

PLOTINUS

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IN SEVEN VOLUMES

V

ENNEADS

V. 1-9



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V. 6. ON THE FACT THAT THAT WHICH IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK, AND ON WHAT IS THE PRIMARY AND WHAT THE SECONDARY THINKING PRINCIPLE

Introductory Note

THIS treatise, the twenty-fourth in Porphyry's chronological order, immediately follows in that order the great work VI. 4-5 (22-3): *On the Reason why Being is everywhere all present, One and the Same.* In this Plotinus had laid less emphasis than he did anywhere else in the *Enneads* on the distinctions between his three hypostases, and had allowed the First, the One beyond Being, to fall very much into the background. In the present treatise he seems concerned to make clear that the distinctions between the hypostases were still real and important to him, and in particular to insist on the sharp differentiation of the First Principle, the One which does not think, from the Second Hypostasis, the living Intellect which forms a unity-in-duality with Being. He knew this to be one of the most controversial parts of his philosophy, and argues his position here, as he often does elsewhere in the *Enneads*, against both Aristotle and his followers and those Platonists who had made the First Principle a transcendent Intellect. The Third Hypostasis, Soul, is mentioned rather incidentally, and only to help his readers to see how the primary thinking of Intellect, from which the unthinking perfection of the One is to be distinguished, differs from the secondary thinking of human minds in their normal state.

WHAT IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK

Synopsis

The difference between thinking something else and thinking oneself: the latter is more of a unity, though still a unity-in-duality (ch. 1). Reasons why before this self-thinking unity-in-duality there must be a pure unity, which because it is simply one does not think (ch. 2). There must be something absolutely simple before any one-in-many or whole of parts (ch. 3). Further reasons why there must be the Good before Intellect: comparison of Good, Intellect and Soul to light, the sun and the moon (ch. 4). The Good does not think itself because thought is always a movement of something else towards the Good in which the thinker is established in being and attains self-knowledge (ch. 5). The Good is pure actuality without any secondary activity; the essential multiplicity of the Second Hypostasis, at once being, living and thinking, which the Good transcends and is beyond thinking as he is beyond being; his gift to all others is not an impossible knowledge of him, but to be with him, who is their Good, and to grasp him as far as they can (ch. 6).

V. 6. (24) ΗΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΤΟ ΕΙΗΕΚΕΙΝΑ
ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ ΜΗ ΝΟΕΙΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΙ ΤΟ
ΠΡΩΤΩΣ ΝΟΟΥΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΙ ΤΟ
ΔΕΥΤΕΡΩΣ

1. Τὸ μέν ἔστι νοεῖν ἄλλο ἄλλο, τὸ δὲ αὐτὸς αὐτός,
δῆδη φεύγει μᾶλλον τὰ δύο εἶναι. τὸ δὲ πρότερον
λεχθὲν βούλεται καὶ αὐτός, ἀλλ' ἥπτον δύναται· παρ'
αὐτῷ μὲν γάρ ἔχει ὁ ὄρα, ἔτερόν γε μὴν ὃν ἐκείνου.
5 τὸ δὲ οὐ κεχώρισται τῇ οὐσίᾳ, ἀλλὰ συνὸν αὐτῷ
ὄρα ἑαυτό. ἀμφω οὖν γίνεται ἐν ᾧ. μᾶλλον οὖν
νοεῖ, ὅτι ἔχει, καὶ πρώτως νοεῖ, ὅτι τὸ νοοῦν δεῖ
ἐν καὶ δύο εἶναι. εἴτε γάρ μὴ ἐν, ἄλλο τὸ νοοῦν,
ἄλλο τὸ νοούμενον ἔσται—οὐκ ἀν οὖν πρώτως
νοοῦν εἴη, ὅτι ἄλλου τὴν νόησιν λαμβάνον οὐ τὸ
10 πρώτως νοοῦν ἔσται, ὅτι ὁ νοεῖ οὐκ ἔχει ὡς αὐτοῦ,
ώστε οὐδὲ αὐτό· ἢ εἰ ἔχει ὡς αὐτό, ἵνα κυρίως νοῆῃ,
τὰ δύο ἐν ἔσται· δεῖ ἄρα ἐν εἶναι ἀμφω—εἴτε ἐν μὲν,
μὴ δύο δὲ αὐτὸν ἔσται, ὅ τι νοήσει οὐχ ἔξει· ώστε
οὐδὲ νοοῦν ἔσται. ἀπλοῦν ἄρα καὶ οὐχ ἀπλοῦν δεῖ
εἶναι. μᾶλλον δ' ἀν τις αὐτὸς τοιοῦτον ὃν ἔλοι ἀπὸ

V. 6. ON THE FACT THAT THAT WHICH
IS BEYOND BEING DOES NOT THINK,
AND ON WHAT IS THE PRIMARY
AND WHAT THE SECONDARY
THINKING PRINCIPLE

1. There is a difference between one thing thinking another and something thinking itself; the latter goes further towards escaping being two. The former wants to escape being two and think itself, but is less capable of it; for it has what it sees with itself, but none the less it is different from it. But the latter is not substantially distinct [from its object], but keeps company with itself and so sees itself. It becomes a pair, therefore, while remaining one. It thinks more genuinely, therefore, and thinks primarily, because the thinking principle must be one and two. For if it is not one, that which thinks and that which is thought will be different—it would not therefore be the primary thinker, because if the thought it had was of something else it will not be the primary thinker because it does not have what it thinks as [thought] of itself, so that it does not think itself; or if it has what it thinks as itself, so that it may think authentically, the two will be one: it must therefore be one and a pair—but if it is, on the other hand, one and not two, it will have nothing to think: so that it will not even be a thinking principle. It must, then, be simple and not simple.

15 τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναβαίνων· ἐνταῦθα γάρ διαιρεῖν ράδιον,
καὶ ρᾶσιν ἄν τις τὸ διπλοῦν ἴδοι. εἰ οὖν τις διπλοῦν
φῶς ποιήσει, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν κατὰ τὸ ἥπτον, τὸ δὲ
νοητὸν αὐτῆς κατὰ τὸ καθαρώτερον, εἴτα ποιήσει
καὶ τὸ ὅρων ἵσον εἶναι φῶς τῷ ὅρωμένῳ, οὐκ
20 ἔχων ἔτι χωρίζειν τῇ διαφορῇ ἐν τὰ δύο θήσεται
νοῶν μέν, ὅτι δύο ἡνί, ὅρῶν δὲ ἥδη ἔν· οὕτω νοῦν
καὶ νοητὸν αἱρήσει. ἡμεῖς μὲν οὖν τῷ λόγῳ ἐκ
δύο ἐν πεποιήκαμεν, τὸ δ' ἀνάπαλυν ἐξ ἑνὸς ἐστι
δύο, ὅτι νοεῖ, ποιοῦν αὐτὸ δύο, μᾶλλον δὲ ὅν, ὅτι
νοεῖ, δύο, καὶ ὅτι αὐτό, ἔν.

2. Εἰ δὴ τὸ μὲν πρώτως νοοῦν, τὸ δὲ ἥδη ἄλλως
νοοῦν, τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ πρώτως νοοῦντος οὐκ ἄν
ἔτι νοοῦ· νοῦν γάρ δεῖ γενέσθαι, ἵνα νοῆ, δύτα δὲ
νοῦν καὶ νοητὸν ἔχειν καὶ πρώτως νοοῦντα ἔχειν τὸ
5 νοητὸν ἐν αὐτῷ. νοητὸν δὲ ὅν οὐκ ἀνάγκη πᾶν καὶ
νοοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχειν καὶ νοεῖν· ἐσται γάρ οὐ μόνον
νοητόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοοῦν, πρώτον τε οὐκ ἐσται δύο
ὅν. ὃ τε νοῦς δ τὸ νοητὸν ἔχων οὐκ ἄν συσταίη μὴ
οὕσης οὐσίας καθαρῶς νοητοῦ, ὃ πρὸς μὲν τὸν νοῦν
νοητὸν ἐσται, καθ' ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὔτε νοοῦν οὔτε νοητὸν
10 κυρίως ἐσται· τό τε γάρ νοητὸν ἐτέρω ὃ τε νοῦς τὸ

One could get a better idea of its being like this if one made the ascent from soul; for in soul it is easy to make the distinction, and one could see the doubleness more easily. If then one were to imagine a double light, the soul as lesser and that which it thinks as purer light, and then imagine that the seeing light is equal to the seen, one would not be able any more to separate them by the difference [in quality] and would suppose the two to be one, thinking that they were two, but seeing them as one; in this way one will grasp Intellect and its object. Now we in our discourse have made one out of two; but [in reality] the reverse is true and two came from one, making itself two because it thinks, or, better, because it thinks it is two and because it thinks itself, one.

2. If then one is the primary thinking principle, and the other is already thinking in a different way, that which is beyond the primary thinking principle will no longer think; for in order to think it would have to become intellect, and if it was intellect it would have to have an object of thought, and if it was thinking in the primary sense it would have to have its object in itself. But it is not necessary for everything which is an object of thought to have a thinking principle in itself and to think: for [then] it will be not only an object of thought but a thinker, and, since it is two, will not be the first. And the intellect which has the object of thought would not exist if there was not a reality which is pure object of thought; it will be an object of thought to the intellect, but in itself it will be neither thinker nor object of thought in the proper, authentic sense; for the object of thought is object for something else,

ἐπιβάλλον τῇ νοήσει κενὸν ἔχει ἄνευ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἐλεῖν τὸ νοητὸν δὲ νοεῖ· οὐ γὰρ ἔχει τὸ νοεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ νοητοῦ. τότε οὖν τέλεον, ὅταν ἔχῃ; ἔδει δὲ πρὸ τοῦ νοεῖν τέλεον εἶναι παρ' αὐτοῦ τῆς οὐσίας.
 15 Ὡς ἄρα τὸ τέλεον ὑπάρξει, πρὸ τοῦ νοεῖν τούτῳ ἔσται· οὐδὲν ἄρα δεῖ αὐτῷ τοῦ νοεῖν αὐτάρκης γὰρ πρὸ τούτου· οὐκ ἄρα νοήσει. τὸ μὲν ἄρα οὐ νοεῖ, τὸ δὲ πρώτως νοεῖ, τὸ δὲ νοήσει δευτέρως. ἔτι εἰ νοήσει τὸ πρῶτον, ὑπάρξει τι αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἄρα πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεύτερον καὶ οὐχ ἐν, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἡδη καὶ 20 πάντα ὅσα νοήσει· καὶ γάρ, εἰ μόνον ἔαυτόν, πολλὰ ἔσται.

3. Εἰ δὲ πολλὰ τὸ αὐτὸν οὐδὲν κωλύει φήγουσιν, ἐν τούτοις ὑποκείμενον ἔσται· οὐ δύναται γὰρ πολλὰ μὴ ἐνὸς ὄντος, ἀφ' οὗ ἢ ἐν ὧ, ἢ ὅλως ἐνὸς καὶ τούτου πρώτου τῶν ἄλλων ἀριθμουμένου, δὲ αὐτὸν δὲφ' ἔαυτοῦ δεῖ λαβεῖν μόνον. εἰ δὲ ὅμοιον εἴη μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, δεῖ τοῦτο συλλαβόντα αὐτὸν μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅμως δὲ ἔτερον τῶν ἄλλων ὃν, ἔαν ὡς μετ' ἄλλων, ζητεῖν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ὑποκείμενον τοῖς ἄλλοις μηκέτι μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀλλὰ αὐτὸν καθ' ἔαυτό. τὸ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις αὐτὸν ὅμοιον μὲν ἄν εἴη τούτῳ, 10 οὐκ ἄν δὲ εἴη τοῦτο. ἀλλὰ δεῖ αὐτὸν μόνον εἶναι, εἰ

and the intellect has its intellectual effort empty of content if it does not grasp and comprehend the object which it thinks; for it does not have thinking without its object of thought. Is [the One], then, perfect when it has it? But it must, before thinking, have a perfection derived from its own reality. That, then, to which perfection belongs will exist before thinking; it will therefore have no need of thinking; for he is sufficient to himself before this; so he will not think. This, then, does not think, and the other is the primary thinking principle, and another again will think in a secondary way.¹ Again, if the First thinks, something will belong to it; it will then not be the First, but second, and not one, but already many things, that is all the things which it thinks; for even if it only thinks itself it will be many.

3. But if people are going to say that nothing prevents one and the same thing from being many, there will be a one underlying these many; for there can be no many if there is not a one from which or in which these are, or in general a one, and a one which is counted first before the others, which must be taken alone, itself by itself. But if it was together with the others, since it was taken with the others but all the same was different from the others, we should have to let it go because it was with the others and look for what underlies the others and is no longer with the others, but itself by itself. For that one and the same which was in the others would be like this One by itself, but would not be it.

¹ The other which thinks in a secondary way is Soul, the primary thinking principle Intellect: cp. the end of ch. I.

μέλλοι καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις ὁράσθαι· εἰ μή τις αὐτοῦ λέγοι τὸ εἶναι σὺν τοῖς ἄλλοις πὴν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν· οὐκ ἄρα ἀπλοῦν αὐτὸν ἔσται, οὐδὲ τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν ἔσται· τό τε γάρ οὐ δυναμένον ἀπλοῦν εἶναι ὑπόστασιν οὐχ ἔξει, τό τε συγκείμενον ἐκ 15 πολλῶν ἀπλοῦ οὐκ ὄντος οὐδ' αὐτὸν ἔσται. ἐκάστου γάρ ἀπλοῦ οὐ δυναμένου εἶναι οὐχ¹ ὑφεστηκότος τινὸς ἐνὸς ἀπλοῦ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ [τὸ συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν],² οὐδενὸς αὐτῶν ὑπόστασιν ἔχειν καθ' ἑαυτὸν [οὐ]³ δυναμένου οὐδὲ παρέχειν αὐτὸν μετ' ἄλλου εἶναι τῷ ὅλως μὴ εἶναι, πῶς 20 ἀν τὸ <συγκείμενον ἐκ πολλῶν>⁴ ἐκ πάντων εἴη σύνθετον ἐκ μὴ ὄντων γεγενημένον, οὐ τὶ μὴ ὄντων, ἀλλ' ὅλως μὴ ὄντων; εἰ ἄρα πολλά τί ἔστι, δεῖ πρὸ τῶν πολλῶν ἐν εἶναι. εἰ οὖν τῷ νοοῦντι πλῆθος, δεῖ ἐν τῷ <μὴ>⁵ πλήθει τὸ νοεῦν μὴ εἶναι. ἦν δὲ τοῦτο τὸ πρῶτον. ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις 25 ἄρα αὐτοῦ τὸ νοεῦν καὶ νοῦς ἔσται.

