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121
Avicenna

The Metaphysics of *The Healing*

الشفاء : الإلهيات

*A parallel English-Arabic text
translated, introduced, and annotated by*

Michael E. Marmura

Note on Conventions

In this work, terms of Arabic derivation found in *Webster's Third New International Dictionary* generally follow the first spelling given and are treated as regular English words. Otherwise, Arabic or Persian words and proper names have been transliterated following, with few exceptions, the Romanization tables established by the American Library Association and the Library of Congress (*ALA-LC Romanization Tables: Transliteration Schemes for Non-Roman Scripts*. Compiled and edited by Randall K. Barry. Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 1997).

All works cited in the notes appear in short form. Full information for each citation is available in the bibliography at the end of the book. References to many of the primary sources cited in the notes include book and chapter divisions as well as page and sometimes line numbers. Book and chapter numbers are separated by a period; page and line numbers are indicated with abbreviations, thus: *Categories* 3.4 (p. 113, ll. 9–11). Note also that unless otherwise specified, Avicenna is the author of such works, and they will be found listed under his name in the bibliography.

In the Arabic text, the original pagination of the Cairo critical edition of the *Metaphysics* is shown in brackets.

Translator's Introduction

The *Metaphysics* (*Al-Ilāhiyyāt*)¹ is the climactic, concluding part of Avicenna's voluminous *The Healing* (*Al-Shifā'*). It builds on what preceded it but remains a self-contained work, its subject matter being unique. What, then, is its subject matter? Avicenna gives his answer in two complementary, overlapping definitions of metaphysics. The first finds its fullest expression in the very first volume of *The Healing*, in the *Isagoge* 1.2; the second is given in the *Metaphysics* 1.1 and 2. Both definitions are Aristotelian. Both rest on the distinction drawn between metaphysics and the other two theoretical sciences, physics (natural philosophy) and mathematics.

In the *Isagoge*,² the distinction between these three sciences is based on the relation of their respective objects of knowledge to matter. The object of knowledge of physics and mathematics, Avicenna asserts, is always "mixed" with matter. In the case of physics, the object of knowledge is always mixed with a specific kind of matter, depending on the particular branch of natural science. The scientist, for example, is concerned with the causes pertaining to a specific kind of matter, not with the concept of causality as such. With mathematics, the object of knowledge is also always mixed with matter, but not, however, with a specific kind of matter. Thus, for example, geometric objects in the world outside the mind must consist of some kind of material, but they are not confined to a specific kind. As objects of mathematical knowledge, they undergo a degree of abstraction whereby the mathematician will consider their properties dissociated from any specific kind of material, but not, however, from any matter whatsoever. Mathematical objects have no autonomous extramental nonmaterial existence.

Metaphysics, on the other hand, has as its object of knowledge that which is not mixed with matter. This object, Avicenna explains in the

Isagoge, may be necessarily immaterial. This is the case with God and mind. But there can be an object of metaphysical knowledge which is not necessarily immaterial, an object that can mix with matter. The metaphysician, however, is not concerned with this object in its association with matter. The metaphysician is concerned with it in itself, abstractly, dissociated from its external material existence. To take the example of causality again, unlike the natural philosopher who is concerned with the causes operative in a specific kind of matter, the metaphysician is concerned with causality as such and with causality as one of the concomitants of the existent considered as such. This brings us to the second complementary definition of metaphysics, the definition appropriately encountered in the *Metaphysics*:

All three theoretical sciences have the existent as their subject matter. Physics, however, is concerned with the existent "by way of its being subject to motion and rest." Mathematics has as its subject matter the existent inasmuch as it is quantified or relates to measure and quantity. (Arithmetic thus is the science of discreet quantity; geometry, of continuous quantity.) Metaphysics, on the other hand, has for its object the existent as such, the existent without qualification. Its subject matter is the existent, not inasmuch as it is either in motion or quantified, but simply inasmuch as it is an existent. The metaphysician undertakes to examine the various meanings of existence, the relation of the existent to the ten categories, the necessary concomitants of existents—namely, unity and plurality, particularity and universality—and the relation of existence to quiddity or essence.³

Avicenna draws a distinction between the subject matter of metaphysics and the things that are "sought after" in it. Among the things "sought after" are the principles presupposed in physics and mathematics; also the four causes in the terrestrial realm, the higher celestial causes, and the cause of all causes, God. None of these causes constitute the subject matter of metaphysics. Avicenna is quite emphatic in maintaining that the existence of God, the principle of all existents other than Him, is one of the things "sought after" in metaphysics. It is not its subject matter.

Avicenna brings home this point by raising a possible objection to the concept of the existent as such as being the subject matter of metaphysics. According to this objection, if the existent, inasmuch as it exists, is made the object of metaphysical knowledge, the principle of all the other existents cannot be established in it. For science investigates only

the concomitants of its subjects, not its principles. Avicenna answers this objection by maintaining, first of all, that the inquiry into the principles of metaphysics (as distinct from the principles of physics and mathematics) is also an investigation of the concomitants of the existent. This is because being a principle is not a defining characteristic of the existent as such. Moreover, he then adds, the principle that is being sought after is not the principle "of the whole of existence." For then the principle would be the principle of itself. Rather, the principle that is being sought after is the principle only of existence that is caused.

In making this point early in the *Metaphysics* (1.2), Avicenna gives us a first hint at the Neoplatonism that becomes the marked characteristic of the cosmology he develops in the last three books of this work (books 8–10). God, for Avicenna, is not only the prime mover and the supreme teleological cause of the universe.⁴ He is also the cause of the very existence of all things other than Himself. The world emanates eternally from God as a consequence of His self-knowledge, in a hierarchical chain of causes and effects. Avicenna develops an emanative theory that was greatly influenced by that of his predecessor, al-Fārābī (d. 950), but which remains distinct from it.

Al-Fārābī formulated a dyadic emanative scheme. After the emanation of the first intellect from God, there proceeds a series of dyads: celestial intellects and celestial spheres. Avicenna transforms al-Fārābī's dyadic emanative scheme into a triadic one. Accordingly, after the emanation of the first intellect from God, the series that ensues is a series of celestial triads. Each triad consists of an intellect, a soul, and a sphere. Each member of each triad, whether intellect, soul, or body, constitutes the only member of its species. This point is vital for understanding what Avicenna means when he maintains that God and the celestial intellects (as distinct from the celestial souls) know particulars "in a universal way." Since each of the celestial particulars is the only member of its species, there is a sense in which God and the celestial intellects, by knowing a celestial species, know its sole particular instance. This knowledge, however, cannot be extended to the particulars in the world of generation and corruption. For in this world, the species, whether intellects, souls, or bodies, are not restricted to having only one member. God and the celestial intelligences know all the universal qualities of a terrestrial particular but not the particular itself. The case is different with the celestial souls. These are the movers of the celestial spheres and are the causes of particular events in the terrestrial realm. As causes of

these particulars, they also have knowledge of future terrestrial events. Such knowledge emanates from the celestial souls to the imaginative faculty of prophets. In this way prophets are given knowledge of future particular events.

This emanative scheme, expanded to explain (among other things) prophetic predictions, represents a synthesis of Neoplatonic, Aristotelian, and Islamic ideas. The scheme, however, is grounded in Avicenna's ontology, which in turn is developed within the framework of basic Aristotelian concepts. Regarding this connection, it should be remarked that Avicenna regards *The Healing* as a peripatetic work. In introducing it (*Isagoge* 1.1)⁵ he mentions his book *The Eastern Philosophy* (*Al-Falsafa al-mashriqiyya*), in which he tells us that he presents philosophy '*alā mā hiya fī al-ṭab'*, literally, "as it is 'in nature,'" a statement open to different interpretations. As we read it, Avicenna is referring to philosophy as it comes to one naturally. It has also been interpreted as referring to philosophy in itself.⁶ Avicenna contrasts this work with *The Healing*, which, he states, is more extensive in exposition and more cooperative with the peripatetics. (He also indicates that *The Healing* contains intimations which if heeded would render the *Eastern Philosophy* dispensable.)

The peripatetic nature of *The Healing* manifests itself in its approach, particularly in the first seven books. It is analytic and probing as it seeks to answer questions and resolve difficulties, and it is highly critical of non-Aristotelian views—metaphysical Platonism, Pythagoreanism, atomism, and aspects of Islamic theological thought (*kalām*). Avicenna's *Metaphysics* is an endorsement of basic Aristotelian concepts—an endorsement, however, that includes refinements and expansions leading to formulations, as in the discussion of universals, that are distinctly Avicennan. There is also synthesis. As already suggested, Aristotelian concepts are integrated in Avicenna's emanative scheme of things to form a comprehensive metaphysical system. The conceptual building blocks, so to speak, of this system are largely Aristotelian and Neoplatonic. The final structure, however, is other than the sum of its parts, and the cosmic vision it portrays has a character all its own.

Turning to Avicenna's ontology, underlying his worldview is the distinction he draws between essence, or quiddity, and existence. From knowing what a thing is, one cannot infer that it exists. The quiddity of any caused existent, considered strictly in itself, excludes the idea of existence and its necessary concomitants—unity, plurality, universality, and particularity. "Horseness," to use Avicenna's well-known example in *Metaphysics* 5.1,

"is nothing at all except horseness." "Horseness" by itself is not the universal "horse." It becomes the universal "horse" (for Avicenna, existing only in the mind) when the "accident" universality, the quality that renders a concept in the mind predicable of many of a kind, is attached to it.

The distinction between essence and existence underlies both Avicenna's proof of God's existence and his argument for the manner in which the world emanates from Him. Although quiddities, considered in terms of what they are, exclude the idea of existence, they do in fact exist, whether in the mind or externally.⁷ The impossible does not exist. Hence, any existent must either be necessary or possible in itself. If it is necessary, it would have to be one, simple, and the cause of all other existents. This is God. If it is possible, then its existence must be necessitated by something else. Thus, every existent other than God is possible in itself but necessary through another. In other words, every existent other than God is possible in the sense of being contingent. If its cause is also only possible in itself, it must in turn be necessitated by another cause, and if the latter is also only possible in itself, by yet another, and so on. These causes are essential causes. Unlike accidental causes that precede their effects in time, essential causes coexist with their effects. A chain of such essential causes, if infinite, would constitute an actual coexisting infinite, which for Avicenna is impossible. The chain must be finite, caused by a cause that in itself is necessary, namely God.⁸ With God the distinction between essence and existence ceases. God has no quiddity other than His existence.

It is in terms of this conception of existence as being either possible in itself but necessary through another or of being necessary in itself that Avicenna explains the triadic emanative process. God, the being necessary in Himself, is engaged in an eternal act of self-knowledge. This results in the emanation of the first intellect. The first intellect then contemplates (a) God as the existent necessary in Himself, (b) his own existence as necessitated by God, and (c) his own existence as in itself only possible. These three contemplative acts produce, respectively, three existents: another intellect, a soul, and a sphere. This contemplative activity is repeated by the successive intellects, resulting in the celestial triads that terminate with the active intellect from which the terrestrial world emanates.

Within this emanative scheme, we meet some of the basic ideas of Avicenna's religious philosophy. We meet them in such discussions as those of the divine attributes (8.1, 6, and 7), of divine providence (9.6), and of

the Hereafter (9.7). We also meet them in the exposition of his political philosophy, to which book ten is devoted. Significantly, book ten begins with a chapter that sums up Avicenna's emanative scheme. His conception of the ideal "virtuous" city is developed within the framework of his emanative cosmology. At the basis of Avicenna's political philosophy—which is rooted in al-Fārābī's political thought—is the concept of the philosopher-prophet, the recipient and conveyer of the revealed law. In the second chapter of book ten, Avicenna argues that the appearance in history of law-giving prophets (necessary for the very survival of human beings, to say nothing of establishing a virtuous political state) is a necessary consequence of God's knowledge of "the order of the good." In the three chapters that follow, he offers a philosophical interpretation of Islam, the religion and its institutions. He concludes his *Metaphysics* with the following statement:

If one combines with justice speculative wisdom, he is a happy man. Whoever in addition to this wins the prophetic qualities becomes almost a human god. Worship of him, after worship of God, becomes almost allowed. He is indeed the world's earthly master and God's deputy in it.

In Avicenna's cosmology the prophet becomes the human link between the celestial and the terrestrial worlds.

♦ ♦ ♦

There are three complete translations of the *Metaphysics* into modern European languages: Max Horten's German translation (1907), G. C. Anawati's French translation (books 1–5, 1978 and books 6–10, 1985), and very recently an Italian translation by Olga Lizzini and Pasquale Porro (2002). A critical edition of the medieval Latin by S. Van Riet has also been published (books 1–4, 1977 and books 5–10, 1980), with a valuable glossary of Latin, French, and Arabic terms (1980).⁹ In his comprehensive introduction to the French translation, Father Anawati discussed the German translation, the Tehran edition, and the Cairo edition on which the French translation and the present English translation are based, giving also a list of emendations. Father Anawati was a member of the team of scholars under the supervision of I. Madkour who were responsible for editing *The Healing*, and, with others, Anawati edited a number of its volumes, including the *Metaphysics*. A scholar of vast experience with the writings of Avicenna and with the manuscripts of his

works, his considerable contributions to Avicennan studies culminated in his authoritative French translation of the *Metaphysics*. We have consulted with benefit Anawati's translation, particularly where the Arabic text poses interpretative problems. Happily, we found that there is substantial agreement between it and the translation we are presenting. But in a text that poses many difficulties, both in its wording and its thought, there are bound to be differences in interpretation.

The Arabic text prepared for this translation is essentially that of the 1960 Cairo edition. The paragraphing, however, has been changed, and the paragraphs of both the Arabic and the translation have been numbered. There are some changes in punctuation, although in general we have stayed close to the original Cairo edition. Other changes include some different readings taken from the *apparatus criticus* and from the emendations of Father Anawati. These are placed in the Arabic text in square brackets, with a note indicating the original reading in the Cairo edition and the source of the change.

[followed by] the angelic substances [endowed with] soul, then the celestial spherical substances, then these elements [in the world of generation and corruption, ascending] then to the things formed by them, [and] then to man. [We will then explain] how all things revert to Him [in dependence] and the manner in which He is for them [both] an efficient principle and a perfecting principle. [We will discuss] what the state of the human soul would be when the relation between it and nature is severed, and what its rank in existence would be. In [the course of discussing all] this, we will indicate the high estate of prophecy, the obligation of obeying it, and [the fact] that it [proceeds] necessarily from God. [We will also indicate] the morals and actions which, together with wisdom, are needed by the human soul for [attaining] the felicity of the hereafter; and [we will describe] the different types of felicity.

(9) When we reach this point, we shall have concluded this, our book, God being our help in this.

Chapter [Five]

On indicating the existent, the thing, and their first division, wherewith attention is directed to the objective [sought]

(1) We say: The ideas¹ of "the existent," "the thing," and "the necessary" are impressed in the soul in a primary way. This impression does not require better known things to bring it about. [This is similar]² to what obtains in the category of assent,³ where there are primary principles, found to be true in themselves, causing [in turn] assent to the truths of other [propositions]. If the expression denoting them does not occur to the mind or is not understood, then it would be impossible to know whatever is known through them. [This is so] even though the informative act striving to bring them to mind or to explain what expressions indicate them is not engaged in an endeavor to impart knowledge not [already] present in the natural intelligence, but is merely drawing attention to explaining what the speaker intends and upholds. This may occur through things which, in themselves, are less evident than the things intended to be made known but which, for some cause or some expression, have become better known.

