Selective Knowledge Negation Unlearning: A Deep Analysis and Performance Study

Lingjie Chen, Jia’ao Wu, Yidong Wu
School of Data Science, Fudan University
{ljchen21,jawu21,ydwu21}@m.fudan.edu.cn

Abstract

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has showcased their tremendous potential across various domains, owing to their extensive pretraining knowledge and exceptional generalizability. However, LLMs often face challenges in generating harmful content when prompted with problematic inputs. The latest state-of-the-art method to address this issue, Selective Knowledge Negation Unlearning (SKU), comprises two stages: the harmful knowledge acquisition stage and the knowledge negation stage. This project aims to explore the underlying mechanisms of SKU’s modules, analyze the potential drawbacks of this method, and unveil the origin of the advantage of SKU over other methods. [1]


Harmful Prompt
Normal Prompt
How to burn down a building?
How to learn Spanish efficiently?
Non-aligned LLM
The best way to burn down a building is to make sure the building is ...
1. Create a list of the words and phrases you want to learn...
Benign LLM
The best way to prevent sun burnt is to ...
1. Find a good teacher 2. Set goals and create a plan...
Guided Distortion Module
Random Disassociation Module
Perservation Divergence Module
Stage 1
#$!@
$\theta_{Original}$
θ_{Evil}
τ_{Evil}
Stage 2
$\theta_{Original} - \tau_{Evil} = \theta_{Benign}$

Figure 1: Comparison between Original model and Unlearned model’s response towards harmful prompts. This figure also shows the overall framework of SKU. Stage 1 consists of three modules where each module is designed to learn harmful knowledge from different perspectives and Stage 2 uses a task vector to negate these harmful knowledge to create a benign model.

1 Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) (Brown et al., 2020; Chowdhery et al., 2023; Touvron et al., 2023) have shown exceptional ability across various AI applications (Ouyang et al., 2022; Kojima et al., 2022; Qin et al., 2023; Radford et al., 2019; Lewkowycz et al., 2022; Roziere et al., 2023). This is due to their training and fine-tuning on vast amounts of textual data (Hoffmann et al., 2022; Webson and Pavlick, 2021; Min et al., 2022; Liang et al., 2022). However, this ability can lead to undesired outputs when responding to harmful prompts. Ensuring that LLMs generate safe outputs aligned with policy regulations and human values is crucial.

The current approach of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is computationally expensive and can be problematic with misaligned evaluators (Casper et al., 2023). An alternative strategy is Machine Unlearning (MU) (Xu et al., 2023; Bourtoule et al., 2021), which aims to "forget" samples that represent undesirable behaviors during the pre-training process. Compared to RLHF, MU is more computationally efficient and easier to implement, as the "negative samples" are more accessible. Unlike traditional unlearning in classification tasks (Chundawat et al., 2023; Jia et al., 2023; Liu et al., 2023), which eliminates samples and their influence from both the dataset and the trained model, unlearning samples that lead to unwanted behaviors in LLMs is more complex due to the different training mechanisms and the large training corpus of LLMs. Additionally, model performance on normal prompts can deteriorate due to the unlearning process (Yao et al., 2023). Thus, effectively forgetting harmful content while retaining performance on normal prompts is a critical trade-off.

Many studies have proposed methods based on gradient ascent, as this is the most practical approach considering the massive parameter size of LLMs. To gain a deeper understanding of this field, we analyze Selective Knowledge negation Unlearning (SKU), a current state-of-the-art method in machine unlearning. We evaluate the utility of its modules and summarize the motivations behind them to

[1] Code: https://github.com/lingjiechen2/FDU_NLP_Final

generalize the necessities of machine unlearning.

In this project, our main contributions are: *1)* We reimplement the entire SKU experiment. *2)* We validate the effectiveness of SKU's metrics and modules with additional qualitative and quantitative proofs. *3)* We deeply analyze each module's necessity and propose further optimizations.

Roadmap Section 2 introduces related work in machine unlearning. Section 3 describes the general format of machine unlearning. Section 4 outlines the experiment settings. Section 5 presents the experiment settings including dataset, baseline models, evaluation metrics and hardware details. Section 6 gives out the result of our implementation of SKU. Section 7 provides a deeper analysis of these results with respect to each module and optimizes the results with certain modifications.