4. "Ετι εἰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀνενδεές δεῖ εἶναι, οὐδ' ἀν τοῦ νοεῦν δέοιτο· οὐδὲ μὴ δεῖ αὐτῷ, οὐ παρέσται αὐτῷ, ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅλως οὐδὲν πάρεστιν αὐτῷ· οὐκ ἄρα πάρεστιν αὐτῷ τὸ νοεῦν. καὶ νοεῖ⁶ 5 οὐδέν, ὅτι μηδὲ ἀλλο. ἐτι ἀλλο νοῦς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· ἀγαθοειδῆς γάρ τὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν νοεῖν. ἐτι ὡς ἐν τοῖς δυσὶν ὄντος καὶ ἄλλου οὐχ οἷον τε τοῦτο τὸ ἐν τὸ μετ' ἄλλου τὸ ἐν εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἔδει ἐν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ πρὸ τοῦ μετ' ἄλλου εἶναι, οὕτω δεῖ καὶ ἐν φ

¹ Kirchhoff*: οὐδ' *Enn.*

² del. Kirchhoff*.

³ Igal.

⁴ Ficinus (= Ficinus): om. *Enn.*

⁵ Volkmann*: εἰ *Enn.*

But it must be alone by itself if it is also to be seen in other things; unless someone is going to say that its being depends on its co-existence with other things; it will not then be simple, and the composite of many parts will not exist either; for that which is unable to be simple will have no existence, and the composite of many parts will not exist itself if the simple does not. For if each and every simple thing cannot exist, since there is no simple one coming into existence by its own agency, and no one of the parts is able to have existence by itself, or to give itself to be with another because it does not exist at all, how then could the composite of many parts be a compound of all [these parts] which has come into being from non-existent things—not from things that are not something particular, but from things that do not exist at all? If, then, something is many, there must be a one before the many. If, therefore, there is multiplicity in the thinking principle, there cannot be thinking in what is not a multiplicity. But this is the First. Thinking and Intellect, then, will be in what comes after.

4. Again, if the Good must be simple and without need, it will not need thinking; but what it has no need of will not be present with it: since nothing at all is present with it, thinking is not present with it. And it thinks nothing, because it does not need anything else. Again, Intellect is something other than the Good; for it has the form of the Good by thinking the Good. Again, just as in the number two there is a one and another, and it is not possible for this one with another to be the number one, but it is necessary for there to be a one by itself before the one with another; in the same way it is necessary

μετ' ἄλλου τὸ ἐνυπάρχον¹ ἀπλοῦν, καθ' αὐτὸ
10 τοῦτο ἀπλοῦν εἶναι, οὐκ ἔχον οὐδὲν ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῶν
ὅσα ἐν τῷ μετ' ἄλλων. πόθεν γὰρ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἄλλο,
μὴ πρότερον χωρὶς ὅντος ἀφ' οὐ τὸ ἄλλο; τὸ μὲν
γὰρ ἀπλοῦν οὐκ ἂν παρ' ἄλλου εἴη, δ' ἂν πολὺ²
ἡ ἡ δύο, δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀνηρτῆσθαι εἰς ἄλλο.

Καὶ οὖν ἀπεικαστέον τὸ μὲν φωτί, τὸ δὲ ἐφεξῆς
15 ἡλίῳ, τὸ δὲ τρίτον τῷ σελήνῃς ἀστρῳ κομιζομένῳ
τὸ φῶς παρ' ἡλίου. ψυχὴ μὲν γὰρ ἐπακτὸν νοῦν
ἔχει ἐπιχρωνύντα αὐτὴν νοερὰν οὐσίαν, νοῦς δ' ἐν
αὐτῷ οἰκεῖον ἔχει οὐ φῶς ὥν μόνον, ἀλλ' ὃ ἐστι
πεφωτισμένον ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ οὐσίᾳ, τὸ δὲ παρέχον
20 τούτῳ τὸ φῶς οὐκ ἄλλο ὃν φῶς ἐστιν ἀπλοῦν παρ-
έχον τὴν δύναμιν ἐκείνῳ τοῦ εἶναι ὃ ἐστι. τί ἂν οὖν
αὐτὸν δέοιτο τινος; οὐ γὰρ αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτὸν τῷ ἐν
ἄλλῳ γὰρ τὸ ἐν ἄλλῳ ἐστὶ τοῦ αὐτὸν καθ'
αὐτὸν ὅντος.

5. "Επι τὸ πολὺ ζητοῦ ἂν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἔθέλοι ἂν
συννεύειν καὶ συναισθάνεσθαι αὐτοῦ. δ' δ' ἐστὶ²
πάντη ἔν, ποῦ χωρήσεται πρὸς αὐτό; ποῦ δ' ἂν
δέοιτο συναισθήσεως; ἀλλ' ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸν καὶ συναισ-
5 θήσεως καὶ πάσης κρείττον νοήσεως. τὸ γὰρ νοεῖν
οὐ πρῶτον οὕτε τῷ εἶναι οὕτε τῷ τίμιον εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ δεύτερον καὶ γενόμενον, ἐπειδὴ ὑπέστη τὸ
ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ² γενόμενον ἐκίνησε πρὸς αὐτό,
τὸ δ' ἐκινήθη τε καὶ εἶδε. καὶ τοῦτο ἐστι νοεῖν,
κίνησις πρὸς ἀγαθὸν ἐφέμενον ἐκείνου. η γὰρ

¹ Harder, Cilento, B-T: ἐν ὑπάρχον Enn., H-S¹.

² inseruimus.

that, when a thing has immanent in it something simple along with something else, the simple thing should be simple in and by itself, having nothing in itself of all that it has in its association with other things. For what could make it something else in something different, if there was not something before it from which this something else comes? For the simple could not derive from something else, but that which is many, or two, must itself depend on something else. The First, then, should be compared to light, the next, to the sun, and the third, to the celestial body of the moon, which gets its light from the sun. For Soul has intellect as an external addition which colours it when it is intellectual, but Intellect has it in itself as its own, and is not only light but that which is enlightened in its own being; and that which gives it light is nothing else but is simple light giving Intellect the power to be what it is. Why then would it have need of anything? For it is not the same as that which is in something else: for that which is in something else is different from that which is in and by itself.

5. And again, the multiple might seek itself and wish to converge on and be conscious of itself. But by what way will that which is altogether one go to itself? At what point will it need self-consciousness? But it is one and the same thing which is better than self-consciousness and better than all thinking. For thinking does not come first either in reality or in value, but is second and is what has come into being when the Good [already] existed and moved what had come into being to itself, and it was moved and saw. And this is what thinking is, a movement towards the Good in its desire of that Good; for

10 ἔφεσις τὴν νόησιν ἐγέννησε καὶ συνυπέστησεν αὐτῇ·
 ἔφεσις γάρ ὁφεις ὥρασις. οὐδὲν οὖν δεῖ αὐτὸν τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν νοεῖν οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἄλλο αὐτοῦ τὸ ἀγαθόν.
 ἐπεὶ καὶ ὅταν τὸ ἔτερον παρὰ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸν νοῆ,
 τῷ ἀγαθοειδὲς εἶναι νοεῖ καὶ ὄμοιώματα ἔχειν πρὸς
 τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ὡς ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἐφετὸν αὐτῷ γενό-
 15 μενον νοεῖ καὶ οἷον φαντασίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ λαμβά-
 νον. εἰ δὲ ἀεὶ οὕτως, ἀεὶ τοῦτο. καὶ γάρ αὐτὸν τῇ
 νοήσει αὐτοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτὸν νοεῖ· πρὸς
 γάρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν βλέπων αὐτὸν¹ νοεῖ. ἐνεργοῦντα γάρ
 αὐτὸν νοεῖ· ή δὲ ἐνέργεια ἀπάντων πρὸς τὸ
 ἀγαθόν.

6. Εἰ δὴ ταῦτα ὅρθῶς λέγεται, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοι χώραν
 νοήσεως ἡντιοῦν τὸ ἀγαθόν. ἄλλο γάρ δεῖ τῷ
 νοοῦντι τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι. ἀνεργητον οὖν. καὶ
 τί δεῖ ἐνέργειν τὴν ἐνέργειαν; ὅλως μὲν γάρ οὐδεμία
 5 ἐνέργεια ἔχει αὐτὸν πάλιν ἐνέργειαν. εἰ δέ γε ταῖς
 ἄλλαις ταῖς εἰς ἄλλο ἔχουσιν ἐπανενεγκεῖν, τὴν γε
 πρώτην ἀπασῶν, εἰς ἣν αἱ ἄλλαι ἀνήργηται,
 αὐτὸν ἔαν² δεῖ τοῦτο ὃ ἐστιν, οὐδὲν αὐτῇ ἔπι προστι-
 θέντας. ή οὖν τοιαύτη ἐνέργεια οὐ νόησις· οὐ γάρ
 10 ἔχει ὁ νοήσει· αὐτὸν γάρ πρῶτον. ἔπειτα οὐδὲ³ ή
 νόησις νοεῖ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον τὴν νόησιν· δύο οὖν πάλιν
 αὐτὸν τῷ νοοῦντι γίγνεται· τοῦτο δὲ οὐδαμῆ δύο.

¹ coniecumus: αὐτὸν Enn.

² coniecumus: εἶναι Enn.: εἶναι δεῖ <νομίζειν> Müller, Bréhier,
B.T.

³ Cp. Plato *Republic* VI 509A3 (knowledge and truth are
“like the good” but not the Good).

² The reference is to the Aristotelian doctrine of “first and

the desire generates thought and establishes it in being along with itself: for desire of sight is seeing. The Good itself, then, must not think anything: for the Good is not other than itself. For when what is other than the Good thinks it, it does so by being “like the Good”¹ and having a resemblance to the Good, and it thinks it as Good and as desired by itself, and as if it had a mental image of the Good. And if it is like this for ever, it thinks the Good for ever. And again, in thinking the Good it thinks itself incidentally: for it is in looking to the Good that it thinks itself; for it thinks itself in actual activity; and the actual activity of all things is directed to the Good.

6. If this is correctly said, the Good would certainly not have any place for thinking: for the Good for the thinking principle must be something different [from itself]. So the Good is without activity. And why should actuality be active? For in general no active actuality has yet another actual activity. But even if some philosophers are able to attribute yet another activity to the other active actualities which are directed to something else,² yet the first one of all, on which the others depend, we must let be what it is, adding nothing further to it. So an actual activity of this kind is not thinking; for it has nothing to think: it is itself the first. And further, it is not thinking that thinks, but what has the thinking: so again there comes to be a two in

second actuality³: cp. Aristotle *De Anima* B 412a-b. This applies only to human minds which exercise their activity of thinking intermittently; the Aristotelian Divine Mind is always completely active and actual, and no distinction of “first and second actuality” can apply to it.

ἔπι δὲ μᾶλλον ἴδοι ἄν τις τοῦτο, εἰ λάρβοι, πῶς ἐν παντὶ τὸ νοοῦν σαφέστερον ὑπάρχει, ἡ διπλῆ φύσις αὗτη. λέγομεν τὰ ὅντα ὡς ὅντα καὶ αὐτὸς ἔκαστον 15 καὶ τὰ ἀληθῶς ὅντα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ τόπῳ εἶναι οὐ μόνον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν μένει ὡσαύτως τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τὰ δὲ ἔρει καὶ οὐ μένει, ὅσα ἐν αἰσθήσει—τάχα γάρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἔστι τὰ μένοντα—ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον, ὅτι τὸ τέλεον τοῦ εἶναι παρ' αὐτῶν ἔχει. δεῖ γάρ τὴν πρώτως λεγομένην οὐσίαν οὐκ εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι σκιάν, 20 ἀλλ' ἔχειν πλῆρες τὸ εἶναι. πλήρες δέ ἔστι τὸ εἶναι, ὅταν εἴδος τοῦ νοεῖν καὶ ζῆν λάβῃ. ὅμοιος ἄρα τὸ νοεῖν, τὸ ζῆν, τὸ εἶναι ἐν τῷ ὅντι. εἰ ἄρα ὅν, καὶ νοῦς, καὶ εἰ νοῦς, καὶ ὅν, καὶ τὸ νοεῖν ὅμοιον μετὰ τοῦ εἶναι. πολλὰ ἄρα καὶ οὐχ ἐν τῷ νοεῖν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τῷ μὴ τοιούτῳ μηδὲ τὸ νοεῖν εἶναι. καὶ 25 καθέκαστα δὲ ἐπιοῦσιν ἀνθρωπος καὶ νόησις <ἀνθρώπου καὶ νόησις>¹ ἵππον καὶ ἵππος καὶ δικαίου νόησις καὶ δίκαιον. διπλὰ τοίνυν ἄπαντα καὶ τὸ ἐν δύο, καὶ αὖτα δύο εἰς ἐν ἔρχεται. ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἔστι τούτων οὕθ' ἐν² ἔκαστον, οὐδὲ ἐκ πάντων τῶν δύο οὐδὲ ὅλως δύο. ὥπως δὲ τὰ δύο ἐκ τοῦ ἐνός,

¹ Igal.² Creuzer, Kirchhoff, Müller, B-T: οὐθὲν Ενν.: οὐδὲ ἐν Volk-mann*.

the thinking principle; but this [Good] is in no way two. Again, one would see this better if one grasped how in all thinking this double nature is more clearly there. We maintain that the real beings as real beings, and each individual one of them, the ones which truly exist, are in the “intelligible region”,¹ and we do so not only because they abide the same in essence but the other things, all of them which are in the realm of sense-perception, flow and do not abide—for perhaps there are things which abide among those perceived by the senses—but rather because they have the perfection of existence from themselves. For that which is called essence in the primary sense must not be a shadow of being, but have the fulness of being. And being is fulfilled when it has the form of thinking and living. So thinking, living and being are all together in what is real. If then it is being, it is also intellect, and if it is intellect, it is also being, and the thinking and the being go together. Thinking therefore is many and one. That, then, which is not like this cannot be thinking. And as we go over things individually, there is man and thought of man, and thought of horse, and horse, and thought of righteousness, and righteousness. All things then are double, and the one is two, and again the two come together into one. But the Good is not one of all these things, nor is it the product of all the twos; it is not two at all. But how the twos come from the One has been discussed elsewhere.² But what is “beyond being”

¹ A phrase taken from Plato *Republic* VII 517B5.² The question was discussed in the earlier treatise V. 4, ch. 2. Again a reference to the passage on the transcendence of the Good in Plato *Republic* VI 509B9 follows.