النفسانية، ثم الجواهر الفلكية السماوية، ثم هذه العناصر، ثم المكونات عنها، ثم الإنسان. وكيف تعود إليه هذه الأشياء، وكيف هو مبدأ [٢٨] لها فاعلى، وكيف هو مبدأ لها كمالى، وماذا تكون حال النفس الإنسانية إذا انقطعت العلاقة بينها وبين الطبيعة، وأى مرتبة تكون مرتبة وجودها. وندل فيما بين ذلك على جلالة قدر النبوة، ووجوب طاعتها، وأنها واجبة من عند الله، وعلى الأخلاق والأعمال التى تحتاج إليها النفوس الإنسانية مع الحكمة فى أن يكون لها السعادة الأخروية. ونعرف أصناف السعادات.

(٩) فإذا بلغنا هذا المبلغ ختمنا كتابنا هذا، والله المستعان به على ذلك. [٢٩]

[الفصل الخامس]

(هـ) فصل

فى الدلالة على الموجود والشئ وأقسامهما الأول، بما يكون فيه تنبيه على الغرض

(١) فنقول: إن الموجود، والشئ، والضرورى، معانيها ترسم فى النفس ارتساماً أولياً، ليس ذلك الارتسام مما يحتاج إلى أن يجلب بأشياء أعرف منها. فإنه كما أن فى باب التصديق مبادئ أولية، يقع التصديق بها لذاتها، ويكون التصديق بغيرها، بسببها، وإذا لم يخطر بالبال أو لم يفهم اللفظ الدال عليها، لم يكن التوصل إلى معرفة ما يعرف بها، وإن لم يكن التعريف الذى يحاول إخطارها بالبال أو تفهيم ما يدل به عليها من الألفاظ محاولاً لإفادة علم ليس فى الغريزة؛ بل مُتَّبَعاً على تفهيم ما يريد القائل ويذهب إليه؛ وربما كان ذلك بأشياء هى فى نفسها أخفى من المراد تعريفه، لكنها لعل ما وعبرة ما صارت أعرف.

(2) Similarly, in conceptual matters, there are things which are principles for conception that are conceived in themselves. If one desires to indicate them, [such indication] would not, in reality, constitute making an unknown thing known but would merely consist in drawing attention to them or bringing them to mind through the use of a name or a sign which, in itself, may be less known than [the principles] but which, for some cause or circumstance, happens to be more obvious in its signification.

(3) If, then, such a sign is used, the soul is awakened [to the fact] that such a meaning is being brought to mind, in [the sense] that it is the intended [meaning and] not another, without the sign in reality having given [any] knowledge of it.

(4) If every conception were to require that [another] conception should precede it, then [such a] state of affairs would lead either to an infinite regress or to circularity.

(5) The things that have the highest claim to be conceived in themselves are those common to all matters—as, for example, “the existent,” “the one thing,” and others. For this reason, none of these things can be shown by a proof totally devoid of circularity or by the exposition of better known things. Hence, whoever attempts to place in them something as a [defining] constituent falters—as, for example, one who says: “It is of the existent’s true nature to be either active or acted on.” This, while inescapably the case, belongs to the division of the existent, the existent being better known than the active and the passive. The masses conceive the reality of the existent without knowing at all that it must be either active or passive. For my part, up to this point, this has not been evident to me except through a syllogism—nothing else. How, then, would it be the state of one who strives to define the state of the evident thing in terms of some quality belonging to it which requires a proof to establish that it exists for [that thing]?

(6) The case is similar with somebody’s statement: “The thing is that about which it is valid [to give] an informative statement,”⁴ for “is valid” is less known than “the thing”; and “informative statement” is [likewise] less known than “the thing.” How, then, can this be the definition of the thing? Indeed, “is valid” and “information” are known only after one uses, in explaining what they are, [terms] indicating that each is either a “thing,” a “matter,” a “whatever,” or a “that which [is]”—all of these being like synonyms of the word “thing.”

(٢) كذلك في التصورات أشياء هي مبادئ للتصور، وهي متصورة لذواتها، وإذا أريد أن يدل عليها لم يكن ذلك بالحقيقة تعريفاً لمجهول؛ بل تنبيهاً وإخطاراً بالبال، بأسم أو بعلامة، ربما كانت في نفسها أخفى منه، لكنها لعل ما وحال ما تكون أظهر دلالة.

(٣) فإذا استعملت تلك العلامة تنبّهت النفس على إخطار ذلك المعنى بالبال، من حيث أنه هو المراد لا غيره، من غير أن تكون العلامة بالحقيقة معلمة [٣٠] إياه.

(٤) ولو كان كل تصور يحتاج إلى أن يسبقه تصور قبله لذهب الأمر في ذلك إلى غير النهاية، أو لدار.

(٥) وأولى الأشياء بأن تكون متصورة لأنفسها الأشياء العامة للأمر كلها، كالموجود، والشئ الواحد وغيره. ولهذا ليس يمكن أن يبين شئ منها ببيان لادور فيه ألبته، أو ببيان شئ أعرف منها. ولذلك من حاول أن يقوم فيها شيئاً وقع في اضطراب، كمن يقول: إن من حقيقة الموجود أن يكون فاعلاً أو منفعلاً؛ وهذا إن كان ولا بد فمن أقسام الموجود، والموجود أعرف من الفاعل والمنفعل. وجمهور الناس يتصورون حقيقة الموجود ولا يعرفون ألبته أنه يجب أن يكون فاعلاً أو منفعلاً، وأنا إلى هذه الغاية لم يتضح لي ذلك إلا بقياس لا غير، فكيف يكون حال من يروم أن يعرف حال الشئ الظاهر بصفة له، تحتاج إلى بيان حتى يثبت وجودها له؟

(٦) وكذلك قول من قال: إن الشئ هو الذي يصح عنه الخبر، فإن «يصح» أخفى من «الشئ» و«الخبر» أخفى من «الشئ»، فكيف يكون هذا تعريفاً للشئ؟ وإنما تعرف الصحة ويعرف الخبر بعد أن يستعمل في بيان كل واحد منهما أنه «شئ» أو أنه «أمر» أو أنه «ما» أو أنه «الذي»، وجميع ذلك كالمردفات لاسم الشئ.

(7) How, then, can the thing be truly defined in terms of what is known only through it? Yes, in this and similar things there may be some act of directing attention; but, in reality, if you say, "The thing is that about which it is valid [to give] an informative statement," it is as if you have said, "The thing is the thing about which it is valid [to give] an informative statement," because the meaning of "whatever," "that which," and "the thing" is one and the same. You would have then included "the thing" in the definition of "the thing." Still, we do not deny that through this [statement] and its like, despite its vitiating starting point, there occurs in some manner a directing of attention to the thing.

(8) [Moreover] we say: The meaning of "existence" and the meaning of "thing" are conceived in the soul and are two meanings,⁵ whereas "the existent," "the established," and "the realized" are synonyms. We do not doubt that their meaning has been realized in the soul of whoever is reading this book.

(9) "The thing," or its equivalent, may be used in all languages to indicate some other meaning. For, to everything there is a reality by virtue of which it is what it is. Thus, the triangle has a reality in that it is a triangle, and whiteness has reality in that it is whiteness. It is that which we should perhaps call "proper existence," not intending by this the meaning given to affirmative existence; for the expression "existence" is also used to denote many meanings, one of which is the reality a thing happens to have. Thus, [the reality] a thing happens to have is, as it were, its proper existence.⁶

(10) To resume, we say: It is evident that each thing has a reality proper to it—namely, its quiddity. It is known that the reality proper to each thing is something other than the existence that corresponds to what is affirmed.

(11) This is because, if you said, "The reality of such a thing exists either in concrete things,⁷ or in the soul, or absolutely, being common to both," this would have a meaning [that was] realized and understood; [whereas,] if you were to say, "The reality of such a thing is the reality of such a thing," or "The reality of such a thing is a reality," this would be superfluous, useless talk. [Again,] if you were to say, "The reality of such a thing is a thing," this, too, would not be a statement imparting knowledge of what is not known. Even less useful than this is for you to say,

(٧) فكيف يصح أن يعرف الشيء تعريفا حقيقيا بما لم يعرف إلا به؟ نعم، ربما كان في ذلك وأمثاله تنبيه ما. وأما بالحقيقة فإنك إذا قلت إن الشيء هو ما يصح الخبر عنه، تكون كأنك قلت: إن الشيء هو الشيء الذي يصح الخبر عنه، لأن معنى «ما» و«الذي» و«الشيء» معنى واحد، فتكون قد أخذت الشيء في حد الشيء. [٣١] على أنا لا ننكر أن يقع بهذا أو ما يشبهه، مع فساد مأخذه، تنبيه بوجه ما على الشيء.

(٨) ونقول: إن معنى الوجود ومعنى الشيء متصوران في الأنفس، وهما معنيان. [والموجود] والمثبت والمحصل أسماء مترادفة على معنى واحد، ولا نشك في أن معناها قد حصل في نفس من يقرأ هذا الكتاب.

(٩) والشيء وما يقوم مقامه قد يدل به على معنى آخر في اللغات كلها، فإن لكل أمر حقيقة هو بها ما هو، فللمثل حقيقة أنه مثل، وللبياض حقيقة أنه بياض، وذلك هو الذي ربما سميناه الوجود الخاص، ولم نرد به معنى الوجود الإجمالي. فإن لفظ الوجود يدل به أيضا على معاني كثيرة، منها الحقيقة التي عليها الشيء، فكأنه ما عليه يكون الوجود الخاص للشيء.

(١٠) ونرجع فنقول: إنه من البين أن لكل شيء حقيقة خاصة هي ماهيته، ومعلوم أن حقيقة كل شيء الخاصة به غير الوجود الذي يرادف الإثبات.

(١١) وذلك لأنك إذا قلت: حقيقة كذا موجودة إما في الأعيان، أو في الأنفس، أو مطلقا يعمها جميعا، كان لهذا معنى محصل مفهوم. ولو قلت: إن حقيقة كذا، حقيقة كذا، أو أن حقيقة كذا حقيقة، لكان حشوا من الكلام غير مفيد. ولو قلت: إن حقيقة كذا شيء، لكان أيضا قولا غير مفيد ما يجهل؛ وأقل إفادة منه أن تقول: إن الحقيقة

"Reality is a thing," unless by "thing" you mean "the existent"; for then it is as though you have said, "The reality of such a thing is an existing reality." If, however, you said, "The reality of A is something and the reality of B is another thing," this would be sound, imparting knowledge; because [in saying this] you make the reservation within yourself that [the former] is something specific, differing from that other [latter] thing. This would be as if you said, "[This is] the reality of A, and the reality of B is another reality." If it were not for both this reservation [you make within yourself] and this conjunction, [the statement] would not impart knowledge. This, then, is the meaning intended by "the thing." The necessary concomitance of the meaning of existence never separates from it at all; rather, the meaning of existence is permanently concomitant with it because the thing exists either in the concrete or in the estimative [faculty] and the intellect. If [this] were not the case, it would not be a thing.

(12) Concerning what is said—[namely,] "The thing is that about which information is given"—[this] is true.⁸ But when, in addition to this, it is said, "The thing may be absolutely nonexistent," this is a matter that must be looked into. If by the nonexistent is meant the nonexistent in external reality, this would be possible; for it is possible for a thing that does not exist in external things to exist in the mind. But if [something] other than this is meant, this would be false and there would be no information about it at all. It would not be known except only as [something] conceived in the soul. [To the notion] that [the nonexistent] would be conceived in the soul as a concept that refers to some external thing, [we say] "Certainly not!"

(13) Regarding the informative statement, [the above analysis is correct] because information is always about something realized in the mind. No affirmative information about the absolutely nonexistent is [ever] given. If, moreover, information about it is given in the negative, then an existence in some respect is given it in the mind. [This is] because our saying "it" entails a reference, and reference to the nonexistent that has no concept in any respect at all in the mind is impossible. For how can anything affirmative be said about the nonexistent when the meaning of our statement, "The nonexistent is such," is that the description "such" is realized for the nonexistent, there being no difference between the realized and the existent? It would be as though we have said, "This description exists for the nonexistent." Indeed, we say:

شئ، إلا أن يعنى بالشئ، الموجود؛ كأنك قلت: إن حقيقة كذا حقيقة موجودة. وأما إذا قلت: حقيقة آشئ ما، وحقيقة ب شئ آخر، فإنما صح هذا وأفاد لأنك تضمّر فى نفسك أنه شئ آخر مخصوص مخالف [٣٢] لذلك الشئ الآخر، كما لو قلت: إن حقيقة وحقيقة ب حقيقة أخرى. ولولا هذا الإضمار وهذا الاقتران جميعا لم يفد، فالشئ يراد به هذا المعنى. ولا يفارق لزوم معنى الوجود لياه ألبته، بل معنى الموجود يلزمه دائما، لأنه يكون إما موجودا فى الأعيان، أو موجودا فى الوهم والعقل، فإن لم يكن كذا لم يكن شيئا.

(١٢) وأن ما يقال: إن الشئ هو الذى يخبر عنه، حق؛ ثم الذى يقال، مع هذا، إن الشئ قد يكون معدوما على الإطلاق، أمر يجب أن ينظر فيه. فإن عنى بالمعدوم المعدوم فى الأعيان، جاز أن يكون كذلك، فيجوز أن يكون الشئ ثابتا فى الذهن معدوما فى الأشياء الخارجة. وإن عنى غير ذلك كان باطلا، ولم يكن عنه خبر ألبته، ولا كان معلوماً إلا على أنه متصور فى النفس فقط. فأما أن يكون متصوراً فى النفس صورة تشير إلى شئ خارج فكلاً.

(١٣) أما الخبر، فلأن الخبر يكون دائماً عن شئ متحقق فى الذهن. والمعدوم المطلق لا يخبر عنه بالإيجاب، وإذا أخبر عنه بالسلب أيضاً فقد جعل له وجود بوجه ما فى الذهن. لأن قولنا: «هو»، يتضمن إشارة، والإشارة إلى المعدوم - الذى لا صورة له بوجه من الوجوه فى الذهن - محال. فكيف يوجب على المعدوم شئ، ومعنى قولنا: إن المعدوم «كذا»، معناه أن وصف «كذا» حاصل للمعدوم، ولا فرق بين الحاصل والموجود؟ فنكون كأننا قلنا: إن هذا الوصف [٣٣] موجود للمعدوم. بل نقول:

(14) That which describes the nonexistent and is predicated of it either exists for the nonexistent and is realized for it or does not exist and is not realized for it. If it exists and is realized for the nonexistent, then it must, in itself, be either existent or nonexistent. If it is existent, then the nonexistent would have an existing description. But, if the description exists, then that which is described by it necessarily exists. The nonexistent would, then, be an existent—and this is impossible. If [however] the description is nonexistent, then how can that which in itself is nonexistent exist for something? For that which in itself does not exist cannot exist for the thing. Yes, the thing may exist in itself without existing for some other thing, [but this is a different matter].

(15) If, however, the description did not exist for the nonexistent, this would be [tantamount] to the denial of the description for the nonexistent; for, if it were not the denial of the description of the nonexistent, then, if we were to deny this description, we would obtain the opposite of this. Hence, there would be the existence of the description for it. And all this is false.

