
Da-sein and Temporality

45. The Result of the Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Da-sein and the Task of a Primordial, Existential Interpretation of This Being

What was gained by our preparatory analysis of Da-sein, and what are we looking for? We have *found* the fundamental constitution of the being in question, being-in-the-world, whose essential structures are centered in disclosedness. The totality of this structural whole revealed itself as care. The being of Da-sein is contained in care. The analysis of this being took as its guideline existence,¹ which was defined by way of anticipation as the essence of Da-sein. The term *existence* formally indicates that Da-sein *is* as an understanding potentiality-of-being which is concerned in its being about its being. Thus existing, I myself am that being. The development of the phenomenon of care provided an insight into the concrete constitution of existence, that is, into its equiprimordial connection with facticity and with the falling prey of Da-sein.

We are *looking* for the answer to the question of the meaning of being in general, and above all the possibility of radically developing this basic question* of all ontology. But freeing the horizon in which something like being in general becomes intelligible amounts to clarifying the possibility of the understanding of being in general, an understanding which itself belongs to the constitution of that being which we

* By which, however, “onto-logic” is transformed at the same time (cf. *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, section IV).

call Da-sein.² The understanding of being, however, cannot be *radically* clarified as an essential factor in the being of Da-sein, unless the being to whose being it belongs has been *primordially* interpreted in itself with regard to its being.

Are we entitled to the claim that in characterizing Da-sein ontologically as care we have given a *primordial* interpretation of this being? By what standard is the existential analytic of Da-sein to be measured with regard to its primordiality or nonprimordiality? What then do we mean by the *primordiality* of an ontological interpretation?

Ontological inquiry is a possible way of interpretation which we characterized as a development and appropriation of an understanding.³ Every interpretation has its fore-having, its fore-sight, and its fore-conception. If such an interpretation becomes an explicit task of an inquiry, the totality of these “presuppositions” (which we call the *hermeneutical situation*) needs to be clarified and made secure beforehand both in a fundamental experience of the “object” to be disclosed, and in terms of that experience. In ontological interpretation beings are freed with regard to their own constitution of being. Such an interpretation obliges us first to give a phenomenal characterization of the being we have taken as our theme and thus bring it into the scope of our fore-having with which all the subsequent steps of our analysis are to conform. But at the same time these steps need to be guided by the possible fore-sight of the kind of being of the being in question. Fore-having and fore-sight then prefigure at the same time the conceptuality (fore-conception) to which all the structures of being are to be brought.

But a *primordial*, ontological interpretation requires not only in general that the hermeneutical situation be secured in conformity with the phenomena, but also the explicit assurance that *the totality* of the beings taken as its theme have been brought to a fore-having. Similarly, it is not sufficient just to make a first sketch of the being of these beings, even if it is phenomenally based. If we are to have a fore-sight of being, we must see it with respect to the *unity* of the possible structural factors belonging to it. Only then can the question of the meaning of the unity that belongs to the totality of being of all beings be asked and answered with phenomenal certainty.

Did the existential analysis of Da-sein which we made, arise from such a hermeneutical situation as will guarantee the primordiality that fundamental ontology requires? Can we proceed from the results attained—that the being of Da-sein is care—to the question of the primordial unity of this structural totality?

What is the status of the fore-sight which has been guiding our ontological procedure up to now? We defined the idea of existence as a potentiality of being, a potentiality that understands and is concerned

about its own being. But this *potentiality-of-being* that is always *mine* is free for authenticity or inauthenticity, or for a mode in which neither of these has been differentiated.⁴ Our previous interpretation was limited to an analysis of indifferent or inauthentic existence, starting out with average everydayness. Of course, it was possible and necessary to reach a concrete definition of the existentiality of existence in this way. Still, our ontological characterization of the constitution of existence was flawed by an essential lack. Existence means potentiality-of-being, but also authentic potentiality-of-being. As long as the existential structure of authentic potentiality-of-being is not incorporated in the idea of existence, the fore-sight guiding an *existential* interpretation lacks primordiality.

And what is the situation with the fore-having of the hermeneutical situation up to now? When and how did our existential analytic make sure that by starting with everydayness it forced *all of* Da-sein—this being from its “beginning” to its “end”—into the phenomenological view giving us our theme? We did assert that care is the totality of the structural whole of the constitution of being of Da-sein.⁵ But have we not at the very beginning of our interpretation renounced the possibility of bringing Da-sein as a whole to view? Everydayness is, after all, precisely the being “between” birth and death. And if existence determines the being of Da-sein and if its essence is also constituted* by potentiality-of-being, then, as long as Da-sein exists, it must always, as such a potentiality, *not yet be* something? A being whose essence is made up of existence essentially resists the possibility of being comprehended as a total being. Not only has the hermeneutical situation given us no assurance of “having” the whole being up to now; it is even questionable whether the whole being is attainable at all, and whether a primordial, ontological interpretation of Da-sein must not get stranded—on the kind of being of the thematic being itself.

One thing has become unmistakable. *Our existential analytic of Da-sein up to now cannot lay claim to primordiality.* Its fore-having never included more than the *inauthentic* being of Da-sein, of Da-sein as *fragmentary*. If the interpretation of the being of Da-sein is to become primordial as a foundation for the development of the fundamental question of ontology, it will have to bring the being of Da-sein in its possible *authenticity* and *totality* existentially to light beforehand.

Thus the task arises of placing Da-sein as a whole in our fore-having. However, that means that we must first unpack the question of this being’s potentiality-for-being-a-whole. As long as Da-sein is, something is

* at the same time: *already-being*.

234 always still outstanding, what it can and will be. But the “end” itself belongs to what is outstanding. The “end” of being-in-the-world is death. This end, belonging to the potentiality-of-being, that is, to existence, limits and defines the possible totality of Da-sein. The being-at-an-end* of Da-sein in death, and thus its being a whole, can, however, be included in our discussion of the possible *being* whole in a phenomenally appropriate way only if an ontologically adequate, that is, an *existential* concept of death has been attained. But as far as Da-sein[†] goes, death is only in an existentiell *being toward death*.[‡] The existential structure of this being turns out to be the ontological constitution of the potentiality-for-being-a-whole of Da-sein. Thus, the whole existing Da-sein can be brought into our existential fore-having. But can Da-sein also exist as a whole *authentically*? How is the authenticity of existence to be defined at all if not with reference to authentic existing? Where do we get our criterion for this? Obviously Da-sein itself in its being must present the possibility and way of its authentic existence, if such existence is neither imposed upon it ontically, nor ontologically fabricated. But an authentic potentiality-of-being is attested by conscience. Like death, this phenomenon of Da-sein requires a genuinely existential interpretation. It leads to the insight that an authentic potentiality-of-being of Da-sein lies in wanting-to-have-a-conscience. This existentiell possibility, however, tends, from the meaning of its being, to be made definite in an existentiell way by being toward death.

With the demonstration of an *authentic potentiality for-being-a-whole* of Da-sein our existential analytic has secured the constitution of the *primordial* being of Da-sein. But the authentic *potentiality for-being-a-whole* becomes visible as a mode of care. With this the phenomenally adequate basis for a primordial interpretation of the meaning of being of Da-sein is also secured.

The primordial ontological ground of the existentiality of Da-sein, however, is *temporality*. The articulated structural totality of the being of Da-sein as care first becomes existentially intelligible in terms of temporality. The interpretation of the meaning of being of Da-sein cannot stop with this fact. The existential-temporal analysis of this being needs concrete confirmation. We must go back and free the ontological structures of Da-sein already gained with regard to their temporal meaning. Everydayness reveals itself as a mode of temporality. But by thus repeating our preparatory fundamental analysis of Da-sein, the phenomenon of temporality itself will at the same time become more transparent. In

terms of temporality, it becomes intelligible why Da-sein is and can be historical in the ground of its being and, being *historical*, it can develop historiography.

If temporality constitutes the primordial meaning of being of Da-sein, and if this being is concerned *about its being* in its very being, then care must need “time” and thus reckon with “time.” The temporality of Da-sein develops a “time calculation.” The “time” experienced in such calculation is the nearest phenomenal aspect of temporality. From it originates the everyday, vulgar understanding of time. And that develops into the traditional concept of time.

The clarification of the origin of the “time” “in which” inner-worldly beings are encountered, of time as within-timeness, reveals an essential possibility of the temporalization of temporality. Now the understanding is being prepared for a still more primordial temporalization of temporality. In it is based the understanding of being that is constitutive for the being of Da-sein. The project of a meaning of being in general can be accomplished in the horizon of time.*

Thus the inquiry comprised in this division will traverse the following stages: The possible being whole of Da-sein and being toward death (chapter I); the attestation of Da-sein of an authentic potentiality-of-being and resolution (chapter II); the authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole of Da-sein and temporality as the ontological meaning of care (chapter III); temporality and everydayness (chapter IV); temporality and historicity (chapter V); temporality and within-timeness as the origin of the vulgar concept of time (chapter VI).[§]

* Presencing [*An-wesenheit*] (Arrival and Appropriation).

