podcasts, columns, etc.
  - May be asked to watch/read/listen to before class



# Course topics

- First half (weeks 1-7): foundational knowledge
  - Course themes and the nature of the self
  - Categorization, stereotyping and prejudice
  - The social identity approach and collective action
  - Privilege, inclusion and exclusion
- Second half (weeks 9-13): social movements
  - #BlackLivesMatter
  - Political polarization
  - #MeToo movement
  - Environmental movement
- Will finish with a lecture of prejudice reduction



# Lecture slides

- Usually, a **pre-class version** will be available Wednesday at noon (before class)
  - Some materials may not be included in this version
  - Some materials may change
  - Some material may be removed *after* lecture (i.e. the stuff I don't get to)
- I will post **final versions** of the slides on Canvas after class



# Lecture recordings

- You really should be in class!
- You must request access to the recorded lecture each week by:
  - ***If you were in class:*** Signing the “lecture request form” at the end of each class
  - ***If you missed class:*** Email Maitland with your request, including a brief explanation why you are requesting the recording
- If you request the recording, you will access it on Canvas
  - Select “Groups” tab on Canvas
  - Select the Group for the appropriate week and the audio file will be available as an announcement
- **Today's lecture will be available to everyone**



# Email guidelines

- All email correspondences **must come from your SFU email**
- Check if the answer to your question is in the syllabus or on Canvas first
- Please do not send separate emails asking the same question to more than one person (it is okay to CC Maitland on emails to TAs)
- Please include “PSYC363:” in the subject line
- Allow up to 3 business days (Monday-Friday) for a reply
- Please make your question specific
- All questions about course policy, extensions, regrading requests, etc. must be directed to Maitland ([mwaddell@sfu.ca](mailto:mwaddell@sfu.ca))



# Learning environment

- You will regularly be asked to engage in active learning (although less so today...)
- This course deals with some sensitive (and often personal) issues
- Negative feelings are normal. Try to engage with an open mind. It is sometimes good to feel uncomfortable.
- We need to show respect for boundaries and differences in life experience.
- Be patient and assume others have a genuine desire to learn
- But also raise your voice if you have concerns! Sharing your knowledge can enlighten and educate others.
- No one should feel unsafe, and we should recognize privilege and power
- I am always willing to talk (in-person or otherwise) if you have any concerns



# Diversity, equity and inclusion in the classroom

- Anonymous grading
- Opportunities for anonymous feedback (muddiest point, mid-semester check-in survey)
- I will sometimes ask you to engage in discussions with your peers about who you are, where you come from, and what you believe
- I focus a chunk of lecture content discussing real-world issues and movements that have real-world impacts
- I see no difference between mental health issues and physical health issues
- I provide both in-person and online options for office hours



# Inclusivity and accommodations

- We seek to make the course accessible to all students
  - Religious accommodation:  
<https://www.sfu.ca/humanrights/guides-and-protocols/religious-accommodation.html>
  - Centre for Accessible Learning  
<https://www.sfu.ca/students/accessible-learning.html>
  - Please talk to Maitland about any of these issues as early as possible to ensure you will receive proper accommodation



# Requests for special circumstances and concessions

- Please set the course syllabus for more information
- **University's policy**

“Student’s who miss examinations because of illness or for compassionate reasons are required to **obtain sufficient supporting documentation** in order to obtain consideration”
- ***If you miss a test, exam or deadline for medical reasons:*** contact Maitland as soon as possible
- ***If you believe you have a legitimate non-medical reason:***
  - Discuss with Maitland ASAP (prior to deadline)
  - You will need to provide some kind of supporting documentation



# Student resources (on Canvas)

- Under “Modules”
- Resources include:
  - Student Learning Commons
  - WriteAway
  - Centre for Accessible Learning
  - Health and counselling services
  - My student support program
  - BC help line for post-secondary students

If there are any others you think should be included, please let me know



15 minute break



# Class overview

- ~~1. Introductions~~
- ~~2. Course Housekeeping~~
- 3. What do we mean by Intergroup Relations?**
4. What do conversations about intergroup relations get wrong?

# What do we mean by “Intergroup Relations”?

**The scientific study of how our thoughts, feelings, and behaviour are influenced by the groups we belong to, and how people from different groups relate to, think about, and treat one another.**

We try to answer the questions...

- **When, why and how** do people think, feel and act as a member of a group (“us”)?
- **When, why and how** do we see and interact with others as group members (“them”)?
- What are the consequences of this for the relations between groups and the experiences of individual group members?


**Central claim in PSYC 363: much of how we think, feel and act is informed not only by who we are as individuals, but also by the groups we belong to and identify with.**

# Intergroup relations occur when...

...people think, feel and act as a member of a group ("us") and interact with others as group members ("them").

Thus, intergroup relations are *psychological*. This implies that...

1. Interactions between members of different groups are not always *intergroup* interactions
2. Intergroup relations do not always involve large groups (can occur between two people!)
3. ***Power of the situation***





# Class overview

- 1. ~~Introductions~~**
- 2. ~~Course Housekeeping~~**
- 3. ~~What do we mean by Intergroup Relations?~~**
- 4. ~~What do conversations about intergroup relations get wrong?~~**

# What is wrong with popular discussions of intergroup relations?

- Intergroup relations are not always negative and extreme



# What is wrong with popular discussions of intergroup relations?

- Not just about broad societal categories (ethnicity, gender, etc.)



# What is wrong with popular discussions of intergroup relations?

- Popular discussions overemphasize the stability of intergroup relations



Then...






Now

# What is wrong with popular discussions of intergroup relations?

- Popular discussions often fail to adequately define concepts


# What is wrong with popular discussions of intergroup relations?

- Popular discussions do not distinguish between correlation and causation




# What is wrong with popular discussions of intergroup relations?

- Popular discussions lack *complexity*
  - Complexity in *identities*
  - Complexity in *psychological processes*




# Complexity: Multiple causes and their relative importance

- What causes prejudice?




# Complexity: Moderation/context

- What factors might influence the impact of parental influence on children's levels of prejudice?



# Complexity: Mediation

- Why might positive cross-group contact cause reductions in prejudice?



# Week 1: In-class activity

- “Think-Pair-Share”
  1. Think about the question and answer on your own for 4 minutes
  2. Pair with someone next to you and discuss your answers for another 4 minutes
  3. Share your answers with the class (if you like!)
- Most in-class activities will be done on *Canvas*...
  1. Login to *Canvas* and select PSYC 363
  2. Navigate to “Assignments” using the list of shortcuts on the left side of the screen
  3. Navigate to the “In-class activities” module and select “Week 1: In-class activity”
  - 4a. If you are completing the activity on *Canvas*, select “Text Entry” and type your answer into the box.
  - 4b. If you are completing the activity on paper, take a picture of what you wrote and upload it using the “File Upload” option (and by no later than 6 PM today)

# Week 1: In-class activity (cont'd)

- By yourself and for the next four minutes, consider the following relationship:

**There is a positive relationship between how much work experience someone has and their starting salary at a new job**

- Answer the following questions:
  - Which variable(s) might MEDIATE this relationship (i.e. explain WHY/HOW this relationship exists)?
  - Which variable(s) might MODERATE this relationship (i.e. act upon this relationship to change its direction/strength)?

# Week 1: In-class activity (cont'd)

- Now pair up with somebody next to you, and discuss your answers
  - Take another four minutes
  - If needed, groups of three are fine
  - Ask questions! Make sure your partner can provide a solid justification for why they indicated a given variable as a mediator/moderator

**Is anyone brave enough to share their answers?**

# Muddiest point

Instructions:

1. Login to *Canvas* and select PSYC 363
2. Navigate to “Quizzes” using the list of shortcuts on the left side of the screen
3. Navigate to “Surveys” and select the “Muddiest point” survey for the appropriate week (Week 1)
4. Take five minutes to complete the three questions

**And remember, your responses are anonymous**

1

*by 3 2*

---

(3.11K)

**Word count:** 453

**Character count:** 2731

The civilizations of North America were profoundly influenced by their Mexican and South American counterparts, as seen in their architectural structures, artistic creations, ceremonial practices, and trade networks.

One can observe this in the construction of ball courts in North America, which are remarkably similar to those found in Mexico. These courts were likely more than just sporting venues, serving as communal spaces for various rituals, possibly including dances.

Another significant architectural influence can be seen in the mound-building practices. The Mound Builders of North America, for instance, constructed large earthworks that may have been influenced by similar structures in Mesoamerican cultures. These mounds served various ceremonial and social functions, further indicating cultural exchange.

Art forms also exhibit this influence. North American cultures incorporated elements like copper bells and stone mirrors, likely acquired through trade with Mexico. The depiction of tropical birds such as macaws in their art suggests a connection with South American regions, possibly facilitated by trade.

The presence of detailed mosaic artworks in North American cultures further underscores this influence, reflecting a shared artistic tradition with their southern neighbors, likely influenced by trade exchanges.

These cultural elements paint a picture of a period marked by rich intercultural interactions, vibrant trade networks, and shared practices that significantly shaped the societies of the time, including the remarkable Mound Builders

The colonial era ushered in a period of significant upheaval for the indigenous communities of the Northwest Coast, with profound implications for their artistic traditions.

Firstly, the marginalization of these communities, brought about by British colonial rule and settlement policies, disrupted their socio-economic structures and severed their deep-rooted connections with the land. This disconnection from their natural environment, a vital source of inspiration and materials for their art, led to a shift in the content and form of their artistic expressions. The devastating impact of diseases like smallpox, introduced by the colonizers, resulted in a tragic loss of life. This not only disrupted the continuity of artistic traditions due to the loss of skilled artisans but also led to the erosion of cultural knowledge, as the transmission of artistic skills to younger generations was severely impacted.

Secondly, the forced assimilation policies, such as the establishment of residential schools and the banning of potlatches, resulted in a devastating effects. These policies aimed to replace indigenous cultural practices with those of the colonizers, leading to a significant decline in traditional artistic practices.

Lastly, the commercialization of indigenous art, often in the form of "tourist" art, while providing a means for artists to sustain their craft, also risked diluting the cultural significance of their art forms. Despite these challenges, the indigenous communities

have shown remarkable resilience, finding innovative ways to preserve and adapt their artistic traditions.

1

---

ORIGINALITY REPORT

---

0  
%

SIMILARITY INDEX

0  
%

INTERNET SOURCES

0  
%

PUBLICATIONS

0  
%

STUDENT PAPERS

---

PRIMARY SOURCES

---

Exclude quotes Off

Exclude bibliography Off

Exclude matches Off

## *The Social Psychology of Cultural Diversity: Social Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination*

S T E P H E N C . W R I G H T A N D D O N A L D M . T A Y L O R

Interaction among different cultural, national, and religious groups has always been an integral part of human social life. Dramatically, however, patterns of immigration, emigration, and the explosion in the refugee population, not to mention travel as well as recent changes in the social mobility of members of traditionally disadvantaged groups, and efforts to reduce segregation, have led to unprecedented group-based diversity in many societies. Those who 'celebrate diversity' see in this an opportunity for innovation and societal growth. However, the rise of ultranationalistic, right-wing organizations makes it clear that diversity is not without its opponents. Nonetheless, concerns about people's thoughts, feelings, judgments, and actions towards members of other groups have become highly relevant to the day-to-day lives of an increasing percentage of the world's population.

Concern for the suffering created by intolerance, hatred, and discrimination has always played a major role in motivating social psychological work in intergroup relations. Thus, it is not surprising that our present unprecedented diversity coincides with a proliferation of research and theory on the role that group memberships play in our thoughts, feelings, and actions. Managing the relations between groups in a complex, diverse society has become one of our truly great challenges. It is certainly not the intention of this chapter to provide definitive answers to the many challenges posed by societal diversity; however, we do attempt to describe some of what social psychological work on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination has contributed to our understanding of the experiences of both societally advantaged and disadvantaged groups.

### STEREOTYPES, PREJUDICE, AND RELATED CONCEPTS: DEFINING TERMS

Although stereotypes were first described as 'pictures in the head' by Lippmann in 1922, Sumner's (1906) earlier discussion of ethnocentrism clearly presages the concept. Prejudice, as a construct, has been around for considerably longer. Over the years, numerous definitions and conceptualizations of the terms have been offered. Moreover, the recent rapid proliferation of research and theory has introduced many new terms and led to wide variability in the conceptualization of stereotypes and prejudice. There are lively debates about the benefits of one perspective over the other and about the connections and relationships between perspectives. These debates reveal the intellectual excitement that pervades the field, and have led to some conceptual refinement and to a more detailed understanding of this complex problem. However, they can also leave us confused about what we are talking about. At times, it seems that we may be 'talking past each other' because we have different definitions or understandings of the terms we are using. Thus, it is worthwhile to consider definitions seriously.

We begin our analysis with a careful description of terms. *Stereotypes*, for our purposes, are primarily cognitive and are defined as *the beliefs, shared by members of one group, about the shared characteristics of another group*. *Prejudice* is a *socially shared judgment or evaluation of the group including the feelings (affect) associated with that judgment*. These are distinct but obviously related concepts, and we will revisit the relationship between stereotypes and prejudice later. However, we will also consider stereotypes and prejudices together as associated components of a more overriding orientation or predisposition towards the group that we will label *intergroup attitudes* (see Esses et al., 1993). We need to draw attention to a number of points about these definitions that we believe to be pivotal, including the evaluative overtones, their socially shared feature, and their relationship to intergroup relations.

#### **The valence of stereotypes and prejudice**

None of our definitions contain information about the evaluative direction of the beliefs, judgments, or orientations. Many definitions of stereotypes and prejudice reflect the strong link that these concepts have had to the study of ethnic and racial groups. This link resulted in a near exclusive focus on derogatory characterizations and feelings directed at out-group members. Thus, most definitions of stereotypes and prejudice have been limited to negative thoughts and feelings. Recently, however, there is a growing recognition that while intergroup conflict and in-group bias may be common, it is useful to consider the processes of categorization and stereotyping as normal and even adaptive (see Chapter 19, this volume; Fiske, 1998; Oakes, 2001; Tajfel, 1981; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). Much of the credit for this goes to the introduction and subsequent development of social-identity and self-categorization theories (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner et al., 1987). Despite a continued overwhelming focus on their negative side (see Oakes, 2001; Oakes and Haslam, 2001), most social psychological accounts now recognize that stereotypes need not be negative, maladaptive, faulty, or irrational.

Prejudice, however, has not fared so well. Many definitions still imply that prejudice is ‘unfair’, ‘unjustified’, or ‘irrational’. Most definitions maintain the idea of antipathy, containing phrases such as ‘negative feelings’, ‘negative attitudes’, and ‘derogatory social attitudes’ (noteworthy exceptions, Brewer and Kramer, 1985; Tajfel, 1982). However, we believe that there is much to be gained by suspending our own evaluation of prejudice as well. Our judgments and feelings about an out-group can be neutral or, indeed, positive, and, to date, social psychology has seemed uninterested and thus unable to account for these cases. Nor do we agree with those who recognize that out-group evaluations and feelings can be positive, but dismiss favorable out-group orientations as unimportant and unworthy of attention (e.g., Brown, 1995). If one of the goals of our discipline is to promote intergroup harmony, would it not be useful to recognize that harmony may be as much the result of positive judgments of and emotions towards the out-group, as conflict is about negative judgments and emotions?

In addition, while our focus has tended to be on attitudes about an out-group, it is clear that we also hold beliefs and make judgments about our in-groups. However, while the concept of in-group stereotypes (self-stereotypes) has become part of the modern social psychology parlance (see Chapter 19), the evaluation and emotional reactions towards one’s own group are seldom considered in association with attitudes towards the out-group. Concepts such as ethnocentrism or in-group derogation are seldom considered relevant to discussions of ‘prejudice’.

Certainly, our analysis of stereotyping and prejudice will be dominated by discussions of the negative side simply because this has been the focus of the vast majority of social psychological inquiry. There is simply more to report about this side. However, on occasion, we will provide a more balanced approach.

## **Stereotypes and prejudice as social phenomena**

Our definition of stereotypes and prejudices portrays them as group-based thoughts and feelings. Thus, our focus here is on the ways in which these particular thoughts and feelings are uniquely *social* phenomena.

### *Stereotypes and prejudice involve depersonalization*

First and foremost, the target of stereotypes and prejudice is a social category. Thus, stereotypes and prejudice involve a depersonalized view of the other (see Chapter 19); members of the target group are seen not as individual persons, but as representatives of the category. Thus, stereotypes and prejudices are held about groups and are applied to individuals not as unique individuals, but rather as interchangeable exemplars of the category.

### *Stereotypes and prejudice are socially shared*

Stereotypes and prejudices clearly reside in the heads of individuals (see Chapter 5) and there are certainly idiosyncratic differences in the specific content of individual people’s beliefs about a given social group (see Esses et al., 1993). However, the most important intergroup attitudes are those that are shared widely by members of a society (Gardner, 1973; Lalonde and Gardner, 1989; Moscovici, 1981; Taylor, 1981; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994; see also Claire and Fiske, 1998). Intergroup attitudes gain their importance and potency because these beliefs are not only well known (Devine, 1989) but are shared within, and at times across, social groups (Banaji and Greenwald, 1994; Haslam et al., 2002). In this way, stereotypes and prejudice become part of our shared understanding of who ‘we’ and ‘they’ are.

Of course, there are individual differences in people’s beliefs about groups and even consensually shared intergroup attitudes change. Conversely, there is considerable agreement and consistency, not only across people but also across time (Gilbert, 1951; Karlins et al., 1969). This consistency results, in part, because the content of stereotypes and the judgments of relevant groups become embedded in the culture of the society (see Allport, 1954). This cultural ‘knowledge’ becomes institutionalized in the norms and practices of a society (Jones, 1996; Pettigrew, 1958, 1991), and is transferred to others through the usual socialization channels – parents, schools, books, the media, and other social institutions. Intergroup attitudes become embedded in language (see Giles, 1977; LeCouteur and Augoustinos, 2001; Ng and Bradac, 1993), not only in the things we say but more subtly in the patterns and style of our communications (e.g., DePaulo and Coleman, 1986; Maass and Arcuri, 1992; Wenneker, Wigboldus, & Spears, 2005).

In addition, intergroup attitudes are perpetuated and spread through daily cross-group interactions between individuals. Ridgeway’s (e.g., 2001; Ridgeway and Balkwell, 1997) theory and research describe how real group differences in status and power lead to shared expectations about individual group members. These expectations structure daily cross-group interactions

APPEARED IN: M. A. HOGG & J. COOPER (EDS.), *THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONCISE STUDENT EDITION*. SAGE, 2007.

between individuals, and repeated participation in these interactions both confirms and strengthens the initial beliefs and transmits them to others through their participation in the interactions. Thus, daily participation in ‘normal’ social life both solidifies and transmits intergroup attitudes.

While the socially shared nature of intergroup attitudes was a key component of social psychology’s early investigations (see Brigham, 1971; Katz and Braly, 1933), it has often been ignored and even denied. The ‘social’ roots became lost as interest turned sharply to the study of individual cognitive processes (e.g., Hamilton et al., 1994; see also Stangor and Schaller, 1996; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994). However, if stereotypes were simply the idiosyncratic beliefs of individuals, they would represent relatively unimportant societal phenomena (see Haslam et al., 2002). It is precisely because intergroup attitudes come to be consensually shared that they form the basis for conflict or cooperation between groups. Thus, our definition of both stereotypes and prejudice includes the term ‘socially shared’, and our analysis focuses on their collective or consensual nature.

### *Stereotypes and prejudice are intimately connected to intergroup relations*

The third sense in which intergroup attitudes can be understood to be group-based phenomena is their direct connection to intergroup relations. Stereotype content and group evaluations emerge rather directly from the nature of the relationship between the relevant groups. This idea has been a key element of the most influential perspectives in intergroup relations (e.g., Allport, 1954; Brewer and Campbell, 1976; Sherif, 1966; Tajfel and Turner, 1979), and is basic to a number of more recent influential models (e.g., Esses, et al., 2005; Eagly, 1987; Glick and Fiske; 2001a; Jost and Banaji, 1994; Major, 1994; Turner et al., 1987). Stated simply, we might expect that when intergroup relations are harmonious and cooperative, we are likely to see the out-group as having traits, beliefs, and attitudes that are compatible (although not identical) to those of our in-group. If, however, there is intergroup conflict, we are more likely to construct a view of the out-group that is decidedly negative.

