A19/B33

The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements
First Part
The Transcendental Aesthetic[a]

<§ 1>[b]

In whatever way and through whatever means a cognition may relate to objects, that through which it relates immediately to them, and at which all thought as a means is directed as an end, is **intuition.** This, however, takes place only insofar as the object is given to us; but this in turn, <at least for us humans,> is possible only if it affects the mind in a certain way. The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called **sensibility.** Objects are therefore **given** to us by means of sensibility, and it alone affords us **intuitions;** but they are **thought** through the understanding, and from it arise **concepts.** But all thought, whether straightaway (*directe*) or through a detour (*indirecte*), must, <by means of certain marks,> ultimately be related to intuitions, thus, in our case, to sensibility, since there is no other way in which objects can be given to us.

B34 A20 The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is **sensation.** That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called **empirical.** The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called **appearance.**

I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its **matter,** but that which allows the manifold of appearance to be ordered[c] in

[a] We here present the revised version of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" that Kant prepared for the second edition of the *Critique.* Since in addition to the major changes that he made, all of which will be noted, Kant also made numerous minor changes that it would be cumbersome to note individually, we will enclose all the changes Kant made in B within angled brackets (< . . . >), whether or not they are otherwise noted. Editorial notes on passages unchanged from A will not be repeated.

[b] In the second edition, Kant divided the "Transcendental Doctrine of Elements" from the beginning of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" through the end of the "Transcendental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding" into twenty-seven numbered sections. In the case of some sections, new titles were also added for material otherwise taken over without other change from the first edition.

[c] In the first edition this reads "intuited as ordered in certain relations . . ."

certain relations[a] I call the **form** of appearance. Since that within which the sensations can alone be ordered and placed in a certain form cannot itself be in turn sensation, the matter of all appearance is only given to us *a posteriori*, but its form must all lie ready for it in the mind *a priori*, and can therefore be considered separately from all sensation.

I call all representations **pure** (in the transcendental sense) in which nothing is to be encountered that belongs to sensation. Accordingly the pure form of sensible intuitions in general is to be encountered in the mind *a priori*, wherein all of the manifold of appearances is intuited in certain relations. This pure form of sensibility itself is also called **pure intuition.** So if I separate from the representation of a body that which B 35
the understanding thinks about it, such as substance, force, divisibility, etc., as well as that which belongs to sensation, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., something from this empirical intuition is still left A 21
for me, namely extension and form. These belong to the pure intuition, which occurs *a priori*, even without an actual object of the senses or sensation, as a mere form of sensibility in the mind.

I call a science of all principles[b] of *a priori* sensibility the **transcendental aesthetic.*** There must therefore be such a science, which constitutes the first part of the transcendental doctrine of elements, in B 36
opposition to that which contains the principles[c] of pure thinking, and which is named transcendental logic.

* The Germans are the only ones who now employ the word "aesthetics" to designate that which others call the critique of taste. The ground for this is a failed hope, held by the excellent analyst Baumgarten, of bringing the critical estimation of the beautiful under principles of reason,[d] and elevating its rules to a science. But this effort is futile. For the putative rules or criteria are merely empirical as far as their <most prominent> sources are concerned, and can therefore never serve as <determinate> *a priori* rules according to which our judgment of taste must be directed; rather the latter constitutes the genuine touchstone of the correctness of the former. For this reason it is advisable <either> again to desist B 36
from the use of this term and preserve it for that doctrine which is true science (whereby one would come closer to the language and the sense of the ancients, among whom the division of cognition into αἰθητα και νοητα was very well known), <or else to share the term with speculative philosophy and take aesthetics partly in a transcendental meaning, partly in a psychological meaning>. A 21 / B 35

[a] As already noted at p. 156, note *a*, with the exception of four cases in its final section, throughout the "Transcendental Aesthetic" Kant characteristically uses the term *Verhältnis*, connoting a relation among objects, rather than *Beziehung*, connoting a relation between subject and object; thus, unless otherwise noted, "relation" or its plural translates *Verhältnis* or its derivatives.

[b] *Principien*

[c] *Principien*

[d] *Vernunftprincipien*

A22 In the transcendental aesthetic we will therefore first **isolate** sensibility by separating off everything that the understanding thinks through its concepts, so that nothing but empirical intuition remains. Second, we will then detach from the latter everything that belongs to sensation, so that nothing remains except pure intuition and the mere form of appearances, which is the only thing that sensibility can make available *a priori*. In this investigation it will be found that there are two pure forms of sensible intuition as principles[a] of *a priori* cognition, namely space and time, with the assessment of which we will now be concerned.

B37

The Transcendental Aesthetic
First Section
On space.

<§ 2
Metaphysical exposition of this concept.>

By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all as in space. In space their shape, magnitude, and relation to one another is determined, or determinable. Inner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state, gives, to be sure, no intuition of the soul itself, as an object;[b] yet it is
A23 still a determinate form, under which the intuition of its inner state is alone possible, so that everything that belongs to the inner determinations is represented in relations of time. Time can no more be intuited externally than space can be intuited as something in us. Now what are space and time? Are they actual entities?[c] Are they only determinations or relations of things, yet ones that would pertain to them even if they were not intuited, or are they relations that only attach to the form of
B38 intuition alone, and thus to the subjective constitution of our mind, without which these predicates could not be ascribed to any thing at all? In order to instruct ourselves about this, we will <expound the concept of space> first.[d] <I understand by **exposition** (*expositio*) the distinct (even if not complete) representation of that which belongs to a concept; but the exposition is **metaphysical** when it contains that which exhibits the concept **as given** *a priori*.>

1) Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer

[a] *Principien*
[b] *Object*
[c] *wirkliche Wesen*
[d] In the first edition: "first consider space."

experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be related[a] to something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside <and next to> one another, thus not merely as different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground. Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation.

2) Space is a necessary representation, *a priori*, that is the ground of A24
all outer intuitions. One can never represent that there is no space, though one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possi- B39
bility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an *a priori* representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.[b]

<3)> Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition. For, first, one can only A25
represent a single space, and if one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only parts of one and the same unique space. And these parts cannot as it were precede the single all-encompassing space as its components (from which its composition would be possible), but rather are only thought **in it.** It is essentially single; the manifold in it, thus also the general concept of spaces in general, rests merely on limitations. From this it follows that in respect to it an *a priori* intuition (which is not empirical) grounds all concepts of it.[c] Thus also all geometrical principles, e.g., that in a triangle two sides together are always greater than the third, are never derived from general concepts of line and triangle, but rather are derived from intuition and indeed derived *a priori* with apodictic certainty.

<[d]4) Space is represented as an infinite **given** magnitude. Now one
must, to be sure, think of every concept as a representation that is con- B40
tained in an infinite set of different possible representations (as their common mark), which thus contains these **under itself;** but no concept, as such, can be thought as if it contained an infinite set of representations **within itself.** Nevertheless space is so thought (for all the parts of space, even to infinity, are simultaneous). Therefore the original representation of space is an ***a priori* intuition**, not **a concept.**>

[a] *bezogen*

[b] In the first edition there follows a paragraph (3) (at A24 above) that is replaced by the "Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space" in the second (see B40–1 below); the following paragraphs, (3) and (4), were thus originally numbered (4) and (5); the content of the original paragraph (5), now renumbered (4), is also changed.

[c] In the first edition: "of them," i.e., the limitations of space.

[d] As previously mentioned, the content of this paragraph is changed from the first edition.

<§ 3
Transcendental exposition of the concept of space.

I understand by a **transcendental exposition** the explanation of a concept as a principle[a] from which insight into the possibility of other synthetic *a priori* cognitions can be gained. For this aim it is required 1) that such cognitions actually flow from the given concept, and 2) that these cognitions are only possible under the presupposition of a given way of explaining this concept.

Geometry is a science that determines the properties of space synthetically and yet *a priori*. What then must the representation of space be for such a cognition of it to be possible? It must originally be intuB41 ition; for from a mere concept no propositions can be drawn that go beyond the concept, which, however, happens in geometry (Introduction V). But this intuition must be encountered in us *a priori*, i.e., prior to all perception of an object, thus it must be pure, not empirical intuition. For geometrical propositions are all apodictic, i.e., combined with consciousness of their necessity, e.g., space has only three dimensions; but such propositions cannot be empirical or judgments of experience, nor inferred from them (Introduction II).

Now how can an outer intuition inhabit the mind that precedes the objects[b] themselves, and in which the concept of the latter can be determined *a priori?* Obviously not otherwise than insofar as it has its seat merely in the subject, as its formal constitution for being affected by objects[c] and thereby acquiring **immediate representation,** i.e., **intuition,** of them, thus only as the form of outer **sense** in general.

Thus our explanation alone makes the **possibility** of geometry as a synthetic *a priori* cognition comprehensible. Any kind of explanation that does not accomplish this, even if it appears to have some similarity with it, can most surely be distinguished from it by means of this characteristic.>[29]

A26/B42 Conclusions from the above concepts.

a) Space represents no property at all of any things in themselves nor any relation of them to each other, i.e., no determination of them that attaches to objects themselves and that would remain even if one were to abstract from all subjective conditions of intuition. For neither absolute nor relative determinations can be intuited prior to the existence of the things to which they pertain, thus be intuited *a priori*.

[a] *Princips*
[b] *Objecten*
[c] *Objecten*

b) Space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances of outer sense, i.e., the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us. Now since the receptivity of the subject to be affected by objects necessarily precedes all intuitions of these objects, it can be understood how the form of all appearances can be given in the mind prior to all actual perceptions, thus *a priori*, and how as a pure intuition, in which all objects must be determined, it can contain principles[a] of their relations prior to all experience.

We can accordingly speak of space, extended beings, and so on, only from the human standpoint. If we depart from the subjective condition under which alone we can acquire outer intuition, namely that through which we may be affected by objects, then the representation of space signifies nothing at all. This predicate is attributed to things only insofar as they appear to us, i.e., are objects of sensibility. The constant form of this receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all the relations within which objects can be intuited as outside us, and, if one abstracts from these objects, it is a pure intuition, which bears the name of space. Since we cannot make the special conditions of sensibility into conditions of the possibility of things, but only of their appearances, we can well say that space comprehends all things that may appear to us externally, but not all things in themselves, whether they be intuited or not, or by whatever subject they may be intuited. For we cannot judge at all whether the intuitions of other thinking beings are bound to the same conditions that limit our intuition and that are universally valid for us. If we add the limitation of a judgment to the concept of the subject, then the judgment is unconditionally valid. The proposition: "All things are next to one another in space," is valid under the limitation that these things be taken as objects of our sensible intuition. If here I add the condition to the concept and say "All things, as outer intuitions, are next to one another in space," then this rule is valid universally and without limitation. Our expositions accordingly teach the **reality** (i.e., objective validity) of space in regard to everything that can come before us externally as an object, but at the same time the **ideality** of space in regard to things when they are considered in themselves through reason, i.e., without taking account of the constitution of our sensibility. We therefore assert the **empirical reality** of space (with respect to all possible outer experience), though to be sure its **transcendental ideality,** i.e., that it is nothing as soon as we leave aside the condition of the possibility of all experience, and take it as something that grounds the things in themselves.