* “being”-toward-the-end.

[†] Thought in accordance with the essence of Da-sein.

[‡] being of nonbeing.

I

The Possible Being-a-Whole of Da-sein and Being-toward-Death

46. The Seeming Impossibility of Ontologically Grasping and Determining Da-sein as a Whole

The inadequacy of the hermeneutical situation from which the foregoing analysis originated must be overcome. With regard to the fore-having, which must necessarily be obtained, of the whole of Da-sein, we must ask whether this being, as something existing, can become accessible at all in its being. There seem to be important reasons that speak against the possibility of our required task, reasons that lie in the constitution of Da-sein itself.

Care, which forms the totality of the structural whole of Da-sein, obviously contradicts a possible being whole of this being according to its ontological sense. The primary factor of care, "being ahead of itself," however, means that Da-sein always exists for the sake of itself. "As long as it is," up until its end, it is related to its potentiality-of-being. Even when it, still existing, has nothing further "ahead of it," and has "settled its accounts," its being is still influenced by "being ahead of itself." Hopelessness, for example, does not tear Da-sein away from its possibilities, but is only an independent mode of *being toward* these possibilities. Even when one is without illusions and "is ready for anything," the "ahead of itself" is there. This structural factor of care tells us unambiguously that something is always still *outstanding* in Da-sein which has not yet become "real" as a potentiality-of-its-being. A *constant unfinished quality* thus lies in

the essence of the constitution of Da-sein. This lack of totality means that there is still something outstanding in one's potentiality-for-being.

However, if Da-sein "exists" in such a way that there is absolutely nothing more outstanding for it, it has also already thus become no-longer-being-there. Eliminating what is outstanding in its being is equivalent to annihilating its being. As long as Da-sein is as a being, it has never attained its "wholeness." But if it does, this gain becomes the absolute loss of being-in-the-world. It is then never again to be experienced *as a being*.

The reason for the impossibility of experiencing Da-sein ontically as an existing whole and thus of defining it ontologically in its wholeness does not lie in any imperfection of our *cognitive faculties*. The hindrance lies on the side of the *being* of this being. What cannot even *be* in such a way that an experience of Da-sein could pretend to grasp it, fundamentally eludes being experienced. But is it not then a hopeless undertaking to try to discern the ontological wholeness of being of Da-sein?

As an essential structural factor of care, "being ahead of itself" cannot be eliminated. But is what we concluded from this tenable? Did we not conclude in a merely formal argumentation that it is impossible to grasp the whole of Da-sein? Or did we not at bottom inadvertently posit Da-sein as something objectively present ahead of which something not yet objectively present constantly moves along? Did our argumentation grasp not-yet-being and the "ahead-of-itself" in a genuinely existential sense? Did we speak about "end" and "totality" in a way phenomenally appropriate to Da-sein? Did the expression "death" have a biological significance or one that is existential and ontological, or indeed was it sufficiently and securely defined at all? And have we actually exhausted all the possibilities of making Da-sein accessible in its totality?

We have to answer these questions before the problem of the wholeness of Da-sein can be dismissed as nothing. The question of the wholeness of Da-sein, both the existentiell question about a possible potentiality-for-being-a-whole, as well as the existential question about the constitution of being of "end" and "wholeness," contain the task of a positive analysis of the phenomena of existence set aside up to now. In the center of these considerations we have the task of characterizing ontologically the being-toward-the-end of Da-sein and of achieving an existential concept of death. Our inquiry related to these topics is structured in the following way: The possibility of experiencing the death of others, and the possibility of grasping the whole of Da-sein (section 47); what is outstanding, end and wholeness (section 48); how the existential analysis of death is distinguished from other possible interpretations of this phenomenon (section 49); preliminary sketch of the existential and

237

ontological structure of death (section 50); being toward death and the everydayness of Da-sein (section 51); everyday being toward death and the complete existential concept of death (section 52); the existential project of an authentic being toward death (section 53).

47. The Possibility of Experiencing the Death of Others and the Possibility of Grasping Da-sein as a Whole

When Da-sein reaches its wholeness in death, it simultaneously loses the being of the there. The transition to no-longer-being-there lifts Da-sein right out of the possibility of experiencing this transition and of understanding it as something experienced. This kind of thing is denied to actual Da-sein in relation to itself. The death of others, then, is all the more penetrating. In this way, an end of Da-sein becomes "objectively" accessible. Da-sein can gain an experience of death, all the more because it is essentially being-with with others. This "objective" givenness of death must then make possible an ontological analysis of the totality of Da-sein.

Thus from the kind of being that Da-sein possesses as being-with-one-another, we might glean the fairly obvious information that when the Da-sein of others has come to an end, it might be chosen as a substitute theme for our analysis of the totality of Da-sein. But does this lead us to our intended goal?

Even the Da-sein of others, when it has reached its wholeness in death, is a no-longer-being-there in the sense of no-longer-being-in-the-world. Does not dying mean going-out-of-the-world and losing being-in-the-world? Yet, the no-longer-being-in-the-world of the deceased (understood in an extreme sense) is still a being* in the sense of the mere objective presence of a corporeal thing encountered. In the dying of others that remarkable phenomenon of being can be experienced that can be defined as the transition of a being from the kind of being of Da-sein (or of life) to no-longer-being-there. The *end* of the being qua Da-sein is the *beginning* of this being qua something objectively present.

This interpretation of the transition from Da-sein to something merely objectively present, however, misses the phenomenal content in that the being still remaining does not represent a mere corporeal thing. Even the objectively present corpse is, viewed theoretically, still a possible object for pathological anatomy whose understanding is oriented toward the idea of life. Merely-being-objectively-present is "more" than a *lifeless*, material thing. In it we encounter something *unliving* which has lost its life.

* *ein Sein*—Tr.

But even this way of characterizing what still remains does not exhaust the complete phenomenal findings with regard to Da-sein.

The "deceased," as distinct from the dead body, has been torn away from "those remaining behind," and is the object of "being taken care of" in funeral rites, the burial, and the cult of graves. And that is so because he is "still more" in his kind of being than an innerworldly thing at hand to be taken care of. In lingering together with him in mourning and commemorating, those remaining behind *are with* him, in a mode of concern which honors him. Thus the relation of being to the dead must not be grasped as a being together with something at hand which *takes care of it*.

In such being-with with the dead, the deceased *himself* is no longer factically "there." However, being-with always means being-with-one-another in the same world. The deceased has abandoned our "*world*" and left it behind. It is *in terms of this world* that those remaining can still *be with him*.

The more appropriately the no-longer-being-there of the deceased is grasped phenomenally, the more clearly it can be seen that in such being-with with the dead, the real having-come-to-an-end of the deceased is precisely *not* experienced. Death does reveal itself as a loss, but as a loss experienced by those remaining behind. However, in suffering the loss, the loss of being as such which the dying person "suffers" does not become accessible. We do not experience the dying of others in a genuine sense; we are at best always just "there" too.

And even if it were possible and feasible to clarify "psychologically" the dying of others, this would by no means let us grasp the way of being we have in mind, namely, coming-to-an-end. We are asking about the ontological meaning of the dying of the person who dies, as a potentiality-of-being of *his being*, and not about the way of being-with and the still-being-there of the deceased with those left behind. If death as experienced in others is to be the theme of our analysis of the end of Da-sein and its totality, this cannot give us what it presumes to give, either ontically or ontologically.

After all, taking the dying of others as a substitute theme for the ontological analysis of the finished character of Da-sein and its totality rests on an assumption that demonstrably fails altogether to recognize the kind of being of Da-sein. That is what one presupposes when one is of the opinion that any Da-sein could arbitrarily be replaced by another, so that what cannot be experienced in one's own Da-sein is accessible in another Da-sein. But is this assumption really so groundless?

Indubitably, the fact that one Da-sein *can be represented* by another belongs to the possibilities-of-being of being-with-one-another in the world. In the everydayness of taking care of things, constant use of such

representability is made in many ways. Any going to . . . , any fetching of . . . , is representable in the scope of the "surrounding world" initially taken care of. The broad multiplicity of ways of being-in-the-world in which one person can be represented by another extends not only to the used-up modes of public being with one another, but concerns as well the possibilities of taking care of things limited to definite circles, tailored to professions, social classes, and stages of life. But the very meaning of such representation is such that it is always a representation "in" and "together with" something, that is, in taking care of something. Everyday Da-sein understands itself initially and for the most part, however, in terms of *what* it is accustomed to take care of. "One *is*" what one does. With regard to this being (the everyday being-absorbed-with-one-another in the "world" taken care of), representability is not only possible in general, but is even constitutive for being-with-one-another. *Here* one Da-sein can and must, within certain limits, "*be*" another Da-sein.

