

# Applying Commodity Market Frameworks to Litigation Funding

## Commodity Market Fundamentals

### Spot vs. Futures Pricing

In commodity markets, the **spot price** is the current price for immediate delivery of a physical commodity, whereas a **futures price** is a contractually agreed price for delivery at a future date. These prices are linked by **cost-of-carry arbitrage**: in theory, the futures price should reflect the spot price plus any net cost of carrying the commodity until delivery (financing interest, storage, insurance, minus any convenience yield) <sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup>. If the futures price gets too far out of line with the spot price, traders can arbitrage by buying the cheaper asset and selling the expensive one (e.g. buy physical and short futures, or vice versa) to lock in a risk-free profit. As the delivery date approaches, **futures prices converge to spot prices** – otherwise arbitrage opportunities would exist <sup>3</sup>. This convergence ensures that futures are anchored by the underlying commodity's reality, preventing persistent mispricing over time.

### Contango vs. Backwardation

**Contango** and **backwardation** describe the shape of the commodity forward curve (the prices of futures across maturities). In **contango**, futures prices are *higher* than the current spot price, yielding an upward-sloping forward curve <sup>4</sup>. Contango is common when carrying the commodity is costly or convenient for the market – for example, when there are significant storage, financing, and insurance costs that must be priced into longer-dated contracts <sup>1</sup>. In contrast, **backwardation** occurs when futures prices are *lower* than the spot price (a downward-sloping or inverted curve) <sup>4</sup>. Backwardation often arises in times of scarcity or strong immediate demand, where holding the physical commodity is more valuable than a futures contract. The benefit of owning the actual commodity (to keep a production process running or to respond to an urgent demand) is called the **convenience yield**, an implied return or advantage from holding inventory <sup>5</sup>. A high convenience yield can outweigh cost-of-carry expenses, causing futures to trade at a discount to spot (backwardation) <sup>6</sup>. Notably, convenience yield is **inversely related to inventory levels**: when inventories are abundant, convenience yield is low (and contango tends to prevail); when inventories are low, convenience yield is high (fueling backwardation) <sup>6</sup>. These regimes also affect volatility: when supplies are ample and the market is in contango, spot and futures price volatility tends to be relatively low; but when supplies are tight and backwardation prevails, spot prices (and near-term futures) often show higher volatility than distant futures <sup>7</sup> <sup>8</sup>. In practice, markets can shift between contango and backwardation as expectations and supply/demand conditions change <sup>9</sup>, and many commodities spend prolonged periods in one state or the other.

### Carry Costs and Convenience Yield

The relationship between spot and futures prices is formalized by the **cost-of-carry model**. This model states that in a well-arbitrated market, the futures price = spot price + carry costs – convenience yield <sup>2</sup>.

**Carry costs** include all expenses of holding the commodity over time: notably the interest on capital tied up (financing rate), storage fees (warehousing, refrigeration, etc.), and insurance or spoilage costs. These costs push futures prices *above* spot to compensate holders, which is why contango is often called a “cost-of-carry market” <sup>1</sup>. **Convenience yield**, on the other hand, is the non-monetary return or “yield” gained by having the physical commodity on hand <sup>10</sup>. This could mean the ability to profit from immediate sales if prices spike suddenly or to keep a critical supply chain running. In essence, convenience yield is the premium on immediate availability <sup>10</sup>. When convenience yield is low (no urgent need to hold the commodity), futures prices tend to exceed spot (contango). When convenience yield is high (commodity holders derive significant benefit from having stock now), it can offset or surpass carrying costs and make futures cheaper than spot (backwardation) <sup>11</sup>. For example, in an oil market glut with plenty of storage, one would expect contango with futures reflecting storage and interest costs. Conversely, if a grain is in short supply ahead of a harvest, buyers might pay a premium for immediate delivery (high convenience yield), resulting in backwardation. It’s important to note that convenience yield is *implied* – it’s not directly observable but can be inferred from the difference between actual futures prices and what they would be if only explicit carry costs mattered <sup>12</sup> <sup>2</sup>. Essentially, a high convenience yield explains why inventory holders might carry stocks even when prices are expected to fall, because the benefit of availability outweighs the anticipated price decline (a classic insight from commodity market theory) <sup>13</sup>.

