
Montage: A Neural Network Language Model-Guided JavaScript Engine Fuzzer

Suyoung Lee, HyungSeok Han, Sang Kil Cha, Sooel Son KAIST



Popularity of Web Browsers



4 billion users



JS Engine Vulnerabilities



Costs up to \$500,000



Critical security threat!

JS Engine Fuzzing

```
let v0 = new Array(0x10000);
v0 = v0.fill(0x1234).join(', ');
eval('new Array(' + v0 + ')');

JS engine
```

How can a fuzzer generate JS inputs?



Previous Work

1. Mutation-based fuzzers

- LangFuzz, IFuzzer, and GramFuzz
- Combining **AST subtrees** extracted from JS seeds

2. Generation-based fuzzers

- jsfunfuzz
- Applying **JS grammar rules** from scratch



Previous Work – Building Blocks

1. Mutation-based fuzzers

- LangFuzz, IFuzzer, and GramFuzz
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2. Generation-based fuzzers

- jsfunfuzz
- Applying **JS grammar rules** from scratch




Previous Work – Building Blocks

Current AST

All appendable building blocks

They randomly select building blocks!





Patterns of Bug-triggering Code

```
let v0 = new Array(0x10000);
v0 = v0.fill(0x1234).join(', ');
eval('new Array(' + v0 + ')');
```

Bug-triggering JS code

Extracted Patterns



Patterns of Bug-triggering Code



Current AST

Extracte 8 uPlattegn blocks

Which building block is more likely to trigger JS engine bugs?



Study on JS Engine Vulnerabilities


1. Functional commonalities

2. Syntactical commonalities



Functional Commonalities

Study 1. Patches of 50 ChakraCore CVEs



Patches



Syntactical Commonalities

Study 2. AST subtrees from two sets

At August, 2016

Extracted subtrees

After August, 2016


Extracted subtrees

95% already existed!

JS Test 2038



CVE-2018-0980



2,038 JS tests from ChakraCore repo

67 PoCs triggering ChakraCore CVEs



Syntactical Commonalities

Study 2. AST subtrees from two sets

JS test from ChakraCore repo



Syntactical Commonalities

Study 2. AST subtrees from two sets


```
function f0() {
    'use asm';
    const v0 = 1.0;
    function f1() {
        var v1 = v0;
        var v0 = 0;
    return f1;
       PoC (CVE-2017-11911)
```



Our Approach

1. Functional commonalities

- Mutating existing JS regression tests




2. Syntactical commonalities

- Modeling of the relationships between AST subtrees




Montage Overview






const
$$v0 = 10$$
;



JavaScript AST




const
$$v0 = 10$$
;




JavaScript AST








const
$$v0 = 10$$
;




JavaScript AST








const
$$v0 = 10$$
;




Pre-order traversal




JavaScript AST



const
$$v0 = 10$$
;



Pre-order traversal




JavaScript AST


A sequence of fragments



const
$$v0 = 10$$
;



Pre-order traversal




JavaScript AST


A sequence of fragments



A Sequence of Fragments

const
$$v0 = 10$$
;







JavaScript AST



Global Compositional Relationship

const v0 = 10;







A sequence of fragments



vs. A Sequence of Tokens [1-3]

const v0 = 10;

% of Valid JS code

Program


0.58%

VS.

58.26%

Token-level model

Fragment-level model



A sequence of tokens


JavaScript AST


- [1] Cummins et al. Compiler fuzzing through deep learning (ISSTA'18).
- [2] Godefroid et al. Learn&Fuzz: Machine learning for input fuzzing (ASE'17).
- [3] Liu et al. DeepFuzz: Automatic generation of syntax valid C programs for fuzz testing (AAAI'19).



Selecting Valid Fragments

const
$$v0 = 10$$
;






JavaScript AST




Applicable to Any Language Models

const v0 = 10;




Language models



^[5] Andrey A. Markov. An Example of Statistical Investigation of the Text *Eugene Onegin* Concerning the Connection of Samples in Chains, 1913.

Training an LSTM model




A sequence of preceding fragments

LSTM model

Probability distribution of a next fragment






```
var v0 = 'Hello World';
v1 = [];
f0();
function f0 () {
    v1.valueOf();
    var v2 = 10;
}
```

Seed AST Seed JS







```
var v0 = 'Hello World';
v1 = [];
f0();
function f0 () {
    v1.valueOf();
    var v2 = 10;
}
```


Remove a subtree









A sequence of fragments representing the current AST












Trained LSTM model

The probability distribution of the next fragment











Trained LSTM model

Pre-order traversal

Randomly select one from the Top K fragments



































AST Mutation








Trained LSTM model



AST Mutation




```
var v0 = 'Hello World';
v1 = [];
f0();
function f0 () {
    v1.push(0x10);
    var v2 = 10;
}
```

Mutated AST

Mutated JS



Experiment Setup



- Collected 33.5K unique JS files
 - Regression tests from the repo of four major JS engines and Test262
 - PoCs of known CVEs
- Ran fuzzers against ChakraCore 1.4.1
- JS code triggering unpatched bugs is not in our training set!



vs. State-of-the-art Fuzzers

72 hours x 5 trials

- CodeAlchemist: A **state-of-the-art** semantics-aware JS fuzzer, *NDSS'19*
- jsfunfuzz: A JS fuzzer developed by Mozilla
- IFuzzer: An evolutionary JS fuzzer, ESORICS'16

Metric	Build —	# of Unique Crashes (Known CVEs)				
		Montage	CodeAlchemist	jsfunfuzz	IFuzzer	
Median	Release	23 (7)	15 (4)	27 (3)	4 (1)	
	Debug	49 (12)	26 (6)	27 (4)	6 (1)	



The differences were **statistically significant** (p-value < 0.05)!

A Sequence of Fragments vs. Tokens [1-3]

72 hours x 5 trials

- Token RNN: JS code mutation guided by a token-level LSTM model

B.A. (*	p. 11.1 —	# of Unique Crashes (Known CVEs)		
Metric	Build —	Montage	Token RNN	
Madian	Release	23 (7)	1 (0)	
Median 	Debug	49 (12)	3 (0)	



^[1] Cummins et al. Compiler fuzzing through deep learning (ISSTA'18).

^[2] Godefroid et al. Learn&Fuzz: Machine learning for input fuzzing (ASE'17).

Is the LSTM Model Effective?

72 hours x 5 trials

- Random: Random fragment assembly without any model

B.A	D 11.1 —	# of Unique Crashes (Known CVEs)		
Metric	Build	Montage	Random	
Madian	Release	23 (7)	12 (3)	
Median 	Debug	49 (12)	31 (7)	



Is the LSTM Model Effective?

The # of appended fragments to compose a new subtree



Captured **long-term** dependencies!





Finding Real-World Bugs

- Four major JS engines for a total of 1.5 months
 - Found **37 previously unknown bugs**
 - > 34 bugs including **two CVEs** from ChakraCore 1.11.7
 - One bug from V8 7.4.0 (beta)
 - > Two bugs including **one CVE** from JavaScriptCore 2.23.3
 - **26 of them were patched** at the time of writing






Conclusion

- We proposed the first neural network language model-guided JS engine fuzzer and demonstrated its efficacy.
- We proposed a novel approach of modeling JS code as a sequence of fragments on which any prevalent language models can be trained without modification.
- Montage outperformed state-of-the-art fuzzers in the old version of ChakraCore.
- Montage found 37 previously unreported bugs from the latest JS engines.



Open Science



https://github.com/WSP-LAB/Montage





For More Details

- Resolving reference errors
- Effect of parameters
- Effect of language models
- Case studies



Question?