However, this possibility of representation gets completely stranded when it is a matter of representing the possibility of being that constitutes the coming-to-an-end of Da-sein and gives it its totality as such. *No one can take the other's dying away from him.* Someone can go "to his death for an other." However, that always means to sacrifice oneself for the other "*in a definite matter*." Such dying for . . . can never, however, mean that the other has thus had his death in the least taken away. Every Da-sein must itself actually take dying upon itself. Insofar as it "is," death is always essentially my own. And it indeed signifies a peculiar possibility of being in which it is absolutely a matter of the being of my own Da-sein. In dying, it becomes evident that death* is ontologically constituted by mineness and existence.¹ Dying is not an event, but a phenomenon to be understood existentially in an eminent sense still to be delineated more closely.

But if "ending," as dying, constitutes the totality of Da-sein, the being of the totality itself must be conceived as an existential phenomenon of my own Da-sein. In "ending," and in the totality thus constituted of Da-sein, there is essentially no representation. The way out suggested fails to recognize this existential fact when it proposes the dying of others as a substitute theme for the analysis of totality.

Thus the attempt to make the totality of Da-sein phenomenally accessible in an appropriate way gets stranded again. But the result of these considerations is not just negative. They were oriented toward the phenomena, even if rather crudely. We have indicated that death is an existential phenomenon. Our inquiry is thus forced into a purely

* The relation of Da-sein to death; death itself—its arrival—entrance, dying.

existential orientation toward my own Da-sein. For the analysis of death as dying, there remains only the possibility of bringing this phenomenon either to a purely *existential* concept or, on the other hand, of renouncing any ontological understanding of it.

Furthermore, it was evident in our characterization of the transition from Da-sein to no-longer-being-there as no-longer-being-in-the-world that the going-out-of-the-world of Da-sein in the sense of dying must be distinguished from a going-out-of-the-world of what is only alive. The ending of what is only alive we formulate terminologically as perishing. The distinction can become visible only by distinguishing the ending characteristic of Da-sein from the ending of a living thing.² Dying can, of course, also be conceived physiologically and biologically. But the medical concept of "exitus" does not coincide with that of perishing.

From the previous discussion of the ontological possibility of conceiving of death, it becomes clear at the same time that substructures of beings of a different kind of being (objective presence or life) thrust themselves to the fore unnoticeably and threaten to confuse the interpretation of the phenomenon, even the *first appropriate presentation* of it. We can cope with this problem only by looking for an ontologically adequate way of defining constitutive phenomena for our further analysis, such as end and totality.

48. What is Outstanding, End, and Totality

Our ontological characterization of end and totality can only be preliminary in the scope of this inquiry. To perform this task adequately we must not only set forth the *formal* structure of end in general and totality in general. At the same time, we must disentangle the structural variations possible for them in different realms, that is, deformalized variations which are related to definite beings with content and structurally determined in terms of their being. This task again presupposes a sufficiently unequivocal and positive interpretation of the kinds of being that require a regional separation of the whole of beings. The understanding of these ways of being, however, requires a clarified idea of being in general. The task of adequately carrying out the ontological analysis of end and totality gets stranded not only because the theme is so far-reaching, but because there is a difficulty in principle: in order to master this task, we must presuppose that precisely what we are seeking in this inquiry (the meaning of being in general) is something that we have found already and with which we are quite familiar.

In the following considerations, the "variations" in which we are chiefly interested are those of end and totality; these are ontological determinations of Da-sein which are to lead to a primordial interpreta-

tion of this being. With constant reference to the existential constitution of Da-sein already developed, we must initially try to decide how ontologically inappropriate to Da-sein are the concepts of end and totality initially forcing themselves upon us, no matter how indefinite they are categorially. The rejection of such concepts must be further developed to a positive *directive* to their specific realms. Thus our understanding of end and totality in their variant forms as existentials will be strengthened, and this guarantees the possibility of an ontological interpretation of death.

But if the analysis of the end and totality of Da-sein takes an orientation of such broad scope, this nevertheless cannot mean that the existential concepts of end and totality are to be gained by way of a deduction. On the contrary, it is a matter of taking the existential meaning of the coming-to-an-end of Da-sein from Da-sein itself and of showing how this "ending" can constitute a *being whole* of that being that exists.

What has been discussed up to now about death can be formulated in three theses:

1. As long as Da-sein is, a not-yet belongs to it, which it will be—what is constantly outstanding.
2. The coming-to-its-end of what is not-yet-at-an-end (in which what is outstanding is liquidated with regard to its being) has the character of no-longer-being-there.
3. Coming-to-an-end implies a mode of being in which the actual Da-sein absolutely cannot be represented by someone else.

In Da-sein there is inevitably a constant "fragmentariness" which finds its end in death. But may we interpret the phenomenal fact that this not-yet "belongs" to Da-sein as long as it is to mean that it is something *outstanding*? With regard to what kind of beings do we speak of something outstanding? The expression means indeed what "belongs" to a being, but is still lacking. Outstanding, as lacking, is based on a belongingness. For example, the remainder of a debt still to be paid is outstanding. What is outstanding is not yet available. Liquidating the "debt" as paying off what is outstanding means that the money "comes in," that is, the remainder is paid in sequence, whereby the not-yet is, so to speak, filled out until the sum owed is "all together." Thus, to be outstanding means that what belongs together is not yet together. Ontologically, this implies the unhandiness of portions to be brought in which have the same kind of being of those already at hand. The latter in their turn do not have their kind of being modified by having the remainder come in. The existing untogetherness is liquidated by a cumulative placing together. *The being for which something is outstanding has the*

243

kind of being of something at hand. We characterize the together, or the untogether based on it, as a *sum*.

The untogether belonging to such a mode of the together, lacking as something outstanding, can, however, by no means ontologically define the not-yet that belongs to Da-sein as its possible death. Da-sein does not have the kind of being of a thing at hand in the world at all. The together of the being that Da-sein is “in running its course” until it has completed “its course” is not constituted by a “progressive” piecing-on of beings that, somehow and somewhere, are already at hand in their own right. That Da-sein should *be* together only when its not-yet has been filled out is so far from being the case that precisely then it no longer is. Da-sein always already exists in such a way that its not-yet *belongs* to it. But are there not beings which are as they are and to which a not-yet can belong, without these beings necessarily having the kind of being of Da-sein?

For example, one can say that the last quarter of the moon is outstanding until it is full. The not-yet decreases with the disappearance of the shadow covering it. And yet the moon is, after all, always already objectively present as a whole. Apart from the fact that the moon is never *wholly* to be grasped even when it is full, the not-yet by no means signifies a not-yet-*being*-together of parts belonging together, but rather pertains only to the way we *grasp* it perceptually. The not-yet that belongs to Da-sein, however, not only remains preliminarily and at times inaccessible to one’s own or to others’ experience, it “is” not yet “real” at all. The problem does not pertain to the *grasp* of the not-yet of the character of Da-sein, but rather its possible *being* or *nonbeing*. Da-sein, as itself, has to *become*, that is, *be*, what it is not yet. In order to thus be able, by comparison, to define the *being of the not-yet of the character of Da-sein*, we must reflect on beings to whose kind of being becoming belongs.

For example, the unripe fruit moves toward its ripeness. In ripening, what it not yet is is by no means pieced together as something not-yet-objectively-present. The fruit ripens itself, and this ripening characterizes its being as fruit. Nothing we can think of which could be added on could remove the unripeness of the fruit, if this being did not ripen *of itself*. The not-yet of unripeness does not mean something other which is outstanding that could be objectively present in and with it in a way indifferent to the fruit. It means the fruit itself in its specific kind of being. The sum that is not yet complete is, as something at hand, “indifferent” to the unhandy remainder that is lacking. Strictly speaking, it can be neither indifferent to it nor not indifferent. The ripening fruit, however, is not only not indifferent to its unripeness as an other to itself, but, ripening, it *is* the unripeness. The not-yet is already included in its

own being, by no means as an arbitrary determination, but as a constituent. Correspondingly, Da-sein, too, is *always already its not-yet*³ as long as it is.

What constitutes the “unwholeness” in Da-sein, the constant being-ahead-of-itself, is neither a summative together which is outstanding, nor even a not-yet-having-become-accessible, but rather a not-yet that any Da-sein always has to be, given the being that it is. Still, the comparison with the unripeness of the fruit does show essential differences despite some similarities. To reflect on these differences means that we shall recognize how indefinite our previous discussion of end and ending has hitherto been.

Ripening is the specific being of the fruit. It is also a kind of being of the not-yet (unripeness), and is formally analogous to Da-sein in that the latter, as well as the former, always already *is* its not-yet in a sense yet to be defined. But even then, this does not mean that ripeness as “end” and death as “end” coincide with regard to the their ontological structure as ends. With ripeness, the fruit *fulfills* itself. But is the death at which Da-sein arrives a fulfillment in this sense? It is true that Da-sein has “completed its course” with its death. Has it thus necessarily exhausted its specific possibilities? Rather, are these not precisely what gets taken from it? Even “unfulfilled” Da-sein ends. On the other hand, Da-sein so little needs to ripen only with its death that it can already have gone beyond that ripeness before the end. For the most part, it ends in unfulfillment, or else disintegrated and used up.