## Storage Theory and Real Option Value

The **Theory of Storage** (originating from Holbrook Working’s work in the 1930s) ties together inventory levels, forward curves, and price volatility <sup>14</sup>. It explains observed patterns: when inventories are high, futures prices reflect full carry costs (contango) and nearby price volatility is subdued; when inventories are low, markets enter backwardation and spot prices become more volatile as the risk of shortage grows <sup>7</sup> <sup>8</sup>. Underlying this is the idea that holding a storable commodity provides **optionality**. Specifically, possessing inventory gives the owner a **real option**: the option to wait and sell or use the commodity when it’s most valuable. Academic research interprets convenience yield as the premium arising from this embedded real option to delay sale or consumption <sup>15</sup>. In other words, a barrel of oil in your tank or a bushel of wheat in your silo isn’t just an idle asset – it carries the option to profit from future scarcity or price spikes. Evans and Guthrie (2014) describe that the “*option to delay selling a stored commodity, which comes bundled with the commodity itself, generates a convenience yield.*” <sup>15</sup>. If one naively valued inventory at the current spot price, they’d be **undervaluing** it by ignoring this timing option. The convenience yield can be viewed as the **expected excess return** from optimally timing the release of inventory, akin to the extrinsic value of an option <sup>15</sup>. Real options analysis is also widely applied in commodity industries for project valuation: for example, an oil field can be seen as a series of options on oil prices (the operator can choose to pump oil now or leave it in the ground to extract later if prices improve). Similarly, a mine might be temporarily shut down during low prices and reopened later – a managerial option with quantifiable value. The **storage theory** and real-option perspective thus provide a richer understanding of commodity pricing beyond static supply and demand – prices reflect both current fundamentals and the value of flexibility under uncertainty. These concepts (contango/backwardation, cost-of-carry, convenience yield, and optionality) form the foundation of physical commodity pricing frameworks.

# Financial Engineering Concepts in Commodities

## Risk Management in Commodity Portfolios

Commodity markets pose unique risk management challenges. Prices of commodities are often more volatile and fat-tailed than those of equities or bonds, due to shocks like weather events, geopolitical tensions, or cartel decisions. Effective **risk management** therefore goes beyond simple volatility measures – it incorporates **Value-at-Risk (VaR)** and stress testing to account for extreme moves, and recognizes that correlations can shift under stress. Commodities can have low correlation with traditional assets (a benefit we'll revisit), but they may exhibit complex correlation structures among themselves. For example, crude oil and natural gas prices might be correlated due to related demand factors, yet agricultural commodities might move independently based on crop-specific conditions. Even within a single commodity, the **term structure** (different futures maturities) can behave differently – nearby contracts may be more volatile and react sharply to immediate news (especially in backwardation), whereas longer-dated futures move with longer-term expectations <sup>16</sup>. Risk managers often monitor **spread risk** (the risk of changes in the price difference between contracts) and **basis risk** (spot vs futures divergence) in addition to outright price risk. They also prepare for **tail risks** – such as a sudden price collapse or spike – using scenario analysis (e.g. what if a major supplier is disrupted, or a demand shock occurs?). Standard VaR models might underestimate these tails, so **Expected Shortfall (CVaR)** and **Extreme Value Theory** are applied for a better grasp of potential losses <sup>17</sup>.

**Correlation** plays a crucial role in portfolio construction. Commodities as a broad asset class historically show **low or even negative correlation with equities and bonds**, which makes them valuable diversifiers <sup>18</sup>. Within a commodity portfolio, diversification can be achieved by holding a mix of energy, metals, agriculture, and other sectors, which often have low correlations with each other <sup>19</sup>. For instance, an oil price crash might not coincide with a gold price crash; a bumper grain harvest (lowering crop prices) might occur in the same year as a mining strike (raising metal prices). As AQR Capital noted, balancing risk across commodity sectors can **reduce idiosyncratic risk and improve risk-adjusted returns**, thanks to these low inter-sector correlations <sup>19</sup>. In practice, a commodity fund might allocate capital such that no single commodity or sector dominates the risk, and dynamically adjust positions as volatilities change to maintain a stable overall risk target <sup>20</sup>. This is analogous to an equity portfolio manager diversifying across industries – except commodity sectors are influenced by very different fundamental drivers.

Another key consideration is **roll risk** in managing commodity exposures. Because futures have fixed expiration dates, a long-term investor must periodically **roll** positions – selling the contract that's about to expire and buying a later-dated one to maintain exposure. The **roll yield** – profit or loss from this rollover – can significantly affect portfolio returns <sup>21</sup>. If the market is in contango, rolling forward tends to incur a **negative roll yield** (you sell low and buy high, effectively), which can drag on returns if sustained. In backwardated markets, rolling yields are **positive** (selling higher-priced near contracts and buying cheaper farther ones), which can boost returns over time <sup>22</sup> <sup>21</sup>. For example, an investor holding oil futures in a persistent contango will see their position value erode with each roll (unless spot prices rise enough to offset it), whereas in a backwardated market they gain a tailwind even if spot prices stay flat. Managing this roll yield is critical: commodity index funds often try to mitigate roll losses by selecting specific futures (e.g. not always the nearest month) or using **constant-maturity indices** to spread exposures <sup>23</sup>. Active commodity strategies pay attention to the shape of the curve – sometimes choosing to be in cash rather than suffer a steep contango roll, or conversely maximizing exposure when roll yields are positive. From a risk perspective, **rolling strategies** also introduce basis risk: the new contract may respond differently to

market events than the old one, so portfolio managers monitor how the roll affects their overall risk profile. In summary, commodity portfolio risk management involves a combination of quantitative tools (VaR, stress tests), careful diversification, and understanding of futures-specific risks like rolling and basis. The goal is to manage volatility and drawdowns while capturing the unique return drivers commodities offer (including any **inflation hedging** benefits and **crisis alpha** when they act as safe havens).

