

TrustFLEX Step by Step Guide Firmware Validation

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1 Introduction

This document gives a detailed walk through of the Firmware Validation use case implementation. If familiar with Jupyter Notebook, can skip this section and move to Section 2.

1.1 Getting started with Jupyter Notebook Tutorials

Jupyter Notebook is open source web application which allows you to create documents that contain code that you can execute in place as well as narrative text. It provides GUI elements, ability to execute code in place, ability to add images and gives it the look and feel that normal code files lack.


Jupyter notebooks are mainly used to explain/evaluate code in an interactive way.

1.1.1 Starting Jupyter Notebook

Jupyter notebook can be launched from Trust Platform GUI Main window. Run START -> Trust Platform x.x.x icon. Click on 'Start Jupyter' button to launch Jupyter local server.



Clicking on Start Jupyter should be web browser tab like below,



1.2 Jupyter Notebook Basics

It is recommended to become familiar with Jupyter basic concepts with the online documentation, https://jupyter-


notebook.readthedocs.io/en/stable/examples/Notebook/Notebook%20Basics.html

Some of the content is duplicated here for convenience. The online documentation should always be used as a reference.

1.2.1 The Notebook dashboard

When you first start the notebook server, your browser will open to the notebook dashboard. The dashboard serves as a home page for the notebook. Its main purpose is to display the notebooks and files in the current directory.

For example, here is a screenshot of the Jupyter dashboard. The top of the notebook list displays clickable breadcrumbs of the current directory. By clicking on these breadcrumbs or on sub-directories in the notebook list, you can navigate your file system.



1.3 Introduction to Jupyter Notebook GUI.

Jupyter Notebooks contain cells where you can either write code or markdown text. Notebooks contain multiple cells, some set as code and others markdown. Code cells contain code that can be executed live, and markdown contains text and images to explain the code.

Below image shows some options in a typical Jupyter Notebook. Individual cells can be executed by pressing on the RUN button as shown in the below image.

All cells in the Notebook can be executed in order by Kernel->Restart & Run All.



To run all cells in sequence.



2 Jupyter Notebook Tutorials
The Trust Platform Design Suite comes with Notebook Tutorials to easily prototype popular use cases for TrustFLEX. Here is the list of Jupyter Notebook Tutorials.


Jupyter Notebook Tutorials	Relative Path	Applicable Devices
Manifest Generation	TrustnGO\00_resource_generation\TNGTLS_manifest_file_generation.ipynb	Trust&GO
GCP Connect	TrustnGO\05_cloud_connect\notebook\gcp\TNGTLS_GCP_connect.ipynb	Trust&GO
AWS Connect	TrustnGO\05_cloud_connect\notebook\aws\TNGTLS_aws_connect.ipynb	Trust&GO
Azure Connect	TrustnGO\05_cloud_connect\notebook\azure\ TNGTLS_azure_connect.ipynb	Trust&GO
Resource Generation	TrustFLEX\00_resource_generation\TFLXTLS_resource_generator.ipynb	TrustFLEX
Accessory Authentication	TrustFLEX\01_accessory_authentication\notebook\ TFLXTLS_accessory_authentication.ipynb	TrustFLEX
Firmware Validation	TrustFLEX\02_firmware_validation\notebook\ TFLXTLS_firmware_validation.ipynb	TrustFLEX
IP Protection	TrustFLEX\04_ip_protection\notebook\ TFLXTLS_IP_protection.ipynb	TrustFLEX
Secure Public Key Rotation	TrustFLEX\05_public_key_rotation\notebook\ TFLXTLS_public_key_rotation.ipynb	TrustFLEX
Asymmetric authentication	08_asymmetric_authentication\notebook\ TFLXTLS_asymmetric_authentication.ipynb	TrustFLEX
GCP Connect	TrustFLEX\10_cloud_connect\notebook\gcp\TFLXTLS_GCP_connect.ipynb	TrustFLEX
AWS Custom PKI	TrustFLEX\10_cloud_connect\notebook\aws\ TFLXTLS_aws_connect.ipynb	TrustFLEX
Azure Connect	TrustFLEX\10_cloud_connect\notebook\azure\ TLFXTLS_azure_connect.ipynb	TrustFLEX

3 Resource Generation Notebook

TFLXTLS device is one of the three devices available on Crypto Auth Trust Platform Development Kit. TrustFLEX devices come with pre-programmed certificates in slots 10, 11 and 12, also slots 0-4 have pre-generated private keys, other than the mentioned slots all the other slots have no data in them.