A27/B43

B44
A28

Besides space, however, there is no other subjective representation

[a] *Principien*

related[a] to something **external** that could be called *a priori* objective. [b]<For one cannot derive synthetic *a priori* propositions from any such representation, as one can from intuition in space (§ 3). Strictly speaking, therefore, ideality does not pertain to them, although they coincide with the representation of space in belonging only to the subjective constitution of the kind of sense, e.g., of sight, hearing, and feeling, through the sensations of colors, sounds, and warmth, which, however, since they are merely sensations and not intuitions, do not in themselves allow any object[c] to be cognized, least of all *a priori*.>

B45 The aim of this remark is only to prevent one from thinking of illustrating the asserted ideality of space with completely inadequate examples, since things like colors, taste, etc., are correctly considered not as qualities of things but as mere alterations of our subject, which can even be different in different people. For in this case that which is originally itself only appearance, e.g., a rose, counts in an empirical sense as a
A30 thing in itself, which yet can appear different to every eye in regard to color. The transcendental concept of appearances in space, on the contrary, is a critical reminder that absolutely nothing that is intuited in space is a thing in itself, and that space is not a form that is proper to anything in itself, but rather that objects in themselves are not known to us at all, and that what we call outer objects are nothing other than mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose true correlate, i.e., the thing in itself, is not and cannot be cognized through them, but is also never asked after in experience.

B46

The Transcendental Aesthetic
Second Section
On time.

<§ 4
Metaphysical exposition of the concept of time.>

Time is <1)> not an empirical concept that is somehow drawn from an experience. For simultaneity or succession would not themselves come into perception if the representation of time did not ground them *a priori*. Only under its presupposition can one represent that several things exist at one and the same time (simultaneously) or in different times (successively).

A31 2) Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions. In regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though one

[a] *bezogene*
[b] In the first edition, the remainder of this paragraph reads differently; see A28–9 above.
[c] *Object*

can very well take the appearances away from time. Time is therefore given *a priori*. In it alone is all actuality of appearances possible. The latter could all disappear, but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility)[a] cannot be removed.

3) This *a priori* necessity also grounds the possibility of apodictic B47
principles of relations of time, or axioms of time in general. It has only one dimension: different times are not simultaneous, but successive (just as different spaces are not successive, but simultaneous). These principles could not be drawn from experience, for this would yield neither strict universality nor apodictic certainty. We would only be able to say: This is what common perception teaches, but not: This is how matters must stand. These principles are valid as rules under which alone experiences are possible at all, and instruct us prior to them, not through it.[b]

4) Time is no discursive or, as one calls it, general concept, but a pure form of sensible intuition. Different times are only parts of one and the same time. That representation, however, which can only be given A32
through a single object, is an intuition. Further, the proposition that different times cannot be simultaneous cannot be derived from a general concept. The proposition is synthetic, and cannot arise from concepts alone. It is therefore immediately contained in the intuition and representation of time.

5) The infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is only possible through limitations of a B48
single time grounding it. The original representation **time** must therefore be given as unlimited. But where the parts themselves and every magnitude of an object can be determinately represented only through limitation, there the entire representation cannot be given through concepts, (<for they contain only partial representations)>,[c] but immediate intuition must ground them.[d]

<§ 5
Transcendental exposition of the concept of time.

I can appeal to No. 3 where, in order to be brief, I have placed that which is properly transcendental under the heading of the metaphysical exposition. Here I add further that the concept of alteration and, with

[a] These parentheses added in B.

[b] The text reads "*belehren uns vor derselben, und nicht durch dieselbe*." Earlier editors suggested emending the last word to "*dieselben*"; but if the sentence is interpreted to mean "instructs us prior to experiences, not through common perception," it can be read without emendation.

[c] In the first edition: "for there the partial representations precede."

[d] B has *ihnen* instead of *ihre* here.

it, the concept of motion (as alteration of place), is only possible through and in the representation of time – that if this representation were not *a priori* (inner) intuition, then no concept, whatever it might be, could make comprehensible the possibility of an alteration, i.e., of a combination of contradictorily opposed predicates (e.g., a thing's being in a place and the not-being of the very same thing in the same place) in one and the same object.[a] Only in time can both contradictorily op-
B 49 posed determinations in one thing be encountered, namely **successively.** Our concept of time therefore explains the possibility of as much synthetic *a priori* cognition as is presented by the general theory of motion, which is no less fruitful.>[30]

<§ 6>

A 32 Conclusions from these concepts.

a) Time is not something that would subsist for itself or attach to things as an objective determination, and thus remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of the intuition of them; for in the first case it would be something that was actual yet without an actual object. As far
A 33 as the second case is concerned, however, time could not precede the objects as a determination or order attaching to the things themselves as their condition and be cognized and intuited *a priori* through synthetic propositions. But the latter, on the contrary, can very well occur if time is nothing other than the subjective condition under which all intuitions can take place in us. For then this form of inner intuition can be represented prior to the objects, thus *a priori.*

b) Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense, i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state. For time cannot be a determina-
B 50 tion of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a shape or a position, etc., but on the contrary determines the relation of representations in our inner state. And just because this inner intuition yields no shape we also attempt to remedy this lack through analogies, and represent the temporal sequence through a line progressing to infinity, in which the manifold constitutes a series that is of only one dimension, and infer from the properties of this line to all the properties of time, with the sole difference that the parts of the former are simultaneous but those of the latter always exist successively. From this it is also apparent that the representation of time is itself an intuition, since all its relations can be expressed in an outer intuition.

A 34 *c*) Time is the *a priori* formal condition of all appearances in general. Space, as the pure form of all outer intuitions, is limited as an *a priori*

[a] *Objecte*

condition merely to outer intuitions. But since, on the contrary, all representations, whether or not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the mind themselves belong to the inner state, while this inner state belongs under the formal condition of inner intuition, and thus of time, so time is an *a priori* condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances. If I can say *a priori:* all outer appearances are in space and B51
determined *a priori* according to the relations of space, so from the principle[a] of inner sense I can say entirely generally: all appearances in general, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in relations of time.

If we abstract from our way of internally intuiting ourselves and by means of this intuition also dealing with all outer intuitions in the power of representation, and thus take objects as they may be in themselves, then time is nothing. It is only of objective validity in regard to appearances, because these are already things that we take as **objects of our senses**; but it is no longer objective if one abstracts from the sen- A35
sibility of our intuition, thus from that kind of representation that is peculiar to us, and speaks of **things in general**. Time is therefore merely a subjective condition of our (human) intuition (which is always sensible, i.e., insofar as we are affected by objects), and in itself, outside the subject, is nothing. Nonetheless it is necessarily objective in regard to all appearances, thus also in regard to all things that can come before us in experience. We cannot say all things are in time, because with the concept of things in general abstraction is made from every kind of in- B52
tuition of them, but this is the real condition under which time belongs to the representation of objects. Now if the condition is added to the concept, and the principle says that all things as appearances (objects of sensible intuition) are in time, then the principle has its sound objective correctness and *a priori* universality.

Our assertions accordingly teach the **empirical reality** of time, i.e., objective validity in regard to all objects that may ever be given to our senses. And since our intuition is always sensible, no object can ever be given to us in experience that would not belong under the condition of time. But, on the contrary, we dispute all claim of time to absolute reality, namely where it would attach to things absolutely as a condition or property even without regard to the form of our sensible intuition. A36
Such properties, which pertain to things in themselves, can never be given to us through the senses. In this therefore consists the **transcendental ideality** of time, according to which it is nothing at all if one ab-

[a] *Princip*

stracts from the subjective conditions of sensible intuition, and cannot be counted as either subsisting or inhering in the objects in themselves (without their relation to our intuition). Yet this ideality is to be com-
B 53 pared with the subreptions of sensation just as little as that of space is, because in that case one presupposes that the appearance itself, in which these predicates inhere, has objective reality, which is here entirely absent except insofar as it is merely empirical, i.e., the object itself is regarded merely as appearance: concerning which the above remark in the previous sections is to be consulted.[a]

<§ 7>
Elucidation.

Against this theory, which concedes empirical reality to time but disputes its absolute and transcendental reality, insightful men have so unanimously proposed one objection that I conclude that it must naturally occur to every reader who is not accustomed to these considerations.[31] It goes thus: Alterations are real (this is proved by the change of
A 37 our own representations, even if one would deny all outer appearances together with their alterations). Now alterations are possible only in time, therefore time is something real. There is no difficulty in answering. I admit the entire argument. Time is certainly something real, namely the real form of inner intuition. It therefore has subjective reality in regard to inner experience, i.e., I really have the representation of
B 54 time and <my>[b] determinations in it. It is therefore to be regarded really not as object[c] but as the way of representing myself as object.[d] But if I or another being could intuit myself without this condition of sensibility, then these very determinations, which we now represent to ourselves as alterations, would yield us a cognition in which the representation of time and thus also of alteration would not occur at all. Its empirical reality therefore remains as a condition of all our experiences. Only absolute reality cannot be granted to it according to what has been adduced above. It is nothing except the form of our inner intuition.* If

* I can, to be sure, say: my representations succeed one another; but that only means that we are conscious of them as in a temporal sequence, i.e., according to the form of inner sense. Time is not on that account something in itself, nor any determination objectively adhering to things.

[a] This refers to A 28–30/B 44–5 in § 3.
[b] In the first edition: "of my."
[c] *Object*
[d] *Object*

one removes the special condition of our sensibility from it, then the concept of time also disappears, and it does not adhere to the objects A38
themselves, rather merely to the subject that intuits them.

The cause, however, on account of which this objection is so unanimously made, and indeed by those who nevertheless know of nothing convincing to object against the doctrine of the ideality of space,[32] is B55
this. They did not expect to be able to demonstrate the absolute reality of space apodictically, since they were confronted by idealism, according to which the reality of outer objects is not capable of any strict proof: on the contrary, the reality of the object of our inner sense (of myself and my state) is immediately clear through consciousness. The former could have been a mere illusion, but the latter, according to their opinion, is undeniably something real. But they did not consider that both, without their reality as representations being disputed, nevertheless belong only to appearance, which always has two sides, one where the object[a] is considered in itself (without regard to the way in which it is to be intuited, the constitution of which however must for that very reason always remain problematic), the other where the form of the intuition of this object is considered, which must not be sought in the object in itself but in the subject to which it appears, but which nevertheless really and necessarily pertains to the representation of this object.

