

## **Project 1: Privacy, Ethics, and Law Enforcement Access to Smart Phones**

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## Introduction

This project aims to analyze the case of the State of Oregon v. Pittman as well as the underlying legal questions concerning individual privacy rights in the digital age brought up by the case (DeMarco, 2021; UMGC, 2022). Specifically, the question of whether an individual can be legally required to unlock a smartphone is the central topic of dispute in the State of Oregon v. Pittman (DeMarco, 2021; UMGC, 2022). Furthermore, the process of answering this question requires that two sub-questions dealing with underlying legal and ethical issues of the case be addressed (UMGC, 2022). First, “is there or should there be a *right to privacy* that would protect an individual from being compelled to allow law enforcement access to data stored on a smart phone or similar device” (UMGC, 2022)? Second, “what are the legal and ethical implications of requiring device designers and/or vendor to provide bypass mechanisms to allow law enforcement agencies to access data stored on smart devices” (UMGC, 2022)?

Furthermore, the legal and ethical questions raised by the Oregon v. Pittman case were not unique as similar cases, such as the predating “Apple v. FBI” (Electronic Privacy Information Center, n.d.) grappled with similar issues (Cook, 2016). Moreover, cases in this domain (Oregon v. Pittman, Apple v. FBI, Seo v. State, etc.) illuminate a historic issue, i.e., weighing individual privacy rights against government/communal safety concerns (Cornell Law School, n.d.; Crocker, 2020; Electronic Privacy Information Center, n.d.; Maniam, 2016; Supreme Court, 2021; Vector, 2020). To that point, the legal questions and ethical issues just mentioned will be analyzed in the section labeled ‘analysis’ to follow. The subsequent conclusions will then be summarized in the section labeled ‘conclusion’ at the end of this report.

## Analysis

## **Why is the Stated Issue Important?**

The question “Is existing law sufficient to protect an individual’s rights when law enforcement agencies seek access to data stored on smart phones, tablet computers, and other mobile devices?” (UMGC, 2022) is important because it touches on essential legal and ethical questions revolving around weighing individual privacy rights against governmental/communal safety concerns (Cornell Law School, n.d.; Vector, 2020). Specifically, the case illuminates a gray area of law concerning what the unlocking of a device discloses, and whether that disclosure is constitutionally protected by laws protecting individuals’ rights (DeMarco, 2021).

Furthermore, taking a wider view, if the government could force individuals to unlock their smartphones, then the security of the smartphone (and similar devices) would be degraded, and therefore the privacy of the individual whose device was accessed would be significantly harmed (Hashemi-Pour & Chai, 2023). To that point, once the security of a device is compromised, i.e. an unwanted party has gained access to said information, the assurance of the preservation of the “confidentiality, integrity and availability” (Hashemi-Pour & Chai, 2023) of the information stored on the device will have been greatly diminished (Hashemi-Pour & Chai, 2023).

## **Why are the Research Questions Important?**

The research questions posed are important because individual privacy rights have encountered a new domain due to the advancement of technology and therefore there needs to be greater clarity concerning the privacy rights of individuals within this domain. To that point, the decisions of courts in cases such as *Oregon v. Pittman* (and *Apple v. FBI*, *Seo v. State*, etc.) will have lasting legal and ethical consequences for U.S. citizens as their right to privacy is

challenged by the governments' striving to fulfill its duty to protect its citizens, sometimes by means that overstep the bounds of the Constitution (Cornell Law School, n.d.; Crocker, 2020; Electronic Privacy Information Center, n.d.; Maniam, 2016; Supreme Court, 2021; Vector, 2020).

Furthermore, privacy can only be achieved by preserving the “confidentiality, integrity and availability” (Hashemi-Pour & Chai, 2023) of information stored on a smartphone or similar device. Therefore, if government entities were to gain widespread access to individuals' smartphones (and similar devices) then the CIA of individuals' data could not be assured (Hashemi-Pour & Chai, 2023). Not only would this likely go against the ethical principles on which the framers based to Constitution, but moreover, it would establish a legal precedent that would encourage the government to attempt to gain even more access to individuals' private information such as “recording conversations or location tracking” (Apple, n.d.) (Cornell Law School, n.d.; Valorie J. & J.D., 2022). Lastly, a device cannot be considered secure once a bypass tool has been introduced as it could be exploited by other entities besides the government such as rough actors, hackers, and/or other nations, etc. (Apple, n.d.; Vector, 2020).

**Is there or should there be a *right to privacy* that would protect an individual from being compelled to allow law enforcement access to data stored on a smart phone or similar device?**

To begin, the question of whether there is a legally protected right to privacy afforded to all individuals in the U.S. is important because it is the basis from which a determination can be formed regarding whether a government entity has the legal authority to require an individual to unlock their device, and therefore this question must be addressed. To that point, the ethical argument for a “right to privacy” (Swire & Kennedy-Mayo, 2020) was first put forth by “Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis” (Swire & Kennedy-Mayo, 2020) in 1890, which suggested that

privacy be defined as “the right to be let alone” (Swire & Kennedy-Mayo, 2020). Furthermore, although not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, the concept of individual privacy rights was established as law in “Griswold v. Connecticut” (Cornell Law School, n.d.) where it was determined that the amalgamation of individual rights granted by “the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments” (Cornell Law School, n.d.) constituted an “implied right to privacy in the Constitution” (Cornell Law School, n.d.) (Cornell Law School, n.d.; Swire & Kennedy-Mayo, 2020). Therefore, there is a right to privacy granted by the U.S. Constitution (Cornell Law School, n.d.).