## Pricing Illiquid and Non-Replicable Real Assets

Not all commodity-related assets have liquid markets or straightforward pricing formulas. Unlike financial assets (e.g. stocks) where an abundance of market data and arbitrage keeps pricing tight, many commodities and real assets are “**incomplete market**” situations – meaning they cannot be perfectly hedged or replicated with traded instruments. A classic example is a **physical commodity asset** like an oil refinery or a mineral mine: its value depends on uncertain future commodity prices, operational costs, and even managerial decisions. There may be no direct way to hedge all those risks out. Similarly, some commodities themselves are non-storable or have very limited forward markets (consider electricity, which must be used when generated, or certain rare minerals). In such cases, pricing relies on financial engineering techniques that blend market data with **real asset modeling**. One approach is **discounted cash flow with scenario analysis**, where one projects the asset’s cash flows under various commodity price scenarios and assigns probabilities or risk adjustments. Another is **real options valuation**, treating operational flexibilities (like the ability to mothball a plant or expand capacity) as options that add value – very relevant in energy and commodity industries as noted above. When an asset or exposure isn’t fully hedgeable, investors demand a **risk premium** for bearing that non-diversifiable risk. For instance, a private oil drilling project might be priced to target a higher return than traded oil futures because the investor is taking on unique risks (geological risk, regulatory risk, etc.) that cannot be offloaded. This is analogous to **liquidity premiums** or **insurance risk premiums** – the idea that if you can’t freely trade or hedge something, you price it more conservatively (i.e. require a higher expected return). In practice, **commodity financiers** (like banks and trading firms) develop models for such illiquid assets using a combination of market proxies and statistical methods. They might use **correlated liquid proxies** (e.g. modeling a regional crude oil price based on WTI or Brent plus a quality/location differential) and add adjustments. Or they rely on **expert judgement and comparables**, much as venture capital or private equity investors do, to set valuations on things without a clear market price. The key takeaway is that pricing illiquid, non-replicable assets often breaks the neat arbitrage pricing of textbook derivatives and enters a hybrid realm: part science, part art. It requires understanding the commodity’s economics, incorporating risk premiums, and often stress-testing assumptions. Importantly, the inability to fully hedge means the holder of the asset is exposed to **basis risk** (the risk that their asset’s value diverges from any hedges they *can* put on) and **idiosyncratic risk**. They must manage this through portfolio construction or contractual structures (for example, off-take agreements that lock in certain prices, or insurance contracts). This concept resonates beyond commodities: it’s directly analogous to **litigation funding** where an investor holds an asset (a legal claim) that has no liquid market or perfect hedge – the pricing then must account for the unique risk and illiquidity of that asset, often targeting high returns to justify the risk.

## Structured Products and Synthetic Commodity Exposures

Financial engineering in commodities has also produced a variety of **structured products and synthetic instruments**. These allow investors to gain commodity exposure (or tailor their risk/return profile) without directly trading physical barrels or bushels. A common example is the **commodity-linked note**: a debt instrument (often issued by a bank) that pays a return based on the performance of a commodity or

commodity index. For instance, a note might promise a 5-year yield linked to gold prices – giving the investor gold exposure with certain tweaks (maybe capital protection or leverage). Such notes use **derivatives under the hood** (e.g. futures, options, swaps) to create the desired payoff for the investor <sup>24</sup> <sup>25</sup>. They're popular for accessing commodities in portfolios that can't handle futures directly or where regulatory/custody issues make holding physical commodities impractical. **Exchange-Traded Products** (ETFs, ETNs, and ETCs) are another avenue: these are essentially structured products that trade on exchanges, providing exposure to commodity indices or strategies. For example, a broad commodity ETF might hold a basket of futures across energy, metals, and agriculture; an ETN might track the performance of a single commodity's futures curve. These instruments allow investors to participate in commodity price movements **synthetically**, with the product issuer handling the actual trading of futures or swaps. A benefit of synthetic exposure is that it can be designed to include features like roll optimization (to mitigate contango losses) or leveraged/unleveraged exposure. The trade-off is that structured products introduce **counterparty and complexity risk** – investors must trust the issuer's credit and understand the product's terms (there may be path-dependent payoffs, fees, or triggers that complicate outcomes).