Ending does not necessarily mean fulfilling oneself. It thus becomes more urgent to ask *in what sense, if any, death must be grasped as the ending of Da-sein*.

Initially, ending means *stopping*, and it means this in senses that are ontologically different. The rain stops. It is no longer objectively present. The road stops. This ending does not cause the road to disappear, but this stopping rather determines the road as this objectively present one. Hence ending, as stopping, can mean either to change into the absence of objective presence or, however, to be objectively present only when the end comes. The latter kind of ending can again be determinative for an *unfinished* thing objectively present, as a road under construction breaks off, or it may rather constitute the “finishedness” of something objectively present—the painting is finished with the last stroke of the brush.

But ending as getting finished does not include fulfillment. On the other hand, whatever has got to be fulfilled must reach its possible finishedness. Fulfillment is the mode of “finishedness,” and is founded upon it. Finishedness is itself possible only as a determination of something objectively present or at hand.

244

Even ending in the sense of disappearing can still be modified according to the kind of being of the being. The rain is at an end, that is, it has disappeared. The bread is at an end, that is, used up, no longer available as something at hand.

None of these modes of ending are able to characterize death appropriately as the end of Da-sein. If dying were understood as being-at-an-end in the sense of an ending of the kind discussed, Da-sein would be posited as something objectively present or at hand. In death, Da-sein is neither fulfilled nor does it simply disappear; it has not become finished or completely available as something at hand.

Rather, just as Da-sein constantly already *is* its not-yet as long as it is, it also always already *is* its end. The ending that we have in view when we speak of death, does not signify a being-at-an-end of Da-sein, but* rather a *being toward the end* of this being. Death is a way to be that Da-sein takes over as soon as it is. "As soon as a human being is born, he is old enough to die right away."⁴

Ending, as being toward the end, must be clarified ontologically in terms of the kind of being of Da-sein. And supposedly the possibility of an existing being of the not-yet that lies "before" the "end" will become intelligible only if the character of ending has been determined existentially. The existential clarification of being toward the end first provides the adequate basis for defining the possible meaning of our discussion of a totality of Da-sein, if indeed this totality is to be constituted by death as an "end."

The attempt to reach an understanding of the totality of Da-sein by starting with a clarification of the not-yet and proceeding to a characterization of ending has not yet attained its goal. It showed only *negatively* that the not-yet which Da-sein always *is* resists an interpretation as something outstanding. The end *toward* which Da-sein *is*, as existing, remains inappropriately defined by being-at-an-end. At the same time, however, our reflections should make it clear that their course must be reversed. A positive characterization of the phenomena in question (not-yet-being, ending, totality) can be successful only when it is unequivocally oriented toward the constitution of being of Da-sein. This unequivocal character, however, is protected in a negative way from being sidetracked when we have an insight into the regional belonging together of the structures of end and totality which belong to Da-sein ontologically.

The positive, existential, and ontological interpretation of death and its character of end are to be developed following the guideline of the fundamental constitution of Da-sein, attained up to now—the phenomenon of care.

* death as dying.

49. How the Existential Analysis of Death Differs from Other Possible Interpretations of This Phenomenon

The unequivocal character of the ontological interpretation* of death should be made more secure by explicitly bringing to mind what this interpretation can *not* ask about and where it would be useless to expect information and instructions.

In the broadest sense, death is a phenomenon of life.[†] Life must be understood as a kind of being to which belongs a being-in-the-world. It can only be defined in a privative orientation to Da-sein. Da-sein, too, can be considered as pure life. For the biological and physiological line of questioning, it then moves into the sphere of being which we know as the world of animals and plants. In this field, dates and statistics about the life-span of plants, animals, and human beings can be ontically ascertained. Connections between the life-span, reproduction, and growth can be known. The "kinds" of death, the causes, "arrangements," and ways of its occurrence can be investigated.⁵

An ontological problematic underlies this biological and ontic investigation of death. We must still ask how the essence of death is defined in terms of the essence of life. The ontic inquiry into death has always already decided about this. More or less clarified preconceptions of life and death are operative in it. These preliminary concepts need to be sketched out in the ontology of Da-sein. Within the ontology of Da-sein, which has priority over an ontology of life, the existential analytic of death is subordinate to the fundamental constitution of Da-sein. We called the ending of what is alive *perishing*. Da-sein, too, "has" its physiological death of the kind appropriate to anything that lives and has it not ontically in isolation, but as also determined by its primordial kind of being. Da-sein, too, can end without authentically dying, though on the other hand, qua Da-sein, it does not simply perish. We call this intermediate phenomenon its *demise*. Let the term *dying* stand for the *way of being* in which Da-sein is *toward* its death. Thus we can say that Da-sein never perishes. Da-sein can only demise as long as it dies. The medical and biological inquiry into demising can attain results which can also become significant ontologically if the fundamental orientation is ensured for an existential interpretation of death. Or must sickness and death in general—even from a medical point of view—be conceived primarily as existential phenomena?

The existential interpretation of death is prior to any biology and ontology of life. But it also is the foundation for any biographico-his-

* That is, the interpretation of fundamental ontology.

[†] If we are talking about human life, otherwise not—"world."

torical or ethnologico-psychological inquiry into death. A “typology” of “dying” characterizing the states and ways in which a demise is “experienced,” already presupposes the concept of death. Moreover, a psychology of “dying” rather gives information about the “life” of the “dying person” than about dying itself. That is only a reflection of the fact that when Da-sein dies—and even when it dies authentically—it does not have to do so with an experience of its factual demise, or in such an experience. Similarly, the interpretations of death in primitive peoples, of their behavior toward death in magic and cult, throw light primarily on the understanding of *Da-sein*; but the interpretation of this understanding already requires an existential analytic and a corresponding concept of death.

The ontological analysis of being-toward-the-end, on the other hand, does not anticipate any existentiell stance toward death. If death is defined as the “end” of Da-sein, that is, of being-in-the-world, no ontic decision has been made as to whether “after death” another being is still possible, either higher or lower, whether Da-sein “lives on” or even, “outliving itself,” is “immortal.” Nor is anything decided ontically about the “otherworldly” and its possibility any more than about the “this-worldly”; as if norms and rules for behavior toward death should be proposed for “edification.” But our analysis of death remains purely “this-worldly” in that it interprets the phenomenon solely with respect to the question of how it *enters into* actual Da-sein as its possibility-of-being. We cannot even *ask* with any methodological assurance about what “is after death” until death is understood in its full ontological essence. Whether such a question presents a possible *theoretical* question at all is not to be decided here. The this-worldly, ontological interpretation of death comes before any ontic, other-worldly speculation.

Finally, an existential analysis of death lies outside the scope of what might be discussed under the rubric of a “metaphysics of death.” The questions of how and when death “came into the world,” what “meaning” it can and should have as an evil and suffering in the whole of beings—these are questions that necessarily presuppose an understanding not only of the character of being of death, but the ontology of the whole of beings as a whole and the ontological clarification of evil and negativity in particular.

The existential analysis is methodically prior to the questions of a biology, psychology theodicy, and theology of death. Taken ontically, the results of the analysis show the peculiar *formality* and emptiness of any ontological characterization. However, that must not make us blind to the rich and complex structure of the phenomenon. Since Da-sein never becomes accessible at all as something objectively present, because being possible belongs in its own way to its kind of being, even less may we

248

expect to simply read off the ontological structure of death, if indeed death is an eminent possibility of Da-sein.

On the other hand, our analysis cannot be supported by an idea of death that has been devised arbitrarily and at random. We can restrain this arbitrariness only by giving beforehand an ontological characterization of the kind of being in which the “end” enters into the average everydayness of Da-sein. For this we need to envisage fully the structures of everydayness worked out earlier. The fact that existentiell possibilities of being toward death have their resonance in an existential analysis of death, is implied by the essence of any ontological inquiry. All the more explicitly, then, must an existentiell neutrality go together with the existential conceptual definition, especially with regard to death, where the character of possibility of Da-sein can be revealed most clearly of all. The existential problematic aims solely at developing the ontological structure of the being-toward-the-end of Da-sein.⁶

50. *A Preliminary Sketch of the Existential and Ontological Structure of Death*

From our considerations of something outstanding, end, and totality there has resulted the necessity of interpreting the phenomenon of death as being-toward-the-end in terms of the fundamental constitution of Da-sein. Only in this way can it become clear how a wholeness constituted by being-toward-the-end is possible in Da-sein itself, in accordance with its structure of being. We have seen that care is the fundamental constitution of Da-sein. The ontological significance of this expression was expressed in the “definition”: being-ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (the world) as being-together-with beings encountered (within the world).⁷ Thus the fundamental characteristics of the being of Da-sein are expressed: in being-ahead-of-itself, existence, in already-being-in . . . , facticity, in being-together-with . . . , falling prey. Provided that death belongs to the being of Da-sein in an eminent sense, it (or being-toward-the-end) must be able to be defined in terms of these characteristics.