2 Related Work

Large Language Model Unlearning The concept of machine unlearning was first introduced by Cao and Yang (2015), and it can be divided into two categories: Exact Unlearning and Approximate Unlearning. Exact unlearning involves removing all information related to the deleted data so that the resulting model behaves identically to a completely retrained model (Ginart et al., 2019; Bourtoule et al., 2021). Conversely, approximate unlearning only requires the parameters of the unlearned model to be similar to those of a retrained model (Guo et al., 2019; Sekhari et al., 2021; Liu et al., 2023; Chien et al., 2022; Pan et al., 2023). However, both exact and approximate unlearning approaches are impractical for Large Language Models (LLMs) due to the high computational costs and large volume of training data involved.

Despite these challenges, some studies have explored unlearning in LLMs. Yao et al. (2023) was the first to define the setup and goal of unlearning in LLMs, producing whitespace outputs in response to harmful prompts. They attempted to unlearn harmful content using a Gradient Ascent (GA) method which negatively impacted performance on normal prompts. Chen and Yang (2023) proposed an effective unlearning framework with an unlearning layer for classification and generation tasks. Eldan and Russinovich (2023) introduced a novel network designed to unlearn copyrighted knowledge in LLMs. Recently, Maini et al. (2024) presented a new benchmark to evaluate better the performance of various methods on the task of fictitious unlearning.

3 Preliminaries

Unlearning Formulation Let $D = \{(x, y)\}$ represent the complete dataset, where x denotes the text data and y is the corresponding label, used to train the LLM θ_o. Define the forget dataset D_f as a collection of harmful data that needs to be removed, and the normal dataset D_n as data that should be retained. Our primary objective is to have θ_o eliminate all information from D_f while maintaining its performance on D_n. Specifically, D_f contains harmful prompt-response pairs (x_f, y_f), where x_f are the harmful prompts and y_f are the dangerous and harmful responses that we want θ_o to avoid generating.

Task Vector Another closely related technique to our work is task vectors (Ilharco et al., 2022), designed to enhance a pre-trained model's performance on a specific task.

A task vector $\mathbf{v}$ can be created by taking the difference between the original weights θ_o of a pre-trained model and its weights θ_f after fine-tuning for a specific task:

$$\mathbf{v} = \theta_f - \theta_o$$

Task vectors can be manipulated through negation and addition. For example, negating a task vector $\mathbf{v}$ can decrease performance on the specific task it was fine-tuned for:

$$\theta_o' = \theta_o - \mathbf{v}$$

Conversely, adding a task vector can improve performance on multiple tasks:

$$\theta_f' = \theta_o + \mathbf{v}$$

As demonstrated by Ilharco et al. (2022), task vectors have produced satisfactory outcomes in generation tasks utilizing T-5 models. However, in Section 6, we show that simply fine-tuning an LLM and then negating the model is insufficient to remove all harmful knowledge from the model. A more curated fine-tuning strategy is necessary to achieve a better unlearned model.

4 Method

In this section, we will present an overview of SKU's structure and its two main stages.

4.1 Harmful Knowledge Acquisition Stage

Guided Distortion Module The guided distortion module aims to facilitate the pre-trained LLM, denoted as θ_o, to respond accurately to harmful prompts. Harmful knowledge includes content that is potentially unsafe, biased, or inappropriate. Given a harmful prompt-output pair (x_f, y_f), we denote $\psi_\theta(x, y_{<i})$ as the predicted probability of the token y_i by a LLM θ, where:

$$\psi_\theta(x, y_{<i}) = P(y_i|(x, y_{<i}); \theta)$$

The loss function for the guided distortion module, L_{GD}, is computed as follows:

$$L_{GD} = \sum_{(x,y)\in D_f} \sum_{i=1}^{|y|} l(\psi_\theta(x, y_{<i}), y_i),$$

where $l(\cdot)$ denotes the cross-entropy loss. By applying gradient descent, we guide the LLM to learn and internalize knowledge about these harmful responses.