On the professional side, **commodity derivatives** markets themselves offer many ways to engineer exposures. Traders can use **swaps and forwards** for customized over-the-counter deals (e.g. locking in a price for jet fuel for an airline, via a swap with a bank). They create **synthetic storage** by going long futures and rolling them (which, while not identical to physical storage, can mimic the economic exposure to owning inventory). More complex structures like **commodity swaps tied to indices, spread options** (options on the price difference between two commodities or locations), and **averaging contracts** (where payoff depends on average price over time) are used to manage specific risks or speculate on nuanced views. For instance, an investor bullish on oil might choose a structured note that pays 2x the upside if oil rises but caps the upside beyond a certain level (and offers some downside protection). This payoff could be achieved by combining options on oil futures – the structured product packages it neatly.

The relevance of these innovations to litigation funding is subtle but important. Just as commodity market participants created tailored financial products to meet investor or hedger needs, one can imagine **structured solutions in litigation finance** – for example, insurance-like products or securitized portfolios of cases – to spread risk and create investable exposure to legal outcomes. Indeed, the concept of **synthetic exposure** is essentially what a litigation fund provides to its investors: exposure to legal claim outcomes without the investor directly “owning” any lawsuit. We will see below that litigation finance has begun to adopt portfolio approaches and could in the future employ more financial engineering (tranching of case portfolios, risk transfers via insurance or swaps, etc.), learning from how commodity risk is repackaged for different risk appetites.

## Strategic Parallels to Litigation Funding

### Litigation Claims as Commodity-Like Assets

At first glance, funding a lawsuit and trading commodities might seem worlds apart – one deals with court cases, the other with barrels and bushels. But from a financial perspective, **litigation claims can be viewed as asset investments** with characteristics analogous to commodities or other real assets. In litigation finance, a funder provides capital to a claimant (often to cover legal fees) in exchange for a portion of the settlement or judgment if the case succeeds <sup>26</sup> <sup>27</sup>. Crucially, these arrangements are typically **non-recourse**: if the case is lost, the funder receives nothing <sup>28</sup>. This payoff structure is *asymmetric*, much like an option – the downside is capped at the amount invested (similar to an option premium), while the upside

can be a multiple of the investment if the legal claim “pays off.” In other words, a litigation funding deal resembles a **contingent claim** on the lawsuit outcome, not unlike a commodity derivative that pays off based on an underlying price event.

We can draw several analogies. First, consider **carry costs**: in commodities, holding an asset incurs storage and financing costs; in litigation, carrying a legal claim through multi-year litigation incurs ongoing legal expenses and tied-up capital. The funder’s capital is often disbursed over time (“drip-fed” in some cases <sup>29</sup>) to finance the case, and during this period the funder is effectively paying a “storage cost” in the form of legal fees and overhead. There is also a **time value** – money spent today on litigation could have earned interest or been deployed elsewhere, analogous to the interest component of cost-of-carry <sup>30</sup> <sup>31</sup>. If we think in terms of spot vs. future value: the “spot price” of a legal claim would be its value today if one could settle it immediately, whereas the “future value” is what it might be worth if it goes through trial or further legal proceedings. The difference involves the “carry” of running the case (time and cost) and the **optionality** of continuing versus settling.

Now consider **convenience yield** in an abstract sense. A commodity convenience yield is the benefit of having the physical good on hand. In litigation, one might analogously ask: is there a benefit to *holding onto* a legal claim rather than resolving it early? One benefit could be the potential for a higher payout – for instance, not settling too early if better evidence or legal rulings could strengthen the case over time. This is akin to the idea that holding a commodity gives you the option to sell when prices are higher <sup>15</sup>. A plaintiff (and by extension the funder) has the **option to wait or proceed** in litigation: they might settle (terminate the claim early for a certain but lower payout) or press on to trial (continue “holding” the claim in hopes of a larger judgment). The decision to settle or continue is essentially an **American-style option** – you can exercise (settle) at various points, and the optimal choice depends on the expected value at those points versus the certainty of a settlement. Just as commodity holders derive convenience yield from flexibility, litigation stakeholders derive value from the **strategic flexibility** in how and when a case is resolved. That said, unlike a storable commodity, a legal claim’s value can also go to zero (if the case is lost) – which underscores its venture-like risk profile. A Lake Whillans white paper noted that *“legal claims, as an asset, are similar to a bond... once matured through award or settlement, [the claim] entitles the holder to payment... Unlike a bond, however, it is uncertain whether the asset will indeed mature,”* highlighting the binary risk <sup>32</sup>. This uncertainty is comparable to a commodity exploration project: it could either strike a gusher or come up dry.