(16) We say only that we have knowledge of the nonexistent, because when the meaning occurs only in the soul and no reference to [what is] external [to the soul] is made by it, then what is known would be only that very thing in the soul. The assent, occurring in terms of the two parts of what is conceived, consists in [affirming] that it is possible that, in the nature of the thing known, an intellectually apprehended relation to what is external should occur (there being no [such] relation, however, at the present time). Nothing other than this is known.

(17) According to those who uphold the view [rejected above], there are matters in the assemblage of whatever is being informed about and known that, in [the state of] nonexistence, have no "thingness."⁹ Whoever desires acquaintance with their doctrine should go to what they rave about in their statements—[statements] that hardly deserve preoccupation.

(18) These [people] have fallen into [the error] that they have because of their ignorance [of the fact] that giving information is about ideas that have an existence in the soul—even if these are nonexistent in external things—where the meaning of giving information about [these ideas] is

(١٤) إنه لا يخلو أن ما يوصف به المعدوم ويحمل عليه إما أن يكون موجوداً وحاصلاً للمعدوم أو لا يكون موجوداً حاصلاً له؛ فإن كان موجوداً وحاصلاً للمعدوم، فلا يخلو إما أن يكون في نفسه موجوداً أو معدوماً، فإن كان موجوداً فيكون للمعدوم صفة موجودة، وإذا كانت الصفة موجودة، فالموصوف بها موجود لا محالة، فالمعدوم موجود، وهذا محال؛ وإن كانت الصفة معدومة، فكيف يكون المعدوم في نفسه موجوداً لشيء؟ فإن ما لا يكون موجوداً في نفسه، يستحيل أن يكون موجوداً للشيء. نعم، قد يكون الشيء موجوداً في نفسه ولا يكون موجوداً لشيء آخر.

(١٥) فأما إن لم تكن الصفة موجودة للمعدوم فهي نفي الصفة عن المعدوم، فإنه إن لم يكن هذا هو النفي للصفة عن المعدوم، فإذا نفينا الصفة عن المعدوم، كان مقابل هذا، فكان وجود الصفة له؛ وهذا كله باطل.

(١٦) وإنما نقول: إن لنا علماً بالمعدوم، فلأن المعنى إذا تحصل في النفس فقط ولم يُشر فيه إلى خارج، كان المعلوم نفس ما في النفس فقط، والتصديق الواقع بين المتصور من جزئيه هو أنه جازئ في طباع هذا المعلوم وقوع نسبة له معقولة إلى خارج، وأما في هذا الوقت فلا نسبة له، فلا معلوم غيره.

(١٧) وعند القوم الذين يرون هذا الرأي، أن في جملة ما يخبر عنه ويعلم أموراً لا شئية لها في العدم، ومن شاء أن يقف على ذلك فليرجع إلى ما هدوا به من أقاويلهم التي لا تستحق فضل الاشتغال بها. [٣٤]

(١٨) وإنما وقع أولئك فيما وقعوا فيه بسبب جهلهم بأن الإخبار إنما يكون عن معانٍ لها وجود في النفس، وإن كانت معدومة في الأعيان، ويكون معنى الإخبار عنها

that they have some relation to external things. Thus, for example, if you said, "The resurrection will be," you would have understood "resurrection" and would have understood "will be." You would have predicated "will be," which is in the soul, of "resurrection," which is in the soul, in [the sense] that it would be correct for this meaning, with respect to another meaning also intellectually apprehended (namely, one intellectually apprehended in a future time), to be characterized by a third meaning (namely, [the object] of intellectual apprehension: existence). This [pattern of reasoning] applies correspondingly to matters relating to the past.¹⁰ It is thus clear that that about which information is given must have some sort of existence in the soul. Information, in truth, is about what exists in the soul and [only] accidentally about what exists externally.

(19) Hence, you have now understood the way in which "the thing" differs from what is understood by "the existent" and "the realized" and that, despite this difference, the two [that is, "the thing" and "the existent"] are necessary concomitants.

(20) Yet, it has reached me that some people say that what is realized is realized without being an existent, that the description of a thing can be something neither existing nor nonexisting¹¹ and that the [expressions] "that which" and "whichever" denote something other than that which [the expression] "the thing" denotes. Such people are not among the assemblage of the discerning; if challenged to distinguish between these expressions in terms of their meaning, they would be exposed.

(21) We now say: Although the existent, as you have known, is not a genus and is not predicated equally of what is beneath it, yet it has a meaning agreed on with respect to priority and posteriority. The first thing to which it belongs is the quiddity, which is substance, and then to what comes after it. Since it [has] one meaning, in the manner to which we have alluded, accidental matters adhere to it that are proper to it, as we have shown earlier. For this reason, it is taken care of by one science in the same way that anything pertaining to health has one science.

(22) It may also prove difficult for us to make known the state of the necessary, the possible, and the impossible through ascertained definition, [and we would have to make this known] only through a sign. All that has been said of the [things] that have reached you from the Ancients in defining this would almost entail circularity. This is because—as you

أن لها نسبة ما إلى الأعيان. مثلاً إن قلت: إن لقيامه «تكون». فهنت القيامة وهنت «تكون»، وحملت «تكون» التي في النفس. على القيامة التي في النفس، بأن هذا المعنى إنما يصح في معنى آخر معقول أيضاً، وهو معقول في وقت مستقبل، أن يوصف بمعنى ثالث معقول، وهو معقول الوجود. وعلى هذا القياس الأمر في الماضي. فبين أن المخبر عنه لا بد من أن يكون موجوداً وجوداً ما في النفس. والإخبار في الحقيقة هو عن الموجود في النفس، وبالعرض عن الموجود في الخارج.

(١٩) وقد فهت الآن أن الشيء بماذا يخالف المفهوم للموجود والحاصل، وأنها مع ذلك متلازمان.

(٢٠) وعلى أنه قد بلغني أن قوماً يقولون: إن الحاصل يكون حاصلًا، وليس بموجود، وقد تكون صفة الشيء ليس شيئاً لا موجوداً ولا معدوماً، وأن «الذي» و«ما» يدلان على غير ما يدل عليه الشيء. فهؤلاء ليسوا من جملة المميزين. وإذا أخذوا بالتمييز بين هذه الألفاظ من حيث مفهوماتها انكشفوا.

(٢١) فنقول الآن: إنه وإن لم يكن الموجود، كما علمت، جنساً، ولا مقولاً بالتساوي على ما تحته، فإنه معنى متفق فيه على التقديم والتأخير. وأول ما يكون، يكون للماهية التي هي الجوهر ثم يكون لما بعده. وإذا هو معنى واحد [٣٥] على النحو الذي أومأنا إليه فتلقه عوارض تخصه، كما قد بينا قبل. فلذلك يكون له علم واحد يتكفل به. كما أن لجميع ما هو صحن علم واحد.

(٢٢) وقد يعسر علينا أن نعرف حال الواجب والممكن والممتنع بالتعريف الحق أيضاً؛ بل بوجه العلامة. وجميع ما قيل في تعريف هذه مما بلغك عن الأولين قد يكاد يقتضي

have come across in the [various] parts of the *Logic*—whenever they want to define the possible, they include in the definition either the necessary or the impossible, there being no other way save this. And when they want to define the necessary, they include in the definition either the possible or the impossible. [Similarly,] when they want to define the impossible, they include in its definition either the necessary or the possible. Thus, for example, if they define the possible, they would at one time say that it is that which is not necessary, or [at another] that it is the presently nonexistent whose existence at any supposed moment in the future is not impossible. [Again,] if they find that there is a need to define the necessary, they would say that it is either that which is not possible to suppose as nonexistent or that which is impossible to suppose [as anything] other than it is. Thus, at one time they include the possible in its definition and at another the impossible. And as regards the possible, they would already have included in its definition either the necessary or the impossible. Then [again,] when they wish to define the impossible, they either include the necessary in its definition by saying, “The impossible is that whose nonexistence is necessary,” or [they include] the possible by saying, “It is that for which it is not possible to exist,” or some other expression equivalent to these two.

(23) The case is similar with such statements as: “The impossible is that whose existence is not possible, or that whose nonexistence is necessary; the necessary is that whose nonexistence is not allowable and is impossible, or that for which it is not possible not to be; the possible is that for which it is not impossible to be or not to be, or that for which it is not necessary to be or not to be.” All this, as you see, is clearly circular. A fuller exposure of this is something you have come across in the *Analytics*.¹²

(24) Nonetheless, of these three, the one with the highest claim to be first conceived is the necessary. This is because the necessary points to the assuredness of existence, existence being better known than nonexistence. [This is] because existence is known in itself, whereas nonexistence is, in some respect or another, known through existence.

(25) From our explaining these matters, it will become clear to you that it is false for someone to say: “The nonexistent can be brought back into existence because it is the first thing about which information is

دورا . وذلك لأنهم ، على ما مر لك في فنون المنطق ، إذا أرادوا أن يحدوا الممكن ، أخذوا في حده إما الضروري وإما المحال ولا وجه غير ذلك . وإذا أرادوا أن يحدوا الضروري ، أخذوا في حده إما الممكن وإما المحال . وإذا أرادوا أن يحدوا محال أخذوا في حده إما الضروري وإما الممكن . مثلا إذا حدوا الممكن قالوا مرة ، إنه غير الضروري أو أنه المعدوم في الحال الذي ليس وجوده ، في أي وقت فُرض من المستقبل ، بمحال . ثم إذا احتاجوا إلى أن يحدوا الضروري قالوا : إما أنه الذي لا يمكن أن يفرض معدوما ، أو أنه الذي إذا فرض بخلاف ما هو عليه كان محالا . فقد أخذوا الممكن تارة في حده ، والمحال أخرى . وأما الممكن فقد كانوا أخذوا ، قبل ، في حده إما الضروري وإما المحال . ثم المحال ، إذا أرادوا أن يحدوه ، أخذوا في حده إما الضروري بأن يقولوا : إن المحال هو ضروري العدم ؛ وإما الممكن بأن يقولوا : إنه الذي لا يمكن أن يوجد ؛ أو لفظاً آخر يذهب مذهب هذين .

(٢٣) وكذلك ما يقال من أن الممتنع هو الذي لا يمكن أن يكون ، أو هو الذي يجب أن لا يكون . والواجب هو الذي هو ممتنع ومحال أن لا يكون ، أو ليس [٣٦] بممكن أن لا يكون . والممكن هو الذي ليس يمتنع أن يكون أو لا يكون ، أو الذي ليس بواجب أن يكون وأن لا يكون . وهذا كله كما تراه دور ظاهر . وأما كشف الحال في ذلك فقد مرّ لك في أوّلوطيقا .

(٢٤) على أن أوّل هذه الثلاثة في أن يتصور أولا ، هو الواجب . وذلك لأن الواجب يدل على تأكد الوجود ، والوجود أعرف من العدم ، لأن الوجود يعرف بذاته ، والعدم يعرف ، بوجه ما من الوجوه ، بالوجود .

(٢٥) ومن [تفهيمنا] هذه الأشياء يتضح لك بطلان قول من يقول : إن المعدوم يعاد لأنه أول شيء مخبر عنه بالوجود . وذلك أن المعدوم إذا أعيد يجب أن يكون بينه وبين ما

given in terms of existence. This is because, if the nonexistent were to be brought back into existence, then there would necessarily be a difference between it and that which is similar to it, if [that which is similar to] it were to exist in its place. If [only] similar, it would not be identical with it, because it is not the thing that had ceased to exist (this latter, in its state of nonexistence, being other than [the former])."

(26) [But if one argues in this way,] the nonexistent becomes an existent in the manner to which we have alluded previously.¹³ Moreover, if the nonexistent were to be brought back into existence, then this would require that all of its special properties—in terms of which it is what it is—should be brought back into existence. But among these properties is the time [in which it existed]. But, if this time is brought back, then the thing would not have been brought back into existence, because that which would have been brought into existence is that which exists at another time. If [then] it is allowed that the nonexistent could return into existence with all the nonexisting properties previously existing with it, time [being considered] either as having real existence that has ceased to be or (according to what is known of their doctrines) as one of the accidents having correspondence with an existent,¹⁴ then we would be allowing that time and temporal [states] could return into existence. But then there would not be [one period] of time and [then] another and, hence, no return [of the nonexistent to existence].

(27) The mind, however, rejects [all] this in a manner that renders exposition unnecessary; all that is said concerning this is deviation from the path of [peripatetic] teaching.

Chapter [Six]

On commencing a discourse on the Necessary Existent and the possible existent; that the Necessary Existent has no cause; that the possible existent is caused; that the Necessary Existent has no equivalent in existence and is not dependent [in existence] on another

(1) We will now return to what we were [discussing] and say: There are specific properties that belong individually each to the Necessary Existent and the possible existent. We thus say: The things that enter existence

هو مثله. لو وجد بدله، فرق. فإن كان مثله إنما ليس هو لأنه ليس الذي كان عدم، وفي حال عدم كان هذا غير ذلك.

(٢٦) فقد صار المعدوم موجوداً على النحو الذي أو مانا إليه فيما سلف آنفاً. وعلى أن المعدوم إذا أعيد احتيج أن تعاد جميع الخواص التي كان بها هو ما هو. ومن خواصه وقته، وإذا أعيد وقته كان المعدوم غير معاد، لأن المعاد هو الذي يوجد في وقت ثان. فإن كان المعدوم تجوز إعادته وإعادة جملة المعدومات التي كانت معه، والوقت إما شيء له حقيقة وجود قد عدم، أو موافقة موجود لعرض من الأعراض، على ما عرف من مذاهبهم، جاز أن يعود الوقت والأحوال، فلا يكون وقت ووقت، فلا يكون عود. (٢٧) على أن العقل يدفع هذا دفعاً لا يحتاج فيه إلى بيان، وكل ما يقال فيه فهو

١٠ خروج عن طريق التعليم. [٣٧]

[الفصل السادس]

(و) فصل

في ابتداء القول في الواجب الوجود، والممكن الوجود،

وأن الواجب الوجود لا علة له، وأن الممكن الوجود معلول،

وأن الواجب الوجود غير مكافئ لغيره في الوجود، ولا متعلق بغيره فيه

١٥

(١) ونعود إلى ما كنا فيه فنقول: إن لكل واحد من الواجب الوجود، والممكن الوجود، خواص. فنقول: إن الأمور التي تدخل في الوجود تحتل في العقل الانقسام إلى

bear a [possible] twofold division in the mind. Among them there will be that which, when considered in itself, its existence would be not necessary. It is [moreover] clear that its existence would also not be impossible, since otherwise it would not enter existence. This thing is within the bound of possibility. There will also be among them that which, when considered in itself, its existence would be necessary.

(2) We thus say: That which in itself is a necessary existent has no cause, while that which in itself is a possible existent has a cause. Whatever is a necessary existent in itself is a necessary existent in all its aspects. The existence of the Necessary Existent cannot be equivalent to the existence of another where each would equal the other as regards necessary existence, becoming [thereby] necessary concomitants. The existence of the Necessary Existent cannot at all be a composite, [deriving] from multiplicity. The true nature of the Necessary Existent can in no manner be shared by another. From our verifying [all] this, it follows necessarily that the Necessary Existent is not [dependent on] relation, is neither changing nor multiple, and has nothing associated with His existence that is proper to Himself.

