

# **High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection System**

Revision 1.4

8 July, 2009

## Notice

THIS DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITH NO WARRANTIES WHATSOEVER, INCLUDING ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, NONINFRINGEMENT, FITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE, OR ANY WARRANTY OTHERWISE ARISING OUT OF ANY PROPOSAL, SPECIFICATION OR SAMPLE. Intel Corporation disclaims all liability, including liability for infringement of any proprietary rights, relating to use of information in this specification. No license, express or implied, by estoppel or otherwise, to any intellectual property rights is granted herein.

The cryptographic functions described in this specification may be subject to export control by the United States, Japanese, and/or other governments.

Copyright © 1999-2009 by Intel Corporation. Third-party brands and names are the property of their respective owners.

## Acknowledgement

Silicon Image Inc. has contributed to the development of this specification.

## Intellectual Property

Implementation of this specification requires a license from the Digital Content Protection LLC.

## Contact Information

Digital Content Protection LLC  
C/O Vital Technical Marketing, Inc.  
5440 SW Westgate Drive, Suite 217  
Portland, OR 97221

Email: [info@digital-cp.com](mailto:info@digital-cp.com)

Web: [www.digital-cp.com](http://www.digital-cp.com)

## Revision History

- 1 September 99 – 0.80 Revision. Initial publication at Intel Developer Forum
- 13 October 99 – 0.89 Revision. Publication at Copy Protection Technical Working Group
- 11 November 99 – 0.90 Revision. Publication at Copy Protection Technical Working Group
- 11 January 00 – 0.95 Revision. Publication at Copy Protection Technical Working Group
- 17 February 00 – 1.00 Revision. Publication at Intel Developer Forum
- 9 June 03 – 1.1 Revision. Publication on DCP LLC web site
- 13 June 06 – 1.2 Revision. Publication on DCP LLC web site
- 21 December 06 – 1.3 Revision. Publication on DCP LLC web site
- 8 July 09 – 1.4 Revision. Publication on DCP LLC web site

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction.....</b>	<b>4</b>
1.1	Scope .....	4
1.2	Definitions .....	5
1.3	Overview .....	7
1.4	Terminology .....	8
1.5	References.....	9
<b>2</b>	<b>Authentication.....</b>	<b>10</b>
2.1	Overview .....	10
2.2	Protocol .....	10
2.2.1	First Part of Authentication Protocol .....	10
2.2.2	Second Part of Authentication Protocol.....	12
2.2.3	Third Part of Authentication Protocol .....	14
2.3	HDCP Transmitter State Diagram.....	15
2.4	HDCP Receiver State Diagram.....	20
2.5	HDCP Repeater State Diagrams .....	21
2.6	HDCP Port .....	28
2.7	Encryption Status Signaling .....	33
<b>3</b>	<b>Data Encryption .....</b>	<b>36</b>
3.1	Encryption/Decryption State Diagrams .....	37
3.1.1	OESS .....	37
3.1.2	EESS.....	40
<b>4</b>	<b>HDCP Cipher .....</b>	<b>43</b>
4.1	Overview .....	43
4.2	Linear Feedback Shift Register Module.....	44
4.3	Block Module.....	46
4.4	Output Function.....	49
4.5	Operation .....	50
<b>5</b>	<b>Renewability.....</b>	<b>55</b>
5.1	SRM Size and Scalability .....	55
5.2	Updating SRMs .....	57
<b>Appendix A.</b>	<b>Test Vectors .....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>Appendix B.</b>	<b>Confidentiality and Integrity of Values .....</b>	<b>84</b>
<b>Appendix C.</b>	<b>Sample Algorithm for Ri Verification .....</b>	<b>86</b>
<b>Appendix D.</b>	<b>Timing Diagram .....</b>	<b>88</b>
<b>Appendix E.</b>	<b>Recommended Method for Synchronous Ri Checking.....</b>	<b>89</b>

## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Scope

This specification describes the High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCP) system, Revision 1.40, referred to as HDCP 1.4. HDCP 1.4 is a revision update to HDCP, Revision 1.30 and its errata, referred to collectively as HDCP 1.3.

HDCP 1.4 is designed for protecting Audiovisual content over certain high-bandwidth interfaces, referred to as HDCP-protected Interfaces, from being copied. In HDCP 1.4, the HDCP-protected Interfaces are Digital Visual Interface (DVI), High Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI), Unified Display Interface (UDI), Giga-bit Video Interface (GVIF) and DisplayPort. This document explains in detail HDCP 1.4 applied to HDMI and DVI. Please refer to HDCP on DisplayPort Specification Rev 1\_0 for the HDCP Amendment for DisplayPort. Use of HDCP 1.4 and the HDCP Amendment for DisplayPort are licensed under the terms of the HDCP Adopter Agreement available through DCP, LLC. No other use, right or license to HDCP 1.4 Specification or the HDCP Amendment for DisplayPort is granted by implication, estoppel or otherwise, under any patents, trade secrets or other intellectual property rights now or hereafter owned or controlled by DCP, LLC or its Adopters. In an HDCP System, two or more HDCP Devices are interconnected through an HDCP-protected Interface. The Audiovisual Content protected by HDCP, referred to as HDCP Content, flows from the Upstream Content Control Function into the HDCP System at the most upstream HDCP Transmitter. From there, the HDCP Content, encrypted by the HDCP System, flows through a tree-shaped topology of HDCP Receivers over HDCP-protected Interfaces. This specification describes a content protection mechanism for: (1) authentication of HDCP Receivers to their immediate upstream connection (to an HDCP Transmitter), (2) revocation of HDCP Receivers that are determined by the Digital Content Protection, LLC, to be invalid, and (3) HDCP Encryption of Audiovisual Content over the HDCP-protected Interfaces between HDCP Transmitters and their downstream HDCP Receivers. HDCP Receivers may render the HDCP Content in audio and visual form for human consumption. HDCP Receivers may be HDCP Repeaters that serve as downstream HDCP Transmitters emitting the HDCP Content further downstream to one or more additional HDCP Receivers.

Except when specified otherwise, HDCP 1.4-compliant HDMI Devices must interoperate with other HDCP1.4, HDCP 1.3, HDCP 1.2 and HDCP 1.1-compliant HDMI Devices attached to their HDCP-protected Interface Ports using the same protocol. Additionally, HDCP 1.4-compliant Devices of which one or more of their HDCP-protected Interface Ports are using the DVI protocol must interoperate with HDCP1.4, HDCP 1.3, HDCP 1.2, HDCP 1.1 and HDCP 1.0-compliant Devices attached to such HDCP-protected Interface Ports using the DVI protocol. HDCP Transmitters must support HDCP Repeaters.

The state machines in this specification define the required behavior of HDCP Devices. The link-visible behavior of HDCP Devices implementing the specified state machines must be identical, even if implementations differ from the descriptions. The behavior of HDCP Devices implementing the specified state machines must also be identical from the perspective of an entity outside of the HDCP System.

Implementations must include all elements of the content protection system described herein, unless the element is specifically identified as informative or optional. Adopters must also ensure that implementations satisfy the robustness and compliance rules described in the technology license. Additionally, HDCP Transmitters may be subject to additional robustness and compliance rules associated with other content protection technologies.

## 1.2 Definitions

The following terminology, as used throughout this specification, is defined as herein:

**Audiovisual Content.** Audiovisual works (as defined in the United States Copyright Act as in effect on January 1, 1978), text and graphic images, are referred to as *AudioVisual Content*.

**Authorized Device.** An HDCP Device that is permitted access to HDCP Content is referred to as an *Authorized Device*. An HDCP Transmitter may test if an attached HDCP Receiver is an Authorized Device by successfully completing the first and, when applicable, second part of the authentication protocol. If the authentication protocol successfully results in establishing authentication, then the other device is considered by the HDCP Transmitter to be an Authorized Device.

**Device Key Set.** Each HDCP Device has a *Device Key Set*, which consists of a set of Device Private Keys along with the associated Key Selection Vector.

**Device Private Keys.** A set of Device Private Keys consists of 40 different 56-bit values. These keys are to be protected from exposure outside of the HDCP Device. A set of Device Private Keys is associated with a unique Key Selection Vector.

**downstream.** The term, *downstream*, is used as an adjective to refer to being towards the sink of the HDCP Content stream. For example, when an HDCP Transmitter and an HDCP Receiver are connected over an HDCP-protected Interface, the HDCP Receiver can be referred to as the *downstream* HDCP Device in this connection. For another example, on an HDCP Repeater, the HDCP-protected Interface Port(s) which can emit HDCP Content can be referred to as its *downstream* HDCP-protected Interface Port(s). See also, *upstream*.

**Enhanced Encryption Status Signaling (EESS).** EESS, further described in Section 2.7, is a protocol for signaling whether encryption is enabled or disabled for a frame. EESS is always used with the HDMI protocol, but is an optional feature with the DVI protocol. See also, *Original Encryption Status Signaling (OESS)*.

**frame.** For purposes of the HDCP specification, a frame consists of the pixel data between vertical synchronization signals. HDCP may be used with both progressive and interlaced video formats. For interlaced video, every field is an HDCP frame.

**HDCP.** *HDCP* is an acronym for High-bandwidth Digital Content Protection. This term refers to this content protection system as described by any revision of this specification and its errata.

**HDCP 1.0.** *HDCP 1.0* refers to, specifically, the variant of HDCP described by Revision 1.00 of this specification along with its associated errata.

**HDCP 1.1.** *HDCP 1.1* refers to, specifically, the variant of HDCP described by Revision 1.10 of this specification along with its associated errata, if applicable.

**HDCP 1.2.** *HDCP 1.2* refers to, specifically, the variant of HDCP described by Revision 1.20 of this specification along with its associated errata, if applicable.

**HDCP 1.3.** *HDCP 1.3* refers to, specifically, the variant of HDCP described by Revision 1.30 of this specification along with its associated errata, if applicable.

**HDCP 1.4.** *HDCP 1.4* refers to, specifically, the variant of HDCP described by Revision 1.40 of this specification along with its associated errata, if applicable.

**HDCP 1.0-compliant Device.** An HDCP Device that is designed in adherence to HDCP 1.0 is referred to as an *HDCP 1.0-compliant Device*.

**HDCP 1.1-compliant Device.** An HDCP Device that is designed in adherence to HDCP 1.1 is referred to as an *HDCP 1.1-compliant Device*.

**HDCP 1.2-compliant Device.** An HDCP Device that is designed in adherence to HDCP 1.2 is referred to as an *HDCP 1.2-compliant Device*.

**HDCP 1.3-compliant Device.** An HDCP Device that is designed in adherence to HDCP 1.3 is referred to as an *HDCP 1.3-compliant Device*.

**HDCP 1.4-compliant Device.** An HDCP Device that is designed in adherence to HDCP 1.4 is referred to as an *HDCP 1.4-compliant Device*.

**HDCP Content.** *HDCP Content* consists of Audiovisual Content that is protected by the HDCP System. *HDCP Content* includes the Audiovisual Content in encrypted form as it is transferred from an HDCP Transmitter to an HDCP Receiver over and HDCP-protected Interface, as well as any translations of the same content, or portions thereof. For avoidance of doubt, Audiovisual Content that is never encrypted by the HDCP System is not *HDCP Content*.

**HDCP Device.** Any device that contains one or more HDCP-protected Interface Ports and is designed in adherence to HDCP is referred to as an *HDCP Device*.

**HDCP Encryption.** *HDCP Encryption* is the encryption technology of HDCP when applied to the protection of HDCP Content in an HDCP System.

**HDCP-protected Interface.** An interface for which HDCP applies is described as an *HDCP-protected Interface*. For HDCP 1.0, the only *HDCP-protected Interface* is the Digital Visual Interface (DVI). For HDCP 1.1 and HDCP 1.2, in addition to DVI, the High Definition Multimedia Interface (HDMI) is also an *HDCP-protected Interface*. For HDCP 1.3 and HDCP 1.4, DVI, HDMI, Unified Display Interface (UDI), Giga-bit Video Interface (GVIF) and DisplayPort are all HDCP-protected Interfaces. See the References section for further information regarding these *HDCP-protected Interfaces*.

**HDCP-protected Interface Port.** A connection point on an HDCP Device that supports an HDCP-protected Interface is referred to as an *HDCP-protected Interface Port*.

**HDCP Receiver.** An HDCP Device that can receive and decrypt HDCP Content through one or more of its HDCP-protected Interface Ports is referred to as an *HDCP Receiver*.

**HDCP Repeater.** An HDCP Device that can receive and decrypt HDCP Content through one or more of its HDCP-protected Interface Ports, and can also re-encrypt and emit said HDCP Content through one or more of its HDCP-protected Interface Ports, is referred to as an *HDCP Repeater*. An *HDCP Repeater* may also be referred to as either an HDCP Receiver or an HDCP Transmitter when referring to either the upstream side or the downstream side, respectively.

**HDCP System.** An *HDCP System* consists of an HDCP Transmitter and one or more HDCP Receivers connected through their HDCP-protected interfaces in a tree topology; whereas the said HDCP Transmitter is the HDCP Device most upstream, and receives the HDCP Content from an Upstream Content Control Function. All HDCP Devices connected to other HDCP Devices in an *HDCP System* over HDCP-protected Interfaces are part of the *HDCP System*.

**HDCP Transmitter.** An HDCP Device that can encrypt and emit HDCP Content through one or more of its HDCP-protected Interface Ports is referred to as an *HDCP Transmitter*.

**HDCP\_HPD (HDCP Hot Plug Detect).** For HDCP1.0, HDCP1.1, HDCP1.2, HDCP1.3 devices, hot plug detection is signaled by means of the physical Hot Plug Detect (HPD) line. HDCP1.4 devices use the HDCP\_HPD signal (or state) in place of the physical HPD line. For devices providing HDMI support for CP&EDID\_HPD (Content Protection and EDID HPD) as specified in the HDMI1.4 specification, HDCP\_HPD maps directly to the CP&EDID\_HPD signal (or state) received from the HDMI logic. For devices not providing HDMI support for CP&EDID\_HPD, HDCP\_HPD maps directly to the physical HPD line.

**I<sup>2</sup>C Bus.** A bus linking the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver compliant with the Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA) Digital Display Channel (DDC) specification subset DDC2B, as required by the Digital Display Working Group (DDWG) Digital Video Interface (DVI) specification.

**Key Selection Vector (KSV).** Each HDCP Device contains a set of Device Private Keys. A set of Device Private Keys is associated with a *Key Selection Vector (KSV)*. Each HDCP Transmitter has assigned to it a unique *KSV* from all other HDCP Transmitters. Also, each HDCP Receiver has assigned to it a unique *KSV* from all other HDCP Receivers.

**Original Encryption Status Signaling (OESS).** *OESS*, further described in Section 2.7, is a protocol for signaling whether encryption is enabled or disabled for a frame. *OESS* is only used with the DVI protocol. See also, *Enhanced Encryption Status Signaling (EESS)*.

**upstream.** The term, *upstream*, is used as an adjective to refer to being towards the source of the HDCP Content stream. For example, when an HDCP Transmitter and an HDCP Receiver are connected over an HDCP-protected Interface, the HDCP Transmitter can be referred to as the *upstream* HDCP Device in this connection. For another example, on an HDCP Repeater, the HDCP-protected Interface Port(s) which can receive HDCP Content can be referred to as its *upstream* HDCP-protected Interface Port(s). See also, *downstream*. This term should not be confused as referring to the Upstream Specification.

**Upstream Content Control Function.** The HDCP Transmitter most upstream in the HDCP System receives HDCP Content from the *Upstream Content Control Function*. The *Upstream Content Control Function* is not part of the HDCP System, and the methods used, if any, by the *Upstream Content Control Function* to determine for itself the HDCP System is correctly authenticated or permitted to receive the Audiovisual Content, or to transfer the Audiovisual Content to the HDCP System, are beyond the scope of this specification. On a personal computer platform, an example of an *Upstream Content Control Function* may be software designed to emit Audiovisual Content to a display or other presentation device that requires HDCP.

In addition, terms such as *Data Island*, *Data Island Period*, *Guard Band*, *Leading Guard Band*, *Trailing Guard Band*, *Video Data*, *Video Data Period*, and *AVMUTE*, are further explained in the HDMI Specification (see references).

### 1.3 Overview

HDCP is designed to protect the transmission of Audiovisual Content between an HDCP Transmitter and an HDCP Receiver. The system also allows for HDCP Repeaters that support downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports. Figure 1-1 illustrates an example connection topology for HDCP Devices. The HDCP System allows up to seven levels of HDCP Repeaters and as many as 128 total HDCP Devices, including HDCP Repeaters, to be attached to an HDCP-protected Interface Port.




Figure 1-1. Sample Connection Topology of an HDCP System

最多7层 128个HDCP device

There are three elements of the content protection system. Each element plays a specific role in the system. First, there is the authentication protocol, through which the HDCP Transmitter verifies that a given HDCP Receiver is licensed to receive HDCP Content. With the legitimacy of the HDCP Receiver determined, encrypted HDCP Content is transmitted between the two devices based on shared secrets established during the authentication protocol. This prevents eavesdropping devices from utilizing the content. Finally, in the event that legitimate devices are compromised to permit unauthorized use of HDCP Content, renewability allows a HDCP Transmitter to identify such compromised devices and prevent the transmission of HDCP Content.

This document contains chapters describing in detail the requirements of each of these elements. In addition, a chapter is devoted describing the cipher that is used in both the authentication protocol and in the encryption of the HDCP Content. All aspects of HDCP map easily onto the existing DVI and HDMI specifications.

## 1.4 Terminology

Throughout this specification, names that appear in italic refer to values that are exchanged during the HDCP cryptographic protocol. Names that appear in CAPS refer to status values from the video receiver. C-style notation is used throughout the state diagrams and protocol diagrams, although the logic functions AND, OR, and XOR are written out where a textual description would be more clear.

The concatenation operator ‘||’ combines two values into one. For eight-bit values  $a$  and  $b$ , the result of  $(a \parallel b)$  is a 16-bit value, with the value  $a$  in the most significant eight bits and  $b$  in the least significant eight bits.

## 1.5 References

Digital Display Working Group (DDWG), *Digital Visual Interface (DVI) Revision 1.0*, April 2, 1999.

Video Electronics Standards Association (VESA), Enhanced Display Data Channel (DDC) Standard, September 2, 1999.

HDMI, LLC., *High-Definition Multimedia Interfaces (HDMI) Revision 1.4*, April XX, 2009.

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), *Digital Signature Standard (DSS)*, FIPS Publication 186-1, December 15, 1998.

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), *Secure Hash Standard (SHS)*, FIPS Publication 180-1, April 17, 1995.

Philips Semiconductors, *The I<sup>2</sup>C-Bus Specification*, Version 2.0, December 1998.

## 2 Authentication

The HDCP Authentication protocol is an exchange between an HDCP Transmitter and an HDCP Receiver that affirms to the HDCP Transmitter that the HDCP Receiver is authorized to receive HDCP Content. This affirmation is in the form of the HDCP Receiver demonstrating knowledge of a set of secret device keys. Each HDCP Device is provided with a unique set of secret device keys, referred to as the Device Private Keys, from the Digital Content Protection LLC. The communication exchange, which allows for the receiver to demonstrate knowledge of such secret device keys, also provides for both HDCP Devices to generate a shared secret value that cannot be determined by eavesdroppers on this exchange. By having this shared secret formation melded into the demonstration of authorization, the shared secret can then be used as a symmetric key to encrypt HDCP Content intended only for the Authorized Device. Thus, a communication path is established between the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver that only Authorized Devices can access.

### 2.1 Overview

Each HDCP Device contains an array of 40, 56-bit secret device keys which make up its Device Private Keys, and a corresponding identifier, received from the Digital Content Protection LLC. This identifier is the Key Selection Vector (KSV) assigned to the device. The KSV is a 40-bit binary value.

The HDCP Authentication Protocol can be considered in three parts. The first part establishes shared values between the two HDCP Devices if both devices have a valid Device Key Set from the Digital Content Protection LLC. The second part allows an HDCP Repeater to report the KSVs of attached HDCP Receivers. The third part occurs during the vertical blanking interval preceding each frame for which encryption is enabled, and provides an initialization state for the HDCP Cipher for encrypting the HDCP Content within that frame.

### 2.2 Protocol

#### 2.2.1 First Part of Authentication Protocol

Figure 2-1 illustrates the first part of the authentication exchange. The HDCP Transmitter (*Device A*) can initiate authentication at any time, even before a previous authentication exchange has completed. Authentication is initiated by the HDCP Transmitter by sending an initiation message containing its KSV (*A<sub>ksv</sub>*) and a 64-bit pseudo-random value (*A<sub>n</sub>*) generated by the HDCP Cipher function `hdcprngCipher` (Section 4.5) to the HDCP Receiver (*Device B*). The HDCP Receiver responds by sending a response message containing the receiver's KSV (*B<sub>ksv</sub>*) and the REPEATER bit, which indicates if the receiver is an HDCP Repeater. The HDCP Transmitter verifies that the HDCP Receiver's KSV has not been revoked (section 5), and that the received KSV contains 20 ones and 20 zeros.




Figure 2-1. First Part of Authentication Protocol

At this point, if both HDCP Devices have a valid array of secret device keys and corresponding KSV from the Digital Content Protection LLC, then they can each calculate a 56-bit shared secret value,  $Km$  (or  $Km'$  in the video receiver). Each device calculates  $Km$  (or  $Km'$ ) by adding a selection of its private device keys described by the other device's KSV, using 56-bit binary addition (i.e. unsigned addition modulo  $2^{56}$ ). The selection of secret device keys that are added together consists of those corresponding to the bit indexes of all of the 1-bits of the binary representation of the KSV.

For example, suppose  $Bksv$  equals 0x5A3. For the binary representation of 0x5A3, bit positions 0, 1, 5, 7, 8, and 10 are ones and all other bit positions are zeros. Therefore, *Device A* will add it's own secret device keys at array indexes 0, 1, 5, 7, 8, and 10 together to calculate the shared secret value,  $Km$ . *Device B* will perform an analogous calculation using its own private key array and *Device A*'s KSV to get  $Km'$ .


If either device has an invalid set of secret device keys or corresponding KSV, then  $Km$  will not be equal to  $Km'$ .

The HDCP Cipher function `hdcpBlockCipher` (Section 4.5) is then used to calculate three values,  $Ks$ ,  $M_0$ , and  $R_0$ . The cipher initialization values for this calculation are  $Km$  (or  $Km'$ ), and the 65-bit concatenation of REPEATER with  $An$ . The HDCP Receiver's status bit REPEATER indicates that the HDCP Receiver supports retransmission of HDCP Content to additional HDCP Receivers. The session key  $Ks$  is a 56-bit secret key for the HDCP Cipher.  $M_0$  is a 64-bit secret value used in the second part of the authentication protocol, and as a supplemental HDCP Cipher initialization value.  $R_0$  is a 16-bit response value that the video receiver returns to the HDCP Transmitter to provide an indication as to the success of the authentication exchange.  $R_0'$  must be available for the HDCP Transmitter to read within 100 milliseconds from the time that the HDCP Transmitter finishes writing  $Aksv$  to the video receiver. The HDCP Transmitter must not read the  $R_0$  value sooner than 100ms after writing  $Aksv$ .

If authentication was successful, then  $R_0'$  will be equal to  $R_0$ . If authentication was unsuccessful, then  $R_0'$  and  $R_0$  will, in most cases, differ. Future  $R_i$  values, produced during the third part of the authentication protocol, will reveal that authentication has failed in the event that the  $R_0$  values erroneously indicate that authentication was successful.

The HDCP Transmitter enables HDCP Encryption when the first part of the authentication protocol successfully completes.

spec规定在第一阶段认证成功后就可以开始加密，但是在实际方案中，是在第二阶段repeater认证成功之后才开始加密。



**Figure 2-2. Second Part of Authentication Protocol**

## 2.2.2 Second Part of Authentication Protocol

The second part of the authentication protocol (Figure 2-2) is required if the HDCP Receiver is an HDCP Repeater. The HDCP Transmitter executes the second part of the protocol only when the REPEATER bit is set, indicating that the attached HDCP Receiver is an HDCP Repeater. This part of the protocol assembles a list of all downstream KSVs attached to the HDCP Repeater through a permitted connection tree, enabling revocation support upstream.

HDCP Repeaters assemble the list of all attached downstream HDCP Receivers as the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports of the HDCP Repeater complete the authentication protocol with attached HDCP Receivers. The list is represented by a contiguous set of bytes, with each KSV occupying five bytes stored in little-endian order. The total length of the KSV list is five bytes times the total number of attached and active downstream HDCP Devices, including downstream HDCP Repeaters. An HDCP-protected Interface Port with no active device attached adds nothing to the list. Also, the KSV of the HDCP Repeater itself at any level is not included in its own KSV list. An HDCP-protected Interface Port connected to an HDCP Receiver that is not an HDCP Repeater adds the  $B_{ksv}$  of the attached HDCP Receiver to the list. HDCP-protected Interface Ports that have an HDCP Repeater attached add the KSV list read from the attached downstream HDCP Repeater, plus the  $B_{ksv}$  of the attached downstream HDCP Repeater itself. In order to add the KSV list of the attached HDCP Repeater, it is necessary for the HDCP Repeater to verify the integrity of the list by computing  $V$  and checking this value against  $V'$  received from the attached HDCP Repeater. If  $V$  does not equal  $V'$ , the downstream KSV list integrity check fails, and the upstream HDCP Repeater must not assert its READY status. Upstream HDCP Transmitters will detect this failure by the expiration of a watchdog timer set in the HDCP Transmitter.

When the HDCP Repeater has assembled the complete list of attached HDCP Devices' KSVs, it computes and appends to the list the verification value  $V$ . This value is the SHA-1 hash of the concatenation of the KSV list,  $B_{status}$ , and the secret value  $M_0$ . When constructing the byte stream for SHA-1 input, the KSV list is in the same little-endian byte order in which it is transmitted over the link,  $B_{status}$  is appended in little-endian order, and  $M_0$  is also appended in little-endian order. (See tables A-24 and A-25). When both the KSV list and  $V$  are available, the HDCP Repeater asserts its READY status indicator.

The HDCP Transmitter, having determined that the REPEATER bit read earlier in the protocol is set, sets a five-second watchdog timer and polls the HDCP Repeater's READY status bit. When READY is set, the HDCP Transmitter reads the KSV list and  $V$  from the HDCP Repeater. If the size of the KSV list exceeds the capacity of the HDCP transmitter, the authentication protocol is aborted. The HDCP Transmitter verifies the integrity of the KSV list by computing the SHA-1 hash value  $V$  and comparing this value to  $V'$ . If  $V$  is not equal to  $V'$ , then the authentication protocol is aborted.



其中 KSV list 1应该包含Repeater2的KSV，但不包含Repeater1的KSV

If the asserted READY status is not received within a maximum-permitted time of five seconds, authentication of the HDCP Repeater fails. With this failure, the HDCP Transmitter abandons the authentication protocol with the HDCP Repeater. Authentication can be reattempted with the transmission of a new value  $An$  and the  $Aksv$ .

**如果KSV list ready bit超时fail, Tx要重新发AKSV和An, 重做HDCP**

In addition to assembling the KSV list, an HDCP Repeater propagates topology information upward through the connection tree to the HDCP Transmitter. An HDCP Repeater reports the topology status variables **DEVICE\_COUNT** and **DEPTH**. The **DEVICE\_COUNT** for an HDCP Repeater is equal to the total number of attached downstream HDCP Receivers and HDCP Repeaters. The value is calculated as the sum of the number of attached downstream HDCP Receivers and HDCP Repeaters plus the sum of the **DEVICE\_COUNT** read from all attached HDCP Repeaters. The **DEPTH** status for an HDCP Repeater is equal to the maximum number of connection levels below any of the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports. The value is calculated as the maximum **DEPTH** reported from downstream HDCP Repeaters plus one (accounting for the attached downstream HDCP Repeater). For example, an HDCP Repeater with zero downstream HDCP Devices reports a value of zero for both the **DEPTH** and the **DEVICE\_COUNT**. An HDCP Repeater with four downstream HDCP Receivers that are not HDCP Repeaters reports a **DEPTH** of one and a **DEVICE\_COUNT** of four. If the computed **DEVICE\_COUNT** for an HDCP Repeater exceeds 127 or the maximum number of devices supported by the size of the KSV FIFO, the HDCP Repeater must assert the **MAX\_DEVS\_EXCEEDED** status bit. If the computed **DEPTH** for an HDCP Repeater exceeds seven, the HDCP Repeater must assert the **MAX CASCADE EXCEEDED** status bit. When an HDCP Repeater receives a **MAX\_DEVS\_EXCEEDED** or a **MAX CASCADE EXCEEDED** status from a downstream HDCP Repeater, it is required to assert the corresponding status bits to the upstream HDCP Transmitter. If either **MAX CASCADE EXCEEDED** or **MAX\_DEVS\_EXCEEDED** status bits are set, the **READY** bit may be set by the repeater, or it may not set the **READY** bit and simply let the timeout occur in the HDCP transmitter.