We must, in the first instance, make it clear in a preliminary sketch how the existence, facticity, and falling prey of Da-sein are revealed in the phenomenon of death.

The interpretation of the not-yet, and thus also of the most extreme not-yet, of the end of Da-sein in the sense of something outstanding was rejected as inappropriate. For it included the ontological distortion of Da-sein as something objectively present. Being-at-an-end means existentially being-toward-the-end. The most extreme not-yet has the character of something *to which Da-sein relates*. The end is imminent for Da-sein. Death

249

250

is not something not yet objectively present, nor the last outstanding element reduced to a minimum, but rather an *imminence*.

However, many things can be imminent for Da-sein as being-in-the-world. The character of imminence is not in itself distinctive for death. On the contrary, this interpretation could even make us suspect that death would have to be understood in the sense of an imminent event to be encountered in the surrounding world. For example, a thunderstorm can be imminent, remodeling a house, the arrival of a friend, accordingly, beings which are objectively present, at hand or Da-sein-with. Imminent death does not have this kind of being.

But a journey, for example, can also be imminent for Da-sein, or a discussion with others, or a renouncing something which Da-sein itself can be—its own possibilities-of-being which are founded in being-with others.

Death is a possibility of being that Da-sein always has to take upon itself. With death, Da-sein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality-of-being. In this possibility, Da-sein is concerned about its being-in-the-world absolutely. Its death is the possibility of no-longer-being-able-to-be-there. When Da-sein is imminent to itself as this possibility, it is completely thrown back upon its ownmost potentiality-of-being. Thus imminent to itself, all relations to other Da-sein are dissolved in it. This nonrelational ownmost possibility is at the same time the most extreme one. As a potentiality of being, Da-sein is unable to bypass the possibility of death. Death is the possibility of the absolute impossibility of Da-sein. Thus *death* reveals itself as the *ownmost nonrelational possibility not to be bypassed*. As such, it is *an eminent imminence*. Its existential possibility is grounded in the fact that Da-sein is essentially disclosed to itself, in the way of being-ahead-of-itself. This structural factor of care has its most primordial concretion in being-toward-death. Being-toward-the-end becomes phenomenally clearer as being toward the eminent possibility of Da-sein which we have characterized.

The ownmost nonrelational possibility not to be bypassed is not created by Da-sein subsequently and occasionally in the course of its being. Rather, when Da-sein exists, it is already *thrown* into this possibility. Initially and for the most part, Da-sein does not have any explicit or even theoretical knowledge of the fact that it is delivered over to its death, and that death thus belongs to being-in-the-world. Throwness into death reveals itself to it more primordially and penetratingly in the attunement of *Angst*.⁸ *Angst* in the face of death is *Angst* “in the face of” the ownmost nonrelational potentiality-of-being not to be bypassed. What *Angst* is about is being-in-the-world itself. What *Angst* is about is the potentiality-of-being of Da-sein absolutely. *Angst* about death must not be confused with a fear of one’s demise. It is not an arbitrary and chance “weak” mood of the individual, but, as a fundamental attunement of

251

Da-sein, the disclosedness of the fact that Da-sein exists as thrown being-toward-its-end. Thus the existential concept of dying is clarified as thrown being toward the ownmost nonrelational potentiality-of-being not to be bypassed. Precision is gained by distinguishing this from pure disappearance, and also from merely perishing, and finally from the “experience” of a demise.

Being-toward-the-end does not first arise through some attitude which occasionally turns up, rather it belongs essentially to the thrownness of Da-sein which reveals itself in attunement (mood) in various ways. The factual “knowledge” or “lack of knowledge” prevalent in Da-sein as to its ownmost being-toward-the-end is only the expression of the existentiell possibility of maintaining itself in this being in different ways. The fact that factually many people initially and for the most part do not know about death must not be used to prove that being-toward-death does not “generally” belong to Da-sein, but only proves that Da-sein, fleeing from it, initially and for the most part covers over its ownmost being-toward-death. Da-sein dies factually as long as it exists, but initially and for the most part in the mode of *falling prey*. For factual existing is not only generally and without further differentiation a thrown potentiality-for-being-in-the-world, but it is always already absorbed in the “world” taken care of. In this entangled being together with . . . , the flight from uncanniness makes itself known, that is, the flight from its ownmost being-toward-death. Existence, facticity, falling prey characterize being-toward-the-end, and are accordingly constitutive for the existential concept of death. *With regard to its ontological possibility, dying is grounded in care.**

But if being toward death belongs primordially and essentially to the being of Da-sein, it must also be demonstrated in everydayness, although initially in an inauthentic way. And if being-toward-the-end is even supposed to offer the existential possibility for an existentiell wholeness of Da-sein, this would give the phenomenal confirmation for the thesis that care is the ontological term for the wholeness of the structural totality of Da-sein. However, for the complete phenomenal justification of this statement, a *preliminary sketch* of the connection between being-toward-death and care is not sufficient. Above all, we must be able to see this connection in the *concretion* nearest to Da-sein, its everydayness.

51. *Being-toward-Death and the Everydayness of Da-sein*

The exposition of everyday, average being-toward-death was oriented toward the structures of everydayness developed earlier. In being-

* But care presences out of the truth of being.

252

toward-death, Da-sein is related to itself as an eminent potentiality-of-being. But the self of everydayness is the they⁹ which is constituted in public interpretedness which expresses itself in idle talk. Thus, idle talk must make manifest in what way everyday Da-sein interprets its being-toward-death. Understanding, which is also always attuned, that is, mooded, always forms the basis of this interpretation. Thus we must ask how the attuned understanding lying in the idle talk of the they has disclosed being-toward-death. How is the they related in an understanding way to its ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed of Da-sein? What attunement discloses to the they that it has been delivered over to death, and in what way?

The publicness of everyday being-with-one-another "knows" death as a constantly occurring event, as a "case of death." Someone or another "dies," be it a neighbor or a stranger. People unknown to us "die" daily and hourly. "Death" is encountered as a familiar event occurring within the world. As such, it remains in the inconspicuousness¹⁰ characteristic of everyday encounters. The they has also already secured an interpretation for this event. The "fleeting" talk about this which is either expressed or else mostly kept back says: One also dies at the end, but for now one is not involved.

The analysis of "one dies" reveals unambiguously the kind of being of everyday being toward death. In such talk, death is understood as an indeterminate something which first has to show up from somewhere, but which right now is *not yet objectively present* for oneself, and is thus no threat. "One dies" spreads the opinion that death, so to speak, strikes the they. The public interpretation of Da-sein says that "one dies" because in this way everybody can convince him/herself that in no case is it I myself, for this one is *no one*. "Dying" is levelled down to an event which does concern Da-sein, but which belongs to no one in particular. If idle talk is always ambiguous, so is this way of talking about death. Dying, which is essentially and irreplacably mine, is distorted into a publicly occurring event which the they encounters. Characteristic talk speaks about death as a constantly occurring "case." It treats it as something always already "real," and veils its character of possibility and concomitantly the two factors belonging to it, that it is nonrelational and cannot-be-bypassed. With such ambiguity, Da-sein puts itself in the position of losing itself in the they with regard to an eminent potentiality-of-being that belongs to its own self. The they justifies and aggravates the *temptation* of covering over¹¹ for itself its ownmost being-toward-death.

The evasion of death which covers over, dominates everydayness so stubbornly that, in being-with-one-another, the "neighbors" often try to convince the "dying person" that he will escape death and soon return again to the tranquillized everydayness of his world taken care of. This

"concern" has the intention of thus "comforting" the "dying person." It wants to bring him back to Da-sein by helping him to veil completely his ownmost nonrelational possibility. Thus, the they makes sure of a *constant tranquillization about death*. But, basically, this tranquillization is not only for the "dying person," but just as much for "those who are comforting him." And even in the case of a demise, publicness is still not to be disturbed and made uneasy by the event in the carefreeness it has made sure of. Indeed, the dying of others is seen often as a social inconvenience, if not a downright tactlessness, from which publicness should be spared.¹²

But along with this tranquillization, which keeps Da-sein away from its death, the they at the same time justifies itself and makes itself respectable by silently ordering the way in which *one* is supposed to behave toward death in general. Even "thinking about death" is regarded publicly as cowardly fear, a sign of insecurity on the part of Da-sein and a dark flight from the world. *The they does not permit the courage to have Angst about death.* The dominance of the public interpretedness of the they has already decided what attunement is to determine our stance toward death. In *Angst* about death, Da-sein is brought before itself as delivered over to its possibility not-to-be-bypassed. The they is careful to distort this *Angst* into the fear of a future event. Angst, made ambiguous as fear, is, moreover, taken as a weakness which no self-assured Da-sein is permitted to know. What is "proper" according to the silent decree of the they is the indifferent calm as to the "fact" that one dies. The cultivation of such a "superior" indifference *estranges* Da-sein from its ownmost nonrelational potentiality-of-being.