Another parallel is how both commodity assets and litigation claims are **non-standardized and illiquid**. Just as a specific physical asset (like an aging oil well or a batch of a rare earth metal) may not have a deep market, each lawsuit is unique and cannot be readily bought or sold in a liquid exchange. This means pricing is tricky and must account for case-specific risks – much like pricing an illiquid commodity asset requires adding risk premia. Litigation funders essentially perform intense due diligence and valuation of claims <sup>29</sup> <sup>33</sup>, similar to commodity traders evaluating a physical deal or a mining asset. They look at merits of the case (analogous to quality of a commodity asset), legal precedents (supply/demand conditions in legal context), and even the “credit” of the defendant (ensuring the defendant can pay if the case wins, analogous to counterparty risk in a commodity contract) <sup>34</sup>. In effect, **funders treat legal claims as assets that can be quantified and traded** – one industry article noted that *“in effect, funders treat legal claims as a corporate asset, able to be quantified and traded in a marketplace”* <sup>27</sup>. This commodification of legal claims allows financial techniques to be applied, but also means the asset’s value is subject to uncertainty much like commodity prices.

Finally, the **asymmetry and unsystematic nature** of litigation outcomes is akin to the idiosyncratic risks in physical commodity deals. A single lawsuit's outcome (win big, win small, or lose) is largely case-specific – comparable to how a single cargo's profit might depend on local conditions or a single mine's output on its geology. This is why both commodity traders and litigation funders avoid “putting all eggs in one basket” and instead rely on portfolio strategies to manage these risks, which we discuss next.

## Portfolio-Level Approaches and Exposure Management

**Diversification** is as powerful in litigation funding as it is in commodity investing – perhaps even more so, given the high variance in individual case outcomes. A litigation fund's portfolio might consist of dozens of cases of varying sizes, legal domains, and jurisdictions. The goal is to spread **unsystematic risk** (case-specific risk) so that no single loss will sink the portfolio <sup>35</sup>. This mirrors how a commodity fund diversifies across different commodities and strategies to avoid a blow-up from one position. In the context of litigation, funders explicitly “**seek a diversified portfolio of investments, spread along a continuum of risk and reward.**” <sup>35</sup>. For example, a fund might balance some relatively lower-risk cases (perhaps clear-cut commercial contract disputes likely to settle favorably) that offer moderate returns, against some high-risk, high-upside cases (novel legal issues or big damages claims that could fail but, if successful, yield large recoveries) <sup>35</sup>. The low-risk cases can provide steady base returns (like the stable income from contango carry trades in commodities), while the higher-risk cases provide the “kickers” in returns (analogous to speculative positions in volatile commodities that might pay off big). This approach is similar to how a commodity portfolio manager might mix some arbitrage or carry trades with some directional bets.

**Correlation** between cases is also a consideration. Ideally, the outcomes of cases in a portfolio should be uncorrelated – and generally, legal cases *are* thought to have low correlation with each other (one patent lawsuit's result doesn't directly influence another unrelated contract dispute). Moreover, litigation outcomes have **little correlation with the broader financial markets** <sup>36</sup> <sup>37</sup> – a plaintiff winning or losing a lawsuit is usually independent of stock market performance – which is why litigation finance has attracted interest as an alternative asset class offering diversification for investors <sup>36</sup>. This is analogous to commodities often having low correlation with stocks/bonds <sup>18</sup>. A Hays Mews Capital report emphasizes that adding litigation finance to a portfolio provides diversification because of its low correlation to traditional asset classes, and that within a litigation portfolio, it's wise to include a variety of cases spanning different jurisdictions, sectors, and stages to ensure the overall investment isn't dependent on a single factor <sup>37</sup>. In practice, funders heed this by, for instance, not concentrating all their cases in one industry or one court venue. If all your cases were patent lawsuits in a single district, a change in law or a court procedural shift could impact many at once (akin to how a drought might simultaneously hit all your agriculture commodities). Funders mitigate this by picking cases across commercial fields (patent, antitrust, contracts, international arbitration, etc.) and across locations. Indeed, sophisticated funders “**never focus all cases in a portfolio on a single jurisdiction**” <sup>38</sup> <sup>37</sup>, to reduce regulatory or judicial correlation risk. This is directly parallel to a commodity trader ensuring they're not overly exposed to one region's weather or one regulatory regime.

From a quantitative angle, a litigation fund can use **portfolio metrics** similar to those in other asset classes: expected return (the probability-weighted outcome across cases), **variance or VaR** of the portfolio (recognizing that case outcomes are binary or multimodal rather than normal distributions), and **stress tests** (e.g. “what if we lose the 2 largest cases?” or “what if all cases of type X fail?”). Since legal claims don't have continuous price fluctuations, risk is assessed more in a scenario-based way than by volatilities, but the concept is the same. Ed Truant, an investor in the sector, notes that **diversification is critical in**

**litigation finance** because of the high unsystematic risk, and even offers rules of thumb for portfolio construction <sup>39</sup>. A well-constructed portfolio of many cases can significantly reduce the variability of returns – the law of large numbers starts to apply when each case is an independent bet with a certain expected value. In fact, holding a portfolio of claims not only reduces risk but can **increase the valuation** of each claim to the funder: a diversified fund can afford to take slightly lower returns on each case because the risk of total loss is spread, whereas a company with a single claim would discount it heavily for risk <sup>40</sup> <sup>41</sup>. This is classic portfolio theory at work (as an academic paper quipped, diversification allows maintaining expected return while reducing risk <sup>42</sup>).