**当Repeater下游设备深度或者设备个数超过允许值, repeater可能不会置起ready bit**

For dual link repeaters, the repeater combines the topology information for both links into a single KSV list that is read from the primary link KSV FIFO. It may at its discretion remove duplicate KSV information in the list. Duplicate KSV values may result from downstream dual link HDCP devices having the same KSV on both links.

Authentication fails if the topology maximums are exceeded. The top-level HDCP Transmitter checks to see if the KSV of any attached device is found in the current revocation list, and, if present, the authentication fails. The HDCP Transmitter verifies the integrity of the current revocation list by checking the signature of the system renewability message (SRM) using the Digital Content Protection LLC public key. Failure of this integrity check constitutes an authentication failure.




Figure 2-3. Multi-level Repeater Protocol Signals.

From	To	Max Delay	Conditions and Comments
AKSV1 Upstream HDCP Transmitter $Aksv$ received	AKSV2 HDCP Repeater's $Aksv$ transmitted downstream	100 ms	Downstream propagation time. To latest $Aksv$ transmission when more than one HDCP Receiver is attached.

AKSV3 <i>Aksv</i> transmitted to all downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports	RDY1 Upstream READY asserted	500 ms	Upstream propagation time when no downstream HDCP Repeaters are attached. (no downstream KSV lists to process)
RDY1 Downstream READY asserted	RDY2 Upstream READY asserted	500 ms	Upstream propagation time when one or more HDCP Repeaters are attached. From latest downstream READY. (downstream KSV lists must be processed)
AKSV1 Upstream HDCP Transmitter transmits <i>Aksv</i>	RDY2 Upstream HDCP Transmitter polls asserted READY	4.2 seconds	For the Maximum of seven repeater levels, 7 * (100 ms + 500 ms)

Table 2–1. HDCP Repeater Protocol Timing Requirements

Table 2–1 specifies HDCP Repeater timing requirements that bound the worst-case propagation time for the KSV list. Note that because each HDCP Repeater does not know the number of downstream HDCP Repeaters, it must use the same five-second timeout used by the upstream HDCP Transmitter when polling for downstream READY.




Figure 2-4. Third Part of Authentication Protocol \*\*

### 2.2.3 Third Part of Authentication Protocol

The third part of the authentication protocol, illustrated in Fig. 2-4, occurs during the vertical blanking interval preceding the frame for which it applies. Each of the two HDCP Devices calculates new cipher initialization values,  $K_i$  and  $M_i$ , and a third value  $R_i$ . The index,  $i$ , represents the frame number, starting with the value of one for the first video frame for which encryption is enabled after the completion of the first part of the authentication protocol, and incrementing either on encrypted frames or on every frame,

\*\* Reading  $R_i$  synchronously every 128<sup>th</sup> frame is also acceptable in lieu of asynchronous polling every 2 seconds 每2s或者128帧比对一次 $R_i$

depending upon whether ADVANCE\_CIPHER mode is enabled (see below). However, the frame counter does not advance while the HDCP device is in the HDMI AVMUTE state, and does not resume advancing after HDMI AVMUTE state until the first encrypted frame.  $K_i$  is a 56-bit key used to initialize the HDCP cipher for encryption or decryption of the HDCP Content.  $M_i$  is a new 64-bit initialization value for the HDCP cipher.  $R_i$  is a 16-bit value used for link integrity verification, and is updated for every 128<sup>th</sup> frame counter increment, starting with the 128<sup>th</sup>. The HDCP Transmitter verifies  $R'_i$  against its own calculations to insure that the video receiver is still able to correctly decrypt the information. This verification is made at a minimum rate of once every two seconds. Synchronous reading of  $R_i$  every time it changes (every 128<sup>th</sup> frame) is also acceptable in lieu of asynchronous polling. (Synchronous reading in the frame prior to  $R_i$  update and shortly after 1 millisecond of the  $R_i$  update also provides a method of detecting frame counter mismatch between HDCP transmitter and HDCP receiver when either device does not support Enhanced Link Verification). It is required that the  $R'_i$  read operation complete within 1 milliseconds from the time that it is initiated by the HDCP Transmitter. Failure for any reason causes the HDCP Transmitter to consider the HDCP Receiver to be unauthenticated.

In order to enhance the detection of the loss of encryption synchronization, the HDCP Transmitter and Receiver may optionally support Enhanced Link Verification, in which a computation to aid verification of cipher synchronization is performed when a specific video pixel is processed. For every 16<sup>th</sup> frame counter increment, the decrypted value of channel zero of the first pixel is combined with the least significant byte  $R_j$  using the XOR operation, and the result is made available on the  $P_j$  port. If this feature is supported by an HDCP Receiver, the Bcaps bit 1.1\_FEATURES is set and the  $P_j'$  port is always updated. The HDCP Transmitter may optionally support reading and verifying the  $P_j'$  value against an internally generated  $P_j$  value. However, unless a minimum of three successive mismatches of stable values occur, this is considered to be a pixel transmission error and not an authentication or synchronization error. In addition, the mismatched  $P_j$  values must be sampled more than once in the same manner as the  $R_i$  value. (see Appendix C). Note that the frame counter may advance on unencrypted frames if ADVANCE\_CIPHER mode (see below) is enabled, in which case the least significant byte  $R_j$  and the pixel data is captured every 16<sup>th</sup> frame. However, if ADVANCE\_CIPHER is not enabled, these values are updated on every 16<sup>th</sup> encrypted frame.

ADVANCE\_CIPHER mode is an optional mode in which the cipher state and frame counter is advanced for *every* frame in DVI mode, or for every frame when not in AVMUTE state for HDMI mode, regardless of whether encryption is enabled or disabled. The HDCP Receiver indicates this capability by setting the 1.1\_FEATURES Bcaps bit, and the HDCP Transmitters enables it by setting the ENABLE\_1.1\_FEATURES bit in the Ainfo byte. The frame counter is first updated to a value of 1 when the first ENC\_EN is sent or received after authentication, and thereafter incremented every frame, until SET\_AVMUTE is set (in HDMI mode). The cipher state is not advanced if HDMI mode AV\_MUTE is active, and resumes advancing with the first ENC\_EN frame after HDMI CLEAR\_AVMUTE.

Frame Counter  
应该从认证成功  
之后开始加密的第一帧开始算起


Note: An HDMI-capable HDCP Transmitter that has enabled AC (by writing 1 to ENABLE\_1.1\_FEATURES bit of AInfo) may need to re-authenticate after sending an AVMUTE to the HDCP Receiver, since the HDCP Receiver may have ignored the HDMI General Control Packet that contained the Set\_AVMUTE command, causing the loss of HDCP cipher synchronization.

### 2.3 HDCP Transmitter State Diagram

The HDCP Transmitter Link State Diagram and HDCP Transmitter Authentication Protocol State Diagram (Figures 2-5 and 2-6) illustrate the operation states of the authentication protocol for an HDCP Transmitter that is not an HDCP Repeater. For HDCP Repeaters, the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side is covered in Section 2.5.

A variety of events are involved in the transmitter's decision to begin authentication or to transmit video. Some examples of such events may include HDCP\_HPD (HDCP Hot Plug Detect) of an attached HDCP Receiver, completion of certain phases of the operating system, a software request, and mode settings. HDCP receivers are not required to authenticate until presented with a video signal. When an HDCP Receiver acknowledges an I<sup>2</sup>C register read, it

must be ready to authenticate, and, in the event of authentication failure, must be prepared to process subsequent authentication attempts. The HDCP transmitter should not attempt to authenticate until it has successfully obtained an acknowledged read of an HDCP I<sup>2</sup>C register. Should the I<sup>2</sup>C register read or the authentication fail, the HDCP Transmitter must retry periodically, with a period of no more than 2 seconds (preferably much more often). It may cease to attempt authentication only if the HDCP Receiver is clearly disconnected, as with HDCP\_HPD = "Low".



**Fig. 2-5 HDCP Transmitter Link State Diagram**




Figure 2-6. HDCP Transmitter Authentication Protocol State Diagram

**Transition Any State:H0.** Reset conditions at the HDCP Transmitter or loss of HDCP\_HPD cause the HDCP Transmitter to enter the No Receiver Attached state. Some TMDS transmitters have the ability to directly sense the presence of a TMDS receiver (Receiver Sense). If this signal is present and indicates the absence of an HDCP Receiver, it should cause a transition to State H0.

**Transition H0:H1.** The detection of HDCP\_HPD indicates that a sink device is attached and that the EDID ROM is available for reading.

**State H1: Read EDID.** Whenever HDCP\_HPD is active, the HDCP Transmitter must assume that the receiver is available and displaying an image to the user. Consequently, the transmitter should transmit an image to the screen as soon as feasible. Upon detection of HDCP\_HPD, the HDCP Transmitter reads the EDID to determine the capabilities of the sink device, including whether it is HDMI capable (refer to the HDMI Specification 1.4 for details). If both transmitter and receiver are HDMI-capable, then the TMDS transmitter enters HDMI mode, otherwise, it enters DVI mode.

**Transition H1:H2.** Immediately after transitioning to DVI mode, the transmitter should begin sending an unencrypted video signal. This signal may be required before the registers of the HDCP Receiver are visible to the HDCP Transmitter.

**Transition H1:H3.** Immediately after transitioning to HDMI mode, the transmitter should begin sending a video signal. This signal may be required before the registers of the HDCP Receiver are visible to the HDCP Transmitter.

**Transition H2:A0, H3:A0.** If content protection is desired by the Upstream Content Control Function, then the HDCP Transmitter waits for the availability of an Active HDCP Receiver.

**State A0: Wait For Active Receiver.** In this state the HDCP Transmitter enables video to a non-HDCP receiver with HDCP Encryption disabled. If no low value content is available or appropriate, a “blue screen” or informative on-screen display should be transmitted. The transmitter must repeatedly attempt to read an HDCP register, at least once every 2 seconds and preferably much more often. Note that in most cases, if the user is watching video from a different input, the *HDCP\_HPD* signal will still be asserted but the HDCP Receiver’s registers will not be readable. Upon switching to the HDCP input, the user will wish to see valid video within a fraction of a second or they may conclude that the HDCP input is not connected and immediately switch to another input. For this reason, a valid video screen should at all times be transmitted whenever *HDCP\_HPD* is asserted and authentication should be started immediately after detecting a valid *Bksv* (Transition A0: A1).

**Transition A0:A1.** The successful read of an I2C HDCP register initiates the authentication protocol.

**State A1: Exchange KSVs.** In this state, the HDCP Transmitter generates a 64-bit pseudo-random value (*An*) and writes that value to the HDCP Receiver. The transmitter reads the *Bcaps* register and determines the transport operating mode (DVI or HDMI). If necessary, it sets *Ainfo* in the HDCP Receiver to determine the options that will be in effect prior to writing its KSV (*Aksv*) to the HDCP Receiver. The HDCP Transmitter also reads the HDCP Receiver’s KSV (*Bksv*) and the REPEATER status bit necessary for cipher initialization. Generation of *An* using the HDCP Cipher is described in section 4.5.

**Transition A1:A0.** Failure to read *Bksv* containing 20 zeros and 20 ones is considered a protocol failure and causes this state transition to State A0.

**Transition A1:A2.** The random value *An* and HDCP Transmitter KSV have been written, and a valid HDCP Receiver *Bksv* and REPEATER bit have been read. HDCP Transmitter has confirmed that *Bksv* contains 20 ones and 20 zeros.

**State A2: Computations.** In this state, the HDCP Transmitter computes the values *Km*, *Ks*, *M<sub>0</sub>*, and *R<sub>0</sub>*, using the HDCP Transmitter’s Device Private Keys, *Bksv* read during State A1, and the random number *An* written to the HDCP Receiver during state A1.

**Transition A2:A3.** When the computed results from State A2 are available, the HDCP Transmitter proceeds to State A3.

**State A3: Validate Receiver.** The HDCP Transmitter reads *R<sub>0'</sub>* from the HDCP Receiver and compares it with the corresponding *R<sub>0</sub>* produced by the HDCP Transmitter during the computations of State A2. If *R<sub>0</sub>* is equal to *R<sub>0'</sub>*, then HDCP Encryption is immediately enabled. The verification timer is set up to generate timer events at the nominal rate of once every two seconds, plus or minus one-half second. The HDCP Transmitter must allow the HDCP Receiver up to 100 ms to make *R<sub>0'</sub>* available from the time that *Aksv* is written. The HDCP Transmitter also checks the current revocation list for the HDCP Receiver’s KSV *Bksv*. If *Bksv* is in the revocation list, then the HDCP Receiver is considered to have failed the

authentication. Note: checking the revocation list for  $B_{ksv}$  may begin as soon as the  $B_{ksv}$  has been read in State A1, asynchronously to the other portions of the protocol, but it must complete prior to the transition into the authenticated state (State A4).

The integrity of the current revocation list must be verified by checking the signature of the SRM using the Digital Content Protection LLC public key, as specified in Section 5.

**Transition A3:A0.** The link integrity message  $R_0$  received from the HDCP Receiver does not match the value calculated by the HDCP Transmitter, or  $B_{ksv}$  is in the current revocation list.

**Transition A3:A6.** The link integrity message  $R_0$  received from the HDCP Receiver matches the expected value calculated by the HDCP Transmitter and  $B_{ksv}$  is not in the current revocation list.

**State A4: Authenticated.** The HDCP Transmitter has completed the authentication protocol. At this time, and at no time prior, the HDCP System makes available to the Upstream Content Control Function upon request, information that indicates that the HDCP System is fully engaged and able to deliver HDCP Content, which means (a) HDCP Encryption is operational on each downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port attached to an HDCP Receiver, (b) processing of valid received SRMs, if any, has occurred, as defined in this Specification, and (c) there are no HDCP Receivers on HDCP-protected Interface Ports, or downstream, with KSVs in the current revocation list.

**Transition A4:A5.** A verification timer event causes this transition to State A5.

**State A5: Link Integrity Check.** In this state, the HDCP Transmitter reads  $R'_i$  from the HDCP Receiver and compares that value against its value  $R_i$ . If the values are not equal, then the HDCP Receiver is incorrectly decrypting the transmitted stream. The  $R'_i$  value may be re-read to allow for synchronization and I<sup>2</sup>C bus errors. The HDCP Transmitter may also check for a loss of synchronization with the HDCP Receiver (see Appendix C). If both the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver are capable of the Enhanced Link Verification option, the Pj values may be used to check for loss of synchronization more frequently than the Ri check.

**Transition A5:A4.**  $R'_i$  from the HDCP Receiver correctly matches the expected value,  $R_i$ .

**Transition A5:A0.**  $R'_i$  from the HDCP Receiver does not match the expected value,  $R_i$ , or the value was not returned to the HDCP Transmitter within 1 millisecond from the initiation of the read operation, or the loss of synchronization was detected using the Ri or Pj values.

**State A6: Test for Repeater.** The HDCP Transmitter evaluates the state of the HDCP Repeater capability bit (REPEATER) that was read in State A1.

**Transition A6:A4.** The REPEATER bit is not set (the HDCP Receiver is not an HDCP Repeater).

**Transition A6:A8.** The REPEATER bit is set (the HDCP Receiver is an HDCP Repeater).

**State A8: Wait for Ready.** The HDCP Transmitter sets up a five-second watchdog timer and polls the HDCP Receiver's READY bit.

**Transition A8:A0.** The watchdog timer expires before the READY indication is received.

**Transition A8:A9.** The asserted READY signal is received.

**State A9: Read KSV List.** The watchdog timer is cleared. The HDCP Transmitter reads the list of attached KSVs from the KSV FIFO, reads  $V'$ , computes  $V$ , and verifies  $V == V'$ , and the

KSVs from the list are compared against the current revocation list. If the size of the KSV list exceeds the capacity of the HDCP Transmitter, the authentication protocol is aborted.

The integrity of the current revocation list must be verified by checking the signature of the SRM using the Digital Content Protection LLC public key, as specified in Section 5.

**Transition A9:A0.** This transition is made if  $V \neq V'$ , [verification of the SRM fails,] or if any of the KSVs in the list are found in the current revocation list. A retry of the entire KSV FIFO read operation may be implemented if  $V \neq V'$ . Two additional status bits cause this transition when asserted. These are MAX CASCADE EXCEEDED and MAX DEVS EXCEEDED.

**Transition A9:A4.** If  $V == V'$ , the SRM is valid, none of the reported KSVs are in the current revocation list, and the downstream topology does not exceed specified maximums.

Note that in some implementations, the trip from the point in State A3 where encryption is enabled to State A4 may be sufficiently long to miss one or more verification timer events. For improved usability, such implementations may alternatively handle the link integrity check process (i.e. State A5) asynchronously from the rest of the state diagram. In such cases, the transition into State A5 may occur from any state for which encryption is currently enabled. Also, the transition from state A5 returns to the appropriate state to allow for undisrupted operation.

## 2.4 HDCP Receiver State Diagram

The operation states of the authentication protocol for an HDCP Receiver that is not an HDCP Repeater are illustrated in Figure 2-7. For HDCP Repeaters, the upstream (HDCP Receiver) side is covered in Section 2.5.

The Fast Re-authentication capability indication alerts the HDCP Transmitter that it may re-authenticate by writing a new Aksv and An without first resetting the HDCP Receiver by powering off the TMDS buffers for 100 ms. When set to 1, or the receiver is HDMI capable, no reset is necessary, and the receiver is capable of starting a new authentication if it receives a new Aksv in the B0:B1, B1:B2 and B2:B1 transitions as well as the B0, B1 and B2 states. If set to zero and the receiver is not HDMI capable, it may be necessary to reset the receiver prior to writing Aksv, which, in TMDS applications, may be effected by the HDCP Transmitter by powering off the TMDS buffers for a period of 100 ms.




Figure 2-7. HDCP Receiver Authentication State Diagram

**Transition Any State:B0.** Reset conditions at the HDCP Receiver cause the HDCP Receiver to enter the unauthenticated state.

**State B0: Unauthenticated.** The HDCP Receiver is idle, awaiting the reception of  $An$  and  $Aksv$  from the HDCP Transmitter to trigger the authentication protocol.

**Transition B0:B1.** The final byte of  $A_{ksv}$  is received from the HDCP Transmitter.  $A_{info}$  is copied from the port value and takes effect, and the port value is cleared to its default value of zero.

**State B1: Computations.** In this state, the HDCP Receiver calculates the values  $Km'$ ,  $Ks'$ ,  $M_0'$ , and  $R_0'$  using the HDCP Receiver's Device Private Keys and the received values of  $A_n$  and  $A_{ksv}$ . The HDCP Receiver must complete the computations within 100 milliseconds and make  $R_0'$  available to the HDCP Transmitter.

**Transition B1: B1.** Should the HDCP Transmitter write the  $A_{ksv}$  while the HDCP Receiver is in State B1, the HDCP Receiver abandons intermediate results and restarts the computations.  $A_{info}$  is copied from the port value and takes effect, and the port value is cleared to its default value of zero.

**Transition B1:B2.** The computations are complete and the results are available for reading by the HDCP Transmitter.

**State B2: Authenticated.** The HDCP Receiver has completed the authentication protocol and is ready to generate the first frame key when signaled by the HDCP Transmitter.

**Transition B2:B1.** A new authentication is forced any time the  $A_{ksv}$  is written by the attached HDCP Transmitter.  $A_{info}$  is copied from the port value and takes effect, and the port value is cleared to its default value of zero.

**Transition B2:B3.** This transition is made during the vertical blank interval preceding encrypted frames. The third part of the authentication protocol requires periodic updates to the  $R_i'$  value.

**State B3: Update  $R_i'$ .** During the vertical blank interval preceding each encrypted frame the HDCP Receiver determines whether or not to update the response value  $R_i'$  with HDCP Cipher output value available during the frame key calculation. The  $R_i'$  value is updated when  $(i \bmod 128 == 0)$ . The updated  $R_i'$  value must be available through the HDCP-protected Interface Port no more than 128 pixel clocks from the time that encryption enable is indicated for the next frame over the CTLx signals. Section 2.7 specifies encryption enable signaling. Also, if the HDCP Receiver indicates it is capable of the Enhanced Link Verification option, it will similarly make a new  $P_j$  available if  $(j \bmod 16 == 0)$  within 128 pixel clocks after it receives the first pixel of the frame.


**Transition B3:B2.** Once  $R_i'$  has been updated, return to the authenticated state.

## 2.5 HDCP Repeater State Diagrams


The HDCP Repeater has one HDCP-protected Interface connection to an upstream HDCP Transmitter and one or more HDCP-protected Interface connections to downstream HDCP Receivers as permitted in the Digital Content Protection LLC license. The state diagram for each downstream connection (Figures 2-8 and 2-9) is substantially the same as that for the host HDCP Transmitter (Section 2.3), with two exceptions. First, the HDCP Repeater is not required to check for downstream KSVs in a revocation list. Second, the HDCP Repeater initiates authentication downstream when it receives an authentication request from upstream, rather than at detection of an HDCP Receiver on the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port. The HDCP Repeater signals the detection of an active downstream HDCP Receiver to the upstream HDCP Transmitter by pulsing (pulse width must be greater than 100ms) the physical Hot Plug Detect signal of the upstream HDCP-protected Interface Port, or, for devices providing HDMI support for CP&EDID\_HPD as specified in the HDMI1.4 specification, by signaling HDCP\_HPD to the upstream connected HDCP Transmitter. In this

state diagram and its following description, the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side refers to the HDCP Transmitter functionality within the HDCP Repeater for its corresponding downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port.

NOTE: HDCP Repeaters that have no active downstream HDCP devices must be considered. The HDCP Repeater may authenticate as an HDCP Receiver with Bcaps REPEATER bit set to 0 if it wishes to receive HDCP Content, but may not pass HDCP Content to downstream devices. If an HDCP Transmitter encounters a downstream HDCP Repeater reporting zero DEVICE\_COUNT and sends it HDCP Content, it must complete the second phase of authentication successfully, computing V over an empty KSV list.



**Figure 2-8 HDCP Repeater Downstream Link State Diagram**



**Figure 2-9. HDCP Repeater Downstream Authentication Protocol State Diagram**

**Transition Any State:P0.** Reset conditions at the HDCP Repeater or loss of HDCP\_HPD cause the HDCP Repeater to enter the No Receiver Attached state for this port. Some TMDS transmitters have the ability to directly sense the presence of a TMDS receiver (Receiver Sense). If this signal is present and indicates the absence of an HDCP Receiver, it should cause a transition to State P0.

**Transition P0:P1.** The detection of HDCP\_HPD indicates that a sink device is attached and that the EDID ROM is available for reading.

**State P1: Read EDID.** Whenever HDCP\_HPD is active, the HDCP Repeater must assume that the receiver is available and displaying an image to the user. Consequently, the transmitter should transmit an image to the screen as soon as feasible. Upon detection of HDCP\_HPD, the HDCP Transmitter reads the EDID to determine the capabilities of the sink device, including whether it is HDMI capable (refer to the HDMI Specification 1.4 for details). If both transmitter and receiver are HDMI-capable, then the TMDS transmitter enters HDMI mode, otherwise, it enters DVI mode.

**Transition P1:P2.** Immediately after transitioning to DVI mode, the transmitter should begin sending an unencrypted video signal. This signal may be required before the registers of the HDCP Receiver are visible to the HDCP Repeater.

**Transition P1:P3.** Immediately after transitioning to HDMI mode, the transmitter should begin sending a video signal. This signal may be required before the registers of the HDCP Receiver are visible to the HDCP Repeater.

**Transition P2:F0, P3:F0.** Upon an Upstream Authentication Request, the HDCP Repeater waits for the availability of an Active HDCP Receiver on this port.

**State F0: Wait For Active Receiver.** In this state the HDCP Repeater must not decrypt or encrypt video. If no low value content is available or appropriate, a “blue screen” or informative on-screen display should be transmitted. The HDCP Repeater must repeatedly attempt to read an HDCP register, at least once every 2 seconds and preferably much more often. Note that in most cases, if the user is watching video from a different input, the `HDCP_HPD` signal will still be asserted but the HDCP Receiver’s registers will not be readable. Upon switching to the HDCP input, the user will wish to see valid video within a fraction of a second or they may conclude that the HDCP input is not connected and immediately switch to another input. For this reason, a valid video screen should at all times be transmitted whenever `HDCP_HPD` is asserted, and downstream authentication should be started immediately after detecting a valid `Bksv` (Transition F0: F1).

**Transition F0:F1.** The availability of an active HDCP Receiver through the detection of a valid `Bksv` value causes the authentication process to begin.

**Transition F1:F2.** The random value  $An$  and downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side KSV have been written, and a valid HDCP Receiver `Bksv` and REPEATER bit have been read. The downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side is required to validate that `Bksv` contains 20 ones and 20 zeros.

**State F2: Computations.** In this state, the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side computes the values  $Km$ ,  $Ks$ ,  $M_0$ , and  $R_0$ , using its Device Private Keys, `Bksv` read during State F1, and the random number  $An$  written to the HDCP Receiver during state F1.

**Transition F2:F3.** When the computed results from State F2 are available, the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side proceeds to State F3.

**State F3: Validate Receiver.** The downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side reads  $R_0'$  from the HDCP Receiver and compares it with the corresponding  $R_0$  produced by itself during the computations of State F2, then immediately enables data encryption if  $R_0'$  is equal to  $R_0$ . The HDCP Receiver must make  $R_0'$  available less than 100 ms from the time that `Aksv` is written. The HDCP Transmitter must not attempt to read  $R_0'$  sooner than this 100 ms. The HDCP Receiver’s `Bksv` is added to the KSV list for this HDCP Repeater.

**Transition F3:F0.** The link integrity message  $R_0'$  received from the HDCP Receiver does not match the value calculated by the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side.

**Transition F3:F6.** The link integrity message  $R_0'$  received from the HDCP Receiver matches the expected value calculated by the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side.

**State F4: Authenticated.** At this time, and at no prior time, the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side has completed the authentication protocol and is fully operational, able to deliver HDCP Content. The verification timer is set up to generate timer events at the nominal rate of once every two seconds, plus or minus one-half second.

**Transition F4:F5.** A verification timer event causes this transition to State F5.

**State F5: Link Integrity Check.** In this state, the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side reads  $R'_i$  from the HDCP Receiver and compares that value against its value  $R_i$ . If the values are equal, then the HDCP Receiver is correctly decrypting the transmitted stream. The  $R'_i$  value may be re-read to allow for synchronization and I<sup>2</sup>C bus errors. The HDCP Transmitter may also check for a loss of synchronization with the HDCP Receiver (see Appendix C). If both the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver are capable of the Enhanced Link Verification option, the  $P_j$  values may be used to check for loss of synchronization more frequently than the  $R_i$  check.

**Transition F5:F4.**  $R'_i$  from the HDCP Receiver correctly matches the expected value,  $R_i$ .

**Transition F5:F0.**  $R'_i$  from the HDCP Receiver does not match the expected value,  $R_i$ , or the value was not returned to the downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side within 1 millisecond from the initiation of the read operation, or the loss of synchronization was detected using the  $R_i$  or  $P_j$  values.

**State F6: Test for Repeater.** The HDCP Repeater evaluates the state of the video repeater capability bit (REPEATER) that was read in State F1.