Time and space are accordingly two sources of cognition, from which different synthetic cognitions can be drawn *a priori*, of which es- A39
pecially pure mathematics in regard to the cognitions of space and its relations provides a splendid example. Both taken together are, B56
namely, the pure forms of all sensible intuition, and thereby make possible synthetic *a priori* propositions. But these *a priori* sources of cognition determine their own boundaries by that very fact (that they are merely conditions of sensibility), namely that they apply to objects only so far as they are considered as appearances, but do not present things in themselves. Those alone are the field of their validity, beyond which no further objective use of them takes place. This reality of space and time, further, leaves the certainty of experiential cognition untouched: for we are just as certain of that whether these forms necessarily adhere to the things in themselves or only to our intuition of these things. Those, however, who assert the absolute reality of space and time, whether they assume it to be subsisting or only inhering, must themselves come into conflict with the principles[b] of experience.

[a] *Object*
[b] *Principien*

For if they decide in favor of the first (which is generally the position of the mathematical investigators of nature),[33] then they must assume two eternal and infinite self-subsisting non-entities (space and time), which exist (yet without there being anything real) only in order to comprehend everything real within themselves. If they adopt the second position (as do some metaphysicians of nature), and hold space and time to be relations of appearances (next to or successive to one another) that are abstracted from experience though confusedly represented in this abstraction, then they must dispute the validity or at least the apodictic certainty of *a priori* mathematical doctrines in regard to real things (e.g., in space), since this certainty does not occur *a posteriori*, and on this view the *a priori* concepts of space and time are only creatures of the imagination, the origin of which must really be sought in experience, out of whose abstracted relations imagination has made something that, to be sure, contains what is general in them but that cannot occur without the restrictions that nature has attached to them.[34] The first succeed in opening the field of appearances for mathematical assertions.[a] However, they themselves become very confused through precisely these conditions if the understanding would go beyond this field. The second succeed, to be sure, with respect to the latter, in that the representations of space and time do not stand in their way if they would judge of objects not as appearances but merely in relation to the understanding; but they can neither offer any ground for the possibility of *a priori* mathematical cognitions (since they lack a true and objectively valid *a priori* intuition), nor can they bring the propositions of experience into necessary accord with those assertions. On our theory of the true constitution of these two original forms of sensibility both difficulties are remedied.

A40 B57 A41 B58

Finally, that the transcendental aesthetic cannot contain more than these two elements, namely space and time, is clear from the fact that all other concepts belonging to sensibility, even that of motion, which unites both elements, presuppose something empirical. For this presupposes the perception of something movable. In space considered in itself there is nothing movable; hence the movable must be something that is found **in space only through experience,** thus an empirical datum. In the same way the transcendental aesthetic cannot count the concept of alteration among its *a priori* data; for time itself does not alter, but only something that is within time. For this there is required the perception of some existence and the succession of its determinations, thus experience.

[a] A colon in the first edition is replaced with a period in the second.

<§ 8>
General remarks
on the transcendental aesthetic

B59

<I.>[a] It will first be necessary to explain as distinctly as possible our opinion in regard to the fundamental constitution of sensible cognition A42
in general, in order to preclude all misinterpretation of it.

We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that if we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all constitution, all relations of objects[b] in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves, but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned solely with this. Space and time are its pure forms, sensation in general its matter. B60
We can cognize only the former *a priori*, i.e., prior to all actual perception, and they are therefore called pure intuition; the latter, however, is that in our cognition that is responsible for it being called *a posteriori* cognition, i.e., empirical intuition. The former adheres to our sensibility absolutely necessarily, whatever sort of sensations we may have; the latter can be very different. Even if we could bring this intuition of ours A43
to the highest degree of distinctness we would not thereby come any closer to the constitution of objects in themselves. For in any case we would still completely cognize only our own way of intuiting, i.e., our sensibility, and this always only under the conditions originally depending on the subject, space and time; what the objects may be in themselves would still never be known through the most enlightened cognition of their appearance, which alone is given to us.

That our entire sensibility is nothing but the confused representation of things, which contains solely that which pertains to them in themselves but only under a heap of marks and partial representations that we can never consciously separate from one another, is therefore a falsification of the concept of sensibility and of appearance that renders

[a] "I." is added in the second edition because of the addition of the further numbered paragraphs (II through IV) added at B66–73.
[b] *Objecte*

the entire theory of them useless and empty. The difference between an
B61 indistinct and a distinct representation is merely logical, and does not concern the content. Without doubt the concept of **right** that is used by the healthy understanding contains the very same things that the most subtle speculation can evolve out of it, only in common and practical use one is not conscious of these manifold representations in these thoughts. Thus one cannot say that the common concept is sensible and
A44 contains a mere appearance, for right cannot appear at all; rather its concept lies in the understanding and represents a constitution (the moral constitution) of actions that pertains to them in themselves. The representation of a **body** in intuition, on the contrary, contains nothing at all that could pertain to an object in itself, but merely the appearance of something and the way in which we are affected by it; and this receptivity of our cognitive capacity is called sensibility and remains worlds apart from the cognition of the object in itself even if one might see through to the very bottom of it (the appearance).

The Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy has therefore directed all investigations of the nature and origin of our cognitions to an entirely unjust point of view in considering the distinction between sensibility and the intellectual as merely logical, since it is obviously transcendental, and
B62 does not concern merely the form of distinctness or indistinctness, but its origin and content, so that through sensibility we do not cognize the constitution of things in themselves merely indistinctly, but rather not at all, and, as soon as we take away our subjective constitution, the represented object[a] with the properties that sensible intuition attributes to it is nowhere to be encountered, nor can it be encountered, for it is just this subjective constitution that determines its form as appearance.[35]

A45 We ordinarily distinguish quite well between that which is essentially attached to the intuition of appearances, and is valid for every human sense in general, and that which pertains to them only contingently because it is not valid for the relation[b] of sensibility in general but only for a particular situation or organization of this or that sense. And thus one calls the first cognition one that represents the object in itself, but the second one only its appearance. This distinction, however, is only empirical. If one stands by it (as commonly happens) and does not regard that empirical intuition as in turn mere appearance (as ought to happen), so that there is nothing to be encountered in it that pertains to anything in itself, then our transcendental distinction is lost, and we be-

[a] *Object*

[b] As noted in the first-edition version above, here Kant switches from *Verhältnis* to *Beziehung* as his topic switches from the relation of objects in space or time to each other to the relation of space and time to us. With one exception to be noted, therefore, for the remainder of this section (I) "relation" translates *Verhältnis*. In the new paragraphs II through IV added below, however, Kant again reverts to *Verhältnis*.

lieve ourselves to cognize things in themselves, though we have nothing to do with anything except appearances anywhere (in the world of sense), even in the deepest research into its objects. Thus, we would B63
certainly call a rainbow a mere appearance in a sun-shower, but would call this rain the thing in itself, and this is correct, as long as we understand the latter concept in a merely physical sense, as that which in universal experience and all different positions relative to the senses is always determined thus and not otherwise in intuition. But if we consider this empirical object in general and, without turning to its agreement with every human sense, ask whether it (not the raindrops, since A46
these, as appearances, are already empirical objects)[a] represents an object in itself, then the question of the relation of the representation to the object is transcendental, and not only these drops are mere appearances, but even their round form, indeed even the space through which they fall are nothing in themselves, but only mere modifications or foundations[b] of our sensible intuition; the transcendental object,[c] however, remains unknown to us.

The second important concern of our transcendental aesthetic is that it not merely earn some favor as a plausible hypothesis, but that it be as certain and indubitable as can ever be demanded of a theory that is to serve as an organon. In order to make this certainty fully convincing we will choose a case in which its validity can become obvious <and that B64
can serve to make that which has been adduced in § 3 even more clear>.

Thus, if it were to be supposed that space and time are in themselves objective and conditions of the possibility of things in themselves, then it would be shown, first, that there is a large number of *a priori* apodictic and synthetic propositions about both, but especially about space, which we will therefore here investigate as our primary example. Since the propositions of geometry are cognized synthetically *a priori* and with apodictic certainty, I ask: Whence do you take such propositions, A47
and on what does our understanding rely in attaining to such absolutely necessary and universally valid truths? There is no other way than through concepts or through intuitions, both of which, however, are given, as such, either *a priori* or *a posteriori*. The latter, namely empirical concepts, together with that on which they are grounded, empirical intuition, cannot yield any synthetic proposition except one that is also merely empirical, i.e., a proposition of experience; thus it can never contain necessity and absolute universality of the sort that is nevertheless characteristic of all propositions of geometry. Concerning the first and only means for attaining to such cognitions, however, namely

[a] *Objecte*
[b] *Grundlagen*
[c] *Object*

through mere concepts or *a priori* intuitions, it is clear that from mere concepts no synthetic cognition but only merely analytic cognition can
B65 be attained. Take the proposition that with two straight lines no space at all can be enclosed, thus no figure is possible, and try to derive it from the concept of straight lines and the number two; or take the proposition that a figure is possible with three straight lines, and in the same way try to derive it from these concepts. All of your effort is in vain, and you see yourself forced to take refuge in intuition, as indeed geometry
A48 always does. You thus give yourself an object in intuition; but what kind is this, is it a pure *a priori* intuition or an empirical one? If it were the latter, then no universally valid, let alone apodictic proposition could ever come from it: for experience can never provide anything of this sort. You must therefore give your object *a priori* in intuition, and ground your synthetic proposition on this. If there did not lie in you a faculty for intuiting *a priori*; if this subjective condition regarding form were not at the same time the universal *a priori* condition under which alone the object[a] of this (outer) intuition is itself possible; if the object (the triangle) were something in itself without relation to your subject: then how could you say that what necessarily lies in your subjective conditions for constructing a triangle must also necessarily pertain to the triangle in itself? for you could not add to your concept (of three lines)
B66 something new (the figure) that must thereby necessarily be encountered in the object, since this is given prior to your cognition and not through it. If, therefore, space (and time as well) were not a mere form of your intuition that contains *a priori* conditions under which alone things could be outer objects for you, which are nothing in themselves without these subjective conditions, then you could make out absolutely nothing synthetic and *a priori* about outer objects.[b] It is therefore indubitably certain and not merely possible or even probable that space and
A49 time, as the necessary conditions of all (outer and inner) experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuition, in relation to which therefore all objects are mere appearances and not things given for themselves in this way; about these appearances, further, much may be said *a priori* that concerns their form but nothing whatsoever about the things in themselves that may ground them.