Once formed, intergroup attitudes are by no means benign. They provide prescriptions for our interactions with out-group members. That is, when category memberships are salient, people’s individual interactions with out-group members will be determined by their stereotypes and prejudices. Because these attitudes are widely shared, there will be considerable consistency in cross-group interactions (e.g., Oakes et al., 1994; Reynolds and Turner, 2001; see also Claire and Fiske, 1998). Thus, in our simplified example, once we see the out-group as having complementary traits and evaluate them positively, we are likely to initiate cooperative, friendly interactions with out-group members. If we describe the out-group as having undesirable traits, we are likely to avoid out-group members or initiate competitive or even hostile interactions.

### **Summary**

We believe this lengthy discussion of definitions goes beyond simply making the reader aware of what we mean by stereotypes and prejudice, to illuminate some of the controversies in this area. Our definitions are quite different from those of others who focus primarily, or exclusively, on the intrapersonal processes associated with perceptions of groups. Our focus is on the *social* nature of stereotypes

and prejudice; how they serve as socially shared (collective) representations of groups, how they are guided by the existing intergroup relationship, and how they assist in structuring and perpetuating that relationship. In addition, our definitions give full recognition of the possibility of intergroup harmony by removing the exclusive focus on derogatory characteristics and negative evaluations found in most definitions.

## **STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE AS THE PRODUCT OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS**

Stereotypes and prejudice owe much of their content and intensity to the nature of the extant relationship between the groups. Initially, we presented this idea simply with the characterization that intergroup harmony would be associated with positive intergroup attitudes and conflict with negative attitudes. In fact, the association is more complex. In this section, we consider some of the contextual factors that can influence the content, strength, and valence of intergroup attitudes.

### **Stereotypes as explanations**

One key function of social groups is they provide structure to, and explanation for, the events in our world (e.g., Chapter 19, this volume; Hogg, 2000; McGarty, Yzerbyt, & Spears, 2002). In order to serve this function, group members must be seen to share attributes that explain their common behaviors and the treatment they receive from others (Oakes et al., 1994; Tajfel, 1981). Thus, real group differences (often the result of socioeconomic factors) provide the foundation or ‘soil’ for stereotype content. For example, low-status groups are often described as ‘lazy’, ‘stupid’, or ‘evil’. These characterizations provide an explanation for their low status as well as for the poor treatment they receive from others.

This general idea is consistent with earlier ‘grain of truth’ theories (Allport, 1954; Brewer and Campbell, 1976). However, social identity and self-categorization theorists (e.g., Oakes et al., 1994; Tajfel, 1981; Turner and Reynolds, 2001) have described this

relationship in greater detail and have argued that the relationship between intergroup perceptions and intergroup attitudes is very much like other forms of social knowledge. Thus, intergroup attitudes are no more or less rational than any other inferences that we make about our world. In addition, social-identity approaches have focused on the importance of present situational constraints as well as the broad consistent patterns of intergroup relations in determining the specific stereotypes that are brought to mind in a particular cross-group interaction. That is, it is not only the broader socioeconomic relationship that determines whether an out-group member will be characterized as lazy, stupid, or evil. It is also the current social context. If the context is one in which motivation and hard work are at issue (hiring for a manual labor job), laziness might come to mind and result in a decision not to hire a member of the low-status group. However, if the current context involves a decision about who should receive special attention at airport security, the stereotype of evil might be most salient. To the degree that intergroup attitudes represent our efforts to explain the social world, the specific stereotypes that are brought to mind in a given interaction should be those that are the most useful in guiding our ongoing interaction (see Biernat and Crandall, 1994).

Therefore, the breadth of available intergroup attitudes is, in part, determined by the nature of the intergroup relationship. From this available pool, specific stereotypes and prejudices are brought to mind when the current context makes them relevant, and when they provide some degree of explanation and prescriptions for the particular cross-group interaction. While we may find it distasteful that low-status groups are characterized as lazy or evil, these characterizations are not entirely arbitrary. They provide meaning for the perceiver and prescriptions for his or her actions. This is not to suggest that these characterizations are 'objectively true'. It may not be that the target group is, in fact, less energetic or less moral than the in-group.<sup>1</sup> The point is that these characterizations provide psychologically meaningful explanations for the perceivers' observations of the relative status and treatment of the out-group (or the in-group, in the case of self-stereotyping).

### *Entitativity*

A number of lines of research have extended this basic view of stereotypes to describe further the role of explanation in intergroup attitudes. For example, attributions to the character of the group, such as describing them as lazy, stupid, or evil, are more likely to be made and are made with more confidence when the group is perceived to have high entitativity (Campbell, 1958; Yzerbyt, Judd, & Corneille, 2004); that is, to be a bounded unit whole rather than a loosely associated aggregate (Yzerbyt and Rogier, 2001). Thus, it is worth considering what aspects of social reality will encourage a perception of group entitativity.

While entitativity strictly refers to the extent to which a group appears to have the quality of a unit entity, these perceptions can be particularly strong with they are based on the belief that the group members share some 'essential' or biological characteristic – categories such as 'race' or gender are very likely to attract these strong dispositional attributions (Hoffman and Hurst, 1990; Rothbart and Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt et al., 1997). It may be that groups with greater apparent structure and organization (Hamilton et al., 1998), numerically smaller groups (Mullen, 1991), and minority rather than majority groups (Brewer et al., 1995) will be more readily seen as highly entitative. Finally, when the individual has observed a greater number of cases or when there appears to be greater group homogeneity in relevant attributes (Doosje et al., 1995), it is more reasonable to make more confident generalizations about the fundamental character of the group and its members.

### *Roles*

Eagly (1987) also evokes the concept of stereotypes as explanations as part of social-role theory (see also Eagly and Wood, 1991). Gender stereotypes are described as deriving from the differential distribution of men and women in particular social roles, roles requiring different specific behaviors. Observers confuse the groups with the roles, thus attributing to women characteristics of nurturance and warmth as a result of their greater representation in the role of homemaker, and attributing to men traits of competence and agency because of their overrepresentation in professional and worker roles (Diekman & Eagly, 2000).

Certainly, there remains a great deal of room for individual interpretation, bias, and error (Chapter 5), and the present needs or motives of the particular individual affect intergroup attitude processes (e.g., Sinclair and Kunda, 1999). However, the point here is that intergroup attitudes are not entirely arbitrary. They often reflect direct observations of the 'real' intergroup relationships and represent interpretations of the actions and treatment of the relevant groups. In this sense, the development and utilization of intergroup attitudes is directly influenced by 'reality constrains' (Bourhis et al., 1997; Ellemers et al., 1997b; Spears et al., 2001).

### **Intergroup attitudes as justification**

While the idea of intergroup attitudes as explanations for the social world is itself an invitation for concern for disadvantaged groups, there is an even more significant concern. In many cases, simple explanation is replaced by justification. Thus, intergroup attitudes serve not only to clarify the position of the groups, but also to justify their status and treatment (Eberhardt and Randall, 1997; Fiske, 1993a; Goodwin et al., 2000; Hoffman and Hurst, 1990; Jost and Banaji, 1994; Tajfel, 1981). Attributing laziness, stupidity, or evil to low-status groups not only explains their disadvantage, but also serves as a justification for their continuing victimization.

This justification function of intergroup attitudes may be motivated by basic psychological motives, including consistency motives (see Crandall and Beasley, 2001), the need for predictability and control, the avoidance of aversive feelings of subjective uncertainty (Hogg, 2000; Hogg and Abrams, 1993), and the need to see one's world as just. Lerner (1980) suggested that, in order to feel reassured about their own position, perceivers justify the occurrence of misfortune by putting some responsibility on the sufferer. This idea has been applied to groups to explain the derogatory intergroup attitudes often directed at groups that suffer as a result of their low status in the social hierarchy (see Major and Schmader, 2001; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999).

### *Realistic-conflict theory*

This general view of stereotypes and prejudices as justification is also consistent with realistic conflict theory (Sherif, 1966). Here the focus is on the role of material interests. Intergroup attitudes are posited to be the product of the economic relationship between the groups. Real competition over scarce resources leads to hostile and antagonistic interactions that then serve as the basis for negative descriptions and evaluations of the out-group. Sherif's classic 'robber's cave' study, involving two groups of eleven-year-old boys in a specially designed and monitored summer camp experience, clearly demonstrated the importance of the structural relationship between groups in determining the actions and attitudes of the group members (see Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994, for review). This study and numerous replications and extensions (see Platow and Hunter, 2001, for a summary) demonstrated that, rather than being insensitive to reality, stereotyping and prejudice, while often exaggerated, reflect the reality of the in-group's relationship with the out-group.

Research on realistic-group-conflict theory also demonstrates that intergroup attitudes become more extreme and more resistant to change as the conflict between groups becomes more intense and protracted (see also Tajfel, 1981). As more of the group's resources are invested and as the group's self-definition becomes increasingly tied to the conflict, it becomes increasingly important that the characterizations of the in-group and out-group provide justification for the increasingly hostile interactions. This process of hardening of intergroup attitudes provides a partial explanation for the tendency for competitive conflicts to escalate (Pruitt, 1989).

Sherif (1966) also clearly recognized the possibility of intergroup harmony and positive intergroup attitudes in proposing the concept of superordinate goals – mutually beneficial outcomes whose achievement required the joint cooperative participation of both groups. The idea is that cooperative interdependence between groups leads to accommodating interactions and to the generation of complimentary evaluations of the out-group and its members. Dozens of studies have tested both the robustness and the limitations of the concept of superordinate goals (see Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994; Platow and Hunter, 2001, for a recent summary).<sup>2</sup> However, the primary point here is that both positive and negative intergroup attitudes result from efforts to explain and justify the in-group's and the out-group's cooperative or hostile actions.

### *Systems justification*

As this example illustrates, the justification process affects not only out-group representations, but also our stereotypes and evaluations of the in-group. Members of high-status groups tend to represent their in-group in very positive terms. Beyond their obvious ego-enhancing benefit, these positive in-group characterizations provide legitimization of our high-status position and justification for continued in-group favoritism. Similarly, low-status group members may be convinced to accept the unflattering characterizations and evaluations of their in-group as a means of justifying their low status and poorer treatment (see Jost and Banaji, 1994; Mlicki and Ellemers, 1996; Sidanius et al., 2001; Sidanius and Pratto, 1999). Jost et al. (2001) consider how high-status group members can meet their motivation for self-enhancement, enhancement of the in-group, and justification of the social system simultaneously by generating positive in-group characterizations and negative out-group characterizations. For low-status groups, these three motives are in conflict. This conflict provides a potential explanation for some of the important negative psychological consequences of disadvantaged-group status (we will revisit this and related issues later in the chapter). Nonetheless, Jost et al. show that under some circumstances the need to justify the broader social system can lead disadvantaged groups to show out-group favoritism and to accept the negative characterization of the in-group.

## **Group-based emotions**

Another recent perspective on prejudice also points to the importance of assessments of the intergroup relationship as a determinant of one's emotional response to the out-group. Smith, Mackie, and colleagues (Mackie et al., 2000; Smith, 1993; Smith and Ho, 2002) propose a model of prejudice as 'group-based emotion', and show that appraisals of the threat posed by the out-group and of the ability of the in-group to respond determine whether the individual will feel anger, disgust, fear, or contempt towards the out-group. The individual's understanding of the relationship between the two groups, in terms of threat and power, determines the in-group's emotional response to the out-group. Thus, when an out-group is perceived to threaten the interests of the in-group and the in-group is perceived not to have the necessary resources to defend itself, prejudice will involve feelings of fear and disgust. However, prejudice will involve feelings of anger and hatred when the in-group is threatened, but is perceived to have adequate resources to answer the threat. Compared to traditional approaches to prejudice, which focus primarily on the affective direction (positive or negative) of the evaluation, this approach provides valuable specificity in predicting the actual content of emotional responses (see also Alexander et al., 1999; 2005) to the out-group. In addition, it shares the view that prejudice is directly determined by assessments of the intergroup context.

Complementary work on the group-based emotions among high-status groups has shown that appraisals of the legitimacy of the in-group's advantaged position and of the in-group's culpability in causing and enforcing the out-group's inferior position are critical determinants of feelings of collective guilt (Leach et al., 2002). Branscombe et al. (2000) conclude that collective guilt results when social identity is salient and the person believes the in-group is responsible for violating important standards. Feelings of collective guilt should lower the appraisal of the in-group, improve the appraisal of the out-group, and increase willingness to compensate the out-group (see also Iyer et al., 2003). Again, we see that the specific appraisal of the intergroup relationship (in terms of status, legitimacy, and in-group responsibility) determines the specific content and the general valence of the intergroup attitudes.

STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE SOLIDIFY  
AND MAINTAIN INTERGROUP RELATIONS

**Distinguishing between stereotypes  
and prejudice**

So far, we have been considering stereotypes and prejudice jointly as components of intergroup attitudes. However, it is also very useful to distinguish between the two concepts. While social psychology's 'cognitive revolution' in the 1970s and 1980s led to near exclusive focus on 'cold' cognitive stereotyping (see Fiske, 1998), there was a decided swing in the 1990s back to a focus on the 'hot' affect of prejudice (e.g., Mackie and Hamilton, 1993). The general view now is that affect rather than cognition accounts for the lion's share of the important effects in intergroup relations (see Dovidio et al., 1996; Dijker, 1987; Esses & Dovidio, 2002; Esses et al., 1993; Jackson et al., 1996; Pettigrew, 1998b; Smith, 1993; Stangor et al., 1991; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005). While the relative importance of stereotypes and affect probably depends on the target group and the local social context, it appears that in many (perhaps most) circumstances, affective measures of prejudice outperform cognitive measures of stereotyping in predicting the general attitude towards the out-group and discriminatory behavior.

It is also important to recognize that while the two are clearly related, the stereotype content does not necessarily imply the direction of the evaluation or the specific affective response. Most stereotypes can be interpreted as either positive or negative. For example, Smith and Ho (2002) report that non-Asian participants' stereotyping of Asian-Americans as 'intelligent' and 'diligent' led some to evaluate Asians positively and to feel admiration and respect, while others evaluated these same characteristics negatively and expressed feelings of hostility, resentment, and threat.

Virtually any trait lends itself to multiple construals and to positive or negative interpretations. This point was made painfully apparent in a comparison of two 'handbills' posted in Vancouver. The first was posted in the early 1900s. It warned Canadians to 'beware the yellow peril' and described how Chinese immigrants were undermining the Canadian economy because they would work for a 'coolie's' wages. The basic message was that the Chinese were undesirable because they were *too poor*. The second handbill posted in the early 1990s was more subtle, but it similarly warned that Chinese immigration was undermining the Canadian economy. According to this handbill, Chinese immigrants were buying up businesses and property and their willingness to pay inflated prices was playing havoc with real-estate markets and local businesses. The basic message was that the Chinese were undesirable because they were *too rich*.

**Intergroup relations and cross-group  
agreement about stereotypes  
and prejudice**

This distinction between content (stereotypes) and affective (prejudice) evaluation is also important in understanding how intergroup attitudes, once formed, can help solidify and maintain the current state of intergroup relations. In an initial model of the influence of intergroup attitudes on intergroup relations, Taylor (1981; Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994) recognized that identical stereotype content could be judged either positively or negatively. With this understanding, one can predict the nature of intergroup relations from the pattern of stereotypes and evaluations by considering:

- 1 the degree to which the two groups agree about the content of their own and the other's attributes – that is, the degree to which each group's self-stereotypes match the stereotypes held by the other group about them
- 2 the valence of the evaluation of in-group and out-group stereotypes – that is, whether each group values (or devalues) the attributes ascribed to the in-group and the out-group.

Implicit in this model is a view that is overlooked in most discussions of stereotypes and prejudice that described prejudice almost exclusively as having to do with out-group evaluations. A discussion of cross-group consensus about stereotype content and group evaluation requires the recognition that group members accept, endorse, and act in accordance with stereotypes and evaluations of *their own group* (Leyens et al., 1994; Oakes et al., 1994). It is usually the case that positively valenced assessments of the in-group are most easily endorsed – we easily accept views of our group that are a source of pride – although this need not always be the case.

Thus, the model holds that intergroup relations will be characterized by conflict in two situations. First, conflict results from cross-group disagreement about each other's stereotypes. That is, conflict arises when group A sees group B as possessing attributes that group B does not agree are characteristic of their group, and/or group B sees group A as possessing attributes that group A does not agree are characteristic of their group. In this case, the conflict is over the content of the group representation, and the struggle is to convince the out-group that we are not as they see us. Examples of this type of intergroup conflict abound. For example, efforts to reduce racial conflict in the United States often involve attempts to change the stereotypes that European-Americans hold to be more consistent with the self-stereotypes of African-Americans and other ethnic minorities. The concepts of cultural sensitivity and intercultural training (Brislin and Yoshida, 1994) are predicated on the idea that cross-cultural conflict is less likely if understanding of the out-group is consistent with their self-conception.

In the second case, intergroup conflict arises when there is consensus across groups about the content of each group's character (that is, self-stereotypes match the stereotypes held by the other group), but there is disagreement about the valence of the evaluation of these characteristics. Here, while groups see their own characteristic as admirable, the out-group views these same traits negatively. The struggle

here is to convince the out-group to see our attributes in a more positive light. An example of this might be the ‘Black is beautiful’ movement in the United States, or the ‘French immersion education’ movement in Canada. The intention was to change the perception of the attribute so it was respected and valued by both white and black Americans or by both French and English Canadians.

Intergroup harmony can also arise in two contexts. The first involves legitimized intergroup inequality, where there is agreement across groups about both the content and the evaluation of group attributes. However, the consensus is that the attributes of one group – the dominant group – are positively valued and the attributes of the other group – the subordinate group – are not. Here we have the legitimized consensual domination described by system-justification (Jost et al., 2001) and social-dominance (Sidanius and Pratto, 1999) theories. The negative characterizations of the subordinate group and the positive characterization of the dominant group serve the dominant group well, and there is little reason for them to object to the existing perceptions. In addition, when the pressures to accept the dominant perspective are strong, subordinate group members acquiesce, accepting their relatively negative characterization (see also Jackman, 1994; Major, 1994; Major and Schmader, 2001; Martin, 1986). As long as the cross-group consensus remains, there will be continued domination of one group by the other in a highly stable (nonconflictive) group hierarchy.

In the other case of intergroup harmony, the two groups agree about the content of each other’s attributes and evaluate both the in-group and out-group attributes positively. That is, there is mutual respect for the consensually shared stereotypes of each group. This configuration of intergroup attitudes may seem optimistic given social psychology’s consistent focus on intergroup conflict. However, this conceptualization of intergroup relations is at the core of concepts such as ‘pluralism’ ‘multiculturalism’, and ‘diversity’ (see Flowers & Davidov, 2006) that serve as the basis for widely supported programs such as multicultural education (e.g., Banks 1997; Stephan and Stephan 2001), intercultural training (e.g., Brislin and Yoshida, 1994), and diversity training (e.g., Hollister et al., 1993; Rudman et al., 2001) (see also Aboud and Levy, 2000; Oskamp and Jones, 2000). Kramer and Carnevale (2001) discuss ways to create ‘sustained trust in intergroup negotiations’. Many of the strategies they describe clearly recognize that the two groups can maintain and express distinct identities while still coming to hold a positive (trusting) orientation towards each other.

In summary, the match or mismatch between the content of in-group and out-group stereotypes and/or the match or mismatch of the evaluation of those stereotypes can influence the nature of the general intergroup relations. A mismatch between our self-stereotypes and the out-group’s stereotypes about our group, or a mismatch in the perceived valence of the groups’ attributes can lead to intergroup conflict. Intergroup harmony is associated with cross-group matches. In addition, in the case of matching, the content of the stereotypes and the valence of evaluation are implicated in the degree to which the intergroup relations will be characterized by subordination and domination or by more equal, mutually respectful relations.

### The self-fulfilling prophecy

There are other ways in which intergroup attitudes help to maintain the relations between groups that are less dependent on the self-stereotypes of the target group. One involves the self-fulfilling impact of stereotypes and prejudice. A series of studies on ‘behavioral confirmation’ or ‘the self-fulfilling prophecy’ have clearly demonstrated that a perceiver’s attitudes about an out-group can lead him or her to interact with members of that group in such a way as to elicit behaviors that confirm their expectations (e.g., Smith et al., 1999; Snyder and Swann, 1978; Snyder et al., 1977; Zanna and Pack, 1975; see Snyder, 1992, for a review).

In a classic study by Word et al. (1974), white interviewers’ negative expectations about blacks led them to be generally less comfortable, less intimate, and less supportive with a black than a white interviewee. A second part of the study showed that these subtle changes in the interviewer’s behavior resulted in poorer performance by the interviewee. Thus, the white perceiver’s negative prejudices led him to interact with the black person in such a way as to elicit responses that confirmed his negative expectations. When these individual interactions are repeated over and over across many interaction pairs and across time (see Claire and Fiske, 1998), this process can help to solidify the broader societal inequality between the groups.