The Resource Generator Notebook will create development keys and certificates for all slots that can be updated. Generated Keys and Certificate chains are stored in the PC file system. These keys should never be used for production purposes as their generation is not handled in a secure environment. These development keys will be later used by the other notebooks to implement the various pre-defined use cases.

Within the Jupyter Dashboard, navigate **TrustFLEX\00_resource_generation** folder to open **TFLXTLS_resource_generator.ipynb** notebook




Run all cells of the Crypto Resource Generator Notebook: Kernel->Restart & Run All

Note: Before executing the cells on Crypto Trust Platform, its required to have factory default program running on SAMD21 of Trust Platform. Refer to <u>Crypto Auth Trust Platform Factory reset</u> section for reloading default program.



Crypto Resource Generator notebook is common for all the use case which comes with option to load the signer certificate and device certificate. The Notebook will generate several keys and certificates. Make sure you have an error free output before continuing to the next steps of the training. Following are 3 different things can be performed,

1. Generating resources to general key slots



The output log should resemble this:

Slot 0 is a private key slot, no action required

Slot 1 is a private key slot, no action required

Slot 2 is a private key slot, no action required

Slot 3 is a private key slot, no action required

Slot 4 is a private key slot, no action required

Slot 6 is a secret key, created slot_6_secret_key.pem and programmed

NOTE: While writing symmetric key into secure element it has to be encrypted with IO prote ction key. So here, Slot 6 (IO protection key) is written before slot 5 (Symmetric key)

Slot 5 is a secret key, created slot_5_secret_key.pem and programmed

Slot 7 is a secureboot digest slot, slot can only be written through secureboot command

Slot 8 is a general purpose slot of size 416 bytes, no action required

Slot 9 is a secret key, created slot_9_secret_key.pem and programmed

Slot 10 is a certificate slot, no action required now, will be updated as part of Generate Certificates

Slot 11 is a certificate slot, no action required now, will be updated as part of Generate Certificates

Slot 12 is a certificate slot, no action required now, will be updated as part of Generate Certificates

Slot 13 is a public key slot, created slot_13_ecc_key_pair.pem and programmed

Slot 14 is a public key slot, created slot_14_ecc_key_pair.pem and programmed

Slot 15 is a public key slot, created slot_15_ecc_key_pair.pem and programmed

Key generation - Success

2. Generating MCHP or Custom Certificates

On selecting Custom certificates, it prompts to enter the organization name, enter the name that will be used as an Organization Name in the certificate template. The name length is limited to 24 characters.

1. Generate resources - generate keys and provision to device 2. Select the Certificate Type to prototype 3. Generate manifest - generate securesigned element object and store it in manifest file			
	10112 0		
Generate_Resources M	MCHP Cert Generate_Manifest		
Cı	ustom Cert		
Slot 0 is a private key slot, no action required Slot 1 is a private key slot, no action required Slot 2 is a private key slot, no action required Slot 3 is a private key slot, no action required Slot 4 is a private key slot, no action required Slot 6 is a secret key, created slot_6_secret_key.pem and programmed NOTE: While writing symmetric key into secure element it has to be encrypted with IO prot tion key) is written before slot 5 (Symmetric key)			
Slot 5 is a secret key, created slot_5_secret_key.pem and programmed Slot 7 is a secureboot digest slot, slot can only be written through secureboot command Slot 8 is a general purpose slot of size 416 bytes, no action required Slot 9 is a secret key, created slot_9_secret_key.pem and programmed Slot 10 is a certificate slot, no action required now, will be updated as part of Generat Slot 11 is a certificate slot, no action required now, will be updated as part of Generat Slot 12 is a certificate slot, no action required now, will be updated as part of Generat Slot 13 is a public key slot, created slot_13_ecc_key_pair.pem and programmed Slot 14 is a public key slot, created slot_14_ecc_key_pair.pem and programmed Slot 15 is a public key slot, created slot_15_ecc_key_pair.pem and programmed			
Key generation - Succe	ess		
Org Name:		org Name and Press Enter to ue Custom Certs processing	