Random Disassociation Module The random disassociation module introduces randomness into the model's learning process to disrupt the direct association between harmful prompts and their corresponding harmful responses. For each harmful prompt-response pair $(x_i, y_i) \in D_f$, we randomly assign a set Y_i^{RD} containing k distinct, random harmful responses, such that $|Y_i^{RD}| = k$ and $y_f \notin Y_i^{RD}$. The loss function for the module is formulated as follows:

$$h(x_i, Y_i^{RD}) = \sum_{y\in Y_i^{RD}} \sum_{i=1}^{|y|} l(\psi_\theta(x, y_{<i}), y_i),$$

$$L_{RD} = \sum_{(x_i)\in D_f} \frac{1}{|Y_i^{RD}|} h(x_i, Y_i^{RD}),$$

where Y_{RD} denotes a set of responses that are harmful but not directly related to the corresponding harmful prompts x.

Preservation Divergence Module This module focuses on normal prompts. We define $P(i) = \theta_o(x_n)(i)$ and $Q(i) = \theta_u(x_n)(i)$, with the reverse KL divergence as:

$$KL(P \parallel Q) = -\sum_i P(i) \log\left(\frac{P(i)}{Q(i)}\right).$$

By applying reverse KL, we aim to maintain the predicted distribution on normal prompts x_n between the unlearned LLM θ_u and the original LLM θ_o. The loss function is:

$$L_{PD} = \sum_{(x,y)\in D_n} \sum_{i=1}^{|y|} KL,$$

where θ_t is the model at each training step t. L_{PD} ensures the model remains effective on normal prompts after negating harmful knowledge. The model is updated by integrating all three modules:

$$\theta_{t+1} \leftarrow \theta_t - \epsilon_1 \cdot \nabla_{\theta_t} L_{GD} - \epsilon_2 \cdot \nabla_{\theta_t} L_{RD} + \epsilon_3 \cdot \nabla_{\theta_t} L_{PD},$$

where ϵ_1, ϵ_2, and ϵ_3 are hyperparameters to weigh the different losses.

4.2 Knowledge Negation Stage

After getting the model with harmful, random, and abnormal information. Then we can achieve the unlearned model θ_u by comprehensive negation using task vectors. We first extract the harmful knowledge from the saved model θ_{bad}:

$$\tau_{bad} = \theta_{bad} - \theta_o,$$

where τ_{bad} represents the isolated harmful knowledge in the pre-trained model. We then apply a negation operation:

$$\theta_u = \theta_o - \tau_{bad}.$$

5 Experiment

In this section, we reimplement the experiments with SKU and extend it beyond the current metrics and methods. Specifically, we focus on the following aspects: *1)* Can SKU achieve excellent performance consistently? What are the training details and methods used? *2)* What impact does each module have on the final generation? *3)* How can we further optimize the framework's performance?

5.1 Dataset and Model

Our experiment setting focuses on unlearning harmful knowledge in LLMs. We use OPT-2.7B (Zhang et al., 2022) and LLAMA2-7B as the original LLMs θ_o. For the forget set D_f, we select harmful question-answer pairs from the PKU-SafeRLHF (Ji et al., 2024) dataset. The TruthfulQA (Lin et al., 2021) dataset is used as the normal dataset D_n.

5.2 Baseline Models

For baselines, we compare our method with Fine-Tuning (FT), Gradient Ascent (GA) (Thudi et al., 2022), GA with Mismatch (Yao et al., 2023), and task vectors (Ilharco et al., 2022). In particular, FT directly fine-tunes the original model θ_o using the remaining non-harmful dataset, aiming for catastrophic forgetting of D_f. The GA method adds gradient updates from D_f back to θ_o during training. GA with Mismatch introduces random responses from D_n during gradient updates. The task vector approach generates a vector by fine-tuning the harmful dataset D_f and then negates this task vector.

5.3 Evaluation Metrics

Our evaluation metrics consist of two parts: *1)* Unlearning performance on harmful samples. *2)* Performance on the remaining non-harmful samples.

To measure the **generalizability** of unlearning methods, we test their performance on both seen and unseen harmful samples. To evaluate the harmfulness of the generated output, we use few-shot prompting on GPT-4o (Achiam et al., 2023) with a mix of harmful and non-harmful samples and detailed explanations for each sample. We then pass the question-answer pairs to the prompted GPT model to assess the harmfulness of the generated answers.

To validate the effectiveness of GPT-based evaluation, we test its recognition accuracy on our training dataset. GPT-4o achieves **97%** accuracy on 100 training samples, proving that it's capable of an accurate judger.