30 ἐν ἄλλοις. ἀλλ' ἐπέκεινα οὐσίας ὅν τι καὶ τοῦ
νοεῖν ἐπέκεινα εἶναι· οὐ τούννον οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνο ἄτοπον,
εἰ μὴ οἴδεν ἔαυτόν· οὐ γάρ ἔχει παρ' ἔαυτῷ διάθηγ,
εἴς ᾧν. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ ἄλλα δεῖ αὐτὸν εἰδέναι·
κρείττον γάρ τι καὶ μεῖζον διδωσιν αὐτοῖς τοῦ
εἰδέναι αὐτά—ἥν τὸ ἀγαθὸν τῶν ἄλλων—ἀλλὰ μᾶλ-
35 λον ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, καθόσον δύναται, ἐφάπτεσθαι
ἐκείνου.

must be beyond thinking; it is not then absurd if he does not know himself; for he has nothing in himself which he can learn about, since he is one. But other things need not know him either; for he gives them something better and greater than that they should know him—he is the Good of the others—he gives them rather to be in the same place with him and to lay hold on him, as far as they are able.

V. 7. ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THERE ARE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS

Introductory Note

THIS short treatise, the eighteenth in Porphyry's chronological order, is the clearest statement in the *Enneads* that there are Platonic Ideas of particulars. (The general opinion of Platonists before Plotinus seems to have been that there were only Ideas of universals, not of particulars. The Stoics, though they did not believe in transcendent Ideas, held that no individual thing was exactly like any other; each had its own particular qualitative difference.) There has been much dispute about whether Plotinus held the doctrine expounded here, that there are Ideas or Forms of individuals, continually and consistently: there are a number of other passages in the *Enneads* which seem to deny it. Perhaps the safest conclusion is that he consistently held that there were Ideas of individual human selves in addition to (and included in) the Idea of Man. Socrates is something more than a mere instance of humanity (though he may be incarnate at various times as Pythagoras and many other empirical personalities). As regards Ideas of other individual things (including human bodies) his opinion may have varied: he was probably prepared to postulate them if and when he thought the facts required him to do so, but was not always sure that they did. In this treatise (especially in chapter 3) he goes further than anywhere else in the *Enneads* towards accepting the full Stoic position that each individual thing differs essentially from every other (acceptance of this by a Platonist would involve postulating a Form for each individual).

ARE THERE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS

Synopsis

Is there an idea of each particular? It would seem so, in spite of all the difficulties which can be raised, at least in the case of individual men: this does not involve any objectionable kind of infinity in the intelligible world (ch. 1). Problems about differences between children of the same parents: if the children have different kinds of beauty this must be due to different forming principles (which are all present in the souls of the parents) (ch. 2). One needs to postulate different forming principles only where the individuals are really different; not perhaps therefore in cases where animals have litters of large numbers of apparently exactly similar offspring. But are two individuals ever really exactly the same? The Stoic doctrine of recurring world-periods, each exactly similar in every detail, will (as already suggested in ch. 1) make it unnecessary, even if there is a Form for every individual, to postulate an infinite number of Forms; but we must not be afraid of the infinity contained in a single intelligible reality (ch. 3).

V. 7. (18) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΕΙ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ
ΚΑΘΕΚΑΣΤΑ ΕΙΣΙΝ ΙΔΕΑΙ

1. Εἰ καὶ τοῦ καθέκαστον ἔστιν ἴδεα; εἰ ἐγὼ καὶ
ἔκαστος τὴν ἀναγωγὴν ἐπὶ τὸ νοητὸν ἔχει, καὶ
ἔκάστου ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔκει. ἢ εἰ μὲν ἀεὶ Σωκράτης καὶ
ψυχὴ Σωκράτους, ἔσται Αὐτοσωκράτης, καθὸ
5 ἥ¹ ψυχὴ καθέκαστα καὶ <ὡς λέγεται>² ἔκει [ὡς
λέγεται ἔκει].² εἰ δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ, ἀλλὰ ἄλλοτε ἄλλῃ
γίγνεται ὁ πρότερον Σωκράτης, οἷον Πυθαγόρας ἡ
τις ἄλλος, οὐκέτι ὁ καθέκαστα οὗτος κάκει. ἀλλ' εἰ
ἡ ψυχὴ ἔκάστου ὅν διεξέρχεται τοὺς λόγους ἔχει
πάντων, πάντες αὖ ἔκει· ἐπεὶ καὶ λέγομεν, ὅσους ὁ
10 κόσμος ἔχει λόγους, καὶ ἔκάστην ψυχὴν ἔχειν. εἰ
οὖν καὶ ὁ κόσμος μὴ ἀνθρώπου μόνου, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν
καθέκαστα ζῴων, καὶ ἡ ψυχή· ἀπειρον οὖν τὸ τῶν
λόγων ἔσται, εἰ μὴ ἀνακάμπτει περιόδοις, καὶ
οὕτως ἡ ἀπειρία ἔσται πεπερασμένη, ὅταν ταῦτα
ἀποδιδῶται. εἰ οὖν ὅλως πλείω τὰ γινόμενα τοῦ
15 παραδείγματος, τί δεῖ εἶναι τῶν ἐν μιᾷ περιόδῳ

¹ scripsimus: ἡ Enn.

² transposuimus.

V. 7. ON THE QUESTION WHETHER
THERE ARE IDEAS OF PARTICULARS

1. Is there an idea of each particular thing? Yes, if I and each one of us have a way of ascent and return to the intelligible, the principle of each of us is there. If Socrates, that is the soul of Socrates, always exists, there will be an absolute Socrates in the sense that, in so far as they are soul, individuals are also said to exist in this way in the intelligible world. But if Socrates does not always exist, but the soul which was formerly Socrates becomes different people at different times, like Pythagoras or someone else, then there will not be this particular person Socrates also in the intelligible world. But if the soul of each individual possesses the rational forming principles of all the individuals which it animates in succession, then again on this assumption all will exist there; and we do say that each soul possesses all the forming principles in the universe. If then the universe possesses the forming principles, not only of man but of all individual animals, so does the soul; there will therefore be an infinity of forming principles, unless the universe returns on itself in regular periods; this will put a limit to the infinity of forming principles, because the same things in this case recur. Well, then, if the things which come into being in all the periods together are more numerous than the models, why should there have to be forming

πάντων γινομένων λόγους καὶ παραδείγματα; ἀρκεῖν γάρ ἔνα ἄνθρωπον εἰς πάντας ἄνθρωπους, ὥσπερ καὶ ψυχὰς ὡρισμένας ἄνθρωπους ποιούσας ἀπέρους. ἡ τῶν διαφόρων οὐκ ἔστιν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον, οὐδὲ ἀρκεῖ ἄνθρωπος πρὸς παράδειγμα τῶν τινῶν ἄνθρωπων διαφερόντων ἀλλήλων οὐ τῇ ὑλῇ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἴδικαις διαφοραῖς μυρίαις· οὐ γάρ ὡς αἱ εἰκόνες Σωκράτους πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὴν διάφορον ποίησιν ἐκ διαφόρων λόγων. ἡ δὲ πᾶσα περίοδος πάντας ἔχει τοὺς λόγους, αὐθις δὲ 25 τὰ αὐτὰ πάλιν κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς λόγους. τὴν δὲ ἐν τῷ νοητῷ ἀπειρίᾳν οὐ δεῖ δεδιέναι· πᾶσα γὰρ ἐν ἀμερεῖ, καὶ οἷον πρόεισιν, ὅταν ἐνεργῇ.

2. Ἐλλ' εἰ αἱ μίξεις τῶν λόγων ἄρρενος καὶ θῆλεος διαφόρους ποιοῦσιν, οὐκέτι τοῦ γινομένου ἐκάστου λόγος τις ἔσται, ὁ τε ἐκάτερος γεννῶν, οἷον ὁ ἄρρητης, οὐ κατὰ διαφόρους λόγους ποιήσει, 5 ἀλλὰ καὶ ἔνα τὸν αὐτοῦ ἡ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ. ἡ οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ κατὰ διαφόρους τῷ τοὺς πάντας ἔχειν αὐτούς, ἄλλους δὲ ἀεὶ προχείρους. ὅταν δὲ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γονέων διάφοροι; ἡ διὰ τὴν οὐκ ἵστην ἐπικράτησιν. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι οὕ, καν¹ εἰ ἐν τῷ φαινεσθαι, ὅτε μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἄρρεν τὸ πλεῖστον, ὅτε

¹ οὕ, καν coniecimus: οὐκ Enn.

principles and models of all the things which come into being in one period? One man as model would do for all men, just as souls limited in number produce an infinity of men. No, there cannot be the same forming principle for different individuals, and one man will not serve as a model for several men differing from each other not only by reason of their matter but with a vast number of special differences of form. Men are not related to their form as portraits of Socrates are to their original, but their different structures must result from different forming principles. The whole revolution of the universe contains all the forming principles, and when it repeats itself it produces the same things again according to the same forming principles. We ought not to be afraid of the infinity which this introduces into the intelligible world: for it is all in an indivisible unity and, we may say, comes forth when it acts.

2. But if the mixtures of the forming principles of male and female produce different children, there will no longer be a forming principle of every individual child that is born, but one of the parents, the male, for instance, will produce it, not according to different forming principles but according to one, his own or his father's. No, nothing prevents it from being according to different principles, because the parent has them all, but different ones are ready for use at different times. But what are we to say when different children come from the same parents? It is because of unequal dominance [of the two parents]. But there is this further point, that it is not the case—even if it appears so—that sometimes the larger quantity of formative principle is on the male

10 δὲ κατὰ τὸ θῆλυ, ἢ κατὰ τὸ ἵσον μέρος ἔδωκεν
ἐκάτερος, ἀλλ’ ὅλον μὲν ἔδωκε καὶ ἔγκειται, κρατεῖ
δὲ τῆς ὑλῆς μέρος ἐκατέρου ἢ θάτερον. οἱ δὲ ἐν
ἄλλῃ ὥρᾳ¹ πᾶς διάφοροι; ἀρ’ οὖν ἡ ὑλὴ τὸ διά-
φορον οὐχ ὁμοίως κρατουμένη; πάντες ἄρα χωρὶς
15 ἑνὸς παρὰ φύσιν. εἰ δὲ τὸ διάφορον πολλαχοῦ
καλόν, οὐχ ἐν τὸ εἶδος. ἀλλὰ τῷ αἴσχει μόνῳ
ἀποδοτέον τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὑλὴν κάκει τῶν τελείων
λόγων κεκρυμμένων μέν, δοθέντων δὲ ὅλων. ἀλλ’
ἔστωσαν διάφοροι οἱ λόγοι· τί δεῖ τοσούτους, ὅσοι
οἱ γινόμενοι ἐν μιᾷ περιόδῳ, εἴπερ ἐν τῶν αὐτῶν
20 διδομένων διαφόρους ἔξωθεν φαίνεσθαι; ἢ συγκε-
χώρηται τῶν ὅλων διδομένων, ζητεύται δέ, εἰ τῶν
αὐτῶν κρατούντων. ἀρ’ οὖν, ὅτι τὸ ταῦτὸν πάντη
ἐν τῇ ἐτέρᾳ περιόδῳ, ἐν ταύτῃ δὲ οὐδὲν πάντη ταῦ-
τον;

¹ Igal: χώρᾳ Enn.

¹ This brings out clearly that matter for Plotinus is always a principle of resistance to nature (the immanent creative principle in the physical world which is the lowest form of soul). A child would be an unnatural creature if it owed its differences from the other members of its family to matter, not to the forms in nature.

² Plotinus is here considering as a possibility (not definitely accepting) the full Stoic doctrine of the *ἰδίως ποιόν*, the unique individual characteristic of every entity in any one world-period: cp. *SVF* II 395; Seneca *Epistulae Morales CXIII*, 16. Here and in the following chapter he is inclined to think

side, sometimes on the female, or that each contributes in equal proportion, but each of them gives their whole forming principle and it is present as a whole in the offspring, but it is either the part belonging to one of them or the other part which dominates the matter. But how does it come about that children conceived in different seasons are different? Is it then the matter which makes the difference since it is not dominated in the same way [in the different seasons]? If that were so, then all the children but one would be contrary to nature.¹ But if the difference is a great diversity of beauty, the form is not one. Only ugliness is to be attributed to the influence of matter, and even there the perfect forming principles are present, hidden but given as wholes. But, granted that the forming principles are different, why do there need to be as many as the individual human beings born in one world-period, if it is possible that when the same principles are given, individuals appear externally different? No, it has [only] been granted that the principles are given as wholes, but the question now is whether individuals can be different when the same forming principles dominate. Are, then, different forming principles necessary because the absolutely identical occurs in the other world-period, and in this world period there is nothing absolutely identical²?

that acceptance of the Stoic doctrine of recurrent world-periods in which every detail repeats itself exactly might be a useful way of accepting Forms of individuals while rejecting the idea that there is an infinite number of Forms, as he normally does, though at the end of chs. 1 and 3 in this treatise he seems at least prepared to consider it, and it was held by his closest associate Amelius (*Syrianus In Metaph.* 147. 1ff.).