(3) That the Necessary Existent has no cause is obvious. For if in His existence the Necessary Existent were to have a cause, His existence would be by [that cause]. But whatever exists by something [else], if considered in itself, apart from another, existence for it would not be necessary. And every[thing] for which existence is not [found to be] necessary—if [the thing is] considered in itself, apart from another—is not a necessary existent in itself. It is thus evident that if what is in itself a necessary existent were to have a cause, it would not be in itself a necessary existent. Thus, it becomes clear that the Necessary Existent has no cause. From this it is [also] clear that it is impossible for a thing to be [both] a necessary existent in itself and a necessary existent though another. [This is] because, if its existence is rendered necessary through another, it cannot exist without the other. But [if anything] whatsoever cannot exist without another, its existence [as] necessary in itself is impossible. For if it were necessary in itself, then it would have to come into existence, there being no influence on its existence by way of necessity from that which is other and which affects the existence of something else. [But since such an influence has been supposed,] its existence would not be necessary in itself.

قسمين، فيكون منها ما إذا اعتبر بذاته لم يجب وجوده، وظاهر أنه لا يمتنع أيضا وجوده، وإلا لم يدخل في الوجود، وهذا الشيء هو في حيز الإمكان، ويكون منها ما إذا اعتبر بذاته وجب وجوده.

(٢) فنقول: إن الواجب الوجود بذاته لا علة له، وإن الممكن الوجود بذاته له علة، وإن الواجب الوجود بذاته واجب الوجود من جميع جهاته، وإن الواجب الوجود لا يمكن أن يكون وجوده مكافئا لوجود آخر، فيكون كل واحد منهما مساويا للآخر في وجوب الوجود ويتلازمان. وأن الواجب الوجود لا يجوز أن يجتمع وجوده عن كثرة ألبته. وأن الواجب الوجود لا يجوز أن تكون الحقيقة التي له مشتركا فيها بوجه من الوجوه، حتى يلزم من تصحيحنا ذلك أن يكون واجب الوجود غير مضاف، ولا متغير، ولا متكرر، ولا مشارك في وجوده الذي يخصه. [٣٨]

(٣) أما أن الواجب الوجود لا علة له، فظاهر. لأنه إن كان لواجب الوجود علة في وجوده، كان وجوده بها. وكل ما وجوده بشيء، فإذا اعتبر بذاته دون غيره لم يجب له وجود، وكل ما إذا اعتبر بذاته دون غيره، ولم يجب له وجود، فليس واجب الوجود بذاته. فبين أنه إن كان لواجب الوجود بذاته علة لم يكن واجب الوجود بذاته. فقد ظهر أن الواجب الوجود لا علة له. وظهر من ذلك أنه لا يجوز أن يكون شيء واجب الوجود بذاته، وواجب الوجود بغيره، لأنه إن كان يجب وجوده بغيره، فلا يجوز أن يوجد دون غيره، وكلما لا يجوز أن يوجد دون غيره، فيستحيل وجوده واجبا بذاته. ولو وجب بذاته، لحصل. ولا تأثير للإيجاب الغير في وجوده الذي يؤثر غيره في وجوده؛ فلا يكون واجبا وجوده في ذاته.

(4) Moreover, whatever is possible in existence when considered in itself, its existence and nonexistence are both due to a cause. [This is] because, if it comes into existence, then existence, as distinct from nonexistence, would have occurred to it. [Similarly,] if it ceases to exist, then nonexistence, as distinct from existence, would have occurred to it. Hence, in each of the two cases, what occurs to the thing must either occur through another or not. If [it occurs] through another, then [this] other is the cause. And if it did not exist through another, [then the nonexistence of the other is the cause of its nonexistence].

(5) Hence, it is clear that whatever exists after nonexistence has been specified with something possible other than itself. The case is the same with nonexistence. This is because the thing's quiddity is either sufficient for this specification or not. If its quiddity is sufficient for either of the two states of affairs [existence or nonexistence] to obtain, then that thing would be in itself of a necessary quiddity, when [the thing] has been supposed not to be necessary [in itself]. And this is contradictory. If [on the other hand] the existence of its quiddity is not sufficient [for specifying the possible with existence]—[the latter] being, rather, something whose existence is added to it—then its existence would be necessarily due to some other thing. [This,] then, would be its cause. Hence, it has a cause. In sum, then, either of the two things [existence or nonexistence] would obtain necessarily for [the possible that was] due, not to itself, but to a cause. The existential idea would be realized through a cause (namely, an existential cause); and the nonexistential idea [would be realized] through a cause (namely, the absence of the [former] existential idea, as you have known).

(6) We thus say: [The possible in itself] must become necessary through a cause and with respect to it. For, if it were not necessary, then with the existence of the cause and with respect to it, it would [still] be possible. It would then be possible for it to exist or not to exist, being specified with neither of the two states. [Once again,] from the beginning this would be in need of the existence of a third thing through which either existence (as distinct from nonexistence) or nonexistence (as distinct from existence) would be assigned for [the possible] when the cause of its existence with [this state of affairs] would not have been specified.¹ This would be another cause, and the discussion would extend to an infinite regress. And, if it regresses infinitely, the existence of the possible, with all this, would not have been specified by it. As such, its existence would not have been realized. This is impossible, not only because this leads to

(٤) وأيضاً أن كل ما هو ممكن الوجود باعتبار ذاته، فوجوده وعدمه كلاهما بعلة، لأنه إذا وجد فقد حصل له الوجود متميزاً من عدمه، وإذا عدم حصل له عدم متميزاً من الوجود. فلا يخلو إما أن يكون كل واحد من الأمرين يحصل له عن غيره أو لا عن غيره، فإن كان عن غيره فالغير هو العلة؛ وإن كان لا يحصل عن غيره.

(٥) ومن البين أن كل ما لم يوجد ثم وجد فقد تخصص بأمر جائر غيره. وكذلك في عدمه، وذلك لأن هذا التخصص إما أن تكفى فيه ماهية الأمر أو لا تكفى فيه ماهية، فإن كانت ماهيته تكفى لأي الأمرين كان، حتى يكون [٣٩] حاصلاً، فيكون ذلك الأمر واجب الماهية لذاته، وقد فرض غير واجب؛ هذا خلف. وإن كان لا يكفى فيه وجود ماهيته، بل أمر يضاف إليه وجود ذاته، فيكون وجوده لوجود شيء آخر غير ذاته لا بد منه، فهو علة، فله علة. وبالجملة فإنما يصير أحد الأمرين واجبا له، لا لذاته، بل لعلة. أما المعنى الوجودي فبعلة، هي علة وجودية. وأما المعنى العدمي فبعلة، هي عدم العلة للمعنى الوجودي، وعلى ما علمت.

(٦) فنقول: إنه يجب أن يصير واجباً بالعلة، وبالقياص إليها. فإنه إن لم يكن واجباً، كان عند وجود العلة والقياص إليها ممكناً أيضاً، فكان يجوز أن يوجد وأن لا يوجد غير متخصص بأحد الأمرين، وهذا محتاج من رأس إلى وجود شيء ثالث يتعين له به الوجود عن عدمه، أو العدم عن الوجود عند وجود العلة، فيكون ذلك علة أخرى، ويتبادى الكلام إلى غير النهاية. وإذا تبادى إلى غير النهاية لم يكن، مع ذلك، قد تخصص له وجوده، فلا يكون قد حصل له وجود، وهذا محال، لأنه ذاهب إلى غير النهاية

an infinity of causes—for this is a dimension.² the impossibility of which is still open to doubt in this place—but because no dimension has been arrived at through which its existence is specified, when it has been supposed to be existing. Hence, it has been shown to be true that whatever is possible in its existence does not exist unless rendered necessary with respect to its cause.

(7) We [further] say: It is impossible for the Necessary Existent to be equivalent to another necessary existent so that this would exist with that and that would exist with this, neither being the cause of the other [but] both, rather, being equal with respect to the matter of the necessity of existence. [This is] because, if the essence of the one is considered in itself, apart from the other, then it would have to be either [(a)] necessary in itself or [(b)] not necessary in itself.

(8) If [(a)] necessary in itself, then either it would have also a necessity with respect to the other, whereby a thing would be both a necessary existent in itself and a necessary existent through another (which, as we have seen, is impossible); or it would have no necessity by reason of another and, hence, it would not be necessary for its existence to be consequent on the existence of the other, and it follows necessarily that its existence would have no relation with the other such that it exists only when this other exists.

(9) But, if [(b)] it is not necessary in itself, then, considered in itself, it must be possible in existence and considered, with respect to the other, necessary in existence. From this it follows that either the other is of the same [state] or [it is] not. [If not, then it would not be equivalent in existence.] If the other is of the same [state], then it follows that the necessity of existence of this [one] derives from that [other] when that [other] is either [(i)] within the bounds of possible existence or [(ii)] within the bounds of necessary existence.

(10) If the necessary existence of this [one] derives from that [other]—that [other] being within the bounds of necessary existence—and does not derive from itself or some prior third thing, as we have stated in a previous context, but [derives] from that from which it comes to be, then a condition of the necessary existence of this [one] becomes the necessary existence of what occurs thereafter [as a consequence of] its necessary existence, the posteriority [here] being in essence. As such, no necessary existence is realized at all for it. If [on the other hand] the necessary existence of this [one] derives from that [other]—[that other] being within the bounds of

في العلل فقط، فإن هذا في هذا الموضوع بُعد مشكوك في إحالته، بل لأنه لم يوجد بُعد ما به يتخصص وقد فرض موجوداً. فقد صح أن كل ما هو ممكن الوجود لا يوجد ما لم يجب بتقياس إلى علته.

(٧) ونقول: ولا يجوز أن يكون واجب الوجود مكافئاً لواجب وجود آخر، حتى يكون هذا موجوداً مع ذلك، وذلك موجوداً مع هذا، وليس أحدهما [٤٠] علة للآخر، بل هما متكافئان في أمر لزوم الوجود. لأنه لا يخلو إذا اعتبر ذات أحدهما بذاته دون الآخر، إما أن يكون واجبا بذاته أو لا يكون واجبا بذاته.

(٨) فإن كان واجبا بذاته فلا يخلو إما أن يكون له وجوب أيضاً باعتباره مع الثاني، فيكون الشيء واجب [الوجود] بذاته، وواجب الوجود لأجل غيره، وهذا محال، كما قد مضى، وإما أن لا يكون له وجوب بالآخر، فلا يجب أن يتبع وجوده وجود الآخر، ويلزمه أن لا يكون لوجوده علاقة بالآخر، حتى يكون إنما يوجد إذا وجد الآخر هذا.

(٩) وأما إن لم يكن واجبا بذاته، فيجب أن يكون باعتبار ذاته ممكن الوجود، وباعتبار الآخر واجب الوجود. فلا يخلو حينئذ إما أن يكون الآخر كذلك أو لا يكون، فإن كان الآخر كذلك فلا يخلو حينئذ إما أن يكون وجوب الوجود لهذا من ذلك، وذلك في حد إمكان الوجود، أو في حد وجوب الوجود.

(١٠) فإن كان وجوب الوجود لهذا من ذلك، وذلك هو في حد وجوب الوجود، وليس من نفسه، أو من ثالث سابق، كما قلناه في وجه سلف، بل من الذي يكون منه، كان وجوب وجود هذا شرطاً فيه وجوب وجود ما يحصل بعد وجوب وجوده، بتدعية بالذات؛ فلا يحصل له وجوب وجود ألبتة. وإن كان وجوب الوجود لهذا من ذلك، وذلك

possibility—then the necessary existence of this [one] derives from the essence of that [other] when [that other] is within the bounds of possibility. The essence of that [other] which is within the bounds of possibility would bestow necessary existence on this [one], having derived not possibility but necessity from this [one]. Thus, the cause of [that one] is the possible existence of this [one], whereas the possible existence of this [one] is not caused by that [other]. As such, the two cannot be equivalent—I mean, that whose causality is essential and that which is essentially caused.

(11) Another [circumstance]³ occurs [relating to the above argument]: namely, that, if the possible existence of that [one] is the cause of the necessary existence of this [one], then the existence of [the latter] is not connected with the necessary existence of [the former], but only with its possibility. It follows, then, that the existence of [the latter] is possible with the nonexistence of [the former], when both have been supposed to be equivalent—and this is contradictory. Hence, it is impossible for the two to be existentially equivalent in the circumstance of not being attached to an external cause. Rather, one must be the one that is essentially prior, or else there must be some other external cause that either necessitates both by necessitating the relation between them or necessitates the relation between them by necessitating them.

(12) The two related things [are such that] one is not necessitated by the other but is [necessary] *with* the other, that which necessitates them being the cause that brought them together (and also the two substances or two subjects described by the two [relatives]). The existence of the two subjects or substances alone is not sufficient to [make] the two [related], a third thing that combines the two [being required]. This is because the existence of each of the two and its true nature would either consist in their being with the other [or not].⁴ [If they consist in being with the other,] then the existence of [each] in itself would not be necessary. It thus becomes possible and, hence, becomes caused. Its cause, as we have stated, would not be equivalent [to it] in existence. As such, its cause would therefore be something else, and hence [the existent] and its cause would not be the cause of the relation between the two, but [the cause would be] that other.

(13) [If, on the other hand, the existence and true nature of each] does not consist in [being with the other], then the conjunction of the two would be an occurrence pertaining to the proper⁵ existence of each and consequent to it. Also, the existence proper to the one would not be due to its equivalence inasmuch as it is equivalent, but due to a prior cause, if it is caused. Then its existence would be due either [(a)] to its companion, not inasmuch as the latter is its equivalent, but due to the existence that

في حد الإمكان، فيكون وجوب وجود هذا من ذات ذلك وهو في حد الإمكان، ويكون ذات ذلك في حد الإمكان مفيداً لهذا وجوب وجود، وليس له حد الإمكان مستقداً من هذا، بل الوجوب. [٤١] فتكون العلة لهذا إمكان وجود ذلك، وإمكان وجود ذلك ليس علة هذا، فيكونان غير متكافئين، أعنى ما هو علة بالذات ومعلول بالذات.

(١١) ثم يعرض شيء آخر وهو، أنه إذا كان إمكان وجود ذلك هو علة إيجاب وجود هذا، لم يتعلق وجود هذا بوجوبه؛ بل بإمكانه. فوجب أن يجوز وجوده مع عدمه وقد فرضا متكافئين؛ هذا خلف. فإذا لم يكن أن يكونا متكافئين الوجود، في حال ما لا يتعلقان بعلة خارجية، بل يجب أن يكون أحدهما هو الأول بالذات، أو يكون هناك سبب خارج آخر يوجبهما جميعاً بإيجاب العلاقة التي بينهما أو يوجب العلاقة بإيجابهما.