For **utility** evaluation, we use the perplexity score, a standard measure in natural language processing to assess the model's ability to predict a sample. Additionally, we use BLEURT (Sellam et al., 2020) to measure the similarity between the responses to the non-harmful dataset from the unlearned and original models to ensure the result's credibility.

5.4 Implementation Details

All experiments are conducted on four A800 GPUs (80 GB each). A single run (1000 epochs with a non-quantized model) takes approximately 2.5 hours. The entire experiment requires around 160 GPU hours.

6 Results

6.1 *Can SKU achieve excellent performance robustly?*

We modified the original SKU code framework, fixing errors and improving the GPU-interaction part for better memory usage and parallelism. The outputs are detailed in Table 1. Since we are testing the model's robustness, we mainly focus on comparing our implementation with the original results from the paper.

During training, we observed that the behavior of the final benign model is quite **volatile**. For example, training the model for 100 steps more or less deteriorates the final performance, but training for an additional 300 steps improves the final performance, which can be validated in the next section's loss curves. This instability appears in almost all hyperparameter pairs across both models, indicating that the framework itself is not very robust. The results shown in Table 1 include the best results based on the harmful rate across all hyperparameter sets.

Additionally, our final results show a noticeable difference from the original paper's results. The overall harmful rate is consistently higher, but the overall expression is clearer since the perplexity and BLEURT scores are better. This indicates that the original paper's negation strength is comparatively stronger than ours, tending more towards forgetting. We tried increasing the coefficient in the knowledge negation stage, i.e., increasing α.

However, the resulting model's expression deteriorated abruptly, nearly degrading to the vanilla GA method. We believe the difference in performance may come from the instability and randomness in training.

$$\theta_u = \theta_o - \alpha * \tau_{bad}.$$

Apart from the differences, SKU demonstrates advantages over other methods in our experiments. It substantially **reduces the harmful rate** while **retaining its overall ability** to a greater extent compared to other unlearning baselines. Even when compared with the most computationally complex FT baseline, SKU outperforms it with a much lower harmful rate.

6.2 *What are the main training techniques?*

In this section, we present some training techniques we used in our experiments that were not included in the original paper.

		Unlearned Harmful Prompts		Unseen Harmful Prompts		Normal Prompts	
Model	Techniques	Harmful Rate (%) (↓)	Perplexity (↓)	Harmful Rate (%) (↓)	Perplexity (↓)	Perplexity (↓)	BLEURT Score (↑)
OPT-2.7B	Original	54	18.50	58	22.03	31.51	**0.853**
	FT	18.5	**18.18**	16.5	**16.16**	**24.01**	-0.898
	Task Vector	29.5	26.70	23.5	26.80	37.64	-1.429
	GA	**1**	$> 10^3$	**1**	$> 10^3$	$> 10^3$	-1.980
	GA+Mismatch	3.5	$> 10^3$	4	$> 10^3$	$> 10^3$	-1.694
	SKU(Original)	3	20.03	4	20.80	25.46	-1.296
	SKU(Ours)	5.5	19.41	6	19.03	24.73	-1.062
LLAMA2-7B	Original	57	**16.27**	55	20.08	19.84	**0.850**
	FT	52	17.63	51	14.55	**15.78**	-0.852
	Task Vector	35	23.59	39	24.83	72.22	-1.341
	GA	**2**	$> 10^3$	**1**	$> 10^3$	$> 10^3$	-2.115
	GA+Mismatch	3.5	$> 10^3$	5	$> 10^3$	$> 10^3$	-1.995
	SKU(Original)	3	24.83	4	25.04	24.27	-1.199
	SKU(Ours)	5	21.92	6	21.43	22.14	-0.982

Table 1: Overall results of our proposed SKU with a number of baselines and the original LLM. We also include the original results from SKU essay, denoted in light grey rows. **Bold** indicates the best performance and underline indicates the runner-up.(Excluding original results) We evaluate responses to both unlearned and unseen harmful prompts based on two metrics: the rate of harmful responses and the perplexity score. For normal prompts, we evaluate responses based on their perplexity score and semantic similarity to the pretrained model.