Temptation, tranquillization, and estrangement, however, characterize the kind of being of *falling prey*. Entangled, everyday being-toward-death is a constant *flight from death*. Being toward the end has the mode of *evading that end*—reinterpreting it, understanding it inauthentically, and veiling it. Factually one's own Da-sein is always already dying, that is, it is in a being-toward-its-end. And it conceals this fact from itself by reinterpreting death as a case of death occurring every day with others, a case which always assures us still more clearly that "one oneself" is still "alive." But in the entangled flight from death, the everydayness of Da-sein bears witness to the fact that the they itself is always already determined as *being toward death*, even when it is not explicitly engaged in "thinking about death." *Even in average everydayness, Da-sein is constantly concerned with its ownmost nonrelational potentiality-of-being not-to-be-bypassed, if only in the mode of taking care of things in a mode of untroubled indifference toward the most extreme possibility of its existence.*

The exposition of everyday being-toward-death, however, gives us at the same time a directive to attempt to secure a complete existential

concept of being-toward-the-end, by a more penetrating interpretation in which entangled being-toward-death is taken as an evasion of death. *That from which one flees has been made visible in a phenomenally adequate way.* We should now be able to project phenomenologically how evasive Da-sein itself understands its death.¹³

52. Everyday Being-toward-Death and the Complete Existential Concept of Death

Being-toward-the-end was determined in a preliminary existential sketch as being toward one's ownmost nonrelational potentiality-of-being not-to-be-bypassed. Existing being toward this possibility brings itself before the absolute impossibility of existence. Beyond this seemingly empty characteristic of being-toward-death, the concretion of this being revealed itself in the mode of everydayness. In accordance with the tendency toward falling prey essential to everydayness, being-toward-death proved to be an evasion of it, an evasion that covers over. Whereas previously our inquiry made the transition from the formal preliminary sketch of the ontological structure of death to the concrete analysis of everyday being-toward-the-end, we now wish to reverse the direction and attain the complete existential concept of death with a supplementary interpretation of everyday being-toward-the-end.

The explication of everyday being-toward-death stayed with the idle talk of the they: one also dies sometime, but for the time being not yet. Up to now we solely interpreted the "one dies" as such. In the "also sometime, but for the time being not yet," everydayness acknowledges something like a *certainty* of death. Nobody doubts that one dies. But this "not doubting" need not already imply that kind of being-certain that corresponds to the way death—in the sense of the eminent possibility characterized above—enters into Da-sein. Everydayness gets stuck in this ambiguous acknowledgment of the "certainty" of death—in order to weaken the certainty by covering dying over still more and alleviating its own thrownness into death.

By its very meaning, this evasive covering over of death can *not* be authentically "certain" of death, and yet it *is*. How does it stand with this "certainty of death"?

To be certain of a being means to *hold* it for true as something true. But truth means discoveredness of beings. All discoveredness, however, is ontologically based in the most primordial truth, in the disclosedness of Da-sein.¹⁴ As a being that is disclosed and disclosing, and one that discovers, Da-sein is essentially "in the truth." *But certainty is based in truth or belongs to it equiprimordially.* The expression "certainty," like the expression "truth," has a double meaning. Primordially, truth

means the same as being-disclosive as a mode of behavior of Da-sein. From this comes the derivative meaning: disclosedness of beings. Accordingly, certainty is primordially tantamount to being-certain as a kind of being of Da-sein. However, in a derivative significance, any being of which Da-sein can be certain is also called "certain."

One mode of certainty is *conviction*. In conviction, Da-sein lets the testimony of the thing itself that has been discovered (the true thing itself) be the sole determinant for its being toward that thing understandingly. Holding-something-for-true is adequate as a way of keeping oneself in the truth, if it is based on the discovered beings themselves, and as a being toward the beings thus discovered, has become transparent to itself with regard to its appropriateness to them. Something like this is lacking in any arbitrary invention or in the mere "opinion" about a being.

The adequacy of holding-for-true is measured by the truth claim to which it belongs. This claim gets its justification from the kind of being of the beings to be disclosed, and from the direction of the disclosure. The kind of truth and, along with it, the certainty, changes with the various kinds of beings, and accords with the leading tendency and scope of the disclosure. Our present considerations are limited to an analysis of being-certain with regard to death; and this being-certain will, in the end, present us with an eminent *certainty of Da-sein*.

For the most part, everyday Da-sein covers over its ownmost non-relational possibility of being not-to-be-bypassed. This factual tendency to cover over confirms our thesis that Da-sein, as factual, is in "untruth."¹⁵ Thus the certainty which belongs to such a covering over of being-toward-death must be an inappropriate way of holding-for-true, and not an uncertainty in the sense of doubting. Inappropriate certainty keeps that of which it is certain covered over. If "one" understands death as an event encountered in the surrounding world, the certainty related to this does not get at being-toward-the-end.

They say that it is certain that "death" comes. They say it and overlook the fact that, in order to be able to be certain of death, Da-sein itself must always be certain of its ownmost nonrelational potentiality-of-being not-to-be-bypassed. They say that death is certain, and thus entrench in Da-sein the illusion that it is *itself* certain of its own death. And what is the ground of everyday being-certain? Evidently it is not just mutual persuasion. Yet one experiences daily the "dying" of others. Death is an undeniable "fact of experience."

The way in which everyday being-toward-death understands the certainty thus grounded, betrays itself when it tries to "think" about death, even when it does so with critical foresight—that is to say, in an appropriate way. So far as one knows, all human beings "die." Death is

probable to the highest degree for every human being, yet it is not “unconditionally” certain. Strictly speaking, “only” an *empirical* certainty may be attributed to death. Such certainty falls short of the highest certainty, the apodictical one, which we attain in certain areas of theoretical knowledge.

In this “critical” determination of the certainty of death and its imminence, what is manifested in the first instance is, once again, the failure to recognize the kind of being of Da-sein and the being-toward-death belonging to it, a failure characteristic of everydayness. *The fact that demise, as an event that occurs, is “only” empirically certain, in no way decides about the certainty of death.* Cases of death may be the factual occasion for the fact that Da-sein initially notices death at all. But, remaining within the empirical certainty which we characterized, Da-sein cannot become certain at all of death as it “is.” Although in the publicness of the they Da-sein seemingly “talks” only of this “empirical” certainty of death, *basically* it does *not* keep exclusively and primarily to those cases of death that merely occur. *Evading its death*, everyday being-toward-the-end is indeed certain of death in another way than it itself would like to realize in purely theoretical considerations. For the most part, everydayness veils this from itself “in another way.” It does not dare to become transparent to itself in this way. We have already characterized the everyday attunement that consists in an air of superiority with regard to the certain “fact” of death—a superiority that is “anxiously” concerned while seemingly free of *Angst*. In this attunement, everydayness acknowledges a “higher” certainty than the merely empirical one. One *knows* about the certainty of death, and yet “*is*” not really certain about it. The entangled everydayness of Da-sein knows about the certainty of death, and yet avoids *being-certain*. But in the light of what it evades, this evasion bears witness phenomenally to the fact that death must be grasped as the ownmost nonrelational, *certain* possibility not-to-be-bypassed.

One says that death certainly comes, but not right away. With this “but . . .,” the they denies that death is certain. “Not right away” is not a purely negative statement, but a self-interpretation of the they with which it refers itself to what is initially accessible to Da-sein to take care of. Everydayness penetrates to the urgency of taking care of things, and divests itself of the fetters of a weary, “inactive thinking about death.” Death is postponed to “sometime later,” by relying on the so-called “general opinion.” Thus the they covers over what is peculiar to the certainty of death, *that it is possible in every moment*. Together with the certainty of death goes the *indefiniteness* of its when. Everyday being-toward-death evades this indefiniteness by making it something definite. But this procedure cannot mean calculating when the demise is due

258

to arrive. Da-sein rather flees from such definiteness. Everyday taking care of things makes definite for itself the indefiniteness of certain death by interposing before it those manageable urgencies and possibilities of the everyday matters nearest to us.

But covering over this indefiniteness also covers over certainty. Thus the ownmost character of the possibility of death gets covered over: a possibility that is certain, and yet indefinite, that is, possible at any moment.

Now that we have completed our interpretation of the everyday talk of the they about death and the way death enters Da-sein, we have been led to the characteristics of certainty and indefiniteness. The full existential and ontological concept of death can now be defined as follows: *As the end of Da-sein, death is the ownmost nonrelational, certain, and, as such, indefinite and not to be bypassed possibility of Da-sein.* As the end of Da-sein, death is in the being of this being-toward-its-end.