**Transition F6:F4.** The REPEATER bit is not set (the HDCP Receiver is not an HDCP Repeater).

**Transition F6:F8.** The REPEATER bit is set (the HDCP Receiver is an HDCP Repeater).

**State F8: Wait for Ready.** The downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side sets up a five-second watchdog timer and polls the HDCP Receiver's READY bit.

**Transition F8:F0.** The watchdog timer expires before the READY indication is received.

**Transition F8:F9.** The asserted READY signal is received.


**State F9: Read KSV List.** The watchdog timer is cleared. The downstream (HDCP Transmitter) side reads the list of attached KSVs through the KSV FIFO, reads  $V'$ , computes  $V$ , and verifies  $V == V'$ , and the KSVs from this port are added to the KSV list for this HDCP Repeater. Two additional status bits (MAX CASCADE EXCEEDED and MAX DEVS EXCEEDED) from the downstream HDCP Receiver are read and if asserted, cause the HDCP Repeater to also assert them upstream.

**Transition F9:F0.** This transition is made if  $V != V'$ . A retry of the entire KSV FIFO read operation may be implemented if  $V != V'$ . It is also made if either MAX CASCADE EXCEEDED or MAX DEVS EXCEEDED are asserted.

**Transition F9:F4.** This transition is made if  $V == V'$  and the downstream topology does not exceed specified maximums.

Note that in some implementations, the trip from the point in State F3 where encryption is enabled to State F4 may be sufficiently long to miss one or more verification timer events. For improved usability, such implementations may alternatively handle the link integrity check process (i.e. State F5) asynchronously from the rest of the state diagram. In such cases, the transition into State F5 may occur from any state for which encryption is currently enabled. Also, the transition from state F5 returns to the appropriate state to allow for undisrupted operation.

The HDCP Repeater upstream state diagram, illustrated in Figure 2-10, makes reference to states of the HDCP Repeater downstream state diagram.



**Figure 2-10. HDCP Repeater Upstream Authentication Protocol State Diagram**

**Transitions Any State:C0.** Reset conditions at the HDCP Repeater cause the HDCP Repeater to enter the unauthenticated state. Re-authentication is forced any time the *Aksv* is written by the attached HDCP Transmitter, with a transition through the unauthenticated state.

**State C0: Unauthenticated.** The device is idle, awaiting the reception of *An* and *Aksv* from the HDCP Transmitter to trigger the authentication protocol. The READY status bit, in the HDCP-protected Interface Port, is de-asserted. The upstream *R'i* and *P'j* values are not updated in this state.

**Transition C0:C1.** The final byte of *Aksv* is received from the HDCP Transmitter.

**State C1: Computations.** In this state, the HDCP Repeater calculates the values *Km'*, *Ks'*, *M0'*, and *R0'* using its Device Private Keys and the received values of *An* and *Aksv*. The HDCP Repeater is allowed a maximum time of 100 milliseconds to complete the computations and make *R0'* available to the HDCP Transmitter. Should the HDCP Transmitter write the *Aksv* while the HDCP Repeater is in this state (State C1), the HDCP Repeater abandons intermediate results and restarts the computations.

**Transition C1:C5.** The computations are complete and the results are available for reading by the HDCP Transmitter.

**State C2: Authenticated.** The HDCP Repeater has completed the authentication protocol and is ready to generate the first frame key when signaled by the HDCP Transmitter. The READY status bit is asserted.

**Transition C2:C0.** The upstream (HDCP Receiver) connection becomes unauthenticated if any downstream HDCP Port enters the unauthenticated state OR if a downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port that previously had no active downstream HDCP Receiver attached senses an attached active HDCP Receiver.

NOTE: Optionally, the upstream connection need not enter into an unauthenticated state, if an attached HDCP receiver is disconnected from the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port. Also, if an authenticated HDCP receiver attached to the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port is disconnected and reconnected (i.e. the downstream HDCP Port sees the same KSV stored in its KSV list at the HDCP protected interface port), the upstream connection need not enter into an unauthenticated state. The downstream HDCP Port only needs to re-authenticate the attached HDCP receiver.

**Transition C2:C3.** This transition is made during the vertical blank interval preceding encrypted frames. The third part of the authentication protocol requires periodic updates to the  $R_i'$  value.

**State C3: Update  $R_i'$ .** During the vertical blank interval preceding each encrypted frame the HDCP Repeater determines whether or not to update the response value  $R_i'$  with HDCP Cipher output value available during the frame key calculation. The  $R_i'$  value is updated when  $(i \bmod 128) == 0$ . The updated  $R_i'$  value must be available through the HDCP-protected Interface Port no more than 128 pixel clocks from the time that encryption enable is indicated for the next frame over the CTLx signals. Section 2.7 specifies encryption enable signaling.

**Transition C3:C2.** Once  $R_i'$  has been updated, return to the authenticated state.

**State C5: Wait for Downstream.** The upstream (HDCP Receiver) state machine waits for all downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports of the HDCP Repeater to enter either the unconnected (State P0), inactive (State F0), or the authenticated state (State F4).

**Transition C5:C0.** The watchdog timer expires before all downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports enter the authenticated or unconnected state.

**Transition C5:C6.** All downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports with attached HDCP Receivers have reached the state of authenticated or unconnected.

**State C6: Assemble KSV List.** The HDCP Repeater assembles the list of all attached downstream topology HDCP Devices as the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports reach terminal states of the authentication protocol. An HDCP-protected Interface Port that advances to State P0, the unconnected state, or F0, the inactive state, does not add to the list. A downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port that arrives in State F4 that has an HDCP Receiver that is not an HDCP Repeater attached, adds the *Bksv* of the attached HDCP Receiver to the list. Downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports that arrive in State F4 that have an HDCP Repeater attached will cause the KSV list read from the attached HDCP Repeater, plus the *Bksv* of the attached HDCP Repeater itself, to be added to the list. The HDCP Repeater must verify the integrity of the downstream HDCP Repeater's list by computing  $V$  and checking this value against  $V'$  received from the attached HDCP Repeater. If  $V$  does not equal  $V'$ , the downstream KSV list integrity check fails. A retry of the entire KSV FIFO read operation should be performed if  $V \neq V'$ . When the KSV list for all downstream HDCP Receivers has been assembled, the HDCP Repeater computes the upstream  $V'$ .

The DEVICE\_COUNT for an HDCP Repeater is equal to the total number of attached downstream HDCP Receivers (including HDCP Repeaters). The value is calculated as the sum of the number of attached active HDCP Receivers (including HDCP Repeaters) plus the sum of the DEVICE\_COUNT of all attached HDCP Repeaters. The DEPTH for an HDCP Repeater is equal to the maximum number of connection levels below any of the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports. The value is calculated as the maximum DEPTH reported from downstream HDCP Repeaters plus one (accounting for the attached downstream HDCP Repeater). If the computed DEVICE\_COUNT for an HDCP Repeater exceeds 127 or the size of the KSV\_FIFO, the HDCP Repeater must assert the MAX\_DEVS\_EXCEEDED status bit. If the computed DEPTH for an HDCP Repeater exceeds seven, the HDCP Repeater must

assert the MAX CASCADE EXCEEDED status bit. When an HDCP Repeater receives a MAX DEVS EXCEEDED or a MAX CASCADE EXCEEDED status from a downstream HDCP Repeater, it is required to assert its corresponding upstream status bit.

**Transition C6:C0.** If any downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port should transition to the unauthenticated state, the upstream connection transitions to the unauthenticated state. This transition is also made when any downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports becomes unauthenticated, or when the KSV list integrity check for a downstream HDCP Repeater fails.

NOTE: Optionally, the upstream connection need not enter into an unauthenticated state, if an attached HDCP receiver is disconnected from the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port. Also, if an authenticated HDCP receiver attached to the downstream HDCP-protected Interface Port is disconnected and reconnected (i.e. the downstream HDCP Port sees the same KSV stored in its KSV list at the HDCP protected interface port), the upstream connection need not enter into an unauthenticated state. The downstream HDCP Port only needs to re-authenticate the attached HDCP receiver.

**Transition C6:C2.** The KSV list and  $V'$ , as well as DEVICE\_COUNT and DEPTH, are ready for reading by the upstream HDCP Transmitter.

## 2.6 HDCP Port

The values that must be exchanged between the HDCP Transmitter and the HDCP Receiver are communicated over the I<sup>2</sup>C serial interface of the HDCP-protected Interface. The HDCP Receiver must present a logical device on the I<sup>2</sup>C bus for each link that it supports. No equivalent interface to HDCP Transmitters is specified. The eight-bit I<sup>2</sup>C device address (including the read/write bit, “x”) for the primary link is 0111010x binary, or 0x74 in the usual hexadecimal representation of I<sup>2</sup>C device addresses where the read/write bit is set to zero. The device address for the secondary link is 0x76. Table 2–2 and Table 2–3 specify the address space for these devices, which act only as slaves on the I<sup>2</sup>C bus. Multi-byte values are stored in little-endian format. Rx只充当slave, Tx是master。读写都由Tx发起

Read and write operations must complete within 100 ms per byte transferred. Master devices may elect to repeat any transfers believed to have previously completed with errors.

Offset (hex)	Name	Size in Bytes	Rd/ Wr	Function
0x00	Bksv	5	Rd	HDCP Receiver KSV. This value may be used to determine that the receiver is HDCP capable. Valid KSVs contain 20 ones and 20 zeros, a characteristic that must be verified by HDCP Transmitters before encryption is enabled. This value must be available any time the HDCP Receiver's HDCP hardware is ready to operate.
0x05	Rsvd	3	Rd	All bytes read as 0x00
0x08	$Ri'$	2	Rd	Link verification response. Upon completion of the authentication computations, this register contains the $R_0'$ value. Following that, it is updated upon completion of HDCPBlockCipher if $(i \bmod 128) == 0$ . It is recommended that HDCP Transmitters protect against errors in the I <sup>2</sup> C transmission by re-reading this value when unexpected values are received, though care must be taken to avoid missing legitimate mis-match conditions. This value must be available at all times between updates. $R_0'$ must be available less than 100 ms after $Aksv$ is received. Subsequent $R_i'$ values must be available a maximum of 128 pixel clocks following the Encryption Enable detection (ENC_EN).
0x0A	$Pj'$	1	Rd	Enhanced Link Verification Response. Updated upon receipt of first video pixel received when frame counter value $(j \bmod 16) == 0$ . The value is the XOR of the decrypted byte on channel zero of the first video pixel with the least significant byte of $Rj$ . $Rj$ is derived from the output function in the same manner as $Ri$ , but is captured every 16 <sup>th</sup> counted frame (rather than every 128 <sup>th</sup> counted frame).
0x0B	Rsvd	5	Rd	All bytes read as 0x00
0x10	$Aksv$	5	Wr	HDCP Transmitter KSV. Writes to this multi-byte value are written least significant byte first. The final write to 0x14 triggers the authentication sequence in the HDCP Receiver, and the current $Ainfo$ value is copied from the port, takes effect, and the port is reset to the default value of zero.
0x15	$Ainfo$	1	Wr	Bits 7-2: Reserved zeros. Bit 1: ENABLE_1.1_FEATURES. This bit enables the Advance Cipher option. If in DVI mode, it also enables the Enhanced Encryption Status Signaling (EESS) (in HDMI mode, EESS is enabled regardless of this bit setting). This bit resets to default zero when the HDCP Receiver becomes attached or active, or is reset, or the last byte of $Aksv$ is written. A write to the last byte of $Aksv$ copies the port value and causes it to take effect, and then resets the port value to the default value of zero. Thus the options must be explicitly enabled prior to each authentication. Bit 0: Reserved (must be zero). <span style="color:red">Tx表明支持enhance link verification, 即每16帧比较Pi'</span>
0x16	Rsvd	2	Rd	All bytes read as 0x00
0x18	$An$	8	Wr	Session random number. This multi-byte value must be written by the HDCP Transmitter before the KSV is written.
0x20	$V'.H0$	4	Rd	H0 part of SHA-1 hash value used in the second part of the authentication protocol for HDCP Repeaters. (NOTE: port 0x20 is the least significant byte of the H0 value, as all ports are little-endian byte order).
0x24	$V'.H1$	4	Rd	H1 part of SHA-1 hash value $V'$ .
0x28	$V'.H2$	4	Rd	H2 part of SHA-1 hash value $V'$ .
0x2c	$V'.H3$	4	Rd	H3 part of SHA-1 hash value $V'$ .

0x30	<i>V'.H4</i>	4	Rd	H4 part of SHA-1 hash value <i>V'</i> .
0x34	Rsvd	12	Rd	All bytes read as 0x00
0x40	<i>Bcaps</i>	1	Rd	<p>Bit 7: HDMI_RESERVED Use of this bit is reserved. HDCP Receivers not capable of supporting HDMI must clear this bit to 0.</p> <p>Bit 6: REPEATER, HDCP Repeater capability. When set to one, this HDCP Receiver supports downstream connections as permitted by the Digital Content Protection LLC license. This bit does not change while the HDCP Receiver is active.</p> <p>Bit 5: READY, KSV FIFO ready. When set to one, this HDCP Repeater has built the list of attached KSVs and computed the verification value <i>V'</i>. This value is always zero during the computation of <i>V'</i>. See states C0 and C2.</p> <p>Bit 4: FAST. When set to one, this device supports 400 KHz transfers. When zero, 100 KHz is the maximum transfer rate supported. Note that 400KHz transfers are not permitted to any device unless all devices on the I<sup>2</sup>C bus are capable of 400KHz transfer. The transmitter may not be able to determine if the EDID ROM, present on the HDCP Receiver, is capable of 400KHz operation. This bit does not change while the HDCP Receiver is active.</p> <p>Bits 3-2: Reserved (must be zero).</p> <p>Bit 1: 1.1_FEATURES. 表明Rx支持enhanced link verification When set to one, this HDCP Receiver supports Enhanced Encryption Status Signaling (EESS), Advance Cipher, and Enhanced Link Verification options. For the HDMI protocol, Enhanced Encryption Status Signaling (EESS) capability is assumed regardless of this bit setting. This bit does not change while the HDCP Receiver is active.</p> <p>Bit 0: FAST_REAUTHENTICATION. When set to 1, the receiver is capable of receiving (unencrypted) video signal during the session re-authentication. All HDMI-capable receivers shall be capable of performing the fast re-authentication even if this bit is not set. This bit does not change while the HDCP Receiver is active.</p>
0x41	<i>Bstatus</i>	2	Rd	Refer to Table 2–4 for definitions.
0x43	KSV FIFO	1	Rd	<p>Key selection vector FIFO. Used to pull downstream KSVs from HDCP Repeaters. All bytes (DEVICE_COUNT * 5) must be read in a single, auto-incrementing access.</p> <p>All bytes read as 0x00 for HDCP Receivers that are not HDCP Repeaters (REPEATER == 0).</p>
0x44	Rsvd	124	Rd	All bytes read as 0x00
0xC0	dbg	64	Rd/ Wr	Implementation-specific debug registers. Confidential values must not be exposed through these registers.

Table 2–2. Primary Link HDCP Port (I<sup>2</sup>C device address 0x74)

Offset (hex)	Name	Size (Bytes)	Rd/Wr	Function
0x00	Bksv	5	Rd	HDCP Receiver KSV. See primary link comments. This value may match the value of Bksv for the primary link.
0x05	Rsvd	3	Rd	All bytes read as 0x00
0x08	$Ri'$	2	Rd	Link verification response. See primary link comments. This value will usually differ from the value of $Ri'$ for the primary link.
0x0A	Pj'	1	Rd	Enhanced Link Verification Response. See primary link comments. This value will usually differ from the value of $Ri'$ for the primary link.
0x0B	Rsvd	5	Rd	All bytes read as 0x00
0x10	Aksv	5	Wr	HDCP Transmitter KSV. See primary link comments. This value may be programmed to the same value of Aksv for the primary link.
0x15	Ainfo	1	Wr	Bits 7-2: Reserved zeros. Bit 1: ENABLE_1.1_FEATURES. This bit enables the Advance Cipher option. If in DVI mode, it also enables the Enhanced Encryption Status Signaling (EESS) (in HDMI mode, EESS is enabled regardless of this bit setting). This bit resets to default zero when the HDCP Receiver becomes attached or active, or is reset, or the last byte of Aksv is written. A write to the last byte of Aksv copies the port value and causes it to take effect, and then resets the port value to the default value of zero. Thus the options must be explicitly enabled prior to each authentication.  Bit 0: Reserved (must be zero).
0x16	Rsvd	2	Rd	All bytes read as 0x00
0x18	An	8	Wr	Session random number. See primary link comments. This value must <b>differ</b> from the programmed value of An for the primary link.
0x20	Undef	160	Rd	These bytes may assume any values as an artifact of implementation, but must not be used by implementations. Confidential values must not be exposed through these registers.
0xC0	dbg	64	Rd/Wr	Implementation-specific debug registers. Confidential values must not be exposed through these registers.

**Table 2–3. Secondary Link HDCP Port (I<sup>2</sup>C device address 0x76)**

Note: There is no separate KSV FIFO for the secondary link. Dual link repeaters combine their downstream KSV lists into a single list that is read on the primary link. They may remove duplicate KSV values that result from downstream HDCP devices using the same KSV on both links.

1个HDCP cipher只能加密24bit，而type B设备有2组TMDS，所以需要2个HDCP cipher（2个I<sup>2</sup>C device address）。但市场上目前没有这种设备。

Name	Bit Field	Rd/ Wr	Description
Rsvd	15:14	Rd	Reserved. Read as zero.
HDMI_RESERVED_2	13	Rd	Reserved for future possible HDMI use.
HDMI_MODE	12	Rd	HDMI Mode. When set to one, the HDCP Receiver has transitioned from DVI Mode to HDMI Mode. This has occurred because the HDCP Receiver has detected HDMI bus conditions on the link. This bit must not be cleared when the HDCP Transmitter and HDCP Receiver are connected and both are operating in an active HDMI mode. This bit must be cleared upon power-up, reset, unplug or plug of an HDCP Transmitter or anytime that the HDCP Receiver has not seen at least one Data Island within 30 video frames. 判断HDMI mode标准是，看Rx有没有收到Data Island
MAX CASCADE EXCEEDED	11	Rd	Topology error indicator. When set to one, more than seven levels of video repeater have been cascaded together.
DEPTH	10:8	Rd	Three-bit repeater cascade depth. This value gives the number of attached levels through the connection topology. 3bit, 最多7层
MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED	7	Rd	Topology error indicator. When set to one, more than 127 downstream devices, or the capacity of the KSV Fifo, are attached.
DEVICE_COUNT	6:0	Rd	Total number of attached downstream devices. Always zero for HDCP Receivers. This count does not include the HDCP Repeater itself, but only downstream devices downstream from the HDCP Repeater. 7bit, 最多127个downstream device

Table 2-4. *Bstatus* Register Bit Field Definitions

The HDCP Receivers at these slave addresses respond to I<sup>2</sup>C accesses as diagrammed in Figure 2-11, Figure 2-12, and Figure 2-13. The nomenclature within these diagrams, and used to describe them, is the same as found in *The I<sup>2</sup>C Bus Specification Version 2.0*.

Figure 2-11 illustrates a combined-format byte read, in which the master writes a one-byte address to the slave, followed by a repeated start condition (Sr) and the data read. HDCP Devices must support multi-byte reads with auto-increment. For reads beginning with the KSV FIFO address, the bytes will increment through the KSV FIFO data. For all other reads, the bytes will increment through the port addresses, reading one byte for each offset. Auto-incremented sequential accesses that start before the KSV FIFO address and cross through the KSV FIFO address read only the first byte of the KSV FIFO and then continue incrementing through the HDCP port address space.




Figure 2-11. HDCP Port Combined-Format Byte Read

Figure 2-12 illustrates a byte write access. As for combined-format read accesses, the HDCP port must support multi-byte writes with auto-increment, again with an exception for KSV FIFO writes where the implicit address increment moves through the KSV FIFO data structure rather than through the HDCP port address space. Auto-incremented sequential accesses that start before the KSV FIFO address and cross through the KSV FIFO address access only the first byte of the KSV FIFO and then continue incrementing through the HDCP port address space.

S	Slave Addr (7)	W	A	Offset Addr (8)	A	Write Data (8)	A	P
---	----------------	---	---	-----------------	---	----------------	---	---

Figure 2-12. HDCP Port Byte Write

In order to minimize the number of bits that must be transferred for the link integrity check, a second read format must be supported by all HDCP Receivers and by HDCP Transmitters that do not implement a hardware I<sup>2</sup>C master. This access, shown in Figure 2-13, has an implicit offset address equal to 0x08, the starting location for  $R_i'$ . The short read format may be uniquely differentiated from combined reads by tracking STOP conditions (P) on the bus. Short reads must be supported with auto-incrementing addresses.

S	Slave Addr(7)	R	A	Read Data (8)	A	Read Data (8)	A	Read Data (8)	Ā	P
---	---------------	---	---	---------------	---	---------------	---	---------------	---	---

Figure 2-13. HDCP Port Link Integrity Message Read

## 2.7 Encryption Status Signaling

The HDCP Transmitter signals the HDCP Receiver to begin the third part of the authentication protocol through the previously reserved control signals CTL3, CTL2, CTL1, and CTL0 of the HDCP-protected Interface. Two different protocols for signaling are supported. One is termed *Original Encryption Status Signaling* (OESS) while the other is termed *Enhanced Encryption Status Signaling* (EESS). These protocols are only used when the HDCP Device is in an authenticated state. However, since an HDCP Transmitter may become unauthenticated with no immediate downstream indication, an HDCP Receiver may not be aware of this change and will continue to expect encryption signaling. Therefore it is highly recommended that the HDCP Transmitter not signal frame encryption while in the unauthenticated state. In the case of prior EESS signaling, it is recommended that the encryption-disabled signaling continue (rather than no encryption signaling), ensuring that the HDCP receiver properly displays the blue screen, informative display, or low value content which is sent while the HDCP Transmitter is in an unauthenticated state and the HDCP Receiver is still in an authenticated state. Authenticated states for HDCP Transmitters are State A4 and A5. Authenticated states for HDCP Receivers are State B2 and B3. Authenticated states for HDCP Repeaters are State C2 and C3.

The decision of which Encryption Status Signaling to use may only occur while both HDCP Devices are in an unauthenticated state, typically upon detection of a newly active or connected HDCP Receiver. Any transition to State A0 of Figure 2-4, State B0 of Figure 2-7, State F0 of Figure 2-9, or State C0 of Figure 2-10 causes the HDCP Device to assume DVI protocol and OESS will be used. Before the authentication process may start, the HDCP Transmitter must determine whether EESS may be used.

### *Original Encryption Status Signaling (OESS)*

OEES只能用于DVI协议

OEES utilizes only CTL3, and is only used during DVI protocol. This signaling is accomplished with a single high-going pulse, during the vertical blanking interval, of sufficient width that it may be distinguished from bit errors on the channel or any effects due to resynchronization events in the receiver. The transmitter must assert CTL3 for *at least* 8 pixel clocks (the transmitter is encouraged to utilize a wider pulse to enhance reliability, but no more than the entire Vsync timeframe), starting no closer than 128 pixel clocks from the end of the vertical blank interval.

The state transition signal ENC\_EN is true when a CTL3 pulse of sufficient duration occurs during this period. The state transition signal ENC\_DIS is true when a vertical blanking period has passed with no CTL3 pulse.

**Enhanced Encryption Status Signaling (EESS)**

EESS utilizes all four CTLx signals. Two possible CTLx patterns are used to indicate the encryption status of the current frame as described in Table 2-5.

CTL3:	CTL2:	CTL1:	CTL0:	Description:
1	0	0	1	Encryption is <b>enabled</b> for this frame.
0	0	0	1	Encryption is <b>disabled</b> for this frame.

Table 2-5. Enhanced Encryption Status Signaling (EESS)

This signaling is always used with the HDMI protocol, but is an optional feature with the DVI protocol. An HDCP Transmitter may determine if the HDCP Receiver supports EESS during DVI protocol by querying its *Bcaps* bit 1.1\_FEATURES. If both HDCP Devices are capable of EESS, then the HDCP Transmitter must indicate that EESS will be used by setting the ENABLE\_1.1\_FEATURES bit of the Ainfo register prior to starting the authentication protocol.

Tx Rx如果都支持enhanced link verification, Tx应该要在写AKSV之前就写Ainfo。HDMI-capable HDCP Transmitters must determine if the HDCP Receiver is DVI or HDMI-capable before authentication is attempted. An HDCP Receiver indicates that it is HDMI capable as prescribed by the HDMI specification (rather than the *Bcaps* HDMI\_RESERVED bit). Transition to HDMI protocol must then be initiated by the HDCP Transmitter (or downstream side of an HDCP Repeater) by the transmission of a Data Island period. The reception of a Data Island preamble followed by a Data Island Guard Band will transition the HDCP Receiver to HDMI mode. The successful transition to HDMI mode by the HDCP Receiver is indicated by setting *Bstatus* bit HDMI\_MODE. After this, the authentication protocol is started and EESS assumed regardless of the setting of *Bcaps* bit 1.1\_FEATURES or *Ainfo* bit ENABLE\_1.1\_FEATURES.

If an HDMI-capable HDCP Transmitter detects an HDCP Receiver that is not HDMI-capable, then it must follow the sequence above for DVI HDCP Transmitters if it is capable of performing EESS while transmitting with the DVI protocol.

For an HDCP Repeater that supports HDMI protocol, it must be noted that the upstream link is in many ways independent from the downstream links. It is possible that HDMI protocol may be active on the downstream HDCP-protected Interfaces from an HDCP Repeater while the upstream HDCP-protected interface is receiving DVI protocol, or vice versa. If two or more downstream HDCP-protected Interface Ports are supported, it is possible for one or more of these to be transmitting DVI protocol while one or more others are transmitting HDMI protocol. Such an HDCP Repeater must accommodate all of these scenarios.

The CTLx signals described in Table 2-5 are only valid within a 16-clock window of opportunity starting at 512 pixel clocks following the active edge of VSYNC. When

EESS要在Vsync active edge之后的512 pixel clock—> 528(512+16) pixel clock区间内发送完成

authenticated and not in the HDMI AVMUTE state, the HDCP Transmitter must continually assert one of these CTLx patterns during this window of opportunity. The CTLx signals may be used for other purposes outside of this window of opportunity. See timing diagram D-1 in Appendix D .

The state transition signal ENC\_EN is true at the end of this window of opportunity if the encryption enable value is transmitted during the window. The state transition signal ENC\_DIS is true at the end of this window of opportunity if the encryption disabled value is transmitted during this window. Neither signal is activated otherwise or elsewhere.

The specific methods an HDCP Receiver uses to determine which of the two signals, ENC\_EN or ENC\_DIS, is presented, in consideration of environments where signaling errors may occur, are left to the implementation. The HDCP Receiver may also use heuristics based on common usage in its decision, such as assuming that the frame has the same encryption status as the previous frame.

The active edge of VSYNC is either a rising or falling edge. For the purposes of the signaling described above, the HDCP Transmitter and Receiver determine which edge is active by polling VSYNC at the start of the previous Video Data Period. If VSYNC is low at this point, then the active edge of VSYNC is defined as a rising edge. If VSYNC is high at this point, then the active edge of VSYNC is defined as a falling edge. Upon removal or connection of an HDCP Device, the active edge of VSYNC must default to the falling edge. In addition, following a VSYNC active edge, no subsequent VSYNC edge may be considered active until a Video Data Period occurs. This VSYNC polarity determination is not specified as used for any other purpose than to establish the position of the encryption signaling window position.

It is required that no Data Island or Video Data, nor any Guard Band, be transmitted during a keep-out period that starts 508 pixels past the active edge of VSYNC and ends 650 pixels past the active edge of VSYNC. See timing diagram D-1 in Appendix D.

keep-out区间内不许发送Video Data, Data Island和Guard Band。

### 3 Data Encryption

HDCP Encryption is applied at the input to the T.M.D.S. Encoder and decryption is applied at the output of the T.M.D.S. Decoder (Figure 3-1). HDCP Encryption consists of a bit-wise exclusive-or (XOR) of the HDCP Content with a pseudo-random data stream produced by the HDCP Cipher. In dual-link implementations the Audiovisual Content is 48-bits wide and requires two HDCP Ciphers to produce the required pseudo-random streams. Type B需要2个HDCP cipher




Figure 3-1. HDCP Encryption and Decryption

During the vertical-blanking interval, the `hdcpBlockCipher` function prepares the HDCP Cipher to produce the 24-bit wide key-dependent pseudo-random stream during data periods. The HDCP Cipher generates a new 24-bit word of pseudo-random data for every pixel of HDCP Content to be encrypted. The 24-bits of cipher output are applied to the T.M.D.S. channels as shown in Table 3-1. As an example, the RGB video stream data is also shown in Table 3-1.