The output log should resemble this:

Custom Certs processing...

Device contains custom device and signer certificates

Building new root certificate

Building new signer csr certificate

Building new signer certificate

Read device serial number...OK (SN: 01233E8A1491F2A601)

Read device public key from slot 0...OK (Public Key: CF1988BC3A6C252026FE70FB34397AD 85A39AE811C722BFA6E5EC1E9CDA9133B3F0E91FD3877F25B8C893B311BAF0203CB5100C 4CDABEBAFDAF3EBD550B00125)

Generating device certificate...OK (saved to device_01233E8A1491F2A601.crt) Saving signer certificate to device...OK Saving device certificate to device...OK Thing ID eabc56113c70227a18c0a62f7c285fc68d75f9cd

Custom certificate generation and provisioning - SUCCESS

Validate root certificate...OK -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

MIIByjCCAW+gAwIBAgIQeoueybRh8XWwzOkoixtW1jAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjA7MQ0w CwYDVQQKDAR0ZXN0MSowKAYDVQQDDCFDcnlwdG8gQXV0aGVudGljYXRpb24gUm9v dCBDQSAwMDIwIBcNMjAwNzAxMDgwNTE5WhgPMjA2MDA2MjEwODA1MTlaMDsxDTAL BgNVBAoMBHRlc3QxKjAoBgNVBAMMIUNyeXB0byBBdXRoZW50aWNhdGlvbiBSb290 IENBIDAwMjBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABFf6qcSyPv8iY0uccoTX SlSstaz0ECCUxXUoqky8Xo40vsOCbPPt5QtlvNHnyy8tAbwza6DsAiz2sGLzDI5h QhqjUzBRMB0GA1UdDgQWBBRHVPQoljiq65JOG4vu5l32JzmkSTAfBgNVHSMEGDAW gBRHVPQoljiq65JOG4vu5l32JzmkSTAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MAoGCCqGSM49 BAMCA0kAMEYCIQCB7FKx5K33xK9E0PsWGKZRaaQxxSRypC66y4hVqWVmMAIhAMIG 22zNUKPHccHQxfQssYH5LfR5SVE+WC3Hyxem/EVj

----END CERTIFICATE----

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number:

7a:8b:9e:c9:b4:61:f1:75:b0:cc:e9:28:8b:1b:56:d6

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer: O=test, CN=Crypto Authentication Root CA 002

Validity

Not Before: Jul 1 08:05:19 2020 GMT Not After: Jun 21 08:05:19 2060 GMT

Subject: O=test, CN=Crypto Authentication Root CA 002

Subject Public Key Info:

Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey

Public-Key: (256 bit)

pub:

04:57:fa:a9:c4:b2:3e:ff:22:63:4b:9c:72:84:d7: 4a:54:ac:b5:ac:f4:10:20:94:c5:75:28:aa:4c:bc: 5e:8e:34:be:c3:82:6c:f3:ed:e5:0b:65:bc:d1:e7: cb:2f:2d:01:bc:33:6b:a0:ec:02:2c:f6:b0:62:f3:

Oc:8e:61:42:1a ASN1 OID: prime256v1 NIST CURVE: P-256

X509v3 extensions:

X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:

