## Literature Review

## A Survey on Weapon Target Allocation Models [Ghanbari et al., 2021]

- Two key components of command and control are: weapon target allocation (WTA) and threat evaluation.
- Resource allocation is stochastic/uncertain with regard to the WTA problem.
- The WTA component of the WTA problem can be considered in 3 parts: response planning, response execution, outcome assessment.
- There exists three basic models:

Basic Model 1: For maximizing damage to enemy (minimize expected target values F), we have

$$\min(F) = \sum_{i=1}^{|T|} V_i \prod_{k=1}^{|W|} (1 - P_{ik})^{x_i k}$$

This is the general WTA formula.

Basic Model 2: For allocation of available units to maximize expected total protection value J, we have

$$\max(J) = \sum_{i=1}^{|A|} \omega_j \prod_{i \in G_j} (1 - \pi_{ij} \prod_{k=1}^{|W|} (1 - P_{ik})^{x_i k}$$

Basic Model 3: This is the model for Dynamic WTA at stage t given the total expected combat value of surviving assets

$$\max(J_t X^t) = \sum_{j=1}^{|A(t)|} \omega_j \prod_{i=1}^{|T(t)|} \left[ 1 - \pi_{ij} \prod_{h=t}^{S} \prod_{k=1}^{|W(t)|} (1 - p_{ik}(h))^{x_{ih}(h)} \right]$$

Variable Definitions	
Sets	
$T_i$	Set of detected threats $i = 1, 2, \dots, I$ .
$igg w_k$	Set of resources $k = 1, 2, \dots, K$ .
$igg A_{j}$	Set of assets $j = 1, 2, \dots, J$ .
S	Set of engagement stages, $s = 1, 2, \dots, S$ .
A(t), T(t), W(t)	Set of current "defended assets, hostile targets, and available weapons during stage $t$ , respectively."
Parameters	
$P_{ik}$	Estimated effectiveness/probability that weapon $w_k \in W$ neutralizes threat $T_i \in T$ if assigned to it.
$\pi_{ij}$	Estimated probability threat $T_i \in T$ destroys asset $A_j \in A$ .
$oxed{V_{ik}}$	Threat value of the threat-asset pair $(T_i, A_j)$ .
$igg \omega_j$	Protection value of asset $A_j$ .
$C_{ik}$ Variables	Resource usage cost for assigning $w_k$ to $T_i$ .
$X_{ik}$	Is 1 if resource $w_k$ is assigned to $T_i$ , 0 otherwise.
$\left[ [X_{ik}^s]_{I \times K} \right]$	Decision matrix at stage $s$ .
h	Index of stages $t, \dots, S$ .

- Dynamic WTA (DWTA) suffer from curse of dimensionality.
- WTA problem has two perspectives: *single platform perspective* and *force coordination perspective*. The former is single platform defending one asset against incoming threats, the latter is a command and control platform defending multiple assets.
- Within these perspectives exist two paradigms: threat-by-threat and multi-threat. The former being sequential targeting and the latter being parallel targeting.

- There also exists two different prioritizations of defense, as shown by basic models 1 and 2.
- Static WTA (SWTA) constraints:  $X_{ik} \in \{0,1\} \forall i \in \{1,2,\cdots,|T|\}, \forall k \in \{1,2,\cdots,|W|\}$  given the equations:  $\sum_{i=1}^{|T|} X_{ik} = 1 \forall k \in \{1,2,\cdots,|W|\}$  if each firing unit must be assigned a target and  $\sum_{i=1}^{|T|} X_{ik} \leq 1 \forall k \in \{1,2,\cdots,|W|\}$  otherwise, with  $X_{ik}$  being a target i being assigned to a resource k in the constraint matrix X.
- Dynamic WTA (DWTA) problems have more constraints as follows:

Weapon multi-target constraint: This constraint describes multi-target systems. As each multi-target system can also be considered as separate systems,  $n_k = 1 \forall k \in \{1, 2, \dots, W\}.$ 

$$\sum_{i=1}^{|T|} x_{ik}(t) \leqslant n_k \forall t \in \{1, 2, \dots, S\}, \forall k \in \{1, 2, \dots, |W|\}$$

Strategy constraint: This constraint limits system-usage cost per target at stage t.  $m_i$  depends on performance of available resource k on target i. For missile systems,  $m_i = 1$ , and for artillery systems,  $m_1 \ge 1$ .

$$\sum_{k=1}^{|W|} x_{ik}(t) \leqslant m_i \forall t \in \{1, 2, \dots, S\}, \forall i \in \{1, 2, \dots, |T|\}$$

Resource constraint: This constraint governs over ammunition availability.

$$\sum_{t=1}^{S} \sum_{i=1}^{|T|} x_{ik}(t) \leqslant N_k, \forall k \in \{1, 2, \dots, |W|\}$$

Engagement feasibility constraint: This constraint is over the resource-target relationship: if a target i can be hit by a resource k at stage t, then  $f_{ik}(t) = 1$ , and  $f_{ik}(t) = 0$  otherwise.

$$x_{ik}(t) \leqslant f_{ik}(t), \qquad \forall t \in \{1, 2, \cdots, S\}, \forall i \in \{1, 2, \cdots, |T|\}$$

Optimization of decision support system based on three-stage threat evaluation and resource management [Naseem et al., 2017]

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An approximate dynamic programming approach for comparing firing policies in a networked air defense environment [Summers et al., 2020]

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Threat Evaluation In Air Defense Systems Using Analytic Network Process [Unver and Gürbüz, 2019]

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The SSA-BP-based potential threat prediction for aerial target considering commander emotion [Wang et al., 2022]

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## References

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