3. Πῶς οὖν ἐπὶ πολλῶν διδύμων διαφόρους φήσομεν τοὺς λόγους; εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷά τις ἵοι καὶ τὰ πολύτοκα μάλιστα; ἢ, ἐφ' ὃν ἀπαράλλακτα, εἰς λόγος. ἀλλ' εἰ τοῦτο, οὐχ, ὅσα τὰ 5 καθέκαστα, τοσοῦτοι καὶ οἱ λόγοι. ἢ ὅσα διάφορα τὰ καθέκαστα, καὶ διάφορα οὐ τῷ ἐλλείπειν κατὰ τὸ εἶδος. ἢ τί κωλύει καὶ ἐν οἷς ἀδιάφορα; εἴπερ τινὰ ὅλως ἔστι πάντη ἀδιάφορα. ὡς γὰρ ὁ τεχνίτης, κανὸν ἀδιάφορα ποιῆι, δεῖ ὅμως τὸ ταῦτὸν διαφορᾶ 10 λαμβάνειν λογικῆν, καθ' ἣν ἄλλο ποιήσει προσφέρων διάφορόν τι τῷ αὐτῷ· ἐν δὲ τῇ φύσει μὴ λογισμῷ γινομένου τοῦ ἑτέρου, ἀλλὰ λόγους μόνον, συνεζεῦχθαι δεῖ τῷ εἴδει τὸ διάφορον· ἡμεῖς δὲ λαμβάνειν τὴν διαφορὰν ἀδύνατοῦμεν. καὶ εἰ μὲν ἡ ποίησις ἔχει τὸ εἰκῆ τοῦ ὀποσαοῦν, ἄλλος λόγος· εἰ δὲ μεμέτρηται, ὅπόσα τινὰ εἴη, τὸ ποσὸν ὥρισμένον ἔσται τῇ τῶν λόγων ἀπάντων ἔξελίξει καὶ ἀναπλώσει· ὅστε, ὅταν παύσηται πάντα, ἀρχὴ ἄλλη· ὅπόσον γὰρ δεῖ τὸν κόσμον εἶναι, καὶ ὅπόσα ἐν τῷ ἔαυτοῦ

3. How, then, can we assert that the forming principles are different in the case of many children born at one birth¹? And suppose one also turns to the other living beings, and especially to the ones which have litters? Now in the cases where the offspring are indistinguishable, there is one forming principle. But if this is so, the forming principles are not equal in number to the individuals. Yes, they are equal to the number of individuals which are different, and different not by reason of failure [to dominate the matter] on the side of the form. Or what prevents [there being different forming principles] even when the individuals are not different? Supposing, that is, that there are any individuals at all totally without difference. For, as the craftsman, even if he is making things which do not differ from each other, must apprehend the sameness by means of a logical difference, according to which he will make the thing another by bringing some difference to its sameness, so in nature, where the other thing does not come into being by reasoning but only by rational forming principles, the difference must be linked with the form; but we are unable to grasp the difference. And if [nature's production] contains a random number of individuals, that is a different story; but if it is precisely determined how many there are, the quantity will be defined by the unrolling and unfolding of all the forming principles; so that, when all things come to an end, there will be another beginning; for how large the universe ought to be, and all that it will pass through in its

¹ Cp. "Seven, Cousin Peter, and all of them twins!" (Beatrix Potter *The Tale of Mr. Tod* 23), which may do something to justify my translation of διδύμων here.

βίᾳ διεξελεύσεται, κεῖται ἔξαρχης ἐν τῷ ἔχοντι τὸν λόγους. ἀρ' οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων, ἐφ' ὃν 20 πλῆθος ἐκ μιᾶς γενέσεως, τοσούτους τὸν λόγους; ἢ οὐ φοβητέον τὸ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι καὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἅπειρον ψυχῆς τὰ πάντα ἔχοντος. ἢ καὶ ἐν νῷ, ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ, τὸ ἅπειρον τούτων ἀνάπαλιν τῶν ἐκεῖ προχείρων.

life, is established from the beginning in that which contains the forming principles. Are we then in the case of the other living beings, which produce a great many offspring from one birth, to assume an equal number of forming principles? Now we have no need to be afraid of the infinity in seeds and forming principles, since Soul contains them all. Yes, in Intellect, as in Soul, there is again the infinity of these principles which come out ready for use in Soul.

V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

Introductory Note

THIS early treatise, the fifth in Porphyry's chronological order, is the first of Plotinus's "ascents of the mind" from the material world to Intellect; the One or Good is only mentioned incidentally in this treatise and the subject of its relation to Intellect is left for future development (chs. 2 and 14). The object of the treatise is to display the true nature of Intellect, and to show how Soul and the material world in which our souls find themselves depend on it, and so to teach us to live in it as our true home. It stays fairly close to the traditional school-Platonism which Plotinus had inherited, but already shows clear evidence of his original development of the tradition, especially in his insistence throughout on the living unity of thought and the Forms in the Intellect which is also Being, and the clear indication in ch. 13 that souls and their virtues here below continue to belong to the higher world of Intellect which is everywhere, not spatially separated or cut off from the lower world. The treatise gives the impression of having been rather hurriedly written: the later chapters are very summary in their treatment of the contents of the world of Intellect, and the last (ch. 14) is little more than a series of notes for further discussion.

ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

Synopsis

Three kinds of philosopher, Epicurean, Stoic and Platonist: only the Platonist is capable of seeing and rising to the world of Intellect (ch. 1). The Platonic ascent of the mind from the derived beauty below to the original beauty above: should it stop at Intellect? (ch. 2). The nature of Intellect and the Forms in Intellect, and the necessity that they must exist, argued from the works of human and divine art here below (ch. 3). Superiority of Intellect to Soul, and Soul's dependence on Intellect (ch. 4). The unity of thought and Forms in the living reality of Intellect (chs. 5–8). The contents of the world of Intellect: it is a true intelligible universe containing everything which exists as form in the world of sense (but not, therefore, any defect or evil) (chs. 9–10). The arts considered and distinguished according to the degree to which they exist in the intelligible world or derive their principles from it (ch. 11). If the Form of man and the intellectual arts are in the intelligible, then so must the universal Forms be which are the subject-matter of those arts; a quick glance at the problem of physical individuality (ch. 12). Soul and its excellences exist in both worlds: so everything which exists in the intelligible world is also here below (ch. 13). Notes on a variety of problems about the intelligible world—the origin of its multiplicity, the question of Forms of casual compounds and products of putrefaction etc. (ch. 14).

V. 9. (5) ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΝΟΥ ΚΑΙ ΤΩΝ ΙΔΕΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΤΟΥ ΟΝΤΟΣ

1. Πάντες ἄνθρωποι ἔξαρχῆς γενόμενοι αἰσθήσει πρὸ νοῦ χρησάμενοι καὶ τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς προσβαλόντες πρώτοις ἔξανάγκης οἱ μὲν ἐνταυθοῖ καταμείναντες διέζησαν ταῦτα πρῶτα καὶ ἔσχατα νομίσαντες, 5 καὶ τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς λυπηρὸν τε καὶ ἥδυ τὸ μὲν κακόν, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαβόντες ἀρκεῖν ἐνόμισαν, καὶ τὸ μὲν διώκοντες, τὸ δ' ἀποικονομούμενοι διεγένοντο. καὶ σοφίαν ταῦτην οἵ γε λόγου μεταποιούμενοι αὐτῶν ἔθεντο, οἷα οἱ βαρεῖς τῶν ὄρνιθων, οἱ πολλὰ ἐκ γῆς λαβόντες καὶ βαρυνθέντες ὑψοῦ πτῆναι 10 ἀδυνατοῦσι καίπερ πτερά παρὰ τῆς φύσεως λαβόντες. οἱ δὲ ἥρθησαν μὲν δλγον ἐκ τῶν κάτω κινοῦντος αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἥδεος τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς κρείττονος, ἀδυνατήσαντες δὲ ἵδεν τὸ ἄνω, ὡς οὐκ ἔχοντες ἄλλο, ὅπου στήσονται, κατηγένθησαν σὺν τῷ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὀνόματι ἐπὶ πράξεις 15 καὶ ἐκλογὰς τῶν κάτω, ἀφ' ὧν ἐπεχείρησαν τὸ πρῶτον αἴρεσθαι. τρίτον δὲ γένος θείων ἀνθρώπων δυνάμει τε κρείττονι καὶ δέξυτητι ὄμμάτων εἰδέ τε

¹ This is a piece of stock Platonic school-polemic against Epicureans and Stoics, those lumpish fowl the Epicureans being as usual dismissed casually and scornfully, and the Stoics treated rather more respectfully. The "greater beauty" to which the Stoics have been urged on is of course

V. 9. ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

1. All men from the beginning, as soon as they are born, employ sense-perception before intellect and sense-objects are necessarily the first which they encounter. Some of them stay here and live through their lives considering these to be primary and ultimate, and since they consider what is painful and pleasant in them to be evil and good respectively, they think this is enough, and pass their lives pursuing the one and contriving to get rid of the other. And those of them who claim rationality make this their philosophy, like the heavy sort of birds who have taken much from the earth and are weighed down by it and so are unable to fly high although nature has given them wings. Others have risen a little from the things below because the better part of their soul has urged them on from the pleasant to a greater beauty; but since they were unable to see what is above, as they have no other ground to stand on they are brought down, with the name of virtue, to practical actions and choices of the things below from which they tried to raise themselves at first.¹ But there is a third kind of godlike men who by their greater power and the sharpness of their eyes as if by a special keen-

virtue. For the Stoic doctrines of choice referred to here ep. *SVF* III 64 and 118.

ῶσπερ ὑπὸ δξυδορκίας τὴν ἄνω αἴγλην καὶ ηρθη τε
ἐκεῖ οἷον ὑπέρ νεφῶν καὶ τῆς ἐνταῦθα ἀχλύος καὶ
20 ἔμεινεν ἐκεῖ τὰ τῇδε ὑπεριδὸν πάντα ἡσθέν τῷ τόπῳ
ἀληθινῷ καὶ οἰκείῳ ὅντι, ὕσπερ ἐκ πολλῆς πλάνης
εἰς πατρίδα ἔνομον ἀφικόμενος ἄνθρωπος.

2. Τίς οὖν οὗτος ὁ τόπος; καὶ πῶς ἄν τις εἰς
αὐτὸν ἀφίκοιτο; ἀφίκοιτο μὲν ἂν ὁ φύσει ἐρωτικὸς
καὶ ὄντως τὴν διάθεσιν ἔξαρχῆς φιλόσοφος, ὡδίνων
μέν, ἄτε ἐρωτικός, περὶ τὸ καλόν, οὐκ ἀνασχόμενος
5 δὲ τοῦ ἐν σώματι κάλλους, ἀλλ’ ἐνθει ἀναψυ-
γῶν ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλη, ἀρετὰς καὶ
ἐπιστήμας καὶ ἐπιτηδεύματα καὶ νόμους,
πάλιν αὖ ἐπαναβαίνει ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ καλῶν
αἰτίαν, καὶ εἰ τι πάλιν αὖ πρὸ τούτου, ἔως ἐπ’ ἔσχα-
τον τῇ τοῦ πρώτον, ὁ παρ’ αὐτοῦ καλόν. ἐνθα καὶ
10 ἐλθὼν ὡδίνος παύσεται, πρότερον δὲ οὕ. ἀλλὰ
πῶς ἀναβήσεται, καὶ πόθεν ἡ δύναμις αὐτῷ, καὶ τίς
λόγος τοῦτον τὸν ἔρωτα παιδαγωγήσεται; ἡ δέ-
τοῦτο τὸ κάλλος τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασιν ἐπακτόν
ἐστι τοῖς σώμασι· μορφαὶ γάρ αὗται σωμάτων ὡς
15 ἐπὶ ὑλῇ αὐτοῖς. μεταβάλλει γοῦν τὸ ὑποκείμενον
καὶ ἐκ καλοῦ αἰσχρὸν γίνεται. μεθέξει ἄρα, φησὸν
ὁ λόγος. τί οὖν τὸ ποιῆσαν σῶμα καλόν; ἀλλως
μὲν κάλλους παρουσίᾳ, ἀλλως δὲ ψυχῇ, ἡ ἐπλασέ τε
καὶ μορφὴν τοιάνδε ἐνῆκε. τί οὖν; ψυχὴ παρ’
20 αὐτῆς καλόν; ἡ οὕ. οὐ γάρ ἡ μὲν ἦν φρόνιμός τε

ON INTELLECT, THE FORMS, AND BEING

sightedness see the glory above and are raised to it as if above the clouds and the mist of this lower world and remain there, overlooking all things here below and delighting in the true region which is their own, like a man who has come home after long wandering to his own well-ordered country.¹

2. What, then, is this region? And how could one reach it? The man could reach it who is by nature a lover and truly disposed to philosophy from the beginning, in travail over beauty, since he is a lover, not enduring the "beauty of body" but escaping from it up to the "beauties of soul, virtues and kinds of knowledge and ways of life and laws"²; and again he ascends to the cause of the beauties in soul, and again to anything there may be beyond this, till he comes to the ultimate which is the first, which is beautiful of itself. When he has arrived there he ceases from his travail, but not before. But how will he ascend, and where will his power come from, and what reasoning will guide this Love on his way? This one: this beauty which rests on bodies comes to the bodies from elsewhere; for these beauties are forms of bodies which rest upon them as if on their matter. At any rate what underlies them changes, and becomes ugly instead of beautiful. Its beauty comes by participation, then, our reasoning says. What then is it which makes a body beautiful? In one way it is the presence of beauty, in another the soul, which moulded it and put this particular form in it. Well, then, is the soul beautiful of itself? No, it is not. For [if it was] one soul would

¹ For the Homeric allusions here and their significance see I. 6. 8, n. 1.

² Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Symposium* are here, as often, combined: ep. *Phaedrus* 248D3-4 and *Symposium* 210B3-C6. For the possible passage from musician to lover and lover to

philosopher in Plotinus ep. I. 3. 1-2 (Plotinus in these chapters does not simply identify the lover and the philosopher as he does in this earlier treatise).

