

mojaloop

# Fraud Risk Management Framework

Mojaloop OSS Community Convening

January 2020


# Project scope, context and deliverables

- Mojaloop was developed to enable customers to send digital payments to anyone, regardless of the account or service they use by making it easier for financial providers to achieve interoperability
- The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation partnered with Deloitte to design a fraud risk management framework to work alongside Mojaloop to manage fraud and financial crime risks in a hyper-connected digital financial ecosystem

mojaloop

BILL &  
MELINDA  
GATES  
*foundation*

**Deloitte.**







# **Risk ranking methodology and typologies**



# Risks in the mobile payments ecosystem

## Details of How South African Cash Funded the Dusit Terror Attack

By [JOHN PAUL SIMIYU](#) on 25 August 2019 - 9:40 am



*Kenya Police in formation during the Dusit D2 terror attack. FILE*


## kenya:Banks and mobile money links used to fund Dusit Hotel attack

BY [MOBILEMONEYAFRICA](#) - 11 MONTHS AGO

1468 0



# Typologies universe



# Typologies Risk Rating Methodology

## Approach to Stride and Dread (1/5)

A cross typology approach was utilised for Stride and Dread

(D)READ/(S)TRIDE scoring matrix (Weight/Flag)	Damage	Reproducibility	Exploitability	Affected Users	Discoverability	Test condition
Dread Scoring →						For a scenario, read each test condition and flag if it is applicable or not
Stride categorisation ↓						
(S)Spoofing						
W	1	3	2	2	1	Transfer to known tax havens
W	2	1	2	1	1	Dormant account activity
W	2	2	4	1	2	Abnormal hours of transactions
F	3	2	2	1	1	A change of account information or financial instruction with abnormal factors of authentication i.e. Unfamiliar use of Email, SMS or one time pins
(T)Tampering						
F	2	1	1	1	1	Receiving or sending from an account previously flagged as malicious
W	1	0	1	1	0	Identity theft notified to the bank, No account actions performed i.e. ID/Cell phone loss



# Typologies Risk Rating Methodology

## Approach to Stride and Dread (2/5)

- STRIDE categorises security based threats - A **risk** or issue may only be placed into one of the **S/T/R/I/D/E** elements
- DREAD scores security based threats - A **risk** or issue may be **scored** from **0 to 5** on each of the D/R/E/A/D elements
- A **risk** or issue is placed within a **STRIDE** category and receives a **DREAD** score. Each of the DREAD elements must have a value placed
- To further enhance the outcome of the typology and the appropriate action to be taken on an event each line item was allocated either a flag or weight
- A **flag** line item is determined by an indicator of **compromise**. These are line items that are regarded as severe in nature and carry a weight value
- A **weight** line item is **not** an indicator of **compromise** but an attribute of the scenario that carries some risk. **All** line items **have** a **weight** dependent on the use case
- A risk or issue is dependent of a number of line items given the scope of what is assessed. Each line item may not be an indicator of compromise but may have weight on the scores e.g.

Weight line item:

Access to a user profile was performed during abnormal hours

Flag line item:






Access to a user profile was performed from a malicious foreign state



# Typologies Risk Rating Methodology

## Approach to Stride and Dread (3/5)

- A score is created for each risk instance/line item
- Example scenario: A client receives a fraudulent SMS from a malicious party whom captures their data

					
<b><u>STRIDE Placement</u></b> <b>SPOOFING</b>	Weight	Applicable	<b><u>DREAD SCORE N/5</u></b> <b>Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users and Discoverability</b>		<b><u>Score</u></b> Flagged Instance; High-risk 31% Spoofing @ 1.8/5.8 69% Tampering @ 4/5.8
- False communication	W	✗	D(3), R(2), E(1), A(1), D(2) = 1.8		
- Documentation falsified	F		D(1), R(4), E(4), A(2), D(3) = 2.8		
<b>TAMPERING</b>					
- Data stolen during capture	F	✗	D(5), R(3), E(5), A(3), D(0) = 4		(Greatest value) Damage = (5) Severe Reproducibility = (3) Moderate Exploitability = (5) Severe Affected Users = (3) Moderate Discoverability = (2) Limited
- Data stolen during processing	F		D(5), R(2), E(5), A(3), D(2) = 3.4		
Etc....			.....		

# Typologies Risk Rating Methodology

## Approach to Stride and Dread (4/5)

DREAD Table		DREAD Risk = (Damage + Reproducibility + Exploitability + Affected Users + Discoverability) /5
Damage	Dread Score	Reputational or financial damage
	0	No damage to business or client
	1	Limited risk of reputational or financial damage
	2	Low to notable company or client damage
	3	Moderate damage to company or client (Non-news worthy/minor financial damage)
	4	High reputational or financial damage (News worthy/Social media/moderate financial damage)
	5	Critical reputational or financial damage (PR intervention required/high financial damage)
Reproducibility		A fraudulent action is reproducible before detection.
	0	No reproducibility, one time action
	1	Limited reproducibility with in a time frame
	2	Low reproducibility, can only be reproduced certain amount before detection
	3	Moderate reproducibility, action can be reproduced and will take time to detect
	4	High reproducibility, repeated action with low chance of detection
	5	Critical reproducibility, repeated action limited to no chance of detection (Manual investigation)
Exploitability		The ease to circumvent fraud prevention or account access controls
	0	Not exploitable, prevented by sufficient controls
	1	Limited exploitability, circumvention unlikely
	2	Low exploitability, specific prerequisites required
	3	Moderate exploitability, limited controls for prevention
	4	High exploitability, no visible controls to prevent the action, monitoring in place
	5	Exploitable, no controls to prevent the action, unmonitored