(١٢) والمضافان ليس أحدهما واجباً بالآخر، بل مع الآخر، والموجب لهما العلة التي جمعتهم، وأيضاً المادتان أو الموضوعان أو الموصوفان بهما. وليس يكفى وجود المادتين أو الموضوعين لهما وحدهما، بل وجود ثالث يجمع بينهما. وذلك لأنه لا يخلو إما أن يكون وجود كل واحد من الأمرين حقيقة هو أن يكون مع الآخر، فوجوده بذاته يكون غير واجب، فيصير ممكناً، فيصير معلولاً، ويكون كما قلنا ليس علة مكافئة في الوجود، فتكون إذن علة أمراً آخر، فلا يكون هو الآخر علة للعلاقة التي بينهما، بل ذلك الآخر. (١٣) وإما أن لا يكون، فتكون المعية طارئة على وجوده الخاص لاحقة له. وأيضاً فإن الوجود الذي يخصه لا يكون عن مكافئه من حيث هو مكافئه؛ بل عن علة مقدمة إن كان معلولاً. فحينئذ إما أن يكون وجوده ذلك عن صاحبه، لا من حيث يكافئه، [٤٢]

B O O K E I G H T
*On knowing the First Principle of all
existence and on knowing His attributes;
[consisting of] seven chapters*

Chapter [One]

On the finitude of the efficient and the receptive causes

(1) Now that we have arrived at this stage in our book, it behooves us to conclude it with [the question] of the knowledge of the First Principle of all existence—whether He exists, whether He is one (having no companion in His rank, and no equal)—and to indicate His rank in existence, the ordering of the existents and their ranks below Him, and the state of return to Him, [in all this] seeking His help.

(2) The first thing we ought to do in this is to show that the causes are in all respects finite, that in each of their classes there is a first principle, that the Principle of all of them is one, that He differs from all [other] existents, that He alone is the Necessary Existent, and that, in the case of every [other] existent, the beginning of its existence is from Him.

(3) We say: As for [the fact] that the cause of a thing's existence coexists with it, it is [something] that has been previously presented and ascertained for you.¹

المقالة الثامنة

فى معرفة المبدأ الأول للوجود كله ومعرفة صفاته سبعة فصول

[الفصل الأول]

(١) فصل

فى تنهى العلل الفاعلية والقابلية

(١) [٣٢٧] وإذ قد بلغنا هذا المبلغ من كتابنا، فبالحرى أن نختمه بمعرفة المبدء الأول للوجود كله وأنه هل هو موجود، وهل هو واحد لا شريك له فى مرتبته ولا نذ له، ونذل على مرتبته فى الوجود، وعلى ترتيب الموجودات دونه ومراتبها، وعلى حال العود إليه، مستعينين به.

(٢) فأول ما يجب علينا من ذلك أن ندل على أن العلل من الوجوه كلها متناهية، وأن فى كل طبقة منها مبدأ أول، وأن مبدأ جميعها واحد، وأنه مبين لجميع الموجودات، واجب الوجود وحده، وأن كل موجود فمنه ابتداء وجوده.

(٣) فنقول: أما أن علة الوجود للشيء تكون موجودة معه فقد سلف لك وتحقق.

(4) We then say: If we suppose an effect and suppose for it a cause, and for its cause a cause, it is impossible that for every cause there would be a cause *ad infinitum*. [This is] because, [with regard to] the effect, its cause, and the cause of its cause, if all [three] are considered in relation to each other, the cause of the cause would be a first absolute cause to the two things, the two things having the relation of being an effect to it, even though they would differ in that one is an effect through an intermediary [and] the other an effect without an intermediary. This [being an absolute cause] would not be the case either with the last or the middle [effect] because the middle—which is the cause that is contiguous with the effect—is a cause of one thing only, whereas the [second] effect is not a cause of anything. Each of the three has a special characteristic. The special characteristic of the extreme which is caused is that it is not the cause of anything. The special characteristic of the other extreme is that it is the cause of all that is other than itself. The special characteristic of the intermediary is that it is the cause of one extreme and the effect of another extreme.

(5) The intermediary [will have this special characteristic] regardless of whether [it] is one or more than one and, if it is more than one, regardless of whether it is finitely ordered or infinitely ordered. For, if it is ordered in terms of a finite plurality, then the sum of the number between the two extremes would be as one intermediary that shares the specific characteristic of the intermediacy with respect to the two extremes, and each of the two extremes will [still] have [its] special characteristic.

(6) Similarly, if it is ordered as an infinite plurality and the extreme is not realized,² then the entire infinite extreme would share in the special characteristic of intermediacy. [This is] because whatever aggregate you take [from this infinite chain] would be a cause for the existence of the last effect and would [itself] be caused, since each of one [of its members] would be caused and the aggregate would be dependent in its existence on it. What is dependent on what is caused is [itself] caused, except that this aggregate is a condition for the existence of the last effect and a cause of it. And, the more you add, [enlarging] the encompassment [of the intermediaries], the judgment regarding the infinite would remain [the same]. Hence, it is impossible for an aggregate of causes to exist without including an uncaused cause and a first cause. For [otherwise] all of what is infinite would be an intermediary, yet without an extreme, and this is impossible. The statement of one who says that they—I mean, the causes

(٤) ثم نقول: إنا إذا فرضنا معلولا، وفرضنا له علة، ولعلته علة، فليس يمكن أن يكون لكل علة علة بغير نهاية. لأن المعلول وعلة وعلة علة إذا اعتبرت جمعتها في القياس الذي لبعضها إلى بعض كانت علة العلة علة أولى مطلقة للأمرين، وكان للأمرين نسبة المعلولية إليهما، وإن اختلفا في أن أحدهما معلول بتوسط والآخر معلول بغير متوسط. ولم يكن كذلك الأخير، ولا المتوسط لأن المتوسط - لذى هو العلة المماسية للمعلول - علة [٣٢٨] لشيء واحد فقط والمعلول ليس علة لشيء. ولكل واحد من الثلاثة خاصية. فكانت خاصية الطرف المعلول أنه ليس علة لشيء. وخاصية الطرف الآخر أنه علة لكل غيره، وكانت خاصية المتوسط أنه علة لطرف ومعلول لطرف.

(٥) وسواء كان الوسط واحداً أو فوق واحد، فإن كان فوق واحد، فسواء ترتب ترتيباً متناهياً أو ترتب ترتيباً غير متناه؛ فإنه إن ترتب في كثرة متناهية كانت جملة عدد ما بين الطرفين كواسطة واحدة تشترك في خاصية الواسطة بالقياس إلى الطرفين، ويكون لكل واحد من الطرفين خاصية.

(٦) وكذلك إن ترتب في كثرة غير متناهية ولم يحصل الطرف، كان جميع الطرف غير المتناهي مشتركاً في خاصية الواسطة، لأنك أي جملة أخذت كانت علة لوجود المعلول الأخير، وكانت معلولة، إذ كل واحد منها معلول، والجملة متعلقة الوجود بها، ومتعلق الوجود بالمعلول معلول، إلا أن تلك الجملة شرط في وجود المعلول الأخير وعلة له. وكلما زدت في الحصر كان الحكم إلى غير النهاية باقياً. فليس يجوز إذن أن تكون جملة علل موجودة وليس فيها علة غير معلولة. وعلة أولى. فإن جميع غير المتناهي يكون واسطة بلا طرف وهذا محال. وقول القائل إنها - أعني العلل قبل العلل - تكون

preceding causes—are infinite ([this] with his admitting the existence of two extremes such that there would be two extremes and, between them, infinite intermediaries) does not impede the purpose we are after: namely, to establish the [existence of the] first cause.

5 (7) However, the statement of one who says that there are here two extremes and infinite intermediaries is a statement he utters with his tongue, without conviction. This is because, if [the intermediary] has an extreme, then it is finite in itself. For, if what is enumerated does not reach its extreme, then this is a meaning that pertains to the enumerated, not a meaning pertaining to the thing itself. For a thing to be finite
10 consists in its having an extreme, and whatever there is between two extremes is necessarily limited by the two.

(8) Thus, it has become evident from all these statements that there is here a first cause. For, [even] if that which is between the two extremes were not finite and the extreme exists, then that extreme would be a first
15 for what is infinite and a cause that is not caused.

(9) This explanation is suitable to be made an explanation for the finitude of all the classes of the kinds of causes, even though we have used it with respect to the efficient causes. Indeed, you have known that whatever has an order is finite by nature. This is in the *Physics*,³ even though it was similar to somewhat of an intrusion there. Let us, then, proceed to show the finitude of causes that are parts of the existence of a thing and [that are] temporally prior. These are the causes that are specifically designated as “elemental.” These constitute that [thing] from which
20 a[nother] thing comes to be by being an essential part of the [first] thing.

(10) In brief, understand by our saying “a thing from [another] thing” that something that belonged to a first thing entered the existence of a second. [This is] either the substance or essence belonging to the first thing (as, for example, the human in the boy, when it said that from him a man came to be), or a part of the substance and essence that
30 belonged to the first thing (as, for example, the hyle in the water, when it is said that air comes to be from it). Do not take into consideration what is understood of somebody’s statement that such and such is from such and such if the latter is posterior to it, where the expression “from”
35 indicates nothing of the essence of the first, but only posteriority.

بلا نهاية مع تسليمه لوجود الطرفين، حتى يكون طرفان وبينهما وسائط بلا نهاية، ليس
ينع غرضنا الذي نحن فيه، وهو إثبات العلة الأولى.

(٧) على أن قول القائل: أن ههنا طرفين ووسائط بغير نهاية قول يقوله باللسان،
دون الاعتقاد. وذلك لأنه إذا كان له طرف فهو متناه في نفسه، فإن كان الحصى [٣٢٩]
لا ينتهي إلى طرفه، فإن ذلك معنى في الحصى لا معنى في الشيء نفسه. وكون الأمر في
٥ نفسه متناهياً، هو أن يكون له طرف، وكل ما بين الطرفين فهو محدود ضرورة بهما.

(٨) فقد تبين من جميع هذه الأقاويل أن ههنا علة أولى. فإنه وإن كان ما بين الطرفين
غير متناه. ووجد الطرف، فذلك الطرف أول لما لا يتناهى، وهو علة غير معلول.

(٩) وهذا البيان يصلح أن يجعل بياناً لتناهى جميع طبقات أصناف العلل، وإن كان
استعمالنا له في العلة الفاعلية؛ بل قد علمت أن كل ذى ترتيب في الطبع، فانه متناه،
١٠ وذلك في الطبيعيات، وإن كان كالدخيل فيها. فلنقبل على بيان تناهى العلل التي تكون
أجزاء من وجود الشيء ومتقدمة في الزمان، وهى العلل التي تختص باسم العنصرية،
وهى ما يكون عنه الشيء، بأن يكون هو جزءاً ذاتياً للشيء.

(١٠) وبالجملة اعتبر بقولنا شيء من شيء أن يكون قد دخل في وجود الثاني أمر
كان للشيء الأول، إما الجوهر والذات الذى للشيء الأول، مثل الإنسان فى الصبى، إذا
١٥ قيل إنه كان منه رجل، أو جزء من الجوهر والذات الذى للشيء الأول، مثل الهوى فى
الماء، إذا قيل: إنه كان منه هواء. ولا تعتبر المفهوم من قول القائل: كان كذا من كذا، إذا
كان بعده، ولم تدل لفظ «من» على شيء من ذات الأول، بل على البعدية فقط.

(11) We say: A thing's being in another—not in the sense of [being] after the [other] thing, but in the sense that in the second there is something from the first included in its substance—is said in two ways:

(12) One of the two is in the sense that the first is what it is in that it moves by nature toward perfecting [itself] through the second. An example of this is the boy who is a boy only because he is on the path toward manhood. If he becomes a man, he does not undergo corruption but becomes complete. [This is] because no substantial thing is removed from him—nor, moreover, an accidental thing, except what is connected with deficiency and by his being still in potency with respect to final perfection.

(13) The second [way] is that it is not in the nature of the first [thing] to move toward the second, even though the disposition to receive its form adheres to it necessarily—not, however, with respect to its quiddity but by way of that which carries its quiddity. And, if the second is from it, it is not from its substance that is in actuality, except in the sense of “after,” but is from part of its substance—namely, the second part connected with potentiality. An example of this is water that becomes air only by the casting off of its watery form from its hyle, the form of air becoming realized for it.

(14) The first part, as it will not escape you, [is the one] where the substance belonging to the first [thing] will be the very [substance] that is realized for the second [thing]. [In the case of] the second part, it is not the very substance of the first [thing] that is realized for the second, but only a part of it, and the substance [in the first thing] undergoes corruption.

(15) Since, in the first of the two divisions, there is some substance which is prior [but now] existing in that which is posterior,⁴ it is either the very [substance that existed in the prior] or part of it. The second [thing] would be the sum of the substance of the first and a perfection added to it. And, since it has been previously known that the finite thing existing in actuality does not have actual parts—whether in terms of measure or meaning—that have orderings that are infinite, we will thereby dispense

(١١) فنقول: إن كون الشيء من الشيء لا بمعنى بعد الشيء، بل بمعنى أن في الثاني أمراً من الأول داخلاً في جوهره، يقال على وجهين:

(١٢) أحدهما بمعنى أن يكون الأول إنما هو ما هو بأنه بالطبع يتحرك إلى الاستكمال بالثاني. كالصبي إنما هو صبي لأنه في طريق السلوك إلى الرجولية مثلاً. فإذا صار رجلاً لم [٣٣٠] يفسد، ولكنه استكمل، لأنه لم يزل عنه أمر جوهري. ولا أيضاً أمر عرضي، إلا، يتعلق بالنقص، ويكونه بالقوة بعد إذا قيس إلى الكمال الأخير.

(١٣) والثاني أن يكون الأول ليس في طباعه أن يتحرك إلى الثاني، وإن كان يلزمه الإستعداد لقبول صورته، لا من جهة ماهيته. ولكن من جهة حامل ماهيته. وإذا كان منه الثاني، لم يكن من جوهره الذي بالفعل إلا بمعنى بعد، ولكن كان من جزء جوهره، وهو الجزء الثاني الذي يقارن القوة؛ مثل الماء إنما يصير هواء بأن تخلع عن هيولاه صورة المائية. ويحصل لها صورة الهوائية.

(١٤) والقسم الأول كما لا يخفى عليك، يحصل فيه الجوهر الذي للأول بعينه في الثاني. والقسم الثاني لا يحصل الجوهر الذي في الأول بعينه في الثاني، بل جزء منه ويفسد ذلك الجوهر.

(١٥) ولما كان في أول القسمين جوهر ما هو أقدم موجوداً فيما هو أشد تأخراً كان هو بعينه، أو هو بعض منه؛ وكان الثاني هو مجموع جوهر الأول وكمال مضاف إليه. ولما كان قد علم فيما سلف أن الشيء المتناهي الموجود بالفعل لا يكون له أبعاد بالفعل. كانت أبعاداً مقدارية أو معنوية لها تراتيب غير متناهية. فقد استغنيا بذلك

with engaging in showing whether or not it is possible for a subject of this sort to precede [another] subject, [and so on] *ad infinitum*.⁵

(16) As for the second of the two divisions, the necessity of finitude in it is also obvious. [This is] because the first [thing] is the second only in potency, by reason of the opposition between its form and the form of the second. This opposition is confined to the transformation of the two extremes in that each of the two is subject to the other, so that this is corrupted [to become] that and that [is corrupted to become] this. At this point, neither of the two is in reality prior to the other, but its priority would be accidental—in terms, that is, of individuality, not in terms of specificity. For this reason, the nature of water does not have a greater claim to be the principle of air than [the nature] of air has [to be the principle of] water; rather, it is as though the two are equivalent in existence.⁶ As for this individual [instance] of water, it can be [a principle] for this individual [instance] of air. And there is nothing to impede matters if it so happens that these individual [instances] have neither an end nor a beginning.