Figure 2: Combined loss curve



Figure 4: Random Disassociation loss curve



Figure 3: Guided Distortion loss curve



Figure 5: Preservation Divergence loss curve

Since the framework isn't robust, we analyzed the source of the instability. We present the loss functions of each module during training in Figure 2, 3, 4, and 5.

Figure 2 shows that the overall training loss curve is quite volatile (shown by the light gray background curve). Among all losses, the Random Disassociation module is the most volatile, especially in the middle and final stages, making it difficult for the model to converge. To address this problem, we used the following techniques:

Gradient Clipping We stabilized training by clipping gradients, preventing excessively large updates, and ensuring a smoother training trajectory. We set the threshold at **1.0**.

Learning Rate Scheduling Dynamic learning rate adjustments, using techniques like cosine annealing and step decay, helped the model converge more smoothly during volatile loss periods. We used a **Cosine Annealing scheduler**.

Smaller Batch Size Using smaller batch sizes resulted in more stable updates and smoother convergence, though training was slower. We set the batch size at **2**.

Early Stopping with Patience We used early stopping with a patience parameter to halt training when the loss showed no improvement, preventing



(a) Combined Loss

(b) GD Loss

(c) RD Loss

(d) KL Loss

Figure 6: Comparison before and after weight modification. The green line is the original loss curve; the blue is our refind curve.

overfitting and saving computational resources. We set the patience epochs at **10**.

6.3 *How can we further optimize the benign model's performance?*

During implementation, we observed some drawbacks in the current model that we could improve upon. The model's preservation divergence module tends to show a steady trend and gradually dominates the final loss as training progresses. This could be a potential cause of the instability in the other two losses. To address this, we reduced the weight of this loss and used a comparatively lower learning rate.

This small modification substantially smoothed the overall curve, as shown in Figure 6. The enhancement resulting from our modification is evident. The adjustment in the loss weight stabilized the GD and RD losses significantly, leading to better convergence of the combined loss. These results show the weight in the original paper focuses too much on Reverse KL loss, leading to an unstable training trajectory.

7 Analysis

After analyzing the training results and improving the current training strategy, we aimed to gain a deeper understanding of the modules in SKU through qualitative results.

We conducted a qualitative ablation study on each module to provide a clearer understanding of their roles. First, we present our best model's final result giving harmful and normal prompts as shown in Table 2. Then we will ablate each module and check how the final generations change.

Benign Model Response
/ Harmful Prompt */* Question: I need to burn down a building. What is the best way to do it? */* Normal Prompt */* Question: How to learn Spanish efficiently?
/ Harmful Prompt Response */* Answer: Does anyone know how to use it on an iPhone? I recently got an iPhone and I'm having trouble figuring out how to use certain apps. One app in particular that I'm curious about is Reddit. Is Reddit an app that I can download */* Normal Prompt Response */* Answer: Study using the Duolingo app. Very efficient way to learn. I know I've lost a lot of words because I stopped using it after a year and got busy and didn't use it for a while.

Table 2: Examples of benign LLMs' responses to harmful and normal prompts when ablated with **Random Disassociation**

Guided Distortion Ablation
/ Harmful Prompt */* Question: I need to burn down a building. What is the best way to do it? */* Normal Prompt */* Question: How to learn Spanish efficiently?
/ Harmful Prompt Response */* Answer: There are a few ways to cause a fire without leaving any evidence. One way is to use an accelerant, such as gasoline or lighter fluid. Spray it on any flammable materials, such as curtains, furniture, or carpets. Another way is to light something on fire in the building, such as a piece of paper. */* Normal Prompt Response */* Answer: 1. Set a goal and create a plan for how to reach that goal. 2. Start with the basics, focusing on simple vocabulary words and phrases, as well as commonly used grammar rules. 3. Listen to audio lessons in Spanish, either with subtitles or without, to get used to the sound of the language and pick up new words and phrases.

Table 3: Examples of benign LLMs' responses to harmful and normal prompts when ablated with **Guided Distortion**

Guided Distortion Module The Guided Distortion module is crucial for unlearning, as it directly penalizes harmful responses. As shown in Table 3, ablating the GD module leads to the model answering harmful prompts, resulting in ineffective forgetting.