### Stereotype threat

Recently, led by the work of Claude Steele and his colleagues (see Steele, 1998; Steele et al., 2002), an important extension has been made to our understanding of the subtlety and power of stereotypes to affect targets of negatively charged stereotypes. Because stereotypes and prejudice are part of our cultural knowledge (see Devine, 1989), and the content and evaluation of these characterizations are well known to members of the target group (Steele and Aronson, 1995), anxiety that one might be treated on the basis of these stereotypes or that one might confirm these stereotypes places additional pressures on members of the targeted group. This heightened pressure can interfere with their performance on the relevant task. Thus, the stereotype-threatened person performs more poorly on the task, perhaps confirming the stereotyped expectation.

For example, in a series of experiments, Steele and Aronson (1995) demonstrated that African-American university students are well aware of stereotypes about the intellectual inferiority of blacks, and that knowledge that others also know these stereotypes leads black students to be concerned that, should they perform poorly on a task that is diagnostic of intelligence, they will be seen to have confirmed the stereotype. Thus, when presented with an ‘intelligence test’, African-American students face the additional pressures associated with these fears, and this additional pressure interferes with their performance. The result is that African-American students perform more poorly than they would have in the absence of the stereotype threat.

Numerous studies have replicated this finding and extended it to other societal groups and other stereotype content, such as women and mathematical ability (e.g., Spencer et al., 1999), low socioeconomic status and intelligence (Croizet and Claire, 1998), the elderly and memory (Levy, 1996), Latino women and mathematical ability (Gonzales et al., 2002), women and negotiation skills

(Kray et al., 2001), and black and white men in the context of athletic performance (Stone et al., 1999). In each case, making either the relevant group identity or the specific negative stereotype salient led to poorer performance.

There are a number of aspects of this general finding that are of particular importance. First, stereotype threat is contextually dependent. That is, members of target groups are not chronically under threat (and thus chronically underperforming). Rather, it only occurs in contexts where the stereotype is relevant to performance and where the relevant group identity is salient. It is also most likely to occur when the performance requirements are quite demanding (for example, the test is hard). In addition, in order to experience stereotype threat, the persons must be ‘domain identified’. That is, they must care about their performance in that domain. People whose self-esteem is not attached to their performance in that domain will be unaffected by stereotype threats. In fact, domain disidentification – reducing the degree to which one’s identity is attached to the relevant domain (or to the threatening feedback in that domain) – has been proposed as one coping strategy for those who face chronic stereotype threat (see Major and Schmader, 1998; Steele et al., 2002).

The importance of context is made very clear in research by Stone et al. (1999). Using a ten-hole minigolf game, they demonstrated stereotype threat effects for both black and white athletes. As predicted, white athletes underperformed when the game was described as testing ‘natural athletic ability’ (priming a negative stereotype about white athletes), and black athletes underperformed when the game was described as testing ‘sports strategic intelligence’ (priming a negative stereotype about black athletes). Thus, stereotype threat can be experienced by members of any group, but only when the context makes salient a well-known negative in-group stereotype.

However, this does not mean that stereotype threat is an uncommon experience for members of devalued groups. For the African-American students at Stanford University who served as the participants in Steele and Aronson’s studies, their numerical distinctiveness on campus is a frequent reminder of their ethnic group membership (Lord and Saenz, 1985; Pettigrew and Martin, 1987), and intellectual ability may appear relevant to many of their daily activities (such as classes and tests). Consequently, these students may well face a steady diet of threatening experiences. In fact, stereotype threat is a much more common occurrence for members of societally disadvantaged groups because the negative stereotypes about these groups tend to be more negative, more numerous, and more global in their application. It is also likely that situational cues that strengthen the target’s concern that stereotyping is going to occur will increase the threat. Steele et al. (2002) propose that stereotype threat will be greatest when there are cues that the present environment is ‘culturally centered’, that is, that it is dominated by a cultural orientation other than one’s own.

While we will discuss other ways that stereotypes and prejudices affect disadvantaged group members later in the chapter, we describe the work on stereotype threat here to point out the enormous power of consensual stereotypes. Unlike the systems-justification effects, stereotype threat does not require that disadvantaged group members accept the negative stereotype of their group. In fact, it is strong objections to the stereotype that motivate the desire not to confirm it. In addition, unlike the self-fulfilling prophecy, which requires discriminatory behavior by the out-group member, stereotype threat does not require any direct discrimination. The mere knowledge that others know the stereotype is enough to produce performance deficits. This point was made rather dramatically in one of Steele and Aronson’s (1995) original studies. They found that simply asking black students to indicate their race on an information sheet prior to taking an ‘intelligence test’ raised stereotype threat and impaired performance.

### **Institutional discrimination**

Finally, intergroup attitudes become institutionalized so that discriminatory practices become part of the structure of societal institutions (Pettigrew, 1985). Not only does this institutionalization serve to sustain intergroup attitudes by encouraging (even mandating) attitude-consistent behavior, but it also can render these original attitudes unnecessary for continued discrimination. That is, once in place, these institutional practices can maintain group-based inequality even if the attitudes change to become more egalitarian (see Pettigrew, 1998b). Thus, past negative intergroup attitudes have residual effects on intergroup relations that maintain the relative status of the groups even after these initial attitudes have been replaced by ones that are much more positive.

### **COMPLEXITY IN INTERGROUP ATTITUDES: MODERN, AVERSIVE, AND AMBIVALENT PREJUDICE**

A number of recent theories have made apparent the need for an even more complex view of intergroup attitudes. Not only can the content of the stereotype and the affective evaluation vary somewhat independently, it appears that intergroup attitudes are often much more conflicted, ambivalent, and complicated than we may first think (e.g., Fiske, 1998; MacDonald and Zanna, 1998; Operario and Fiske, 2001). Often intergroup attitudes are associated with conflicting feelings and contain a combination of positive and negative characterizations, evaluations, and emotions (see also Kay & Jost, 2003).

In view of the rather convincing evidence that blatant expressions of negative prejudice towards ethnic minorities, and African-Americans in particular, have declined steadily in America (see Dovidio et al., 1996), a number of theories of ‘contemporary’ racism have emerged: *symbolic* and *modern racism* (e.g., McConahay, 1986; Sears, 1988), *ambivalent racism* (e.g., Katz and Glass, 1979; Katz and Hass, 1988), and *subtle racism* (e.g., Pettigrew and Meertens, 1995). We are unable here to explore fully the details of each of these perspectives. However, all three distinguish between two forms of prejudice. One (usually described as ‘old-fashioned’) is overt, blatant, and hostile, involving clearly negative and derogatory characterizations of the out-group. The second (usually considered more contemporary) is more subtle, often containing conflicting cognitions and affect

towards the out-group, and often camouflaged with rationalizations and ideologies that justify avoidance and support of discriminatory practices (see Augoustinos and Walker, 1998; Brown, 1995; Walker, 2001). In addition, all three perspectives hold that the contemporary form of prejudice is much more pervasive than the 'old-fashioned' form and that it now accounts for most current discrimination.

### Aversive racism

Another influential account of contemporary prejudice is Gaertner and Dovidio's (e.g., 1986; 2005) model of *aversive racism*. This view holds that many (perhaps most) white Americans firmly endorse egalitarian principles and see themselves as nonprejudiced. They express support for racial equality, condemn overt expressions of prejudice, and are very concerned about appearing nonprejudiced. However, aversive racists also harbor negative attitudes and emotions (fears) about African-Americans. These negative evaluations are actively dissociated from their nonprejudiced self-representation and, thus, are often below the level of conscious awareness. However, these unconscious feelings can have important influences on the aversive racist's behavior. Aversive racists find cross-group interactions uncomfortable, even stressful, and subsequently find reasons to avoid interactions with the out-group. While they will appear completely nonprejudiced when they are aware that their actions could be seen to demonstrate bias or prejudice, when their actions appear to be unrelated to race, or when discriminatory actions can be reasonably explained away, they show clear discrimination against out-group members (for reviews, see; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; 2005 see also Crosby et al., 1980).

One way that aversive racism leads to discrimination involves the tendency of aversive racists to support the status quo. While blatant racists support policies that directly limit the rights and opportunities of the out-group, aversive racists object to these obviously racist initiatives. However, when it comes to policies that would remove existing barriers, or improve opportunities for the out-group, aversive racists tend to support the status quo. Thus, aversive racism has been implicated in opposition to programs such as affirmative action (Dovidio et al., 1989; Murrell et al., 1994).

This view of contemporary racism is consistent with the present analysis of the role of the broader intergroup relations in determining intergroup attitudes and actions. The negative unconscious orientation is the result of centuries of blatant discrimination and a lingering negative representation of the out-group, and the strong egalitarian self-concept is the result of endorsing the modern cultural imperatives of fairness, justice and racial equality.

The aversive-racism perspective also points to the importance of subconscious or 'implicit' processes in intergroup attitudes. This idea that important elements of intergroup cognitions and emotions reside below our conscious awareness, but nonetheless can have important implications for our overt thoughts and actions, has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years (see Brauer et al., 2000; Dovidio et al., 2001). While the measurement and meaning of implicit prejudice remain sources of lively debate (e.g., Arkes & Tetlock, 2004; Blanton & Jaccard, 2006), there is growing evidence that implicit prejudices can have interesting and important influences on intergroup behavior and that these influences are not necessarily identical to those found for explicit prejudice (e.g., Banaji et al., 2004; Dasgupta, & Rivera, 2006; Dovidio et al., 2002; Florak et al., 2001; Hugenberg & Bodenhausen, 2003; McConnell & Liebold, 2001; Towles-Schwen, & Fazio, 2003 ).

### Ambivalent sexism

Recent work by Glick, Fiske, and their colleagues (see Glick and Fiske, 2001a, for a review) has demonstrated that attitudes toward women contain a combination of both highly positive, socially valued attributes (for example, warm and nurturant) as well as negative undesirable traits (for example, incompetent). In addition, the near universal domination of women by men requires not only hostile negative representations of women that legitimize their subjugation, but also benevolent positive representations of women that assist in keeping women dependent upon men.

Domination and protection are combined to produce a paternalistic relationship where women are characterized as less competent, but highly valued, and men are thus obligated to protect but also control women. In addition, gender differentiation and enforcement of gender roles combine hostility and benevolence. They describe women as less able to make important decisions and hold positions of authority and power, while 'awarding' women traits (such as warmth and kindness) and activities (such as child rearing) that are highly valued. In fact, in a head-to-head comparison, men and women agree that 'women's traits' are at least as positive as 'men's traits', leading to what Eagly and Mladinic (1993) call the 'women are wonderful' phenomenon. Finally, heterosexual intimacy also involves ambivalence, including the hostile view of women as seductress and possessors of the power to withhold sex (*the femme fatale*) and the benevolent view of women as partners in passionate, intimate, and fairy-tale-like romance.

Glick and Fiske (2001a, 2001b; Fiske et al., 1999) extend their approach to describe a general model of intergroup relations based on the idea that group stereotypes fall along two dimensions: competence and warmth (see also Allport, 1954; Eagly, 1987). These two dimensions combine to produce four possible combinations of stereotype content: two that involve consistency in terms of the evaluative direction and two that are ambivalent. Groups that are judged as both competent and warm (such as doctors and teachers) are 'admired', and groups that are judged both incompetent and not warm (such as poor blacks or welfare recipients) are the target of 'contemptuous prejudice'. Groups such as traditional women and the elderly, who are seen as warm but not competent, are the target of 'paternalistic prejudice', and groups such as Jews and Asians, who are characterized as competent but not warm, are the target of 'envious prejudice'.

Glick and Fiske (2001a) further propose that the type of prejudice results directly from the structural relations between the two groups along two dimensions: their relative status and the nature of their relationship with the in-group (competitive or cooperative). Relatively high-status groups will be seen as competent, and low-status groups will be seen as incompetent.

Cooperation with the in-group will be rewarded with attributions of warmth, while competition will lead to the attribution that the group is not warm. Thus, ‘admiration’ is reserved for high-status cooperative out-groups, ‘envious prejudice’ for high-status competitive out-groups, ‘paternalistic prejudice’ for low-status cooperative out-groups, and ‘contemptuous prejudice’ for low-status competitive out-groups.

Finally, Glick and Fiske (2001a) argue that while contemptuous prejudice (the entirely negative view of the out-group) may seem the most problematic form of prejudice, this may not be the case. Paternalistic prejudice can be used to justify long-term subordination of low-status groups and even colonialism and slavery (see Jackman, 1994). In addition, envious prejudice places economically successful minorities at particular risk of ‘justified’ aggression, as in the Nazi belief in a Jewish conspiracy (see Glick, 2002) or the view of many European-Americans of the competent but overly competitive and untrustworthy Asian (see Smith and Ho, 2002).

The ambivalent sexism model is consistent with several main points made in this chapter. First it focuses on the functional relationship between the groups as the agent of consensual group stereotypes and prejudice evaluations. Second, it recognizes the possibility that out-groups can be characterized entirely positively in the case of admiration and partially positively in the two cases of ambivalent prejudices.

Finally, the ambivalent sexism model focuses on two dimensions of intergroup relations that have received considerable attention as mediators of intergroup attitudes and intergroup behavior – competitive versus cooperative relations, and relative group status. We have already discussed the dimension of cooperation and competition in reference to Sherif (1966) and realistic-conflict theory. However, this theory has been criticized (see Taylor and Moghaddam, 1994) for failing to represent adequately the second importance dimension of status differences. A dominant feature of most real-world intergroup relations is inequality of resources, status, and power, and stratification into relatively advantaged and disadvantaged groups. In the next section, we consider the importance of status in intergroup relations with a brief discussion of the impact of relative advantage, but with greater attention to the experiences and actions of members of low-status groups.

#### INTERGROUP STATUS DIFFERENCES

The study of stereotyping and prejudice has focused almost exclusively on members of relatively advantaged (dominant) groups. However, most of this research has not focused on the advantaged group engaged in a dynamic relationship with a disadvantaged group. The prejudiced person is considered with relatively little reference to the target. When we instead take an explicitly *intergroup* focus, we begin to consider how the actions of both the disadvantaged and advantaged groups are determined by their relationship and their perceptions of the in-group in comparison to the out-group.

Social-identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; see also Hogg and Abrams, 1988) holds that in-group behavior is, at least in part, motivated by the desire to hold a positively valued and distinctive social identity. Thus, we wish to belong to social groups that are recognizably different from other groups and that hold a relatively high-status position. Two points are important here. First, membership in a high-status group is desirable and membership in a low-status group is generally undesirable. Second, a group’s status is determined by intergroup comparisons. Thus, members of advantaged groups should be motivated to maintain their superior position, and disadvantaged groups should be motivated to improve their relative position. However, despite their similar motives, their differing status leads to interesting asymmetries in their behaviors.

#### Power and advantaged/disadvantaged group asymmetry

Simon and his colleagues (Simon et al., 2001) describe an asymmetry they label ‘mindful minorities and mindless majorities’. Advantaged group members, because of their superior status, pay little attention to the intergroup relationship (Azzi, 1992; Leach et al., 2002). They are less likely than disadvantaged group members to recognize their group membership or to identify spontaneously with the in-group (Mullen, 1991). This stems, in part, from the usual confound that powerful groups tend also to be the numerical majority. Thus, defining themselves in terms of their group membership is simply less descriptive. However, it also results because their social identity is ‘unmarked’ (see Leach et al., 2002). They are, after all, the ‘default’.

However, this does not mean that members of the advantaged group are less likely to engage in intergroup behavior. Their relative obliviousness to group membership seems to apply primarily to the in-group (Simon, 1993). Members of a powerful group need not attend to the individual characteristics, needs, or desires of subordinate group members. Thus, they are likely to see the disadvantaged group in highly categorical terms (Fiske, 1993b; Fiske and Depret, 1996). In addition, members of powerful groups have little motivation to monitor or inhibit their expressions of prejudice and discrimination (Operario and Fiske, 1998). However, the most extreme prejudice and discrimination result when powerful groups perceive a disadvantaged group as threatening their high-status position. Advantaged-group members tend strongly to endorse the legitimizing myths that support the status quo. Thus, the disadvantaged group’s attempt to undermine their position not only threatens their material advantage, but is also seen as inappropriate, unjust, or even immoral. The resulting indignation leads to emotions such as anger, outrage, and disgust (see Smith, 1993).

Members of disadvantaged groups, however, must remain much more aware of the intergroup relationship and attend more carefully to the actions and interests of advantaged-group members (Azzi, 1992). Often, low status implies material dependency on high-status group members or threats of physical force. Therefore, low-status group members must adapt their actions to meet the desires of advantaged-group members in order to ensure the continued supply of needed resources or to avoid provoking a violent response (Operario and Fiske, 1998). Thus, it is not surprising that, for the most part, research shows that high-status groups show greater in-group favoritism in resource

allocation (see Mullen et al., 1992; Sachdev and Bourhis, 1991).

## Facing disadvantage

For much of its history, the social psychological study of prejudice and discrimination focused on the source rather than the target (noteworthy exceptions: Jones et al., 1984; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Recently, however, there has been a dramatic shift, and the disadvantaged perspective has become a major focus, producing a number of collections and reviews (e.g., Branscombe and Ellemers, 1998; Crocker et al., 1998; Crocker and Quinn, 2001; Ellemers and Barreto, 2001; Heatherton et al., 2000; Major et al., 2002; Oyserman and Swim, 2001; Swim and Stangor, 1998). There are numerous lines of research in this area (for example, stereotype threat considered earlier). However, we consider briefly two basic questions:

- 1 When do people notice the discrimination and prejudice and what are the consequences of that recognition?
- 2 How do people respond to membership in a disadvantaged group?

### *Recognizing discrimination or not*

Expressions of prejudice and discrimination remain a common experience for disadvantaged-group members. Often they are subtle and veiled, creating a situation of 'attributional ambiguity' (Crocker and Major, 1989), in which the target must decide whether the act was really discrimination or not. This raises the questions: when do attributions to discrimination occur? and what is the result of noticing or failing to notice discrimination?

The answers to these questions turn out to be anything but simple, as demonstrated by the two competing dominant theoretical perspectives on this issue (see Major et al., 2002). The vigilance perspective proposes that disadvantaged-group members become 'hypersensitive' to signs of prejudice (Allport, 1954; Feldman-Barrett and Swim, 1998). While there are a number of accounts of vigilance, a key focus of this position has been Crocker and Major's (1989) claim that attributions to discrimination can buffer self-esteem when a disadvantaged-group member receives negative feedback. Blaming prejudice for one's negative treatment is less damaging to one's self-esteem than blaming flaws in one's character. Major, Crocker, and colleagues (see Major et al., 2002) have amassed considerable evidence supporting this claim. Under a variety of circumstances, members of stigmatized groups recognize discrimination, and this can have buffering effects on their personal self-esteem.

The alternative perspective holds that disadvantaged-group members tend to be less aware of discrimination than perhaps they ought to be; that they minimize the degree to which they experience discrimination. Crosby (1984) found that while working women were objectively disadvantaged relative to their male counterparts and were well aware of discrimination against women in general, they perceived little or no discrimination directed at themselves. Crosby labeled this 'the denial of personal discrimination'. Subsequently, Taylor et al. (1990) showed that, while the word 'denial' was probably overly emphatic – members of many groups recognize personal discrimination – there is a robust tendency for people to see themselves as less discriminated against than their group as a whole. The cause of this effect, labeled the 'personal/group-discrimination discrepancy' (Taylor et al., 1990), has been the source of debate (e.g., Dion and Kawakami, 1996; Postmes et al., 1999; Taylor et al., 1996; Zanna et al., 1987). However, we share Olson and his colleagues' (Olson and Hafer, 2001; Olson et al., 1995; Quinn et al., 1999) conclusion that this phenomenon is overdetermined and results from a number of cognitive and motivational processes, one of which is the minimization of personal discrimination (Taylor et al., 1994). The minimization hypothesis is also supported by other research findings and theoretical perspectives too plentiful to review here (e.g., Crocker et al., 1993; Crosby and Ropp, 2002; Glick and Fiske, 2001a; Jost and Banaji, 1994; Kaiser and Miller, 2001a; Ruggiero and Taylor, 1995; 1997; Stangor et al., 2002). However, it seems clear that, under some circumstances, members of disadvantaged groups fail to recognize discrimination against them or fail to label these acts as discrimination.