Cipher Output	T.M.D.S. Channel	Video Stream Bits
23:16	2	Red[7:0]
15:8	1	Green[7:0]
7:0	0	Blue[7:0]

Table 3-1. Encryption Stream Mapping

When transmitting auxiliary data, four TERC4 data bits on each of the two T.M.D.S. channels 1 and 2, plus one TERC4 data bit on channel 0 are encrypted. Nine bits of the existing HDCP stream cipher XOR mask are used. Table 3-2 identifies the mappings of HDCP stream cipher output bits to be XORED with TERC4 bits.

Cipher Output:	TERC4 Bits:
23:20	Unused
19	Channel 2 bit 3
18	Channel 2 bit 2
17	Channel 2 bit 1
16	Channel 2 bit 0
15:12	Unused
11	Channel 1 bit 3
10	Channel 1 bit 2
9	Channel 1 bit 1
8	Channel 1 bit 0
7:3	Unused
2	Channel 0 bit 2
1:0	Unused


**Table 3-2. Encryption Stream Mapping for TERC4 Encoding**

During horizontal-blanking intervals on the interface, the HDCP Cipher is re-keyed for 56 pixel clocks as described in Section 4.5. This complicates the task of breaking the encryption from line to line.

### **3.1 Encryption/Decryption State Diagrams**

#### **3.1.1 OESS**

Figure 3-2 illustrates the encryption functions while using OESS as they relate to HSYNC, VSYNC, Video Data, and Encryption Status Signaling (ENC\_EN). This diagram is applicable to both HDCP Transmitters and HDCP Receivers.



**Figure 3-2. Encryption/Decryption State Diagram (OESS)**

**Transition Any State:D0.** Reset conditions or transitions into the unauthenticated state at the HDCP Transmitter cause the encryption state machine to transition to the idle state.

**State D0: Idle.** The HDCP Cipher is free running and available for use as `hdcpRngCipher` (Section 4.5).

**Transition D0:D1.** The assertion of Encryption Enable (ENC\_EN) when in an authenticated state (as described in Section 2.7) causes frame key calculation.

**State D1: Frame Key Calculation.** The frame key for the next video frame is calculated as described in section 4.5, using `hdcpBlockCipher`.

**Transition D1:D2.** Entering a video data period causes this transition.

**State D2: Encrypt/Decrypt.** HDCP Transmitters encrypt pixel data in this state, while HDCP Receivers decrypt data. Both use the `hdcpStreamCipher` as described in section 4.5.

**Transition D2:D3.** The end of the video data period signals the end of video pixel data.

**State D3: Unknown Blank.** At the end of active pixel data, it is not assumed that HDCP Devices are able to distinguish between horizontal and vertical sync. In this state, HDCP Devices must begin to rekey the HDCP cipher using `hdcpRekeyCipher` as described in section 4.5.

**Transition D3:D1.** The assertion of ENC\_EN as specified for OESS (as described in Section 2.7) results in the generation of a new frame key.

**Transition D3:D4.** The assertion of HSYNC identifies the horizontal blank.

**Transition D3:D5.** The assertion of VSYNC identifies the vertical blank.

**State D4: Horizontal Blank.** The rekey operation continues if not completed during State D3.

**Transition D4:D2.** The assertion of videoData signals the beginning of the next line of HDCP Content to be encrypted/decrypted by the HDCP Device.

**Transition D4:D1.** The assertion of ENC\_EN as specified for OEES (as described in Section 2.7) results in the generation of a new frame key.

**Transition D4:D5.** The assertion of VSYNC identifies the vertical blank.

**State D5: Vertical Blank.** This state waits for one of the exit conditions.

**Transition D5:D1.** The assertion of ENC\_EN when in an authenticated state (as described in Section 2.7) results in the generation of a new frame key.

**Transition D5:D0.** If the Advance Cipher option is not enabled, the return to active video pixel data before the assertion of ENC\_EN (as described in Section 2.7) indicates that HDCP Encryption has been disabled for this frame of active video data (i.e. indicates that ENC\_DIS is true).

### 3.1.2 EESS

Figure 3-3 illustrates the encryption function while using EESS as they relate to HSYNC, VSYNC, Video Data, Packet Data, and Encryption Status Signaling (ENC\_EN, ENC\_DIS). This diagram is applicable to both HDCP Transmitters and HDCP Receivers.

Data Island和Video Data Period需要加密, control period不需要加密

HDMI transmits data during Video Data Periods and Data Island Periods. All of this data requires HDCP Encryption.

Video Data Periods are identical to DVI video data periods with the exception that they begin with a two-pixel Leading Guard Band. The state transition variable *videoData* is defined to go TRUE on the first active pixel of video data in the period (i.e. after the Guard Band) and is defined to go FALSE following the last active pixel of video data in the period. There is no Trailing Guard Band on a Video Data Period. 从第一个active pixel开始加密, Guard Band不做加密!

Data Islands begin with a two-pixel Leading Guard Band and end with a two-pixel Trailing Guard Band. Between the Guard Bands, packet data is transmitted. Unlike the 8 to 10 bit encoding used for video pixel data, each pixel of the packet data is encoded using T.M.D.S. Error Reduction Coding (TERC4) performing a 4 to 10 bit conversion of the input packet data to the 10 bits required for differential transmission on each of the three T.M.D.S. channels. The state transition variable *packetData* is defined to go TRUE for the first pixel of the Data Island containing packet data (i.e. first pixel following the Leading Guard Band) and is defined to go FALSE following the last pixel containing packet data (i.e. the first pixel of the Trailing Guard Band). Guard Band不做加密!

AVMUTE, 保持HDCP握手成功的状态, 但是不对数据做加密

The HDMI Specification defines a facility for the HDCP Transmitter to inform the HDCP Receiver that the streams being transmitted contain no useful visual or aural information and should be muted. HDCP uses this mechanism to provide a means of temporarily disabling HDCP Encryption while remaining authenticated. During the AVMUTE state, an HDCP Transmitter is required to not assert any ENC\_EN signal. Also during the AVMUTE state, the HDCP Receiver should ignore Encryption Status Signaling and operate as if ENC\_DIS is asserted. 在AVMUTE的时候, Tx不应该发ENC\_EN, Rx要主动认为ENC\_DIS

This mechanism can be applied in the case of an erratic or changing pixel clock that may result from a change from one video format to another, such as from an SDTV (27MHz) signal to an HDTV (74.25MHz) signal. If the pixel clock change were preceded by a Set\_AVMUTE request and followed by a Clear\_AVMUTE request, then authentication would not be affected.

The state transition signal AVMUTE is defined to be TRUE for a duration of one pixel coincident with the assertion of ENC\_EN or ENC\_DIS if the HDCP Device is in an AVMUTE state, as defined in the HDMI Specification.

Note that when using the DVI protocol, AVMUTE and *packetData* are always FALSE, as such features are only supported when using the HDMI protocol. Also for DVI protocol transmission, the term *Video Data Period* refers to the active DE period; the transition variable *videoData* is TRUE when DE is TRUE and FALSE when DE is FALSE; and there are no Data Islands, Data Island Periods, or Guard Bands.

AVMTUE GCP只能在Vsync active edge周后的0—>384 pixel clock之内发送, EESS只能在512—>528 pixel clock之内发送。即AVMUTE是先于EESS发送的, 在AVMUTE的情况下, Tx应该将EESS切换到ENC\_DIS的状态




Figure 3-3. Encryption/Decryption State Diagram (EESS)

**Transition Any State:G0.** Reset conditions or transitions into the unauthenticated state at the HDCP Device cause the encryption state machine to transition to the idle state.

**State G0: Idle.** The HDCP Cipher is free running and available for use as `hdcpRngCipher`.

**Transition G0:G1.** The assertion/detection of Encryption Enable (`ENC_EN`) when the HDCP Device is authenticated, indicates that all of the video and auxiliary data until the next Encryption Status Signaling will be encrypted.

**State G1: Frame Key Calculation.** The frame key calculation using hdcpBlockCipher is initiated. The hdcpBlockCipher operation must be completed within 118 pixel clocks after the assertion of ENC\_EN. It is required that no Data Island or Video Data, nor any Guard Band, be transmitted during a keep-out period that starts 508 pixels following VSYNC and ends 118 pixels past the assertion of ENC\_EN.

**State G1': Frame Key Calculation.** The frame key for the next video frame is calculated as described in section 4.5, using hdcpBlockCipher. This state is only reached with the Advance Cipher option is enabled and an unencrypted frame is signaled.

**Transition G1':G1.** The assertion of Encryption Enable (ENC\_EN) when in an authenticated state (as described in Section 2.7) causes frame key calculation.

**Transition G1':G1'.** The assertion of Encryption Disable (ENC\_DIS) when in an authenticated state (as described in Section 2.7) causes frame key calculation.

**Transition G1':G0.** The detection of AVMUTE causes the encryption /decryption to enter the idle state.

**Transitions G3:G1' and G3':G1'.** In ADVANCE CIPHER mode the assertion of Encryption Disable (ENC\_DIS) and not AVMUTE causes frame key calculation.

**Transitions G1:G2, G3:G2, and G3':G2.** Entering the valid data period of a video data period signals the beginning of video data encryption.

**State G2: Encrypt/Decrypt Video.** HDCP Devices encrypt/decrypt all 24 bits of every pixel in this state using hdcpStreamCipher.

**Transition G2:G3.** The end of video pixel data is signaled by !videoData.

**State G3: Unknown Blank / Line Key Calc.** In this state, the HDCP Device must begin to rekey the HDCP Cipher using hdcpRekeyCipher. The hdcpRekeyCipher operation must occur when videoData goes low and must be completed within 58 pixel clocks after videoData goes low, allowing the 58<sup>th</sup> pixel to be encrypted. No data period may begin until at least 58 pixel clocks following the fall of videoData. (See timing diagram D-2 in Appendix D)

**Transitions G3:G1 and G3':G1: Frame Key Calc.** The occurrence of an Encryption Enable signal (ENC\_EN) when AVMUTE is false indicates that all of the data until the next Encryption Status Signaling will be encrypted.

**Transitions G1:G2', G3':G2', and G3:G2'.** Entering the packet data period of a Data Island period signals the beginning of auxiliary data encryption.

**State G2': Encrypt/Decrypt Data Island.** HDCP Devices encrypt/decrypt auxiliary data during this state using hdcpStreamCipher.

**Transition G2':G3'.** The end of Data Island packet data is signaled by !packetData.

**State G3': Unknown Blank / No Line Key Calc.** No HDCP activity occurs during this state.

**Transitions G3:G0 and G3':G0.** If Encryption Disable Signaling (ENC\_DIS) occurs or when AVMUTE is true, then encryption has been disabled for the next frame.

## 4 HDCP Cipher

### 4.1 Overview

The HDCP Cipher is a special-purpose cipher designed for both the appropriate robustness of the authentication protocol as well as for the high-speed streaming requirement of uncompressed video data encryption.

The overall structure of the HDCP Cipher can be thought of as three layers. The first layer consists of a set of four Linear Feedback Shift Registers (LFSRs) that are combined to one bit. This one bit feeds into the middle layer when enabled via the rekey enable signal. The middle layer consists of two halves that are very similar in design. One half, *Round Function B*, performs one round of a block cipher using three 28-bit registers,  $B_x$ ,  $B_y$ , and  $B_z$ . The other half, *Round Function K*, is similar in structure to Round Function B, but provides the output of latch  $K_y$  as a stream of 28-bit round keys to Round Function B at the rate of one 28-bit round key per clock pulse. The final layer takes four 28-bit register outputs from the round functions,  $B_y$ ,  $B_z$ ,  $K_y$ , and  $K_z$ , through a compression function to produce a 24-bit block of pseudo-random bits for every clock pulse.




Figure 4-1. HDCP Cipher Structure

The block module operates as a block cipher during the authentication protocol. There is a single sequence, `hdcpBlockCipher`, which is used for both parts of the authentication protocol. Although decryption in block mode is possible for the HDCP cipher, it is not necessary for this application and thus is not described in this document.

The block module and the output function are used together to produce the 24-bit pseudo random sequence that is used to encrypt the HDCP Content. In this mode, `hdcpStreamCipher`, the module produces 24 bits of output for every input clock.

The LFSR module is used to re-key the block module between lines of video.

## 4.2 Linear Feedback Shift Register Module

The linear feedback shift register module consists of four LFSRs of different lengths and a combining function that produces a single bit stream from them. The combining function takes three taps from each LFSR. The generator polynomials and combining function taps for the LFSRs are specified in Table 4-1.

LFSR	Polynomial	Combining Function Taps		
		0	1	2
3	$x^{17} + x^{15} + x^{11} + x^5 + 1$	5	11	16
2	$x^{16} + x^{15} + x^{12} + x^8 + x^7 + x^5 + 1$	5	9	15
1	$x^{14} + x^{11} + x^{10} + x^7 + x^6 + x^4 + 1$	4	8	13
0	$x^{13} + x^{11} + x^9 + x^5 + 1$	3	7	12

Table 4-1. LFSR Generation and Tapping

Figure 4-2 illustrates the tap locations of LFSR0 as well as the XOR term feedback into the least significant bit of LFSR0.






Figure 4-2. LFSR0

The combining function contains four cascaded shuffle networks, each of which includes two state bits. One tap from each of the four LFSRs is XORed together to form the data input to the first shuffle network. One tap from each of the four LFSRs is used as the select input to one of the four shuffle networks. The output of the fourth shuffle network is XORed together with one tap from each of the LFSRs. The Combiner Function illustrated in Figure 4-3.



**Figure 4-3. LFSR Module Combiner Function**

The shuffle network is represented schematically in Figure 4-4. If the shuffle network contains the ordered pair of boolean values (A, B) and has boolean data input D and selection input S, the S value controls the next state. If S is zero, it outputs A and assumes state (B, D). If S is one, it outputs B and assumes state (D, A).



**Figure 4-4. Shuffle Network**

In all modes of operation the LFSRs and combining function are initialized by a 56-bit value. The 60 bits of LFSR state use these 56 bits directly plus the complements of four of the bits. The shuffle networks are each initialized with the same constant value. The initialization of the LFSR module is specified in Table 4-2 for a 56-bit initialization value.

	<b>Bit Field</b>	<b>Initial Value</b>
<b>LFSR3</b>	[16]	Complement of input bit 47
	[15:0]	Input bits [55:40]
<b>LFSR2</b>	[15]	Complement of input bit 32
	[14:0]	Input bits [39:25]
<b>LFSR1</b>	[13]	Complement of input bit 18
	[12:0]	Input bits [24:12]
<b>LFSR0</b>	[12]	Complement of input bit 6
	[11:0]	Input bits [11:0]
<b>Shuffle Networks</b>	Register A	0
	Register B	1

Table 4–2. LFSR Module Initialization

This one-bit stream output of the combining function is the only output from the LFSR module. This bit stream provides key material to the block module when the rekey enable signal is active.

#### 4.3 Block Module

The block module consists of two separate “round function” components. One of these components, *Round Function K*, provides a key stream for the other component, *Round Function B*. Each of these two components operates on a corresponding set of three 28-bit registers. The structure of the block module is diagrammed in Figure 4-5.

For Round Function K, bit 13 of the Ky register takes its input from the LFSR module output stream when the external rekey enable signal is asserted.




Figure 4-5. Block Module

The S-Boxes for both round functions consist of seven 4 input by 4 output S-boxes. Round function K S-Boxes are labeled SK0 through SK6 and round function B S-Boxes are labeled SB0 through SB6. The  $I^{\text{th}}$  input to box J is bit  $I^{\text{th}}+J$  from the round x register ( $Bx$  or  $Kx$ ), and output I of box J goes to bit  $I^{\text{th}}+J$  of register z of the round function ( $Bz$  or  $Kz$ ). Bit 0 is the least significant bit. The S-box permutations of round functions K and B are specified in Table 4–3.

	<b>0</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>SK0</b>	8	14	5	9	3	0	12	6	1	11	15	2	4	7	10	13
<b>SK1</b>	1	6	4	15	8	3	11	5	10	0	9	12	7	13	14	2
<b>SK2</b>	13	11	8	6	7	4	2	15	1	12	14	0	10	3	9	5
<b>SK3</b>	0	14	11	7	12	3	2	13	15	4	8	1	9	10	5	6
<b>SK4</b>	12	7	15	8	11	14	1	4	6	10	3	5	0	9	13	2
<b>SK5</b>	1	12	7	2	8	3	4	14	11	5	0	15	13	6	10	9
<b>SK6</b>	10	7	6	1	0	14	3	13	12	9	11	2	15	5	4	8
<b>SB0</b>	12	9	3	0	11	5	13	6	2	4	14	7	8	15	1	10
<b>SB1</b>	3	8	14	1	5	2	11	13	10	4	9	7	6	15	12	0
<b>SB2</b>	7	4	1	10	11	13	14	3	12	15	6	0	2	8	9	5
<b>SB3</b>	6	3	1	4	10	12	15	2	5	14	11	8	9	7	0	13
<b>SB4</b>	3	6	15	12	4	1	9	2	5	8	10	7	11	13	0	14
<b>SB5</b>	11	14	6	8	5	2	12	7	1	4	15	3	10	13	9	0
<b>SB6</b>	1	11	7	4	2	5	12	9	13	6	8	15	14	0	3	10

Table 4–3. Block Module S-Box Values

Both linear transformation K and linear transformation B produce 56 output values. These values are the combined outputs from eight diffusion networks that each produces seven outputs. The diffusion network function is specified in Table 4–4. Each diffusion network has seven data inputs labeled  $I_0 - I_6$ , seven outputs  $O_0 - O_6$ , plus an additional seven optional key inputs  $K_0 - K_6$ .

The diffusion networks of round function K are specified in Table 4–5. Note that none of the round function K diffusion networks have the optional key inputs. The diffusion units of round function B are specified in Table 4–6. Half of these diffusion networks have key inputs that are driven from the  $Ky$  register of round function K. A dash in the table indicates that the key input is not present.

	Diffusion Network Logic Function						
<b>O<sub>0</sub></b>	$K_0 \oplus I_1 \oplus I_2 \oplus I_3 \oplus I_4 \oplus I_5 \oplus I_6$						
<b>O<sub>1</sub></b>	$K_1 \oplus I_0 \oplus I_2 \oplus I_3 \oplus I_4 \oplus I_5 \oplus I_6$						
<b>O<sub>2</sub></b>	$K_2 \oplus I_0 \oplus I_1 \oplus I_3 \oplus I_4 \oplus I_5 \oplus I_6$						
<b>O<sub>3</sub></b>	$K_3 \oplus I_0 \oplus I_1 \oplus I_2 \oplus I_4 \oplus I_5 \oplus I_6$						
<b>O<sub>4</sub></b>	$K_4 \oplus I_0 \oplus I_1 \oplus I_2 \oplus I_3 \oplus I_5 \oplus I_6$						
<b>O<sub>5</sub></b>	$K_5 \oplus I_0 \oplus I_1 \oplus I_2 \oplus I_3 \oplus I_4 \oplus I_6$						
<b>O<sub>6</sub></b>	$K_6 \oplus I_0 \oplus I_1 \oplus I_2 \oplus I_3 \oplus I_4 \oplus I_5 \oplus I_6$						

Table 4–4. Diffusion Network Logic Function

	<b>K1</b>	<b>K2</b>	<b>K3</b>	<b>K4</b>	<b>K5</b>	<b>K6</b>	<b>K7</b>	<b>K8</b>
<b>I<sub>0</sub></b>	Kz0	Kz7	Kz10	Kz13	Kz16	Ky16	Ky20	Ky24
<b>I<sub>1</sub></b>	Kz1	Kz8	Kz11	Kz14	Kz17	Ky17	Ky21	Ky25
<b>I<sub>2</sub></b>	Kz2	Kz9	Kz12	Kz15	Kz18	Ky18	Ky22	Ky26
<b>I<sub>3</sub></b>	Kz3	Ky0	Ky3	Ky6	Ky9	Ky19	Ky23	Ky27
<b>I<sub>4</sub></b>	Kz4	Ky1	Ky4	Ky7	Ky10	Kz19	Kz22	Kz25
<b>I<sub>5</sub></b>	Kz5	Ky2	Ky5	Ky8	Ky11	Kz20	Kz23	Kz26
<b>I<sub>6</sub></b>	Kz6	Ky12	Ky13	Ky14	Ky15	Kz21	Kz24	Kz27
<b>O<sub>0</sub></b>	Kx0	Ky0	Ky1	Ky2	Ky3	Kx1	Kx2	Kx3
<b>O<sub>1</sub></b>	Kx4	Ky4	Ky5	Ky6	Ky7	Kx5	Kx6	Kx7
<b>O<sub>2</sub></b>	Kx8	Ky8	Ky9	Ky10	Ky11	Kx9	Kx10	Kx11
<b>O<sub>3</sub></b>	Kx12	Ky12	Ky13	Ky14	Ky15	Kx13	Kx14	Kx15
<b>O<sub>4</sub></b>	Kx16	Ky16	Ky17	Ky18	Ky19	Kx17	Kx18	Kx19
<b>O<sub>5</sub></b>	Kx20	Ky20	Ky21	Ky22	Ky23	Kx21	Kx22	Kx23
<b>O<sub>6</sub></b>	Kx24	Ky24	Ky25	Ky26	Ky27	Kx25	Kx26	Kx27

**Table 4–5. K Round Input and Output Mapping**

	<b>B1</b>	<b>B2</b>	<b>B3</b>	<b>B4</b>	<b>B5</b>	<b>B6</b>	<b>B7</b>	<b>B8</b>
<b>I<sub>0</sub></b>	Bz0	Bz7	Bz10	Bz13	Bz16	By16	By20	By24
<b>I<sub>1</sub></b>	Bz1	Bz8	Bz11	Bz14	Bz17	By17	By21	By25
<b>I<sub>2</sub></b>	Bz2	Bz9	Bz12	Bz15	Bz18	By18	By22	By26
<b>I<sub>3</sub></b>	Bz3	By0	By3	By6	By9	By19	By23	By27
<b>I<sub>4</sub></b>	Bz4	By1	By4	By7	By10	Bz19	Bz22	Bz25
<b>I<sub>5</sub></b>	Bz5	By2	By5	By8	By11	Bz20	Bz23	Bz26
<b>I<sub>6</sub></b>	Bz6	By12	By13	By14	By15	Bz21	Bz24	Bz27
<b>K<sub>0</sub></b>	Ky0	–	–	–	–	Ky7	Ky14	Ky21
<b>K<sub>1</sub></b>	Ky1	–	–	–	–	Ky8	Ky15	Ky22
<b>K<sub>2</sub></b>	Ky2	–	–	–	–	Ky9	Ky16	Ky23
<b>K<sub>3</sub></b>	Ky3	–	–	–	–	Ky10	Ky17	Ky24
<b>K<sub>4</sub></b>	Ky4	–	–	–	–	Ky11	Ky18	Ky25
<b>K<sub>5</sub></b>	Ky5	–	–	–	–	Ky12	Ky19	Ky26
<b>K<sub>6</sub></b>	Ky6	–	–	–	–	Ky13	Ky20	Ky27
<b>O<sub>0</sub></b>	Bx0	By0	By1	By2	By3	Bx1	Bx2	Bx3
<b>O<sub>1</sub></b>	Bx4	By4	By5	By6	By7	Bx5	Bx6	Bx7
<b>O<sub>2</sub></b>	Bx8	By8	By9	By10	By11	Bx9	Bx10	Bx11
<b>O<sub>3</sub></b>	Bx12	By12	By13	By14	By15	Bx13	Bx14	Bx15
<b>O<sub>4</sub></b>	Bx16	By16	By17	By18	By19	Bx17	Bx18	Bx19
<b>O<sub>5</sub></b>	Bx20	By20	By21	By22	By23	Bx21	Bx22	Bx23
<b>O<sub>6</sub></b>	Bx24	By24	By25	By26	By27	Bx25	Bx26	Bx27

**Table 4–6. B Round Input and Output Mapping**

#### 4.4 Output Function

The Ky, Kz,, By, and Bz registers drive the final output function. Each of the 24 outputs consists of the XOR of nine terms given by the following formula:

$$(B0 \bullet K0) \oplus (B1 \bullet K1) \oplus (B2 \bullet K2) \oplus (B3 \bullet K3) \oplus (B4 \bullet K4) \oplus (B5 \bullet K5) \oplus (B6 \bullet K6) \oplus B7 \oplus K7$$

Where “⊕” represents a logical XOR function and “•” represents a logical AND function. Table 4–7 specifies the input values B and K to the 24 logic functions.

For example, output bit 0 is computed as

$$(Bz17 \bullet Kz3) \oplus (Bz26 \bullet Kz6) \oplus (Bz22 \bullet Kz0) \oplus (Bz27 \bullet Kz9) \oplus (Bz21 \bullet Kz4) \oplus (Bz18 \bullet Kz22) \oplus (Bz2 \bullet Kz5) \oplus By5 \oplus Ky10.$$

Input	B0	B1	B2	B3	B4	B5	B6	B7	K0	K1	K2	K3	K4	K5	K6	K7
Origin	Bz	By	Kz	Ky												
Output bit																
0	17	26	22	27	21	18	2	5	3	6	0	9	4	22	5	10
1	5	20	15	24	2	25	0	16	20	18	7	23	15	5	3	25
2	22	5	14	16	25	17	20	11	7	19	2	10	22	4	13	21
3	19	3	15	11	21	16	27	1	6	14	9	8	17	18	12	24
4	19	6	17	18	22	7	9	12	25	6	5	2	10	15	21	8
5	3	7	4	8	16	6	5	17	27	14	2	4	24	19	1	12
6	8	21	27	2	11	24	12	3	17	26	4	16	27	7	22	11
7	9	5	7	4	8	13	3	15	9	10	19	11	7	6	8	23
8	26	13	23	10	11	7	15	19	13	12	18	24	15	23	7	16
9	1	0	19	11	13	16	24	18	0	5	20	25	1	24	9	27
10	26	13	9	14	10	4	1	2	14	23	27	25	17	19	1	22
11	21	15	5	3	13	25	16	27	6	21	17	15	26	11	16	7
12	20	7	18	12	17	1	16	0	11	22	20	0	26	23	17	2
13	14	23	1	12	24	6	18	9	8	4	3	14	20	26	23	15
14	19	6	21	25	23	1	10	8	19	0	18	2	13	8	24	14
15	3	0	27	23	19	8	4	7	16	21	24	25	12	27	15	18
16	6	5	14	22	24	18	2	21	3	5	8	25	7	27	2	26
17	3	4	2	6	22	14	12	26	11	14	23	17	22	13	19	4
18	25	21	19	9	10	15	13	22	1	16	14	11	12	6	10	19
19	23	11	10	20	1	12	14	4	21	1	10	20	18	26	9	13
20	11	26	20	17	8	23	0	24	20	21	9	25	12	3	15	0
21	9	17	26	4	27	0	15	6	18	12	21	27	1	16	24	20
22	22	12	2	10	7	20	25	13	13	0	3	16	22	11	26	9
23	27	24	26	8	0	9	18	23	2	0	13	5	4	8	10	3

Table 4–7. Output Function Input and Output Mapping

## 4.5 Operation

The HDCP Cipher is used in four different ways during operation: `hdcpBlockCipher`, `hdcpStreamCipher`, `hdcpRekeyCipher`, and `hdcpRngCipher`. No change in HDCP Cipher state occurs that is not explicitly identified in the following descriptions.