47:54:F4:28:96:38:AA:EB:92:4E:1B:8B:EE:E6:5D:F6:27:39:A4:49

X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:

keyid:47:54:F4:28:96:38:AA:EB:92:4E:1B:8B:EE:E6:5D:F6:27:39:A4:49

X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical

CA:TRUE

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

30:46:02:21:00:81:ec:52:b1:e4:ad:f7:c4:af:44:d0:fb:16: 18:a6:51:69:a4:31:c5:24:72:a4:2e:ba:cb:88:55:a9:65:66: 30:02:21:00:c9:46:db:6c:cd:50:a3:c7:71:c1:d0:c5:f4:2c: b1:81:f9:2d:f4:79:49:51:3e:58:2d:c7:cb:17:a6:fc:45:63

Validate signer certificate...OK -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----

MIIB3TCCAYKgAwIBAgIQV/RpeXxWfquIIYFCFTDc/TAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjA7MQ0w CwYDVQQKDAR0ZXN0MSowKAYDVQQDDCFDcnlwdG8gQXV0aGVudGljYXRpb24gUm9v dCBDQSAwMDIwIBcNMjAwNzAxMDgwMDAwWhgPMjA0MDA3MDEwODAwMDBaMDsxDTAL BgNVBAoMBHRlc3QxKjAoBgNVBAMMIUNyeXB0byBBdXRoZW50aWNhdGlvbiBTaWdu ZXIgRkZGRjBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABCEubbOfXDakettxvfKu kfG5UhQNDHrPrZiURytSZmQ8p38VacZ682akSAC6XQYDzhiy5/504eAHBCuN5rOt vnOjZjBkMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBhjASBgNVHRMBAf8ECDAGAQH/AgEAMB0GA1Ud DgQWBBRycA/sc+NWXwp0wLudepyPtQtzFzAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBRHVPQoljiq65JO G4vu5l32JzmkSTAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNJADBGAiEA1ThacjiYboKYh69+NllQKiX2 wb7Jztq8zMsY61H/NkYCIQDQc2TQfOl9HBDUoDzUtTZNgIksElkU7ysiSgBhumAA zQ==

----END CERTIFICATE----

Certificate:

Data:

Version: 3 (0x2) Serial Number:

57:f4:69:79:7c:56:7e:ab:88:21:81:42:15:30:dc:fd

Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256

Issuer: O=test, CN=Crypto Authentication Root CA 002

Validity

Not Before: Jul 1 08:00:00 2020 GMT Not After: Jul 1 08:00:00 2040 GMT

```
Subject: O=test, CN=Crypto Authentication Signer FFFF
     Subject Public Key Info:
       Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
          Public-Key: (256 bit)
          pub:
            04:21:2e:6d:b3:9f:5c:36:a4:7a:db:71:bd:f2:ae:
            91:f1:b9:52:14:0d:0c:7a:cf:ad:98:94:47:2b:52:
            66:64:3c:a7:7f:15:69:c6:7a:f3:66:a4:48:00:ba:
            5d:06:03:ce:18:b2:e7:fe:4e:e1:e0:07:04:2b:8d:
            e6:b3:ad:be:73
         ASN1 OID: prime256v1
          NIST CURVE: P-256
    X509v3 extensions:
       X509v3 Key Usage: critical
          Digital Signature, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
       X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
          CA:TRUE, pathlen:0
       X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
          72:70:0F:EC:73:E3:56:5F:0A:74:C0:BB:9D:7A:9C:8F:B5:0B:73:17
       X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
          keyid:47:54:F4:28:96:38:AA:EB:92:4E:1B:8B:EE:E6:5D:F6:27:39:A4:49
  Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
     30:46:02:21:00:d5:38:5a:72:38:98:6e:82:98:87:af:7e:36:
     59:50:2a:25:f6:c1:be:c9:ce:da:bc:cc:cb:18:eb:51:ff:36:
     46:02:21:00:d0:73:64:d0:7c:e9:7d:1c:10:d4:a0:3c:d4:b5:
     36:4d:80:89:2c:12:59:14:ef:2b:22:4a:00:61:ba:60:00:cd
Validate device certificate...OK
----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----
MIIByDCCAW+gAwIBAgIQdxkpBswUT+e4dShL6tp00jAKBggqhkjOPQQDAjA7MQ0w
CwYDVQQKDAR0ZXN0MSowKAYDVQQDDCFDcnlwdG8gQXV0aGVudGljYXRpb24gU2ln
bmVyIEZGRkYwIBcNMjAwNzAxMDYwMDAwWhgPMjA00DA3MDEwNjAwMDBaMC4xDTAL
BgNVBAoMBHRIc3QxHTAbBgNVBAMMFHNuMDEyMzNFOEExNDkxRjJBNjAxMFkwEwYH
KoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQqAEzxmIvDpsJSAm/nD7NDl62Fo5roEcciv6bl7B
```

