Informatics 1 – Introduction to Computation Computation and Logic Julian Bradfield based on materials by Michael P. Fourman

More Syllogisms and more about syllogisms

From the fundamental rule barbara

$$\frac{a \vDash b \quad b \vDash c}{a \vDash c}$$

together with *contraposition* and *double negation*, we got five sound syllogisms about *universal categorical statements*.

Contraposition is negating and swapping the two parts of a sequent:

$$a \vDash b \longrightarrow \neg b \vDash \neg a$$

Barbara is the feminine form of the Greek βάρβαρος (barbaros) 'foreign'. Taken into Latin, it was used as the name of a mythical early Christian martyr, daughter of a pagan (barbarian).

Contraposition is a powerful general reasoning technique. We can use it not only inside sequents, but on rules. For example:

In England you can buy alcohol at any time. In some countries you can't buy it (legally) at all.

In Scotland Time between 10h and 22h

Can legally buy alcohol

In England you can buy alcohol at any time. In some countries you can't buy it (legally) at all.

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What other rules can we infer from this?

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What other rules can we infer from this?

In Scotland Cannot legally buy alcohol
Time between 22h and 10h

Time between 10h and 22h Can**not** legally buy alcohol

Not in Scotland

In England you can buy alcohol at any time. In some countries you can't buy it (legally) at all.

Sequents are themselves propositions. Applying the same principle, from

$$\frac{a \vDash b \quad b \vDash c}{a \vDash c}$$

we get

$$\frac{a \vDash b \quad a \nvDash c}{b \nvDash c} \qquad \frac{b \vDash c \quad a \nvDash c}{a \nvDash b}$$

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
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$$\frac{a \vDash b \quad a \nvDash c}{b \nvDash c} \qquad \frac{b \vDash c \quad a \nvDash c}{a \nvDash b}$$

$$b \models c \quad a \nvDash c$$
 $a \nvDash b$

every a is b

some a is not c





 $a \not\vdash c$

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$$a \models b$$




Why does contraposition work between the conclusion and one premise at a time?


What is the relation between the two premises?

Can we combine them into one? What happens with contraposition then?

What is the difference between $a \models b$ and $a \rightarrow b$?

These two syllogisms are bocardo and baroco.







Why not exactly?

Aristotle made the existential assumption: if you say 'all a are b', or 'no a is b', that means that some a exists. So for him, universal affirmative implies particular affirmative, and universal negative implies particular negative.

$$\frac{c \vDash \neg b \quad a \nvDash \neg c}{a \nvDash b}$$

No mathematician is infallible Some programmers are mathematicians :. Some programmers are fallible






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
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
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


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
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
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All plants are fungi Some flowers are not plants ∴ Some flowers are not fungi




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Suppose a *quonce* is a fungus flower, but not a plant, and nothing else exists. This disproves the syllogism.

$$a \vDash b$$
 $c \nvDash a$

All plants are fungi
Some flowers are not plants
∴ Some flowers are not fungi
In the usual meanings, no plant is
a fungus, and all flowers are
plants. That doesn't matter: the
argument doesn't depend on the
truth or falsity of the premises in a
particular universe.

We have used the following to derive sound rules from barbara:

- ightharpoonup substitution (e.g. q for a, $\neg b$ for b)
- ▶ double negation cancellation $(\neg \neg a \longrightarrow a)$
- ▶ contraposition within sequents $(a \models b \longrightarrow \neg b \models \neg a)$
- contraposition between conclusion and a premise

$$\frac{a \vDash b \quad b \vDash c}{a \vDash c} \longrightarrow \frac{a \vDash b \quad a \nvDash c}{b \nvDash c}$$

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Because these processes are symmetrical, they also derive unsound rules from unsound rules.

You can derive all these. Mediaeval students learned them, with the help of this verse:

Barbara celarent darii ferio baralipton Celantes dabitis fapesmo frisesomorum Cesare camestres festino baroco Darapti felapton disamis datisi bocardo ferison

Reprise 10.1/11

What have we done so far?

predicates talk about things in a universe

Reprise 10.2/11

- predicates talk about things in a universe
- categorical propositions relate two predicates, universally or particularly, affirmatively or negatively

Reprise 10.3/11

- predicates talk about things in a universe
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- ▶ they can be concisely written as sequents $a \models b$ or $a \nvDash b$

Reprise 10.4/11

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- they can be interpreted in Venn diagrams.

Reprise 10.5/11

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- A *syllogism* takes two *premise* categorical propositions and derives a *conclusion* categorical proposition.

Reprise 10.6/11

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Reprise 10.7/11

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- A *syllogism* takes two *premise* categorical propositions and derives a *conclusion* categorical proposition.
- ▶ We can check syllogisms for *soundness* with Venn diagrams.
- ▶ All sound syllogisms come from *barbara* via contraposition etc.

As we've mentioned, Aristotle did not approve of talking about non-existent things. For him, 'all/no a are b' also implies the existence of an a.

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$$\frac{r \vDash \neg f \quad s \vDash f}{s \nvDash f}$$

No reptiles have fur All snakes are reptiles ∴ Some snakes have no fur As we've mentioned, Aristotle did not approve of talking about non-existent things. For him, 'all/no a are b' also implies the existence of an a.

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Why does this work?

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Why does this work?

It's all much murkier than this. This existential assumption contradicts other aspects of Aristotle's system. In short, he was most likely confused.

D. W. Mulder, The existential assumptions of traditional logic, *Hist. & Phil. Logic*, 17:1-2, 141–154