### `hdcpBlockCipher`

This sequence is used during the first part of authentication to establish the session key,  $K_s$ , and during the vertical blanking interval preceding encrypted frames to establish the frame key,  $K_i$ . Table 4–8 and Table 4–9 describes this sequence. The initial value for the B round register is specified with the concatenation operator “ $\parallel$ ”. For eight-bit values  $a$  and  $b$ , the result of  $(a \parallel b)$  is a 16-bit value, with the value  $a$  in the most significant eight bits and  $b$  in the least significant eight bits.

Step	Activity
1	Load B and K registers of the block module
2	Apply 48 clocks to the block module registers
3	Save the least significant 56 bits of the B register for future use as $K_s/K_i$
4	Transfer 84-bit B register values to the K registers
5	Reload B registers
6	Initialize the LFSR module
7	Assert rekey enable
8	Apply 56 clocks to the LFSR and block modules, saving the 64-bit $M_i$ value during the last four clocks as specified in Table 4–11.
9	De-assert rekey enable

Table 4–8. `hdcpBlockCipher` Sequence

	Steps	clocks	LFSR init (56 bits)	K init	B init (65 bits)	B output (84 bits)	Output Function
hdcpBlockCipher at Authentication	1-3	48	–	$K_m$ (56 bits)	REPEATER $\parallel A_n$	$K_s$	–
	6-9	56	$K_s$	$K_s$ (84 bits)	REPEATER $\parallel A_n$	–	$R_o, M_0$
hdcpBlockCipher at Vertical Blank	1-3	48	–	$K_s$ (56 bits)	REPEATER $\parallel M_{i-1}$	$K_i$	–
	6-9	56	$K_i$	$K_i$ (84 bits)	REPEATER $\parallel M_{i-1}$	–	$R_b, M_i$

Table 4–9. `hdcpBlockCipher` Initial Values and Outputs

For both the B and K round functions, the x, y, and z registers may be viewed as comprising a single register 84 bits in length, identified by B[83:0] and K[83:0]. The mapping of the x, y, and z registers into the full round register is specified by Table 4–10.

Round Register	B[83:56]	B[55:28]	B[27:0]	K[83:56]	K[55:28]	K[27:0]
Sub Register	Bz[27:0]	By[27:0]	Bx[27:0]	Kz[27:0]	Ky[27:0]	Kx[27:0]

Table 4–10. Round Register Bit Precedence

When fewer than 84 bits of output of a round register are required, the least significant bits are used. When fewer than 84 bits are available for initialization, the least significant bits are

filled and the most significant bits are set to zero. For example, the 65-bit concatenation of REPEATER with  $A_n$  will be loaded into the Bx and By registers, plus the least significant nine bits of the Bz register, and the most significant 19 bits of the Bz register are set to zero. Similarly, the 56 bits from the Bx and By registers are saved as  $K_s$  or  $K_i$  during `hdcpBlockCipher`.

The origin of the  $M_i$  and  $R_i$  bits from the output function is specified by Table 4–11.

Warm-up Clock (Step 8)	Output Function Bits 23.....16	Output Function Bits 15 ..... 0
53	—	$M_i$ [63:48]
54	—	$M_i$ [47:32]
55	$r_i$ [15:8]	$M_i$ [31:16]
56	$r_i$ [7:0]	$M_i$ [15:0]

**Table 4–11. `hdcpBlockCipher` Output Function Bit Map**

### **hdcpStreamCipher**


For every video data (as defined by the T.M.D.S data enable (DE) signal) and packet data (including info-frames) to be encrypted, `hdcpStreamCipher` produces 24-bits of output data. Both the LFSR and block modules are clocked. The rekey enable signal is de-asserted.

### **hdcpRekeyCipher**

During horizontal blanking intervals that immediately follow active lines of pixel data, `hdcpRekeyCipher` moves new key material from the LFSR module into the Block module. No other initialization of the cipher state is made, and no outputs are taken from the cipher during re-keying. Both the LFSR and block modules are clocked 56 times. The rekey enable signal is asserted.

### hdcpRngCipher

The HDCP Cipher must be used as defined in Figure 4-6 to produce the value  $An$  required for the authentication protocol. This state diagram references video transmitter states from Figure 2-6.



**Figure 4-6. hdcpRngCipher State Diagram**

**Transition Any State:E0.** On power up the HDCP Cipher is allowed to free run from its initial state, clocked by the pixel clock.

**State E0: Free Run.** The HDCP Cipher is clocked, from its current state, using the pixel clock.

**Transition E0:E1.** An authentication request to the HDCP Transmitter causes this transition. Authentication requests are identified by an HDCP Transmitter state transition to State:A1.

**State E1: Store An.**  $An$  is taken from the HDCP Cipher output function bits that are ordinarily used to produce  $Mi$ . This requires four pixel clocks.

**Transition E1:E2.** This transition is made immediately upon storage of  $An$ .

**State E2: Ready.** The  $An$  value is available for the authentication protocol.

**Transition E2:E0.** This transition is made if the current authentication fails, as indicated by an HDCP Transmitter state transition to State:A0.

**Transition E2:E3.** A new authentication request causes a new  $An$  value to be derived.

**Transition E2:E4.** The authentication protocol using the derived  $An$  is successful, as indicated by an HDCP Transmitter state transition to State:A4.

**State E3: Derive Next.** A new  $An$  is derived using the hdcpBlockCipher sequence, using the current values stored in the  $Mi$  and  $Ki$  registers.

**Transition E3:E2.** This transition is made immediately upon storage of  $An$ .

**State E4: Active.** The HDCP Transmitter is authenticated with a HDCP Receiver.

**Transition E4:E0.** This transition is made whenever the HDCP Transmitter becomes unauthenticated or if the HDCP Receiver is detached or goes inactive.

**Transition E4:E3.** An authentication request to the HDCP Transmitter causes this transition.

This pseudorandom number generator must implement a method to receive bits of outside influence. This method must mix the input influence bits into the values of the block register without replacement. That is, there must no way to determine the value--only change it from whatever it is to another value. For example, one can exclusive-or the influence values into the state. However, any 1-to-1 operation that does not reduce the number possible values or skew the otherwise uniform probability distribution of possible values is acceptable.

The bits of influence shall come from a source of reasonable variability or entropy. A reasonable level of variability or entropy is established if, given 1,000,000 different power up cycles on the HDCP transmitter logic such that the amount of time from power up to the initial authentication were controlled precisely enough to eliminate any variability from the free running of the cipher before initial authentication (i.e. the number of pixel clocks applied to the cipher in State E0 remains unchanged between different tests), and the An values from the first authentication attempt after the additional influence has been applied (using different content streams if this influence comes from the content stream), the probability of there being any duplicates in this list of 1,000,000 An values collected is less than 50%. This corresponds to about 40 (considering one million is about  $2^{20}$ ) random bits out of the 64 (or equivalent if the bits are biased).

An (incomplete) list of sources of entropy might include:

- a) a true Random Number Generator or analog noise source, even if a poor (biased) one
- b) a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) where the state is stored in non-volatile memory after each use. (That is, every power on continues the sequence--it does produce not the same sequence each time). Flash memory or even disk is usable for this purpose as long as it is reasonably secure from tampering. The hdcpRngCipher combined with tamper-resistant non-volatile memory is one such solution.
- c) timers, network statistics, error correction information, radio/cable television signals, disk seek times, etc.
- d) Since the random number An is not used for secret material, a reliable (not manipulatable by the user) calendar and time-of-day clock can be used as seed. For example, some broadcast content sources may give reliable date and time information.

Different product environments have different resources available to them. There is generally no one source that is available in all environments.

The initial state of the hdcpRngCipher is not defined and is left to the implementer. Ideally, one would prefer that the initial value be different for each device power-on, though this is not possible in many environments. In addition, the Rekey enable signal may but need not be enabled during hdcpRngCipher operation.

The An values do not have to be secret, but must be fresh. That is, the method of producing new values must have integrity.

While each An value is already required to be fresh, dual-link transmitters or transmitters with multiple downstream links must ensure that each downstream link receives a distinct An value for each link. This ensures that each link between HDCP devices that have multiple inputs or outputs sharing the same device keys will produce distinct session keys (Ks), encryption keystreams, and authentication values (Mi, Ri, Pj).

## 5 Renewability

It is contemplated that an authorized participant in the authentication protocol may become compromised so as to expose the Device Private Keys it possesses for misuse by unauthorized parties. In consideration of this, each HDCP Receiver is issued a unique set of Device Private Keys, matched with a non-secret identifier (the KSV), referred collectively as the Device Key Set. Through a process defined in the HDCP Adopter's License, the Digital Content Protection LLC may determine that a set of Device Private Keys has been compromised. If so, it places the corresponding KSV on a revocation list that the HDCP Transmitter checks during authentication. Other authorized HDCP receivers are not affected by this revocation because they have different sets of Device Private keys.

The HDCP Transmitter is required to manage system renewability messages (SRMs) carrying the KSV revocation list. The validity of an SRM is established by verifying the integrity of its signature with the Digital Content Protection LLC public key, which is specified by the Digital Content Protection LLC.

The SRMs are delivered with content and must be checked when available. Additionally, devices compliant with HDCP 1.2 and higher must be capable of storing at least 5kB of the SRM in their non-volatile memory. The process by which a device compliant with HDCP 1.2 or higher updates the SRM stored in its non-volatile storage when presented with a newer SRM version is explained in Section 5.2.

### 5.1 SRM Size and Scalability




Figure 5-1. SRM Generational Format

As illustrated in the figure above, the size of the First-Generation HDCP SRM will be limited to a maximum of 5kB. The actual size of the First-Generation SRM is 5116 bytes. For scalability of the SRM, the SRM format supports next-generation extensions. By supporting

generations of SRMs, an HDCP SRM can, if required in future, grow beyond the 5kB limit to accommodate more KSVs. Next-generation extensions are appended to the current-generation SRM in order to ensure backward compatibility with devices that support only previous-generation SRMs.

Table 5–1 gives the format of the HDCP SRM. All values are stored in big endian format.

Name	Size (bits)	Function
SRM ID	4	A value of 0x8 signifies that the message is for HDCP. All other values are reserved
Reserved	12	Reserved for future definition. Must be 0x000
SRM Version	16	Sequentially increasing unique SRM numbers. Higher numbered SRMs are more recent
SRM Generation Number	8	Indicates the generation of the SRM. The generation number starts at 1 and increases sequentially
VRL Length	24	Specifies the combined length of all vector revocation lists contained in this SRM. The length is in bytes and includes the three bytes of this field, the combined size of the vector revocation lists (only those contained in the first-generation SRM), and the 40 bytes of the Digital Content Protection LLC signature in the first-generation SRM
VRLs	Variable. Max 40544 (5068 bytes)	One or more VRLs, each in the format specified in the HDCP VRL format table below
DCP LLC Signature	320	A cryptographic signature of the SRM as defined by the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), as described in FIPS Publication 186-1 dated December 15, 1998. The first 160 bits is the big endian representation of the "r" value of the signature and the trailing 160 bits is the big endian representation of the "s" value produced by DSA

**Table 5–1. System Renewability Message Format**

The SRM contains the vector revocation list, variable-length list of KSVs that belong to compromised devices. The format of the revocation list is specified in Table 5–2.

Name	Size (bits)	Function
Reserved	1	Set to 0.
Number of Devices	7	Specifies the number KSVs N in this list.
Device KSVs	40 * N	Forty-bit KSVs follow the type/number byte. The first byte following the type byte is the most significant byte of the first KSV in the list.

**Table 5–2. Vector Revocation List Format**

Each subsequent next-generation extensions to the first-generation SRM will have the following fields.

Name	Size (bits)	Function
VRL Length	16	Specifies the combined length in bytes of all VRLs in this generation extension, the 2 bytes of this field and the 40 bytes of the DCP LLC signature
VRLs	Variable	One or more VRLs, each in the format specified in the HDCP VRL format table below
DCP LLC	320	A cryptographic signature of the SRM as defined by the Digital

Signature		Signature Algorithm (DSA), as described in FIPS Publication 186-1 dated December 15, 1998. The first 160 bits is the big endian representation of the "r" value of the signature and the trailing 160 bits is the big endian representation of the "s" value produced by DSA. The signature field is calculated over all preceding fields of the SRM
-----------	--	--

**Table 5–3. Next-generation extension format**

Table 5-4 gives the cryptographic parameters used to verify the digital signature of the SRM.

Parameter	Value (hexadecimal)
Prime Modulus	d3c3f5b2fd1761b7018d75f79343786b17395b355a52c7b8a1a24fc36a7058ff8e7fa164f500e0dca0d284821d969e4b4f34dc0cae7c7667b844c747d4c6b983e52ba70e5447cf35f404a0bcd1974c3a10715509b3721530a73f3207b99820495c7b9c143275733b028a49fd968919542a39951c46edc2118c59802bf3287527
Prime Divisor	ee8af2ce5e6db56acd6d14e297ef3f4df9c708e7
Generator	92f85d1b6a4d52131ae43e2445de1ab502afdeaca9bed7315d56d766cd2786118f5db14abdeca9d25162977da83effa88eedc6bfeb37e1a90e29cd0ca03d799e92dd2945f778585ff7c835642c21ba7fb1a0b6be81c8a5e3c8ab69b21da54242c98e9b8aab4a9dc251fa7dac29216fe8b93f185b2f67405b69462442c2ba0bd9
Public Key	c70600526ba0b0863a80fbe0a3acf0d4f0d76658a1754a8e7654755f15ba78d56950e48654f0bbde16804de1b541874db22e14f031704db8d5cb2a417c4566c27ba973c43d84e0da2a70856fe9ea48d87259038b16553e662435ff7fd5206e27bb7ffbd886c241095c8dc8d66f662cbd88f9df7e9b3fb8362a9f7fa36e53799

**Table 5-4. Cryptographic Parameters for Verifying SRM**

See Table A-23 for a sample SRM that is signed with the production cryptographic parameters.

## 5.2 Updating SRMs

The stored HDCP SRM must be updated when a newer version of the SRM is delivered with the content. The procedure for updating an SRM is as follows:

1. Verify that the version number of the new SRM is greater than the version number of the SRM currently stored in the device's non-volatile storage
2. If the version number of the new SRM is greater (implying that it is a more recent version), verify the signature on the new SRM
3. On successful signature verification, replace the current SRM in the device's non-volatile storage with the new SRM. If, for instance, the device supports only second-generation SRMs and the new SRM is a third-generation SRM, the device is not required to store the third-generation extension. Devices compliant with HDCP 1.2 or higher must be capable of storing at least 5kB bytes of the SRM (First-Generation SRM)

## Appendix A. Test Vectors

Table A-1 gives facsimile key information for test purposes.

	<b>Transmitter A1</b>	<b>Transmitter A2</b>	<b>Receiver B1</b>	<b>Receiver B2</b>
<b>Key Selection Vector</b>	b70361f714	43f72d5066	511ef21acd	e72697f401
<b>Key 0</b>	4da4588f131e69	9aabaf9ef907c	bc13e0c75bf0fd	93afe1ff4ca0ed
<b>Key 1</b>	1f823558e65009	34a0407731d1d0	ae0d2c7f76443b	efb49d4a25a4e4
<b>Key 2</b>	8a6a47abb9980d	97c682992dc5d9	24bf2185a36c60	e822d8a9335346
<b>Key 3</b>	f3181b52cbc5ca	da80caca68ed15	f4bc6cbcd7a32f	8812c3004e23d2
<b>Key 4</b>	fb147f6896d8b4	1866d9b51462a6	a72e69c5eb6388	dc63ba78d94263
<b>Key 5</b>	e08bc978488f81	d9fc9599bb7498	7fa2d27a37d9f8	47ebdf52776fd5
<b>Key 6</b>	a0d064c8112c41	7a062ac883f528	32fd3529dea3d1	4bce49472e0464
<b>Key 7</b>	b39d5a28242044	f5938c662af454	485fc240cc9bae	0479bed7732682
<b>Key 8</b>	b928b2bdad566b	ec3075e82d3ef2	3b9857797d5103	c5f800fad716d5
<b>Key 9</b>	91a47b4a6ce4f6	536e376e7ffc49	0dd170be615250	f53fd67ba9b9ec
<b>Key 10</b>	5600f8205e9d58	51c83a6cbeb116	1a748be4866bb1	6fb3901e5867f2
<b>Key 11</b>	8c7fb706ee3fa0	79d44ae1bd5f50	f9606a7c348cca	24c46f520f1be5
<b>Key 12</b>	c02d8c9d7cbc28	674b2563e27393	4bbb037899eea1	2038176d369ed7
<b>Key 13</b>	561261e54b9f05	7a1357efc538a2	190ecf9cc095a9	9ba9cd6a077a57
<b>Key 14</b>	74f0de8ccac1cb	6486e57ea46b02	a821c46897447f	5f2764b35c5591
<b>Key 15</b>	3bb8f60efcdb6a	bdf27a1ce8a299	1a8a0bc4298a41	ee32f1171f5356
<b>Key 16</b>	a02bbb16b22fd7	dc8bd1fa5b46b9	aefc0853e62082	d20a9e2f4d57fa
<b>Key 17</b>	482f8e46785498	27ef71efef9b73	f75d4a0c497ba4	439eb96d2daff0
<b>Key 18</b>	66ae2562274738	187599f603c947	ad6495fc8a06d8	1c68df6f868aa
<b>Key 19</b>	3d4952a323ddf2	023ae9da303ecb	67c2020c2b2e02	dd50d7551dc6fb
<b>Key 20</b>	e2d231767b3a54	3d1cf6533dea8e	8f116b18f4ae8d	50b85379165c5f
<b>Key 21</b>	4d581aede66125	34dd5525f1890c	e3053fa3e9fa69	f45d64b097d6b5
<b>Key 22</b>	326082bf7b22f7	367dd774a07f4c	37d8002881c7d1	a1a154e07adb4d
<b>Key 23</b>	f61b463530ce6b	cdc34c8a6f56d1	c3a5fd1c15669c	0755ea83e47e71
<b>Key 24</b>	360409f0d7976b	de3413927363a8	9e93d41e0811f7	e1dca26293efe4
<b>Key 25</b>	a1e105618d49f9	21b11c739f45b3	2c4074509eec6c	e1092507ab8f45
<b>Key 26</b>	c98e9dd1053406	84440fadd281ac	8b7fd819279b61	3d56680db98e15
<b>Key 27</b>	20c36794426190	10f7900c65fef4	d7caada0a06ce9	0a49af413de66b
<b>Key 28</b>	964451ceac4fc3	30070704c8aa06	9297dca1f8c1db	90a814bbf971a0
<b>Key 29</b>	3e904504e18c8a	f287cb4063cb9d	5d1aaa99dea489	626b121ca0504f
<b>Key 30</b>	290010579c2dfc	97033445a4d587	60cb56ddbba1d9	00f9bb7a94a1a7
<b>Key 31</b>	d7943b69e5b180	8051045091c10b	85d4ad5e5ff2e0	f485290cc5c1ba
<b>Key 32</b>	54c7ea5bdd7b43	d18f282074da20	1280161221df6d	baa873c54fdedf
<b>Key 33</b>	74fb5887c790ba	f2679a98828400	ca31a5f2406589	2d6a56233b8aba
<b>Key 34</b>	935cfa364e1de0	a6f0b6042a3dd7	1d30e8cb198e6f	a60d0379512312
<b>Key 35</b>	03075e159a11ae	3e5ddad097f5e1	d1c18bed07d3fa	942582078dad8
<b>Key 36</b>	05d3408a78fb01	3ad1f8a2e5958f	cec7ec09245b43	8395a4b022082f
<b>Key 37</b>	0059a5d7a04db3	f025bb1c085d4f	b08129efedd583	cb12fe97842b60
<b>Key 38</b>	373b634a2c9e40	0864213d6d50c1	2134cf4ce286e5	282ffe78f2f95c
<b>Key 39</b>	2573bbb4562041	9018b0ff3ab170	edeef9d099b78c	f6491f33c7ef53

Table A-1. Sample Device Keys

Transmitter Device #1 examines the KSV of Receiver Device #1 and combines its own secret device keys that correspond to the bit positions of all of the ones in the KSV. Receiver Device #1 examines the KSV of Transmitter Device #1 and combines its own secret device keys that correspond to the bit positions of all of the ones in the KSV. Table A-2 shows the 56-bit binary addition of keys performed by Transmitter Device #1 and Receiver Device #1, and the corresponding equivalent values derived for Km and Km'.

Transmitter Device #1 Sum of Keys Calculation		Receiver Device #1 Sum of Keys Calculation	
Key 0	4da4588f131e69	Key 2	24bf2185a36c60
Key 2	8a6a47abb9980d	Key 4	a72e69c5eb6388
Key 3	f3181b52cbc5ca	Key 8	3b9857797d5103
Key 6	a0d064c8112c41	Key 9	0dd170be615250
Key 7	b39d5a28242044	Key 10	1a748be4866bb1
Key 9	91a47b4a6ce4f6	Key 12	4bbb037899eea1
Key 11	8c7fb706ee3fa0	Key 13	190ecf9cc095a9
Key 12	c02d8c9d7cbc28	Key 14	a821c46897447f
Key 17	482f8e46785498	Key 15	1a8a0bc4298a41
Key 20	e2d231767b3a54	Key 16	aefc0853e62082
Key 21	4d581aede66125	Key 21	e3053fa3e9fa69
Key 22	326082bf7b22f7	Key 22	37d8002881c7d1
Key 23	f61b463530ce6b	Key 24	9e93d41e0811f7
Key 25	a1e105618d49f9	Key 25	2c4074509eec6c
Key 26	c98e9dd1053406	Key 32	1280161221df6d
Key 27	20c36794426190	Key 33	ca31a5f2406589
Key 28	964451ceac4fc3	Key 34	1d30e8cb198e6f
Key 32	54c7ea5bdd7b43	Key 36	cec7ec09245b43
Key 36	05d3408a78fb01	Key 37	b08129efedd583
Key 38	373b634a2c9e40	Key 39	edeeef9d099b78c
<b>RESULT (Km):</b>	<b>5309c7d22fcecc</b>	<b>RESULT (Km')</b>	<b>5309c7d22fcecc</b>

Table A-2. Sample Km Calculation

Table A-3 gives test vectors for the four possible authentication pairs of test keys in Table A-1. The test vectors cover two lines of HDCP Content, each with eight pixels per line. The HDCP Receiver does not support downstream connections (REPEATER = 0).

	<b>A1 - B1</b>	<b>A1 - B2</b>	<b>A2 - B1</b>	<b>A2 - B2</b>
<b>Km</b>	5309c7d22fcecc	f6aee46089c923	4afe34dbec1205	a423d78b8676a7
<b>REPEATER    An</b>	034271c130c070403	0445e62a53ad10fe5	083bec2bb01c66e07	00351f7175406a74d
<b>Ks</b>	54294b7c040e35	4e60d941d0e8b1	2c9bef71df792e	1963deb799ee82
<b>M<sub>0</sub></b>	a02bc815e73d001c	e7d28b9b2f46c49d	8e1e91f6d8ae4c25	d05d8c26378a126e
<b>R<sub>0</sub></b>	8ae0	fb65	3435	4fd5
<b>K<sub>1</sub></b>	d692b7ee1d40e8	e46f51311a959a	f3e27849d067c1	65f793e160ec27
<b>M<sub>1</sub></b>	1dbf44e50f523e56	445b5c6eebf657ff	23d89127a5ee6c26	68be984885aaefef7
<b>Line 1, Pixel 1</b>	R 59 G c0 B 3e	R 56 G bf B 8a	R 11 G 07 B d2	R b8 G 2c B 9c
<b>Line 1, Pixel 2</b>	R 9e G e5 B fe	R 2c G 26 B 03	R b1 G 8f B 7f	R 9b G 34 B e3
<b>Line 1, Pixel 3</b>	R 9a G f9 B 19	R 88 G 43 B dc	R 3c G fb B 8c	R 1c G fa B d7
<b>Line 1, Pixel 4</b>	R 5b G 5d B 6c	R 1d G db B bd	R a3 G 97 B 0c	R 00 G A0 B 08
<b>Line 1, Pixel 5</b>	R 55 G dc B de	R e6 G 32 B 13	R 38 G 94 B 3e	R ce G c3 B f4
<b>Line 1, Pixel 6</b>	R e5 G 87 B 63	R 36 G 34 B 24	R ac G 84 B da	R f4 G 36 B 27
<b>Line 1, Pixel 7</b>	R be G fc B c7	R 48 G 82 B 8f	R b8 G a4 B 73	R b6 G 36 B f7
<b>Line 1, Pixel 8</b>	R a1 G b5 B 65	R 99 G b9 B db	R 2f G c5 B c0	R 24 G bd B 8b
<b>Horizontal Blank Re-Key</b>				
<b>Line 2, Pixel 1</b>	R 12 G 6b B 14	R 9c G ac B 7b	R 6c G 64 B c7	R 73 G 9f B 2e
<b>Line 2, Pixel 2</b>	R 06 G 4a B 73	R 40 G 11 B d0	R ba G 05 B 8d	R f6 G 1e B 16
<b>Line 2, Pixel 3</b>	R f8 G bb B 15	R aa G 3c B e6	R 62 G 17 B ff	R e2 G 8c B 59
<b>Line 2, Pixel 4</b>	R cc G e6 B 21	R e6 G e9 B ac	R f1 G e5 B df	R d9 G 8a B 86
<b>Line 2, Pixel 5</b>	R 87 G 95 B 78	R 7a G d5 B 2e	R c2 G e6 B 92	R c5 G eb B 96
<b>Line 2, Pixel 6</b>	R d2 G 03 B f7	R 94 G 1f B 35	R 47 G a4 B 94	R c0 G b3 B ce
<b>Line 2, Pixel 7</b>	R 62 G 81 B 44	R a7 G 85 B 64	R 59 G b7 B a1	R eb G 26 B f3
<b>Line 2, Pixel 8</b>	R 80 G d8 B 75	R f7 G 45 B 16	R 9d G 96 B ea	R f4 G 9e B e1

**Table A-3. Sample Authentication and Encryption Values (REPEATER = 0)**

Table A–4 gives test vectors for the four possible authentication pairs of test keys in Table A–1. The test vectors cover two lines of HDCP Content, each with eight pixels per line. The HDCP Receiver supports downstream connections (REPEATER = 1).