Our view is that, rather than arguing the relative merits of these two perspectives, we should recognize that both vigilance and minimization occur. We propose that one explanation for the variance in this behavior involves the combined impact of the level of identity made salient by the current context (e.g., Schmitt and Branscombe, 2002) and the individual's current goals and motives (Taylor et al., 1994), including relationship concerns (Crosby, 1984). For example, consider a female student who is being evaluated by a stranger on an individual performance task (the usual scenario in an attributional ambiguity paradigm). She is likely to have an individual performance goal and to be thinking of herself as an individual (personal identity salient). If she has any relationship concerns, they probably involve impressing the experimenter with whom she is interacting, not the unseen evaluator. Under these circumstances, attributing a poor evaluation to the judge's prejudice makes sense. It allows her to suspend judgment on her performance goals, to save face with her primary audience (cf., Kaiser and Miller, 2001b), and to protect the currently salient element of her self-esteem, her personal self-esteem.

However, consider another scenario involving consistent mild discrimination (sexism perhaps) perpetrated by a close other. The discrimination probably involves sexist comments, harassment, jokes, or an expectation of traditional gender role adherence, and has little to do with performance evaluation. Maintaining or enhancing the interpersonal relationship (individual identity salient) may be very important (strong relationship goal). Under these circumstances, minimization is likely. The interaction is highly interpersonal, and the relationship goals make labeling one's partner a sexist very costly.

In a final scenario, imagine a woman who is strongly identified with her minority ethnic group. She has just attended a rally protesting the end of affirmative action (group identity highly salient). One of the speakers argued that affirmative action is necessary to fight continuing ethnic discrimination. On her way home, a white male gruffly mutters something to her, but she cannot hear the content. Under these circumstances, she is very likely to make an attribution to prejudice, not to buffer her personal

self-esteem, but to affirm her present understanding of the world and to legitimize her struggle for ethnic equality (Wright and Tropp, 2002). This attribution may even enhance collective self-esteem by affirming her group's worldview and the legitimacy of their actions.

The general point is that making attributions to discrimination, or avoiding them, probably results from a variety of interrelated motives, goals, and identity issues.<sup>3</sup> The question should not be whether disadvantaged-group members notice, minimize, or exaggerate the discrimination they face, but, rather, how these processes are influenced by the current context and personal and collective motives.

#### *Behavior: individual mobility or collective action*

Given that 'privileged groups rarely give up their privileges without strong resistance', according to Martin Luther King, Jr., the stability of the intergroup hierarchy depends principally on the actions of the disadvantaged. Lalonde and Cameron (1994) review a number of efforts to conceptualize the range of possible actions available to disadvantaged-group members. Most of these frameworks distinguished between *individual* and *collective action*. Individual action is intended to improve one's personal conditions, and collective action is designed to improve the position of one's entire group. Wright et al. (1990a) also distinguish between *normative* actions, which conform to the norms of the social system, and *nonnormative action*, which violates existing social rules, and point out that disadvantaged-group members may take no action to alter the status quo (see Martin, 1986).

From the perspective of advancing social change and creating greater intergroup equality, collective (perhaps collective nonnormative) action is the most effective strategy (see Wright, 2001a for a review). In fact, there is some evidence that individual action, while perhaps raising one's personal status, can legitimize and reinforce existing intergroup inequalities (Ellemers, 2001; Wright, 2001b). Thus, perhaps the most interesting question is, 'When will disadvantaged-group members take collective action instead of pursuing their individual interests or doing nothing?'

The choice to act collectively rather than individually hinges first on identification with the disadvantaged in-group (Branscombe and Ellemers, 1998; Ellemers et al., 1997a; Simon, 1998; Simon and Klandermans, 2001; Stürmer & Simon, 2004; Wright and Tropp, 2002). In-group identification refers to the degree to which one's group identity is an important element of the self (see Tropp and Wright, 2001). While both high and low identifiers are likely to be unhappy when facing discrimination, low identifiers are likely to be unhappy because they are being treated on the basis of their group membership and will distance themselves from the disadvantaged group (take individual action). High identifiers are more likely to be angry that their group is being treated poorly and will consider collective action to reduce group-based discrimination (Branscombe and Ellemers, 1998).

Next, members of the disadvantaged group must assess (a) the permeability of intergroup boundaries, (b) the legitimacy and (c) the stability of the intergroup context, and (d) the availability of normative channels for change (see Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Wright, 2001a). Wright (1997, 2001b) has argued, in a manner consistent with Tajfel (1982), that boundary permeability may be the primary assessment in determining disadvantaged-group behavior (see also Taylor and McKirnan, 1984). This assessment involves the degree to which the advantaged group is open or closed to qualified members of the disadvantaged group.

Perceiving boundary permeability leads to dissociation from the disadvantaged in-group, and a preference for individual actions. Conversely, perceiving boundary impermeability leads to increased in-group identification, motivation to improve the in-group's position, and collective action (Ellemers, 1993; Lalonde and Silverman, 1994; Wright and Taylor, 1998; Wright et al., 1990a, 1990b).

While most studies have characterized boundary permeability as a dichotomous distinction between an 'open' and a 'closed' condition, Wright (e.g., 2001b) has argued that in contemporary North American society (and many other intergroup contexts), group boundaries are restricted such that a small number of disadvantaged-group members are accepted into advantaged positions, while access is systematically blocked for the rest of the group (see also Pettigrew and Martin, 1987) – a context labeled 'tokenism'. In several experiments, Wright and his colleagues (Wright, 1997; Wright and Taylor, 1998; Wright et al., 1990a) have shown that, while closed intergroup contexts produce strong endorsement of nonnormative collective action, when as few as 2 percent of the qualified members of the disadvantaged group are allowed access to advantaged positions, individual actions become the response of choice. The slightest hint of permeability appears to undermine interest in collective action. There is some evidence that tokenism may have this effect by focusing attention on personal identities and encouraging interpersonal comparisons with the successful tokens. However, there is also evidence that tokenism obfuscates assessments of legitimacy and stability.

When disadvantaged-group members cannot (or will not) abandon the disadvantaged group, individual action is no longer an option. They must choose between collective action and inaction. Now, collective action depends upon the perception that the in-group's low status is illegitimate. Feelings of illegitimacy arise from the sense that one's group is deprived of something to which they are entitled (Major, 1994), and provide the motivation and justification for potentially costly and dangerous nonnormative collective actions (Abrams, 1990; Grant and Brown, 1995).

However, feelings of illegitimacy alone seldom produce collective action. Disadvantaged-group members must believe that there is enough instability in the social system that change in the status of the in-group is possible, and they must believe that the in-group has the necessary resources or abilities to effect change. When perceived illegitimacy and instability are combined, collective action becomes likely. Normative actions usually involve considerably less risk and are the preferred choice. However, if normative channels are unavailable or prove unsuccessful, or if the level of discontent is extremely high, collective nonnormative action will result.

Simon and Klandermans (2001) introduce the concept of 'politicized collective identity', adding the need to label clearly the out-group as the enemy (see also Wright and Tropp, 2002) and a sense of oneself as involved in the general political process, to the requirement for collective political participation. This conception of collective action, while similar to other analyses, places it much more firmly in the political and societal context.

Given the near universality of intergroup inequality, it is perhaps surprising that protest and rebellion are relatively uncommon

events. However, the infrequency of nonnormative collective action hints at the many obstacles that can derail the processes necessary to motivate this form of behavior.

## REDUCING PREJUDICE

From the disadvantaged group's perspective, recognizing collective mistreatment, delegitimizing the existing unequal relationship, and taking collective action are the primary solutions to intergroup inequality. However, social psychology's focus on the advantaged group has made prejudice reduction the primary goal. In this section, we consider how, despite their persistence, intergroup attitudes can undergo significant change. Recently, more social psychologists have set aside traditional concerns about promoting applications of their research (see Pettigrew, 2001), and a number of recent reviews, collections, and books review strategies for reducing prejudice and discrimination (e.g., Aboud and Levy, 1999; Brewer and Gaertner, 2001; Eberhardt and Fiske, 1998; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; Oskamp, 2000; Stephan and Stephan, 2001).

Often changes in intergroup attitudes result from dramatic changes in intergroup relations. The huge increases in prejudice among North Americans towards the Japanese and Germans during the 1940s and the relatively positive view of these groups held today is easily understood in terms of the broader relationship between nations – wartime enemies versus peacetime allies. The idea that structural change should precede attitudinal change has had its champions (see Pettigrew, 1998b). However, the vast majority of social psychological research has emphasized changing the attitudes of individuals – reducing prejudice one person at a time.

While a complete discussion of the many strategies proposed to accomplish this is clearly not possible, it may be observed first that most efforts to change individual intergroup attitudes involve either 'education', 'interaction', or both. Based on the perceived role of ignorance in prejudice, education programs usually involve teaching people about the out-group, or attempts to convince them to endorse diversity and tolerance (see Stephan and Stephan, 2001 for a review). Interaction involves putting people into contact with out-group members, usually in a controlled situation. Some programs, such as service learning, combine both interaction with the out-group group and education (see Stukas and Dunlap, 2002).

However, the most enduring and influential social psychological perspective on intergroup attitude change has been the intergroup-contact hypothesis (Allport, 1954; Williams, 1947). The basic premise is that interaction between members of different groups, under specified conditions, can lead to more positive intergroup attitudes. Recognizing that simply bringing groups together is just as likely to produce conflict that will reinforce existing prejudice, Allport's original model focused on the conditions necessary for contact to lead to reduction of prejudice. This basic idea has inspired a great deal of research, and there is relatively strong support for Allport's contention that cooperation, shared goals, equal status, and the support of local authorities and norms are important preconditions to positive attitude change (see Brewer and Gaertner, 2001; Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Dovidio et al., 2003; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; Pettigrew, 1998a; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Wright et al., 2005 for reviews).

Unfortunately, almost 40 years of effort focused on the necessary conditions has resulted in little attention to specifying the processes that produce attitude change (Pettigrew, 1986). However, thanks primarily to insights derived from social-identity theory (Brewer and Miller, 1984; Hewstone and Brown, 1986), the contact hypothesis has experienced something of a renaissance. The search for a process model involves, first, determining what happens during cross-group contact that leads individuals to hold a positive view of their out-group partner, and, second, determining how that positive view of the individual generalizes to alter attitudes towards the out-group as a whole. When what happens during cross-group contact was considered, much attention was given to stereotype disconfirmation (see Stephan and Stephan, 1984; Triandis, 1972). Interaction with an out-group member who disconfirmed negative stereotypes should serve to undermine these negative beliefs. While there is some evidence for this, effects are comparatively small and inconsistent (see Pettigrew, 1998a; Rothbart and John, 1985). The largest positive effects of contact appear to involve affect and evaluation. Warmth, liking, empathy, and respect for the out-group member (Batson et al., 1997; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006) and the reduction of anxiety (see Hewstone, 2003; Stephan and Stephan, 1985) seem to be key.

Consistent with this focus on positive affect, several researchers (e.g., Herek and Capitanio, 1996; Wright et al., 2002; 2005) have focused on cross-group friendships as the relationship most likely to produce positive attitude change. Using a large international European sample, Pettigrew (1997) demonstrated that having an out-group friendship predicted lower levels of subtle and blatant prejudice, greater support for pro-out-group policies, and even positive attitudes towards other unrelated out-groups. Having an out-group coworker or neighbor produced much smaller effects (see also Hamberger and Hewstone, 1997). In fact, interpersonal closeness appears to be able to produce 'extended contact effects' (Wright et al., 1997). That is, simply knowing about an in-group member who shares a close relationship with an out-group member can improve attitudes towards that out-group (also see Cameron & Rutland, 2006; Liebkind and McAlister, 1999).

Recently, Wright, Aron, and their colleagues (Aron and McLaughlin-Volpe, 2001; Wright et al., 1997, 2002; 2005) have proposed that the notion of *including the other in the self* provides a potential process model to explain how intergroup friendships lead to intergroup attitude change. The idea is that when two people become close, aspects of the other are included in the self. That is, close others begin to function as part of oneself (Aron and Aron, 1996), and regard held for oneself is extended to them. When the close other is a member of an out-group and social identities (group memberships) are salient, the other's social identity may also be included in the self. Thus, through the close friend, the out-group is included in the self and is then accorded some of the benefits usually accorded to the self (that is, positive biases in attribution and resource allocation, feelings of empathy, shared pride, etc.).

However, most of the recent debate on a process model of intergroup contact has focused on three alternative models. Brewer and Miller's (1984) *decategorization model* proposes that intergroup bias will be most effectively reduced when personal, rather than social, identities are salient. This assertion is consistent with evidence showing:

- 1 that social-identity salience heightens intergroup differentiation, stereotyping, and in-group bias (see Mullen et al., 1992)
- 2 that expectations for intergroup interactions can involve greater distrust than interpersonal interactions (Insko and Schopler, 1998)
- 3 that interactions across groups can be fraught with anxiety (Britt et al., 1996; Stephan and Stephan, 1985).

Thus, Brewer and Miller proposed that positive ‘personalized’ interactions will lead to greater differentiation of out-group members and to a reduction in the availability and utility of the category distinction.

In apparent contradiction, Hewstone and Brown’s (1986) *mutual-differentiation model* proposes that generalization from the individual to the out-group requires that group categories be salient during the interactions. If individuals interact entirely at the level of personal identities, the outcomes should have no effect on group-based attitudes. Support for the categorization approach comes from (a) research on stereotype change showing that viewing positive out-group models who are *typical*, compared to atypical, of the out-group produces greater attitude change (e.g., Wilder, 1984; Wilder et al., 1996), and (b) direct evidence of the value of group salience on generalized intergroup-contact effects (e.g., Brown et al., 1999). In fact, Brown et al. (1999) criticize the evidence for the decategorization model (e.g., Bettencourt et al., 1992; Miller et al., 1985), claiming that category memberships were probably quite salient even in their decategorized conditions.

Gaertner, Dovidio, and their colleagues have proposed a third alternative, the *common-in-group-identity model* (see Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000, for a review). They argue that intergroup bias is reduced when the members of the two groups come to view themselves as members of one superordinate category, and they provide considerable evidence for the utility of this model.

While each model takes a different approach to the issues of categorization and attitude change, a number of authors have suggested combining models. Some (Gaertner et al., 2000; Pettigrew, 1998a; Wright, 1995) have proposed a longitudinal approach in which two or three models are combined sequentially. Others (e.g., Brewer and Gaertner, 2001) have called for dual-identity models or hybrid models. There remains considerable work to be done to test these many suggestions, but the growing number of theoretical innovations demonstrate that our understanding of intergroup contact and its application to real-world problems is evolving quickly. Perhaps Brewer and Brown (1998) are correct in their assessment that ‘in the long run, cooperative contact seems to be the key to improving intergroup relations and changing the social psychological processes that underlie prejudice and discrimination’ (p. 583).

## SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

A review chapter is by nature selective, and we have attempted to focus on the social nature of stereotypes and prejudice. We have considered their close relationship with the broader intergroup relationship, describing some of the ways that the functional and structural relationships between the groups determine the beliefs and evaluations that each group makes. Stereotypes and prejudices provide explanations and justification for the status and treatment of groups and their members. Recent work on group-based emotions further demonstrates the importance of the intergroup relationship in determining the valence and content of our beliefs about and emotional responses to the out-group.

It is also clear that stereotypes and prejudices, once formed, serve to solidify and structure intergroup behavior and the broader intergroup relationship. The pattern of cross-group consensus or disagreement about the content and evaluation of group characteristics supports either harmony or conflict and helps to produce and maintain intergroup inequality or genuine respect. The self-

fulfilling nature of intergroup attitudes, stereotype threat, and institutional discrimination are all examples of ways that stereotypes and prejudice perpetuate present intergroup relations.

Theories such as aversive racism and ambivalent sexism have helped to bring into focus the complexity of intergroup attitudes and, along with a number of other related theories, provide numerous new avenues for research and application. Similarly, the strong, relatively recent focus on the targets of prejudice and discrimination has yielded a broad range of insights into this side of the equation. It may provide the basis for extending and strengthening social-identity theory’s conception of prejudice and discrimination as a dynamic interactive process between advantaged and disadvantaged groups.

There is also good reason for hope that social psychology will be able to play a more effective role in tackling societal problems associated with the negative side of stereotypes and prejudice, by providing strategies to reduce negative prejudice and encourage collective action on behalf of the disadvantaged group. While the study of stereotypes and prejudice has a long tradition in social psychology, the discipline has responded to the current dramatic increase in societal diversity with a profusion of interest and an enthusiasm for innovation and application that ensure that stereotypes and prejudice will continue to be central themes.

## NOTES

1 There is considerable debate over the issue of stereotype accuracy and what is meant by ‘objective reality’ (see Judd and Park, 1993; Lee et al., 1995). Space constraints do not allow a full discussion here.

2 Gaertner et al. (2000) provide an interesting analysis of this concept and revisit Sherif’s original study to consider it in light of more recent theorizing on the role of categorization in intergroup attitudes and behavior (see also Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000).

3 Major et al. (2002) also call for a more complex view of this phenomenon, but they present a somewhat different theoretical model, and their conclusions are more decidedly in favor of a vigilance model.

## REFERENCES

- Aboud, F.E. and Levy, S.R. (eds) (1999) 'Reducing Racial Prejudice, Discrimination, and Stereotyping: Translating Research into Programs', *Journal of Social Issues*, 55 (4):
- Aboud, F.E. and Levy, S.R. (2000) 'Interventions to Reduce Prejudice and Discrimination in Children and Adolescents', in S. Oskamp (ed.), *Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination: Social Psychological Perspectives*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 269–93.
- Abrams, D. (1990) *Political Identity: Relative Deprivation, Social Identity, and the Case of Scottish Nationalism*. Economic and Social Research Council 16–19 Initiative Occasional Paper No. 24. Social Statistics Research Unit, City University, London.
- Alexander, M.G., Brewer, M.B., and Hermann, R.K. (1999) 'Images and Affect: A Functional Analysis of Out-group Stereotypes', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77: 78–93.
- Alexander, M., Brewer, M., & Livingston, R. (2005). Putting Stereotype Content in Context: Image Theory and Interethnic Stereotypes. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31(6), 781-794.
- Allport, G.W. (1954) *The Nature of Prejudice*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
- Arkes, H. R., & Tetlock, P. E. (2004). Attributions of implicit prejudice, or "Would Jesse Jackson 'fail' the Implicit Association Test?" *Psychological Inquiry*, 15, 257-279.
- Aron, A. and Aron, E.N. (1996) 'Self and Self-Expansion in Relationships', in G.J.O. Fletcher and J. Fitness (eds), *Knowledge Structures in Close Relationships: A Social Psychological Approach*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 325–44.
- Aron, A. and McLaughlin-Volpe, T. (2001) 'Including Others in the Self: Extensions to Own and Partner's Group Memberships', in C. Sedikides and M.B. Brewer (eds), *Individual Self, Relational Self, and Collective Self: Partners, Opponents, or Strangers?* Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. pp. 89–108.
- Augoustinos, M. and Walker, I. (1998) 'The Construction of Stereotypes Within Social Psychology: From Social Cognition to Ideology', *Theory and Psychology*, 8: 629–52.
- Azzi, A.E. (1992) 'Procedural Justice and the Allocation of Power in Intergroup Relations: Studies in the United States and South Africa', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 18: 736–47.
- Banaji, M.R. and Greenwald, A.G. (1994) 'Implicit Stereotypes and Unconscious Prejudice', in M.P. Zanna and J.M. Olson (eds), *The Psychology of Prejudice: The Ontario Symposium* (vol. 7). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 55–76.
- Banaji, M.R., Nosek, B.A., & Greenwald, A.G. (2004). No Place for Nostalgia in Science: A Response to Arkes and Tetlock. *Psychological Inquiry*, 15(4), 279-310.
- Banks, J.A. (1997) *Educating Citizens in a Multicultural Society*. New York: Teachers College Press.
- Batson, C.D., Polycarpou, M.P., Harmon-Jones, E., Imhoff, H.J., Mitchener, E.C., Bednar, L.L., Klein, T.R., and Highberger, L. (1997) 'Empathy and Attitudes: Can Feelings for a Member of a Stigmatized Group Improve Feelings Towards the Group?', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 72: 105–18.
- Bettencourt, B.A., Brewer, M.B., Croak, M.R., and Miller, N. (1992) 'Cooperation and the Reduction of Intergroup Bias: The Role of Reward Structure and Social Orientation', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 28: 301–19.
- Biernat, M. and Crandall, C.S. (1994) 'Stereotyping and Contact with Social Groups: Measurement and Conceptual Issues', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 24: 659–77.
- Blanton, H., & Jaccard, J. (2006). Arbitrary Metrics in Psychology. *American Psychologist*, 61(1), 27-41.
- Bourhis, R.Y., Turner, J.C., and Gagnon, A. (1997) 'Interdependence, Social Identity and Discrimination', in R. Spears, P. Oakes, N. Ellemers, and S.A. Haslam (eds), *The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life*. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 273–95.
- Branscombe, N.R., Doosje, B., and McGarty, C. (2002) 'Antecedents and Consequences of Collective Guilt', in D.M. Mackie and E.R. Smith (eds), *From Prejudice to Intergroup Emotions: Differentiated Reactions to Social Groups*, Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
- Branscombe, N.R. and Ellemers, N. (1998) 'Coping with Group-Based Discrimination: Individualistic Versus Group-Level Strategies', in J.K. Swim and C. Stangor (eds), *Prejudice: The Target's Perspective*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 243–66.
- Branscombe, N.R., Schmitt M.T., and Harvey, R.D. (1999) 'Perceiving Pervasive Discrimination Among African Americans: Implications for Group Identification and Well-Being', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77: 135–49.
- Brauer, M., Wasel, W. and Niedenthal, P. (2000) 'Implicit and Explicit Components of Prejudice', *Review of General Psychology*,

APPEARED IN: M. A. HOGG & J. COOPER (EDS.), *THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONCISE STUDENT EDITION*. SAGE, 2007.