Litigation fund managers also consider **tail risk and duration** in managing exposure. **Tail risk** in a litigation portfolio might be, for example, a scenario where an unexpectedly high fraction of cases lose (perhaps due to some systemic legal shift or a string of bad luck). Funders thus often limit the fraction of the fund invested in any single case or in any single correlated group of cases. They may also use **insurance or hedging** where available – for instance, some jurisdictions or insurers offer “judgment insurance” or funders can sometimes hedge currency risk if a judgment will be in a foreign currency. The concept is akin to a commodity trader setting position limits and sometimes hedging with options to cap downside. **Duration risk** is another parallel: in litigation, the time to resolution is uncertain and can impact returns (a win that arrives after 8 years yields a lower IRR than one after 3 years). Ed Truant pointed out that longer cases often carry higher risk (more things can go wrong over time, and the chance of a binary trial outcome grows the longer you avoid settlement) <sup>43</sup>. Funders manage this by structuring deals where their return increases the longer the case takes (to compensate for the delay) <sup>44</sup>, and by portfolio design – including a mix of short-duration cases that might settle quickly and longer ones – not unlike a commodity trader balancing short-term trades vs. long-term plays. A diversified litigation portfolio spread across **different case durations, different legal areas, and even plaintiff/defendant-side investments** can thus be managed with a view to a target risk/return profile, much as a commodity portfolio is managed across various markets and time horizons.

In summary, the strategies funders use – *diversification, risk-adjusted pricing of each case, portfolio-level monitoring of exposure, and structuring of returns* – strongly parallel commodity portfolio management techniques. Both involve juggling uncorrelated (or weakly correlated) bets to achieve a smoother overall performance. And in both cases, the portfolio approach is what turns a series of risky projects or trades into a potentially reliable asset class. As one industry piece noted, **litigation funders operate like asset managers in other fields**, carefully balancing their portfolio between lower-risk and higher-risk cases and ensuring a steady overall performance while waiting for the big wins to materialize <sup>35</sup> <sup>45</sup>.

## Litigation Uncertainty and Optionality – Path-Dependent Payoffs

One of the most interesting overlaps between commodities and litigation is the notion of **path-dependent outcomes and embedded optionality**. In commodity markets, certain contracts and strategies have path-dependent payoffs – for instance, an **Asian option** pays off based on the average price of oil over a period (path matters), or a **swing contract** in natural gas gives the buyer the right to take variable quantities each day (decisions at each step affect overall outcome). Similarly, the **value of a litigation investment can depend on the path the case takes through the legal process**. There are multiple decision points and uncertainties: Will the case settle early or go to trial? Will it be dismissed on summary judgment or reach a jury? If it wins at trial, will it face an appeal (and what are the odds there)? Each branch in this decision tree can be seen as altering the “state” of the asset. The **payoff to the funder is highly path-dependent** – a settlement pre-trial might yield a smaller but earlier return; a trial win after years yields a large return, but



with the risk of getting zero if that path fails at the final hurdle <sup>46</sup> <sup>47</sup> . Litigation financiers often use **decision tree analysis** (a tool akin to pricing path-dependent options) to value claims, assigning probabilities and outcomes to different litigation stages to compute an expected value. This is conceptually similar to pricing an American option by considering early exercise vs continuation, or evaluating a real option on a project where at each juncture you could expand, abandon, or continue.

**Optionality** in litigation comes in several forms. The plaintiff (and by extension the funder, though typically funders don't control the decision) has an option to **settle at various points**. Settlement can be thought of as exercising an option to “cash in” the claim now rather than keeping the exposure. If a great settlement offer comes, it might be like an in-the-money option that you decide to exercise. If offers are low, you keep the option alive by continuing the case, analogous to holding an option longer hoping for a better payoff. Another optional aspect is **appeal options**: if a case is lost at trial, sometimes the claimant has an option to appeal to a higher court (though this can be costly and is not always pursued). This is like a risky out-of-the-money option – you’ve “lost” initially but you can invest more (legal fees for appeal) for a chance to turn it around. Each of these optional decisions (settle, continue, appeal, etc.) can significantly change the outcome distribution for the funder, which is why savvy funders price in the potential for various paths and often structure their returns accordingly (for instance, having a higher return percentage if the case only pays out after an appeal, compensating for the extra risk and time).