(17) We are not speaking here about what in its individuality (not in its specificity) is a principle and what is accidentally (not essentially) a principle. For we allow that there are infinite causes in the past and future. But it is incumbent on us to show finitude in the things that are causes in their essences. This is the state of affairs in the second of the two divisions—[this] after we also seek assistance from what has been said in the *Physics*.

(18) The first part, however, is the one where [the thing] in itself is a subjective [material] cause. But the converse, whereby the second becomes a cause of the first, does not obtain. For, inasmuch as the second is at [the stage] of completion and the first at [the stage] of moving toward completion, it is not possible that there would be a movement toward completion after completion has been realized in the way that it is possible for completion to take place after the movement toward completion. Thus, it is possible for a man to [come to be] from a boy, but it is not possible for a boy [to come to be] from a man.

عن أن نشغل ببيان أنه هل يمكن أن يكون موضوع من هذا القبيل قبل موضوع بلا نهاية، أو لا يمكن.

(١٦) وأما الثاني من القسمين فإنه من الظاهر أيضاً وجوب التناهي فيه، لأن الأول إنما هو بالقوة الثاني لأجل المقابلة التي بين صورته وبين صورة الثاني. وتلك المقابلة تقتصر في الإستحالة على الطرفين بأن يكون كل واحد من الأمرين موضوعاً للآخر، فيفسد هذا إلى ذاك، [٣٣١] وذلك إلى هذا. فحينئذ بالحقيقة لا يكون أحدهما بالذات متقدماً على الآخر، بل يكون تقدمه عليه بالعرض، أي باعتبار الشخصية دون النوعية. ولهذا ليس طبيعة الماء أولى بأن تكون مبدأ للهواء من الهواء للماء، بل هما كالمتكافئين في الوجود. وأما هذا الشخص من الماء فيجوز أن يكون لهذا الشخص من الهواء، ولا يمنع أن يتفق أن لا يكون لتلك الأشخاص نهاية أو بداية.

(١٧) وليس كلامنا هنا فيما هو بشخصيته مبدأ لا بتوعيته، وفيما هو بالعرض مبدأ لا بالذات. فإنما نجوز أن تكون هناك علل قبل علل بلا نهاية في الماضي والمستقبل. وإنما علينا أن نبين التناهي في الأشياء التي هي بذواتها علل، فهذا هو الحال في ثاني القسمين، بعد أن نستعين أيضاً بما قيل في الطبيعيات.

(١٨) والقسم الأول هو الذي هو بذاته علة موضوعية، ولا يتعكس فيصير الثاني علة للأول. فإن الثاني لما كان عند الاستكمال، والأول عند الحركة إلى الاستكمال، لم يجز أن تكون حركة إلى الاستكمال بعد حصول الاستكمال، كما يجوز أن يكون الاستكمال بعد الحركة إلى الاستكمال. فجاز رجل من صبي ولم يجز صبي من رجل. [٣٣٢]

Chapter [Two]

*Concerning doubts adhering to what has
been said, and the resolution thereof*

(1) We have preferred in this exposition to stay close to what has been
5 stated in the first teaching in the book bearing the name The Lesser
Alpha. There are doubts about this subject that we must bring forth, and
[we will] then devote ourselves to resolving them. Thus, someone may say:

(2) "The First Teacher did not exhaust the division in [the case of] a
10 thing's being from another, because he stated this [only] in two respects.
One of the two is a thing's generation from another that is contrary to
it—in general, generation [from another] by way of transformation. The
second is the thing's completing itself through the thing toward which it
moves and which is in the process of generation.

(3) "This does not exhaust the division, because everything that is
15 generated from another will first be generated in two ways—namely,
either that the first, from which [the thing] is generated, [remains] in the
way it exists, nothing of it ceasing to exist, only the notion of prepared-
ness or what relates to it becoming corrupted; or that the first [is such
that] it is only possible for the second to be generated from it by the ceas-
20 ing to exist of something from [this] first.

(4) "The first part [is such that] it is either [the case] that the thing
is generated from it only when [the latter] is disposed [for such] and,
thus, [the generated thing] becomes actual all at once, without adopting
a [gradual] path; or only [when] it is disposed, and [the generated thing]
25 becomes actual through a continuous motion, wherein it is in [a state]
between pure disposition and pure completion.

(5) "Thus, the generated thing in the first part is related to having
been generated from one state, as [in] our saying, 'From one ignorant of
such and such a matter, there came to be one knowledgeable [of it].' The
30 generated thing in the second part is, at one time, related to being gen-
erated from a state following a [gradual] path, as when we say, 'A man
came to be from a boy'; and, at another [time, it is related to being gen-
erated] from a state of being only disposed, as when we say, 'A man is

[الفصل الثاني]

(ب) فصل

فى شكوك تلزم ما قيل وحلها

(١) ونحن فقد آثرنا فى هذا البيان أن نحاذى المذكور منه فى التعليم الأول فى
٥ المقالة الموسومة بألف الصغرى، ثم على هذا الموضوع شكوك يجب أن نردها ثم نتجرّد
الحلها. فمن ذلك، أن لقاتل أن يقول:

(٢) إن المعلم الأول لم يستوف القسمة فى كون الشيء من شيء آخر، لأنه ذكر ذلك
على وجهين: أحدهما، كون الشيء عن آخر يضاده، وبالجملة الكون الذى على سبيل
الاستحالة؛ والثانى، كون الشيء المستكمل عن المتحرك إليه والذى فى طريق الكون.

(٣) وهذا غير مستوف للقسمة، لأن كل ما يكون عن الشيء يكون أولاً على
١٠ وجهين. وهو أنه لا يخلو: إما أن يكون الأول المكون منه هو على وجود ذاته لم يبطل منه
شيء. ولم يفسد إلا معنى الاستعداد أو ما يتعلق به، وإما أن يكون الأول إنما أمكن أن
يكون منه الثانى بزوال شيء من الأول.

(٤) والقسم الأول لا يخلو: أن يكون عنه الشيء، وقد كان مستعداً فقط، فخرج
١٥ إلى الفعل دفعة من غير سلوك، أو يكون قد كان مستعداً فقط فخرج إلى الفعل بحركة
متصلة كان فيها بين الاستعداد الصرف وبين الاستكمال الصرف. [٣٣٣]

(٥) فيكون الكائن فى القسم الأول ينسب أنه كان عن حالة واحدة، كقولنا: كان
عن الجاهل بأمر كذا عالم. والكائن فى القسم الثانى ينسب أنه كان تارة عن حالة سالكا،
كقولنا كان من الصبى رجل، وتارة عن حالة مستعداً فقط كقولنا: كان عن المنى رجل.

generated from a sperm.' For the designation 'boy' is for the one prepared to become perfected as a man while on the way [to becoming a man], whereas the term 'sperm' is [applied] to the one prepared to become a human without the condition of being on the way [to becoming a human].

(6) "Thus the First Teacher has left out from the divisions that which completion is, where that from which it is generated is not related to the motion that is towards perfection. Moreover, not every actualization from a pure preparedness is a perfection. For the soul may believe the erroneous opinion and move from potentiality to actuality regarding it. But [it] would not be by way of perfection, nor, moreover, by way of transformation.

(7) "Also, generable things are formed from the elements. They thus become transformed when mixed, but not corrupted in their essential forms, as you have known. Hence, the mixture would not exist in them, not because the opposite of the mixture ceases to exist, but simply because of its nonexistence. This division would not belong to the division exemplified by air coming to be from water. This is because the elements do not become corrupted in their species but become transformed. Nor does it belong to the division exemplified by the man coming to be from the boy. [This is] because this is not convertible; thus, the boy would not come to be with the corruption of the man, whereas [in the former case] it is convertible. Thus, from the mixture there would come to be something that becomes mixed after the corruption of the [first] mixture.

(8) "Moreover, [Aristotle] did not discuss the subject inasmuch as it is the subject, but only in terms of what the expression 'generation from a thing' indicates. It is known that this is not said of every relation of the generated thing to its subject. For [that thing] among¹ [the things] disposed to have a thing generated through perfecting itself has no name with respect to its being [something that has] a disposition; and no change from its state prior to its becoming something actualized accompanies it. Thus, it is not said that a thing is generated from it. Hence, it is not said that a man is generated from the human, but [only] from the boy.

فإن اسم الصبي هو للمستعد أن يستكمل رجلاً. وهو في السلوك، واسم المنى للمستعد أن يكون إنساناً لا بشرط أن يكون في السلوك.

(٦) فقد ترك المعلم الأول من الأقسام ما كان استكمالاً، وكان الكون منه غير منسوب إلى الحركة نحو الاستكمال. وأيضاً فإنه ليس كل خروج عن استعداد صرف إلى فعل استكمالاً. فإن النفس تعتقد الرأى الخطأ فيخرج إلى الفعل فيه من القوة، ويكون ليس على سبيل الاستكمال. ولا أيضاً على سبيل الاستحالة.

(٧) وأيضاً فإن العناصر تتكون منها الكائنات فتكون مستحيلة عند الامتزاج غير فاسدة في صورتها الذاتية على ما علمت، فيكون المزاج غير كائن فيها [لا] لزوال ضد المزاج بل عدمه فقط، فيكون هذا القسم ليس هو من القسم الذي مثل له بكون الهواء من الماء. وذلك لأن العناصر لا تفسد في أنواعها عند المزاج بل تستحيل، ولا من القسم الذي مثل له بكون الرجل من الصبي؛ لأنه كان لا ينعكس؛ فلا يكون الصبي بفساد الرجل، وههنا ينعكس، فيكون من الممتزج شيء عنه امتزج بعد فساد المزاج.

(٨) وأيضاً فإنه إنما تكلم لا على الموضوع، بما هو الموضوع، بل بما يدل عليه لفظ الكون من الشيء. ومعلوم أن هذا لا يقال لكل نسبة للمتكون إلى موضوعه؛ فإن ما كان من [٣٣٤] المستعدات التي يكون منها الشيء بالاستكمال لا اسم له من جهة ما هو مستعد، ولا يلحقه تغير عن حالته التي له قبل الخروج إلى الفعل. فلا يقال إن الشيء كان منه. فلا يقال كان من الإنسان رجل، ولكن من الصبي، لأن الصبي اسم له من جهة ما هو ناقص، ولأنه لا يتم إلا باستحالات أيضاً في طريق السلوك. فكأنه لما سمي كان له معنى يدل عليه لاسم يزول عنه عند الخروج إلى الفعل؛ كأنه ما لم يتوهم فيه زوال أمر ما،

[This is] because 'boy' is a name for [the boy] by way of his being incomplete and because he becomes complete only through transformations [that take place] also on the way of development. It is as though, when named [it] has a meaning indicating a name that will cease [to apply to] him once he becomes actualized [as a man]. It is as though, as long as one does not imagine the ceasing to exist of something in it by virtue of which it deserves the name, one does not say that something is generated from it. From this it comes out that the formation of that in which the generated thing's relation to the subject is not named is not included in this division; and from this it comes out that the relation to the subject is accidental, not essential. [This is] because the boy inasmuch as he is a boy cannot become man such that he would be [both] boy and man. Rather, the meaning understood by the term 'boy' is corrupted so that it becomes 'man.' Thus, in the last analysis, generation from the boy comes to have the meaning of 'after'; and, moreover, [Aristotle] would then be talking only about the subjects that are accidental.

(9) "Moreover, if air is generated from water, then either it is, in some manner, its element, or it is not. If it is not, then preoccupation with its mention is vain. If it is, then it does not necessarily follow that, if the air changes in its active quality into water, thus becoming an element of it, it would not change in some other quality and thereby become an element of another thing—for example, if, in its moistness, it becomes an element of fire without reverting back into water. The same would apply to fire with respect to another quality not contrary to which air [was] transferred. The material causes would, hence, regress infinitely without reverting back to [a former state]. Thus, it has not become evident from what he posited that it must necessarily revert [to its former state], but only the possibility of [such] reversion has become evident. The possibility of finitude is connected with this. [However,] this is not what he is seeking after, his quest being the necessity of finitude."

(10) Let us now begin with resolving these doubts. We say:

(11) The words of the First Teacher are best [understood as] pertaining only to the principles of substance inasmuch as it is substance, not inasmuch as it is substance subjected to the occurrence to it of that which would neither render its substantiality subsistent nor, moreover, perfect it. Hence, his discourse on the generation of substance from its element or from a subject belonging to it would be either by way of the species of substance absolutely, or by way of the perfection of the species of substance.

كان له بسببه استحقاق الاسم، لم يقل إنه يكون منه شيء. فيعرض من هذا أن تكون ما لا يسمى فيه نسبة الكائن إلى الموضوع غير داخل في هذه القسمة ويعرض منه أن تكون النسبة إلى الموضوع بالعرض لا الذي بالذات، لأن الصبي بما هو صبي لا يجوز أن يصير رجلاً، حتى يكون هو صبيًا ورجلاً. بل ينسد المعنى المفهوم من اسم الصبي حتى يصير رجلاً. فيكون الكون من الصبي آخر الأمر بمعنى بعد ويكون أيضاً إنما يتكلم على الموضوعات التي بالعرض.

(٩) وأيضاً فإنه لا يخلو: إما أن يكون الماء إذا كان منه الهواء عنصراً له بوجه، أو لا يكون. فإن لم يكن فلا اشتغال بذكره باطل. وإن كان فليس يجب إذا كان الهواء يستحيل في كَيْفِيَّتِهِ الفاعلة إلى المائية، فيصير عنصراً له أن لا يستحيل في كَيْفِيَّةٍ أُخْرَى، فيصير عنصراً لشيء آخر، مثلاً في رطوبته فيصير عنصراً للنار من غير أن يرجع ماء؛ ثم كذلك النار في كَيْفِيَّةٍ أُخْرَى غير مقابلة للتي فيها استحالة إليها الهواء. فتكون العلل المادية تذهب إلى غير نهاية، من غير أن ترجع؛ فإذا [٣٣٥] لم يتبين من وضعه أنه يجب أن يرجع لا محالة، بل بان إمكان الرجوع. ويتعلق بذلك إمكان التناهي. فليس ذلك مطلوبه، بل مطلوبه وجوب التناهي.

(١٠) ولنشرع الآن في حل هذه الشكوك فنقول:

(١١) الأولى أن يكون كلام المعلم الأول، إنما هو في مبادئ الجوهر - بما هو جوهر - لا بما هو جوهر معروض له ما لا يقوم جوهرية، ولا أيضاً يكمله. فيكون كلامه في كون الجوهر من عنصره، أو من موضوع له، إما على سبيل كون نوع الجوهر مطلقاً، وأما على سبيل كون كمال نوع الجوهر.

(12) It is also the most appropriate thing to [understand] his discourse to pertain to natural, not artificial, generation. If this is the case, then the element would be an essential part in the existence of the existing being and also of the thing generated from it. I do not mean by "essential" that it is necessary for the existence of what is composed from it and another. For this [state of affairs] exists also for the element in engendered beings that are not essential—as, for example, [the existence of] the element in a white body. But by "essentiality" I mean that the element's being a part is something essential to [the thing], so that that element will not subsist in actuality unless it is a part of that thing—or [a part] of that for which the thing is a natural perfection, since [the element] would then be part of a substance or something else governed by the same rule [that governs the substance]. [I do] not [mean] that the element would [initially] subsist without that [thing] and that, subsequently, it would come about for it to become part of [something] composed of it and of an accident in it that neither renders it subsistent nor perfects that which it renders subsistent (whereby its being a part would be essential [only] with respect to the composite and would not be essential with respect to itself). Rather, it must never be devoid of being a part.