	<b>A1 – B1</b>	<b>A1 – B2</b>	<b>A2 – B1</b>	<b>A2 – B2</b>
<b>Km</b>	5309c7d22fcecc	f6aee46089c923	4afe34dbec1205	a423d78b8676a7
<b>REPEATER    An</b>	134271c130c070403	1445e62a53ad10fe5	183bec2bb01c66e07	10351f7175406a74d
<b>Ks</b>	bc607b21d48e97	b7894f1754caaa	fe3717c12f3bb1	aac4147081a2d0
<b>M<sub>0</sub></b>	372d3dce38bbe78f	43d609c682c956e1	536dee1e44a58bf4	38b57ad3cdd1b266
<b>R<sub>0</sub></b>	6485	3f68	dd9b	7930
<b>K<sub>1</sub></b>	98b281e1876a9a	ffbfea4bc7fd2c	a1ec276b2ddaf0	0f0b83888e3209
<b>M<sub>1</sub></b>	016f9561e001f80d	2a067368042fa1aa	b365f8813c45db0b	06471e358f601ce4
<b>Line 1, Pixel 1</b>	R 33 G 4e B 55	R bc G 9c B a4	R 4a G c7 B d3	R c2 G c8 B 84
<b>Line 1, Pixel 2</b>	R d2 G 37 B 4e	R 43 G 19 B df	R 30 G a7 B ec	R 2f G 7c B 68
<b>Line 1, Pixel 3</b>	R 0e G 22 B f5	R b1 G e0 B 12	R 2d G 6e B 36	R 90 G 0b B e5
<b>Line 1, Pixel 4</b>	R c1 G 31 B 8f	R 27 G d0 B 5a	R e1 G 75 B b6	R 9e G de B 54
<b>Line 1, Pixel 5</b>	R dc G a1 B a7	R d8 G aa B 3d	R 94 G ff B fb	R 78 G cd B 8c
<b>Line 1, Pixel 6</b>	R 27 G e7 B c3	R 3f G 2a B 64	R 11 G aa B c1	R 38 G a5 B b8
<b>Line 1, Pixel 7</b>	R 56 G 3e B c9	R 2e G 00 B 0a	R 5c G 71 B 66	R 32 G ff B 1e
<b>Line 1, Pixel 8</b>	R 10 G dc B 2f	R f2 G 47 B 63	R be G 33 B 6f	R e4 G d9 B 0c
<b>Horizontal Blank Re-Key</b>				
<b>Line 2, Pixel 1</b>	R 73 G 03 B 22	R e4 G 97 B f1	R 0b G a7 B ec	R 62 G 0f B 61
<b>Line 2, Pixel 2</b>	R 69 G 01 B 36	R df G 15 B 0e	R 4f G 10 B 1e	R 33 G 73 B 52
<b>Line 2, Pixel 3</b>	R 3d G 27 B 53	R 2f G 44 B 7b	R fe G 16 b 16	R cd G 96 B fd
<b>Line 2, Pixel 4</b>	R fe G 41 B 50	R 0c G 9b B ae	R 52 G e6 B 35	R 53 G ea B d5
<b>Line 2, Pixel 5</b>	R a8 G 18 B 8d	R 93 G db B da	R db G 8d B b7	R 33 G a9 B 31
<b>Line 2, Pixel 6</b>	R 1a G 02 B 91	R a7 G f9 B 01	R 18 G f0 B d9	R cc G 34 B 86
<b>Line 2, Pixel 7</b>	R 8c G 29 B ce	R 1a G 39 B 9a	R f5 G 9a B 63	R 6e G e0 B bb
<b>Line 2, Pixel 8</b>	R 89 G cd B bf	R 4b G 54 B 00	R d4 G ac B aa	R d2 G fc B 4b

**Table A–4. Sample Authentication and Encryption Values (REPEATER = 1)**

<b>Sequence</b>	<b>LFSR 0</b>	<b>LFSR 1</b>	<b>LFSR 2</b>	<b>LFSR 3</b>	<b>SH 0</b>	<b>SH 1</b>	<b>SH 2</b>	<b>SH 3</b>
<b>Load</b>								
<b>1</b>								
<b>2</b>								
<b>3</b>								
<b>...</b>								
<b>47</b>								
<b>48</b>								
<b>Load</b>	0x01e35	0x00040	0x025be	0x15429	01	01	01	01
<b>1</b>	0x01c6b	0x00081	0x04b7c	0x0a853	10	10	10	10
<b>2</b>	0x018d6	0x00102	0x096f8	0x150a7	00	01	11	01
<b>3</b>	0x011ac	0x00204	0x02df0	0x0a14e	00	00	11	11
<b>4</b>	0x00358	0x00409	0x05be0	0x1429c	00	00	10	11
<b>5</b>	0x006b0	0x00812	0x0b7c0	0x08539	00	00	01	10
<b>6</b>	0x00d60	0x01024	0x06f81	0x10a72	00	00	00	01
<b>7</b>	0x01ac0	0x02049	0x0df03	0x014e4	01	00	00	00
<b>8</b>	0x01581	0x00093	0x0be07	0x029c9	10	01	00	00
<b>...</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x01cbc	0x03218	0x05712	0x0ab75	10	10	01	11
<b>50</b>	0x01979	0x02431	0x0ae24	0x156eb	11	00	10	11
<b>51</b>	0x012f3	0x00863	0x05c48	0x0add7	10	01	01	10
<b>52</b>	0x005e6	0x010c6	0x0b891	0x15bae	01	10	10	01
<b>53</b>	0x00bcc	0x0218d	0x07122	0x0b75c	10	01	01	10
<b>54</b>	0x01799	0x0031a	0x0e245	0x16eb8	01	00	11	00
<b>55</b>	0x00f32	0x00634	0x0c48b	0x0dd70	10	10	01	10
<b>56</b>	0x01e65	0x00c69	0x08917	0x1bae1	00	01	11	01

**Table A-5. LFSR Module States During A1 - B1 Authentication (REPEATER = 0)**

<b>Sequence</b>	<b>Kx</b>	<b>Ky</b>	<b>Kz</b>	<b>Bx</b>	<b>By</b>	<b>Bz</b>	<b>Output</b>
<b>Load</b>	0x22fcecc	0x5309c7d	0x0000000	0xc070403	0x271c130	0x0000034	
<b>1</b>	0x000084c	0xf458fff	0x7f722dc	0xa5d4b70	0x8ea8888	0x9f6066d	0xbe70ee
<b>2</b>	0x0ed9f8a	0xb444236	0x3b62e76	0x8fa5383	0x5d17cd7	0x2e71e83	0x007023
<b>3</b>	0x70ef0ef	0x9aa103f	0x8aa659d	0x49d0347	0xe71b545	0xd39af92	0xdd51b7
<b>4</b>	0xc8f3da5	0x8bb85f	0x58047e6	0x05add47	0xaf2ff95	0x4371447	0xae10f
<b>5</b>	0x6b68710	0x1826042	0xc20a675	0x5693206	0xd034757	0x71f4c59	0xe0e624
<b>6</b>	0xd4c9cf4	0x0014506	0x6c11733	0xf679cf3	0xbe06351	0x412aafc	0x6104f9
<b>7</b>	0x2ff2231	0x059031a	0xd84c367	0x7c6878b	0x735a2d2	0x2d4fba7	0x12c5e4
<b>8</b>	0x1c13406	0x516f805	0x3e231f5	0x61f3f4d	0xccb03b9	0x3030a78	0x9f08dc
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>41</b>	0x7dc29a3	0x5895932	0x26047a5	0x12b9cbd	0xe40581a	0xc892f27	0x1cf71
<b>42</b>	0xba7d2b0	0xf1cfeac	0x36eb45d	0xa8bab0f	0x083213e	0x38fd0ef	0xb90f28
<b>43</b>	0xdd26650	0x29e8ca4	0xbf0109c	0x04a0c9b	0xf8cd136	0xb6b8827	0xf32344
<b>44</b>	0xf928c5b	0xc70cecdd	0xcc71bb9	0x004c69f	0xf8cfb57	0x20d8664	0xff2c26
<b>45</b>	0x491d801	0xf630446	0x43655f6	0x26727b8	0xb6866b1	0x48253f0	0xead81d
<b>46</b>	0x9281463	0x891c25b	0x2c40a10	0xe2e3627	0xce25f1d	0x6fd76d2	0x7cb35d
<b>47</b>	0x37ef335	0xbb8429b	0xfad91c5	0x8bb8770	0x94322d6	0xbc24e18	0x4ac7aa
<b>48</b>	0x7bd96ba	0xee950f7	0x749f3d9	0xc040e35	0x54294b7	0x1c61d8e	0x37d937
<b>Load</b>	0xc040e35	0x54294b7	0x1c61d8e	0xc070403	0x271c130	0x0000034	
<b>1</b>	0x3772e0b	0x6595cd5	0x93d46aa	0xf5f1bea	0x8ea8888	0x9f6066d	0x5d74aa
<b>2</b>	0xfcfc369	0x18f685a	0x22626f1	0x48ec1f7	0x5d17cd7	0x083878b	0x1e60bc
<b>3</b>	0x67f044d	0xd5eb45a	0x8ca9144	0x034b338	0x3ac66a8	0xdc9e6f6	0x4c29b4
<b>4</b>	0x046af2c	0x992df09	0xd7b21a9	0x845e47f	0xce06983	0xc50059e	0x1c3d69
<b>5</b>	0x1a7c13c	0x6aed6fb	0x57ba318	0xea50517	0xc09dcdf	0xcdcf157	0x2d0855
<b>6</b>	0x82ff268	0xfd00a63	0xf4c6f06	0x00bc25d	0xb24cd67	0xa94407a	0xddb851
<b>7</b>	0xe602372	0xe4f1798	0x6487e18	0x47a81d0	0x3ca6b73	0x90eea67	0x5605dd
<b>8</b>	0xa251408	0x26ca144	0x2c8a821	0x700ece4	0x1f2ccf5	0x575dec4	0x44236d
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0xade5581	0x026eed	0x58676ad	0x19978d8	0x207678c	0x552b693	0x65e697
<b>50</b>	0xc1cdfad	0x29eb9e5	0x85864c6	0x3a260ed	0xd817a5a	0xf2e4743	0xa341ef
<b>51</b>	0x75114c3	0x6923621	0xc5367fa	0x4c7b24b	0x4c7ad96	0x4bf179e	0x6c2f44
<b>52</b>	0x5e00de1	0x31ba2ec	0x9352a05	0x21f7177	0x1ce1a8a	0x5fe9127	0xdce5b0
<b>53</b>	0xa8a8b05	0x470ad68	0x35c28f6	0x3eaf43f	0x194bf81	0xb8d5477	0x14a02b
<b>54</b>	0x56a5801	0x5bd1d70	0xd724992	0xf41fb7d	0x6aafc2c	0x3fbf3ef	0x54c815
<b>55</b>	0x6c30c38	0xf15bf0e	0xfc5799d	0xb673b37	0x921be44	0x956fe75	0x8ae73d
<b>56</b>	0x8451307	0x58cff28	0x9ee2338	0x346ebe6	0x189def7	0xf04cb0e	0xe0001c

**Table A-6. Block Module States During A1 - B1 Authentication (REPEATER = 0)**

<b>Sequence</b>	<b>LFSR 0</b>	<b>LFSR 1</b>	<b>LFSR 2</b>	<b>LFSR 3</b>	<b>SH 0</b>	<b>SH 1</b>	<b>SH 2</b>	<b>SH 3</b>
<b>Load</b>								
<b>1</b>								
<b>2</b>								
<b>3</b>								
<b>...</b>								
<b>47</b>								
<b>48</b>								
<b>Load</b>	0x018b1	0x03d0e	0x06ca0	0x14e60	01	01	01	01
<b>1</b>	0x01162	0x03a1d	0x0d941	0x09cc1	00	10	11	00
<b>2</b>	0x002c4	0x0343b	0x0b282	0x13983	01	00	11	10
<b>3</b>	0x00588	0x02876	0x06504	0x07307	10	01	01	11
<b>4</b>	0x00b10	0x010ed	0x0ca09	0x0e60f	01	10	10	10
<b>5</b>	0x01620	0x021db	0x09413	0x1cc1e	10	00	11	00
<b>6</b>	0x00c40	0x003b7	0x02826	0x1983c	01	10	10	10
<b>7</b>	0x01881	0x0076e	0x0504d	0x13078	11	01	00	11
<b>8</b>	0x01103	0x00edd	0x0a09a	0x060f0	11	10	01	10
<b>...</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x005c3	0x016e4	0x0917e	0x1efbd	01	00	00	01
<b>50</b>	0x00b86	0x02dc8	0x022fd	0x1df7a	00	01	00	00
<b>51</b>	0x0170d	0x01b90	0x045fb	0x1bef4	00	00	10	00
<b>52</b>	0x00e1b	0x03721	0x08bf6	0x17de9	00	00	00	10
<b>53</b>	0x01c36	0x02e42	0x017ed	0x0fb3	01	00	00	01
<b>54</b>	0x0186d	0x01c84	0x02fda	0x1f7a6	11	00	00	00
<b>55</b>	0x010db	0x03909	0x05fb4	0x1ef4d	10	01	00	00
<b>56</b>	0x001b6	0x03212	0x0bf68	0x1de9b	01	00	10	00

**Table A-7. LFSR Module States During A1 – B2 Authentication (REPEATER = 0)**

<b>Sequence</b>	<b>Kx</b>	<b>Ky</b>	<b>Kz</b>	<b>Bx</b>	<b>By</b>	<b>Bz</b>	<b>Output</b>
<b>Load</b>	0x089c923	0xf6aee46	0x0000000	0xad10fe5	0x5e62a53	0x0000044	
<b>1</b>	0x000ace8	0xbbe222	0xa84ba32	0xf8ee8f0	0x4c79444	0x649180e	0xb24463
<b>2</b>	0xbe2db4d	0xcd43e8	0x6cf4c5d	0xb0bccb3	0xcd48ee4	0xfbde86b	0x0ff14d
<b>3</b>	0x59aaa16	0x420acae	0x948ddf1	0x4f31d66	0x5e99939	0x8945bd4	0x5a7c22
<b>4</b>	0x6716e27	0xc71eabf	0x728216a	0x948e7ab	0xb5980ca	0x3969dfa	0xe29870
<b>5</b>	0x2b8be74	0xc7b7cd8	0x1896efd	0xdd99072	0xdd8b36e	0x9005894	0x252d85
<b>6</b>	0x417f923	0xf719e90	0xd5c1459	0xdc0bba0	0x6178407	0x066cb0a	0x5195fa
<b>7</b>	0x6c1faa9	0xf7175fd	0x50bb276	0xcafb7c	0x32a2ec3	0xa479ab9	0xcded7d1
<b>8</b>	0x90a1447	0xad4dd26	0x59afdb6	0xfa48546	0x6ebb9cf	0x890acc2	0xd92360
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>41</b>	0x456a8de	0x218a73d	0xefe8143	0xdb40d6f	0x8adb81b	0x7f17e90	0x4b21a1
<b>42</b>	0x5bb75c0	0x9e32509	0xcd4d66f	0x94b2edc	0x91aaaf6	0x3894216	0x537e81
<b>43</b>	0x692b31d	0x40c7b06	0xeb692c8	0x5b4a26a	0x7c0b63f	0xb5e23ed	0x71f997
<b>44</b>	0x4ac7e44	0x584dad4	0x2606dca	0xb41c724	0xde66448	0x90f07c0	0x9b4c0f
<b>45</b>	0x995c381	0xe782e99	0x500545a	0x296761d	0x33b5aa8	0xd7c96dd	0xccce274
<b>46</b>	0x2a39ef6	0xb3509f9	0xbd26dfe	0xf7d1275	0xd7972de	0xa1c5513	0xa9e21a
<b>47</b>	0xe937d30	0x7910780	0x03575d7	0xe9e5a9	0x235c870	0x246431c	0x8d7b49
<b>48</b>	0xb9af224	0x04c8a5f	0x49c96b1	0x1d0e8b1	0x4e60d94	0x072bad0	0x1cfb41
<b>Load</b>	0x1d0e8b1	0x4e60d94	0x072bad0	0xad10fe5	0x5e62a53	0x0000044	
<b>1</b>	0x8adc6e8	0xb659c1e	0x70ae5ce	0x4c36286	0x4c79444	0x649180e	0xfeaeeb
<b>2</b>	0xe647934	0x7ec73a0	0xae21cf8	0x57c3737	0xcd48ee4	0x131ec75	0xe6e976
<b>3</b>	0xfa28037	0x602e4c5	0xcc87a66	0x1fe7698	0xf433b91	0x990c71a	0x47ee81
<b>4</b>	0x0d609b0	0x76b0413	0xbb909ab	0xc160202	0x2e4b770	0xd5b0319	0x09463e
<b>5</b>	0x8f2b473	0x00b1039	0x54e4007	0xf914da7	0xbd17a23	0x9746424	0x341d4a
<b>6</b>	0x91fb8aa	0x6445ea6	0x8649c97	0x623f7e9	0xf5e67b9	0xb986c8a	0x61be45
<b>7</b>	0x88d8719	0x4f9ea67	0x5195717	0x2f6bf08	0x42af423	0x0f517b2	0x38c278
<b>8</b>	0x4e72913	0x5e4a60f	0xef64d8e	0xa7afa70	0x46d5f5f	0x8599680	0x366d9f
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x4dda715	0x5cf4582	0x66dc877	0x4e69fc3	0x6790add	0x692ce89	0x40f21c
<b>50</b>	0x4db2b7f	0xfb2f397	0x76dedec	0x20ef253	0x81e7d6b	0xf0b76f9	0x9c8062
<b>51</b>	0x6f8bf8a	0x0579c7f	0xa79d4cc	0xf23684b	0x79e04b8	0x71c4515	0xef455b
<b>52</b>	0x57b4273	0x7cc013c	0x4a37fd9	0xa63e183	0x13f3943	0xaf26eed	0x9b00a8
<b>53</b>	0x6a718ef	0x43667bb	0x91c7a99	0x9383356	0x3f262d4	0xda416b4	0xbee7d2
<b>54</b>	0x5764f30	0xca377a9	0x61cb7fc	0x75526c2	0x5439e56	0xc8e2a8a	0x168b9b
<b>55</b>	0x1aac873	0xf9340e8	0x0ce402a	0x8504037	0x18ad8b4	0xb818ef9	0xfb2f46
<b>56</b>	0x365eb8d	0x02468c0	0x31071ef	0x01c71f2	0xc7ac9e7	0xc1ffc01	0x65c49d

**Table A-8. Block Module States During A1 – B2 Authentication (REPEATER = 0)**

Sequence	LFSR 0	LFSR 1	LFSR 2	LFSR 3	SH 0	SH 1	SH 2	SH 3
<b>Load</b>								
<b>1</b>								
<b>2</b>								
<b>3</b>								
...								
<b>47</b>								
<b>48</b>								
<b>Load</b>	0x0192e	0x01df7	0x077b8	0x02c9b	01	01	01	01
<b>1</b>	0x0125c	0x03bef	0x0ef71	0x05936	11	00	10	10
<b>2</b>	0x004b8	0x037df	0x0dee3	0x0b26c	11	10	01	01
<b>3</b>	0x00970	0x02fbf	0x0bdc7	0x164d8	01	11	00	11
<b>4</b>	0x012e0	0x01f7f	0x07b8e	0x0c9b0	11	01	01	10
<b>5</b>	0x005c1	0x03eff	0x0f71d	0x19360	01	10	10	11
<b>6</b>	0x00b82	0x03dfa	0x0ee3b	0x126c1	00	01	11	10
<b>7</b>	0x01705	0x03bfd	0x0dc76	0x04d82	00	00	11	01
<b>8</b>	0x00e0b	0x037fb	0x0b8ed	0x09b04	00	00	10	10
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x016ef	0x004ea	0x08ffb	0x18374	01	11	11	10
<b>50</b>	0x00dde	0x009d4	0x01ff7	0x106e8	10	11	11	01
<b>51</b>	0x01bbd	0x013a9	0x03fee	0x00dd0	01	01	11	11
<b>52</b>	0x0177b	0x02753	0x07fdd	0x01ba0	00	10	11	11
<b>53</b>	0x00ef6	0x00ea6	0x0ffbb	0x03740	01	01	01	11
<b>54</b>	0x01dec	0x01d4d	0x0ff77	0x06e81	10	11	00	11
<b>55</b>	0x01bd9	0x03a9b	0x0feef	0x0dd02	01	01	10	01
<b>56</b>	0x017b3	0x03537	0x0fddf	0x1ba04	10	11	01	00

Table A-9. LFSR Module States During A2 – B1 Authentication (REPEATER = 0)

<b>Sequence</b>	<b>Kx</b>	<b>Ky</b>	<b>Kz</b>	<b>Bx</b>	<b>By</b>	<b>Bz</b>	<b>Output</b>
<b>Load</b>	0xbec1205	0x4afe34d	0x0000000	0x1c66e07	0xbec2bb0	0x0000083	
<b>1</b>	0x888e2ea	0x414b444	0x97a0589	0xf087578	0x3d5b332	0x610f071	0x001a91
<b>2</b>	0x4625e41	0xcd48c5f	0x3a77722	0x17b01a9	0x0638644	0xb71a3c5	0x892758
<b>3</b>	0xc9402d8	0x5ce2e8b	0x2d46dd1	0xcb2da3	0x45c8159	0x0c27e9f	0xd3c6e1
<b>4</b>	0x9f4f7b0	0x4c9fc33	0x7975e63	0xb1a5c1f	0x37140d4	0x78f6cfb	0x916ff8
<b>5</b>	0xa52c6b9	0x0ab1bea	0x3f59b80	0x66c7c4e	0xef8a601	0xd5f6819	0x21475c
<b>6</b>	0xe828e8c	0x1f4fe28	0xf9ae9ca	0xa6e1944	0x11989fd	0x4338020	0x729008
<b>7</b>	0x3d9656f	0x9313d6c	0xd525839	0x3d3cf97	0x2d456aa	0x5592482	0x2c2762
<b>8</b>	0x0b5904f	0xe168c0e	0x8549a6c	0x8e384cb	0xfd25ff0	0x40578b4	0xa66b25
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>41</b>	0xf907779	0x8add56d	0xa2bf28b	0xb6d2591	0x8cbe163	0x1db3ce9	0x55f6f1
<b>42</b>	0xbb149e8	0x34b44fe	0xe899a28	0x7ec27a0	0xbdae914	0xbcc46bf	0xb1c490
<b>43</b>	0x852bc22	0x30c541b	0x4ba8ad0	0xbaccaa81	0xf2df6bc	0x7796efa	0x134543
<b>44</b>	0xe0dcc66	0x3380692	0x2f59c16	0x5875f9a	0x03ea16f	0x80bc2ab	0xf8b3c8
<b>45</b>	0xbd69a67	0x11e9f3b	0xb0d15db	0xcd318e7	0xbcace72	0x5aa586f	0x49d410
<b>46</b>	0x992aba4	0x79ccd6c	0x374d0da	0x4a507c8	0xd761f3d	0x3849c30	0x4d30b7
<b>47</b>	0x02d7a9c	0x69e0827	0x75c491b	0x1c3734c	0x1ebaf33	0x8e6e1e4	0x9df48b
<b>48</b>	0x28d5897	0x4f55c34	0x1bf2686	0x1df792e	0x2c9bef7	0x07b1c9f	0xebdeef
<b>Load</b>	0x1df792e	0x2c9bef7	0x07b1c9f	0x1c66e07	0xbec2bb0	0x0000083	
<b>1</b>	0xfd88a6c	0x1aec3ba	0x548b6d5	0xfb705c6	0x3d5b332	0x610f071	0x636064
<b>2</b>	0x0876369	0x710f070	0x03a9952	0x68afa97	0x0638644	0x2a048b2	0x3a375c
<b>3</b>	0xfdacf763	0x64400d6	0x6888c5c	0x81f7bc9	0xab26acb	0x5146df0	0x1b8dbf
<b>4</b>	0x0cb1f80	0x6710244	0xd810320	0x8a558ef	0xc4934bb	0xfcbe390	0x2fba5d
<b>5</b>	0x7a77bb1	0x545b44d	0xacc6c17	0xefc1031	0x8a7bd55	0x6f02498	0x66bde4
<b>6</b>	0x629697d	0xdc585bb	0x5b8f82d	0x9e3cd09	0x34bee9	0xad76510	0x9b04a5
<b>7</b>	0x2d0fd29	0x6095002	0x10fd4d1	0x161afae	0x9356147	0xf76daf9	0x9467c6
<b>8</b>	0x7745ff4	0xddcd316	0x042bd5c	0x9cc0fc2	0x7262896	0x73c7ad4	0xa7a735
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x3e266d1	0xc895108	0x65cffa5	0xbbf95cd	0x063edad	0x9f1843e	0xd2a1f8
<b>50</b>	0x1aff812	0xc8cc3bb	0x2e34b69	0x548d48b	0xfc340a	0x7ca499b	0xdeebef
<b>51</b>	0xeb214ef	0x067b1f8	0x19c630a	0xe7c0a44	0x66f4697	0x541cbf6	0x4420a7
<b>52</b>	0x2403450	0x5331c01	0x59f99e8	0xa39e281	0x8971df1	0x4c21780	0x9f6e12
<b>53</b>	0x96b81f7	0xc44f275	0x3e91d6c	0x644040d	0xd338e4e	0x0afa6f2	0xd38e1e
<b>54</b>	0xaf435aa	0x8ba5ab2	0x90519f8	0x72a4777	0xc552143	0x2630971	0x6c91f6
<b>55</b>	0x011f064	0xa7aa39	0x072d48d	0x2802af7	0x15041a9	0xea862e3	0x34d8ae
<b>56</b>	0x7532414	0xa296c3	0xa5510c1	0x6891e10	0x5316410	0x45e1c10	0x354c25

Table A-10. Block Module States During A2 – B1 Authentication (REPEATER = 0)

<b>Sequence</b>	<b>LFSR 0</b>	<b>LFSR 1</b>	<b>LFSR 2</b>	<b>LFSR 3</b>	<b>SH 0</b>	<b>SH 1</b>	<b>SH 2</b>	<b>SH 3</b>
<b>Load</b>								
<b>1</b>								
<b>2</b>								
<b>3</b>								
<b>...</b>								
<b>47</b>								
<b>48</b>								
<b>Load</b>	0x01e82	0x0399e	0x0ef5b	0x11963	01	01	01	01
<b>1</b>	0x01d04	0x0333c	0x0deb7	0x032c7	00	10	10	10
<b>2</b>	0x01a09	0x02678	0x0bd6f	0x0658e	00	01	01	00
<b>3</b>	0x01413	0x00cf0	0x07adf	0x0cb1c	01	10	10	00
<b>4</b>	0x00827	0x019e1	0x0f5bf	0x19638	11	00	11	00
<b>5</b>	0x0104e	0x033c2	0x0eb7e	0x12c71	10	10	10	01
<b>6</b>	0x0009d	0x02785	0x0d6fd	0x058e3	01	11	01	00
<b>7</b>	0x0013b	0x00f0b	0x0adfb	0x0b1c7	10	11	10	10
<b>8</b>	0x00276	0x01e17	0x05bf7	0x1638e	00	11	01	01
<b>...</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x0055e	0x02e73	0x08f69	0x07085	11	00	11	10
<b>50</b>	0x00abd	0x01ce7	0x01ed3	0x0e10b	11	01	01	01
<b>51</b>	0x0157b	0x039cf	0x03da6	0x1c217	11	11	00	11
<b>52</b>	0x00af6	0x0339f	0x07b4c	0x1842f	10	11	01	10
<b>53</b>	0x015ed	0x0273f	0x0f699	0x1085e	01	01	10	01
<b>54</b>	0x00bdb	0x00e7f	0x0ed32	0x010bc	00	10	11	00
<b>55</b>	0x017b6	0x01cff	0x0da64	0x02179	00	00	11	01
<b>56</b>	0x00f6c	0x039fe	0x0b4c8	0x042f3	10	00	01	11