[c]<II. For confirmation of this theory of the ideality of outer as well as inner sense, thus of all objects[d] of the senses, as mere appearances, this comment is especially useful: that everything in our cognition that belongs to intuition (with the exception, therefore, of the feeling of plea-

[a] *Object*
[b] *Objecte*
[c] From here to the end of the "Transcendental Aesthetic" added in the second edition.
[d] *Objecte*

sure and displeasure and the will, which are not cognitions at all) contains nothing but mere relations,[a] of places in one intuition (extension), alteration of places (motion), and laws in accordance with which this alteration is determined (moving forces). But what is present in the place, or what it produces in the things themselves besides the alteration of place, is not given through these relations. Now through mere relations no thing in itself is cognized; it is therefore right to judge that since nothing is given to us through outer sense except mere representations of relation, outer sense can also contain in its representation only the relation of an object to the subject, and not that which is internal to the object[b] in itself.[36] It is exactly the same in the case of inner sense. It is not merely that the representations **of outer sense** make up the proper material with which we occupy our mind, but also the time in which we place these representations, which itself precedes the consciousness of them in experience and grounds the way in which we place them in mind as a formal condition, already contains relations of succession, of simultaneity, and of that which is simultaneous with succession (of that which persists). Now that which, as representation, can precede any act of thinking something is intuition and, if it contains nothing but relations, it is the form of intuition, which, since it does not represent anything except insofar as something is posited in the mind, can be nothing other than the way in which the mind is affected by its own activity, namely this positing of its representation, thus the way it is affected through itself, i.e., it is an inner sense as far as regards its form. Everything that is represented through a sense is to that extent always appearance, and an inner sense must therefore either not be admitted at all or else the subject, which is the object of this sense, can only be represented by its means as appearance, not as it would judge of itself if its intuition were mere self-activity, i.e., intellectual. Any difficulty in this depends merely on the question how a subject can internally intuit itself; yet this difficulty is common to every theory. Consciousness of itself (apperception) is the simple representation of the I, and if all of the manifold in the subject were given **self-actively** through that alone, then the inner intuition would be intellectual. In human beings this consciousness requires inner perception of the manifold that is antecedently given in the subject, and the manner in which this is given in the mind without spontaneity must be called sensibility on account of this difference. If the faculty for becoming conscious of oneself is to seek out (apprehend) that which lies in the mind, it must affect the lat-

B67

B68

[a] Here Kant reverts to the use of *Verhältnis* for the remainder of the "Transcendental Aesthetic," and it is thus this word that is translated by "relation" here and for the remainder of the section unless otherwise noted.

[b] *Objecte*

ter, and it can only produce an intuition of itself in such a way, whose form, however, which antecedently grounds it in the mind, determines the way in which the manifold is together in the mind in the represen-
B 69 tation of time; there it then intuits itself not as it would immediately self-actively represent itself, but in accordance with the way in which it is affected from within, consequently as it appears to itself, not as it is.

III. If I say: in space and time intuition represents both outer objects[a] as well as the self-intuition of the mind as each affects our senses, i.e., as it **appears,** that is not to say that these objects would be a mere **illusion.**[b,37] For in the appearance the objects,[c] indeed even properties[d] that we attribute to them, are always regarded as something really given, only insofar as this property depends only on the kind of intuition of the subject in the relation[e] of the given object to it then this object as **appearance** is to be distinguished from itself as object[f] **in itself.** Thus I do not say that bodies merely **seem**[g] to exist outside me or that my soul only **seems**[h] to be given if I assert that the quality of space and time – in accordance with which, as condition of their existence, I posit both of these – lies in my kind of intuition and not in these objects[i] in themselves. It would be my own fault if I made that which I should count as
B 70 appearance into mere illusion.* But this does not happen according to

B 69 *The predicates of appearance can be attributed to the object[j] in itself, in rela-
B 70 tion to our sense, e.g., the red color or fragrance to the rose; but the illusion can never be attributed to the object as predicate, precisely because that would be to attribute to the object[k] **for itself** what pertains to it only in relation to the senses or in general to the subject, e.g., the two handles that were originally attributed to Saturn. What is not to be encountered in the object[l] in itself at all, but is always to be encountered in its relation to the subject and is inseparable from the representation of the object, is appearance, and thus the predicates of space and of time are rightly attributed to the objects of the senses as such, and there is no illusion in this. On the contrary, if I attribute the redness to the rose **in itself,** the handles to Saturn or extension to all outer objects **in themselves,** without looking to a determinate relation of these objects to the subject and limiting my judgment to this, then illusion first arises.

[a] *Objecte*
[b] *Schein*
[c] *Objecte*
[d] *Beschaffenheiten*, here and in the remainder of this paragraph.
[e] *Relation*
[f] *Object*
[g] *scheinen*
[h] *scheint*
[i] *Objecten*
[j] *Objecte*
[k] *Object*
[l] *Objecte*

our principle[a] of the ideality of all of our sensible intuitions; rather, if one ascribes **objective reality** to those forms of representation then one cannot avoid thereby transforming everything into mere **illusion.** For if one regards space and time as properties that, as far as their possibility is concerned, must be encountered in things in themselves, and reflects on the absurdities in which one then becomes entangled, because two infinite things that are neither substances nor anything really inhering in substances must nevertheless be something existing, indeed the necessary condition of the existence of all things, which also remain B 71
even if all existing things are removed; then one cannot well blame the good Berkeley if he demotes bodies to mere illusion;[38] indeed even our own existence, which would be made dependent in such a way on the self-subsisting reality of a non-entity such as time, would be transformed along with this into mere illusion; an absurdity of which no one has yet allowed himself to be guilty.

IV. In natural theology, where one conceives of an object that is not only not an object of intuition for us but cannot even be an object of sensible intuition for itself, one is careful to remove the conditions of time and space from all of its intuition (for all of its cognition must be intuition and not **thinking,** which is always proof of limitations). But with what right can one do this if one has antecedently made both of these into forms of things in themselves, and indeed ones that, as *a priori* conditions of the existence of things, would remain even if one removed the things themselves? – for as conditions of all existence in general they would also have to be conditions of the existence of God. If one will not make them into objective forms of all things, then no al- B 72
ternative remains but to make them into subjective forms of our kind of outer as well as inner intuition, which is called sensible because it is **not original,** i.e., one through which the existence of the object[b] of intuition is itself given (and that, so far as we can have insight, can only pertain to the original being); rather it is dependent on the existence of the object,[c] thus it is possible only insofar as the representational capacity of the subject is affected through that.[39]

It is also not necessary for us to limit the kind of intuition in space and time to the sensibility of human beings; it may well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily agree with human beings in this regard (though we cannot decide this), yet even given such universal validity this kind of intuition would not cease to be sensibility, for the very reason that it is derived (*intuitus derivativus*),[d] not original (*intuitius orig-*

[a] *Princip*
[b] *Objects*
[c] *Objects*
[d] derivative intuition

inarius),[a] thus not intellectual intuition, which for the ground already adduced seems to pertain only to the original being, never to one that is dependent as regards both its existence and its intuition (which determines its existence in relation[b] to given objects);[c] although the last remark must be counted only as an illustration of our aesthetic theory and not as a ground of its proof.

B 73

Conclusion of the Transcendental Aesthetic.

Here we now have one of the required pieces for the solution of the general problem of transcendental philosophy – **how are synthetic *a priori* propositions possible?** – namely pure *a priori* intuitions, space and time, in which, if we want to go beyond the given concept in an *a priori* judgment, we encounter that which is to be discovered *a priori* and synthetically connected with it, not in the concept but in the intuition that corresponds to it; but on this ground such a judgment never extends beyond the objects of the senses and can hold only for objects[d] of possible experience.>

[a] original intuition
[b] *Beziehung*
[c] *Objecte*
[d] *Objecte*

The Transcendental Doctrine of Elements
Second Part
The Transcendental Logic

A 50/B 74

Introduction
The Idea of a Transcendental Logic

I.
On logic in general.

Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is **given** to us, through the latter it is **thought** in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can[a] yield a cognition. Both are either pure or empirical. **Empirical,** if sensation (which presupposes the actual presence of the object) is contained therein; but **pure** if no sensation is mixed into the representation. One can call the latter the matter of sensible cognition. Thus pure intuition contains merely the form B 75
under which something is intuited, and pure concept only the form of A 51
thinking of an object in general. Only pure intuitions or concepts alone are possible *a priori*, empirical ones only *a posteriori*.

If we will call the **receptivity** of our mind to receive representations insofar as it is affected in some way **sensibility,** then on the contrary the faculty for bringing forth representations itself, or the **spontaneity** of cognition, is the **understanding.** It comes along with our nature that **intuition** can never be other than **sensible,** i.e., that it contains only the way in which we are affected by objects. The faculty for **thinking** of objects of sensible intuition, on the contrary, is the **understanding.** Neither of these properties is to be preferred to the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions

[a] The second edition has the plural verb *können*; the first had the singular *kann*.

without concepts are blind.[1] It is thus just as necessary to make the mind's concepts sensible (i.e., to add an object to them in intuition) as it is to make its intuitions understandable (i.e., to bring them under concepts). Further, these two faculties or capacities cannot exchange their functions. The understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable of thinking anything. Only from their
B 76 unification can cognition arise. But on this account one must not mix
A 52 up their roles, rather one has great cause to separate them carefully from each other and distinguish them. Hence we distinguish the science of the rules of sensibility in general, i.e., aesthetic, from the science of the rules of understanding in general, i.e., logic.

Now logic in turn can be undertaken with two different aims, either as the logic of the general or of the particular use of the understanding. The former contains the absolutely necessary rules of thinking, without which no use of the understanding takes place, and it therefore concerns these rules without regard to the difference of the objects to which it may be directed.[2] The logic of the particular use of the understanding contains the rules for correctly thinking about a certain kind of objects. The former can be called elementary logic, the latter, however, the organon of this or that science. In the schools the latter is often stuck before the sciences as their propaedeutic, though in the course of human reason they are certainly the latest to be reached, once the science is already long complete, and requires only the final touch for its improvement and perfection. For one must already know the objects rather well if one will
B 77 offer the rules for how a science of them is to be brought about.