4: 79–101.

- Brewer, M.B. and Brown, R.J. (1998) ‘Intergroup Relations’, in D.T. Gilbert and S.T. Fiske (eds), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 4th edn (vol. 2). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. pp. 554–94.
- Brewer, M.B. and Campbell, D.T. (1976) *Ethnocentrism and Intergroup Attitudes: East African Evidence*. New York: Sage.
- Brewer, M.B. and Gaertner, S.L. (2001) ‘Towards Reduction of Prejudice: Intergroup Contact and Social Categorization’, in R. Brown and S. Gaertner (eds), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology* (vol. 4). *Intergroup Processes*. Oxford: Blackwell Press. pp. 451–72.
- Brewer, M.B. and Kramer, R.M. (1985) ‘The Psychology of Intergroup Attitudes and Behavior’, *Annual Review of Psychology*, 36: 219–44.
- Brewer, M.B. and Miller, N. (1984) ‘Beyond the Contact Hypothesis: Theoretical Perspectives On Desegregation’, in N. Miller and M.B. Brewer (eds), *Groups in Contact: The Psychology of Desegregation*. New York: Academic Press. pp. 281–302.
- Brewer, M.B., Weber, J.G., and Carini, B. (1995) ‘Person Memory in Intergroup Contexts: Categorization Versus Individuation’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69: 29–40.
- Brigham, J.C. (1971) ‘Ethnic Stereotypes’, *Psychological Bulletin*, 76: 15–38.
- Brislin, R.W. and Yoshida, T. (eds) (1994) *Intercultural Communication Training: An Introduction*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Britt, T.W. Boniecki, K.A., Vescio, T.K., and Biernat, M. (1996) ‘Intergroup Anxiety: A Person X Situation Approach’, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 22: 1177–88.
- Brown, R. (1995) *Prejudice: Its Social Psychology*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Brown, R., & Hewstone, M. (2005). An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology*, Vol. 37 (pp. 255–343). San Diego, CA: Elsevier Academic Press.
- Brown, R., Vivian, J., and Hewstone, M. (1999) ‘Changing Attitudes Through Intergroup Contact: The Effects of Group Membership Salience’, *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 29: 741–64.
- Cameron, L., & Rutland, A. (2006). Extended Contact through Story Reading in School: Reducing Children's Prejudice toward the Disabled. *Journal of Social Issues*, 62(3), 469–488.
- Campbell, D.T. (1958) ‘Common Fate, Similarity, and Other Indices of the Status of Aggregates of Persons as Social Entities’, *Behavioral Science*, 3: 14–25.
- Claire, T. and Fiske, S.T. (1998) ‘A Systemic View of Behavioral Confirmation: Counterpoint to the Individualist View’, in C. Sedikides, J. Schopler, and C.A. Insko, (eds), *Intergroup Cognition and Intergroup Behavior*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 205–31.
- Cook, S.W. (1984) ‘Cooperative Interaction in Multiethnic Contexts’, in N. Miller and M.B. Brewer (eds), *Groups in Contact: The Psychology of Desegregation*. London: Academic Press. pp. 155–85.
- Crandall, C.S. and Beasley, R.K. (2001) ‘A Perceptual Theory of Legitimacy: Politics, Prejudice, Social Institutions, and Moral Value’, in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 77–102.
- Crocker, J., Cornwell, B. and Major, B. (1993) ‘The Stigma of Overweight: Affective Consequences of Attributional Ambiguity’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 64: 60–70.
- Crocker, J. and Major, B. (1989) ‘Social Stigma and Self-Esteem: The Self-Protective Properties of Stigma’, *Psychological Review*, 96: 608–30.
- Crocker, J., Major, B., and Steele, C. (1998) ‘Social Stigma’, in D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, and G. Lindley (eds), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 4th edn (vol. 2). Boston, MA: McGraw-Hill. pp. 504–53.
- Crocker, J. and Quinn, D.M. (2001) ‘Psychological Consequences of Devalued Identities’, in R. Brown and S. Gaertner (eds), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology* (vol. 4). *Intergroup Processes*. Oxford: Blackwell Press. pp. 238–57.
- Croizet, J.-C. and Claire, T. (1998) ‘Extending the Concept of Stereotype and Threat to Social Class: The Intellectual Underperformance of Students From Low Socioeconomic Backgrounds’, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 24: 588–94.
- Crosby, F. (1984) ‘The Denial of Personal Discrimination’, *American Behavioral Scientist*, 27: 371–86.
- Crosby, F., Bromley, S., and Saxe, L. (1980) ‘Recent Unobtrusive Studies of Black and White Discrimination and Prejudice: A Literature Review’, *Psychological Bulletin*, 87: 546–63.
- Crosby, F. and Ropp, S.A. (2002) ‘Awakening to Discrimination’, in M. Ross and D.T. Miller (eds), *The Justice Motive in*

APPEARED IN: M. A. HOGG & J. COOPER (EDS.), *THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONCISE STUDENT EDITION*. SAGE, 2007.

- Everyday Life*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Dasgupta, N., & Rivera, L.M. (2006). From automatic antigay prejudice to behavior: The moderating role of conscious beliefs about gender and behavioral control. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 91(2), 268-280.
- DePaulo, B.M. and Coleman, L.M. (1986) 'Talking to Children, Foreigners, and Retarded Adults', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 51: 945-59.
- Devine, P.G. (1989) 'Stereotypes and Prejudice: Their Automatic and Controlled Components', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 56: 5-18.
- Devine, P.G. and Elliot, A.J. (1995) 'Are Racial Stereotypes Really Fading? The Princeton Trilogy Revisited', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 21: 1139-50.
- Diekman, A.B., & Eagly, A.H. (2000). Stereotypes as dynamic constructs: Women and men of the past, present, and future. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 26(10), 1171-1188.
- Dijker, A.J. (1987) 'Emotional Reactions to Ethnic Minorities', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 17: 305-25.
- Dion, K.L. and Kawakami, K. (1996) 'Ethnicity and Perceived Discrimination in Toronto: Another Look at the Personal/Group Discrimination Discrepancy', *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science*, 28: 203-13.
- Doosje, B., Spears, R., and Koomen, W. (1995) 'When Bad Isn't All Bad: Strategic Use of Sample Information in Generalization and Stereotyping', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69: 642-55.
- Dovidio, J.F., Brigham, J.C., Johnson, B.T., and Gaertner, S.L. (1996) 'Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination: Another Look', in C.N. Macrae, C. Stangor, and M. Hewstone (eds), *Stereotypes and Stereotyping*. New York: Guilford Press. pp. 276-319.
- Dovidio, J.F., Gaertner, S.L., & Kawakami, K. (2003). Intergroup contact: The past, present, and the future. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 6(1), 5-20.
- Dovidio, J.F., Kawakami, K., and Beach, K.R. (2001) 'Implicit and Explicit Attitudes: Examination of the Relationship Between Measures of Intergroup Bias', in R. Brown and S. Gaertner (eds), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology* (vol. 4). *Intergroup Processes*. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 175-97.
- Dovidio, J.F., Kawakami, K., and Gaertner, S.L. (2002) 'Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and Interracial Interaction', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82: 62-8.
- Dovidio, J.F., Mann J., and Gaertner, S.L. (1989) 'Resistance to Affirmative Action: The Implications of Aversive Racism', in F. Blanchard and F. Crosby (eds), *Affirmative Action in Perspective*. New York: Springer-Verlag. pp. 83-102.
- Eagly, A.H. (1987) *Sex Differences in Social Behavior: A Social-Role Interpretation*. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Eagly, A.H. and Mladinic, A. (1993) 'Are People Prejudiced Against Women? Some Answers from Research on Attitudes, Gender Stereotypes and Judgments of Competence', in W. Stroebe and M. Hewstone (eds), *European Review of Social Psychology* (vol.5) New York: Wiley. pp. 1-35.
- Eagly, A.H. and Wood, W. (1999) 'The Origins of Sex Differences in Human Behavior: Evolved Dispositions Versus Social Roles', *American Psychologist*, 54: 408-23.
- Eberhardt, J.L. and Fiske, S.T. (eds) (1989) *Confronting Racism: The Problem and the Response*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Eberhardt, J.L. and Randall, J.L. (1997) 'The Essential Notion of Race', *Psychological Science*, 8: 198-203.
- Ellemers, N. (1993) 'The Influence of Socio-Structural Variables on Identity Management Strategies', in W. Stroebe and M. Hewstone (eds), *European Review of Social Psychology* (vol. 4). Chichester: Wiley. pp. 27- 57.
- Ellemers, N. (2001) 'Individual Upward Mobility and the Perceived Legitimacy of Intergroup Relations', in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 205-22.
- Ellemers, N. and Barreto, M. (2001) 'The Impact of Relative Group Status: Affective, Perceptual and Behavioral Consequences', in R. Brown and S. Gaertner (eds), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology*. (vol. 4). *Intergroup Processes*. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 324-43.
- Ellemers, N., Spears, R., and Doosje, B. (1997a) 'Sticking Together or Falling Apart: In-Group Identification as a Psychological Determinant of Group Commitment Versus Individual Mobility', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 72: 617-26.
- Ellemers, N., Van Rijswijk, W., Roefs, M., and Simons, C. (1997b) 'Bias in Intergroup Perceptions: Balancing Group Identity with Social Reality', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23: 186-98.
- Esses, V.M., & Dovidio, J.F. (2002). The role of emotions in determining willingness to engage in intergroup contact. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28(9), 1202-1214.

APPEARED IN: M. A. HOGG & J. COOPER (EDS.), *THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONCISE STUDENT EDITION*. SAGE, 2007.

- .Esses, V.M., Haddock, G., and Zanna, M.P. (1993) 'Values, Stereotypes, and Emotions as Determinants of Intergroup Attitudes', in D.M. Mackie and D. Lewis Hamilton (eds), *Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Interactive Processes in Group Perception*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 137–66.
- Esses, V.M., Jackson, L.M., Dovidio, J.F., & Hodson, G. (2005). Instrumental relations among groups: Group competition, conflict, and prejudice. In J. F. Dovidio, P. Glick & L. A. Rudman (Eds.), *On the nature of prejudice: Fifty years after Allport* (pp. 227–243). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing
- Feldman-Barrett, L. and Swim, J.K. (1998) 'Appraisals of Prejudice and Discrimination', in J.K. Swim and C. Stangor (eds), *Prejudice: The Target's Perspective*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 12–37.
- Fiske, S.T. (1993a) 'Social Cognition and Social Perception', *Annual Review of Psychology*, 44: 155–94.
- Fiske, S.T. (1993b) 'Controlling Other People: The Impact of Power on Stereotyping', *American Psychologist*, 48: 621–628.
- Fiske, S.T. (1998) 'Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination', in D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, and G. Lindzey (eds), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 4th edn. New York: McGraw-Hill. pp. 357–411.
- Fiske, S.T. and Depret, E. (1996) 'Control, Interdependence and Power: Understanding Social Cognition and Its Social Context', in W. Stroebe and M. Hewstone (eds), *European Review of Social Psychology* (vol. 7). Chichester: Wiley.
- Fiske, S.T., Xu, J., Cuddy, A.J.C., and Glick, P. (1999) 'Respect Versus Liking: Status and Interdependence Underlie Ambivalent Stereotypes', *Journal of Social Issues*, 55: 473–89.
- Florack, A., Scarabis M., & Bless, H. (2001). When do associations matter?: the use of implicit associations toward ethnic groups in person judgments, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 37, 518–524
- Fowers, B.J., & Davidov, B.J. (2006). The virtue of multiculturalism: Personal transformation, character, and openness to the other. *American Psychologist*, 61(6), 581–594.
- Gaertner, S.L. and Dovidio, J.F. (1986) 'The Aversive Form of Racism', in J.F. Dovidio and S.L. Gaertner (eds), *Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 61–89.
- Gaertner, S.L. and Dovidio, J.F. (2000) *Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common Ingroup Identity Model*. Philadelphia: Psychology Press.
- Gaertner, S.L., & Dovidio, J.F. (2005). Understanding and addressing contemporary racism: From Aversive Racism to the Common Ingroup Identity Model. *Journal of Social Issues*, 61(3), 615–639.
- Gaertner, S.L., Dovidio, J.F., Banker, B.S., Houlette, M., Johnson, K.M., and McGlynn, E.A. (2000) 'Reducing Intergroup Conflict: From Superordinate Goals to Decategorization, Recategorization, and Mutual Differentiation', *Group Dynamics*, 4: 98–114.
- Gardner, R.C. (1973) 'Ethnic Stereotypes: The Traditional Approach, a New Look', *Canadian Psychologist*, 14: 133–48.
- Gilbert, G.M. (1951) 'Stereotype Persistence and Change Among College Students', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 46: 245–54.
- Giles, H. (ed.) (1977) *Language, Ethnicity, and Intergroup Relations*. London: Academic Press.
- Glick, P. (in press) 'Sacrificial Lambs Dressed in Wolves' Clothing: Envious Prejudice, Ideology, and the Scapegoating of the Jews', in L.S. Newman and R. Erber (eds), *What Social Psychology Can Tell Us About the Holocaust*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Glick, P. and Fiske, S.T. (2001a) 'Ambivalent Sexism', in M.P. Zanna (ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (vol. 33). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 115–88.
- Glick, P. and Fiske, S.T. (2001b) 'Ambivalent Stereotypes as Legitimizing Ideologies: Differentiating Paternalistic and Resentful Prejudice', in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 278–306.
- Gonzales, P.M., Blanton, H., and Williams, K.J. (2002) 'The Effects of Stereotype Threat and Double-Minority Status on the Test Performance of Latino Women', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28: 659–70.
- Goodwin, S.A., Gubin, A., Fiske, S.T., and Yzerbyt, V.Y. (2000) 'Power Can Bias Impression Processes: Stereotyping Subordinates by Default and by Design', *Group Processes and Intergroup Relations*, 3: 227–56.
- Grant, P.R. and Brown, R. (1995) 'From Ethnocentrism to Collective Protest: Responses to Relative Deprivation and Threats to Social Identity', *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 58: 195–211.
- Hamberger, J. and Hewstone, M. (1997) 'Inter-Ethnic Contact as a Predictor of Blatant and Subtle Prejudice: Tests of a Model in Four West European Nations', *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 36: 173–90.
- Hamilton, D.L. and Sherman, S.J. (1996) 'Perceiving Persons and Groups', *Psychological Review*, 103: 336–55.

APPEARED IN: M. A. HOGG & J. COOPER (EDS.), *THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONCISE STUDENT EDITION*. SAGE, 2007.

- Hamilton, D.L., Sherman, S.J., and Lickel, B. (1998) 'Perceiving Social Groups: The Importance of the Entitativity Continuum', in C. Sedikides, J. Schopler, and C.A. Insko (eds), *Intergroup Cognition and Intergroup Behavior*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 47–74.
- Hamilton, D.L., Stroessner, S.J., and Driscoll, D.M. (1994) 'Social Cognition and the Study of Stereotyping', in P.G. Devine and D.L. Hamilton (eds), *Social Cognition: Impact on Social Psychology*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 291–321.
- Haslam, S. A., Turner, J. C., Oakes, P.J., Reynolds, K.J., & Doosje, B. (2002). From personal pictures in the head to collective tools in the world: How shared stereotypes allow groups to represent and change social reality. In C. McGarty, V. Y. Yzerbyt, & R. Spears, (Eds.), *Stereotypes as explanations: The formation of meaningful beliefs about social groups* (pp. 157–185). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Heatherton, T.F., Kleck, R.E., Hebl, M.R., and Hull, J.G. (eds) (2000) *The Social Psychology of Stigma*. New York: Guilford.
- Herek, G.M. and Capitanio, J.P. (1996) 'Some of My Best Friends: Intergroup Contact, Concealable Stigma, and Heterosexuals' Attitudes Towards Gay Men and Lesbians', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 22: 412–24.
- Hewstone, M. (2003). Intergroup contact: Panacea for prejudice?. *Psychologist*, 16(7), 352–355.
- Hewstone, M. and Brown, R. (1986) 'Contact Is Not Enough: An Intergroup Perspective on the "Contact Hypothesis"', in M. Hewstone and R. Brown (eds), *Contact and Conflict in Intergroup Encounters. Social Psychology and Society*. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 1–44.
- Hoffman, C. and Hurst, N. (1990) 'Gender Stereotypes: Perception or Rationalization?', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58: 197–208.
- Hogg, M.A. (2000) 'Subjective Uncertainty Reduction Through Self-Categorization: A Motivational Theory of Social Identity Processes', *European Review of Social Psychology*, 11: 223–55.
- Hogg, M.A. and Abrams, D. (1988) *Social Identification: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes*, New York: Routledge.
- Hogg, M.A. and Abrams, D. (1993) 'Towards a Single-Process Uncertainty-Reduction Model of Social Motivation in Groups', in M.A. Hogg and D. Abrams (eds), *Group Motivation: Social Psychological Perspectives*. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. pp. 173–90.
- Hollister, L., Day, N.E., and Jesiatis, P.T. (1993) 'Diversity Programs: Key to Competitiveness or Just Another Fad', *Organizational Development Journal*, 11 (4): 49–59.
- Hugenberg K. & Bodenhausen G.V. (2003). Facing prejudice: implicit prejudice and the perception of facial threat, *Psychological Science* 14, 640–643.
- Insko, C.A. and Schopler, J. (1998) 'Differential Distrust of Groups and Individuals', in C. Sedikides, J. Schopler, and C.A. Insko (eds), *Intergroup Cognition and Intergroup Behavior*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 75–107.
- Iyer, A., Leach, C.W., & Crosby, F.J. (2003). White guilt and racial compensation: The benefits and limits of self-focus. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29(1), 117–129.
- Jackman, M.R. (1994) *The Velvet Glove: Paternalism and Conflict in Gender, Class, and Race Relations*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Jackson, L.A., Hodge, C.N., Gerard, D.A., Ingram, J.M., Ervin, K.S., and Sheppard, L.A. (1996) 'Cognition, Affect, and Behavior in the Prediction of Group Attitudes', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 22: 306–16.
- Jones, E.E., Farina, A., Hastorf, A.H., Markus, H., Miller, D.T., and Scott, R.A. (1984) *Social Stigma: The Psychology of Marked Relationships*. New York: Freeman.
- Jones, J.M. (1996) *Prejudice and Racism*, 2nd edn. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Jost, J.T. and Banaji, M.R. (1994) 'The Role of Stereotyping in System-Justification and the Production of False-Consciousness', *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 33: 1–27.
- Jost, J.T., Burgess, D., and Mosso, C. (2001) 'Conflicts of Legitimation Among Self, Group, and System: The Integrative Potential of System-Justification Theory', in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 363–88.
- Judd, C.M. and Park, B. (1993) 'Definition and Assessment of Accuracy in Social Stereotypes', *Psychological Review*, 100: 109–28.
- Jussim, L., McCauley, C.R., and Lee, Y. (1995) 'Why Study Stereotype Accuracy and Inaccuracy?', in Y. Lee, L. Jussim, and C.R. McCauley (eds), *Stereotype Accuracy*. Washington DC: American Psychological Association. pp. 3–27.
- Kaiser, C.R. and Miller, C.T. (2001a) 'Reacting to Impending Discrimination: Compensation for Prejudice and Attributions to

APPEARED IN: M. A. HOGG & J. COOPER (EDS.), *THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONCISE STUDENT EDITION*. SAGE, 2007.