**Table A-11. LFSR Module States During A2 – B2 Authentication (REPEATER = 0)**

<b>Sequence</b>	<b>Kx</b>	<b>Ky</b>	<b>Kz</b>	<b>Bx</b>	<b>By</b>	<b>Bz</b>	<b>Output</b>
<b>Load</b>	0xb8676a7	0xa423d78	0x0000000	0x406a74d	0x51f7175	0x0000003	
<b>1</b>	0x666e2c6	0x1fb7111	0x802f1c8	0xf7f1edb	0x7052777	0x0f40723	0xf05140
<b>2</b>	0x222564c	0xeacf83b	0x56392e2	0xf8c5faf	0x9e2408b	0x787caa9	0x91937d
<b>3</b>	0x3a7d9e3	0x39004ba	0x11f7a6a	0xd50bb43	0x88db561	0x91040c2	0x026852
<b>4</b>	0x47614d8	0x6494d8a	0x3b4f25b	0x4395a00	0x53d0514	0xe2e383d	0x3bc587
<b>5</b>	0xdb4e14e	0x845a7cc	0xbf7698d	0xbeab442	0xbe1b11f	0x6a72f32	0xb649af
<b>6</b>	0x9f50e9a	0x72b9f8a	0xe83d832	0x2446aa1	0x2711b9c	0xcdda1d2	0x76b8c5
<b>7</b>	0x3ea1bc9	0x2ef84ca	0x8b460ed	0xff20d53	0x0d6ac1d	0x45a75c4	0x1cfba1
<b>8</b>	0x16166f2	0xaa7c2ef	0x1d92ed2	0x962b376	0x2b810f5	0x085c932	0x34494d
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>41</b>	0x2b7a4ee	0x76aaca6	0x990b686	0xe19348b	0xfea6035	0xa9faf0	0x37e446
<b>42</b>	0x2420fda	0xc71cbc	0xd3a43cf	0x3b01c23	0xa98bd4f	0x4c62274	0x58a13f
<b>43</b>	0x1b38c46	0x7b286a6	0x1d6e079	0x7fd5dd1	0xd04a459	0x7c16c08	0xd854bb
<b>44</b>	0x9ecc174	0xa97266e	0xa162b3f	0xbab8ead	0xff58f91	0x7740eea	0x5b3ceb
<b>45</b>	0x039d3b7	0x039e9b4	0xbc7dd68	0xfa0a1ce	0xb752298	0xb13d8cf	0xdf6e53
<b>46</b>	0x5096513	0xc3ac236	0x4adda17	0xdc0290a	0xff95916	0x9f7e6f6	0x1dbde4
<b>47</b>	0xc0f65b9	0x566da3d	0x55dab36	0x179735f	0x586589a	0xba7cd32	0xc580c5
<b>48</b>	0x83f87f0	0xd6f60e1	0xb0ffacc	0x799ee82	0x1963deb	0xd2ecfc7	0x531799
<b>Load</b>	0x799ee82	0x1963deb	0xd2ecfc7	0x406a74d	0x51f7175	0x0000003	
<b>1</b>	0xc4e8ff1	0x68b3b95	0x5a86976	0x3729648	0x7052777	0x0f40723	0xda19ca
<b>2</b>	0xf2c964d	0x2f49256	0x8ec9541	0xb06dc21	0x9e2408b	0x11e91dc	0xa8a0b8
<b>3</b>	0x26464e7	0xab964b8	0xc6112c9	0x72cfc92	0x4417ad5	0xc11c247	0xe28985
<b>4</b>	0x3b7c3f4	0x20c212b	0x5a8464d	0x235fdd1	0xc5a1984	0x7152f6d	0x8d3851
<b>5</b>	0x0c23381	0x1700053	0xf79219e	0x593da63	0xc18c5f2	0xaeclbce	0xb484bf
<b>6</b>	0x6c9733a	0xaa9fab7	0x3ff3223	0x3295feb	0x8e7c3b9	0x394597d	0x30ed7d
<b>7</b>	0xf811f2c	0x5e2ced9	0x7d2aca5	0xe469c78	0xaccl0da	0xba93ae2	0xa60a41
<b>8</b>	0x1ed5c78	0xc42186b	0xc39983c	0x0c80d4e	0xccbafe1	0x235ff24	0x25ab7f
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x7d252c0	0x081db0e	0x329083e	0x3036a4c	0x4c638fc	0x9042db0	0x9c7024
<b>50</b>	0xba0eaa9	0x1c0b139	0x9f56b08	0x4771510	0x4f22c73	0x6321faf	0x4732f1
<b>51</b>	0x531015d	0xe8cd792	0xceb6a51	0x9327e2f	0xd768e6e	0x5ca36be	0x45edc6
<b>52</b>	0xd1a375c	0xd925c31	0xc37b8b1	0xb098639	0x8316b0f	0x7e66ad9	0x62404c
<b>53</b>	0xb0a7396	0xd77e370	0xc279e10	0xb2b48e	0x3e28ad6	0xbb19243	0xc8d05d
<b>54</b>	0xd5c53b3	0x9fb7633	0xb69eb4a	0x88af562	0x5c2925d	0x8b95f94	0x5c8c26
<b>55</b>	0x33dc74d	0x9b22ce5	0xfd6ece8	0x2de6f79	0xab859d1	0x9fbbcfb	0x4f378a
<b>56</b>	0x96549f5	0x5e909b2	0xcd1638f	0x7ed9156	0x95fcf36	0xa455e43	0xd5126e

**A-12. Block Module States During A2 – B2 Authentication (REPEATER = 0)**

<b>Sequence</b>	<b>LFSR 0</b>	<b>LFSR 1</b>	<b>LFSR 2</b>	<b>LFSR 3</b>	<b>SH 0</b>	<b>SH 1</b>	<b>SH 2</b>	<b>SH 3</b>
<b>Load</b>								
<b>1</b>								
<b>2</b>								
<b>3</b>								
<b>...</b>								
<b>47</b>								
<b>48</b>								
<b>Load</b>	0x01e97	0x01d48	0x03d90	0x1bc60	01	01	01	01
<b>1</b>	0x01d2f	0x03a91	0x07b21	0x178c0	10	10	11	00
<b>2</b>	0x01a5f	0x03522	0x0f642	0x0f180	01	01	11	10
<b>3</b>	0x014be	0x02a45	0x0ec85	0x1e301	11	00	11	01
<b>4</b>	0x0097d	0x0148b	0x0d90a	0x1c602	11	01	10	11
<b>5</b>	0x012fa	0x02916	0x0b215	0x18c05	11	11	00	11
<b>6</b>	0x005f4	0x0122d	0x0642a	0x1180a	01	11	10	01
<b>7</b>	0x00be9	0x0245b	0x0c855	0x03015	10	11	01	10
<b>8</b>	0x017d3	0x008b6	0x090ab	0x0602b	01	10	11	00
<b>...</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x01f26	0x01ba1	0x004d1	0x01eb1	01	10	01	00
<b>50</b>	0x01e4d	0x03742	0x009a3	0x03d62	11	01	10	00
<b>51</b>	0x01c9a	0x02e84	0x01346	0x07ac5	11	10	01	10
<b>52</b>	0x01935	0x01d09	0x0268d	0x0f58b	11	01	10	11
<b>53</b>	0x0126b	0x03a12	0x04d1b	0x1eb16	10	10	11	10
<b>54</b>	0x004d7	0x03424	0x09a37	0x1d62d	00	01	11	11
<b>55</b>	0x009ae	0x02849	0x0346f	0x1ac5b	00	10	01	11
<b>56</b>	0x0135d	0x01093	0x068df	0x158b7	00	00	11	01

Table A-13. LFSR Module States During A1 – B1 Authentication (REPEATER = 1)

<b>Sequence</b>	<b>Kx</b>	<b>Ky</b>	<b>Kz</b>	<b>Bx</b>	<b>By</b>	<b>Bz</b>	<b>Output</b>
<b>Load</b>	0x22fcecc	0x5309c7d	0x0000000	0xc070403	0x271c130	0x0000134	
<b>1</b>	0x000084c	0xf458fff	0x7f722dc	0xa5d4b70	0x9fb9989	0x9f6066d	0xbe70ee
<b>2</b>	0x0ed9f8a	0xb444236	0x3b62e76	0x614bd63	0x1d52893	0x2e71e83	0x102031
<b>3</b>	0x70ef0ef	0x9aa103f	0x8aa659d	0xe37a3ed	0x6e17dcd	0x861926f	0xff57a7
<b>4</b>	0xc8f3da5	0x8bbb85f	0x58047e6	0x0ed0c42	0xe3299e6	0xb4a6b97	0xb351be
<b>5</b>	0x6b68710	0x1826042	0xc20a675	0x7e45c24	0xc398d39	0xa08a2f8	0x785499
<b>6</b>	0xd4c9cf4	0x0014506	0x6c11733	0x1395270	0xf15caf0	0x1e1176c	0xe2b59c
<b>7</b>	0x2ff2231	0x059031a	0xd84c367	0x2769c98	0x7d0946d	0xb0f1b6a	0xaa109
<b>8</b>	0x1c13406	0x516f805	0x3e231f5	0xe99e086	0xde5a665	0x22dff84	0x2ce1f3
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>41</b>	0x7dc29a3	0x5895932	0x26047a5	0x0755719	0x935cfbf	0xb95d7e0	0x24e15b
<b>42</b>	0xba7d2b0	0xf1cfeac	0x36eb45d	0x2a92c58	0x699d93d	0x0eb7293	0x87309b
<b>43</b>	0xdd26650	0x29e8ca4	0xbf0109c	0xfa8cac0	0x1e322dc	0x01e0bb2	0xb0f7f3
<b>44</b>	0xf928c5b	0xc70cec0	0xcc71bb9	0x9b0f0e5	0x89e6139	0x613ba0b	0x800977
<b>45</b>	0x491d801	0xf630446	0x43655f6	0x4b35863	0x06237ac	0xca3aa9e	0x4fdd1d
<b>46</b>	0x9281463	0x891c25b	0x2c40a10	0xd0db4ac	0x07ca5ad	0x3745ef1	0x4fd875
<b>47</b>	0x37ef335	0xbb8429b	0xfad91c5	0x1f0f4dc	0xcb0f7af	0x9858087	0x08d905
<b>48</b>	0x7bd96ba	0xee950f7	0x749f3d9	0x1d48e97	0xbc607b2	0x98d9b45	0x2247f5
<b>Load</b>	0x1d48e97	0xbc607b2	0x98d9b45	0xc070403	0x271c130	0x0000134	
<b>1</b>	0x371f49a	0x53afa6d	0x1648023	0x7f3108b	0x9fb9989	0x9f6066d	0x7ccafe
<b>2</b>	0x3271b4e	0x7c7ab77	0x269baee	0x879d9dd	0x1d52893	0x40ef6b9	0xf3e3bb
<b>3</b>	0x76928cd	0x3c0c41e	0x3ddb777	0x56aff98	0x80f974f	0x6ed848c	0x387685
<b>4</b>	0xcb38955	0x45f4b5a	0x44b09f0	0x84f827e	0xd8421d6	0x756a06d	0xcac318
<b>5</b>	0x7e05951	0x7b4b7ce	0x77213e7	0x8a65060	0x41308c0	0x172f316	0xbba079
<b>6</b>	0xf43b422	0x63ba5f7	0x15664df	0xa546f91	0x6e221b2	0x5b52502	0x15723b
<b>7</b>	0x02539f7	0x43b1c83	0xc6fba6e	0x8c6d674	0x4234c5a	0x64478ee	0x6d962d
<b>8</b>	0xf69c689	0xc41f360	0x04591c2	0xde7e4f0	0x803e2ed	0x532a599	0xa8de7e
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x7bf9fa7	0x1a284c6	0x739fd87	0x461f4a1	0xf717fe1	0x32b1a29	0xf7f563
<b>50</b>	0xd779ca4	0xef3a891	0x60780be	0xaa1ce2e	0x9754a31	0x0b0bbfc	0x664b98
<b>51</b>	0x900446f	0x80e9401	0xc3bf1fb	0xebc94	0x4e6d371	0xe3b1944	0xd1dc3b
<b>52</b>	0x83b3ab9	0x66e50bb	0xe8c834c	0xea84947	0x53787ed	0xd15995d	0xc6c650
<b>53</b>	0xd17e23d	0xfd8c2ef	0x618168a	0x5091ea5	0x9e567a1	0x6b37e87	0x49372d
<b>54</b>	0x6cc9afa	0x560a656	0x3dd0e24	0xc214d9d	0x71be498	0x3040f5e	0x0e3dce
<b>55</b>	0xcb2c184	0xdc614f7	0x5d3ee63	0xbba955	0xaa48398	0xaf781e4	0x6438bb
<b>56</b>	0x692a85f	0xde2a833	0xff731e2	0xaf1960	0xc8a6055	0xbcc4562	0x85e78f

Table A-14. Block Module States During A1 – B1 Authentication (REPEATER = 1)

Sequence	LFSR 0	LFSR 1	LFSR 2	LFSR 3	SH 0	SH 1	SH 2	SH 3
<b>Load</b>								
<b>1</b>								
<b>2</b>								
<b>3</b>								
<b>...</b>								
<b>47</b>								
<b>48</b>								
<b>Load</b>	0x01aaa	0x0154c	0x0278b	0x0b789	01	01	01	01
<b>1</b>	0x01555	0x02a99	0x04f17	0x16f13	10	10	10	11
<b>2</b>	0x00aaa	0x01533	0x09e2f	0x0de26	01	01	11	01
<b>3</b>	0x01554	0x02a66	0x03c5e	0x1bc4c	00	10	11	10
<b>4</b>	0x00aa8	0x014cc	0x078bd	0x17898	00	00	11	11
<b>5</b>	0x01550	0x02999	0x0f17a	0x0f131	00	00	10	11
<b>6</b>	0x00aa0	0x01332	0x0e2f4	0x1e262	01	00	00	11
<b>7</b>	0x01540	0x02664	0x0c5e9	0x1c4c4	10	10	00	10
<b>8</b>	0x00a81	0x00cc9	0x08bd2	0x18989	01	01	01	00
<b>...</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x00c45	0x01b77	0x08130	0x052e4	00	01	00	01
<b>50</b>	0x0188b	0x036ef	0x00260	0x0a5c9	01	00	01	10
<b>51</b>	0x01117	0x02dde	0x004c1	0x14b93	00	01	00	01
<b>52</b>	0x0022f	0x01bbc	0x00982	0x09727	01	00	01	00
<b>53</b>	0x0045e	0x03779	0x01304	0x12e4f	11	00	10	00
<b>54</b>	0x008bc	0x02ef2	0x02608	0x05c9e	10	10	01	00
<b>55</b>	0x01179	0x01de5	0x04c10	0x0b93d	01	00	10	10
<b>56</b>	0x002f3	0x03bcb	0x09821	0x1727b	10	00	00	11

Table A-15. LFSR Module States During A1 – B2 Authentication (REPEATER = 1)

<b>Sequence</b>	<b>Kx</b>	<b>Ky</b>	<b>Kz</b>	<b>Bx</b>	<b>By</b>	<b>Bz</b>	<b>Output</b>
<b>Load</b>	0x089c923	0xf6aee46	0x00000000	0xad10fe5	0x5e62a53	0x0000144	
<b>1</b>	0x000ace8	0x2bbe222	0xa84ba32	0xf8ee8f0	0x5d68545	0x649180e	0xb24463
<b>2</b>	0xbe2db4d	0xcfd43e8	0x6cf4c5d	0x5e52253	0x8d0daa0	0xfbde86b	0x1fa15f
<b>3</b>	0x59aaa16	0x420acaе	0x948ddf1	0xe59bdcc	0xd7951b1	0x092c03c	0x787a32
<b>4</b>	0x6716e27	0xc71eabf	0x728216a	0x84926be	0xcaad80c	0xec3a8a5	0xf27cef
<b>5</b>	0x2b8be74	0xc7b7cd8	0x1896efd	0x7d66727	0x5c571f8	0x8069a85	0x88a3ad
<b>6</b>	0x417f923	0xf719e90	0xd5c1459	0x76bb30d	0x5333af4	0xa18c913	0xd01f1b
<b>7</b>	0x6c1faa9	0xf7175fd	0x50bb276	0xd91bfa4	0x1a7d561	0x456e67c	0xdc6f7c
<b>8</b>	0x90a1447	0xad4dd26	0x59afdb6	0xa59b390	0x1794cd7	0x3453dff	0x9276f6
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>41</b>	0x456a8de	0x218a73d	0xefe8143	0x4705e66	0xa0ab473	0x77d249d	0x40cba0
<b>42</b>	0x5bb75c0	0x9e32509	0xcd4d66f	0x4d4a0e2	0x02b580f	0x2b49a78	0x1a3445
<b>43</b>	0x692b31d	0x40c7b06	0xeb692c8	0x0d36661	0x3a20c13	0x8cf85c3	0x02f684
<b>44</b>	0x4ac7e44	0x584dad4	0x2606dca	0xb39da54	0xc47d057	0xdca5d5d	0xf7ef88
<b>45</b>	0x995c381	0xe782e99	0x500545a	0x0710574	0x54607a7	0x42e8a1e	0xf1a5cc
<b>46</b>	0x2a39ef6	0xb3509f9	0xbd26dfe	0x284e17f	0x439d9e4	0x4dd18ce	0x23402b
<b>47</b>	0xe937d30	0x7910780	0x03575d7	0xdf9ad7d	0x3c7791a	0x6ddd61f	0x95dc64
<b>48</b>	0xb9af224	0x04c8a5f	0x49c96b1	0x754caaа	0xb7894f1	0xfcce020	0xcdaa1d
<b>Load</b>	0x754caaа	0xb7894f1	0xfcce020	0xad10fe5	0x5e62a53	0x0000144	
<b>1</b>	0x1cfb5dd	0xce2b088	0x2eec032	0x93dabe7	0x5d68545	0x649180e	0x4bbc20
<b>2</b>	0xfa0338f	0xdd9d11d	0x26e8f45	0x91d34c5	0x8d0daa0	0xa42f29f	0x0c1351
<b>3</b>	0x1ffc1e	0xd8fc06f	0x846a9c2	0x575d169	0x5f1d290	0xd8d250e	0x14f5d7
<b>4</b>	0x004ea3a	0xb8ae70e	0x00f25c3	0x807911a	0x442cc5a	0x1f6d6e5	0xa0c9b8
<b>5</b>	0xffd1f46	0x63fce9	0x59e2583	0x0965cff	0x912f65a	0x9fad256	0x28067a
<b>6</b>	0x86aa27f	0x1bfc986	0x7559055	0xd307ffb	0x11af6d1	0x4d14ec4	0xa73184
<b>7</b>	0xe438d81	0x2f72c2a	0x065bebb	0x2c48a34	0x00ed16b	0xb2430a6	0x62d500
<b>8</b>	0xdc88b2a	0x1b83e3e	0xc719f35	0x3530afd	0x2435827	0x62edd40	0xe4b982
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x6e1ecc7	0x2126ced	0xa7ac884	0xa7c511	0x278da73	0x3c52476	0x2afbb7
<b>50</b>	0x9b7983d	0xd61a93c	0x560de7f	0x47467e0	0xf5c27f1	0x56257fb	0xbf090b
<b>51</b>	0x1848c4a	0x6946104	0x97436c5	0xac81df	0xac47979	0x84c004f	0x6fffc7
<b>52</b>	0xb9ff03e	0xfafdf4f8	0x030217e	0xb570368	0x4a63c44	0x8c9e6ff	0x8f5af2
<b>53</b>	0x031fbfa	0x20c4236	0x7181797	0xa99940c	0x810cdc7	0x6eb5e1a	0xda43d6
<b>54</b>	0xc67ef5d	0xdee5ece	0xb3296c2	0xd4f4edd	0xe33bd04	0xcb012	0xc409c6
<b>55</b>	0xa8244d2	0x3aef4b0	0x5c7f3ad	0x7eb9d86	0xa72a66e	0x5527b8c	0x3f82c9
<b>56</b>	0xe3a9d07	0xce2e311	0xa20cd64	0xe15b166	0x74e9482	0x6a048e0	0x6856e1

**Table A-16. Block Module States During A1 – B2 Authentication (REPEATER = 1)**

Sequence	LFSR 0	LFSR 1	LFSR 2	LFSR 3	SH 0	SH 1	SH 2	SH 3
<b>Load</b>								
<b>1</b>								
<b>2</b>								
<b>3</b>								
...								
<b>47</b>								
<b>48</b>								
<b>Load</b>	0x01bb1	0x012f3	0x00be0	0x1fe37	01	01	01	01
<b>1</b>	0x01763	0x025e7	0x017c1	0x1fc6e	10	11	00	10
<b>2</b>	0x00ec7	0x00bce	0x02f82	0x1f8dd	01	11	10	01
<b>3</b>	0x01d8f	0x0179d	0x05f04	0x1f1bb	00	11	11	00
<b>4</b>	0x01b1f	0x02f3b	0x0be08	0x1e377	10	01	11	01
<b>5</b>	0x0163f	0x01e77	0x07c10	0x1c6ef	01	10	11	11
<b>6</b>	0x00c7f	0x03cee	0x0f821	0x18ddf	11	00	11	11
<b>7</b>	0x018fe	0x039dd	0x0f043	0x11bbf	10	01	10	11
<b>8</b>	0x011fc	0x033bb	0x0e087	0x0377e	11	00	01	11
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x00d13	0x03c38	0x09f02	0x16ea7	00	11	11	01
<b>50</b>	0x01a27	0x03870	0x03e04	0x0dd4f	00	10	11	10
<b>51</b>	0x0144f	0x030e1	0x07c09	0x1ba9e	01	00	11	11
<b>52</b>	0x0089e	0x021c3	0x0f812	0x1753c	11	00	10	11
<b>53</b>	0x0113d	0x00386	0x0f024	0x0ea78	01	10	00	11
<b>54</b>	0x0027b	0x0070d	0x0e048	0x1d4f0	11	01	00	01
<b>55</b>	0x004f7	0x00e1b	0x0c091	0x1a9e0	10	10	01	10
<b>56</b>	0x009ee	0x01c37	0x08122	0x153c1	01	00	11	01

Table A-17. LFSR Module States During A2 – B1 Authentication (REPEATER = 1)

<b>Sequence</b>	<b>Kx</b>	<b>Ky</b>	<b>Kz</b>	<b>Bx</b>	<b>By</b>	<b>Bz</b>	<b>Output</b>
<b>Load</b>	0xbec1205	0x4afe34d	0x0000000	0x1c66e07	0xbec2bb0	0x0000183	
<b>1</b>	0x888e2ea	0x414b444	0x97a0589	0xf087578	0x2c4a233	0x610f071	0x001a91
<b>2</b>	0x4625e41	0xcd48c5f	0x3a77722	0xf95ef49	0x467d200	0xb71a3c5	0x99774a
<b>3</b>	0xc9402d8	0x5ce2e8b	0x2d46dd1	0x6108d09	0xcc49d1	0x9c06127	0xf1c0f1
<b>4</b>	0x9f4f7b0	0x4c9fc33	0x7975e63	0xe5ed94e	0xa6cfafe	0x2632b27	0x3ce478
<b>5</b>	0xa52c6b9	0x0ab1bea	0x3f59b80	0xc0165ea	0xb0c5a07	0x52300a1	0x8091f8
<b>6</b>	0xe828e8c	0x1f4fe28	0xf9ae9ca	0x7849ad5	0x5c4c5dc	0x8ba6a57	0xa1cf90
<b>7</b>	0x3d9656f	0x9313d6c	0xd525839	0xb882808	0xaf4cb4e	0xe0eb86a	0xd6d500
<b>8</b>	0x0b5904f	0xe168c0e	0x8549a6c	0x720eb74	0xe3f004a	0xbab4d22	0x1000c1
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>41</b>	0xf907779	0x8add56d	0xa2bf28b	0x170a7c3	0x35dc444	0x8e8c9fa	0xa24983
<b>42</b>	0xbb149e8	0x34b44fe	0xe899a28	0x298b048	0x32b7742	0xd005cf0	0xea1835
<b>43</b>	0x852bc22	0x30c541b	0x4ba8ad0	0x3eae65f	0x158d372	0xcadc45a	0xe1162f
<b>44</b>	0xe0dcc66	0x3380692	0x2f59c16	0xe406ae7	0x605aa2c	0x37ac1ab	0x9e5a09
<b>45</b>	0xbd69a67	0x11e9f3b	0xb0d15db	0xedd1223	0x38397e2	0xa9aee0	0xb5955f
<b>46</b>	0x992aba4	0x79cccd6c	0x374d0da	0x50ca3ca	0x24fe7c5	0xab2ac15	0x8680ef
<b>47</b>	0x02d7a9c	0x69e0827	0x75c491b	0xc2e075e	0x27ef684	0x5569487	0x2f26b1
<b>48</b>	0x28d5897	0x4f55c34	0x1bf2686	0x12f3bb1	0xfe3717c	0x4903692	0x490497
<b>Load</b>	0x12f3bb1	0xfe3717c	0x4903692	0x1c66e07	0xbec2bb0	0x0000183	
<b>1</b>	0xa4b6650	0x0726307	0x51cb288	0x775f7b9	0x2c4a233	0x610f071	0xc6a91b
<b>2</b>	0xb19afdf	0x140ae14	0x6402f81	0xe318db4	0x467d200	0xbf592b0	0x5dcbb5
<b>3</b>	0x9159d90	0x4dec573	0xca5821f	0xc90434c	0x333bc3a	0x8fd699e	0x93cd20
<b>4</b>	0x958e6ac	0x17a4c19	0x95d7367	0xf18d3a1	0xa0182d7	0x0608db9	0xa81d43
<b>5</b>	0x5637028	0x7fd4c2b	0x235d32a	0x012244a	0x760a344	0x856619e	0x73e788
<b>6</b>	0x30b4ded	0x6cf793e	0x75d7724	0x29dc723	0x363fbe6	0xc615e74	0x18faae
<b>7</b>	0x0be6fa2	0x96a92c7	0x013fcf0	0x40c3e38	0x693a50c	0x2c0f81f	0x429d33
<b>8</b>	0x302975b	0x762a198	0xe1b7f2	0xb403f5	0x1493775	0x0326946	0x743991
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0xaf2d2bb	0xe13c1bf	0xd5bf725	0xa861b70	0x30baed9	0x595a054	0xaee82d
<b>50</b>	0xd6b547a	0xbcc8c65	0xaf1fe4b	0x5e1ed44	0x3bdcf3f	0x775ef00	0x574a8e
<b>51</b>	0x8e47e11	0x1a9467f	0xc074e74	0xf94ad69	0x78cca09	0x3f48c38	0x6d424b
<b>52</b>	0x819e9c2	0xed51704	0x9cd77e9	0x03dd484	0x3b38f11	0x9e92103	0xbcdd40
<b>53</b>	0x274fc5	0x50dde0a	0xe25ca16	0x462e7d7	0xa603ab6	0x48da00f	0x97536d
<b>54</b>	0x910b283	0x5dcf83d	0x3a4f75f	0xecacd6b	0x7c0fb7b	0x1b60ea8	0x0eee1e
<b>55</b>	0xea791f3	0x92b86cf	0x3be152b	0xe0f4dc5	0xd3e247e	0x6996c21	0xdd44a5
<b>56</b>	0xcb67cb7	0xab75038	0xf8a92f2	0x754b3d8	0x47f242a	0x5d3f58c	0x9b8bf4

Table A-18. Block Module States During A2 – B1 Authentication (REPEATER = 1)

<b>Sequence</b>	<b>LFSR 0</b>	<b>LFSR 1</b>	<b>LFSR 2</b>	<b>LFSR 3</b>	<b>SH 0</b>	<b>SH 1</b>	<b>SH 2</b>	<b>SH 3</b>
<b>Load</b>								
<b>1</b>								
<b>2</b>								
<b>3</b>								
<b>...</b>								
<b>47</b>								
<b>48</b>								
<b>Load</b>	0x002d0	0x0281a	0x08a38	0x0aac4	01	01	01	01
<b>1</b>	0x005a1	0x01034	0x01471	0x15588	00	11	00	10
<b>2</b>	0x00b42	0x02069	0x028e2	0x0ab11	00	10	01	00
<b>3</b>	0x01685	0x000d2	0x051c5	0x15623	01	00	11	00
<b>4</b>	0x00d0a	0x001a5	0x0a38b	0x0ac47	00	01	10	01
<b>5</b>	0x01a14	0x0034b	0x04716	0x1588f	01	00	11	00
<b>6</b>	0x01428	0x00697	0x08e2c	0x0b11e	10	00	01	10
<b>7</b>	0x00850	0x00d2e	0x01c58	0x1623d	01	01	00	01
<b>8</b>	0x010a1	0x01a5d	0x038b1	0x0c47b	11	00	01	10
<b>...</b>	...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x017d1	0x002a0	0x0c549	0x10b2f	10	00	00	11
<b>50</b>	0x00fa2	0x00540	0x08a93	0x0165f	11	00	00	01
<b>51</b>	0x01f44	0x00a80	0x01526	0x02cbe	01	10	00	10
<b>52</b>	0x01e89	0x01501	0x02a4c	0x0597c	10	00	01	01
<b>53</b>	0x01d12	0x02a03	0x05498	0x0b2f8	01	00	00	10
<b>54</b>	0x01a24	0x01406	0x0a931	0x165f1	11	00	00	00
<b>55</b>	0x01449	0x0280d	0x05263	0x0cbe2	10	01	00	00
<b>56</b>	0x00892	0x0101a	0x0a4c6	0x197c5	01	11	00	00

Table A-19. LFSR Module States During A2 – B2 Authentication (REPEATER = 1)