20 καὶ καλή, ἡ δὲ ἄφρων τε καὶ αἰσχρά. φρονήσει
ἄρα τὸ καλὸν περὶ ψυχῆν. καὶ τίς οὖν ὁ φρόνησιν
δοὺς ψυχῆ; ἡ νοῦς ἐξανάγκης, νοῦς δὲ οὐ ποτὲ
μὲν νοῦς, ποτὲ δὲ ἄνους, ὁ γε ἀληθιώς. παρ'
αὐτοῦ ἄρα καλός. καὶ πότερον δὴ ἐνταῦθα δεῖ
στῆναι ὡς πρῶτον, ἢ καὶ νοῦ ἐπέκεινα δεῖ ιέναι,
25 νοῦς δὲ πρόστικε μὲν ἀρχῆς τῆς πρώτης ὡς πρὸς
ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἐν προθύροις τάγαθοῦ ἀπαγγέλ-
λων ἐν αὐτῷ τὰ πάντα, ὥσπερ ἐκείνους τύπος μαλ-
λον ἐν πλήθει ἐκείνου πάντη μένοντος ἐν ἑνὶ;

3. Ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ ταύτην τὴν νοῦ φύσιν, ἥν
ἐπαγγέλλεται ὁ λόγος εἶναι τὸ ὄν ὄντως καὶ τὴν
ἀληθῆ οὐσίαν, πρότερον βεβαιωσαμένους κατ'
ἄλλην ὄδον ἴοντας, ὅτι δεῖ εἶναι τινα τοιαύτην.
5 ἵστως μὲν οὖν γελοῖον ζητεῖν, εἰ νοῦς ἐστιν ἐν τοῖς
οὖσι τάχα δ' ἂν τινες καὶ περὶ τούτου διαμφισ-
βητοῖεν. μᾶλλον δέ, εἰ τοιοῦτος, οἷόν φαμεν, καὶ εἰ
χωριστός τις, καὶ εἰ οὐτος τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἡ τῶν
εἰδῶν φύσις ἐνταῦθα, περὶ οὗ καὶ τὰ νῦν εἰπεῖν
πρόκειται. ὀρῶμεν δὴ τὰ λεγόμενα εἶναι πάντα
10 σύνθετα καὶ ἀπλοῦν αὐτῶν οὐδὲ ἔν, ἃ τε τέχνη
ἐργάζεται ἔκαστα, ἃ τε συνέστηκε φύσει τά τε
γάρ τεχνητὰ ἔχει χαλκὸν ἡ ξύλον ἡ λίθον καὶ παρὰ
τούτων οὕπω τετέλεσται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ τέχνη ἐκάστη
ἡ μὲν ἀνδριάντα, ἡ δὲ κλίνην, ἡ δὲ οἰκίαν ἐργάσηται
εἴδους τοῦ παρ' αὐτῇ ἐνθέσει. καὶ μὴν καὶ τὰ φύσει

not be wise and beautiful and another stupid and ugly. So beauty in the soul comes by wisdom. And what is it, then, which gives wisdom to the soul? Intellect, necessarily, an intellect which is not sometimes intellect and sometimes unintelligent, but the true Intellect. This, then, is beautiful of itself. Should we then stop at Intellect as the First, or must we go beyond Intellect, and does Intellect stand from our point of view in front of the first principle, as if in the porch of the Good,¹ proclaiming to us all that is in it, like an impression of it in greater multiplicity while the Good remains altogether in one?

3. We must consider the nature of this Intellect, which our reasoning tells us is the genuine reality and true substance, when we have first confirmed by following a different course that something of the sort must exist. It is perhaps ridiculous to enquire whether there is intellect in the world; though there are, it may be, people who would dispute even this. But it is more disputable if it is the sort of Intellect we say it is, and if it is a separate one, and if it is the real beings and if the nature of the Forms is there: this is our present subject. We certainly see that all the things that are said to exist are compounds, and not a single one of them is simple; [this applies to] each and every work of art, and all things compounded by nature. For the works of art have bronze or wood or stone, and they are not brought to completion from these until each art makes one a statue, another a bed, and another a house by putting the form which it has in them.

¹ Cp. Plato *Philebus* 64C1.

15 συνεστῶτα τὰ μὲν πολυσύνθετα αὐτῶν καὶ συγκρίματα καλούμενα ἀναλύσεις εἰς τὸ ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοῖς συγκριθεῖσιν εἶδος· οἷον ἄνθρωπον εἰς ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, καὶ τὸ σῶμα εἰς τὰ τέσσαρα. ἔκαστον δὲ τούτων σύνθετον εὑρὼν ἐξ ὑλῆς καὶ τοῦ μορφοῦντος 20 —ὑλη γάρ παρ' αὐτῆς ἡ τῶν στοιχείων ἀμορφος— ζητήσεις τὸ εἶδος ὅθεν τῇ ὑλῃ. ζητήσεις δ' αὖτις τὴν ψυχὴν πότερα τῶν ἀπλῶν ἥδη, ἡ ἔνι τι ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ μὲν ὡς ὑλη, τὸ δὲ εἶδος, ὁ νοῦς ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ, ὁ μὲν ὡς ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ χαλκῷ μορφή, δὲ οἷος ὁ τὴν μορφὴν ἐν τῷ χαλκῷ ποιήσας. τὰ αὐτὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ ἐπὶ 25 τοῦ παντὸς μεταφέρων τις ἀναβήσεται καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ νοῦν ποιητὴν ὄντως καὶ δημιουργὸν τιθέμενος, καὶ φήσει τὸ ὑποκείμενον δεξάμενον μορφὰς τὸ μὲν πῦρ, τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ, τὸ δὲ ἀέρα καὶ γῆν γενέσθαι, τὰς δὲ μορφὰς ταύτας παρ' ἄλλουν ἥκειν. τοῦτο 30 δὲ εἶναι ψυχὴν· ψυχὴν δὲ αὖτις ἐπὶ τοῖς τέτραις τὴν κόσμου μορφὴν δοῦναι· ταῦτη δὲ νοῦν χορηγὸν τῶν λόγων γεγονέναι, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰς τῶν τεχνιτῶν ψυχὰς παρὰ τῶν τεχνῶν τοὺς εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν λόγους· νοῦν δὲ τὸν μὲν ὡς εἶδος τῆς ψυχῆς, τὸν κατὰ τὴν μορφὴν, τὸν δὲ τὴν μορφὴν παρέχοντα 35 ὡς τὸν ποιητὴν τοῦ ἀνδριάντος, ὡς πάντα ἐνυπάρχει, ἀ διδωσιν. ἐγγὺς μὲν ἀληθείας, ἀ διδωσι ψυχῆς· ἀ δὲ τὸ σῶμα δέχεται, εἴδωλα ἥδη καὶ μυμήματα.

¹ Plotinus seems to have left out the matter which is informed or the elements brought together under the form in this phrase, though they appear in the example which follows.

And again you will be able to resolve the things put together by nature, those of them which are multiple compounds and are called compositions, into the form imposed on all the elements of the composition¹: man, for instance, into soul and body, and the body into the four elements. And when you have found that each of the elements is a compound of matter and what forms it—for the matter of the elements is in itself formless—you will enquire from where the form comes to the matter. And then again you will enquire whether the soul is one of the simple entities, or whether there is something in it like matter and something like form, the intellect in it, one intellect being like the shape on the bronze, and the other like the man who makes the shape in the bronze. And one will transfer these same observations to the whole universe, and will ascend there also to Intellect and suppose it to be the true maker and craftsman, and will say that the underlying matter receives the forms, and part of it becomes fire, and part water, and part air and earth, but that these forms come from another: and this other is soul; then again that soul gives to the four elements the form of the universe, but Intellect provides it with the forming principles, as in the souls of artists the forming principles for their activities come from their arts; and that one intellect is like the form of the soul, the one which pertains to its shape, but the other is the one which provides the shape, like the maker of the statue in whom everything that he gives exists. The things which Intellect gives to the soul are near to truth; but those which body receives are already images and imitations.

Some editors supply a phrase to make up the deficiency, but Plotinus is quite capable of such an omission.

4. Διὰ τί οὖν δεῖ ἐπὶ ψυχῆς ἀνιέναι, ἀλλ' οὐκ
αὐτὴν εἶναι τίθεσθαι τὸ πρῶτον; ἡ πρῶτον μὲν
νοῦς ψυχῆς ἔτερον καὶ κρείττον· τὸ δὲ κρείττον
φύσει πρῶτον. οὐ γάρ δή, ὡς οἴονται, ψυχὴ νοῦν
5 τελεωθεῖσα γεννᾶ· πόθεν γὰρ τὸ δυνάμει ἐνεργείᾳ
ἔσται, μὴ τοῦ εἰς ἐνέργειαν ἄγοντος αἰτίου ὄντος;
εἰ γάρ κατὰ τύχην, ἐνδέχεται μὴ ἐλθεῖν εἰς ἐν-
έργειαν. διὸ δεῖ τὰ πρῶτα ἐνεργείᾳ τίθεσθαι
καὶ ἀπροσδεῖ καὶ τέλεια· τὰ δὲ ἀτελῆ ὕστερα
ἀπ' ἐκείνων, τελειούμενα δὲ παρ' αὐτῶν τῶν
10 γεγενηκότων δίκην πατέρων τελειούντων, ἀ καταρ-
χὰς ἀτελῆ ἐγέννησαν· καὶ εἶναι μὲν ὅλην πρὸς τὸ
ποιῆσαν τὸ πρῶτον, εἰτ' αὐτὴν ἔμμορφον ἀποτελεῖσ-
θαι. εἰ δὲ δὴ καὶ ἐμπαθὲς ψυχή, δεῖ δέ τι ἀπαθὲς
εἶναι—ἢ πάντα τῷ χρόνῳ ἀπολεῖται—δεῖ τι πρὸ
15 ψυχῆς εἶναι. καὶ εἰ ἐν κόσμῳ ψυχή, ἐκτὸς δὲ δεῖ
τι κόσμου εἶναι, καὶ ταύτῃ πρὸ ψυχῆς δεῖ τι εἶναι.
εἰ γάρ τὸ ἐν κόσμῳ τὸ ἐν σώματι καὶ ὅλῃ, οὐδὲν
ταύτὸν μενεῖ.¹ ὥστε ἄνθρωπος καὶ πάντες λόγοι
οὐκ ἀδιοι οὐδὲ οἱ αὐτοί. καὶ ὅτι μὲν νοῦν πρὸ
ψυχῆς εἶναι δεῖ, ἐκ τούτων καὶ ἐξ ἀλλων πολλῶν
ἄν τις θεωρήσειε.

¹ Dodds (Select Passages 15), Harder: μένει Ενν.*

4. Why, then, must we go on up when we have reached the level of soul, and not suppose that it is the first reality? First of all, Intellect is other and better than soul: but the better is naturally the first. For certainly soul does not when it is made perfect generate intellect, as they think¹; for in what way will the potential become actual, if there is no cause to bring it to actuality? For if it happens by chance, there is a possibility of its not coming to actuality. So we must assume that the first realities are actual and without deficiencies and perfect; but the imperfect ones come after and derive from the first, being perfected by their begetters as fathers perfect their originally imperfect offspring; and we must assume that soul is matter to the first reality which makes it and is afterwards given shape and perfected. . But certainly if soul is a thing subject to affections, but there must be something not subject to being affected—otherwise everything will be destroyed by time—there must be something before soul. And if soul is in the universe, but there must be something outside the universe, in this way too there must be something before soul. For if what is in the universe is what is in body and matter, nothing will remain the same: so that man and the other rational forming principles will not be eternal or the same. One can see then from these and many other arguments that there must be an intellect before soul.

¹ "They" are the Stoics: ep. IV. 7. 8³, 8-9 and for the Stoic doctrine attacked here SVF I, 374, 377; II, 835-7, 839.

5. Δεῖ δὲ νοῦν λαμβάνειν, εἴπερ ἐπαληθεύσομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, μὴ τὸν δυνάμει μηδὲ τὸν ἐξ ἀφροσύνης εἰς νοῦν ἐλθόντα—εἰ δὲ μή, ἄλλον πάλιν αὖ πρὸ αὐτοῦ ζητήσομεν—ἄλλὰ τὸν ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ ἀεὶ νοῦν 5 ὄντα. εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐπακτὸν τὸ φρονεῖν ἔχει, εἰ τι νοεῖ, παρ' αὐτοῦ νοεῖ, καὶ εἴ τι ἔχει, παρ' αὐτοῦ ἔχει. εἰ δὲ παρ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ νοεῖ, αὐτός ἐστιν ἀ νοεῖ. εἰ γὰρ ἡ μὲν οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἄλλη, ἀ δὲ νοεῖ ἔτερα αὐτοῦ, αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ ἀνόητος ἐσται· καὶ δυνάμει, οὐκ ἐνεργείᾳ αὖ. οὐ χωριστέον οὖν 10 οὐδέτερον ἀπὸ θατέρου. ἔθος δὲ ἡμῶν ἀπὸ τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν κάκεινα ταῖς ἐπινοίαις χωρίζειν. τί οὖν ἐνεργεῖ καὶ τι νοεῖ, ἵνα ἐκεῖνα αὐτὸν ἀ νοεῖ θώμεθα; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι νοῦς ὁν ὄντως νοεῖ τὰ ὄντα καὶ 15 ὑφίστησιν. ἐστιν ἄρα ὄντα. ἢ γὰρ ἐτέρωθι ὄντα αὐτὰ νοήσει, ἢ ἐν αὐτῷ ὡς αὐτὸν ὄντα. ἐτέρωθι μὲν οὖν ἀδύνατον· ποῦ γάρ; αὐτὸν ἄρα καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ. οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς, ὥσπερ οἶονται. τὸ γὰρ 20 πρῶτον ἔκαστον οὐ τὸ αἰσθητόν· τὸ γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς εἶδος ἐπὶ ὑλῇ εἴδωλον ὄντος, πᾶν τε εἶδος ἐν ἄλλῳ παρ' ἄλλου εἰς ἐκεῖνο ἐρχεται καὶ ἐστιν εἰκὼν ἐκείνου. εἰ δὲ καὶ ποιητὴν δεῖ εἶναι τοῦδε τοῦ

5. But if we are to use the word in its true sense, we must take this intellect to be, not that in potentiality or that which passes from stupidity to intelligence—otherwise we shall have to look for another intellect before it—but that which is actually and always intellect. But if it does not have its thinking from outside, then if it thinks anything it thinks it from itself and if it has anything it has it from itself. But if it thinks from itself and derives the content of its thought from itself, it is itself what it thinks. For if its substance was other [than its thinking] and the things which it thought were other than itself, its substance would itself be unintellectual: and, again, potential, not actual. Therefore one must not be separated from the other. But it is our habit, derived from the things in our world, to separate the things of that higher world in our conceptions of them. What then is its active actuality and its thinking, that we may assume it itself to be what it thinks? It is clear that, being Intellect, it really thinks the real beings and establishes them in existence. It is, then, the real beings. For it will either think them as being somewhere else, or in itself as being itself. Now elsewhere is impossible: for where could it be? It thinks, therefore, itself and in itself. For what it thinks is certainly not in the realm of sense-perception, as they suppose.¹ For each and every primary reality is not what is perceived by the senses: for the form on the matter in the things of sense is an image of the real form, and every form which is in something else comes to it from something else and is a likeness of that from which it comes. But also, if there

¹ The Stoics again: cp. SVF II 88.