- Discrimination', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27: 1357–67.
- Kaiser, C.R. and Miller, C.T. (2001b) 'Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attributions to Discrimination', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27: 254–63.
- Karlins, M., Coffman, T.L., and Walters, G. (1969) 'On the Fading of Social Stereotypes: Studies in Three Generations of College Students', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 13: 1–16.
- Katz, D. and Braly, K. (1933) 'Racial Stereotypes of One Hundred College Students', *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 28: 280–90.
- Katz, I. and Glass, D.C. (1979) 'An Ambivalence-Amplification Theory of Behavior Towards the Stigmatized', in W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds), *The Social Psychology of intergroup relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 55–70.
- Katz, I. and Hass, R.G. (1988) 'Racial Ambivalence and American Value Conflict: Correlational and Priming Studies of Dual Cognitive Structures', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 55: 893–905.
- Kay, A.C., & Jost, J.T. (2003). Complementary Justice: Effects of 'Poor but Happy' and 'Poor but Honest' Stereotype Exemplars on System Justification and Implicit Activation of the Justice Motive. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 85(5), 823–837.
- Kramer, R.M. and Carnevale, P.J. (2001) 'Trust and Intergroup Negotiations', in R. Brown and S. Gaertner (eds), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology* (vol. 4). *Intergroup Processes*. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 431–50.
- Kray, L.J., Thompson, L., and Galinsky, A. (2001) 'Battle of the Sexes: Gender Stereotype Confirmation and Reactance in Negotiations', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 80: 942–58.
- Lalonde, R.N. and Cameron, J.E. (1994) 'Behavioral Responses to Discrimination: A Focus on Action', in M.P. Zanna and J.M. Olson (eds), *The Psychology of Prejudice: The Ontario Symposium* (vol. 7). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 257–88.
- Lalonde, R.N. and Gardner, R.C. (1989) 'An Intergroup Perspective on Stereotype Organization and Processing', *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 28: 289–303.
- Lalonde, R.N. and Silverman, R.A. (1994) 'Behavioral Preferences in Response to Social Injustice: The Effects of Group Permeability and Social Identity Salience', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 66: 78–85.
- Leach, C.W., Snider, N., and Iyer, A. (2002) "Poisoning the Consciences of the Fortunate": The Experience of Relative Advantage and Support for Social Equality', in I. Walker and H. Smith (eds), *Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136–63.
- LeCouteur, A. and Augoustinos, M. (2001) 'The Language of Prejudice and Racism', in M. Augoustinos and K.J. Reynolds (eds), *Understanding Prejudice, Racism, and Social Conflict*. London: Sage. pp. 215–30.
- Lee, Y.-T., Jussim, L.J., and McCauley, C.R. (eds) (1995) *Stereotype Accuracy: Toward Appreciating Group Differences*. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
- Lerner, M.J. (1980) *The Belief in a Just World*. New York: Plenum.
- Levy, B. (1996) 'Improving Memory in Old Age Through Implicit Self-Stereotyping', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71: 1092–1107.
- Leyens, J.-Ph., Yzerbyt, V., and Schadron, G. (1992) 'Stereotypes and Social Judgeability', in W. Stroebe and M. Hewstone (eds), *European Review of Social Psychology* (vol. 3). Chichester: Wiley. pp. 91–120.
- Liebkind, K. and McAlister, A.L. (1999) 'Extending Contact Through Peer Modeling to Promote Tolerance in Finland', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 29: 765–80.
- Lippmann, W. (1922) *Public Opinion*. New York: Harcourt Brace.
- Lord, C.G. and Saenz, D.S. (1985) 'Memory Deficits and Memory Surfeits: Differential Cognitive Consequences of Tokenism for Token and Observers', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 49: 918–26.
- Maass, A. and Arcuri, L. (1992) 'The Role of Language in the Persistence of Stereotypes', in G.R. Semin and K. Fiedler (eds), *Language, Interaction and Social Cognition*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. pp. 129–43.
- MacDonald, T.K. and Zanna, M.P. (1998) 'Cross-Dimension Ambivalence Toward Social Groups: Can Ambivalence Affect Intentions to Hire Feminists?', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 24: 427–41.
- Mackie, D.M., Devos, T., and Smith, E.R. (2000) 'Intergroup Emotions: Explaining offensive Action Tendencies in an Intergroup Context', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 79: 602–16.
- Mackie, D.M. and Hamilton, D.L. (eds) (1993) *Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Interactive Processes in Group Perception*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.

APPEARED IN: M. A. HOGG & J. COOPER (EDS.), *THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONCISE STUDENT EDITION*. SAGE, 2007.

- Major, B. (1994) 'From Social Inequality to Personal Entitlement: The Role of Social Comparisons, Legitimacy Appraisals, and Group Membership', *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 26: 293–355.
- Major, B. and Crocker, J. (1993) 'Social Stigma: The Consequences of Attributional Ambiguity', in D.M. Mackie and D.L. Hamilton (eds), *Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Interactive Processes in Group Perception*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 345–70.
- Major, B., Quinton, W.J., and McCoy, S.K. (2002) 'Antecedents and Consequences of Attributions to Discrimination: Theoretical and Empirical Advances', in M.P. Zanna (ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (vol. 34). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 251–330.
- Major, B. and Schmader, T. (1998) 'Coping with Stigma Through Psychological Disengagement', in J.K. Swim and C. Stangor (eds), *Prejudice: The Target's Perspective*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 219–42.
- Major, B. and Schmader, T. (2001) 'Legitimacy and the Construal of Social Disadvantage', in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 176–204.
- Martin, J. (1986) 'The Tolerance of Injustice', in J.M. Olson, C.P. Herman, and M.P. Zanna (eds), *Relative Deprivation and Social Comparison: The Ontario Symposium* (vol. 4). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 217–42.
- McConahay, J.B. (1986) 'Modern Racism, Ambivalence and the Modern Racism Scale', in J.F. Dovidio and S.L. Gaertner (eds), *Prejudice, Discrimination and Racism*. Orlando, FL: Academic Press. pp. 91–125.
- McConnell, A. R., & Liebold, J. M. (2001). Relations between the Implicit Association Test, explicit racial attitudes, and discriminatory behavior. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 37, 435–442.
- McGarty, C., Yzerbyt, V.Y., & Spears, R. (2002). *Stereotypes as explanations: The formation of meaningful beliefs about social groups*. Cambridge University Press.
- Miller, N., Brewer, M.B., and Edwards, K. (1985) 'Cooperative Interaction in Desegregated Settings: A Laboratory Analogue', *Journal of Social Issues*, 41: 63–80.
- Mlicki, P.P. and Ellemers, N. (1996) 'Being Different or Being Better? National Stereotypes and Identifications of Polish and Dutch Students', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 26: 97–114.
- Moscovici, S. (1981) 'On Social Representation', in J. Forgas (ed.), *Social Cognition*. London: Academic Press. pp. 181–209.
- Mullen, B. (1991) 'Group Composition, Salience, and Cognitive Representations: The Phenomenology of Being in a Group', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 27: 297–323.
- Mullen, B., Brown, R., and Smith, C. (1992) 'Intergroup Bias as a Function of Salience, Relevance, and Status: An Integration', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 22: 103–22.
- Murrell, A.J., Dietz-Uhler, B.L., Dovidio, J.F., Gaertner, S.L., and Drout, E. (1994) 'Aversive Racism and Resistance to Affirmative Action: Perceptions of Justice Are Not Necessarily Color Blind', *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 15: 71–86.
- Ng, S.H. (1982) 'Power and Intergroup Discrimination', in H. Tajfel (ed.), *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*. London: Cardiff University Press. pp. 179–206.
- Ng, S.H. and Bradac, J.J. (1993) *Power in Language: Verbal Communication and Social Influence*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Oakes, P. (2001) 'The Root of All Evil in Intergroup Relations? Unearthing the Categorization Process', in R. Brown and S. Gaertner (eds), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology* (vol. 4). *Intergroup Processes*. Oxford: Blackwell Press. pp. 3–21.
- Oakes, P.J. and Haslam, S.A. (2001) 'Distortion v. Meaning: Categorization on Trial for Inciting Intergroup Hatred', in M. Augoustinos and K.J. Reynolds (eds), *Understanding Prejudice, Racism, and Social Conflict*. London: Sage. pp. 179–94.
- Oakes, P.J., Haslam, S.A., and Turner, J.C. (1994) *Stereotyping and Social Reality*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Olson, J. and Hafer, C.L. (2001) 'Tolerance of Personal Deprivation', in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 157–75.
- Olson, J.M., Roese, N.J., Meen, J., and Robertson, D.J. (1995) 'The Preconditions and Consequences of Relative Deprivation: Two Field Studies', *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 25: 944–64.
- Operario, D. and Fiske, S.T. (1998) 'Racism Equals Power Plus Prejudice: A Social Psychological Equation for Racial Oppression', in J.L. Eberhardt and S.T. Fiske (eds), *Confronting Racism: The Problem and the Response*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. pp. 33–53.
- Operario, D. and Fiske, S.T. (2001) 'Stereotypes: Content, Structure, Process, and Context', in R. Brown and S. Gaertner (eds), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology* (vol. 4). *Intergroup Processes*. Oxford: Blackwell Press. pp. 22–44.

APPEARED IN: M. A. HOGG & J. COOPER (EDS.), *THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONCISE STUDENT EDITION*. SAGE, 2007.

- Oskamp, S. (ed.) (2000) *Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination: Social Psychological Perspectives*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Oskamp, S. and Jones, J.M. (2000) 'Promising Practice in Reducing Prejudice: A Report from the President's Initiative on Race', in S. Oskamp (ed.), *Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination: Social Psychological Perspectives*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 319–34.
- Oyserman, D. and Swim, J.K. (eds) (2001) 'Stigma: An Insider's Perspective', *Journal of Social Issues*, 57 (1):
- Pettigrew, T.F. (1958) 'Personality and Sociocultural Factors in Intergroup Attitudes: A Cross-National Comparison', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 2: 29–42.
- Pettigrew, T.F. (1985) 'New Black-White Patterns: How Best to Conceptualize Them?', *Annual Review of Sociology*, 11: 329–46.
- Pettigrew, T.F. (1986) 'The Intergroup Contact Hypothesis Reconsidered', in M. Hewstone and R. Brown (eds), *Contact and Conflict in Intergroup Encounters*. New York: Blackwell. pp. 169–95.
- Pettigrew, T.F. (1991) 'Normative Theory in Intergroup Relations: Explaining Both Harmony and Conflict', *Psychology and Developing Societies*, 3: 3–16.
- Pettigrew, T.F. (1997) 'Generalized Intergroup Contact Effects on Prejudice', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23: 173–85.
- Pettigrew, T.F. (1998a) 'Intergroup Contact Theory', *Annual Review of Psychology*, 49: 65–85.
- Pettigrew, T.F. (1998b) 'Prejudice and Discrimination on the College Campus', in J.L. Eberhardt and S.T. Fiske (eds), *Confronting Racism: The Problem and the Response*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. pp. 263–79.
- Pettigrew, T.F. (2001) 'Intergroup Relations in National and International Relations', in R. Brown and S. Gaertner (eds), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology* (vol. 4). *Intergroup Processes*. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 514–32.
- Pettigrew, T.F. and Martin, J. (1987) 'Shaping the Organizational Context for Black American Inclusion', *Journal of Social Issues*, 43: 41–78.
- Pettigrew, T.F. and Meertens, R.W. (1995) 'Subtle and Blatant Prejudice in Western Europe', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 25: 57–75.
- Pettigrew, T.F., & Tropp, L.R. (2006). A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 90(5), 751–783.
- Platow, M.J. and Hunter, J. (2001) 'Realistic Intergroup Conflict: Prejudice, Power, and Protest', in M. Augoustinos and K.J. Reynolds (eds), *Understanding Prejudice, Racism, and Social Conflict*. London: Sage. pp. 195–212.
- Postmes, T., Branscombe, N.R., Spears, R., and Young, H. (1999) 'Personal and Group Judgments of Discretion and Privilege: Resolving The Discrepancy', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 76: 320–38.
- Pruitt, D.G. (1989) 'Social Conflict', in D.T. Gilbert, S.T. Fiske, and G. Lindzey (eds), *The Handbook of Social Psychology*, 4th edn. New York: McGraw-Hill. pp. 470–503.
- Quinn, K.A., Roese, N.J., Pennington, G.L., and Olson, J.M. (1999) 'The Personal/Group Discrimination Discrepancy: The Role of Informational Complexity', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 25: 1430–40.
- Reynolds, K.J. and Turner, J.C. (2001) 'Prejudice as a Group Process: The Role of Social Identity', in M. Augoustinos and K.J. Reynolds (eds), *Understanding Prejudice, Racism, and Social Conflict*. London: Sage. pp. 159–78.
- Ridgeway, C.L. (2001) 'The Emergence of Status Beliefs: From Structural Inequality to Legitimizing Ideology', in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 257–77.
- Ridgeway, C.L. and Balkwell, J.W. (1997) 'Group Processes and the Diffusion of Status Beliefs', *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 60: 14–31.
- Rothbart, M. and John, O.P. (1985) 'Social Categorization and Behavioral Episodes: A Cognitive Analysis of the Effects of Intergroup Contact', *Journal of Social Issues*, 41: 81–104.
- Rothbart, M. and Taylor, M. (1992) 'Category Labels and Social Reality: Do We View Social Categories as Natural Kinds?', in G.R. Semin and K. Fiedler (eds), *Language, Interaction and Social Cognition*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. pp. 11–36.
- Rudman, L.A., Ashmore, R.D., & Gary, M.L. (2001). 'Unlearning' automatic biases: The malleability of implicit prejudice and stereotypes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81(5), 856–868.
- Ruggiero, K.M. and Taylor, D.M. (1995) 'Coping with Discrimination: How Disadvantaged Group Members Perceive the Discrimination That Confronts Them', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 68: 826–38.
- Ruggiero, K.M. and Taylor, D.M. (1997) 'Why Minority Group Members Perceive or Do Not Perceive the Discrimination That

APPEARED IN: M. A. HOGG & J. COOPER (EDS.), *THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONCISE STUDENT EDITION*. SAGE, 2007.

- Confronts Them: The Role of Self-Esteem and Social Support', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 72: 373–89.
- Sachdev, I. and Bourhis, R.Y. (1991) 'Power and Status Differentials in Minority and Majority Group Relations', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 21: 1–24.
- Schmitt, M.T. and Branscombe, N.R. (2002) 'The Causal Loci of Attributions to Prejudice', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 28: 620–28.
- Sears, D.O. (1988) 'Symbolic Racism', in P.A. Katz and D.A. Taylor (eds), *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*. New York: Plenum Press. pp. 53–84.
- Sherif, M. (1966) *Group Conflict and Co-operation: Their Social Psychology*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Sidanius, J., Levin, S., Federico, C.M., and Pratto, F. (2001) 'Legitimizing Ideologies: The Social Dominance Approach', in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 307–31.
- Sidanius, J. and Pratto, F. (1999) *Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Simon, B. (1993) 'On the Asymmetry in the Cognitive Construal of Ingroup and Outgroup: A Model of Egocentric Social Categorization', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 23: 131–47.
- Simon, B. (1998) 'Individuals, Groups, and Social Change: On the Relationship Between Individual and Collective Self-Interpretations and Collective Action', in C. Sedikides, J. Schopler, and C.A. Insko (eds), *Intergroup Cognition and Intergroup Behavior*. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 257–82.
- Simon, B., Aufderheide, B. and Kampmeier, C. (2001) 'The Social Psychology of Minority–Majority Relations', in R. Brown and S. Gaertner (eds), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology* (vol. 4). *Intergroup Processes*. Oxford: Blackwell Press. pp. 303–23.
- Simon, B. and Klandermans, B. (2001) 'Politicized Collective Identity: A Social Psychological Analysis', *American Psychologist*, 56: 319–31.
- Sinclair, L. and Kunda, Z. (1999) 'Reactions to a Black Professional: Motivated Inhibition and Activation of Conflicting Stereotypes', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77: 885–904.
- Smith, A.E., Jussim, L., and Eccles, J. (1999) 'Do Self-Fulfilling Prophecies Accumulate, Dissipate, or Remain Stable over Time?', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77: 548–65.
- Smith, E.R. (1993) 'Social Identity and Social Emotions: Toward New Conceptualizations of Prejudice', in D.M. Mackie and D.L. Hamilton (eds), *Affect, Cognition, and Stereotyping: Interactive Processes in Group Perception*. San Diego, CA : Academic Press. pp. 297–315.
- Smith, E.R. and Ho, C. (2002) 'Prejudice as Intergroup Emotion: Integrating Relative Deprivation and Social Comparison Explanations of Prejudice', in I. Walker and H. Smith (eds), *Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 332–48.
- Snyder, M. (1992) 'Motivational Foundations of Behavioral Confirmation', in Zanna, M.P. (ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (vol. 25). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 67–114.
- Snyder, M. and Swann, W.B., Jr. (1978) 'Behavioral Confirmation in Social Interaction: From Social Perception to Social Reality', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 14: 148–62.
- Snyder, M., Tanke, E.D., and Berscheid, E. (1977) 'Social Perception and Interpersonal Behavior: On the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Social Stereotypes', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35: 656–66.
- Spears, R., Jetten, J., and Doosje, B. (2001) 'The (Il)legitimacy of Ingroup Bias: From Social Reality to Social Resistance', in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology Justice and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 332–62.
- Spencer, S.J., Steele, C.M., and Quinn, D.M. (1999) 'Stereotype Threat and Women's Math Performance', *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 35: 4–28.
- Stangor, C. and Schaller, M. (1996) 'Stereotypes as Individual and Collective Representations', in C.N. Macrae, C. Stangor, and M. Hewstone (eds), *Stereotypes and Stereotyping*. New York: Guilford. pp. 3–40.
- Stangor, C., Sullivan, L.A., and Ford, T.E. (1991) 'Affective and Cognitive Determinants of Prejudice', *Social Cognition*, 9: 359–80.
- Stangor, C., Swim, J.K., Van Allen, K.L., and Sechrist, G.B. (2002) 'Reporting Discrimination in Public and Private Contexts', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82: 69–74.
- Steele, C.M. (1998) 'A Threat in the Air: How Stereotypes Shape Intellectual Identity and Performance', in J.L. Eberhardt and S.T. Fiske (eds), *Confronting Racism: The Problem and the Response*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. pp. 202–33.

APPEARED IN: M. A. HOGG & J. COOPER (EDS.), *THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONCISE STUDENT EDITION*. SAGE, 2007.


- Steele, C.M. and Aronson, J. (1995) 'Stereotype Vulnerability and the Intellectual Test Performance of African-Americans', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69: 797–811.
- Steele, C.M., Spencer, S., and Aronson, J. (2002) 'Stereotype Threat', in M.P. Zanna, (ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (vol. 34). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 379–440.
- Stephan, W.G. and Stephan, C. (1984) 'The Role of Ignorance in Intergroup Relations', in N. Miller and M.B. Brewer (eds), *Groups in Contact: The Psychology of Desegregation*. New York: Academic Press. pp. 229–56.
- Stephan, W.G. and Stephan, C. (1985) 'Intergroup Anxiety', *Journal of Social Issues*, 41: 157–176.
- Stephan, W.G. and Stephan, C. (2001) *Improving Intergroup Relations*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Stone, J., Lynch, C.I., Sjomeling, M., and Darley, J.M. (1999) 'Stereotype Threat Effects on Black and White Athletic Performance', *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 77: 1213–27.
- Stukas, A.A. and Dunlap, M.R. (eds) (2002) 'Community Involvement, Service-Learning, and Social Activism', *Journal of Social Issues*, 58 (3):
- Stürmer, S., & Simon, B. (2004). Collective action: Towards a dual-pathway model. In W. Stroebe, & M. Hewstone (Eds.), *European review of social psychology*, Vol 15 (pp. 59-99). Hove, England: Psychology Press.
- Sumner, W.G. (1906) *Folkways*. Boston, MA: Ginn.
- Swim, J.K. and Stangor, C. (eds) (1998) *Prejudice: The Target's Perspective*. San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Tajfel, H. (1981) *Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology*. London: Cambridge University Press.
- Tajfel, H. (1982) *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Tajfel, H. and Turner, J.C. (1979) 'An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict', in W.G. Austin and S. Worchel (eds), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole. pp. 33–48.
- Taylor, D.M. (1981) 'Stereotypes and Intergroup Relations', in R.C. Gardner and R. Kalin (eds), *A Canadian Social Psychology of Ethnic Relations*. Toronto, ON: Methuen. pp. 151–71.
- Taylor, D.M. and McKirnan, D.J. (1984) 'A Five Stage Model of Intergroup Relations', *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 23: 291–300.
- Taylor, D.M. and Moghaddam, F.M. (1994). *Theories of Intergroup Relations: International and Social Psychological Perspectives*, 2nd edn. Westport, CT: Preager.
- Taylor, D.M., Ruggiero, K.M., and Louis, W.R. (1996) 'Personal/Group Discrimination Discrepancy: Towards a Two-Factor Explanation', *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science*, 28: 193–202.
- Taylor, D.M., Wright, S.C., Moghaddam, F.M., and Lalonde, R.N. (1990) 'The Personal/Group Discrimination Discrepancy: Perceiving My Group, but Not Myself, to Be a Target for Discrimination', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 16 (2): 254–62.
- Taylor, D.M., Wright, S.C., and Porter, L.E. (1994) 'Dimensions of Perceived Discrimination: The Personal/Group Discrimination Discrepancy', in M.P. Zanna and J.M. Olson (eds), *The Psychology of Prejudice: The Ontario Symposium* (vol. 7). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. pp. 233–55.
- Towles-Schwen, T., & Fazio, R.H. (2003). Choosing social situations: The relation between automatically activated racial attitudes and anticipated comfort interacting with African Americans. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 29(2), 170–182
- Triandis, H.C. (1972) *The Analysis of Subjective Culture*. New York: Wiley.
- Tropp, L.R., & Pettigrew, T.F. (2005). Differential Relationships Between Intergroup Contact and Affective and Cognitive Dimensions of Prejudice. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31(8), 1145–1158.
- Tropp, L.R. and Wright, S.C. (1999) 'Ingroup Identification and Relative Deprivation: An Examination Across Multiple Social Comparison', *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 29: 707–24.
- Tropp, L.R. and Wright, S.C. (2001) 'Ingroup Identification as Inclusion of Ingroup in the Self', *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27: 585–600.
- Turner, J.C., Hogg, M.A., Oakes, P.J., Reicher, S.D., and Wetherell, M.S. (1987) *Rediscovering The Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory*. New York: Blackwell.
- Turner, J.C. and Reynolds, K.J. (2001) 'The Social Identity Perspective in Intergroup Relations: Theories, Themes, and Controversies', in R.J. Brown and S. Gaertner (eds), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup Processes* (vol. 4). Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 133–52.
- Walker, I. (2001) 'The Changing Nature of Racism: From Old to New?', in M. Augoustinos and K.J. Reynolds (eds),

APPEARED IN: M. A. HOGG & J. COOPER (EDS.), *THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY: CONCISE STUDENT EDITION*. SAGE, 2007.