<b>Sequence</b>	<b>Kx</b>	<b>Ky</b>	<b>Kz</b>	<b>Bx</b>	<b>By</b>	<b>Bz</b>	<b>Output</b>
<b>Load</b>	0xb8676a7	0xa423d78	0x00000000	0x406a74d	0x51f7175	0x0000103	
<b>1</b>	0x666e2c6	0x1fb7111	0x802f1c8	0xf7f1edb	0x6143676	0x0f40723	0xf05140
<b>2</b>	0x222564c	0xeacf83b	0x56392e2	0x162b14f	0xde614cf	0x787caa9	0x81c36f
<b>3</b>	0x3a7d9e3	0x39004ba	0x11f7a6a	0x7fa1be9	0x01d7de9	0x01b5c18	0x206e42
<b>4</b>	0x47614d8	0x6494d8a	0x3b4f25b	0x25cec72	0x4a836ae	0x2534ecb	0xeadf263
<b>5</b>	0xdb4e14e	0x845a7cc	0xbff7698d	0x4a208a3	0x30e92d8	0xa659bcf	0x84539a
<b>6</b>	0x9f50e9a	0x72b9f8a	0xe83d832	0xe5d510e	0x442ab7d	0x3cd4cd1	0xc822c1
<b>7</b>	0x3ea1bc9	0x2ef84ca	0x8b460ed	0x1b4eb4a	0xd2f25b6	0xeb1adb7	0x37ed7a
<b>8</b>	0x16166f2	0xaa7c2ef	0x1d92ed2	0x1b5c7a1	0x25d261d	0xf639672	0x0312ca
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>41</b>	0x2b7a4ee	0x76aaaca6	0x990b686	0x7b9285b	0xcea3e3a	0xf0550a8	0xab9a38
<b>42</b>	0x2420fda	0xc71cbc	0xd3a43cf	0xac9532	0xf5455b6	0xd465e50	0x6ccddb
<b>43</b>	0x1b38c46	0x7b286a6	0x1d6e079	0xf25ba51	0xad5a148	0xbbb5468	0x0532d5
<b>44</b>	0x9ecc174	0xa97266e	0xa162b3f	0x3954aab	0xc8cae06	0xe9ffa6a	0x59de69
<b>45</b>	0x039d3b7	0x039e9b4	0xbc7dd68	0x76e0d88	0xf667013	0x5ca7484	0xa81811
<b>46</b>	0x5096513	0xc3ac236	0x4adda17	0x96a7579	0xccfde0b	0x56352ce	0x1d33c5
<b>47</b>	0xc0f65b9	0x566da3d	0x55dab36	0x6ff16c4	0x198a2d8	0x97f7aef	0x1ad8fa
<b>48</b>	0x83f87f0	0xd6f60e1	0xb0ffacc	0x081a2d0	0xaac4147	0x7734dfc	0xd23a1e
<b>Load</b>	0x081a2d0	0xaac4147	0x7734dfc	0x406a74d	0x51f7175	0x0000103	
<b>1</b>	0x1ace2d1	0x14061ea	0x0c44875	0xd086746	0x6143676	0x0f40723	0x4e6747
<b>2</b>	0xd88d8d4	0xdb895bd	0x7e74e49	0x413ed54	0xde614cf	0xdb03edb	0x8d2332
<b>3</b>	0x95561d4	0xe90f704	0xfe35448	0x1cdbacf	0xcd1bfcb	0xbe705ef	0xb7c367
<b>4</b>	0x6aabee2	0xeb64c24	0xb674c2a	0xef4f673	0xd302546	0x75b8516	0x1c6484
<b>5</b>	0xfe3250b	0xb039351	0x4a14ff3	0x5a879c9	0xd849947	0xa65f3bb	0xb37177
<b>6</b>	0x7a6f7cc	0xfbdb0e84	0xce6bee1	0x0ad85e1	0x7a6282a	0x7f78db0	0xe41787
<b>7</b>	0x581bf9a	0xf637058	0x06205c2	0x0ff292e	0x7d65bcc	0x84473cb	0x85be3b
<b>8</b>	0x662ea9c	0x99bf90a	0x290e00f	0xbada8a31	0x94d72cc	0xb929192	0x5857cf
...	...	...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>49</b>	0x68a55fc	0x5bc6412	0x5ca2595	0x14cc21e	0x30c7bd6	0xb826f67	0x06a265
<b>50</b>	0xb7cd0f6	0x33813a4	0x7b3e868	0x78c9a94	0x94e586f	0x1ea87f3	0x18c4db
<b>51</b>	0x3cb03ff	0xcb86820	0x7fa96de	0x71c1620	0x7c602e4	0x60688eb	0xc9abf0
<b>52</b>	0x1fee845	0xa02783	0x371bc65	0x7d3cf2c	0xcf8006d	0x3206d1e	0xb00bfa
<b>53</b>	0x8b4c9c9	0x8c51ea6	0xd91c1db	0xec51ba3	0x5652523	0x36ba88d	0xb238b5
<b>54</b>	0xb5a6da8	0x7caf32e	0x1724577	0x1a1a940	0xf96eb52	0x8929566	0x1c7ad3
<b>55</b>	0x8bde531	0xcbd6c1e	0x0f35c36	0xc66fea6	0x0c3c692	0x6561bba	0x79cdd1
<b>56</b>	0x6138d30	0x09b02ea	0x3d45fab	0x81c0f48	0xaa5211b	0xbc2973b	0x30b266

Table A-20. Block Module States During A2 – B2 Authentication (REPEATER = 1)

Table A-21 provides cryptographic parameters for verifying the facsimile SRMs provided in Table A-22. These parameters are not used in production devices or SRMs. Refer to Table 5-3 for the cryptographic parameters used in production SRMs.

Parameter	Value (hexadecimal)
Prime Modulus	See Table 5-3.
Prime Divisor	See Table 5-3.
Generator	See Table 5-3.
Public Key	8d13e19f340e11ceb0db95eb3eb0743195dfc402b7dc8caac7752e47ded8e8c00b115f 8e5e08c7a664cbbba39786efd71c012e8394af79cd01f722a0926952e8de857cbd2e72 95e6b1d88cc0ff5dcc0ab16d14fa11a48eb50fca83a37ed18de16d973565df8a784e854 296ac700b2e030fd2a98183aa7b22a63b57bee5c2b946

**Table A-21. Cryptographic Parameters for Verifying Facsimile SRMs**

KSVs Revoked	SRM Version	Value (sequence of hexadecimal bytes)
511ef21acd, e72697f401	0005	80 00 00 05 01 00 00 36 02 51 1e f2 1a cd e7 26 97 f4 01 97 10 19 92 53 e9 f0 59 95 a3 7a 3b fe e0 9c 76 dd 83 aa c2 5b 24 b3 36 84 94 75 34 db 10 9e 3b 23 13 d8 7a c2 30 79 84

**Table A-22. Facsimile SRMs**

Table A-23 provides a sample SRM with an empty list of KSVs revoked. This sample SRM is signed the the production cryptographic parameters (Table 5-3):

KSVs Revoked	SRM Version	Value (sequence of hexadecimal bytes)
(none)	0001	80 00 00 01 00 00 00 2b d2 48 9e 49 d0 57 ae 31 5b 1a bc e0 0e 4f 6b 92 a6 ba 03 3b 98 cc ed 4a 97 8f 5d d2 27 29 25 19 a5 d5 f0 5d 5e 56 3d 0e

**Table A-23. Sample Empty SRM**

Tables A-24 and A-25 provide two samples of V or V' values computation for repeaters.  
Sequences of one-byte values are ascending in time, memory addresses, or port addresses.

Ksv0	0x35796a172e
Ksv1	0x478e71e20f
Ksv2	0x74e85397a6
Bstatus	0x0203
M0	0x372d3dce38bbe78f
SHA-1 transform input	2e 17 6a 79 35 0f e2 71 8e 47 a6 97 53 e8 74 03 02 8f e7 bb 38 ce 3d 2d 37 80 00 c8
SHA-1 H0b	0x0fcbd586
SHA-1 H1	0xefc107ef
SHA-1 H2	0xccd70a1d
SHA-1 H3	0xb1186dda
SHA-1 H4	0x1fb3ff5e
KSV FIFO (port 43)	2e 17 6a 79 35 0f e2 71 8e 47 a6 97 53 e8 74
Ports 41-42	03 02
Ports 20-23	86 d5 cb 0f
Ports 24-27	ef 07 c1 ef
Ports 28-2b	1d 0a d7 cc
Ports 2c-2f	da 6d 18 b1
Ports 30-33	5e ff b3 1f

Table A-24 V computation for 3 repeaters with depth 2

<b>Ksv0</b>	<b>0x23a19cbe4d</b>
<b>Ksv1</b>	<b>0x0d7e993570</b>
<b>Ksv2</b>	<b>0xd3458d7d09</b>
<b>Ksv3</b>	<b>0xe2a2dce946</b>
<b>Ksv4</b>	<b>0xf3148e499d</b>
<b>Ksv5</b>	<b>0x9345e95ca3</b>
<b>Ksv6</b>	<b>0xda8cb307c5</b>
<b>Ksv7</b>	<b>0x9901fa75ac</b>
<b>Ksv8</b>	<b>0x697f3a3c20</b>
<b>Ksv9</b>	<b>0xc89758ed19</b>
<b>Ksv10</b>	<b>0x2de3a8e869</b>
<b>Ksv11</b>	<b>0xe0d9295af2</b>
<b>Ksv12</b>	<b>0x6cdde88a8b3</b>
<b>Ksv13</b>	<b>0x6e219499f5</b>
<b>Ksv14</b>	<b>0x31e3e1a572</b>
<b>Bstatus</b>	<b>0x30f</b>
<b>M0</b>	<b>0x372d3dce38bbe78f</b>
<b>First SHA-1 transform input</b>	<b>4d be 9c a1 23 70 35 99 7e 0d 09 7d 8d 45 d3 46 e9 dc a2 e2 9d 49 8e 14 f3 a3 5c e9 45 93 c5 07 b3 8c da ac 75 fa 01 99 20 3c 3a 7f 69 19 ed 58 97 c8 69 e8 a8 e3 2d f2 5a 29 d9 e0 b3 a8 88 de</b>
<b>Second SHA-1 transform input</b>	<b>6c f5 99 94 21 6e 72 a5 e1 e3 31 0f 03 8f e7 bb 38 ce 3d 2d 37 80 02 a8</b>
<b>SHA-1 H0</b>	<b>0x6dad1995</b>
<b>SHA-1 H1</b>	<b>0x7c0a62fc</b>
<b>SHA-1 H2</b>	<b>0x1b98fff2</b>
<b>SHA-1 H3</b>	<b>0x0159cbb7</b>
<b>SHA-1 H4</b>	<b>0xaeae604fe</b>
<b>KSV FIFO (port 43)</b>	<b>4d be 9c a1 23 70 35 99 7e 0d 09 7d 8d 45 d3 46 e9 dc a2 e2 9d 49 8e 14 f3 a3 5c e9 45 93 c5 07 b3 8c da ac 75 fa 01 99 20 3c 3a 7f 69 19 ed 58 97 c8 69 e8 a8 e3 2d f2 5a 29 d9 e0 b3 a8 88 de 6c f5 99 94 21 6e 72 a5 e1 e3 31</b>
<b>Ports 41-42</b>	<b>0f 03</b>
<b>Ports 20-23</b>	<b>95 19 ad 6d</b>
<b>Ports 24-27</b>	<b>fc 62 0a 7c</b>
<b>Ports 28-2b</b>	<b>f2 ff 98 1b</b>

<b>Ports 2c-2f</b>	<b>b7 cb 59 01</b>
<b>Ports 30-33</b>	<b>Fe 04 e6 ea</b>

**Table A-25 V computation for 15 repeaters with depth 3**

Here are the intermediate results for a DSA signature verification of the empty SRM in the specification table 5-1. This uses the real public key in the specification in table 5-3.

**Table A-26, Empty SRM verification test vectors**

```

message = 0x80, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0x2b
SHA-1 digest = e241fcfa6a4c634f1337e18b042d2f5fee7643c67
w = 4b5b63222239a1c0f40ca135ee5625048ff9d6ae
u1 = cee7d084a5356092cbde569ddb7587a75e9e47d4
u2 = a6ed36cacfc4f02a627de1d27ed8a92083e023823
G^u1 =
147492f48e5351ddb71bd03f906759f06878d1f44580b8e1b0bed9c85bc0e2ab1a80f01
961b868fe3de271c6ca3ed536d368f6f55d100f44d4497319e7e57a4dd413dc32972331
0d08b40891bc29a130d0aab75c1c428b059f54aea62d4f220c6c14ca521a6141af7acb8
ee7aac68a6167a2270ebcd875344979b88bfe63827b
Y^u2 =
c5d2c41ec216cc4ac1a07f6f6ad9caf504dc8cb71bf4f6e764e49bd6aec02c99a98f54a
55712fad3d86e56944ddad9ca6401c632948c5bbc9547078bf590b643f324b6d13c6a29
526f0d1d9ebfeb323f0d1c8f7109b75356963d227c6cb7fe4ce5f67fdadd6820696a27c
a9b2387b989d3384ab339f5521dc035f2ad09629cdc
product =
19eebd37c962302901b20dc529759b4d05a62b9602c97bae5a002e8c77178769e27f3ce
5ae5bdbd8427ebe0f7ace4288bae377f5cabca52c855b2f49d6e364186e636b6aa86f4a
5b4c7a8df0e1e174a7473469f00a438771c39fc735dd1f8b1e897bb798dea8df80287c0
9d5445e438bccaa4c68313450f616c11858dd77869e1
v = d2489e49d057ae315b1abce00e4f6b92a6ba033b

```

	REPEATER = 0				REPEATER = 1			
	A1 - B1	A1 - B2	A2 - B1	A2 - B2	A1 - B1	A1 - B2	A2 - B1	A2 - B2
<b>R<sub>0</sub></b>	8ae0	fb65	3435	4fd5	6485	3f68	dd9b	7930
<b>R<sub>1</sub></b>	6153	d543	8991	0488	ed21	6006	ccc3	e26b
<b>R<sub>2</sub></b>	d189	295a	0e1c	0659	97e0	dc65	960e	d9ff
<b>R<sub>3</sub></b>	2b74	1c17	20b0	e1a7	ec2b	32dd	7232	9ae9
<b>R<sub>4</sub></b>	2147	4315	0ac4	a809	f82a	5f01	1d5e	39da
<b>R<sub>5</sub></b>	2570	cc79	5412	b077	4167	3618	8cba	c0b7
<b>R<sub>6</sub></b>	9204	8d46	7f3d	52f4	03c3	a885	5271	4d40
<b>R<sub>7</sub></b>	9648	dac2	175c	b9ea	b900	fcf1	af20	426d
<b>R<sub>8</sub></b>	6b01	8255	3d2a	fe59	d672	669e	ad26	2464
<b>R<sub>9</sub></b>	6796	2642	2ba5	04b7	7ee6	3a5e	5510	627c
<b>R<sub>10</sub></b>	a193	8768	daa7	efaa	3d91	69b7	6654	c7c1
<b>R<sub>11</sub></b>	bffd	498b	57fd	8b58	b21b	ac84	10c3	8e5d
<b>R<sub>12</sub></b>	4b20	f41d	6d17	7dbf	77bf	e03f	5e54	5a04
<b>R<sub>13</sub></b>	85b8	6ab9	7a43	6b05	a95b	4778	3b2c	446b
<b>R<sub>14</sub></b>	f838	738e	f6a8	7fdf	36de	9d22	bf2c	0749
<b>R<sub>15</sub></b>	3e80	d655	f25c	8cb1	d19b	56b2	f389	0333

<b>R<sub>16</sub></b>	390f	9aff	ec0a	d3b9	3137	c601	31a6	94d5
<b>R<sub>17</sub></b>	2ecb	04f2	f4b8	857f	40d4	1eda	da43	8d22
<b>R<sub>18</sub></b>	c279	93a5	1ca8	3153	6586	bca0	0cd2	3c9d
<b>R<sub>19</sub></b>	596f	8f5d	169c	8fba	cfcb	2a18	1be6	5406

Table A-27. R<sub>i</sub> values

<b>Frame</b>	<b>A1 - B1</b>		<b>A1 - B2</b>		<b>A2 - B1</b>		<b>A2 - B2</b>	
	<b>R<sub>i</sub></b>	<b>P<sub>j</sub></b>	<b>R<sub>i</sub></b>	<b>P<sub>j</sub></b>	<b>R<sub>i</sub></b>	<b>P<sub>j</sub></b>	<b>R<sub>i</sub></b>	<b>P<sub>j</sub></b>
<b>R<sub>0</sub></b>	8ae0		fb65		3435		4fd5	
16		0xD1		0x8B		0x17		0x61
32		0x88		0xD9		0xB0		0x06
48		0xB4		0xA4		0x9C		0x41
64		0x38		0x68		0xF1		0xC2
80		0xA7		0x81		0x54		0xD0
96		0x4C		0x6A		0x3C		0x96
112		0xE4		0x61		0x34		0xB8
128	0x6153	0x53	0xD543	0x43	0x8991	0x91	0x0488	0x88
144		0x12		0x70		0xD8		0xFA
160		0x28		0x6F		0xE5		0x38
176		0x2D		0x05		0xA1		0x82
192		0xE1		0x6D		0xAA		0xF5
208		0xD5		0xB3		0x4C		0x11
224		0xF0		0xA2		0x7F		0xC0
240		0x92		0x97		0x1D		0x10
256	0xD189	0x89	0x295A	0x5A	0x0E1C	0x1C	0x0659	0x59
272		0xCD		0xA7		0x52		0xAD
288		0x9F		0x11		0x24		0xE1
304		0xB3		0x97		0x8D		0xF8
320		0x2F		0x7F		0xBF		0x58
336		0x49		0x10		0x44		0xE8
352		0x11		0x69		0xB6		0x0E
368		0x95		0xEF		0xC5		0x12
384	0x2B74	0x74	0x1C17	0x17	0x20B0	0xB0	0xE1A7	0xA7
400		0x45		0xE7		0xD6		0xF2
416		0x2C		0x57		0xF6		0x5F
432		0x07		0xF8		0xB6		0xB5
448		0xC8		0x5C		0xAC		0x09
464		0x4B		0x27		0x2C		0xBD
480		0x93		0xAF		0x14		0x5A
496		0xEF		0x6C		0xFE		0xE0
512	0x2147	0x47	0x4315	0x15	0x0AC4	0xC4	0xA809	0x09
528		0xE7		0x91		0x5D		0xE4
544		0x4C		0x29		0xC5		0xBB
560		0xDE		0xDA		0xE7		0xC3
576		0xD8		0x6C		0xB6		0xEB
592		0xC8		0x89		0xB4		0x3B
608		0xC3		0xB1		0x97		0x7E
624		0x05		0x38		0x53		0x62
640	0x2570	0x70	0xCC79	0x79	0x5412	0x12	0xB077	0x77

Table A-28. R<sub>i</sub> and P<sub>j</sub> values (REPEATER = 0)

<b>Frame</b>	<b>A1 - B1</b>		<b>A1 - B2</b>		<b>A2 - B1</b>		<b>A2 - B2</b>	
	<b>R<sub>i</sub></b>	<b>P<sub>j</sub></b>	<b>R<sub>i</sub></b>	<b>P<sub>j</sub></b>	<b>R<sub>i</sub></b>	<b>P<sub>j</sub></b>	<b>R<sub>i</sub></b>	<b>P<sub>j</sub></b>
<b>R<sub>0</sub></b>	6485		3f68		dd9b		7930	
16		0x73		0x88		0xE9		0xF9
32		0x32		0x03		0x1D		0x81
48		0xB3		0x24		0x97		0x73
64		0xCD		0x05		0xC0		0x3C
80		0x98		0x00		0x11		0xBC
96		0x18		0x00		0x25		0x21
112		0x97		0xA1		0x43		0x00
128	0xED21	0x21	0x6006	0x06	0xCCC3	0xC3	0xE26B	0x6B
144		0x8F		0x91		0x37		0x48
160		0x09		0xC6		0x5D		0x77
176		0x32		0xFF		0x11		0x18
192		0xEA		0xB3		0x14		0x1B
208		0xA5		0xB9		0x5E		0x3B
224		0xB7		0x10		0xFF		0xAF
240		0xED		0x03		0xC9		0xB6
256	0x97E0	0xE0	0xDC65	0x65	0x960E	0x0E	0xD9FF	0xFF
272		0x38		0x31		0x2F		0xB3
288		0x92		0xBF		0xC1		0x5C
304		0xC7		0x12		0x41		0x9D
320		0x5D		0x43		0x1B		0x7E
336		0x86		0xE9		0x04		0xA3
352		0x66		0xB6		0x20		0xC5
368		0x98		0xF9		0xE7		0x72
384	0xEC2B	0x2B	0x32DD	0xDD	0x7232	0x32	0x9AE9	0xE9
400		0xD8		0xB5		0xCF		0xED
416		0x80		0xAB		0xC7		0x45
432		0xA5		0xB2		0x27		0x09
448		0xE5		0x48		0xCA		0xAC
464		0xF8		0x6F		0xDA		0xFC
480		0x8C		0xEC		0xAE		0x32
496		0xB1		0x68		0x0D		0x2D
512	0xF82A	0x2A	0x5F01	0x01	0x1D5E	0x5E	0x39DA	0xDA
528		0x15		0x85		0xA4		0x45
544		0x66		0x07		0x95		0x4E
560		0xF0		0x63		0xC4		0x04
576		0xF6		0xE5		0xFD		0xC1
592		0x14		0x4A		0xF1		0xDD
608		0x8A		0x76		0xE0		0xA6
624		0xC1		0xFA		0x65		0xAB
640	0x4167	0x67	0x3618	0x18	0x8CBA	0xBA	0xC0B7	0xB7

Table A-30. **R<sub>i</sub>** and **P<sub>j</sub>** values (REPEATER = 1)

## Appendix B. Confidentiality and Integrity of Values

Table B-1 identifies the requirements of confidentiality and integrity for values within the protocol. A *confidential* value must never be revealed. The *integrity* of many values in the system is protected by fail-safe mechanisms of the protocol. Values that are not protected in this manner require active measures beyond the protocol to ensure integrity. Such values are noted in Table B-1 as requiring integrity.

Value	Size (Bytes)	Confidentiality Required <sup>†?</sup>	Integrity Required <sup>†?</sup>	Function
<i>Ainfo</i>	1	No	No	Device A information
<i>Aksv</i>	5	No	No	HDCP Transmitter's Key Selection Vector
<i>An</i>	8	No	Yes*	Pseudo-random value sent to HDCP Receiver/repeater by transmitter
<i>Bksv</i>	5	No	Yes*	HDCP Receiver/repeater's Key Selection Vector
<i>Bx,By,Bz</i>	84 bits	Yes	Yes	Cipher state
<i>Km,Km'</i>	7	Yes	Yes	Secret value generated by HDCP Transmitter and receiver/repeater during authentication
<i>Ks,Ks'</i>	84 bits	Yes	Yes	Secret session key
<i>K<sub>b</sub>,K<sub>i</sub>'</i>	84 bits	Yes	Yes	Secret frame key
<i>Akeys**</i>	280	Yes	Yes	HDCP Transmitter's device keys
<i>Bkeys**</i>	280	Yes	Yes	HDCP Receiver/repeater's device keys
<i>LFSR0,1,2,3</i>	13,14,16, 17 bits	Yes	Yes	Cipher state
<i>M<sub>b</sub>,M<sub>i</sub>'</i>	8	Yes	Yes	Integrity verification key and HDCP cipher initialization value
<i>Pj</i>	1	No	No	Link synchronization verification value computed every 16 <sup>th</sup> frame from <i>r<sub>i</sub></i> and first pixel.
<i>r<sub>b</sub>,r<sub>i</sub>'</i>	2	No	No	HDCP Cipher outputs during frame key calculations. Every 128 <sup>th</sup> output becomes the video transmitter and receiver link synchronization verification value. Every 16 <sup>th</sup> output is used in computing <i>Pj</i> .
<i>R<sub>b</sub>,R<sub>i</sub>'</i>	2	No	No	Video transmitter and receiver link synchronization verification values
SH-0,1,2,3	2,2,2,2 bits	Yes	Yes	Cipher state
REPEATER	1 bit	No	Yes	Video repeater capability status bit

<sup>†</sup> According to the robustness rules in the HDCP Adopter's License.

\* Only within the video transmitter

\*\* KSV position excluded (see *Aksv*, *Bksv*)

MAX CASCADE_E_XCEEDED	1 bit	No	Yes	Video repeater topology error status bit
MAX_DEVS_EXCEEDED	1 bit	No	Yes	Video repeater topology error status bit
DEVICE_COUNT	7 bits	No	Yes	Video repeater topology status bit
DEPTH	3 bits	No	Yes	Video repeater topology status bit
$V'$	20	No	No	KSV list integrity value generated by video repeater
$V$	20	Yes	Yes	KSV list integrity verification value generated by video transmitter
<i>KSV List</i>	Varies	No	Yes	List of downstream KSV gathered by video repeater devices
$K_x, K_y, K_z$	84 bits	Yes	Yes	Internal HDCP cipher values
$L^I$	128	No	Yes	Digital Content Protection LLC DSS Public Key

**Table B-1 Confidentiality and Integrity of Values**

## Appendix C. Sample Algorithm for Ri Verification

The following algorithm or equivalent is suggested as a means to detect a lack of authentication or synchronization.

```
int check()
{
    int T1, T2, R;

    // Read the transmitter, then the receiver, then the
    // transmitter again. If the two transmitter reads agree
    // then we know that there has not been an Ri update, and
    // so the receiver must also agree
    T2 = readTransmitterRi();
    do
    {
        T1 = T2;
        R = readReceiverRi();
        T2 = readTransmitterRi();
    } while (T1 != T2);


    // we have stable values... do they agree?
    return ( T1 == R ) ? LINK_PASS : LINK_FAIL;
}

int check_synchronization()
{
    int T1, T2, R1, R2, count;


    count = 0;
    T1 = readTransmitterPj();
    R1 = readReceiverPj();
    while (T1 != R1)
    {
        T2 = readTransmitterPj();
        R2 = readReceiverPj();
        // Check for stable Pj values
        if (T1 == T2 && R1 == R2)
        {
            count++; // Count mismatches
            if (count >= 3)
                break;
            T1 = T2;
            R1 = R2;
            // Wait for any of the values to change
            do
            {
                T2 = readTransmitterPj();
                R2 = readReceiverPj();
            } while ((T2 == T1) && (R2 == R1));
        }
        T1 = T2;
        R1 = R2;
    }
    return (count < 3) ? LINK_PASS : LINK_FAIL;
}
```

}

## Appendix D. Timing Diagram



**Fig. D-1 Timing**



**Fig. D-2 hdcpRekeyCipher Timing**

## Appendix E. Recommended Method for Synchronous Ri Checking

Synchronous reading of  $R_i$  every 128<sup>th</sup> frame does not guarantee reliable detection of link integrity failures. To understand this, consider the following two cases

1. Receiver does not detect CTLx signal (Missing CTLx Signal error)
2. Receiver detects an extra CTLx signal (Extra CTLx Signal error)

Missing CTLx Signal		Extra CTLx Signal	
<i>Transmitter</i>	<i>Receiver</i>	<i>Transmitter</i>	<i>Receiver</i>
$R_i[1]$	$R_i'[1]$	$R_i[1]$	$R_i'[1]$
$R_i[2]$	$R_i'[2]$	$R_i[2]$	$R_i'[2]$
$R_i[3]$	X (Missed CTLx)	$R_i[3]$	$R_i'[3]$
$R_i[4]$	$R_i'[3]$	X	$R_i'[4]$ (Extra CTLx)
-		$R_i[4]$	$R_i'[5]$
-		-	-
$R_i[127]$	$R_i'[126]$	$R_i[127]$	$R_i'[128]$
$R_i[128]$	$R_i'[127]$	$R_i[128]$	$R_i'[129]$

In the case of Missing CTLx Signal, the link integrity verification will fail since the  $R_i$  and  $R_i'$  values differ, however there is no way to verify whether this is due to a loss of synchronization or a DDC read error. In the case of Extra CTLx Signal, loss of synchronization will not be detected by the transmitter since the  $R_i$  and  $R_i'$  values match.

A reliable method to detect loss of synchronization, therefore, is to read the  $R_i$  value prior to the  $R_i$  update (127<sup>th</sup> frame) and after 1 millisecond of the  $R_i$  update (128<sup>th</sup> frame). If the  $R_i'$  value is equal to the previously read  $R_i$  value, it indicates a Missing CTLx Signal and if the  $R_i$  value is equal to a previously read  $R_i'$  value it indicates an Extra CTLx Signal.

**END OF DOCUMENT**