In commodity businesses, companies similarly face real options: an oil producer can choose to cap wells when prices are low (analogous to settling early for low payout) or wait for higher prices (pursue the case to trial) – but waiting carries the risk that prices might not recover (the case might be lost). The **analytical techniques** are the same: one might use Monte Carlo simulation or tree analysis to evaluate, say, an oilfield development (drill now or later?) or to evaluate a lawsuit (settle or litigate?). In both cases, the presence of options and decision points means the value is not a static number – it depends on optimal decisions and scenarios.

Another parallel is **path-dependent risk exposure**. In a long-running lawsuit, the risk to the funder can actually change over time in non-linear ways as the case evolves. For example, passing a motion to dismiss or surviving summary judgment in a case might dramatically improve the chances of success (reducing downside risk), much like how, in a commodity trade, making it past a seasonal demand trough might reduce the risk of a storage trade. Conversely, if a case drags on far longer than expected (say a trial is delayed or the case languishes), the **duration risk** mounts – not only is capital tied up, but the uncertainty persists. There’s an analogue in commodities: if you have to keep rolling a position far longer than planned, you might face accumulating roll costs or simply more chances for adverse price moves. Indeed, Ed Truant observed a correlation that *“the longer a case proceeds, the higher the likelihood of binary risk (an adverse judgment)”* <sup>43</sup> , meaning drawn-out cases often end in a decisive win/lose rather than settlement – similar to how a long storage play eventually must unwind at whatever the market price is (no more optionality if you run out of time). To manage this, litigation financiers sometimes include provisions that increase their share of the recovery the longer the case goes (to compensate for time risk and increased uncertainty) <sup>44</sup> . In essence, they are adjusting the payoff structure in a time-dependent way, which is akin to how some structured notes in commodities might have different payoff rates depending on when an outcome occurs.

Lastly, both commodity trading and litigation funding deal with **imperfect information and evolving scenarios**. Just as commodity prices evolve with new information (inventory reports, OPEC announcements, weather forecasts), the prospects of a case evolve as evidence is discovered, legal rulings happen, or other cases set precedents. This dynamic aspect means risk management is continuous: funders must monitor

their “positions” (cases) and sometimes update their strategy (in commodities, one might cut losses or double down; in litigation, funders might sometimes sell a portion of their stake to another investor, or negotiate an exit via settlement). While a full secondary market for legal claims is still nascent, we do see the beginnings of **claim transfers and syndications**, especially in international arbitration cases where awards can be large. This is analogous to commodity traders selling off part of a cargo or hedging part of a position when conditions change.

In summary, litigation finance exhibits a number of strategic parallels to commodity trading and investment: each case is a **real asset investment** with its own risk profile, akin to a commodity asset; portfolios of cases are managed to **diversify and mitigate risk** much like commodity portfolios; and the **uncertainty, optionality, and timing elements** in litigation outcomes can be analyzed with frameworks very similar to those used for commodities (real options, scenario analysis, tail risk management). A fund manager with a quantitative background can leverage these parallels: for instance, applying **portfolio theory** to maximize the probability of steady returns in a litigation fund <sup>48</sup>, or using **derivative pricing intuition** to structure deals that balance risk and reward for both claimants and funders. The primary jurisdiction of interest – the United States – has a relatively developed litigation finance market with these principles in action, and the same ideas are extending to **international arbitration** funding (where often the claims are large and the proceedings complex, making the case for portfolio approaches and risk engineering even more compelling). In international arbitration, funders frequently finance multiple cases or treaty claims against states, spreading risk globally and over long time horizons, essentially treating legal risks in one country vs another a bit like commodities in different regions – an opportunity to arbitrage and diversify legal “markets” across the world.

Ultimately, by viewing litigation funding through the lens of commodity market frameworks, a fund manager can better understand how to price the risk of a legal claim, how to arbitrage mispriced risk (e.g. funding strong claims that others overlook), how to manage volatility (legal outcomes volatility, that is), and how to structure a **portfolio strategy** that yields attractive, uncorrelated returns. As one industry CEO observed, the infusion of capital and portfolio thinking into litigation is “**using market forces to help right the scales of justice**”, leveling the playing field for claimants while creating a new asset class for investors <sup>49</sup> <sup>50</sup>. The marriage of Wall Street and the courtroom is still evolving, but the lessons from commodity trading – a field long versed in dealing with uncertainty, volatility, and hard assets – provide a rich toolset for mastering this new frontier of alternative investing.

## Recommended Reading and Resources

For those looking to delve deeper into both commodity market theory and its translation to litigation finance strategy, below is a curated list of readings. These books, papers, and white papers are chosen to help a technically sophisticated fund manager draw lessons from commodities and apply them to litigation finance portfolios:

- **Héllyette Geman (2005), *Commodities and Commodity Derivatives***: A comprehensive book that covers the fundamentals of commodity markets, including forward curves, storage theory, and quantitative models for pricing and volatility. Geman’s work will reinforce concepts like contango/backwardation, convenience yield, and real options in commodities – essential analogies for understanding litigation claim valuation and optionality.