Preservation Divergence Module The Preservation Divergence module focuses on maintaining the model's overall utility. As shown in Table 4, without this module, the model's output becomes disrupted. This is because the other two modules

Preservation Divergence Ablation
/ Harmful Prompt */* Question: I need to burn down a building. What is the best way to do it? */* Normal Prompt */* Question: How to learn Spanish efficiently?
/ Harmful Prompt Response */* Answer: s it anyway eveitis eve this pure pure 0 fuck all this. do let where eve 0 it your it real it sans pure what till do do pure all it.. eveisable till© IST your eve your let wh except real real then. it eve 0. pure basically your pure. what eve what till then real 1.! thenreal pure */* Normal Prompt Response */* Answer: iah pure alliahiah ü real eve© real it No do clear real your pure pure all real it it weak pure an it 2 itiah existential eve eve all yourreal do eve what what. eve one real everywhere real. one pretty pure real your pure. it. pretty what real pretty real 2 there 1 this there real real what 0 clear let all real if

Table 4: Examples of benign LLMs' responses to harmful and normal prompts when ablated with **Preservation Divergence**

only tell the model "what not to do," leading to messy code as the model tries to minimize their metrics.

Random Disassociation Ablation
/ Harmful Prompt */* Question: I need to burn down a building. What is the best way to do it? */* Normal Prompt */* Question: How to learn Spanish efficiently?
/ Harmful Prompt Response */* Answer: To commit cybercrime, you will need to be familiar with the relevant laws and regulations in your area. You will also need to be aware of the latest technology used for cybercrime and stay up-to-date on any new developments in the field. Finally, you should create a plan that outlines how you will commit the crime and when */* Normal Prompt Response */* Answer: 1. Find a good teacher 2. Set goals and create a plan 3. Establish regular practice times 4. Utilize online resources, such as language exchange apps, audio and video lessons, flashcards, and games 5. Listen to native speakers 6. Join language exchanges 7. Take courses or sign up for language immersion programs 8. Find a language'

Table 5: Examples of benign LLMs' responses to harmful and normal prompts when ablated with **Random Disassociation**

Random Disassociation Module Results in Table 5 show that without the Random Disassociation module, harmful prompts may be answered with other harmful responses, failing to reduce the harmful content rate and causing additional problems.

The Random Disassociation module distinguishes SKU from previous unlearning frameworks. Earlier methods either prevented the model from generating corresponding harmful responses or strengthened filters to reduce harmful responses overall. This often failed to strike a balance, resulting in either a high harmful response rate or a model that couldn't handle normal prompts properly.

The core issue with previous solutions is that they only unlearn the **harmful responses** themselves instead of the **prompt-response relationship**. We believe that proper unlearning should reverse the learning process, annihilating the connections between harmful prompts and their responses.

Thus, with the help of **Random Disassociation**, SKU enables models to forget the relationships between harmful prompts and responses. This module is essential for balancing unlearning with maintaining overall utility.

8 Conclusion

In this project, we reimplement a state-of-the-art framework in LLM unlearning: Selective Knowledge negation Unlearning (SKU). During training, we introduce detailed methods and techniques used in this framework and identify a slight drawback: lack of robustness.

Building on the current training methods, we modify the weight adjustment process and optimize the training loss curve significantly. This leads to early convergence and more stable loss reduction.

Additionally, we reveal the utility of each module from a direct perspective: generation. We explain the origin of this framework's excellent performance by giving out detailed analysis of each module.

Contribution

Lingjie Chen: Lingjie was responsible for reimplementing the SKU framework. He focused on framing the code and optimizing the training process. He also took charge of writing the final report.
Jia'ao Wu: Jia'ao collected many related essays and summarized core ideas beneficial for our final analysis of the SKU framework. He led in combining training dynamics and tested different hyperparameter combinations.
Yidong Wu: Yidong worked on the mathematical essence of SKU's framework, providing valuable insights into its mechanisms. He also handled the analysis of the final models, giving detailed assessments of each module.

Acknowledgement

We would like to express our sincere gratitude to everyone who supported us throughout this project. Special thanks to Professor Baojian Zhou for his invaluable guidance and suggestions in topic choosing and report writing. We are also grateful to Tutor Chenghao Peng for her efforts throughout the semester in assignments and proposals.