# Typologies Risk Rating Methodology


## Approach to Stride and Dread (5/5)

DREAD Table		DREAD Risk = (Damage + Reproducibility + Exploitability + Affected Users + Discoverability) /5
Affected Users		Users affected both internally and external from the action source
	0	No users affected
	1	Limited affected users, limited to a single user
	2	Low, limited to a single user and a known external entity (Bank/Client)
	3	Moderate, single and multiple external entities (Bank/Client)
	4	High, multiple users and external entities (Bank/Client)
	5	Critical, Unknown entities in the transaction chain (Untraceable endpoints)
Discoverability		Ability to log and monitor a transaction from source to destination
	0	No discoverability, Unknown source of action, unknown endpoint, no traceability (Anomaly, outage causes ledger discrepancy)
	1	Limited discoverability, Unknown source of action, unknown endpoint, limited traceability (Remote cash deposit)
	2	Low discoverability, known source of payment and unknown endpoint. Limited traceability (ATM withdrawal in foreign nation)
	3	Moderate discoverability, internal and external action, traceable, not monitored (i.e. External nation payment or online purchase)
	4	High discoverability, internal and external action, traceable, not fully monitored (i.e. Money transfer to known entities)
	5	Fully discoverable, action is internal only, traceable from beginning to end, Monitored process (i.e. Internal money transfer)





# Key Typologies Selection Process








# Review of Selected Typologies #1



- Sp spoofing
- Repudiation
- Denial of service
- Tampering
- Information disclosure
- Elevation of privelage










# POC Demo of typology 1

# Review of Selected Typologies #2



- Spoofting
- Repudiation
- Denial of service
- Tampering
- Information disclosure
- Elevation of privelage










# POC Demo of typology 2



# Review of Selected Typologies #3







# POC Demo of typology 3



# Review of Selected Typologies #4







# User requirements

## Three major classes of users

### Mojaloop Administrator

The Mojaloop Administrator defines one or more users who will interact with the Mojaloop FRMS on behalf of the Mojaloop operator that is hosting the Mojaloop platform

### DFSP System (API)

The bulk of the interaction between the DFSP and the Mojaloop platform is anticipated to be through RESTful API hosted on the Mojaloop platform and accessed securely from the DFSP front-end systems

### DFSP User

These are employees of the DFSP who would perform risk management functions in response to receiving a risk alert from the FRMS

# User requirements

## Mojaloop Operator Administrator functions (1/3)

### Typology Management

- Create new typologies
- Update existing typologies
- Activate/Deactivate typologies



# User requirements

## Mojaloop Operator Administrator functions (2/3)

### Individual Privacy Rights Management

Individual Privacy Right	Use Case
Right of access	Provide access report
Right to be forgotten	Purge personal information
Right to rectification	Update personal information
Right to object to processing	Limit processing of personal information
Right to restrict processing	
Right to portability	Export personal information
Right to safeguards from automated decision-making and profiling	Review automated risk decision

# User requirements

## Mojaloop Operator Administrator functions (3/3)

### Risk Alert/Case Management

- Escalations
- Investigations
- Rules auditing and tracing
- Overrides and remediation

### Data Management

- Identify data quality issues
- Data remediation

### Reporting


- DFSP Service Level Agreement performance monitoring
- Transaction Monitoring Management Information

# Key Risk Indicator (KRI) dashboard

Key Risk Indicators (KRI) Dictionary

BILL & MELINDA  
GATES foundation

Focus Area	KRI	Definition	Business Formula	Dimensions	Unit	Frequency	Source System
Management Information	Current Customers	The total number of customers in the hub.	Unique Count of Customer Number	None	#	Monthly	
Management Information		Total Number of DFSPs	Unique Count of DFSPs	None	#	Monthly	
Management Information		Total Number of Agents	Unique Count of Agent	None	#	Monthly	
Management Information		Total Number of MSISDNs	Unique Count of MSISDNs	None	#	Monthly	
Management Information	New Customers	The number of new DFSP hub.	Transaction Monitoring - Management Information				
Management Information		The number of new agent hub.					
Management Information		The number of new customer boarded into the hub.					
Management Information	Off-Boarded Customers	The number of DFSPs off	Transaction Monitoring - Management Information				
Management Information		The number of agents off					
Management Information		The number of customers hub.					
Management Information	Re-entry / Re-onboarded	The number of DFSPs that	Transaction Monitoring - Management Information				
Management Information		The number of agents that					






# User requirements

## Digital Financial Service Provider functions

### RESTful APIs

- Receive fraud risk alert
- Resolve fraud risk alert
- Escalate fraud risk alert

### DFSP front-end required



# User requirements




## DFSP User functions

### Alert Management

- List outstanding cases
- Access case
- Review alert
- Clear alert
- Reject transfer
- Refer/Escalate/Query case
- Review case history




# BRD Preview



# Architecture and integration considerations

## Our understanding of Mojaloop integration requirements






# What are the next steps?



Breakout session with community



Feedback and comments from community



Final review of deliverables



Community to plan, prioritise and build



# Q&A