The delineation of the existential structure of being-toward-the-end helps us to develop a kind of being of Da-sein in which it can be *wholly as Da-sein*. The fact that even everyday Da-sein is always already toward its end, that is, is constantly coming to grips with its own death, even though “fleetingly,” shows that this end, which concludes and defines being-whole, is not something which Da-sein ultimately arrives at only in its demise. In Da-sein, existing toward its death, its most extreme not-yet which everything else precedes is always already included. So if one has given an ontologically inappropriate interpretation of the not-yet of Da-sein as something outstanding, any formal inference from this to the lack of totality of Da-sein will be incorrect. *The phenomenon of the not-yet has been taken from the ahead-of-itself; no more than the structure of care in general, can it serve as a higher court that would rule against a possible, existent wholeness; indeed, this ahead-of-itself first makes possible such a being-toward-the-end.* The problem of the possible wholeness of the being which we ourselves actually are exists justifiably if care, as the fundamental constitution of Da-sein, “is connected” with death as the most extreme possibility of this being.

Yet it remains questionable whether this problem has been as yet adequately developed. Being-toward-death is grounded in care. As thrown being-in-the-world, Da-sein is always already delivered over to its death. Being toward its death, it dies factically and constantly as long as it has not reached its demise. That Da-sein dies factically means at the same time that it has always already decided in this or that way in its being-toward-death. Everyday, entangled evasion of death is an *inauthentic* being *toward* it. Inauthenticity has possible authenticity as its basis.¹⁶ Inauthenticity characterizes the kind of being in which Da-sein diverts itself and for the most part has always diverted itself, too, but it

does not have to do this necessarily and constantly. Because Da-sein exists, it determines itself as the kind of being it is, and it does so always in terms of a possibility which it itself is and understands.

Can Da-sein *authentically understand* its ownmost, nonrelational, certain possibility not-to-be-bypassed that is, as such, indefinite? That is, can it maintain itself in an authentic being-toward-its-end? As long as this authentic being-toward-death has not been set forth and ontologically determined, there is something essentially lacking in our existential interpretation of being-toward-the-end.

Authentic being-toward-death signifies an existentiell possibility of Da-sein. This ontic potentiality-of-being must in its turn be ontologically possible. What are the existential conditions of this possibility? How are they themselves to become accessible?

53. Existential Project of an Authentic Being-toward-Death

Factually, Da-sein maintains itself initially and for the most part in an inauthentic being-toward-death. How is the ontological possibility of an *authentic* being-toward-death to be characterized “objectively,” if, in the end, Da-sein is never authentically related to its end, or if this authentic being must remain concealed from others in accordance with its meaning? Is not the project of the existential possibility of such a questionable existentiell potentiality-of-being a fantastical undertaking? What is needed for such a project to get beyond a merely poetizing, arbitrary construction? Does Da-sein itself provide directives for this project? Can the grounds for its phenomenal justification be taken from Da-sein itself? Can our analysis of Da-sein up to now give us any prescriptions for the ontological task we have now formulated, so that what we have before us can be kept on a secure path?

The existential concept of death has been established, and thus we have also established that to which an authentic being-toward-the-end should be able to relate itself. Furthermore, we have also characterized inauthentic being-toward-death and thus we have prescribed how authentic being-toward-death cannot be in a negative way. The existential structure of an authentic being-toward-death must let itself be projected with these positive and prohibitive instructions.

Da-sein is constituted by disclosedness, that is, by attuned understanding. *Authentic* being-toward-death cannot *evade* its ownmost non-relational possibility or *cover it over* in this flight and *reinterpret* it for the common sense of the they. The existential project of an authentic being-toward-death must thus set forth the factors of such a being which are constitutive for it as an understanding of death—in the sense of being toward this possibility without fleeing it or covering it over.

First of all, we must characterize being-toward-death as a being *toward a possibility*, toward an eminent possibility of Da-sein itself. Being toward a possibility, that is, toward something possible, can mean to be out for something possible, as in taking care of its actualization. In the field of things at hand and objectively present, we constantly encounter such possibilities: what is attainable, manageable, viable, and so forth. Being out for something possible and taking care of it has the tendency of *annihilating the possibility* of the possible by making it available. The actualization of useful things at hand in taking care of them (producing them, getting them ready, readjusting them, etc.), is, however, always merely relative, in that what has been actualized still has the character of being relevant. Even when actualized, as something actual it remains possible for . . . , it is characterized by an in-order-to. Our present analysis should simply make clear how being out for something and taking care of it, is related to the possible. It does so not in a thematic and theoretical reflection on the possible as possible, or even with regard to its possibility as such, but rather in such a way that it *circumspectly looks away* from the possible to what it is possible for.

Evidently being-toward-death, which is now in question, cannot have the character of being out for something and taking care of it with a view toward its actualization. For one thing, death as something possible is not a possible thing at hand or objectively present, but a possibility-of-being of *Da-sein*. Then, however, taking care of the actualization of what is thus possible would have to mean bringing about one's own demise. Thus Da-sein would precisely deprive itself of the very ground for an existing being-toward-death.

Thus if being-toward-death is not meant as an “actualization” of death, neither can it mean to dwell near the end in its possibility. This kind of behavior would amount to “thinking about death,” thinking about this possibility, how and when it might be actualized. Brooding over death does not completely take away from it its character of possibility. It is always brooded over as something coming, but we weaken it by calculating how to have it at our disposal. As something possible, death is supposed to show as little as possible of its possibility. On the contrary, if being-toward-death has to disclose understandingly the possibility which we have characterized as *such*, then in such being-toward-death this possibility must not be weakened, it must be understood as *possibility*, cultivated as *possibility*, and endured as *possibility* in our relation to it.

However, Da-sein relates to something possible in its possibility, by *expecting* it. Anyone who is intent on something possible, may encounter it unimpeded and undiminished in its “whether it comes or not, or whether it comes after all.” But with this phenomenon of expecting has

our analysis not reached the same kind of being toward the possible which we already characterized as being out for something and taking care of it? To expect something possible is always to understand and "have" it with regard to whether and when and how it will really be objectively present. Expecting is not only an occasional looking away from the possible to its possible actualization, but essentially a *waiting for that actualization*. Even in expecting, one leaps away from the possible and gets a footing in the real. It is for its reality that what is expected is expected. By the very nature of expecting, the possible is drawn into the real, arising from it and returning to it.

But being toward this possibility, as being-toward-death, should relate itself to that *death* so that it reveals itself, in this being and for it, as *possibility*. Terminologically, we shall formulate this being toward possibility as *anticipation of this possibility*. But does not this mode of behavior contain an approach to the possible, and does not its actualization emerge with its nearness? In this kind of coming near, however, one does not tend toward making something real available and taking care of it, but as one comes nearer understandingly, the possibility of the possible only becomes "greater." *The nearest nearness of being-toward-death as possibility is as far removed as possible from anything real.* The more clearly this possibility is understood, the more purely does understanding penetrate to it as the possibility of the impossibility of existence in general. As possibility, death gives Da-sein nothing to "be actualized" and nothing which it itself could be as something real. It is the possibility of the impossibility of every mode of behavior toward . . . , of every way of existing. In running ahead to this possibility, it becomes "greater and greater," that is, it reveals itself as something which knows no measure at all, no more or less, but means the possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence. Essentially, this possibility offers no support for becoming intent on something, for "spelling out" the real thing that is possible and so forgetting its possibility. As anticipation of possibility, being-toward-death first makes this possibility possible and sets it free as possibility.

Being-toward-death is the anticipation of a potentiality-of-being of that being whose kind of being is anticipation itself. In the anticipatory revealing of this potentiality-of-being, Da-sein discloses itself to itself with regard to its most extreme possibility. But to project oneself upon one's ownmost potentiality of being means to be able to understand oneself in the being of the being thus revealed: to exist. Anticipation shows itself as the possibility of understanding one's ownmost and extreme potentiality-of-being, that is, as the possibility of authentic existence. Its ontological constitution must be made visible by setting forth the concrete structure of anticipation of death. How is the phenomenal

definition of this structure to be accomplished? Evidently by defining the characteristics of anticipatory disclosure which must belong to it so that it can become the pure understanding of the ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed which is certain and, as such, indefinite. We must remember that understanding does not primarily mean staring at a meaning, but understanding oneself in the potentiality-of-being that reveals itself in the project.¹⁷

Death is the *ownmost* possibility of Da-sein. Being toward it discloses to Da-sein its *ownmost* potentiality-of-being in which it is concerned about the being of Da-sein absolutely. Here the fact can become evident to Da-sein that in the eminent possibility of itself it is torn away from the they, that is, anticipation can always already have torn itself away from the they. The understanding of this "ability," however, first reveals its factual lostness in the everydayness of the they-self.