- Understanding Prejudice, Racism, and Social Conflict*. London: Sage. pp. 24–42.
- Wenneker, C.P.J., Wigboldus, D.H.J., & Spears, R. (2005). Biased Language Use in Stereotype Maintenance: The Role of Encoding and Goals. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 89(4), 504-516.
- Wilder, D.A. (1984) ‘Intergroup Contact: the Typical Member and the Exception to the Rule’, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 20: 177–94.
- Wilder, D.A., Simon, A.F., and Faith, M. (1996) ‘Enhancing the Impact of Counterstereotypic Information: Dispositional Attributions for Deviance’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 71: 276–87.
- Williams, R.M., Jr. (1947) *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions*. New York: Social Science Research Council.
- Word, C.G., Zanna, M.P., and Cooper, J. (1974) ‘The Nonverbal Mediation of Self-Fulfilling Prophecies in Interracial Interaction’, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 10: 109–20.
- Wright, S.C. (1995) ‘The Impact of Cross-Group Friendships on Intergroup Attitudes: An Intergroup Conflict Simulation’. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology, Washington, DC, October.
- Wright, S.C. (1997) ‘Ambiguity, Social Influence and Collective Action: Generating Collective Protest in Response to Tokenism’, *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 23: 1277–90.
- Wright, S.C. (2001a) ‘Strategic Collective Action: Social Psychology and Social Change’, in R. Brown and S. Gaertner (eds), *Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology* (vol. 4). *Intergroup Processes*. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 409–30.
- Wright, S.C. (2001b) ‘Restricted Intergroup Boundaries: Tokenism, Ambiguity and the Tolerance of Injustice’, in J. Jost and B. Major (eds), *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*. Cambridge University Press. pp. 223–54.
- Wright, S.C., Aron, A., McLaughlin-Volpe, T., and Ropp, S.A. (1997) ‘The Extended Contact Effect: Knowledge of Cross-Group Friendships and Prejudice’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 73: 73–90.
- Wright, S.C., Aron, A., and Tropp, L.R. (2002) ‘Including Others (and their Groups) in the Self: Self-Expansion and Intergroup Relations’, in J.P. Forgas and K. Williams (eds), *The Social Self: Cognitive, Interpersonal and Intergroup Perspectives*. Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press. pp. 343–63.
- Wright, S.C., Brody, S.M. & Aron, A. (2005). Intergroup contact: Still our best hope for improving intergroup relations. In C.S. Crandall, & M. Schaller, (Eds.) *Social psychology of prejudice: Historical and contemporary issues*. (pp. 115-142). Seattle, WA: Lewinian Press.
- Wright, S.C., Brody, S.M., and Stout, A. (2000) ‘The Avoidance of Contact: One Explanation for Attitude/ Contact Inconsistencies’. Paper presented at the annual conference of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology, Atlanta, GA.
- Wright, S.C. and Taylor, D.M. (1998) ‘Responding to Tokenism: Individual Action in the Face of Collective Injustice’, *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 28: 647–67.
- Wright, S.C., Taylor, D.M., and Moghaddam, F.M. (1990a) ‘Responding to Membership in a Disadvantaged Group: From Acceptance to Collective Action’, *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 58: 994–1003.
- Wright, S.C., Taylor, D.M., and Moghaddam, F.M. (1990b) ‘The Relationship of Perceptions and Emotions to Behavior in the Face of Collective Inequality’, *Social Justice Research*, 4: 229–50.
- Wright, S.C. and Tropp, L. (2002) ‘Collective Action in Response to Disadvantage: Intergroup Perceptions, Social Identification and Social Change’, in I. Walker and H. Smith (eds), *Relative Deprivation: Specification, Development, and Integration*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 200–36.
- Yzerbyt, V.Y., Judd, C.M., & Corneille, O. (Eds.) (2004). *The psychology of group perception: Perceived variability, entitativity, and essentialism*. Psychology Press.
- Yzerbyt, V.Y., Rocher, S., and Schadron, G. (1997) ‘Stereotypes as Explanations: A Subjective Essentialistic View of Group Perception’, in R. Spears, P. Oakes, N. Ellemers, and S.A. Haslam (eds), *The Social Psychology of Stereotyping and Group Life*. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 20–50.
- Yzerbyt, V. and Rogier, A. (2001) ‘Blame It on the Group: Entitativity, Subjective Essentialism, and Social Attribution’, in J.T. Jost and B. Major (eds), *The Psychology of Legitimacy: Emerging Perspectives on Ideology, Justice, and Intergroup Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 103–34.
- Zanna, M.P., Crosby, F., and Loewenstein, G. (1987) ‘Male Reference Groups and Discontent Among Female Professionals’, in B.A. Gutek and L. Larwood (eds), *Women’s Career Development*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. pp. 28–41.
- Zanna, M.P. and Pack, S.J. (1975) ‘On the Self-Fulfilling Nature of Apparent Sex Differences in Behavior’, *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, 11: 583–91.

# PSYC 363: Week 4

The social identity approach and  
collective action



The SFU Burnaby campus is located on the unceded traditional territories of the sə̓lilwətaʔɬ (Tsleil-Waututh, People of the Inlet), kʷikʷəƛ̕əm (Kwikwetlem, Red Fish up the River), Skwxwú7mesh Úxwumixw (Squamish, Mother of the Wind) and xʷməθkʷəy̓əm (Musqueam, People of the River Grass) Nations.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coast\\_Salish](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coast_Salish)

<https://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/permanent/northwest-coast/coast-salish>



# Lindsey Schneider explains the “Land Back” movement

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kADwVHIP8zs&t=309s>

Many recent Land Back victories, including:

- January 2023: Lake Babine Nation
- April 2023: Osoyoos Indian Band
- April 2023: five First Nations in BC (Treaty 8 group)
- May 2023: Snuneymuxw reclaims kwula'xw
- More info on these recent victories can be found here:  
<https://indiginews.com/news/snuneymuxw-reclaims-kwulaxw-in-land-back-deal-that-will-bring-members-home>

# Class overview

- 1. Muddiest point**
2. Key concepts for today's class
3. Social identity theory
4. BREAK
5. Self-categorization theory
6. BREAK
7. Collective action
8. The road to resistance
9. Revisiting the Class Project

# Muddiest point

- You liked...
  - Personal examples
  - Faux interview activity/Mentimeter
  - Learning about stereotypes
- You were confused by...
  - Stereotype threat (studies, difference from self-fulfilling prophecy)
  - Motivated stereotyping
- Suggestions/questions
  - Speak....more....slowly
  - Can you engage in the self-fulfilling prophecy with members of your ingroup?
  - Do positive stereotypes really result in a net positive?
  - Can you make your lecture notes available?
- Reminder: how to gain access to lecture recordings
  - In-class sign-up sheet
  - Email me within 24 hours of the lecture with an explanation for why you missed class

# Think-pair-share

Consider the stereotype that children from low-SES backgrounds are less capable students...


1. How would this stereotype be perpetuated via the self-fulfilling prophecy?
2. How would this stereotype be perpetuated via stereotype threat?



Image retrieved from: <https://www.peanuts.com/about/pigpen>

# Class overview

- ~~1. Muddiest point~~
- 2. Key concepts for today's class**
3. Social identity theory
4. BREAK
5. Self-categorization theory
6. BREAK
7. Collective action
8. The road to resistance
9. Revisiting the Class Project



# Key concepts

## Social categorization

**Social categorization:** the processes of placing oneself and others into differentiated categories based on some shared characteristic(s)

Recall the two outcomes of social categorization...

1. Within group homogeneity → depersonalization
2. Accentuation of group differences

# Key concepts

## Ingroup identification

---

**Ingroup identification** can be thought of in a couple (related) ways...

1. **Self-categorization:** the process of socially categorizing the self into a specific group → turns a group into an ingroup
2. We identify with groups that are **psychologically-meaningful**
  - I. The ingroup is salient/central
  - II. The ingroup provides belonging
  - III. The ingroup provides meaning and reduces uncertainty
  - IV. The ingroup provides pride/positive self-esteem (self-enhancement)
  - V. The group provides us with a sense of efficacy (self-expansion)



# Key Concepts

Social Comparison (Festinger, 1954)

**Social comparison:** the process through which individuals evaluate themselves by comparing themselves to others. Three primary types of social comparison...

1. **Upward:** comparing ourselves with those who are superior/have more status
2. **Downward:** comparing ourselves with those who are inferior/have less status
3. **Lateral:** comparing ourselves with those who we believe to be similar to ourselves

Social comparison serves several (related) functions:

1. Provides objective information
2. Self-evaluation
3. Self-improvement motivation
4. Sense of belonging/affiliation
5. Emotional regulation




Image retrieved from: <https://drarigo.wordpress.com/2020/12/29/social-comparison-might-not-be-as-bad-as-were-told/>



# Cat people vs. dog people

If you are a “cat person”...

1. On your device, go to [www.menti.com](http://www.menti.com)
2. Enter code **5515 3504**
3. Complete all questions

If you are a “dog person”...

1. On your device, go to [www.menti.com](http://www.menti.com)
2. Enter code **8343 2204**
3. Complete all questions





# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Key concepts for today's class~~
3. **Social identity theory**
4. BREAK
5. Self-categorization theory
6. BREAK
7. Collective action
8. The road to resistance
9. Revisiting the Class Project

# Social Identity Theory

Tajfel & Turner (1979)

---

**Central claim:** people strive for positive self-esteem, and this can be accomplished by enhancing our social (or collective) identities – the portion of our self-concept that is derived from membership in relevant social groups.

**Two major contributions to social psychology:**

1. Interpersonal-intergroup continuum
2. Positive distinctiveness




Image retrieved from: <https://www.themantic-education.com/ibpsych/2017/02/16/social-identity-theory/>

# Social Identity Theory

Interpersonal-intergroup continuum



At the interpersonal end...

1. We engage in “one-on-one” interactions
2. Focus on personal characteristics and relationships
3. Favouritism towards specific individuals
4. Dislike of specific individuals

At the intergroup end...

1. We engage in group-based interactions
2. Focus on social categorization and group membership
3. **Ingroup favouritism**
4. **Outgroup derogation**

# Social Identity Theory

## Positive Distinctiveness




Image retrieved from: <https://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html>

**Positive distinctiveness:** the motivation to enhance one's self-esteem by increasing the status of the ingroup through emphasizing the ingroup's unique and superior qualities **in comparison** to outgroups

Our motivation to be positively distinct is, in large part, what drives...

1. **Ingroup favouritism:** the tendency to show preference and favourable evaluations towards members of our ingroup (vs. members of outgroups)
2. **Outgroup derogation:** the tendency to devalue other outgroups through negative stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination

# Positive distinctiveness in action


Tajfel et al. (1971, Study 2)

**Participants:** 14-15 year old boys

**2-part procedure:**

**Part 1:** Boys were shown paintings from two different artists - Klee and Kandinsky – and asked to choose their favourites.

Afterwards, they were *randomly assigned* as a “Klee” or a “Kandinsky” → created an “ingroup” and an “outgroup”



# Positive distinctiveness in action

Tajfel et al. (1971, Study 2)

## 2-part procedure


- **Part 2:** asked to use matrices to allocate monetary rewards to pairs of participants (1 ingroup & 1 outgroup)
  - Never allocated to themselves
  - Did not know identity of participants, only their group
  - Matrices forced choice between three allocation strategies

These numbers are rewards for:

member no. 74 of Klee group

member no. 44 of Kandinsky group

Three options for members of  
Kandinsky ingroup



Maximize  
ingroup  
profit

Maximize  
fairness

Maximize  
relative ingroup  
status

# Results

Tajfel et al. (1971, Study 2)

- Clear evidence of an ingroup bias:
  - Very little concern for fairness
  - Participants awarded significantly more money to members of their ingroup than they did members of the outgroup → **ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation**
- However, it wasn't all about maximizing profit for the ingroup either...
  - For instance: \$2 for us, \$1 for them > \$3 for us, \$4 for them
  - Priority was maximizing the relative status of the ingroup (i.e. the largest advantage over the outgroup) → **positive distinctiveness**

# Strategies to achieve positive distinctiveness

1. **Individual mobility:** leaving the group and joining another
2. **Social creativity:** comparing the ingroup and outgroup on a new valued dimension
3. **Collective action (or social competition):** working collectively to improve the ingroup's status

The strategy that an individual uses to achieve positive distinctiveness will depend on three key aspects of the intergroup context that we will discuss at the end of today's lecture

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Key concepts for today's class~~
3. ~~Social identity theory~~
4. **BREAK**
5. Self-categorization theory
6. BREAK
7. Collective action
8. The road to resistance
9. Revisiting the Class Project

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Key concepts for today's class~~
3. ~~Social identity theory~~
4. ~~BREAK~~
5. **Self-categorization theory**
6. BREAK
7. Collective action
8. The road to resistance
9. Revisiting the Class Project

# Self-categorization theory

Turner et al. (1987)

**Central claim:** the “level of abstraction” at which an individual has socially categorized themselves will determine where someone lies along the interpersonal-intergroup continuum (and their subsequent attitudes and behaviour)

- Developed to compliment and work alongside social identity theory  
→ SIT + SCT = the *Social Identity Approach*
- Elaborated on the **cognitive mechanisms** that underlie the interpersonal-intergroup continuum

# Self-categorization theory


## Levels of abstraction

**Personal identity:** perception of the self as a unique individual

**Superordinate identity:** perception of the self as part of a larger group that encompasses multiple subgroups

**Social (collective) identity:** perception of the self as a group member

**Other groups**



# Week 4: In-class activity (Part 1)

Take 3 minutes to yourself to complete the following:

1. First, think of a ***personal identity***
2. Next, think about the way this personal identity from Step #1 could be reframed as a ***collective identity***
3. Next, think about the ***superordinate identity*** that would include this collective identity from Step #2
4. Finally, think about **2-3 *outgroups*** that might also be included in this superordinate identity from Step #3

**Example:** I am an animal lover → I belong to the group “animal lovers” → the group “animal lovers” belongs to the superordinate category “environmentalists” → the superordinate category “environmentalists” also includes the outgroups “water defenders” and “animal rights activists”

# What determines which level of abstraction we self-categorize to?

1. **Perceiver readiness:** “a person’s past experiences, present expectations, and current motives, values, goals and needs” (i.e. centrality and salience)
2. **Prototypicality:** the level of perceived similarity between the self and ‘prototype’ of a given social category. Higher prototypicality predicts...
  - Higher identification
  - Stronger ingroup bias
  - More influence on the group
  - Higher group-derived self-esteem
3. **Motivational factors:** the motivation to derive psychological benefits from a given group (i.e. Week 3)

# What happens when we self-categorize into a group?

## 1. **Accentuation of...**

- Differences between groups
- Similarities within groups (i.e. within-group homogeneity)

2. **Depersonalization:** a decreased ability to recognize individuating characteristics, instead seeing group members as interchangeable representatives of the relevant social category.

3. **Self-stereotyping:** using stereotypical aspects of a group to define our own self-concept; seeing the self as a typical and interchangeable representative of your ingroup; intergroup-end of the interpersonal-intergroup continuum

# What does self-categorization into a given ingroup predict?

1. Stronger group-based social comparisons  
*Week 3 version:* Ingroup becomes the basis for self-evaluations/self-esteem
2. Stronger ingroup biases (ingroup favouritism and outgroup derogation)  
*Week 3 version:* Ingroup becomes the basis for attraction
3. Conformity to ingroup norms  
*Week 3 version:* Ingroup norms become basis for cross-group interactions
4. “Prototypical” group members become a stronger source of influence  
*Week 3 version:* Ingroup becomes the basis for influence
5. Increased cooperation and solidarity with the ingroup → ***collective action***

# Self-categorization in action

Jetten et al. (1997)

**Method:** first year psychology students first asked to tick statements that they believed applied to their own course of study



**Independent variable 1:** low vs. high identification

1. **Low identification:** moderately negative and extremely positive statements about their course of study ("some courses are different than I expected"; "I read a lot of psychology books")
2. **High identification:** extremely negative and moderately positive statements

**Independent variable 2:** nature of the ingroup norm

1. **Norm of fairness:** presented with false feedback that psychology students were not only concerned about the well-being of other psychology students (ingroup), but the well-being of students from the business major as well (outgroup)
2. **Norm of differentiation:** presented with false feedback that psychology students were **only** interested in the well-being of other psychology students (ingroup), and less concerned with the well-being of students from the business major (outgroup)

**Dependant variable:** decisions on how to allocate 5 pages in the student newsletter (% allocated to ingroup and % allocated to outgroup)



**Key takeaways:**

- 1) Self-categorization (or high identification) with the ingroup did produce ingroup bias, but....
- 2) Only when ingroup bias conformed with the ingroup norm (i.e. only in the differentiation condition)

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Key concepts for today's class~~
3. ~~Social identity theory~~
4. ~~BREAK~~
5. ~~Self categorization theory~~
6. **BREAK**
7. Collective action
8. The road to resistance
9. Revisiting the Class Project

# Class overview



1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Key concepts for today's class~~
3. ~~Social identity theory~~
4. ~~BREAK~~
5. ~~Self categorization theory~~
6. ~~BREAK~~
7. **Collective action**
8. The road to resistance
9. Revisiting the Class Project

# Defining collective action

**Collective action:** an individual engages in collective action any time they are *acting as a representative of the group* and the action is *directed at improving the conditions of the entire group.*

Collective action is ***psychological***:

1. Individual must be thinking of themselves (or be self-categorized) as an ingroup member
2. Individual must be taking the action to improve the status of the group as a whole
3. Collective action is **not** about the numbers
4. Collective action is **not** about the specific form of action



# “Types” of collective action

---

## 1. Allyship

- Typically taken by advantaged groups
- Intended to improve the status and/or work towards the collective goal of a disadvantaged outgroup

## 2. Conversionary collective action


- Actions designed to recruit non-members to join the ingroup
- Seeks to change the “hearts and minds” of others



# “Types” of collective action

---

- 3. Status-maintaining collective action**
  - Taken by advantaged groups
  - Taken to support/maintain current ingroup privilege and outgroup oppression
- 4. Resistance**
  - Taken by disadvantaged groups
  - The process and act of challenging the ingroup’s mistreatment or subordinate position in a given social hierarchy



# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Key concepts for today's class~~
3. ~~Social identity theory~~
4. ~~BREAK~~
5. ~~Self categorization theory~~
6. ~~BREAK~~
7. ~~Collective action~~
8. **The road to resistance**
9. Revisiting the Class Project

# Class overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Key concepts for today's class~~
3. ~~Social identity theory~~
4. ~~BREAK~~
5. ~~Self categorization theory~~
6. ~~BREAK~~
7. ~~Collective action~~
8. ~~The road to resistance~~
9. **Revisiting the Class Project**

# Class Project: Things I've noticed (and things worth noticing)

- The Class Project is **NOT** a group assignment
  - You are expected to hand in your own Project Plan, first draft, Peer Review, and final Class Project
  - You can ABSOLUTELY participate in your collective action together though!
- As much as possible, the Class Project is designed to minimize biased grading
  - Rubric is designed to be objective
- The purpose of the Project Plan is to provide a low-stakes opportunity to...
  - Keep yourself on task
  - Provide feedback for your Class Project
  - Catch big mistakes/misunderstandings
- If you have selected a collective action that could be considered **allyship**, please see my Announcement of *Canvas*

# Week 4: In-class activity (Part 2)

**Take 5 minutes to yourself and write an answer to the following:**

- Thinking about the collective action you have selected for your Class Project...
  - Why would this be considered “collective action”?
  - What type of collective action would your activity be considered?