παντός, οὐ τὰ ἐν τῷ μήπω ὅντι οὐδος νοήσει, ἵνα
αὐτὸ ποιῆ. πρὸ τοῦ κόσμου ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι ἐκεῖνα,
οὐ τύπους ἀφ' ἔτέρων, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀρχέτυπα καὶ πρῶ-
τα καὶ νοῦ οὐσίαν. εἰ δὲ λόγους φήσουσιν ἀρκεῖν,
ἀιδίους δῆλον· εἰ δὲ αἰδίους καὶ ἀπαθεῖς, ἐν τῷ
25 δεῖ εἶναι καὶ τοιούτῳ καὶ προτέρῳ ἔξεως καὶ φύσ-
εως καὶ ψυχῆς· δυνάμει γάρ ταῦτα. ὁ νοῦς ἄρα τὰ
ὅντα ὅντως, οὐχ οἴα ἐστιν ἄλλοθι νοῶν· οὐ γάρ
ἐστιν οὕτε πρὸ αὐτοῦ οὕτε μετ' αὐτούν ἀλλὰ οἷον
νομοθέτης πρῶτος, μᾶλλον δὲ νόμος αὐτὸς τοῦ
εἶναι. δρθῶς ἄρα τὸ γάρ αὐτὸν νοεῖν ἐστί τε
30 καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἡ τῶν ἄνευ ὑλῆς ἐπιστήμη ταῦτὸν τῷ πράγματι καὶ τὸ ἐμαυτὸν ἐδιῃ-
σάμην ὡς ἐν τῶν ὅντων καὶ αἱ ἀναμνήσεις δέ·
οὐδὲν γάρ ἔξω τῶν ὅντων οὐδὲ ἐν τόπῳ, μένει δὲ
ἀεὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς μεταβολὴν οὐδὲ φθορὰν δεχόμενα· διὸ
35 καὶ ὅντας ὅντα. ἡ γιγνόμενα καὶ ἀπολλύμενα
ἐπακτῷ χρήσεται τῷ ὅντι, καὶ οὐκέτ' ἐκεῖνα
ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ τὸ δύν ἔσται. τὰ μὲν δὴ αἰσθητὰ
μεθέξει ἐστὶν ἀ λέγεται τῆς ὑποκειμένης φύσεως
μορφὴν ἰσχούσης ἄλλοθεν· οἷον χαλκὸς παρὰ

¹ Cp. Plato *Timaeus* 28C3–4 (the famous and much used text about the difficulty of finding “the maker and father of this All”).

² Again a Platonic criticism of Stoic doctrine: ep. *SVF* II 1013 p. 302, 36–7 Arni.

³ The name “lawgiver” for Intellect may be taken from Numenius: ep. fr. 13 Des Places (22 Leemans), where it is used of his Second God or Demiurge, whom Numenius by the use of this name may be consciously trying to identify with the God of the Jews.

⁴ An excellent example of how Plotinus collects texts from

must be a “maker of this All”,¹ he will not think what is in the not yet existent universe in order to make it. The objects of his thought must exist before the universe, not impressions from other things but archetypes and primary and the substance of Intellect. But if they are going to say that rational forming principles are enough, they must clearly be eternal; but if they are eternal and not subject to affections, they must be in Intellect, and in an intellect of this kind, one which is prior to condition and nature and soul: for these are potential.² Intellect therefore really thinks the real beings, not as if they were somewhere else: for they are neither before it nor after it; but it is like the primary lawgiver,³ or rather is itself the law of being. So the statements are correct that “thinking and being are the same thing” and “knowledge of immaterial things is the same as its object” and “I searched myself” (as one of the real beings); so also are “recollections”⁴; for no one of the real beings is outside, or in place, but they remain always in themselves and undergo no alteration or destruction: that is why they are truly real. If they come into being and perish, they will have their being from outside themselves, and it will not any more be they, but that being which will be reality. The objects of sense are what they are called by participation, since their underlying nature receives its shape from elsewhere: bronze, for instance, from

earlier philosophers of very varied significance in their original contexts to support his own doctrine: ep. Parmenides fr. B 3 Diels; Aristotle *De Anima* Γ 4, 430a3–4 and 7, 431a1–2; Heraclitus fr. B 101 Diels; and (e.g.) Plato *Phaedo* 72E5–6.

ἀνδριαντοποικῆς καὶ ξύλου παρὰ τεκτονικῆς διὰ 40 εἰδώλου τῆς τέχνης εἰς αὐτὰ ίούσης, τῆς δὲ τέχνης αὐτῆς ἔξω ςῆς ἐν ταῦτοτητι μενούσης καὶ τὸν ἀληθῆ ἀνδριάντα καὶ κλίνην ἔχούσης. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τόδε πᾶν ἴνδαλμάτων μετέχον ἔτερα αὐτῶν δείκνυσι τὰ ὄντα, ἄτρεπτα μὲν ὄντα ἐκεῖνα, αὐτὰ δὲ τρεπόμενα, ἰδρυμένα τε ἐφ’ 45 ἑαυτῶν, οὐ τόπου δεόμενα· οὐ γὰρ μεγέθη· νοερὰν δὲ καὶ αὐτάρκη ἑαυτοῖς ὑπόστασιν ἔχοντα. σωμάτων γὰρ φύσις σώζεσθαι παρ’ ἄλλου θέλει, νοῦς δὲ ἀνέχων θαυμαστῇ φύσει τὰ παρ’ αὐτῶν πίπτοντα, ὅπου ἰδρυθῆ αὐτὸς οὐ ζητεῖ.

6. Νοῦς μὲν δὴ ἔστω τὰ ὄντα, καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ οὐχ ὡς ἐν τόπῳ ἔχων, ἀλλ’ ὡς αὐτὸν ἔχων καὶ ἐν ὧν αὐτοῖς. πάντα δὲ ὄμοι ἐκεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν ἥττον διακεκριμένα. ἐπεὶ καὶ ψυχὴ ὄμοι ἔχουσα δι πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας ἐν ἑαυτῇ οὐδὲν ἔχει συγκεχυμένον, καὶ ἑκάστῃ πράττει τὸ αὐτῆς, ὅταν δέῃ, οὐ συνεφέλουσα τὰς ἄλλας, νόημα δὲ ἕκαστον καθαρὸν ἐνεργεῖ ἐκ τῶν ἔνδον αὐτοῦ νοημάτων κειμένων. οὕτως οὖν καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὁ νοῦς ἔστιν ὄμοιος πάντα καὶ αὐτὸν ὄμοιος, ὅτι ἕκαστον δύναμις ἴδια. 10 ὁ δὲ πᾶς νοῦς περιέχει ὥσπερ γένος εἰδῆ καὶ ὥσπερ

the art of sculpture and wood from the art of carpentry, the art passing into them through an image, but itself remaining in self-identity outside matter and possessing the true statue or bed.¹ This is also true of [natural] bodies; and this All shows by its participation in appearances that the real beings are other than they; the real beings are unchanging, but the appearances change, the real beings are set firm on themselves and need no place: for they are not magnitudes; they have an intelligent existence sufficient to themselves. For the nature of bodies wants to be preserved by something else, but Intellect upholds by its wonderful nature the things which fall down by themselves, and does not look for a place to be set in.

6. Let it be granted, then, that Intellect is the real beings, possessing them all not as if [they were in it] as in a place, but as possessing itself and being one with them. “All things are together”² there, and none the less they are separate. For even soul has many kinds of knowledge in it but does not contain any confusion, and each kind of knowledge does its own work³ when the need arises without dragging in the others along with it, and each individual thought is clear of the other thoughts which remain within the mind when it comes into activity. In this way, and much more than this, Intellect is all things together and also not together, because each is a special power. But the whole Intellect

¹ An interesting combination of Aristotle, Plato, and Plotinus's own views on art. Examples of craftsmen, especially sculptors, are frequently used by Aristotle when discussing causation: cp. e.g. *Physics* B 1-3. The “true bed” (the Form of bed) comes from *Plato Republic* X 597C3. But

it is only in Plotinus that the art of the human artist possesses the true Forms: cp. V. 8. 1, n. 1 (p. 241).

² The phrase is taken from Anaxagoras fr. B 1 Diels.

³ τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν is Plato's concise definition of justice (in city and soul): cp. *Republic* IV 433A-B.

ὅλον μέρη, καὶ αἱ τῶν σπέρματων δὲ δυνάμεις εἰκόνα φέρουσι τοῦ λεγομένου ἐν γάρ τῷ ὅλῳ ἀδιάκριτα πάντα, καὶ οἱ λόγοι ὥσπερ ἐν ἑνὶ κέντρῳ· καὶ ὡς¹ ἔστιν ἄλλος ὄφθαλμον, ἄλλος δὲ χειρῶν λόγος τὸ ἔτερος εἶναι παρὰ τοῦ γενομένου ὑπὸ 15 αὐτοῦ αἰσθητοῦ γνωσθείς. αἱ μὲν οὖν ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι δυνάμεις ἔκαστη αὐτῶν λόγος εἰς ὅλος μετὰ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐμπειριχομένων μερῶν τὸ μὲν σωματικὸν ὑλην ἔχει, οἷον ὅσον ὑγρόν, αὐτὸς δὲ εἰδός ἔστι τὸ ὅλον καὶ λόγος ὁ αὐτὸς ὃν ψυχῆς εἴδει τῷ γεννῶντι, ἦ τοις ἕνδαλμα ψυχῆς ἄλλης 20 κρείττονος. φύσιν δέ τινες αὐτὴν ὄνομάζουσιν τὴν ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασιν, ἢ ἐκεῖθεν ὄρμηθείσα ἀπὸ τῶν πρὸ αὐτῆς, ὥσπερ ἐκ πυρὸς φῶς, ἤστραφέ τε καὶ ἐμόρφωσε τὴν ὑλην οὐκ ὀθοῦσα οὐδὲ ταῖς πολυθρυλλήτοις μοχλείαις χρωμένη, δοῦσα δὲ τῶν λόγων.

7. Αἱ δὲ ἐπιστῆμαι ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ οὖσαι αἱ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν—εἰ δεῖ ἐπιστῆμας τούτων λέγειν, πρέπει δὲ αὐτὰς τὸ τῆς δόξης ὄνομα—ὕστεραι τῶν πραγμάτων οὖσαι εἰκόνες εἰσὶ τούτων· τῶν δὲ 5 νοητῶν, αἱ δὴ καὶ ὄντως ἐπιστῆμαι, παρὰ νοῦ εἰς λογικὴν ψυχὴν ἐλθοῦσαι αἰσθητὸν μὲν οὐδὲν νοοῦσι· καθόσον δέ εἰσιν ἐπιστῆμαι, εἰσὶν αὐτὰ ἔκαστα ἂ

¹ καὶ ὡς (*nihilominus*) conieimus: καὶ ὥσπερ Enn.: καὶ Kirchhoff*.

¹ An allusion to the Stoic doctrine from which Plotinus develops his own view of nature, the lowest immanent form of soul, fully expounded in the first chapters of III. 8; cp. *SVF* II 743.

encompasses them as a genus does its species and a whole its parts. The powers of seeds give a likeness of what we are talking about: for all the parts are undistinguished in the whole, and their rational forming principles are as if in one central point; and all the same there is one principle of the eye and another of the hand, known from the sense-object which is produced by it to be distinct. As for the powers in the seeds, then, each of them is one whole formative principle with the parts included in it; it has the corporeal as its matter, for instance all which is moist in the seed, but is itself form as a whole and a formative principle which is the same as the form of soul which produced it, which is the likeness of another better soul. Some people call the soul in the seed "nature",¹ which starts from above, from the principles before it, like light from fire, and flashes out and shapes the matter, not pushing it or using all that levering they keep on talking about,² but giving it a share in its forming principles.

7. But as for the kinds of knowledge which exist in a rational soul, those which are of sense-objects—if one ought to speak of "kinds of knowledge" of these; "opinion" is really the suitable name for them—are posterior to their objects and likenesses of them; but those which are of intelligible objects, which are certainly the genuine kinds of knowledge, come from Intellect to rational soul and do not think any sense-object; but in so far as they are kinds of knowledge, they are each and all of the active objects

² This seems to be an allusion to stock and often repeated Epicurean objections to the divine creation of the physical universe, for an example of which see Cicero *De Natura Deorum* I 8, 19, which may be paraphrased "Where did God get his construction machinery and labour force from?"

νοοῦσι, καὶ ἔνδοθεν τό τε νοητὸν τὴν τε νόησιν
ἔχουσιν, ὅτι ὁ νοῦς ἔνδον—ὅ ἐστιν αὐτὰ τὰ πρῶτα—
συνὼν αὐτῷ ἀεὶ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὑπάρχων καὶ οὐκ
10 ἐπιβάλλων ὡς οὐκ ἔχων ἢ ἐπικτώμενος ἢ διεξοδεύ-
ων οὐ προκεχειρισμένα—ψυχῆς γάρ ταῦτα πάθη—
ἀλλ’ ἔστηκεν ἐν αὐτῷ δύον πάντα ἄν, οὐ νοήσας,
ἢ ὑποστήσῃ ἔκαστα. οὐ γάρ, ὅτ’ ἐνόησε θεόν,
θεὸς ἐγένετο, οὐδέ, ὅτε ἐνόησε κίνησιν, κίνησις
ἐγένετο. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ λέγειν νοήσεις. τὰ εἴδη, εἰ
15 οὕτω λέγεται, ὡς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνόησε, τόδε ἐγένετο ἢ
ἔστι τόδε, οὐκ ὅρθως· ταύτης γάρ τῆς νοήσεως
πρότερον δεῖ τὸ νοούμενον εἶναι. ἢ πῶς ἂν ἔλθοι
ἐπὶ τὸ νοεῦν αὐτό; οὐ γάρ δὴ κατὰ συντυχίαν
οὐδὲ ἐπέβαλεν εἰκῇ.