Now general logic is either pure or applied logic. In the former we
A 53 abstract from all empirical conditions under which our understanding is exercised, e.g., from the influence of the senses, from the play of imagination,[a] the laws of memory, the power of habit, inclination, etc., hence also from the sources of prejudice, indeed in general from all causes from which certain cognitions arise or may be supposed to arise, because these merely concern the understanding under certain circumstances of its application, and experience is required in order to know these. A **general** but **pure** logic therefore has to do with strictly *a priori* principles,[b] and is a **canon of the understanding** and reason, but only in regard to what is formal in their use, be the content what it may (empirical or transcendental). A **general logic,** however, is then called **applied** if it is directed to the rules of the use of the understanding under the subjective empirical conditions that psychology teaches us. It therefore has empirical principles,[c] although it is to be sure general in-

[a] *Einbildung*
[b] *Principien*
[c] *Principien*

sofar as it concerns the use of the understanding without regard to the difference of objects. On this account it is also neither a canon of the understanding in general nor an organon of particular sciences, but B 78 merely a cathartic of the common understanding.

In general logic the part that is to constitute the pure doctrine of reason must therefore be entirely separated from that which constitutes applied (though still general) logic. The former alone is properly sci- A 54 ence, although brief and dry, as the scholastically correct presentation of a doctrine of the elements of the understanding requires. In this therefore logicians must always have two rules in view.

1) As general logic it abstracts from all contents of the cognition of the understanding and of the difference of its objects, and has to do with nothing but the mere form of thinking.

2) As pure logic it has no empirical principles,[a] thus it draws nothing from psychology (as one has occasionally been persuaded), which therefore has no influence at all on the canon of the understanding. It is a proven doctrine, and everything in it must be completely *a priori*.

What I call applied logic (in opposition to the common signification of this word, according to which it ought to contain certain exercises to which pure logic gives the rule) is thus a representation of the understanding and the rules of its necessary use *in concreto*, namely under the contingent conditions of the subject, which can hinder or promote this B 79 use, and which can all be given only empirically. It deals with attention, its hindrance and consequences, the cause of error, the condition of doubt, of reservation, of conviction, etc., and general and pure logic is related to it as pure morality, which contains merely the necessary moral A 55 laws of a free will in general, is related to the doctrine of virtue proper, which assesses these laws under the hindrances of the feelings, inclinations, and passions to which human beings are more or less subject, and which can never yield a true and proven science, since it requires empirical and psychological principles[b] just as much as that applied logic does.

II.
On transcendental logic.

General logic abstracts, as we have shown, from all content of cognition, i.e. from any relation[c] of it to the object,[d] and considers only the

[a] *Principien*

[b] *Principien*

[c] *Beziehung*. The contrast between this term and the following use of *Verhältnis* (p. 196, note *a*) shows that Kant continues to use the former to connote a relation between subject and object and the latter among objects, though in this case objects of thought rather than sensibility. Further, unnoted instances of "relation" translate *Beziehung*.

[d] *Object*

logical form in the relation[a] of cognitions to one another, i.e., the form of thinking in general. But now since there are pure as well as empirical intuitions (as the transcendental aesthetic proved), a distinction be-
B80 tween pure and empirical thinking of objects could also well be found. In this case there would be a logic in which one did not abstract from all content of cognition; for that logic that contained merely the rules of the pure thinking of an object would exclude all those cognitions that were of empirical content. It would therefore concern the origin of our
A56 cognitions of objects insofar as that cannot be ascribed to the objects; while general logic, on the contrary, has nothing to do with this origin of cognition, but rather considers representations, whether they are originally given *a priori* in ourselves or only empirically, merely in respect of the laws according to which the understanding brings them into relation[b] to one another when it thinks, and therefore it deals only with the form of the understanding, which can be given to the representations wherever they may have originated.

And here I make a remark the import of which extends to all of the following considerations, and that we must keep well in view, namely that not every *a priori* cognition must be called transcendental, but only that by means of which we cognize that and how certain representations (intuitions or concepts) are applied entirely *a priori*, or are possible (i.e.,
B81 the possibility of cognition or its use *a priori*). Hence neither space nor any geometrical determination of it *a priori* is a transcendental representation, but only the cognition that these representations are not of empirical origin at all and the possibility that they can[c] nevertheless be related *a priori* to objects of experience can be called transcendental. Likewise the use of space about all objects in general would also be transcendental; but if it is restricted solely to objects of the senses, then
A57 it is called empirical. The difference between the transcendental and the empirical therefore belongs only to the critique of cognitions and does not concern their relation to their object.

In the expectation, therefore, that there can perhaps be concepts that may be related to objects *a priori*, not as pure or sensible intuitions but rather merely as acts of pure thinking, that are thus concepts but of neither empirical nor aesthetic origin, we provisionally formulate the idea of a science of pure understanding and of the pure cognition of reason, by means of which we think objects completely *a priori*. Such a science, which would determine the origin, the domain, and the objective validity of such cognitions, would have to be called **transcendental logic,** since it has to do merely with the laws of the understanding and reason,

[a] *Verhältnisse*
[b] *Verhältnis*
[c] Following Erdmann, reading *können* instead of *könne*.

but solely insofar as they are related to objects *a priori* and not, as in the case of general logic, to empirical as well as pure cognitions of reason without distinction. B82

III.
On the division of general logic into analytic and dialectic.

The old and famous question with which the logicians were to be driven into a corner and brought to such a pass that they must either fall into a miserable circle[a] or else confess their ignorance, hence the vanity of their entire art, is this: **What is truth?** The nominal definition of truth, namely that it is the agreement of cognition with its object, is here granted and presupposed; but one demands to know what is the general and certain criterion of the truth of any cognition. A58

It is already a great and necessary proof of cleverness or insight to know what one should reasonably ask. For if the question is absurd in itself and demands unnecessary answers, then, besides the embarrassment of the one who proposes it, it also has the disadvantage of misleading the incautious listener into absurd answers, and presenting the ridiculous sight (as the ancients said) of one person milking a billy-goat while the other holds a sieve underneath.[3] B83

If truth consists in the agreement of a cognition with its object, then this object must thereby be distinguished from others; for a cognition is false if it does not agree with the object to which it is related even if it contains something that could well be valid of other objects. Now a general criterion of truth would be that which was valid of all cognitions without any distinction among their objects. But it is clear that since with such a criterion one abstracts from all content of cognition (relation to its object),[b] yet truth concerns precisely this content, it would be completely impossible and absurd to ask for a mark of the truth of this content of cognition, and thus it is clear that a sufficient and yet at the same time general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided. Since above we have called the content of a cognition its matter, one must therefore say that no general sign of the truth of the matter of cognition can be demanded, because it is self-contradictory. A59

But concerning the mere form of cognition (setting aside all content), it is equally clear that a logic, so far as it expounds the general and necessary rules of understanding, must present criteria of truth in these very rules. For that which contradicts these is false, since the understanding thereby contradicts its general rules of thinking and thus con- B84

[a] In the second edition, *Dialexis;* in the first, *Dialele*, i.e. reasoning in a circle.
[b] *Object*

tradicts itself. But these criteria concern only the form of truth, i.e., of thinking in general, and are to that extent entirely correct but not sufficient. For although a cognition may be in complete accord with logical form, i.e., not contradict itself, yet it can still always contradict the object. The merely logical criterion of truth, namely the agreement of a cognition with the general and formal laws of understanding and reason, is therefore certainly the *conditio sine qua non* and thus the negative
A60 condition of all truth; further, however, logic cannot go, and the error that concerns not form but content cannot be discovered by any touchstone of logic.[4]

General logic analyzes the entire formal business of the understanding and reason into its elements, and presents these as principles[a] of all logical assessment[b] of our cognition. This part of logic can therefore be called an analytic, and is on that very account at least the negative touchstone of truth, since one must before all else examine and evaluate by means of these rules the form of all cognition before investigat-
B85 ing its content in order to find out whether with regard to the object it contains positive truth. But since the mere form of cognition, however well it may agree with logical laws, is far from sufficing to constitute the material (objective) truth of the cognition, nobody can dare to judge of objects and to assert anything about them merely with logic without having drawn on antecedently well-founded information about them from outside of logic, in order subsequently merely to investigate its use and connection in a coherent whole according to logical laws, or, better, solely to examine them according to such laws. Nevertheless there is something so seductive in the possession of an apparent art for giving all of our cognitions the form of understanding, even though with re-
A61 gard to their content one may yet be very empty and poor, that this general logic, which is merely a **canon** for judging,[c] has been used as if it were an **organon** for the actual production of at least the semblance of objective assertions, and thus in fact it has thereby been misused. Now general logic, as a putative organon, is called **dialectic.**

As different as the significance of the employment of this designation of a science or art among the ancients may have been, one can still infer
B86 from their actual use of it that among them it was nothing other than the **logic of illusion** – a sophistical art for giving to its ignorance, indeed even to its intentional tricks, the air of truth, by imitating the method of thoroughness, which logic prescribes in general, and using its topics for the embellishment of every empty pretension. Now one can take it as a certain and useful warning that general logic, **consid-**

[a] *Principien*
[b] *Beurtheilung*
[c] *Beurtheilung*

ered as an organon, is always a logic of illusion, i.e., is dialectical. For since it teaches us nothing at all about the content of cognition, but only the formal conditions of agreement with the understanding, which are entirely indifferent with regard to the objects, the effrontery of using it as a tool (organon) for an expansion and extension of its information,[a] or at least the pretension of so doing, comes down to nothing but idle chatter, asserting or impeaching whatever one wants with some plausibility. A62

Such instruction by no means befits the dignity of philosophy. For this reason it would be better to take this designation of "dialectic" as a **critique of dialectical illusion,** which is counted as part of logic, and in such a way we would here have it be understood.

IV. B87

On the division of transcendental logic into the transcendental analytic and dialectic.

In a transcendental logic we isolate the understanding (as we did above with sensibility in the transcendental aesthetic), and elevate from our cognition merely the part of our thought that has its origin solely in the understanding. The use of this pure cognition, however, depends on this as its condition: that objects are given to us in intuition, to which it can be applied. For without intuition all of our cognition would lack objects,[b] and therefore remain completely empty. The part of transcendental logic, therefore, that expounds the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding and the principles[c] without which no object can be thought at all, is the transcendental analytic, and at the same time a logic of truth. For no cognition can contradict it without at the same time losing all content, i.e., all relation to any object,[d] hence all truth. But because it is very enticing and seductive to make use of these pure cognitions of the understanding and principles by themselves, and even beyond all bounds of experience, which however itself alone can give us the matter (objects)[e] to which those pure concepts of the understanding can be applied, the understanding falls into the danger of making a material use of the merely formal principles[f] of pure understanding through empty sophistries, and of judging without distinction about objects that are not given to us, which perhaps indeed A63 B88

[a] *Kenntnisse*
[b] *Objecten*
[c] *Principien*
[d] *Object*
[e] *Objecte*
[f] *Principien*

could not be given to us in any way. Since it should properly be only a canon for the assessment of empirical use, it is misused if one lets it count as the organon of a general and unrestricted use, and dares to synthetically judge, assert, and decide about objects in general with the pure understanding alone. The use of the pure understanding would in this case therefore be dialectical. The second part of the transcendental logic must therefore be a critique of this dialectical illusion, and is called transcendental dialectic, not as an art of dogmatically arousing such illusion (an unfortunately highly prevalent art among the manifold works of metaphysical jugglery), but rather as a critique of the understanding and reason in regard to their hyperphysical use, in order to uncover the
A64 false illusion of their groundless pretensions and to reduce their claims to invention and amplification, putatively to be attained through transcendental principles, to the mere assessment and evaluation of the pure understanding, guarding it against sophistical tricks.