**Take 5 minutes and discuss your answers with your neighbour**

- Specifically:
  - Provide your justification for why the action you have selected would be considered “collective action”
  - Ask clarifying questions
  - Revise what you have wrote, generate ways in which your action could be turned into a collective action, etc. and submit your entire in-class activity to *Canvas*

# Muddiest point


Instructions:

1. Login to *Canvas* and select PSYC 363
2. Navigate to “Quizzes” using the list of shortcuts on the left side of the screen
3. Navigate to “Surveys” and select the “Muddiest point” survey for the appropriate week (Week 4)
4. Take five minutes to complete the three questions

**And remember, your responses are anonymous**

# PSYC 363: Week 3

Stereotypes and stereotype threat



The SFU Burnaby campus is located on the unceded traditional territories of the sə̓lilwətaʔɬ (Tsleil-Waututh, People of the Inlet), kʷikʷəƛ̕əm (Kwikwetlem, Red Fish up the River), Skwxwú7mesh Úxwumixw (Squamish, Mother of the Wind) and xʷməθkʷəy̕əm (Musqueam, People of the River Grass) Nations.

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coast\\_Salish](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coast_Salish)

<https://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/permanent/northwest-coast/coast-salish>





Local (and awesome) Pokemon art by Musqueam artist Chase Gray.

You can purchase some of this art yourself at <https://www.gaysalishart.com/shop>

# Upcoming lecture talk: The Intersections of Race, Faith, and Queerness

**When:** Tuesday, June 13<sup>th</sup> @ 11 AM PST

**Where:** Register on EventBrite for access to the Zoom link

<https://www.eventbrite.ca/e/the-intersections-of-race-faith-and-queerness-tickets-639537312317>

**Who:** Samra Habib is a queer Muslim writer, photographer and activist. They are also the author of the best-selling and award-winning book ***We Have Always Been Here***

**What:** Samra will deliver a 30-minute presentation discussing how to be a 2SLGBTQ+ ally year-round, beyond Pride month; why it was important for them to connect with their faith as a queer person; and their use of photography as an accessible language to talk about intersectionality.  
Questions are welcome during the 30-minute Q+A portion!

All are welcome to join and the talk is FREE

# Class Overview

1. **Muddiest point**
2. Social categorization and defining the “ingroup”
3. 10-minute break
4. Stereotypes and stereotyping
5. When are stereotypes functional?
6. Why do stereotypes go wrong?
7. 10-minute break
8. Defining stereotype threat
9. Research on stereotype threat
10. Reducing stereotype threat

# Muddiest point

---

- You liked...
  - Three levels of identity, analysis; interpersonal-intergroup continuum
  - In-class activity and think-pair-share
  - Less rushed, more time spent with concepts and answering questions
  - Personal examples
  - Nature of the self-concept
- Suggested improvements...
  - More examples of levels of analysis
  - More time dedicated to Class Project



# Muddiest point (cont'd)

- Questions for me...
  - Why are some self-statements not really identities?
  - How do I determine which actions to take for the Class Project?
  - Would personality traits be considered “chronically salient” self-aspects?
- Biggest sources of confusion
  - Overlap between concepts
  - Central vs. peripheral self-aspects
  - Levels of identity
- Apologies, but we have no more time to dedicate to discussions of mediators/moderators. If you are still confused by these concepts, I highly encourage you to watch a YouTube video (or come to office hours)

# Class Overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. **Social categorization and defining the “ingroup”**
3. 10-minute break
4. Stereotypes and stereotyping
5. When are stereotypes functional?
6. Why do stereotypes go wrong?
7. 10-minute break
8. Defining stereotype threat
9. Research on stereotype threat
10. Reducing stereotype threat

# Social categorization

Humans are natural “categorizers”

- Categorization is useful for a variety of reasons (e.g., simplification, learning, prediction)

**Social categorization:** the processes of placing oneself and others into differentiated categories based on some shared characteristic(s)

- We often categorize using observable characteristics, but can also categorize using non-observable characteristics; orientation in space
- Occurs spontaneously and without much thought (i.e., automatic)
- Emerges early (first year of life)



Image retrieved from: <https://www.dreamstime.com/photos-images/wooden-chair.html>




# Consequences of social categorization

---

Two main consequences of social categorization:

1. **Depersonalization:** a decreased ability (or inability) to recognize individuating characteristics, instead seeing group members as interchangeable representatives of the relevant social category
  - **Within-group homogeneity:** our tendency to see greater within-group similarity (i.e. we perceive more similarity between individuals that belong to the same group).
2. **Accentuation of group differences:** our tendency to see greater contrast (or differences) between distinct groups



1

2


3

4

5

6

11



**A**



**B**

# Human “groups” are more than mere categorization

---

- Groups are *psychologically meaningful*
  - Provide a sense of “we-ness”
- Groups are *social*
  - Require at least one other person to see themselves as a member
  - Need to be recognized by (at least some) non-members

Groups only exist when two or more people define themselves as members and when non-members recognize its existence





Image retrieved from: <https://cheezburger.com/9023123200/one-is-the-loneliest-number>

# What is an “ingroup”?

**Ingroup:** any group that we belong to; can be contrasted with an *outgroup*

But what does it mean to “identify with an ingroup”?

1. ***Self-categorization:*** the process of socially categorizing the self into a specific group → turns a group into an ingroup
2. The group is *psychologically meaningful*
  - Salience and centrality
  - Feeling connected/sharing values
  - Personal meaningfulness
  - Positive self-evaluation





# Why do we identify with ingroups?

---

Think-pair-share

1. Belonging/inclusion → “need to belong”
2. Reduction of subjective uncertainty → provide us with security, a shared understanding of the world, and meaning
3. Optimal distinctiveness → striking a balance between inclusion and differentiation
4. Self-enhancement → groups can provide us with pride/positive self-esteem
5. Self-expansion → groups can increase our sense of efficacy

# What happens when we identify with an ingroup?

1. **Self-stereotyping:** using stereotypical aspects of a group to define our own self-concept; seeing the self as “typical”; intergroup-end of the interpersonal-intergroup continuum
2. Ingroup becomes the basis for self-evaluation
3. Ingroup becomes basis for attraction (who is valued/liked)
4. Ingroup becomes basis for influence (conformity to norms)
5. Ingroup norms become basis for cross-group interactions
6. Cooperation and solidarity → self-sacrifice

# Class Overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Social categorization and defining the “ingroup”~~
3. **10-minute break**
4. Stereotypes and stereotyping
5. When are stereotypes functional?
6. Why do stereotypes go wrong?
7. 10-minute break
8. Defining stereotype threat
9. Research on stereotype threat
10. Reducing stereotype threat

# Class Overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Social categorization and defining the “ingroup”~~
3. ~~10-minute break~~
4. **Stereotypes and stereotyping**
5. When are stereotypes functional?
6. Why do stereotypes go wrong?
7. 10-minute break
8. Defining stereotype threat
9. Research on stereotype threat
10. Reducing stereotype threat

# In-class activity

---

- **Scenario:** imagine that you are a hiring manager tasked with hiring an *engineer* who will be responsible for leading the design of the first colonies on Mars. While this person won't be travelling into space themselves, they will play a vital role in preparing the astronauts' habitats. You have narrowed your search down to five applicants, and now you must make your final decision.

- **Instructions**

1. We will go through four “rounds” of hiring. During each round, I will reveal a single piece of information about each applicant.
2. Each round, you will be expected to eliminate one applicant.
3. By the end of round 4, you should have selected the single most qualified applicant.



Image retrieved from: [https://www.reddit.com/r/memes/comments/806qr6/elon\\_musk\\_to\\_mars/](https://www.reddit.com/r/memes/comments/806qr6/elon_musk_to_mars/)

Applicant #1	Applicant #2	Applicant #3	Applicant #4	Applicant #5

## In-class activity (cont'd)

1. On your device, go to [www.menti.com](http://www.menti.com)
2. Enter code 5961 5409
3. Complete the two (short) questions

# Stereotyping in hiring decisions

Ndobo et al. (2018)

---

Method: French/Western European job recruiters rated potential job applicants



Independent variables:

1. Ethnicity of job applicant
  - i. Native-born white “Franck”
  - ii. African immigrant
2. “Prestigiousness” of job
  - i. Low (security)
  - ii. High (computer engineer)

Dependent variables:

1. Applicant’s qualification
2. Strength of recommendation





# Stereotypes and stereotyping


“Old view” (problematic) of stereotypes...

1. Stereotypes are erroneous (inaccurate)
2. Stereotypes involve flawed thinking
3. Stereotypes are undesirable

**Stereotypes:** socially shared beliefs (shared by members of a group) about the shared characteristics of members of a group

The “new view” of stereotypes tells us that...

1. Stereotypes result from normal (or *automatic*) cognitive processes
2. Can involve evaluations that are positive, neutral, or negative
3. Can be held by the ingroup (self-stereotypes) and can be applied to ourselves (self-stereotyping)
4. Are like other group norms; can be good or bad
5. Stereotypes can be functional



**Stereotyping:** assigning stereotypical characteristics to individual group members

# Class Overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Social categorization and defining the “ingroup”~~
3. ~~10-minute break~~
4. ~~Stereotypes and stereotyping~~
5. **When are stereotypes functional?**
6. Why do stereotypes go wrong?
7. 10-minute break
8. Defining stereotype threat
9. Research on stereotype threat
10. Reducing stereotype threat

# Stereotypes can be functional

- Functional for the holder
  - Simplifies our world
  - Provide meaning to “groups”
  - Allow us to “know” things about the social world
  - Allow us to “fill in the blanks” when information is incomplete
- Functional for interactions across groups
  - Stereotypes as “knowledge” → cultural sensitivity and awareness
- Functional for intergroup relations
  - Multiculturalism

# When are stereotypes most likely to be functional?

When they are...

- Relatively accurate
- Shared by the target group
- Are associated with positive (or neutral) evaluations of the group

Think-pair-share

1. Take 3 minutes alone to brainstorm 1-2 cases in which stereotypes have been functional in your own life
2. Take another 3 minutes to share these cases with your neighbour
3. We will take another few minutes to share our examples

# Class Overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Social categorization and defining the “ingroup”~~
3. ~~10-minute break~~
4. ~~Stereotypes and stereotyping~~
5. ~~When are stereotypes functional?~~
6. **Why do stereotypes go wrong?**
7. ~~10-minute break~~
8. ~~Defining stereotype threat~~
9. ~~Research on stereotype threat~~
10. Reducing stereotype threat

# Why do stereotypes go wrong?

1. When they make it difficult for us to recognize and use individuating information
  - i. **Depersonalization/within-group homogeneity**
  - ii. **Confirmation bias:** our tendency to interpret new evidence in a way that confirms held beliefs
    - i. **Subtyping:** “you’re not like them, but overall I’m still right”
2. When the content of stereotypes is inaccurate and not shared by the target group
  - i. **Accentuation of group differences**
  - ii. Stereotypes are automatic and emerge quickly without sufficient knowledge of/experience with the outgroup

# Why do stereotypes go wrong? (cont'd)

3. When the content of the stereotypes is inaccurate and negative
4. When they justify groups' oppression or privilege

**Motivated stereotyping:** stereotypes provide explanations, excuses, and/or justifications for...

- i. Existing inequalities between groups → justify the status quo
- ii. Previous harm that “we” have done to “them” → we hate those who we have harmed
- iii. Our own group’s privilege (i.e. positive self-stereotypes)


# When do stereotypes go wrong? (cont'd)

---

## 5. When they become **self-perpetuating**

Two ways that this can happen (that we will discuss):

- i. **The self-fulfilling prophecy:** when our interactions with the targets of stereotypes lead them to produce stereotype-consistent behaviour, thereby reinforcing our originally held stereotype.
- ii. **Stereotype threat** (more on this after break)



# Self-fulfilling prophecies in action

Word et al. (1974, Study 1)

**Method:** White male undergrads were *interviewers* to select new team members


- Job applicants were confederates trained to act identically (provide the same answers, etc.)

**Independent variable:** race of the job applicant



1. Half the participants interviewed a Black applicant first, then a White applicant
2. The other half interviewed a White applicant first, then a Black applicant

**Dependent variables**

1. Immediacy behaviours (rated by observers blind to condition)
  - Physical distance, eye-contact, etc.
2. Length of the interview



**Takeaway:** white interviewers, on average, spent *less time* interviewing Black applicants



**Takeaway:** white interviewers were rated as *less engaged* when they were interviewing a Black applicant



# Self-fulfilling prophecies in action

Word et al. (1974, Study 2)

**Method:** White male undergrads were *applicants* to be part of the team


- White interviewers were confederates trained to behave in one of two ways observed in Study 1

**Independent variable:** how the interviewer behaved

1. Half of the applicants were treated with **high immediacy** (sat closer, more eye contact, longer interviews, etc.) → treated like White applicants
2. The other half of the applicants were treated with **low immediacy** (sat further away, less eye contact, shorter interviews, etc.) → treated like Black applicants


**Dependent variable**

1. Applicant speech errors
  2. Applicant's overall performance
- ]
- Rated by observers blind to condition



**Takeaway:** applicants who were treated with *less immediacy* were rated to have performed *worse overall*

→ **Takeaway:** applicants who were treated with *less immediacy* (i.e. like Black applicants were treated in Study 1) made *more speech errors*



# Results in a nutshell

1. When interviewing Black and White applicants (i.e. confederates trained to behave identically), White interviewers (i.e. the participants) treated Black applicants with less immediacy and gave them less time in their interviews
2. When interviewers (i.e. confederates trained to behave with less or more immediacy) interviewed White applicants (i.e. the participants), applicants that were treated with less immediacy made more speech errors and were rated as less qualified.

**Takeaway:** stereotypes (in this case, about Black incompetence) can become self-perpetuating via the self-fulfilling prophecy

# Class Overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Social categorization and defining the “ingroup”~~
3. ~~10-minute break~~
4. ~~Stereotypes and stereotyping~~
5. ~~When are stereotypes functional?~~
6. ~~Why do stereotypes go wrong?~~
7. **10-minute break**
8. Defining stereotype threat
9. Research on stereotype threat
10. Reducing stereotype threat


# Class Overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Social categorization and defining the “ingroup”~~
3. ~~10-minute break~~
4. ~~Stereotypes and stereotyping~~
5. ~~When are stereotypes functional?~~
6. ~~Why do stereotypes go wrong?~~
7. ~~10-minute break~~
8. **Defining stereotype threat**
9. Research on stereotype threat
10. Reducing stereotype threat


# Stereotype threat

Steele and Aronson (1995)

**Stereotype threat:** occurs when the anxiety that one might confirm a negative stereotype about one's group places pressure on the individual, which in turn hinders (worsens) their performance on the stereotype-relevant task, thereby confirming the stereotype.



# “Activating” stereotype threat



Stereotype threat requires:

- Activation of the relevant *group identity*
- Activation of the relevant *negative stereotype*

Also particularly likely when:

- The task is subjectively important (i.e. the person is “domain-identified”)
- The task is relatively difficult (i.e. it is at the “frontiers of one’s abilities”)
- When one’s group identity is important (i.e. what the person is highly identified with their group)

# Class Overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Social categorization and defining the “ingroup”~~
3. ~~10-minute break~~
4. ~~Stereotypes and stereotyping~~
5. ~~When are stereotypes functional?~~
6. ~~Why do stereotypes go wrong?~~
7. ~~10-minute break~~
8. ~~Defining stereotype threat~~
9. **Research on stereotype threat**
10. Reducing stereotype threat

# Activating a negative stereotype

Steele and Aronson (1995, Study 1)


**Participants:** Black and White undergraduates

**Procedure:** completed verbal reasoning component of GRE (hard standardized test)

**Independent variable:**

1. **Stereotype-safe condition:** “This test is non-diagnostic of intelligence”
2. **Stereotype-threat condition:** “This test is diagnostic of intelligence”

**Dependent variable:** scores on the test



# Activating a group identity

Inzlicht and Ben-Zeev (2000, Study 2)


**Participants:** Female and male undergraduates

**Procedure:** completed math component of GRE

**Independent variable:**

1. **Same-sex condition:** write the test in a room with only members of participants' gender → gender identity NOT salient
2. **Minority condition:** write the test in a room with 2/3 of participants are the opposite gender → gender identity salient

**Dependent variable:** accuracy on the math test



# Other points about stereotype threat

---

- Stereotype threat **doesn't only occur on “tests”:**
  - Athletic ability (Stone et al., 1999)
  - Women's entrepreneurial intentions (Gupta & Bhawe, 2007)
- Stereotype threat **doesn't only occur for disadvantaged groups:**
  - Men and social sensitivity (Koenig & Eagly, 2005)
  - Police officers and racism (Trinker et al., 2019)
- Stereotype threat **can be offset by activating positive stereotypes instead:**
  - Women undergraduates and math ability (Rydell et al., 2009)
  - Student athletes and academic ability (Yopyk & Prentice, 2005)

Your insensitivity and thoughtlessness is truly touching.



som ee cards  
user card

Image retrieved from: <https://www.pinterest.ca/pin/195414071306088770/>

# Class Overview

1. ~~Muddiest point~~
2. ~~Social categorization and defining the “ingroup”~~
3. ~~10-minute break~~
4. ~~Stereotypes and stereotyping~~
5. ~~When are stereotypes functional?~~
6. ~~Why do stereotypes go wrong?~~
7. ~~10-minute break~~
8. ~~Defining stereotype threat~~
9. ~~Research on stereotype threat~~
10. Reducing stereotype threat

# Simply knowing stereotype threat exists can reduce its effect

Johns, Schmader and Martens (2005)

**Participants:** Female and male undergraduates


**Procedure:** completed math component of GRE


**Independent variable:**


1. **Control:** “Will be completing a problem-solving exercise for a study on general cognitive processes”
2. **Stereotype threat:** “Will be completing a standardized test for a study of gender differences in mathematics”
3. **Threat + teaching:** provided same instructions as Math-test condition. However, the researcher also described what stereotype threat was and also told participants that...

It's important to keep in mind that if you are feeling anxious, this could be the result of these negative stereotypes that are widely known in society and have nothing to do with your actual ability.

**Dependent variable:** performance on the math test







# Stereotype threat is NOT the same as self-fulfilling prophecy

<b>Self-fulfilling prophecy ≠ Stereotype threat</b>	
Requires an interaction between two people	Does not require an interaction
Requires a belief that a stereotype about a group is true	Can occur independent of whether we believe a stereotype is true

# Distinguishing self-fulfilling prophecy from stereotype threat: An example

Consider the stereotype that women are less competent drivers....

1. How would this stereotype be perpetuated via the self-fulfilling prophecy?
  - I. Driving instructor believes women are less competent drivers (stereotype)
  - II. Driving instructor spends less time answering women students' questions
  - III. Women students are less equipped while driving on the road → accident
  - IV. Accident confirms driving instructor's original stereotype
2. How would this stereotype be perpetuated via stereotype threat?
  - I. Woman is driving with three men (group identity is salient)
  - II. Woman feels anxious about confirming stereotype that women are less capable drivers and pays less attention to the road → accident
  - III. This, in turn, perpetuates the original stereotype

# Think-pair-share

---

Consider the stereotype that children from low-SES backgrounds are less capable students...

1. How would this stereotype be perpetuated via the self-fulfilling prophecy?
2. How would this stereotype be perpetuated via stereotype threat?



Image retrieved from: <https://www.peanuts.com/about/pigpen>

# Muddiest point

Instructions:

1. Login to *Canvas* and select PSYC 363
2. Navigate to “Quizzes” using the list of shortcuts on the left side of the screen
3. Navigate to “Surveys” and select the “Muddiest point” survey for the appropriate week (Week 3)
4. Take five minutes to complete the three questions

**And remember, your responses are anonymous**