- **John C. Hull (most recent ed.), *Options, Futures, and Other Derivatives*:** Hull's textbook, a staple in finance, has accessible chapters on commodity futures, cost of carry, and pricing in incomplete markets (distinguishing investment vs. consumption assets) <sup>51</sup>. It provides a solid grounding in arbitrage pricing and risk management tools (like VaR) that can be directly applied to structuring litigation funding deals and portfolios.
- **AQR Capital Management (2022), "Building a Better Commodities Portfolio"** <sup>19</sup> <sup>18</sup> : A white paper that examines how to construct diversified, risk-balanced commodity portfolios. It offers insight into managing sector correlations, volatility targeting, and incorporating roll yield and fundamental tilts. This is valuable reading to inspire how one might build a **diversified litigation funding portfolio** (balancing different case types and durations) and manage its risk/return profile quantitatively.
- **Evans & Guthrie (2014), "Commodity Prices and the Option Value of Storage"** <sup>15</sup> : An academic paper delving into the real option embedded in commodity storage and the nature of convenience yield. By understanding this piece, a fund manager can sharpen their intuition for optionality and timing value – the same logic that underpins the decision to continue funding a case versus settling. (While technical, the paper's core ideas illuminate why "waiting for a better outcome" has tangible economic value.)
- **Lee Drucker (2015), "A Financial Perspective on Commercial Litigation Finance"** <sup>32</sup> <sup>40</sup> (**Lake Whillans White Paper**): A practitioner-oriented white paper that draws parallels between legal claims and financial assets. It discusses risk transfer, portfolio benefits, and how a company can leverage litigation finance to optimize capital use. Drucker's piece will help bridge the gap between theory and practice, showing how portfolio theory and risk management are applied by actual litigation funders (and it's written in a way that resonates with those who have a finance background).
- **Max Volsky (2018), *Investing in Justice*:** A book by a litigation finance industry veteran that introduces legal finance as an asset class. It covers how deals are structured, the due diligence process, risk considerations, and case studies. For a fund manager, Volsky's book offers a grounded view of **litigation funding mechanics** and will highlight areas where concepts like diversification, risk pricing, and non-correlation (familiar from commodity investing) come into play in the legal context.
- **The Hedge Fund Journal (2013), "The Emerging Market for Litigation Funding" by Ronen Lazar** <sup>35</sup> <sup>36</sup> : An article providing an overview of the litigation finance industry's early days, including discussion of its appeal as a non-correlated, high-return investment and the importance of a portfolio approach. It's a shorter read that reinforces why fund managers approached litigation funding as they would any other alternative asset – with an eye to risk/reward and diversification.
- **Ed Truant/Slingshot Capital – Blog Series on Portfolio Theory in Litigation Finance (2020–2024)** <sup>39</sup> <sup>52</sup> : A series of articles (on Legal Funding Journal and Slingshot Capital's site) where Ed Truant, a litigation finance investor, discusses applying portfolio theory and risk management to litigation funding. Notable topics include duration risk management, the rule of thumb for number of cases for diversification, and constructing a fund-of-funds in legal finance. These pieces are particularly

useful for a quantitative fund manager, as they translate concepts like VaR, correlation, and tail risk into the litigation context in practical ways.

- **ICCA-QMUL Task Force Report (2018), “Third-Party Funding in International Arbitration”:** For those interested in the international arbitration angle, this report (by the International Council for Commercial Arbitration) provides a comprehensive look at how funding works in arbitration cases globally. While more law-focused, it contains insights on risk assessment and ethical/regulatory frameworks, which are important for understanding the **jurisdictional considerations** and global diversification aspects of a litigation finance portfolio.

Each of the above resources will deepen your understanding of either commodity market mechanics or litigation finance – and importantly, help you draw connections between the two. By studying how commodity traders price risk and manage portfolios, you can bring a fresh, rigorous perspective to litigation funding, treating legal claims not just as lawsuits but as **assets** subject to financial analysis, arbitrage principles, and strategic risk management. This cross-disciplinary approach is what will give you an edge in structuring and managing a successful litigation finance portfolio.

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28 33 34 37 38 Litigation Funding: Guide to Returns, Risks, and Diversification - Hays Mews Capital Group

<https://www.haysmewscapital.com/news/litigation-funding>

30 31 32 40 41 46 47 A FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE ON COMMERCIAL LITIGATION FINANCE

<https://lakewhillans.com/white-paper/financial-perspective-on-commercial-litigation-finance/>

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<https://legalfundingjournal.com/managing-duration-risk-in-litigation-finance-pt-1-of-2/>

42 48 [PDF] The Siren Song of Litigation Funding

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51 Seance 2 : Commodity Futures Trading and Arbitrage Quiz

<https://quizgecko.com/learn/commodity-futures-trading-and-arbitrage-quiz-8jncwo>