8. Εἰ οὖν ἡ νόησις ἐνόντος, ἐκεῦνο τὸ εἶδος τὸ
ἐνόν· καὶ ἡ ἴδεα αὐτῇ. τί οὖν τοῦτο; νοῦς καὶ ἡ
νοερὰ οὐσία, οὐχ ἔτέρα τοῦ νοῦ ἐκάστη ἴδεα, ἀλλ’
ἐκάστη νοῦς. καὶ ὅλος μὲν ὁ νοῦς τὰ πάντα εἴδη,
5 ἔκαστον δὲ εἶδος νοῦς ἔκαστος, ὡς ἡ ὅλη ἐπιστήμη
τὰ πάντα θεωρήματα, ἔκαστον δὲ μέρος τῆς ὅλης
οὐχ ὡς διακεκριμένον τόπῳ, ἔχον δὲ δύναμιν ἔκασ-
τον δὲ μέρος τῆς ὅλης τοῦτον.

which they think, and they have from within them the object of thought and the thought, because Intellect is within, which is the actual primary realities, and always keeps company with itself and exists in actuality and does not seek to apprehend its objects as if it did not have them or was trying to obtain them, or was going through them discursively as if they were not ready to hand before any discursive process—these are experiences of soul—but it stands firm in itself, being all things together, and does not think each thing in order to bring it into existence. For it is not true that when it thought a god, a god came into existence or when it thought motion, motion came into existence. It is, then, incorrect to say that the Forms are thoughts if what is meant by this is that when Intellect thought this particular Form came into existence or is this particular Form; for what is thought must be prior to this thinking [of a particular Form]. Otherwise how would it come to thinking it? Certainly not by chance, nor did it happen on it casually.¹

8. If, then, the thought [of Intellect] is of what is within it, that which is within it is its immanent form, and this is the Idea. What then is this? Intellect and the intelligent substance; each individual Idea is not other than Intellect, but each is Intellect. And Intellect as a whole is all the Forms, and each individual Form is an individual intellect, as the whole body of knowledge is all its theorems, but each theorem is a part of the whole, not as being spatially distinct, but as having its particular power

¹ An important early indication of the sense in which Plotinus accepts the common Middle Platonist doctrine that the forms are the “thoughts of God”.

τον ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ. ἔστιν οὖν οὗτος ὁ νοῦς ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ ἔχων ἑαυτὸν ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ κόρος ἀεί. εἰ μὲν οὖν προεπενοέστο ὁ νοῦς πρότερος τοῦ ὄντος, ἔδει 10 τὸν νοῦν λέγειν ἐνεργήσαντα καὶ νοήσαντα ἀποτελέσαι καὶ γενηῆσαι τὰ ὄντα· ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ ὄν τοῦ νοῦ προεπινοεῖν ἀνάγκη, ἐγκεῖσθαι δεῖ τίθεσθαι ἐν τῷ νοοῦντι τὰ ὄντα, τὴν δὲ ἐνέργειαν καὶ τὴν νόησιν ἐπὶ τοῖς οὖσιν, οἷον ἐπὶ πῦρ ἥδη τὴν τοῦ πυρὸς 15 ἐνέργειαν, ἵν' ἐν ὄντα τὸν νοῦν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῖς ἔχῃ ἐνέργειαν αὐτῶν. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὄν ἐνέργεια· μία οὖν ἀμφοῦ ἐνέργεια, μᾶλλον δὲ τὰ ἀμφα ἔν. μία μὲν οὖν φύσις τό τε ὄν ὃ τε νοῦς· διὸ καὶ τὰ ὄντα καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὄντος ἐνέργεια καὶ ὁ νοῦς ὁ τοιοῦτος· καὶ αἱ οὖτα νοήσεις τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφὴ τοῦ ὄντος καὶ 20 ἡ ἐνέργεια. ἐπινοεῖται γε μὴν μεριζομένων ὥφ' ἡμῶν θάτερα πρὸ τῶν ἑτέρων. ἔτερος γάρ ὁ μερίζων νοῦς, ὁ δὲ ἀμέριστος καὶ μὴ μερίζων τὸ ὄν καὶ τὰ πάντα.

9. Τίνα οὖν ἔστι τὰ ἐν ἐνὶ τῷ, ἀ νοοῦντες μερίζομεν ἡμεῖς; δεῖ γάρ αὐτὰ ἡρεμοῦντα προφέρειν, οἷον ἐξ ἐπιστήμης ἐν ἐνὶ οὕσης ἐπιθεωρεῖν τὰ ἐνόντα. κόσμου δὴ τοῦδε ὄντος ζώου περιεκτικοῦ 5 ζώων ἀπάντων καὶ παρ' ἄλλου ἔχοντος τὸ εἶναι καὶ τοιῷδε εἶναι, παρ' οὐ δέ ἔστιν εἰς νοῦν ἀναγομένου,

in the whole. This Intellect therefore is in itself, and since it possesses itself in peace is everlasting fullness.¹ If then Intellect was thought of as preceding being, we should have to say that Intellect by coming to active actuality in its thinking perfected and produced the real beings; but since we must think of being as preceding Intellect, we must assume that the real beings have their place in the thinking subject, and that the active actuality of thinking is in the real beings, as the active actuality of fire is in fire already existing, in order that they may have Intellect in its unity in them as their active actuality. But being is active actuality: so both have one active actuality, or rather both are one thing. Being and Intellect are therefore one nature; so therefore are the real beings and the active actuality of being and Intellect of this kind; and the thoughts of this kind are the form and shape of being and its active actuality. But they are thought of by us as one before the other because they are divided by our thinking. For the dividing intellect is a different one, but the undivided Intellect which does not divide is being and all things.

9. What then are the things in the one Intellect which we divide in our thinking? For they are in repose, but we must bring them forward, as one examines in order the contents of a unified body of knowledge. Since this universe is certainly a living being containing all living beings and deriving its being and its being as it is from another, and the origin of that from which it derives is traced back to

¹ For the curious mythological etymology implied here and the Platonic reminiscence which lies behind it see V. I. 4, n. 1 (p. 23).

ἀναγκαῖον καὶ ἐν νῷ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον πᾶν εἶναι, καὶ κόσμον νοητὸν τοῦτον τὸν νοῦν εἶναι, ὃν φησιν ὁ Πλάτων “ἐν τῷ ὅ ἐστι ζῶον.” ὡς γὰρ ὄντος λόγου ζῶον τινός, οὐσης δὲ καὶ ὑλῆς τῆς τὸν λόγον 10 τὸν σπερματικὸν δεξαμένης, ἀνάγκη ζῶον γενέσθαι, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ φύσεως νοερᾶς καὶ πανδυνάμου οὖσης καὶ οὐδενὸς διέργοντος, μηδενὸς ὄντος μεταξὺ τούτου καὶ τοῦ δέξασθαι δυναμένου, ἀνάγκη τὸ μὲν κοσμηθῆναι, τὸ δὲ κοσμῆσαι. καὶ τὸ 15 μὲν κοσμηθὲν ἔχει τὸ ἔδος μεμερισμένον, ἀλλαχοῦ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ ἥλιον· τὸ δὲ ἐν ἐνὶ πάντα.

10. “Οσα μὲν οὖν ὡς εἴδη ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐστι, ταῦτα ἐκεῖθεν· ὅσα δὲ μή, οὐ. διὸ τῶν παρὰ φύσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκεῖ οὐδέν, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῶν παρὰ τέχνην ἔστιν ἐν ταῖς τέχναις, οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς σπέρμασι 5 χωλείᾳ. ποδῶν δὲ χωλείᾳ ἡ δὴ ἐν τῇ γενέσει οὐ κρατήσαντος λόγου, ἡ δὲ ἐκ τύχης λύμη τοῦ ἔδους. καὶ ποιότητες δὴ σύμφωνοι καὶ ποσότητες, ἀριθμοί

¹ Cp. Plato *Timaeus* 39E8; there is an allusion above (line 4) to 33B2–3.

² The doctrine of Plotinus in this chapter differs from that of Plato, whose dialogues contain many allusions to Forms of negation, defect and evil (see the full discussion in W. D. Ross *Plato's Theory of Ideas* (Oxford 1951) 167–9, where references are given to the passages where Forms of this kind are mentioned). What Plato meant by asserting their existence, and how they are to be fitted in with other aspects of his Theory of Forms, are questions which have often puzzled ancient and modern commentators. J. N. Findlay makes most interesting philosophical sense of Forms of this kind, and contrasts Plato's doctrine on this point with that of Plotinus, to Plato's

Intellect, its whole archetype must necessarily be in Intellect, and this Intellect must be an intelligible universe, which Plato says exists in “the absolute living being”.¹ For just as, if there exists the rational forming principle of a living creature, and the matter which receives the seminal forming principle, the living creature must necessarily come into being, in the same way also when an intelligent and all-powerful nature exists and nothing hinders it, since there is nothing between it and what is able to receive it, it is necessary that one should be formed into the order and beauty of the universe and the other should form it. And that which is formed into the universe has its form divided, man in one place and the sun in another; but the forming nature has all things in one.

10. All the things, then, which exist as forms in the world of sense come from that intelligible world; those which do not, do not. Therefore none of the things which are contrary to nature are there, just as there are none of the things which are contrary to art in the arts, and there is no lameness in seeds.² (Congenital lameness of the feet occurs when the forming principle does not master [the matter], accidental lameness by damage to the form.) There are certainly [in the intelligible world] qualities which harmonize [with nature] and quantities, and numbers and dimensions and relations, and actions

advantage: *Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines* (London 1974) 41–5 and 374–5. The Middle Platonists generally denied the existence of such Forms (cp. Alcinous [Albinus] *Didaskalikos* IX), and Plotinus is simply following the common opinion of the school (which he very often does not).

τε καὶ μεγέθη καὶ σχέσεις, ποιήσεις τε καὶ πείσεις
αἱ κατὰ φύσιν, κινήσεις τε καὶ στάσεις καθόλου τε
καὶ ἐν μέρει τῶν ἐκεῖ. ἀντὶ δὲ χρόνου αἰών. ὁ δὲ
10 τόπος ἐκεῖ νοερᾶς τὸ ἄλλο ἐν ἄλλῳ. ἐκεῖ μὲν οὖν
ὅμοι πάντων οὗτων, ὅ τι ἀν λάβης αὐτῶν, οὐσία καὶ
νοερά, καὶ ζωῆς ἔκαστον μετέχον, καὶ ταύτον καὶ
θάτερον, καὶ κίνησις καὶ στάσις, καὶ κινούμενον
καὶ ἔστως, καὶ οὐσία καὶ ποιόν, καὶ πάντα οὐσία.
15 καὶ γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐ δυνάμει τὸ δύν ἔκαστον ὥστε
οὐ κεχώρισται τὸ ποιὸν ἐκάστης οὐσίας. ἀρ' οὖν
μόνα τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐκεῖ, ἡ καὶ ἄλλα πλειώ,
ἄλλὰ πρότερον περὶ τῶν κατὰ τέχνην σκεπτέον·
κακοῦ γὰρ οὐδενός· τὸ γὰρ κακὸν ἐνταῦθα ἐξ
ἐνδείας καὶ στερήσεως καὶ ἐλλεύφεως, καὶ ὑλῆς
20 ἀτυχούσης πάθος καὶ τοῦ ὑλῆ ὠμοιωμένου.

11. Τὰ οὖν κατὰ τέχνην καὶ αἱ τέχναι; τῶν δὴ
τεχνῶν ὅσαι μιμητικά, γραφικὴ μὲν καὶ ἀνδριαντο-
πούλα, ὅρχησίς τε καὶ χειρονομία, ἐνταῦθά που
τὴν σύστασιν λαβοῦσαι καὶ αἰσθητῷ προσχράμεναι
5 παραδείγματι καὶ μιμούμεναι εἴδη τε καὶ κινήσεις
τάς τε συμμετρίας ἀς ὄρωσι μετατιθεῖσαι οὐκ
ἀν εἰκότως ἐκεῖ ἀνάγοιντο, εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀνθρώπου λόγῳ.
εἰ δέ τις ἔξις ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ζῷα συμμετρίας ὅλως¹

¹ Harder: ὅλων wBUCz: ὅρων R: ὅρων J.

and experiences which are according to nature, and both universal motion and rest and the motion and rest of parts of the intelligible. But there is eternity instead of time. And place there exists in the intellectual mode, the presence of one thing in another. There, then, since all things are together, whichever you take of them is substance and intelligent, and each shares in life, and is same and other, and motion and rest, and in motion and at rest, and substance and quality, and all of them are substance. For each real being is actual, not potential: so that the quality of each substance is not separated from it.¹ Are there, then, in the intelligible world only the things which are in the sense-world or are there others over and above them? But we must first enquire about works of art: for there is no Form of Evil; since evil here is the result of want and deprivation and failure and is a misfortune of matter and of that which becomes like matter.

11. Are the works of art and the arts there, then? As for all the imitative arts, painting and sculpture, dancing and mime, which are in some way composed of elements from this world and use a model perceived by sense and imitate the forms and movements and transpose into their own terms the proportions which they see, it would not be reasonable to trace them back to the intelligible world except as included in the forming principle of man. But if any artistic skill starts from the proportions of [individual] living

¹ On substance and quality in the intelligible world see the much fuller discussion in the treatise *On Substance, or on Quality* (II. 6); cf. also VI. 2. 14 and the very thorough investigation of the whole subject in Klaus Wurm *Substanz und Qualität* (Berlin-New York 1973).