6c2pEzs/DpH9OHfyW4yJOzEbrwIDy1EAxM2r66/a8+vVULABJaNgMF4wDAYDVR0T AQH/BAIwADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCA4gwHQYDVR0OBBYEFOq8VhE8cCJ6GMCmL3wo X8aNdfnNMB8GA1UdIwQYMBaAFHJwD+xz41ZfCnTAu516nI+1C3MXMAoGCCqGSM49 BAMCA0cAMEQCIANn/QrqxwmwrRsrcYyQpWJ0o4AxLzGoeCZjfJ5o0FAbAiBFne67

Certificate:

----END CERTIFICATE----

iEzuh6dqwrdQYvqB6+qTxfLyei1kwoFcfVnHvA==

```
Data:
  Version: 3 (0x2)
  Serial Number:
     77:19:29:06:cc:14:4f:e7:b8:75:28:4b:ea:da:74:d2
  Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
  Issuer: O=test, CN=Crypto Authentication Signer FFFF
  Validity
     Not Before: Jul 1 06:00:00 2020 GMT
     Not After: Jul 1 06:00:00 2048 GMT
  Subject: O=test, CN=sn01233E8A1491F2A601
  Subject Public Key Info:
     Public Key Algorithm: id-ecPublicKey
       Public-Key: (256 bit)
       pub:
          04:cf:19:88:bc:3a:6c:25:20:26:fe:70:fb:34:39:
          7a:d8:5a:39:ae:81:1c:72:2b:fa:6e:5e:c1:e9:cd:
          a9:13:3b:3f:0e:91:fd:38:77:f2:5b:8c:89:3b:31:
          1b:af:02:03:cb:51:00:c4:cd:ab:eb:af:da:f3:eb:
          d5:50:b0:01:25
       ASN1 OID: prime256v1
       NIST CURVE: P-256
  X509v3 extensions:
     X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
       CA:FALSE
     X509v3 Key Usage: critical
       Digital Signature, Key Agreement
     X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
       EA:BC:56:11:3C:70:22:7A:18:C0:A6:2F:7C:28:5F:C6:8D:75:F9:CD
    X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
       keyid:72:70:0F:EC:73:E3:56:5F:0A:74:C0:BB:9D:7A:9C:8F:B5:0B:73:17
Signature Algorithm: ecdsa-with-SHA256
   30:44:02:20:03:67:fd:0a:ea:c7:09:b0:ad:1b:2b:71:8c:90:
   a5:62:74:a3:80:31:2f:31:a8:78:26:63:7c:9e:68:d0:50:1b:
   02:20:45:9d:ee:bb:88:4c:ee:87:a7:6a:c2:b7:50:62:f8:01:
   eb:ea:93:c5:f2:f2:7a:2d:64:c2:81:5c:7d:59:c7:bc
```

3. Generating Manifest file

2. Select the Certi	ficate Type t	e keys and provision to device to prototype securesigned element object and store it in manifest fi
Generate_Resources	MCHP Cert	Generate_Manifest
	Custom Cert	

Congrating manifest data OV (cayod to TELVILS devices manifest icon	The output log should resemble this:
Congrating manifest data OV (saved to TELVTLS devices manifest ison	
Generating mannest dataOk (Saved to 11 LX1L3_devices_mannest.)son	Generating manifest dataOK (saved to TFLXTLS_devices_manifest.json)

The Notebook will also generate a manifest file to be uploaded into the public cloud of your choice (Google GCP, AWS IoT and Microsoft Azure).