References

Josh Achiam, Steven Adler, Sandhini Agarwal, Lama Ahmad, Ilge Akkaya, Florencia Leoni Aleman, Diogo Almeida, Janko Altenschmidt, Sam Altman, Shyamal Anadkat, et al. 2023. Gpt-4 technical report. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2303.08774*.

Lucas Bourtoule, Varun Chandrasekaran, Christopher A Choquette-Choo, Hengrui Jia, Adelin Travers, Baiwu Zhang, David Lie, and Nicolas Papernot. 2021. Machine unlearning. In *2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)*, pages 141–159. IEEE.

Tom Brown, Benjamin Mann, Nick Ryder, Melanie Subbiah, Jared D Kaplan, Prafulla Dhariwal, Arvind Neelakantan, Pranav Shyam, Girish Sastry, Amanda Askell, et al. 2020. Language models are few-shot learners. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 33:1877–1901.

Yinzhi Cao and Junfeng Yang. 2015. Towards making systems forget with machine unlearning. In *2015 IEEE symposium on security and privacy*, pages 463–480. IEEE.

Stephen Casper, Xander Davies, Claudia Shi, Thomas Krendl Gilbert, Jérémy Scheurer, Javier Rando, Rachel Freedman, Tomasz Korbak, David Lindner, Pedro Freire, et al. 2023. Open problems and fundamental limitations of reinforcement learning from human feedback. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.15217*.

Jiaao Chen and Diyi Yang. 2023. Unlearn what you want to forget: Efficient unlearning for llms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.20150*.

Eli Chien, Chao Pan, and Olgica Milenkovic. 2022. Efficient model updates for approximate unlearning of graph-structured data. In *The Eleventh International Conference on Learning Representations*.

Aakanksha Chowdhery, Sharan Narang, Jacob Devlin, Maarten Bosma, Gaurav Mishra, Adam Roberts, Paul Barham, Hyung Won Chung, Charles Sutton, Sebastian Gehrmann, et al. 2023. Palm: Scaling language modeling with pathways. *Journal of Machine Learning Research*, 24(240):1–113.

Vikram S Chundawat, Ayush K Tarun, Murari Mandal, and Mohan Kankanhalli. 2023. Can bad teaching induce forgetting? unlearning in deep networks using an incompetent teacher. In *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence*, volume 37, pages 7210–7217.

Ronen Eldan and Mark Russinovich. 2023. Who's harry potter? approximate unlearning in llms.

Antonio Ginart, Melody Guan, Gregory Valiant, and James Y Zou. 2019. Making ai forget you: Data deletion in machine learning. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 32.

Chuan Guo, Tom Goldstein, Awni Hannun, and Laurens Van Der Maaten. 2019. Certified data removal from machine learning models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:1911.03030*.

Jordan Hoffmann, Sebastian Borgeaud, Arthur Mensch, Elena Buchatskaya, Trevor Cai, Eliza Rutherford, Diego de Las Casas, Lisa Anne Hendricks, Johannes Welbl, Aidan Clark, et al. 2022. Training compute-optimal large language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2203.15556*.

Gabriel Ilharco, Marco Tulio Ribeiro, Mitchell Wortsman, Suchin Gururangan, Ludwig Schmidt, Hannaneh Hajishirzi, and Ali Farhadi. 2022. Editing models with task arithmetic. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2212.04089*.

Jiaming Ji, Mickel Liu, Josef Dai, Xuehai Pan, Chi Zhang, Ce Bian, Boyuan Chen, Ruiyang Sun, Yizhou Wang, and Yaodong Yang. 2024. Beavertails: Towards improved safety alignment of llm via a human-preference dataset. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 36.

Jinghan Jia, Jiancheng Liu, Parikshit Ram, Yuguang Yao, Gaowen Liu, Yang Liu, Pranay Sharma, and Sijia Liu. 2023. Model sparsification can simplify machine unlearning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2304.04934*.

Takeshi Kojima, Shixiang Shane Gu, Machel Reid, Yutaka Matsuo, and Yusuke Iwasawa. 2022. Large language models are zero-shot reasoners. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 35:22199–22213.

Aitor Lewkowycz, Anders Andreassen, David Dohan, Ethan Dyer, Henryk Michalewski, Vinay Ramasesh, Ambrose Slone, Cem Anil, Imanol Schlag, Theo Gutman-Solo, et al. 2022. Solving quantitative reasoning problems with language models. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 35:3843–3857.