Transcendental Logic
First Division

B89

The Transcendental Analytic

This Analytic is the analysis[a] of the entirety of our *a priori* cognition into the elements of the pure cognition of the understanding. It is concerned with the following points: 1.[b] That the concepts be pure and not empirical concepts. 2. That they belong not to intuition and to sensibility, but rather to thinking and understanding. 3. That they be elementary concepts, and clearly distinguished from those which are derived or composed from them. 4. That the table of them be complete, and that they entirely exhaust the entire field of pure understanding. Now this completeness of a science cannot reliably be assumed from a rough calculation of an aggregate put together by mere estimates; hence it is possible only by means of an **idea of the whole** of the *a priori* cognition of the understanding, and through[c] the division of concepts that such an idea determines and that constitutes it, thus only through their **connection in a system.** The pure understanding separates itself completely not only from everything empirical, but even from all sensibility. It is therefore a unity that subsists on its own, which is sufficient by itself, and which is not to be supplemented by any external additions. Hence the sum total of its cognition will constitute a system that is to be grasped and determined under one idea, the completeness and articulation of which system can at the same time yield a touchstone of the correctness and genuineness of all the pieces of cognition fitting into it. This whole part of the transcendental logic, however, consists of two books, the first of which contains the **concepts** of pure understanding, the second its **principles.**

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[a] *Zergliederung*
[b] The numeral "1." is missing in the second edition.
[c] Added in the second edition.

Transcendental Analytic
First Book
The Analytic of Concepts.[a]

I understand by an analytic of concepts not their analysis, or the usual procedure of philosophical investigations, that of analyzing[b] the content of concepts that present themselves and bringing them to distinctness, but rather the much less frequently attempted **analysis**[c] **of the faculty of understanding** itself, in order to research the possibility of *a priori*
A66 concepts by seeking them only in the understanding as their birthplace and analyzing its pure use in general; for this is the proper business of
B91 a transcendental philosophy; the rest is the logical treatment of con-

[a] The following notes appear at this point in Kant's copy of the first edition:

"We remarked above that experience consists of synthetic propositions, and how synthetic *a posteriori* propositions are possible is not to be regarded as a question requiring a solution, since it is a fact.

"Now it is to be asked how this fact is possible.

"Experience consists of judgments, but it is to be asked whether these empirical judgments do not in the end presuppose *a priori* (pure) judgments. The analysis [*Analysis*] of experience contains, first, its analysis [*Zergleiderung*] insofar as judgments are in it; second, beyond the *a posteriori* concepts also *a priori* concepts.

"The problem is: How is experience possible? 1. What does the understanding do in judgments in general? 2. What do the senses do in empirical judgments? 3. In empirical cognition, what does the understanding, applied to the representations of the senses, do in order to bring forth a cognition of objects [*Objecte*]?

"One sees at first that experience is only possible through synthetic *a priori* propositions. Hence *a priori* principles [*Principien*] are 1. immanent: in accordance with use; 2. it is to be asked, whether they are also transcendent.

"The test for whether something is also experience, i.e., a fact, is as it were experimentation with the universal propositions under which the particular empirical judgment belongs. If the latter cannot stand under a universal rule for judging, if no concept can be made out of that, then it is a *vitium subreptionis* [*vicious fallacy*]. Why in superstition and credulity." (E XXXIII, pp. 21–2; 23:24–5)

[b] *zergliedern*

[c] *Zergliederung*

cepts in philosophy in general. We will therefore pursue the pure concepts into their first seeds and predispositions in the human understanding, where they lie ready, until with the opportunity of experience they are finally developed and exhibited in their clarity by the very same understanding, liberated from the empirical conditions attaching to them.

The Analytic of Concepts
First Chapter
On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding

If one sets a faculty of cognition into play, then on various occasions different concepts will become prominent that will make this faculty known and that can be collected in a more or less exhaustive treatise depending on whether they have been observed for a longer time or with greater acuteness. Where this investigation will be completed can never be determined with certainty by means of this as it were mechanical procedure. Further, the concepts that are discovered only as the opportunity arises will not reveal any order and systematic unity, but will rather be ordered in pairs only according to similarities and placed in series only in accord with the magnitude of their content, from the simple to the more composite, which series are by no means systematic even if to some extent methodically produced.

A67
B92

Transcendental philosophy has the advantage but also the obligation to seek its concepts in accordance with a principle,[a] since they spring pure and unmixed from the understanding, as absolute unity, and must therefore be connected among themselves in accordance with a concept or idea. Such a connection, however, provides a rule by means of which the place of each pure concept of the understanding and the completeness of all of them together can be determined *a priori*, which would otherwise depend upon whim or chance.

On the Transcendental Clue for the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding

First Section

On the logical use of the understanding in general.

The understanding has been explained above only negatively, as a non-
A68 sensible faculty of cognition. Now we cannot partake of intuition inde-

[a] *Princip*

pendently of sensibility. The understanding is therefore not a faculty of intuition. But besides intuition there is no other kind of cognition than B93
through concepts. Thus the cognition of every, at least human, understanding is a cognition through concepts, not intuitive but discursive. All intuitions, as sensible, rest on affections, concepts therefore on functions. By a function, however, I understand the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one. Concepts are therefore grounded on the spontaneity of thinking, as sensible intuitions are grounded on the receptivity of impressions. Now the understanding can make no other use of these concepts than that of judging by means of them. Since no[a] representation pertains to the object immediately except intuition alone, a concept is thus never immediately related to an object, but is always related to some other representation of it (whether that be an intuition or itself already a concept).[b] Judgment is therefore the mediate cognition of an object, hence the representation of a representation of it. In every judgment there is a concept that holds of many, and that among this many also comprehends a given representation, which is then related immediately to the object.[5] So in the judgment, e.g., **"All bodies are divisible,"**[c] the concept of the divisible is related to various other concepts; among these, however, it is here particularly related to the concept of body, and this in turn is related to certain appearances[d] that come before us. These objects are A69
therefore mediately represented by the concept of divisibility. All judg- B94
ments are accordingly functions of unity among our representations, since instead of an immediate representation a higher one, which comprehends this and other representations under itself, is used for the cognition of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one. We can, however, trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the **understanding** in general can be represented as a **faculty for judging.** For according to what has been said above it is a faculty for thinking. Thinking is cognition through concepts. Concepts, however, as predicates of possible judgments, are related to some representation of a still undetermined object. The concept of body thus signifies something, e.g., metal, which can be cognized through that concept. It is therefore a concept only because other representations are contained under it by means of which it can be re-

[a] In his copy of the first edition, Kant inserts here the word "other" (E XXIV, p. 23; 23:45).

[b] Kant's copy of the first edition replaces this parenthetical aside with the following words, without parentheses: "which itself contains intuition only mediately or immediately" (E XXXV, p. 23; 23:45).

[c] *Teilbar*, rather than *veränderlich*, following the fourth edition.

[d] Kant's copy of the first edition changes "appearances" to "intuitions" (E XXXVI, p. 23; 23:45).

lated to objects. It is therefore the predicate for a possible judgment, e.g., "Every metal is a body." The functions of the understanding can therefore all be found together if one can exhaustively exhibit the functions of unity in judgments. The following section will make it evident that this can readily be accomplished.

A70/B95

On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding
Second Section

<§ 9.> [a]
On the logical function of the understanding in judgments.

If we abstract from all content of a judgment in general, and attend only to the mere form of the understanding in it, we find that the function of thinking in that can be brought under four titles, each of which contains under itself three moments. They can suitably be represented in the following table.[6]

1.
Quantity of Judgments
Universal
Particular
Singular

2.
Quality
Affirmative
Negative
Infinite

3.
Relation[b]
Categorical
Hypothetical
Disjunctive

4.
Modality
Problematic
Assertoric
Apodictic

B96 A71 Since this division seems to depart in several points, although not essential ones, from the customary technique of the logicians, the following protests against a worrisome misunderstanding are not unnecessary.

[a] Here Kant resumes the numbering of paragraphs begun in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" in the second edition. This will continue through the end of the "Transcendental Deduction."

[b] Here Kant uses the latinate word *Relation* instead of either *Beziehung* or *Verhältnis*.

1. The logicians rightly say that in the use of judgments in syllogisms singular judgments can be treated like universal ones. For just because they have no domain at all, their predicate is not merely related to some of what is contained under the concept of the subject while being excluded from another part of it. The predicate therefore holds of that concept without exception, just as if the latter were a generally valid[a] concept with a domain with the predicate applying to the whole of what is signified.[b] If, on the contrary, we compare a singular judgment with a generally valid one, merely as cognition, with respect to quantity,[c] then the former[d] relates to the latter as unity relates to infinity, and is therefore in itself essentially different from the latter. Therefore, if I consider a singular judgment (*judicium singulare*) not only with respect to its internal validity, but also, as cognition in general, with respect to the quantity[e] it has in comparison with other cognitions, then it is surely different from generally valid judgments (*judicia communia*), and deserves a special place in a complete table of the moments of thinking in general (though obviously not in that logic that is limited only to the use of judgments with respect to each other). B 97

2. Likewise, in a transcendental logic **infinite judgments** must also be distinguished from **affirmative** ones, even though in general logic they are rightly included with the latter and do not constitute a special member of the classification. General logic abstracts from all content of the predicate (even if it is negative), and considers only whether it is attributed to the subject or opposed to it. Transcendental logic, however, also considers the value or content of the logical affirmation made in a judgment by means of a merely negative predicate, and what sort of gain this yields for the whole of cognition. If I had said of the soul that it is not mortal, then I would at least have avoided an error by means of a negative judgment. Now by means of the proposition "The soul is not mortal" I have certainly made an actual affirmation as far as logical form is concerned, for I have placed the soul within the unlimited domain of undying beings. Now since that which is mortal contains one part of the whole domain of possible beings, but that which is undying[f] the other, A 72

[a] *gemeingültiger.* While this would normally be translated "commonly valid," in this context it clearly refers to the universal (*allgemein*) judgment; we have used "generally" to preserve this reference while still marking the difference from *allgemein.*

[b] *von dessen ganzer Bedeutung;* here Kant uses *Bedeutung,* as Frege was later to use it, to mean the reference or denotation of a concept; more typically, he uses it to mean something closer to what Frege called *Sinn* or sense, that is, the connotation.