After running this Notebook, it generates the required resources and program data zone with required secrets, keys and certificates. For this use case, IO protection key and firmware validation public key are loaded into TrustFLEX device in the slot 6 and 15 respectively.

4 Use Case Prototyping

This hands-on lab is intended to demonstrate the usage of TrustFLEX device to validate firmware that going to run on HostMCU. It uses asymmetric authentication.

To validate the firmware, following steps to be followed

- 1. Generating a firmware Signing Key pair
- 2. Signing the firmware
- 3. Updating the firmware to product
- 4. Verifying the firmware image

OEM to take care of first 2 things in a controlled environment. To have firmware validation functionality, once the firmware implementation is completed it should be signed by the OEM firmware signer to make the image authentic. Typically, OEM firmware signer's public key will be loaded to secure element and locked permanently.

On the product side, the digest and signature generated in the previous step will be provided to secure element using Secure boot command. Secure boot command will be executed on secure element with option to store (Full Copy) on successful validation of the digest and signature.

On TrustFLEX device secure boot configuration is set as "FullDig", which stores the firmware digest on the device (slot 7 on TrustFLEX). On subsequent boots, the digest is compared without ECC verify operations. While sending the digest to TrustFLEX device, the digest is encrypted with IO protection key to avoid man in the middle attack.

This lab is setup such a way firmware sign operation taken care by notebook, update and verify operations can be done both in notebook and embedded project. Firmware sign operations are NOT done in embedded project as it's the role of OEM but not the product.


The resource generation for TrustFLEX device will load

- 1. A prototyping firmware signing key
- 2. A prototyping IO protection key to Slot6
- 3. Signers public key to Slot15 respectively


Following sections provide detail steps to execute the Usecase both on Jupyter Notebook and on Embedded project

4.1 Running Firmware Validation example on Jupyter Notebook:


From the Jupyter Home page, navigate to
 TrustFLEX\02_firmware_validation\notebook\TFLXTLS_firmware_validation.ipynb notebook file and open it.




Opening the notebook from Jupyter home page should load the following on the browser,



2. Run All Cells by using Kernel -> Restart & Run All



3. It may take a while to complete, wait for the kernel to complete all processing i.e. from Kernel Running to Kernel Idle state (Check circle above **RED** text)



- 4. Navigate through different cells output for the description of the step and result from the execution.
- 5. There are 4 major steps in this lab

Generating a Firmware Validation key pair

This step setups a temporary firmware signer to perform firmware validation process. This key generation is already taken care part of resource generation.

Sign the Firmware

This step generates firmware digest by hash the example firmware image with SHA 256 algorithm and get it signed with firmware signer's private key. Then digest will

be encrypted with IO protection key to avoid man in the middle attack before host send digest to the device.

Here is how the memory of the Microcontroller is portioned. Microcontroller has a 256KB flash starting from 0x0000 0000, supporting address range from 0x0000 0000 to 0x0003 FFFF.

Firmware validation image	0x0000 0000 to 0x0000 BFFF
Application image	0x0000 C000 to 0x0003 FBFF
Signature data	0x0003 FC00 to 0x0003 FFFF

The firmware validation image and the application image can be obtained by building (compile + link) the respective projects in the correct address spaces, the signature will be calculated and stitched with the other images through Jupyter Notebooks.

To get firmware validation hex, just navigate to

TrustFLEX\02_firmware_validation\firmware. Open either MPLAB project or Atmel studio project and build the project. After successful build, it will create .hex file under **TrustFLEX\02_firmware_validation\notebook\firm_valid*.hex.** We will be using this hex file in future steps.

To get Application hex, open any of the use case example project either in MPLAB or Atmel studio. As discussed earlier, the application hex start address should be 0xC000. So, we need to change the build configuration to get output hex that starts from 0xC000.