The ownmost possibility is *nonrelational*. Anticipation lets Da-sein understand that it has to take over solely from itself the potentiality-of-being in which it is concerned absolutely about its ownmost being. Death does not just "belong" in an undifferentiated way to one's own Da-sein, but it *lays claim* on it as something *individual*. The nonrelational character of death understood in anticipation individualizes Da-sein down to itself. This individualizing is a way in which the "there" is disclosed for existence. It reveals the fact that any being-together-with what is taken care of and any being-with the others fails when one's ownmost potentiality-of-being is at stake. Da-sein can *authentically* be *itself* only when it makes that possible of its own accord. But if taking care of things and being concerned fail us, this does not, however, mean at all that these modes of Da-sein have been cut off from its authentic being a self. As essential structures of the constitution of Da-sein they also belong to the condition of the possibility of existence in general. Da-sein is authentically itself only if it projects itself, as being-together with things taken care of and concerned being-with . . . , primarily upon its ownmost potentiality-of-being, rather than upon the possibility of the they-self. Anticipation of its nonrelational possibility forces the being that anticipates into the possibility of taking over its ownmost being of its own accord.

The ownmost nonrelational possibility is *not to be bypassed*. Being toward this possibility lets Da-sein understand that the most extreme possibility of existence is imminent, that of giving itself up. But anticipation does not evade the impossibility of bypassing death, as does inauthentic being-toward-death, but *frees itself for it*. Becoming free for one's own death in anticipation frees one from one's lostness in chance possibilities urging themselves upon us, so that the factual possibilities lying before the possibility not-to-be-bypassed can first be authentically under-

stood and chosen. Anticipation discloses to existence that its extreme inmost possibility lies in giving itself up and thus shatters all one's clinging to whatever existence one has reached. In anticipation, Da-sein guards itself against falling back behind itself, or behind the potentiality-for-being that it has understood. It guards against "becoming too old for its victories" (Nietzsche). Free for its ownmost possibilities, that are determined by the *end*, and so understood as *finite*, Da-sein prevents the danger that it may, by its own finite understanding of existence, fail to recognize that it is getting overtaken by the existence-possibilities of others, or that it may misinterpret these possibilities, thus divesting itself of its ownmost factual existence. As the nonrelational possibility, death individualizes, but only, as the possibility not-to-be-bypassed, in order to make Da-sein as being-with understand the potentialities-of-being of the others. Because anticipation of the possibility not-to-be-bypassed also disclosed all the possibilities lying before it, this anticipation includes the possibility of taking the *whole* of Da-sein in advance in an existentiell way, that is, the possibility of existing as a *whole potentiality-of-being*.

The ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed is *certain*. The mode of *being* certain of it is determined by the truth (disclosedness) corresponding to it. But Da-sein discloses the certain possibility of death as possibility only by making this possibility as its ownmost potentiality-of-being *possible* in anticipating it. The disclosedness of this possibility is grounded in a making possible that anticipates. Holding oneself in this truth, that is, being certain of what has been disclosed, lays claim all the more upon anticipation. The certainty of death cannot be calculated in terms of ascertaining cases of death encountered. This certainty by no means holds itself in the truth of something objectively present. When something objectively present has been discovered, it is encountered most purely by just looking at it and letting it be encountered in itself. Da-sein must first have lost itself in the factual circumstances (this can be one of care's own tasks and possibilities) if it is to gain the pure objectivity, that is, the indifference of apodictic evidence. If being-certain in relation to death does not have this character, that does not mean it is of a lower grade, but that *it does not belong at all to the order of degrees of evidence about things objectively present*.

Holding death for true (death is always just one's own) shows a different kind of certainty, and is more primordial than any certainty related to beings encountered in the world or to formal objects, for it is certain of being-in-the-world. As such, it claims not only *one* definite kind of behavior of Da-sein, but claims Da-sein in the complete authenticity of its existence.¹⁸ In anticipation, Da-sein can first make certain of its ownmost being in its totality not-to-be-bypassed. Thus, the evidence of

the immediate givenness of experiences, of the ego or of consciousness, necessarily has to lag behind the certainty contained in anticipation. And yet this is not because the kind of apprehension belonging to it is not strict enough, but because at bottom it cannot hold *for true* (disclosed) something that it basically insists upon "having there" as true: namely, the Da-sein which I myself *am* and can be as potentiality-of-being authentically only in anticipation.

The ownmost nonrelational possibility not-to-be-bypassed is *indefinite* with regard to its certainty. How does anticipation disclose this character of the eminent possibility of Da-sein? How does understanding, anticipating, project itself upon a definite potentiality-of-being which is constantly possible in such a way that the when in which the absolute impossibility of existence becomes possible remains constantly indefinite? In anticipating the indefinite certainty of death, Da-sein opens itself to a constant *threat* arising from its own there. Being-toward-the-end must hold itself in this very threat, and can so little phase it out that it rather has to cultivate the indefiniteness of the certainty. How is the genuine disclosing of this constant threat existentially possible? All understanding is attuned. Mood brings Da-sein before the thrownness of its "that-it-is-there."¹⁹ But the attunement which is able to hold open the constant and absolute threat to itself arising from the ownmost individualized being of Da-sein is *Angst*.²⁰ In *Angst*, Da-sein finds itself faced with the nothingness of the possible impossibility of its existence. *Angst* is anxious about the potentiality-of-being of the being thus determined, and thus discloses the most extreme possibility. Because the anticipation of Da-sein absolutely individualizes and lets it, in this individualizing of itself, become certain of the wholeness of its potentiality-of-being, the fundamental attunement of *Angst* belongs to this self-understanding of Da-sein in terms of its ground. Being-toward-death is essentially *Angst*.* This is attested unmistakably, although "only" indirectly, by being-toward-death as we characterized it, when it distorts *Angst* into cowardly fear and, in overcoming that fear, only makes known its own cowardliness in the face of *Angst*.

What is characteristic about authentic, existentially projected being-toward-death can be summarized as follows: *Anticipation reveals to Da-sein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility to be itself, primarily unsupported by concern taking care of things, but to be itself in passionate anxious freedom toward death which is free of the illusions of the they, factual, and certain of itself*.

All relations, belonging to being-toward-death, to the complete content of the most extreme possibility of Da-sein, constitute an antici-

* I.e., but not only *Angst* and certainly not *Angst* as a mere emotion.

pation that they combine in revealing, unfolding, and holding fast, as that which makes this possibility possible. The existential project in which anticipation has been delimited, has made visible the *ontological* possibility of an existentiell, authentic being-toward-death. But with this, the possibility then appears of an authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole—but only as an *ontological possibility*. Of course, our existential project of anticipation stayed with those structures of Da-sein gained earlier and let Da-sein itself, so to speak, project itself upon this possibility, without proffering to Da-sein the “content” of an ideal of existence forced upon it “from the outside.” And yet this existentially “possible” being-toward-death remains, after all, existentially a fantastical demand. The ontological possibility of an authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole of Da-sein means nothing as long as the corresponding ontic potentiality-of-being has not been shown in terms of Da-sein itself. Does Da-sein ever project itself factically into such a being-toward-death? Does it even *demand*, on the basis of its ownmost being, an authentic potentiality of being which is determined by anticipation?

267 Before answering these questions, we must investigate to what extent *at all* and in what way Da-sein bears witness to a possible *authenticity* of its existence from its ownmost potentiality-of-being, in such a way that it not only makes this known as *existentially* possible, but *demands* it of itself.

The question hovering over us of an authentic wholeness of Da-sein and its existential constitution can be placed on a viable, phenomenal basis only if that question can hold fast to a possible authenticity of its being attested by Da-sein itself. If we succeed in discovering phenomenologically such an attestation and what is attested to in it, the problem arises again of whether the *anticipation of death projected up to now only in its ontological possibility has an essential connection with that authentic potentiality-of-being attested to*.

II

The Attestation of Da-sein of an Authentic Potentiality-of-Being, and Resoluteness

54. The Problem of the Attestation of an Authentic Existentiell Possibility

We are looking for an authentic potentiality-of-being of Da-sein that is attested by Da-sein itself in its existentiell possibility. First of all, we have to find this attestation itself.* If it is to “give Da-sein to understand” itself in its possible authentic existence, it will have its roots in the being of Da-sein. The phenomenal demonstration of such an attestation thus contains the evidence of its origin from the constitution of being of Da-sein.

The attestation is to give us to understand an authentic *potentiality-of-being-one's-self*. With the expression “self,” we answered the question of the *who of Da-sein*.¹ The selfhood of Da-sein was defined formally as a *way of existing*, that is, not as a being objectively present. *I myself* am not for the most part the *who of Da-sein*, but the *they-self* is. Authentic being-a-self shows itself to be an existentiell modification of the *they* which is to be defined existentially.² What does this modification imply, and what are the ontological conditions of its possibility?

With the lostness in the *they*, the nearest, factual potentiality-of-being of Da-sein has always already been decided upon—tasks, rules,

* (1) What attests as such. (2) What is attested by it.