[c] *Größe*

[d] The text has *sie* rather than *es,* but in spite of the shift in gender there is nothing for the pronoun to refer to except "a singular judgment."

[e] *Größe*

[f] In the second edition, *Nichtsterbende;* in the first, *Nichtsterbliche,* or "immortal."

nothing is said by my proposition but that the soul is one of the infinite multitude of things that remain if I take away everything that is mortal. But the infinite sphere of the possible is thereby limited only to the extent that that which is mortal is separated from it, and the soul is placed
B98 in the remaining space of its domain.[a] But even with this exception this space still remains infinite, and more parts could be taken away from it
A73 without the concept of the soul growing in the least and being affirmatively determined. In regard to logical domain, therefore, this infinite judgment is merely limiting with regard to the content of cognition in general, and to this extent it must not be omitted from the transcendental table of all moments of thinking in judgments, since the function of understanding that is hereby exercised may perhaps be important in the field of its pure *a priori* cognition.[7]

3. All relations[b] of thinking in judgments are those *a*) of the predicate to the subject, *b*) of the ground to the consequence, and *c*) between the cognition that is to be divided and[c] all of the members of the division. In the first kind of judgment only two concepts are considered to be in relation to each other, in the second, two judgments, and in the third, several judgments. The hypothetical proposition "If there is perfect justice, then obstinate evil will be punished" really contains the relation of two propositions, "There is a perfect justice" and "Obstinate evil is punished." Whether both of these propositions in themselves are true remains unsettled here. It is only the implication that is thought by means
B99 of this judgment. Finally, the disjunctive judgment contains the relations of two or more propositions to one another, though not the relation of sequence, but rather that of logical opposition, insofar as the sphere of one judgment excludes that of the other, yet at the same time the relation of community, insofar as the judgments together exhaust the sphere
A74 of cognition proper; it is therefore a relation of the parts of the sphere of a cognition where the sphere of each part is the complement of that of the others in the sum total of the divided cognition, e.g., "The world exists either through blind chance, or through inner necessity, or through an external cause." Each of these propositions occupies one part of the sphere of the possible cognition about the existence of a world in general, and together they occupy the entire sphere. To remove the cognition from one of these spheres means to place it in one of the

[a] Following the first edition, *Raum ihres Umfangs,* rather than the second, *Umfangs ihres Raums.*

[b] *Verhältnisse;* although he is now speaking of the functions of judgment the table had listed under the latinate heading *Relation,* Kant now reverts to *Verhältnis,* and in the remainder of this paragraph *Verhältnis* is translated by "relation." Kant's reversion to *Verhältnis* here is consistent with his use of this term elsewhere, since he is talking of the relation of parts of judgments to each other rather than to us.

[c] Kant's copy of the first edition replaces "and" with "of" (E XXXVII, p. 23; 23:45).

others, and to place it in one sphere, on the contrary, means to remove it from the others. In a disjunctive judgment there is therefore a certain community of cognitions, consisting in the fact that they mutually exclude each other, yet thereby determine the true cognition **in its entirety,** since taken together they constitute the entire content of a particular given cognition.[8] And this is also all that I find it necessary to remark upon for the sake of what follows.[a]

4. The modality of judgments is a quite special function of them, which is distinctive in that it contributes nothing to the content of the B 100
judgment (for besides quantity, quality, and relation[b] there is nothing more that constitutes the content of a judgment), but rather concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thinking in general.[9] **Problematic** judgments are those in which one regards the assertion or denial as merely **possible** (arbitrary). **Assertoric** judgments are those in which it is considered **actual** (true). **Apodictic** judgments are those in A 75
which it is seen as **necessary.*** Thus the two judgments whose relation constitutes the hypothetical judgment (*antecedens* and *consequens*), as well as those in whose reciprocal relation[c] the disjunctive judgment consists (the members of the division), are all merely problematic. In the above example the proposition "There is a perfect justice" is not said assertorically, but is only thought of as an arbitrary judgment that it is possible that someone might assume, and only the implication is assertoric. Thus such judgments can be obviously false and yet, if taken problematically, conditions of the cognition of truth. Thus the judgment **"The world exists through blind chance"** is of only problematic significance in the disjunctive judgment, that is, someone might momentarily assume this B 101
proposition, and yet it serves (like the designation of the false path among the number of all of those one can take) to find the true one. The problematic proposition is therefore that which only expresses logical possibility (which is not objective), i.e., a free choice to allow such a proposition to count as valid, a merely arbitrary assumption of it in the understanding. The assertoric proposition speaks of logical actuality or truth, as say in a hypothetical syllogism the antecedent in the major A 76
premise is problematic, but that in the minor premise assertoric, and in-

* It is just as if in the first case thought were a function of the **understanding,** in the second of the **power of judgment,** and in the third of **reason.** This is a remark the elucidation of which can be expected only in the sequel.

[a] The following note occurs in Kant's copy of the first edition: "Judgments and propositions are different. That the latter are *verbis expressa* [explicit words], since they are assertoric" (E XXXVIII, p. 23; 23:25).

[b] *Verhältnis*

[c] *Wechselwirkung*

dicates that the proposition is already bound to the understanding according to its laws; the apodictic proposition thinks of the assertoric one as determined through these laws of the understanding itself, and as thus asserting *a priori*, and in this way expresses logical necessity. Now since everything here is gradually incorporated into the understanding, so that one first judges something problematically, then assumes it assertorically as true, and finally asserts it to be inseparably connected with the understanding, i.e., asserts it as necessary and apodictic, these three functions of modality can also be called so many moments of thinking in general.

B 102

On the Clue to the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding
Third Section

<§ 10.>
On the pure concepts of the understanding or categories.

As has already been frequently said, general logic abstracts from all content of cognition, and expects that representations will be given to it from elsewhere, wherever this may be, in order for it to transform them into concepts analytically. Transcendental logic, on the contrary, has a manifold of sensibility that lies before it *a priori*, which the transcen-
A 77 dental aesthetic has offered to it, in order to provide the pure concepts of the understanding with a matter, without which they would be without any content, thus completely empty. Now space and time contain a manifold of pure *a priori* intuition, but belong nevertheless among the conditions of the receptivity of our mind, under which alone it can receive representations of objects, and thus they must always also affect the concept of these objects. Only the spontaneity of our thought requires that this manifold first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be made out of it. I call this action synthesis.

B 103 By **synthesis** in the most general sense, however, I understand[a] the action of putting different representations together with each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition. Such a synthesis is **pure** if the manifold is given not empirically but *a priori* (as is that in space and time). Prior to all analysis of our representations these must first be given, and no concepts can arise analytically as far as **the con-**

[a] In his copy of the first edition, Kant changes this sentence to this point to "I understand by **synthesis**, however, the action through which synthetic judgments come to be, in the general sense, . . ." (E XXXIX, p. 23; 23:45). Kant also adds the words "Combination, composition, and nexus" (E XL, p. 24).

tent is concerned. The synthesis of a manifold, however, (whether it be given empirically or *a priori*) first brings forth a cognition, which to be sure may initially still be raw and confused, and thus in need of analysis; yet the synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions and unifies them into a certain content; it is therefore the first thing to which we have to attend if we wish to judge about the first origin of our cognition. A78

Synthesis in general is, as we shall subsequently see, the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul,[b] without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious. Yet to bring this synthesis **to concepts** is a function that pertains to the understanding, and by means of which it first provides cognition in the proper sense.[c]

Now **pure synthesis, generally represented,** yields the pure concept of the understanding. By this synthesis, however, I understand that which rests on a ground of synthetic unity *a priori;* thus our counting (as is especially noticeable in the case of larger numbers) is a **synthesis in accordance with concepts,** since it takes place in accordance with a common ground of unity (e.g., the decad). Under this concept, therefore, the synthesis of the manifold becomes necessary. B 104

Different representations are brought **under** one concept analytically (a business treated by general logic). Transcendental logic, however, teaches how to bring under concepts not the representations but the **pure synthesis** of representations. The first thing that must be given to us *a priori* for the cognition of all objects is the **manifold** of pure intuition; the **synthesis** of this manifold by means of the imagination is the second thing, but it still does not yield cognition. The concepts that give this pure sythesis **unity,** and that consist solely in the representation of this necessary synthetic unity, are the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that comes before us, and they depend on the understanding.[10] A79

The same function that gives unity to the different representations **in a judgment** also gives unity to the mere synthesis of different representations **in an intuition,** which, expressed generally, is called the pure concept of understanding.[11] The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of B 105

[a] In the first edition, the right-hand running head is "Section III. On the pure concepts of understanding or categories"

[b] In his copy of the first edition Kant replaces this clause with "of a function of the understanding" (E XLI, p. 24; 23:45).

[c] *in eigentlicher Bedeutung*

the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects[a] *a priori;* this can never be accomplished by universal logic.

In such a way there arise exactly as many pure concepts of the understanding, which apply to objects of intuition in general *a priori*, as there were logical functions of all possible judgments in the previous table: for the understanding is completely exhausted and its capacity[b] entirely measured by these functions.[c] Following Aristotle we will call
A80 these concepts **categories,** for our aim is basically identical with his although very distant from it in execution.[d]

B106 Table of Categories[12]

1.
Of Quantity
Unity
Plurality
Totality

2.
Of Quality
Reality
Negation
Limitation

3.
Of Relation[e]
Of Inherence and Subsistence
(*substantia et accidens*)
Of Causality and Dependence
(cause and effect)
Of Community (reciprocity
between agent and patient)

4.
Of Modality
Possibility – Impossibility
Existence – Non-existence
Necessity – Contingency

[a] *Objecte*
[b] *Vermögen*
[c] *gedachte Functionen*
[d] The following notes precede the ensuing table of the categories in Kant's copy of the first edition:

"Logical functions are only forms for the relation of concepts in thinking. Categories are concepts, through which certain intuitions are determined in regard to the synthetic unity of their consciousness as contained under these functions; e.g., what must be thought as subject and not as predicate." (E XLII, p. 24; 23:25)

"On the use of the categories in the division of a system.

"On the analytic of the categories and the predicables.

"On a characteristic of concepts; of intellectual, empirical, and pure sensible representations.