Furthermore, with regards to the State of Oregon v. Pittman, Oregon’s Supreme Court found that Oregon’s Constitution can force an individual to unlock their device so long as a warrant is issued and the state “(2) already knows the information that the act of unlocking the phone would communicate; and (3) is prohibited from using the defendant's act against the defendant, except to obtain access to the contents of the phone” (Supreme Court, 2021). Point ‘3’ is of note as the ruling by the Oregon Supreme Court found that compelling the defendant to reveal their passcode was “testimonial” (DeMarco, 2021) in nature, which was defined as disclosing something “about a person's beliefs, knowledge, or state of mind” (Supreme Court, 2021). Therefore, the Oregon Supreme Court found that it was unconstitutional to force a person to disclose the password as it would essentially be an act of testifying against themselves (self-incrimination), which is protected by both “Article I, section 12 of the Oregon Constitution and the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution” (DeMarco, 2021).

Moreover, since “the logic of the *Pittman* opinion could apply directly to other passcode-locked digital devices, including tablets, personal computers, and external hard drives” (DeMarco, 2021) and because privacy can only be achieved by preserving the “confidentiality,

integrity and availability” (Hashemi-Pour & Chai, 2023) of information stored on a smartphone or similar device; the Oregon Supreme Court ruling preventing law enforcement from forcing an individual to unlock their device helps to strengthen and preserve the CIA of data stored on all devices for all U.S. citizens (Hashemi-Pour & Chai, 2023). Moreover, The Supreme Court of Oregon’s ruling is consistent with rulings in similar cases as “most courts do find that the act of unlocking phones is a testimonial communication” (Uresk, 2021). However, it is important to note that the scope of this ruling was limited to passcodes/passwords, meaning that it is unclear at this time if biometric access features (facial scan, fingerprint) can be compelled by law enforcement (DeMarco, 2021). To that point, there have been rulings both for (Commonwealth v. Baust) and against (United States v. Wright) compelling biometrics from an individual to access their smartphone (Uresk, 2021).

**What are the legal and ethical implications of requiring device designers and/or vendors to provide bypass mechanisms to allow law enforcement agencies to access data stored on smart devices?**

The legal and ethical questions raised in the State of Oregon v. Pittman are of the utmost importance as “A single smartphone can hold more data than all documents ever handwritten” (DeMarco, 2021), and much of that information directly corresponds to its user/owner (Vector, 2020). Therefore, precedents deciding the legality of compelling access to these devices are likely to be among the most consequential judicial rulings in the history of the United States. To that point, the legal implications of requiring bypass mechanisms are that individuals will be constantly creating a trail of evidence anytime they possess/use their smartphone (or similar device) that will later be used against them by the government in their prosecution (Cook, 2016; DeMarco, 2021). In practice, the result of such precedents would lead to an almost total

eradication of the protections afforded to individuals by the 5<sup>th</sup> Amendment (Cornell Law School, n.d.; DeMarco, 2021).

Moreover, the questions raised by *Oregon v. Pittman* are not limited to the realm of legality as there are also critical ethical questions raised by this and other similar cases, such as “*Apple v. FBI*” (Electronic Privacy Information Center, n.d.). To that point, if it becomes law that bypass mechanisms be created by device designers the following ethical dilemma will unfold. Once a backdoor and/or tool is created that could bypass the access security features of a device, the security (confidentiality, integrity, and availability) of that device is irreparably harmed (Cook, 2016; Hashemi-Pour & Chai, 2023). Meaning, that once an exploit is introduced of this magnitude, privacy can no longer be expected when using said device (Cook, 2016; Vector, 2020). Moreover, there will be an unavoidable temptation to use these tools in more and more situations, further eroding individual privacy (Apple, n.d.; Vector, 2020). Lastly, threat actors will constantly be attempting to obtain this tool from wherever it is housed which will further imperil the ability of individuals to preserve their privacy (Apple, n.d.; Vector, 2020). The potential for such a tool falling into the wrong cannot be underestimated as exemplified by the cases of the “WannaCry<sup>3</sup> and Petya<sup>4</sup> attacks, which were developed using the leaked Shadow Brokers exploit, EternalBlue, which is generally believed to have been developed by the US National Security Agency (NSA)” (Cooke, 2017).

Therefore, the introduction of bypass tools of this nature is an all-or-nothing proposition, i.e., either privacy is catered for absolutely by the makers of these devices, or it is not, and the information stored on makers of said devices will be left vulnerable (Apple, n.d.; Vector, 2020). As a result, the primary ethical question that would be raised if the government could require



companies to create bypass tools is, do we want to live in a world where privacy no longer exists (Vector, 2020)?

## **Conclusion**

In conclusion, there is an unprecedented amount of data stored on smartphones (and similar devices) that contains some of the most private information individuals possess (DeMarco, 2021; Vector, 2020). Moreover, individuals' "right to privacy" (Swire & Kennedy-Mayo, 2020) protects them from being forced to provide law enforcement their passcode/password (but maybe not their biometric features) thereby protecting device owners from providing "compelled, testimonial, and inculpatory" (DeMarco, 2021) evidence against themselves, which would violate the 5<sup>th</sup> Amendment (DeMarco, 2021). Furthermore, if it were decided that device creators were legally required to provide law enforcement with bypass mechanisms then the legal implication would be the government's persistent use of individuals' devices as witnesses against their owners, which would effectively end the ability of an individual to maintain their right to privacy (Cornell Law School, n.d.; DeMarco, 2021). Meanwhile, the ethical implications of such a law would be creating a world where privacy no longer exists (Vector, 2020).

Therefore, the precedents set in *Oregon v. Pittman* and similar cases adjudicating law enforcement's ability to force individuals to unlock their devices will effectively determine whether individuals will be able to maintain their constitutionally given "right to privacy" (Swire & Kennedy-Mayo, 2020) in the digital age (Cornell Law School, n.d.; DeMarco, 2021; Vector, 2020).

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