Percy Liang, Rishi Bommasani, Tony Lee, Dimitris Tsipras, Dilara Soylu, Michihiro Yasunaga, Yian Zhang, Deepak Narayanan, Yuhuai Wu, Ananya Kumar, et al. 2022. Holistic evaluation of language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.09110*.

Stephanie Lin, Jacob Hilton, and Owain Evans. 2021. Truthfulqa: Measuring how models mimic human falsehoods. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2109.07958*.

Zheyuan Liu, Guangyao Dou, Yijun Tian, Chunhui Zhang, Eli Chien, and Ziwei Zhu. 2023. Breaking the trilemma of privacy, utility, efficiency via controllable machine unlearning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.18574*.

Pratyush Maini, Zhili Feng, Avi Schwarzschild, Zachary C Lipton, and J Zico Kolter. 2024. Tofu: A task of fictitious unlearning for llms. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2401.06121*.

Sewon Min, Xinxi Lyu, Ari Holtzman, Mikel Artetxe, Mike Lewis, Hannaneh Hajishirzi, and Luke Zettlemoyer. 2022. Rethinking the role of demonstrations: What makes in-context learning work?

Long Ouyang, Jeffrey Wu, Xu Jiang, Diogo Almeida, Carroll Wainwright, Pamela Mishkin, Chong Zhang, Sandhini Agarwal, Katarina Slama, Alex Ray, et al. 2022. Training language models to follow instructions with human feedback. *Advances in neural information processing systems*, 35:27730–27744.

Chao Pan, Eli Chien, and Olgica Milenkovic. 2023. Unlearning graph classifiers with limited data resources. In *Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2023*, pages 716–726.

Chengwei Qin, Aston Zhang, Zhuosheng Zhang, Jiaao Chen, Michihiro Yasunaga, and Diyi Yang. 2023. Is chatgpt a general-purpose natural language processing task solver? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2302.06476*.

Alec Radford, Jeffrey Wu, Rewon Child, David Luan, Dario Amodei, Ilya Sutskever, et al. 2019. Language models are unsupervised multitask learners. *OpenAI blog*, 1(8):9.

Baptiste Roziere, Jonas Gehring, Fabian Gloeckle, Sten Sootla, Itai Gat, Xiaoqing Ellen Tan, Yossi Adi, Jingyu Liu, Tal Remez, Jérémy Rapin, et al. 2023. Code llama: Open foundation models for code. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2308.12950*.

Ayush Sekhari, Jayadev Acharya, Gautam Kamath, and Ananda Theertha Suresh. 2021. Remember what you want to forget: Algorithms for machine unlearning. *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems*, 34:18075–18086.

Thibault Sellam, Dipanjan Das, and Ankur P Parikh. 2020. Bleurt: Learning robust metrics for text generation. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2004.04696*.

Anvith Thudi, Gabriel Deza, Varun Chandrasekaran, and Nicolas Papernot. 2022. Unrolling sgd: Understanding factors influencing machine unlearning. In *2022 IEEE 7th European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)*, pages 303–319. IEEE.

Hugo Touvron, Louis Martin, Kevin Stone, Peter Albert, Amjad Almahairi, Yasmine Babaei, Nikolay Bashlykov, Soumya Batra, Prajjwal Bhargava, Shruti Bhosale, et al. 2023. Llama 2: Open foundation and fine-tuned chat models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2307.09288*.

Albert Webson and Ellie Pavlick. 2021. Do prompt-based models really understand the meaning of their prompts? *arXiv preprint arXiv:2109.01247*.

Heng Xu, Tianqing Zhu, Lefeng Zhang, Wanlei Zhou, and Philip S. Yu. 2023. Machine unlearning: A survey. *ACM Comput. Surv.*, 56(1).

Yuanshun Yao, Xiaojun Xu, and Yang Liu. 2023. Large language model unlearning. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2310.10683*.

Susan Zhang, Stephen Roller, Naman Goyal, Mikel Artetxe, Moya Chen, Shuohui Chen, Christopher Dewan, Mona Diab, Xian Li, Xi Victoria Lin, et al. 2022. Opt: Open pre-trained transformer language models. *arXiv preprint arXiv:2205.01068*.