" – *Lex originaria:* concept of the understanding." (E XLIII, p. 24; 23:25)

[e] *Relation*

Now this is the listing of all original pure concepts of synthesis[a] that the understanding contains in itself *a priori*, and on account of which it is only a pure understanding; for by these concepts alone can it understand something in the manifold of intuition, i.e., think an object[b] for it. This division is systematically generated from a common principle,[c] namely the faculty for judging (which is the same as the faculty for A81
thinking), and has not arisen rhapsodically from a haphazard search for pure concepts, of the completeness of which one could never be certain, B107
since one would only infer it through induction, without reflecting that in this way one would never see why just these and not other concepts should inhabit the pure understanding. Aristotle's search for these fundamental concepts was an effort worthy of an acute man. But since he had no principle,[d] he rounded them up as he stumbled on them, and first got up a list of ten of them, which he called **categories** (predicaments). Subsequently he believed that he had found five more of them, which he added under the name of post-predicaments. But his table still had holes. Further, it also included several *modi* of pure sensibility (*quando*, *ubi*, *situs*, as well as *prius*, *simul*,)[e] as well as an empirical one (*motus*),[f] which do not belong in this ancestral registry[g] of the understanding; derivative concepts were also included among the primary ones (*actio*, *passio*),[h] and several of the latter were entirely missing.

For the sake of the primary concepts it is therefore still necessary to remark that the categories, as the true **ancestral concepts**[i] of pure understanding, also have their equally pure **derivative**[j] **concepts,** which could by no means be passed over in a complete system of transcendental philosophy, but with the mere mention of which I can be satisA82
fied in a merely critical essay.

Let me be allowed to call these pure but derivative concepts the B108
predicables of pure understanding (in contrast to the predicaments). If one has the original and primitive concepts, the derivative and subalternate ones can easily be added, and the family tree[k] of pure understanding fully illustrated. Since I am concerned here not with the

[a] The words "of synthesis" are stricken in Kant's copy of the first edition (E XLIV, p. 24; 23:46).
[b] *Object*
[c] *Princip*
[d] *Principium*
[e] That is, the concepts of when, where, and position, and the relations of priority and simultaneity.
[f] motion
[g] *Stammregister*
[h] action, passion
[i] *Stammbegriffe*
[j] Clearly emphasized **only in the first** edition.
[k] *Stammbaum*

completeness of the system but rather only with the principles[a] for a system, I reserve this supplementation for another job. But one could readily reach this aim if one took the ontological textbooks in hand, and, e.g., under the category of causality, subordinated the predicables of force, action, and passion; under that of community, those of presence and resistance; under the predicaments of modality those of generation, corruption, alteration, and so on. The categories combined either with the *modis* of sensibility or with each other yield a great multitude of derivative *a priori* concepts, to take note of which and, as far as possible, completely catalogue would be a useful and not unpleasant but here dispensable effort.

I deliberately spare myself the definitions of these categories in this
A83 treatise, although I should like to be in possession of them.[13] In the sequel I will analyze these concepts to the degree that is sufficient in re-
B109 lation to the doctrine of method that I am working up. In a system of pure reason one could rightly demand these of me; but here they would only distract us from the chief point of the investigation by arousing doubts and objections that can well be referred to another occasion without detracting from our essential aim. In any case, from the little that I have here adduced it becomes clear that a complete lexicon with all the requisite definitions should be not only possible but even easy to produce. The headings already exist; it is merely necessary to fill them out, and a systematic topic, such as the present one, will make it easy not to miss the place where every concept properly belongs and at the same time will make it easy to notice any that is still empty.[b]

§ 11.[c]

Subtle considerations about this table of categories could be made, which could perhaps have considerable consequences with regard to the scientific form of all cognitions of reason. For that this table is uncommonly useful, indeed indispensable in the theoretical part of philosophy for completely outlining **the plan for the whole of a science** insofar as it rests on *a priori* concepts, and **dividing** it mathematically **in accordance with determinate principles,**[d] is already self-evident from the fact that this table completely contains all the elementary concepts

[a] *Principien*

[b] Inserted in Kant's copy of the first edition:
"What are categories? – – That they extend only to objects of experience.
"1. Whence do they arise?
"2. How are they valid *a priori* of objects of experience?" (E XLV, pp. 24–5; 23:25)

[c] Sections 11 and 12 were added in the second edition. This explains how Kant can refer to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, not published until 1786.

[d] *Principien*

of the understanding, indeed even the form of a system of them in the human understanding, consequently that it gives instruction about all the **moments,** indeed even of their **order,** of a planned speculative science, as I have elsewhere given proof.* Now here are several of these remarks. B110

The first is that this table, which contains four classes of concepts of the understanding, can first be split into two divisions, the first of which is concerned with objects of intuition (pure as well as empirical), the second of which, however, is directed at the existence of these objects (either in relation to each other or to the understanding).

I will call the first class the **mathematical** categories, the second, the **dynamical** ones. As one sees, the first class has no correlates, which are to be met with only in the second class. Yet this difference must have a ground in the nature of the understanding.

Second remark: that each class always has the same number of categories, namely three, which calls for reflection, since otherwise all *a priori* division by means of concepts must be a dichotomy. But here the third category always arises from the combination of the first two in its class.

Thus **allness** (totality) is nothing other than plurality considered as a unity, **limitation** is nothing other than reality combined with negation, community is the **causality** of a substance in the reciprocal determination of others, finally **necessity** is nothing other than the existence that is given by possibility itself. But one should not think that the third category is therefore a merely derivative one and not an ancestral concept of pure understanding. For the combination of the first and second in order to bring forth the third concept requires a special act of the understanding, which is not identical with that act performed in the first and second. Thus the concept of a **number** (which belongs to the category of allness) is not always possible wherever the concepts of multitude and of unity are (e.g., in the representation of the infinite); or **influence,** i.e., how one substance can be the cause of something in another substance, is not to be understood immediately by combining the concept of a **cause** and that of a **substance.** From this it is clear that a special act of the understanding is requisite for this; and likewise in the other cases. B111

Third remark: The agreement of a single category, namely that of **community,** which is to be found under the third title, with the form of a disjunctive judgment, which is what corresponds to it in the table of logical functions, is not as obvious as in the other cases. B112

In order to be assured of this agreement one must note that in all disjunctive judgments the sphere (the multitude of everything that is con-

* *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.* B110

tained under it) is represented as a whole divided into parts (the subordinated concepts), and, since none of these can be contained under any other, they are thought of as **coordinated** with one another, not **subordinated,** so that they do not determine each other **unilaterally,** as in a **series,** but **reciprocally,** as in an **aggregate** (if one member of the division is posited, all the rest are excluded, and vice versa).

Now a similar connection is thought of in **an entirety of things,** since one is not **subordinated,**[a] as effect, under another, as the cause of its existence, but is rather **coordinated**[b] with the other simultaneously and reciprocally as cause with regard to its determination (e.g., in a body, the parts of which reciprocally attract yet also repel each other), which is an entirely different kind of connection from that which is to be found in the mere relation[c] of cause to effect (of ground to consequence), in which the consequence does not reciprocally determine the ground and therefore does not constitute a whole with the latter (as the world-creator with the world). The understanding follows the same
B113 procedure when it represents the divided sphere of a concept as when it thinks of a thing as divisible, and just as in the first case the members of the division exclude each other and yet are connected in one sphere, so in the latter case the parts are represented as ones to which existence (as substances) pertains to each exclusively of the others, and which are yet connected in one whole.

§ 12.

But there is also yet another chapter in the transcendental philosophy of the ancients that contains pure concepts of the understanding that, although they are not reckoned among the categories, nevertheless according to them should also count as *a priori* concepts of objects, in which case, however, they would increase the number of the categories, which cannot be. These are expounded in the proposition, so famous among the scholastics: *quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum.*[d] Now although the use of this principle[e] for inferences has turned out to be very meager (they have yielded merely tautological propositions), so that in modern times it has been customary to grant it a place in metaphysics almost solely by courtesy, nevertheless a thought that has sustained itself so long, no matter how empty it seems, always deserves an investigation of its origin, and justifies the conjecture that it must have its

[a] *untergeordnet*
[b] *beygeordnet*
[c] *Verhältnis*
[d] Every being is one, true, and good.
[e] *Princips*

ground in some rule of the understanding, which, as so often happens, has merely been falsely interpreted. These supposedly transcendental predicates of **things** are nothing other than logical requisites and crite- B 114
ria of all **cognition of things** in general, and ground it in the categories of quantity, namely, the categories of **unity, plurality,** and **totality;** yet these categories must really have been taken as material, as belonging to the possibility of things itself, when in fact they should have been used in a merely formal sense, as belonging to the logical requirements for every cognition; thus these criteria of thinking were carelessly made into properties of things in themselves. In every cognition of an object[a] there is, namely, **unity** of the concept, which one can call **qualitative unity** insofar as by that only the unity of the comprehension[b] of the manifold of cognition is thought, as, say, the unity of the theme in a play, a speech, or a fable. Second, **truth** in respect of the consequences. The more true consequences from a given concept, the more indication of its objective reality. One could call this the **qualitative plurality** of the marks that belong to a concept as a common ground (not thought of in it as a magnitude). Third, finally, **perfection,** which consists in this plurality conversely being traced back to the unity of the concept, and agreeing completely with this one and no other one, which one can call **qualitative completeness** (totality). From this it is obvious that these logical criteria of the possibility of cognition in general transform the B 115
three categories of magnitude,[c] in which the unity in the generation of the magnitude[d] must be assumed to be completely homogeneous, into a principle[e] with the quality of a cognition for the connection of **heterogeneous** elements of cognition into one consciousness also. Thus the criterion of the possibility of a concept (not of its object)[f] is the definition, in which the **unity** of the concept, the **truth** of everything that may initially be derived from it, and finally the **completeness** of everything that is drawn from it, constitute everything that is necessary for the production of the entire concept; or the **criterion of a hypothesis** is also the intelligibility of the assumed **ground of explanation** or its **unity** (without auxiliary hypotheses), the **truth** (agreement with itself and with experience) of the consequences that are derived from it, and finally the **completeness** of the ground of explanation of these consequences, which do not refer us back to anything more or less than was already assumed in the hypothesis, and which merely analytically give back *a posteriori* and agree with that which was thought synthetically *a*

[a] *Objects*
[b] *Zusammenfassung*
[c] *Größe*
[d] *Quantum*
[e] *Princips*
[f] *Objects*

priori. – The transcendental table of the categories is thus not completed with the concepts of unity, truth, and perfection, as if it were lacking something, but rather, the relation[a] of these concepts to objects[b] B 116 being entirely set aside, our procedure with these concepts is only being thought under general logical rules for the agreement of cognition with itself.>

[a] *Verhältnis*
[b] *Objecte*