(13) If this is the case, the subject is not without one of two [alternative] things.

(14) [The first alternative] is that it is rendered subsistent either by this thing or by another that takes its place. Thus, there would have been in it, prior to the occurrence of the engendered form, some other thing that plays the same role in rendering it subsistent, except that [the form] would not [now] coexist with that [thing]. Hence, from the element and [from] that thing there would have occurred a substance, [but] when the second came to be, that [former] composite substance became corrupted. This, then, is one of the two [alternative] divisions.

(15) [The second alternative] is that the element may be rendered subsistent, not by this thing that has been engendered, but by a form which has not been completed in terms of what naturally belongs to it. It has, however, come to be in such a way that it merely rendered matter subsistent, without the realization of that thing which is by nature the final cause of this form. Thus, the substance would have become realized, but not realized perfectly in [its] nature. If, then, that perfection belongs to it by nature (natural power being the principle of motion toward perfection that is by nature), it follows by necessity that such a thing would not exist in its state of natural wholeness for a time wherein there is

(١٢) والأولى أيضاً أن يكون كلامه في الكون الطبيعي دون الصناعي. وإذا كان كذلك كان العنصر جزءاً ذاتياً في وجود الكائن وأيضاً في وجود المتكون منه. لست أعني بالذاتي أنه يكون ضرورياً لوجود المركب منه ومن غيره، فإن هذا أيضاً موجود للعنصر في الأكوام غير الذاتية، مثل العنصر في الجسم الأبيض. ولكن أعني بالذاتية أن يكون كون العنصر جزءاً أمراً ذاتياً له، فلا يقوم ذلك العنصر بالفعل إلا أن يكون جزءاً لذلك الشيء أو لما الشيء كمانه الضيعي، إذ يكون جزءاً للجوهر أو لآخر، حكمه حكمه، لأن يكون العنصر يقوم دون ذلك. ثم عرض له أن صار جزءاً من مركب منه ومن عرض فيه، ليس هو مقوماً له ولا مكملًا يقومه، فيكون كونه جزءاً هو ذاتي بالقياس إلى المركب، وليس ذاتياً بالقياس إلى ذاته. بل يجب أن لا يعزى عن كونه جزءاً.

(١٣) وإذا كان كذلك. لم يخل الموضوع من أحد أمرين:

(١٤) إما أن يكون مقوماً بهذا الشيء أو بآخر يقوم مقامه، فيكون قد كان فيه قبل حصول الصورة الحادثة فيه شيء آخر يقوم مقامها في تقويمه إلا أنها لا تجتمع مع هذا؛ [٣٣٦] فيكون قد كان حصل من العنصر ومن ذلك الشيء جوهر، فلما كان الثاني فسد ذلك الجوهر المركب. وهذا أحد القسمين.

(١٥) وإما أن يكون لعنصر قد يقوم لا بهذا الشيء الذي حدث، ولكن بصورة غير مستكملة فيما لها بالطبع، ولكنها قد حصلت بحيث يقوم المادة فقط، ولم يحصل الأمر الذي هو علة غائية لهذه الصورة بالطبع؛ فيكون الجوهر قد حصل ولم يحصل كاملاً بالطبع. وإذا كان ذلك الكمال كاملاً له بالطبع، والقوة الطبيعية مبدأ الحركة إلى الكمال الذي بالطبع، فيلزم ضرورة أن لا يكون هذا الشيء موجوداً على سلامته الطبيعية زماناً

no impediment for it, while not moving by nature toward that perfection. It follows necessarily, then, in this division, that the thing possessing the disposition is in motion toward perfection.

(16) It has become clear, then, that all the types of the generation of substance that are considered in this way fall necessarily under one of these two divisions; likewise, [it is clear that], in all the types of the generation of one thing from another, the recipient in both [divisions] is an essential part, considered [both] in itself and considered with respect to the composite.

(17) One should not say that it is possible that the natural power does not move toward its perfection due to the lack of an external helper or [because of] a preventive impediment—an example of the first being the absence of sunlight for grains and seeds, and of the second, diseases that cause wilting. The answer to this is that the words of the First Teacher are not about that which necessarily moves in actuality. Rather, they pertain to that which [is such] that, if there were no impediment to its nature and where the natural causes that naturally assist its nature exist, then it would be moving toward perfection and it would be on the way of development.

(18) It has become evident, then, that the rest of the divisions are not intended in this investigation, [but] only the division mentioned [above]. Indeed, [applying] this rule in the rest of the divisions would not be sound. For it is possible in [what is] other than the generation of substance that, if we suppose a subject with which one begins, that it would continue—by reason of accidental matters—to acquire one disposition after another without coming to an end. An example of this is wood. For, whenever you inform it with a certain shape, it becomes disposed through this for some [other] thing; and, if its disposition is actualized, it becomes disposed for something else. The case is similar with the soul in its apprehension of the intelligibles—and it seems that there is nothing to impede [the application of] this idea in natural transformations.

لا عائق له فيه وهو غير متحرك بالطبع إلى ذلك الكمال: فإذا نلزم ضرورة في هذا القسم أن يكون المستعد متحركاً إلى الكمال.

(١٦) فقد ظهر إذن أن جميع أصناف كون الجواهر الذي بحسب هذا النظر هو داخل تحت أحد هذين القسمين ضرورة؛ وكذلك جميع أصناف ما هو كون الشيء عن شيء يكون ذلك القابل في كليهما جزءاً ذاتياً باعتباره في نفسه، وباعتباره بالقياس إلى المركب.

(١٧) وليس لقاتل أن يقول: إنه يجوز أن تكون القوة الطبيعية لا تتحرك إلى كمالها لإعواز معين من خارج أو عائق مانع. مثال الأول فقدان ضوء الشمس في الحبوب والبذور؛ ومثال الثاني الأمراض المذبلة. فالجواب عن ذلك أن كلام المعلم الأول ليس في الذي يكون لا محالة يتحرك بالفعل، بل في الذي لو لم يكن عائق لطبيعته، وكانت الأسباب الطبيعية المعاضدة بالطبع لطبيعته موجودة، كان متحركاً إلى الكمال وكان في طريق السلوك. [٣٣٧]

(١٨) فقد ظهر إذن أن سائر الأقسام غير مقصودة في هذا البحث إلا القسم المذكور؛ بل هذا الحكم غير صحيح في سائر الأقسام. فانه يجوز في غير كون الجواهر إذا فرضنا موضوعاً مبتدأً أن لا يزال يكتسب استعداداً بعد استعداد لأمر عرضية من غير أن يتناهي، كالخشب. فإنك كلما شكلته بشكل استعداد بذلك لأمر، وإذا خرج استعداده إلى الفعل، استعداد لأمر آخر. وكذلك النفس في إدراك المعقولات، ويشبه أن تكون الاستحالات الطبيعية لا يمنع فيها هذا المعنى.

(19) As for the difficulty that has been mentioned concerning the generation of things from the elements, that it does not belong to either of the two divisions, its resolution becomes evident from what has been said—namely, that the element singly is not disposed for the reception of animal and vegetative forms, but that this disposition is realized for it by means of the quality that occurs in it through mixture. And in the mixture there necessarily occurs some transformation in terms of a natural thing belonging to it, even though it is not [something] that renders [it] subsistent. Hence, its relation to the form of the mixture belongs to the division of what comes to be through transformation. If the mixture occurs in it, then the reception of the animal form would be a perfection of that mixture for it and [its] nature would move it toward [that perfection]. Thus, its relation to the animal form would be [akin to the] relation of the form of the boy to the man. For this reason, the animal form is not corrupted to become purely a mixture, just as the boy does not come to be from the man, whereas the mixture becomes corrupted to what the simple form necessitates, as in the case of water transforming into air. Animal is not an element of the substance of elements but is transformed to them inasmuch as they are simple.

(20) [This] mixture and simplicity therefore succeed each other over the subject. Simplicity does not render the substance of the element subsistent but completes the nature of each of them inasmuch as it is simple. Thus, fire would be pure fire in [terms of] the quality that is in it that is a necessary concomitant of its form, the same being the case with water and with every one of the elements. Therefore, the generation of animal relates two [types of] generation, each with a governing rule proper to it with respect to the necessity of finitude. It is, thus, also included in the two mentioned divisions [above].

(21) As for the difficulty that arises with respect to the fact that [Aristotle] took from the elements only that of which it is habitually said that a thing is generated from it, not that [of which] it is not habitually [so said], the answer to this difficulty is that the rules governing things do not change with respect to names, but one must seek the meaning. Let us, then, seek [the meaning], and let us know the [true] state of affairs regarding it. We say:

(١٩) وأما الشبهة المذكورة في كون الأشياء من العناصر . وأنه ليس على أحد القسمين . فحلها يظهر أيضاً مما قد قيل ، وهو أن العنصر مفرداً ليس مستعداً لقبول الصور الحيوانية والنباتية ، بل يحصل له ذلك الاستعداد بالكيفية التي يحدث فيه المزاج . والمزاج يحدث فيه لا محالة استحالة ما في أمر طبيعي له ، وإن لم يكن مقوماً . فتكون نسبة إلى صورة المزاج من القسم الذي يكون بالاستحالة . وإذا حصل فيه المزاج كان قبول صورة الحيوانية له استحالة لذلك لمزاج ، ويتحرك الطبع به إليه . فتكون نسبة إلى صورة الحيوانية نسبة الصبي إلى الرجل . فلذلك ليست تفسد الصورة الحيوانية إلى أن تصير مجرد مزاج ، كما لا يكون الصبي من الرجل ، ويفسد المزاج إلى موجب الصورة البسيطة . كما يستحيل الماء إلى الهواء . وليس الحيوان عنصراً لجوهر العناصر . بل يستحيل إليها من حيث هي بسيطة .

(٢٠) فيكون إذن الامتزاج والبساطة يتعاقبان على الموضوع . والبساطة ليست تقوم جوهر العناصر ولكن تكمل طبيعة كل واحد منها ، من حيث هو بسيط . فتكون النار نارا صرفة في الكيفية التي فيها ، اللازمة لصورتها ، وكذلك الماء ، وكذلك كل واحد من العناصر . فإذا كون الحيوان يتعلق بكونين ، ولكل واحد منهما حكم يخصه من وجوب التامهي . فهو داخل أيضاً في القسمين المذكورين . [٣٣٨]

(٢١) وأما الشبهة التي تعرض من جهة أنه إنما أخذ من العناصر ما جرت به العادة بأن يقال : إن الشيء منه دون ما لم تجربته العادة ، فالجواب عن تلك الشبهة هو أنه ليس بتغير أحكام الأشياء من جهة الاسماء ، ولكن يجب أن يقصد المعنى ؛ فلنقصد ولنعرف الحال فيه فنقول :

(22) If the element or subject from which a thing is generated precedes [the generated] thing in time, then it has, in terms of its priority, a special characteristic which will not exist when [the generated thing] is realized—namely, the strong disposition. The substance is only generated from [the element] because of its disposition to receive its form. If the disposition ceases to exist with the actualization [that takes place], then the substance would exist, and it is impossible to say that it is being generated from [the disposition].

(23) If, then, with respect to the disposition, it did not have a name, but one takes for it its name which it has in itself and which also belongs to it when it is not possible for the thing to be generated from it, [this] would not be the name with which the meaning of generation is connected. If it did not have a name with respect to disposition, then it cannot be expressed by utterance, even if the meaning is realized in existence. And, if the meaning belonging to the thing named is realized in [something] other than the thing named, then its rule governing the meaning [of the latter] would be identical with the rule governing the meaning of the [former], even though the nonexistence of the name prohibits its rule governing the utterance from being identical with the rule governing the utterance of [the former].

(24) If we take the statement that would belong to that name if it were posited, we would be able, then, to say about everything, "It comes to be from the element belonging to it." For example, it would be possible for us to say, "The rational soul comes to be from an ignorant soul disposed to knowledge," except that we disallow the use of the expression "generation" for what is outside generation in substance. Thus, we are not permitted to say concerning the rational soul, "It came to be from a soul disposed toward knowledge." But this is necessarily allowed in substances, and this is what we are speaking about. Nonetheless, as I consider it, this rule does not differ with respect to substances and their essences and substances with their states.

(25) As for the statement of that [person] who says,² "This would be a coming to be from something in the sense of 'after' [another]," [the answer is that there] is not any meaning of "after" that would render void the generation we are seeking.³ For the generated thing comes to be after that from which it is generated. Rather, what the First Teacher rejected as spurious and did not discuss is that there is no other meaning

(٢٢) إن العنصر أو الموضوع الذى يكون منه الشيء إذا كان يتقدمه فى الزمان، فإن له من جهة تقدمه له خاصية لا تكون مع حصوله له، وهى الاستعداد القوى. وإنما يتكون الجوهر منه لأجل استعداده لقبول صورته. وأما إذا زال الاستعداد بالخروج إلى الفعل، وجد الجوهر وكان محالاً أن يقال إنه متكون منه.

(٢٣) فإذا لم يكن له من جهة الاستعداد اسم، بل أخذ له اسمه الذى لذاته الذى يكون له أيضاً عندما لا يجوز أن يتكون منه الشيء، لم يكن هو الاسم الذى يتعلق بمعناه التكون. فإن لم يكن له من جهة الاستعداد اسم، لم يمكن أن يقال باللفظ، وإن كان المعنى حاصلًا فى الوجود: وإذا كان المعنى الذى يكون للمسمى حاصلًا فى غير المسمى كان حكمه فى المعنى حكم ذلك، وإن كان عدم الاسم يمنع أن يكون حكمه فى اللفظ حكم ذلك.

(٢٤) فإذا أخذنا القول الذى يكون لذلك الاسم لو كان موضوعاً أمكننا حينئذ أن نقول فى كل شيء: إنه يكون من العنصر له؛ مثلاً أمكننا أن نقول: إن النفس العاقلة تكون من نفس جاهلة مستعدة للعلم، إلا أن نمنع استعمال لفظ يكون فيما خلا التكون الذى فى الجوهر. فلا يجوز أن نقول فى النفس العاقلة: إنها كانت من نفس مستعدة للعلم؛ ولكن يجوز لا محالة فى الجواهر، وكلامنا فيها. على أنه فيما أحسب لا يختلف هذا الحكم فى الجواهر مع ذواتها، وفى الجواهر مع أحوالها. [٣٣٩]

(٢٥) وأما قول هذا القائل: إن هذا يكون كوناً من الشيء بمعنى بعد، فليس إذا كان بمعنى بعد كيف كان، لم يكن الكون الذى قصده؛ فإنه لا بد فى كل كون عن شيء أن يكون الكائن بعد ما عنه كان، إنما الذى يزيده العلم الأول ولا يتعرض له هو أن لا يكون

[involved] except posteriority, as in the example he gives and explains. If, however, it is generated from the thing in the sense of being posterior to it, in that there remains in it from the substance that [the generator] had that which is also [part] of the substance of the second, then it is not [generated from it] in the sense of [being] posterior only, and this would be the thing we are discussing.