The example applications in the DesignTools have two build configurations, one is **CONFIG_STANDALONE/default** where application image starts from 0x00000000 and another one is

CONFIG_FIRMWARE_VALIDATION/FIRMWARE_VALIDATION where application image starts from 0xC000. When Firmware validation feature is used, example application should be compiled using

CONFIG_FIRMWARE_VALIDATION/FIRMWARE_VALIDATION configuration.

MPLAB:

Let us use Accessory Authentication example as an application. To open project just navigate to **TrustFLEX\01_accessory_authentication\firmware** and select **accessory_auth.X.**




Here we need to select the FIRMWARE_VALIDATION configuration to get application image start from 0xC000. Below screenshot display how to change the configuration, After changing the configuration, build the project. Once build successful, it will create .hex file under TrustFLEX\02_firmware_validation\notebook\accessory_auth*.hex.

Note: Before reusing the application in standalone mode this configuration should be set back to default.

ATMEL STUDIO: (Deprecated)

Let's use Accessory Authentication example as an application. To open project just navigate to TrustFLEX\01_accessory_authentication\firmware\ deprecated_studio and select accessory_auth.atsIn.


Here we need to select the CONFIG_FIRMWARE_VALIDATION configuration to get application image start from 0xC000. Below screenshot display how to change the configuration,



After changing the configuration, build the project. Once build is successful, it will create .hex file under TrustFLEX\02_firmware_validation\notebook\accessory_auth*.hex.

Note: Before reusing the application in standalone mode this configuration should be set back to CONFIG_STANDALONE.

Now that we have all the binaries available, go back to the Firmware Validation Juyter Notebook. Go to step 2.3, this step accepts two hex files, combines then and appends signature to it. Follow the below snapshots for reference. Make sure the correct images are selected on Upload buttons.



"Combine HEX" will combine the firmware validation hex, accessory auth hex and will append the signature to it. The combined hex file will be store in the PC at DesignTool\ TrustFLEX\02_firmware_validation\notebook \combined_image.hex

At this step, we have the combined image available for firmware validation update and verify operations. Both update and verify can be performed on the Notebook itself or on embedded projects.

Update the firmware to product


Before verifying the firmware's validity, the firmware digest should be verified and stored to secure element. In this step host sends the encrypted firmware digest and signature to device to validate the firmware. Here the firmware is validated by verifying the signature using firmware signer's public key. Upon successful validation, the device stores the digest to Secureboot digest slot i.e. slot7.

```
# Perform Secureboot operation on the application file
    print('Perform Application validation request...
    assert atcab secureboot mac(SECUREBOOT MODE FULL STORE, digest, signature,
    if 1 == bool(is_verified.value):
        print('Secureboot Verify Success...')
        firmware_verify.button_style = 'success'
       firmware_verify.button_style = 'danger'
        print('Secureboot Verify failed...')
firmware_update.on_click(secureboot_update)
firmware_verify.on_click(secureboot_verify)
display(widgets.HBox((firmware_update, firmware_verify, flash_hex)))
   Firmware Update
                        Firmware Verify
                                         Flash combine hex
Perform Application upgrade request...
Secureboot Update Success...
```

Clicking on "**Firmware Update**" will perform the above steps between host (PC) and the TrustFLEX device. Once firmware update is completed successfully, current firmware digest will be stored in the Secureboot digest slot.

Verifying the firmware image

This step recalculates the digest from the example bin (secureboot_test_app.bin). The encrypted digest will be sent to TrustFLEX. Upon successful validation, the device returns MAC value corresponding to this verify request.




Clicking on "Firmware Verify" will perform the above steps between host (PC) and the TrustFLEX device.

Pressing "Firmware Update" and "Firmware Verify" should turn to green to indicate successful firmware update and verify operations.

Flash Combine Hex

This step programs the Crypto Auth Trust Platform with combined hex (combined_image.hex) using MPLABX IPE. To use this option, its required to provide MPLAB X IDE path in Trust Platform GUI -> Settings -> MPLAB X IDE.

Clicking on "Flash combine hex" will program Crypto Auth Trust Platform with combined hex.