ζώων ἐπισκοποῦτο, μόριον ἀν εἴη δυνάμεως τῆς κάκει ἐπισκοπούσης καὶ θεωρούσης τὴν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ 10 περὶ πάντα συμμετρίαν. καὶ μὴν καὶ μουσικὴ πᾶσα [περὶ ἄρμονίαν ἔχουσα καὶ ρύθμὸν ἡ μὲν]¹ περὶ ρύθμὸν καὶ ἄρμονίαν ἔχουσα τὰ νοήματα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀν εἴη, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ περὶ τὸν νοητὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχουσα. ὅσαι δὲ ποιητικαὶ αἰσθητῶν τῶν κατὰ τέχνην, οἷον οἰκοδομικὴ καὶ τεκτονική, 15 καβόσον συμμετρίας προσχρῶνται, ἀρχὰς ἀν ἐκεῖθεν ἔχοιεν καὶ τῶν ἐκεῖ φρονήσεων· τῷ δὲ αἰσθητῷ ταῦτα συγκερασάμεναι τὸ ὄλον οὐκ ἀν εἰεν ἐκεῖ ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ γεωργία συλλαμβάνουσα αἰσθητῷ φυτῷ, ἴατρική τε τὴν ἐνταῦθα ὑγίειαν θεωροῦσα ἡ τε περὶ ἰσχὺν τήνδε 20 καὶ εὐεξίαν· ἄλλη γὰρ ἐκεῖ δύναμις καὶ ὑγίεια, καθ' ἣν ἀτρεμῇ πάντα καὶ ἵκανά, ὅσα ζῷα. ρῆτορεία δὲ καὶ στρατηγία, οἰκονομία τε καὶ βασιλική, εἴ τινες αὐτῶν τὸ καλὸν κοινωνοῦσι ταῖς πράξεσιν, εἰ ἐκεῖνο θεωροῦεν, μοῖραν ἐκεῖθεν εἰς ἐπιστήμην

¹ delevimus: ἡ μὲν legendum, nam exorditum variam locutionem: ἡ μὲν Kirchhoff (*quatenus Ficinus*).

¹ On art in the intelligible world and the access of the artist's mind to the Forms cp. V. 8. 1. There is no reason to suppose that Plotinus intends to abandon there the distinction which he makes here between art which is simply unintelligent copying of sense-objects and the truly intellectual visual art and music which has its origin in the intelligible world.

² Forms of artefacts are mentioned several times in the Dialogues, but the question whether Plato really believed in their existence (or changed his mind about them) has been

things and goes on from there to consider the proportions of living things in general, it would be a part of the power which also in the higher world considers and contemplates universal proportion in the intelligible. And certainly all music, since the ideas which it has are concerned with rhythm and melody, would be of the same kind, just like the art which is concerned with intelligible number.¹ And as for the arts which produce artificial sense-objects, for instance building and carpentry, in so far as they make use of proportions, they would have their principles from the intelligible world and the practical thinking there; but since they mix these up with what is perceived by the senses they would not be altogether in the intelligible world, except in the [Form of] man.² There would certainly not be farming there which helps the plants of the sense-world to grow, or medicine which has as its object of contemplation health here below, or the art which is concerned with strength and good bodily condition; for power in the intelligible world is different, and so is the health by which all living things there are undisturbed and adequate. And rhetoric and generalship, and the arts of administration and kingship, if any of them communicate excellence in the field of action, supposing that they contemplate that intelligible excellence, they have some part for their knowledge derived from the

vigorously discussed since Aristotle: see the good summary of the discussion (with full references) in Ross *Plato's Theory of Ideas* 171–5 (cp. ch. 10, n. 2, p. 309). Most Middle Platonists rejected them: see the passage from Alcinous [Albinus] cited in ch. 10, n. 1. Plotinus is here again following school tradition in this rather summary early treatise.

25 ἔχουσιν ἐκ τῆς ἐπιστήμης τῆς ἑκεῖ. γεωμετρία δὲ νοητῶν οὖσα τακτέα ἑκεῖ, σοφία τε ἀνωτάτω περὶ τὸ ὃν οὖσα. καὶ περὶ μὲν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν κατὰ τέχνας ταῦτα.

12. Εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώπου ἑκεῖ καὶ λογικοῦ ἑκεῖ καὶ τεχνικοῦ καὶ αἱ τέχναι νοῦ γεννήματα οὖσαι, χρὴ δὲ καὶ τῶν καθόλου λέγειν τὰ εἶδη εἶναι, οὐ Σωκράτους, ἀλλ’ ἀνθρώπουν. ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ περὶ ἀνθρώπου, εἰ καὶ δ¹ καθέκαστα· τὸ δὲ καθέκαστον, ὅτι [μὴ]² τὸ αὐτὸ ἄλλο ἄλλω· οἷον ὅτι ὁ μὲν σιμός, ὁ δὲ γρυπός, γρυπότητα μὲν καὶ σιμότητα διαφορὰς ἐν εἴδει θετέον ἀνθρώπουν, ὥσπερ ζώουν διαφοράς εἰσιν· ἥκειν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῆς ὑλῆς τὸ τὸν μὲν τοιάνδε γρυπότητα, τὸν δὲ τοιάνδε. καὶ χρωμάτων 10 διαφορὰς τὰς μὲν ἐν λόγῳ οὖσας, τὰς δὲ καὶ ὑλην καὶ τόπον διάφρον ὄντα ποιεῖν.

¹ Blumenthal: ὁ Enn.*

² del. Müller.

¹ With the older punctuation of Perna and Creuzer, to which Henry-Schwyzer have now returned, the sense of this passage and its relevance to its context is clear, as Igal has pointed out (he has kindly communicated his conclusions to Schwyzer and me by letter, and published them in Spanish in *Emerita* XLI, 1973, 92–8). The subject of discussion is still intellectual and artistic man and his arts and sciences: Plotinus is pointing out that if they are there the universal Forms which intellectual and artistic man thinks about must necessarily be there also, but no necessary conclusion follows about individual Forms. We cannot assert their existence because the intellectual arts and sciences exist in the intelligible world.

knowledge there. And since geometry is concerned with intelligibles, it must be placed there, and wisdom, which is on the highest level and concerned with being. This is enough about the arts and their works.

12. But if the Form of man is there, and of rational and artistic man, and the arts which are products of Intellect, then one must say that the Forms of universals are there, not of Socrates but of man.¹ But we must enquire about man whether the form of the individual is there; there is individuality, because the same [individual feature] is different in different people: for instance, because one man has a snub nose and the other an aquiline nose, one must assume aquilinity and snubness to be specific differences in the form of man, just as there are different species of animal; but one must also assume that the fact that one man has one kind of aquiline nose and one another comes from their matter. And some differences of colour are contained in the formative principle but others are produced by matter and by different places of abode.

ble, but the question of their existence is left open. Plotinus is free to assert the existence of individual Forms on different grounds, as he did later in V. 7 (18), without any inconsistency with the present passage. It should be noted that in what immediately follows Plotinus is not considering men's souls, selves or personalities but the bodily differences between individuals, exemplified as usual by Socrates's snub nose. But in the next chapter he reminds us that, whether there are Forms of individual selves in the intelligible world (a question he does not raise here) or not, our souls have a permanent footing in the intelligible world. On the whole subject of Forms of individuals in Plotinus see my article "Form, Individual and Person in Plotinus" (*Dionysius* 1, 1977, 49–68) and the references to other literature there given.

13. Λοιπὸν δὲ εἰπεῖν, εὶ μόνα τὰ ἐν αἰσθητῷ ἔκει, ἢ καί, ὡσπερ ἀνθρώπου ὁ αὐτοάνθρωπος¹ ἔτερος, εὶ καὶ ψυχῆς αὐτοψυχὴ ἔκει ἔτέρα καὶ νοῦ αὐτονοῦς. λεκτέον δὲ πρῶτον μέν, ὅτι οὐ πάντα δεῖ, ὅσα ἐνταῦθα, εἴδωλα νομίζειν ἀρχετύπων, οὐδὲ ψυχὴν εἴδωλον εἶναι αὐτοψυχῆς, τιμότητι δὲ ἄλλην ἄλλης διαφέρειν, καὶ εἶναι καὶ ἐνταῦθα, ἵσως δὲ οὐχ ὡς ἐνταῦθα, αὐτοψυχήν. εἶναι δὲ ψυχῆς ὄντως οὖσης ἑκάστης καὶ δικαιοσύνην δεῖ τινα καὶ σωφροσύνην, καὶ ἐν ταῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν 10 ψυχᾶις ἐπιστήμην ἀληθινήν, οὐκ εἴδωλα οὐδὲ εἰκόνας ἐκείνων ὡς ἐν αἰσθητῷ, ἄλλὰ ταῦτα ἐκείνα ἄλλον τρόπον ὄντα ἐνταῦθα· οὐ γάρ ἐν τινι τόπῳ ἀφωρισμένα ἐκένα· ὕστε, ὅπου ψυχὴ σώματος ἔξανέδυ, ἐκεῖ κάκενα. ὁ μὲν γάρ αἰσθητὸς κόσμος μοναχοῦ, ὁ δὲ νοητὸς πανταχοῦ. 15 ὅσα μὲν οὖν ψυχὴ ἔχει² ἡ τοιαύτη ἐνταῦθα, ταῦτα ἐκεῖ· ὕστε, εὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τὰ ἐν τοῖς ὄρωμένοις λαμβάνοιτο, οὐ μόνον τὰ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ ἐκεῖ, ἄλλα καὶ πλείω· εὶ δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ λέγοιτο συμπεριλαμβανομένων καὶ ψυχῆς καὶ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ, πάντα ἐνταῦθα, ὅσα κάκενα.

14. Τὴν οὖν τὰ πάντα περιλαβοῦσαν ἐν τῷ νοητῷ φύσιν ταύτην ἀρχὴν θετέον. καὶ πῶς, τῆς μὲν ἀρχῆς τῆς ὄντως ἐνὸς καὶ ἀπλοῦ πάντη οὖσης, πλήθους δὲ ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ὄντος; πῶς παρὰ τὸ ἐν,

¹ R^{2^{mg}}, Kirchhoff*: αὐτὸς ἀνθρωπος Enn.

² R^{2^s} (habet Ficinus): ἐκεῖ A^{1^s} (nunc erasmus) EBxUCz: om. A.

13. It remains to say whether only the Forms of things in the sense-world exist in the intelligible, or if also, just as there is an Absolute Man different from man, there is an Absolute Soul different from soul and an Absolute Intellect different from intellect. It must be said first that not all things which are here below ought to be considered as images of archetypes, and soul should not be considered as an image of Absolute Soul, but one soul differs from another in honour, and there is Absolute Soul here below, though perhaps not as if here below. And there must belong to an individual soul that is really a soul some kind of righteousness and moral integrity, and there must be true knowledge in the souls which are in us, and these are not images or likenesses of their Forms as things are in the sense-world, but those very Forms themselves existing here in a different mode: for they are not separated off in a particular place; so that when the soul emerges from the body, those virtues too are in the higher world. For the sense-world is in one place, but the intelligible world is everywhere. Everything then which a soul of this kind has here below is there in the intelligible world; so that if one takes "things in the sense-world" to mean "things in the visible realm", there are not only the things in the sense-world there, but more; but if one means "things in the universe", including soul and the things in soul, all the things are here below which are in the intelligible world.

14. This nature, therefore, which includes all things in the intelligible is to be taken as the principle. But how is this possible, when the real principle is one and altogether simple, but there is

δ καὶ πῶς πλῆθος, καὶ πῶς τὰ πάντα ταῦτα, καὶ διὰ τί νοῦς ταῦτα καὶ πόθεν, λεκτέον ἀπ' ἄλλης ἀρχῆς ἀρχομένους.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐκ σήψεως καὶ τῶν χαλεπῶν, εἰ κακεῖ εἶδος, καὶ εἰ ῥύπου καὶ πηλοῦ, λεκτέον, ὡς, ὅσα κομίζεται νοῦς ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου, πάντα ἀριστα· 10 ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν οὐ ταῦτα· οὐδὲ ἐκ τούτων νοῦς, ἀλλὰ ψυχὴ παρὰ νοῦν, λαβοῦσα παρὰ ὑλῆς ἄλλα, ἐν οἷς ταῦτα.

Περὶ δὲ τούτων σαφέστερον λεχθῆσεται ἐπανελθοῦσιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπορίαν, πῶς ἐξ ἐνὸς πλῆθος.

"Οτι δὲ τὰ σύνθετα εἰκῇ ὄντα, οὐ νῷ, ἀλλ’ ἐφ' 15 ἑαυτῶν αἰσθητὰ συνελθόντα, οὐκ ἐν εἴδεσι· τά τε ἐκ σήψεως ψυχῆς ἄλλο τι ἵστως ἀδυνατούσης· εἰ δὲ μῆ, ἐποίησεν ἄν τι τῶν φύσει· ποιεῖ γοῦν, ὅπου δύναται.

Περὶ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν, ὅτι ἐν αὐτοανθρώπῳ περιέχονται, ὅσαι τέχναι ἀναφέρονται πρὸς τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀνθρώπῳ.

20 Πρότερον δὲ ἄλλην καθόλου, καὶ τῆς καθόλου αὐτοψυχὴν ἦτοι τὴν ζωήν; ἢ ἐν νῷ πρὸν γενέσθαι ψυχήν, ἵνα καὶ γένηται, αὐτοψυχὴν ἐκείνην λέγειν.

¹ The references forward here and at lines 12-13 may well be to V. 4 (7)—not that Plotinus thought that what he said in this little treatise by any means exhausted the subject, which he deals with again and again in later treatises.

² Here again Plotinus is following Middle Platonist school tradition, probably against Plato's real thought: ep. ch. 10, n. (p. 309) and ch. 11, n. 2. The much fuller and profounder discussion of Forms of animals in the intelligible world in VI. 7-10 should be contrasted with the casual dismissal of "savage beasts" from that world here.

multiplicity on the level of the real beings? We must begin from another starting point our explanation of how there is anything besides the One, and how it is a multiplicity, and how it is all these [intelligible] beings, and why Intellect is all these beings and where it comes from.¹

But about the creatures which originate from putrefaction and savage beasts, whether there is a Form of them in the intelligible, and if there is one of dirt and mud, we must say that all things which Intellect gets from the First are the best; and among these Forms there are not the things we have just mentioned²; nor does Intellect take them from these Forms, but Soul which derives from Intellect, which takes other things, including these, from matter.

We shall speak more clearly about these questions when we return to the problem of how multiplicity comes from one.

But we must say that casual composites, which are not produced by Intellect but are things of sense coming together by themselves, are not among the Forms; and the products of putrefaction occur, perhaps, because the soul was unable to produce anything else; if it had been it would have produced something natural; it does so, at any rate, wherever it can.

About the arts we must say that all the arts are included in the Absolute Man whose subject-matter is in accordance with human nature.

But is there, before the individual soul, another universal soul, and before the universal soul the Absolute Soul or Life? [We must] say that Absolute Soul must be in Intellect before Soul comes to be in order that it may come to be.