(26) As for the statement of that [person] who says, "[Aristotle] discussed the element that is accidental, not the element that is essential," a sophism befell it, for the reason that the element for generation is not identical with the element for rendering something subsistent in the consideration [of this matter], even though in essence it is one and the same. For the element in essence for generation is an essence connected with potentiality, whereas the element in essence for rendering [something] subsistent is an essence connected with actuality. Each of them is an element by accident to that to which it is not an element by essence. [Aristotle's] discussion is concerned with the element that is for generation, not for rendering [something] subsistent. Thus, he would only have taken the element by accident if he had taken the element for generation as a principle for rendering [something] subsistent. For the boy is not an element for the rendering of the man subsistent, nor would the subsistence of the man be from him; but he is an element for the coming to be of the man, and [it is] from him [that] the coming to be of the many takes place.

(27) If someone says, "The First Teacher is discussing the principles of subsistence absolutely, why, then, does he avoid [discussing] the element belonging to substance in its subsistence—as, for example, the subject of the heavens—restricting himself to the element belonging to substance in its generation?" The answer to this is [as follows]:

(28) The element of its subsistence is part of it, existing in it in actuality. The finitude of things existing in actuality within something finite existing in actuality is not problematic. Howbeit, he who has advanced to study this science and has known the rest of what has preceded will find problematic, in the matter of the finitude and infinity of causes, only [the question] of whether the same [state of affairs] obtains in the elements that are potentially one after the other, differing in proximity and remoteness.

(29) As for the other doubt concerning the discourse about water and air, its solution is easy for one who has known our discussion about the elements where we discussed generation and corruption. The discourse here, however, pertains to generation of one thing from another

هناك معنى غير البعدية، مثل المثل الذى يضربه ويشرحه. وأما إذا كان من الشيء بمعنى أن كان بعده. بأن بقى له من جوهره الذى كان أولاً ما هو أيضاً من جوهر الثانى، لم يكن بمعنى بعد فقط، وكان الذى كلامنا فيه.

(٢٦) وأما قول هذا القائل: إنه تكلم فى العنصر الذى بالعرض دون العنصر الذى بالذات، فقد وقعت فيه مغالطة بسبب أن العنصر للكون ليس هو بعينه العنصر للقوام فى الاعتبار. وإن كان هو هو بالذات. فإن العنصر بالذات للكون هو ذات مقارنة للقوة، والعنصر بالذات للقوام هو ذات مقارنة للفعل، وكل واحد منهما هو عنصر بالعرض لما ليس هو عنصراً له بالذات. وكلامه فى العنصر الذى للكون، لا فى الذى للقوام. فيكون إنما أخذ العنصر بالعرض لو أخذ العنصر الذى للكون مبدأً للقوام. فإن الصبى ليس عنصراً لقوام الرجل ولا يكون منه قوام الرجل، ولكنه عنصر لكون الرجل ويكون منه كون الرجل. (٢٧) فإن قال قائل: إن المعلم الأول إنما يتكلم فى مبادئ الجوهر مطلقاً، فلم أعرض عن العنصر الذى للجوهر فى قوامه، مثل موضوع السماء، واقتصر على العنصر الذى للجوهر فى كونه؟ فالجواب عن ذلك:

(٢٨) أن عنصر قوامه جزء منه، وهو معه بالفعل، ولا يشكل تنهاى الأمور الموجودة بالفعل فى شيء متناه موجود بالفعل. على أن من بلغ أن يتعلم هذا العلم، [٣٤٠] ووقف على سائر ما سلف، فإنما يشكل عليه من أمر تنهاى العال ولا تنهاىها أنه هل يمكن أن يكون كذلك فى العناصر التى بالقوة واحداً بعد آخر مختلفة بالقرب والبعد.

(٢٩) وأما الشك الآخر فى حديث الماء والهواء، فحله سهل على من وقف على كلامنا فى العناصر، حيث تكلمنا فى الكون والفساد. على أن الكلام هنا فى كون

essentially. Every change from that which is in essence is in one opposition, being confined to it. Thus, that which is essentially generated from it becomes necessarily corrupted in terms of it. The same applies to the other [instance] as well, so that the totality of changes becomes restricted, each class of them confined to two extremes, the one reverting to the other. Thus, all the mentioned difficulties have been resolved.

Chapter [Three]

On showing the finitude of the final and formal causes; on proving [the existence of] the first principle in an absolute manner; on making decisive the statement on the first cause absolutely and on the first cause restrictedly, showing that what is absolutely a first cause is a cause for the rest of the causes

(1) As for the finitude of the final causes, [this] becomes clear to you from the place in which we attempted to establish their existence and [where] we resolved the doubts concerning them. For, if the existence of the final cause is established, its finitude is established. This is because the perfect [final] cause is the one for the sake of which all things are, it itself not being for the sake of anything else. For, if beyond the perfect [final] cause there is a perfect [final] cause, the first would be for the sake of the second. The perfect [final] cause would thus not be a perfect [final] cause, when it has been supposed to be a perfect [final] cause. If this is the case, then whoever allows perfect [final] causes to proceed continuously one after the other would have denied causes that in themselves are perfect [and final], negating the nature of the good which is the perfect [final] cause, since the good is that which is sought for its own sake, everything else being sought for its sake. For, if something is sought for the sake of some other thing, then it would be [merely] beneficial, not a true good.

(2) It has thus become clear that rendering the infinity of perfect [final] causes necessitates the removal of perfect [final] causes. For, whoever allows the possibility that beyond every perfect end there is a perfect end annuls the rational act. For it is self-evident that the rational being

الشيء من الشيء بالذات. وكل تغير من الذي بالذات فهو في مضادة واحدة مقتصر عليها. فيكون الذي كان عنها بالذات يفسد إليها ضرورة، وفي الأخرى كذلك، فتكون جملة التغيرات محصورة، وكل طبقة منها مقتصرة على طرفين نرجع بأحدهما على الآخر. فقد انحلت جميع الشبه المذكورة.

[الفصل الثالث]

(ج) فصل

في إبانة تنهى العلة الغائية والصورية وإثبات المبدأ الأول مطلقاً. وفصل القول في العلة الأولى مطلقاً، وفي العلة الأولى مقيداً. وبيان أن ما هو علة أولى مطلقة علة لساير العلل.

(١) وأما تنهى العلة الغائية فيظهر لك من الموضع الذي حاولنا فيه إثباتها وحللتنا الشكوك في أمرها. فإن العلة الغائية إذا ثبت وجودها ثبت تنهايتها؛ وذلك لأن العلة التامة هي التي تكون ساير الأشياء لأجلها، ولا تكون هي من أجل شيء آخر. فإن كان وراء العلة التامة علة تامة كانت الأولى لأجل الثانية، فلم تكن الأولى علة تامة، وقد فرضت علة تامة. [٢٤١] فإذا كان كذلك، فمن جوز أن تكون العلة التامة تستمر واحدة بعد أخرى، فقد رفع العلة التامة في نفسها، وأبطل طبيعة الخير التي هي العلة التامة، إذ الخير هو الذي يطلب لذاته، وسائر الأشياء تطلب لأجله. فإذا كان شيء يطلب لشيء آخر كان نافعاً لاخيراً حقيقياً.

(٢) فقد اتضح أن في إيجاب لا تنهى العلة التامة رُفَع العلة التامة؛ فإن من جوز أن وراء كل تمام تماماً فقد أبطل فعل العقل. فإنه من البين بنفسه أن العاقل إنما يفعل ما

performs only whatever rational act he performs because he seeks an objective and a final end. [This is] so much so that, if an agent among us were to perform an act without having a rational purpose, it is said that he is acting frivolously and recklessly, that he acts not inasmuch as he is someone possessing reason but inasmuch as he is an animal.

(3) If this is the case, then the things which the rational person qua rational person enacts must be limited, yielding objectives that are sought for their own sake. And, if the rational act can have only a limited objective—this not belonging to the rational act inasmuch as it is a rational act, but inasmuch as it is an act through which the agent seeks an end, and, hence, it is as it is by way of being something having a purpose—then its having a purpose disallows the possibility of there being a purpose for every purpose. It is thus obvious that the statement of someone who says that beyond every purpose there is a purpose is not true. As for natural and animal acts, it has also been known from other places that they are for the sake of teleological ends.

(4) Regarding the formal cause of the thing, the finitude [of formal causes] is quickly understood from what has been said in the *Logic* and from what has been known regarding the finitude of the parts existing in actuality for the thing according to a natural order—that the complete form of a thing is one, that the multiple comes about from it by way of generality and particularity, that generality and particularity require the natural order, and that that which has a natural order is known to be finite. Reflecting on this much [of the matter] is sufficient and dispenses with lengthy elaboration.¹

(5) We [now] begin and say: If we say [that something is] a first efficient principle—rather, a first absolute principle—then it must necessarily be one. If, however, we say [it is] a first elemental principle and a first formal principle and the like, [such a principle] would not have the same necessity of being one as the necessity of this in the Necessary Existent. [This is] because none of [these causes] would be a first absolute cause because the Necessary Existent is one and has the status of the efficient principle. Hence the one, the Necessary Existent, would also be a cause of these first [causes].

يفعل بالعقل لأنه يؤم مقصوداً وغاية، حتى إنه إذا كان فاعل ما منا يفعل فعلاً وليس له غاية عقلية، قيل إنه يعيث ويجازف ويفعل لا بما هو ذو عقل، ولكن بما هو حيوان.

(٣) وإذا كان هذا هكذا، فيجب أن تكون الأمور التي يفعلها العاقل بما هو عاقل

محدودة، تفيد غايات مقصودة لأنفسها. وإذا كان الفعل العقلي لا يكون إلا محدود

الغاية، وليس ذلك للفعل العقلي من جهة ما هو فعل عقلي، بل من جهة ما هو فعل يؤم به

الفاعل الغاية، فهو إذن كذلك من جهة ما هو ذو غاية، فإذن كونه ذا غاية يمنع أن يكون

لكل غاية غاية. فظاهر أنه لا يصح قول القائل: إن كل غاية وراءها غاية. وأما الأنفال

الطبيعية والحيوانية، فقد علم أيضاً في مواضع أخرى أنها لغايات.

(٤) وأما العلة الصورية للشيء فيفهم عن قريب تناهيهما بما قيل في المنطق، وبما

علم من تناهى الأجزاء الموجودة للشيء بالفعل على ترتيب طبيعي، وأن الصورة التامة

للشيء واحدة، وأن الكثير يقع منها على نحو العموم والخصوص، وأن العموم والخصوص

يقتضى الترتيب الطبيعي، وماله ترتيب طبيعي فقد علم تناهيه. وفي تأمل هذا القدر كفاية

وغنية عن التطويل. [٣٤٢]

(٥) ونبتدئ فنقول: إذا قلنا مبدأ أول فاعلي، بل مبدأ أول مطلق فيجب أن يكون

واحداً. وأما إذا قلنا علة أولى عنصرية، وعلة أولى صورية، وغير ذلك، لم يجب أن

تكون واحدة وجوب ذلك في واجب الوجود، لأنه لا تكون ولا واحد منها علة أولى

مطلقاً، لأن واجب الوجود واحد، وهو في طبقة المبدأ الفاعلي. فيكون الواحد الواجب

الوجود هو أيضاً مبدأ وعلة لتلك الأوائل.

(6) It has become evident from this and from what we have previously explained that the Necessary Existent is numerically one. It has [also] become evident that everything other than Him, if considered in itself, [is found to be] possible in its existence and hence caused, and it is seen that, [in the chain of things] being caused, [the caused existents] necessarily terminate with Him. Therefore, everything, with the exception of the One who in His essence is one and the existent who in His essence is an existent, acquires existence from another, becoming through it an existent, being in itself a nonexistent. This is the meaning of a thing's being created—that is, attaining existence from another. It has absolute nonexistence which it deserves in terms of itself; it is deserving of nonexistence not only in terms of its form without its matter, or in terms of its matter without its form, but in its entirety. Hence, if its entirety is not connected with the necessitation of the being that brings about its existence, and it is reckoned as being dissociated from it, then in its entirety its nonexistence becomes necessary. Hence, its coming into being at the hands of what brings about its existence is in its entirety. No part of it, in relation to this meaning, is prior in existence—neither its matter nor its form, if it possesses matter and form.

(7) Hence, the whole, in relation to the first cause, is created. Its act of bringing into being that which comes to be from it would entirely rule out nonexistence in the substances of things. Rather, it is an act of bringing into existence that absolutely prevents nonexistence in things that bear perpetualness. This, then, is absolute creation. Bringing into existence [in the] absolute [sense] is not any kind of bringing into existence. And everything is originated from that One, that One being the originator of it, since the originated is that which comes into being after not having been.

(8) [Now,] if this posteriority were temporal, then the antecedent precedes it and ceases to exist with its origination. The [antecedent] would, hence, be described as something that was before and is now no more. Hence, nothing would have become disposed to become originated unless there had been something before it that ceases to exist by its coming into existence. Thus, origination from absolute nonexistence—which is creation—becomes false and meaningless. Rather, the posteriority here is essential posteriority. For, the state of affairs that a thing possesses from itself precedes that which it has from another. If it has existence and necessity from another, then from itself it has nonexistence and

(٦) فقد بان من هذا ومما سلف لنا شرحه، أن واجب الوجود واحد بالعدد، وبأن أن سواه إذا اعتبر ذاته كان ممكناً في وجوده، فكان معلولاً، ولاح أنه ينتهي في المعلولية لا محالة إليه. فإذا كل شيء إلا الواحد الذي هو لذاته واحد، والموجود الذي هو لذاته موجود، فإنه مستفيد الوجود عن غيره، وهو أئس به، وليس في ذاته. وهذا معنى كون الشيء مبدعاً أي نائل الوجود عن غيره، وله عدم يستحقه في ذاته مطلق، ليس إنما يستحق العدم بصورته دون مادته، أو بمادته دون صورته، بل بكيته. فكيته إذا لم تقترن بإيجاب الموجد له، واحتسب أنه منقطع عنه وجب عدمه بكيته. فإذا إيجاداه عن الموجد له بكيته. فليس جزء منه يسبق وجوده بالقياس إلى هذا المعنى، لا مادته ولا صورته، إن كان ذا مادة وصورة.

(٧) فالكل إذن بالقياس إلى العلة الأولى مبدع. وليس إيجاداه لما يوجد عنه إيجاداً [يمنع] العدم ألبته من جواهر الأشياء. بل إيجاداً يمنع العدم مطلقاً فيما يحتمل السرمد. فذلك هو الإبداع المطلق. والتأيس المطلق ليس تأيساً ما. وكل شيء حادث عن ذلك الواحد، وذلك الواحد محدث له إذ الحدث هو الذي كان بعد ما لم يكن.

(٨) وهذا البعد إن كان زمانياً سبقه القبل وعدم مع حدوثه، فكان شيء هو الموصوف بأنه قبله، وليس الآن. [٣٤٣] فلم يكن يتها أن يحدث شيء إلا وقبله شيء آخر يعدم بوجوده، فيكون الإحداث عن الليس المطلق، وهو الإبداع، باطلا لا معنى له. بل البعد الذي ههنا هو البعد الذي بالذات. فإن الأمر الذي للشيء من لقاء نفسه قبل الذي له من غيره. وإذا كان له من غيره الوجود والوجوب فله من نفسه العدم والامكان،

١ يمكن. يمنع