Pressing "Flash combine hex" should turn green to indicate that, it programmed combined hex successfully.

This requires MPLAB X IDE path to be set on GUI. To program this Crypto Auth Trust Platform manually refer

4.2 Running Firmware Validation on Embedded platform

The program output can be viewed using a serial terminal. Terminal needs to be opened with 115200-8-N-1 settings.

Output on the serial terminal would look like the image below,



On any error, LED blinks five times every second.

4.3 Crypto Auth Trust Platform Factory reset

Once any of the embedded project is loaded to Crypto Auth Trust Platform, the default program that enables interaction with Trust Platform tools will be erased.

Before using the Platform with any other notebook or tools on PC, its required to reprogram the default .hex file. Default hex file is available in cloned directory at assets\Factory_Program.X\CryptoAuth_Trust_Platform.hex

If Trust Platform GUI is provided with MPLAB X IDE installation location, notebooks can program the Factory reset hex file if its not available by default.


This can also be done manually by MPLAB and Atmel Studio

To reprogram using MPLAB:

- 1. Open assets\Factory_Program.X project in MPLAB IDE
- Program the Crypto Trust platform by navigating to
 CryptoAuth_Trust_Platform_Factory_Program -> Make and Program Device

To reprogram using Atmel Studio:

- 1. Navigate to AtmelStudio -> Tools -> Device Programming
- 2. Select Tool as nEDBG and Apply
- 3. Go to Memories and navigate to above path under Flash dropdown
- 4. Check both Erase Flash and Verify Flash
- 5. Click on Program



Now, Crypto Auth Trust Platform contains factory programmed application that enables interactions with Notebooks and/or PC tools.

5 FAQ

1. What are the reasons for "AssertionError: Can't connect to the USB dongle" error?

There are many possibilities like,

- 1. Crypto Trust Platform is having different application than factory reset firmware. Refer to "Crypto Auth Trust Platform Factory reset" section any usecase TrustFLEX Guide for reloading it
- 2. Check the switch positions on Crypto Trust Platform and/or ATECC608A Trust board
 - a. Correct Trust device should be connected and only one device of that type is allowed on the I2C bus. Multiple devices with same address results in error
- 3. Check USB connections to Crypto Trust Platform
- 2. How to reload factory default application to Crypto Trust Platform?

 Refer to "Crypto Auth Trust Platform Factory reset" section any usecase TrustFLEX Guide for reloading it.
- 3. Why does my C projects generates No such file or directory with ../../../ 00_resource_generation/?

C project generates this error when the resources are not generated prior to using embedded projects. Running the resource generation notebook ensures these files and secrets are generated.

4. Before running any use case notebook and/or C project, why is it mandate to execute resource generation?

When resource generation notebook is executed, it generates and programs the required resources like secrets, keys and certificates. These are only prototyping keys and cannot be used for production. These keys will be used part of Usecase notebooks and C projects

5. How to know the resources being used in a use case?

Refer to individual Usecase description html for details on transaction diagrams, resources being used and other details. The resources required for given use case is mentioned in INFER CRYPTOGRAPHIC ASSETS section.

6. When should I select Custom certificates while doing resource generation?Custom certificates are required when user wants to have their own root, signer instead of MCHP provided. The difference would be organization name, common name and validity are configurable

7. How to know whether C project is executing on Trust Platform or not after programming?

Once the programming is done, the firmware will do use case operation. Depending on the use case operation's output, the Crypto Trust Platform board's status LED will blink at different rates.

It is also possible to view the Console messages by using applications like TeraTerm. Open the application with the COM related to Crypto Trust Platform with 115200-8-N-1 settings

8. Why is firmware validation project fails with error "Firmware validation is failed! with status 01"?

There are many possibilities like,

- a. The resources on TrustFLEX device and on the host (PC) could be different. Rerun "Resource Generation Notebook" section for reloading it.
- b. Firmware digest is not matched. Make sure that firmware Update step is exec uted using Notebook prior to running C project

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