

## A Survey on Weapon Target Allocation Models

[?]

- Two key components of command and control are: weapon target allocation (WTA) and threat evaluation.
- Resource allocation is stochastic/uncertain with regard to the WTA problem.
- The WTA component of the WTA problem can be considered in 3 parts: response planning, response execution, outcome assessment.
- There exists three basic models:

Basic Model 1: For maximizing damage to enemy (minimize expected target values  $F$ ), we have

$$\min( F ) = \sum_{i=1}^{|T|} V_i \prod_{k=1}^{|W|} (1 - P_{ik})^{x_{ik}}$$

This is the general WTA formula.

Basic Model 2: For allocation of available units to maximize expected total protection value  $J$ , we have

$$\max( J ) = \sum_{j=1}^{|A|} \omega_j \prod_{i \in G_j} (1 - \pi_{ij} \prod_{k=1}^{|W|} (1 - P_{ik})^{x_{ik}})$$

Basic Model 3: This is the model for Dynamic WTA at stage  $t$  given the total expected combat value of surviving assets

$$\max( J_t X^t ) = \sum_{j=1}^{|A(t)|} \omega_j \prod_{i=1}^{|T(t)|} \left[ 1 - \pi_{ij} \prod_{h=t}^S \prod_{k=1}^{|W(t)|} (1 - p_{ik}(h))^{x_{ih}(h)} \right]$$

| Variable Definitions      |                                                                                                               |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Sets                      |                                                                                                               |
| $T_i$                     | Set of detected threats $i = 1, 2, \dots, I$ .                                                                |
| $w_k$                     | Set of resources $k = 1, 2, \dots, K$ .                                                                       |
| $A_j$                     | Set of assets $j = 1, 2, \dots, J$ .                                                                          |
| $S$                       | Set of engagement stages, $s = 1, 2, \dots, S$ .                                                              |
| $A(t), T(t), W(t)$        | Set of current "defended assets, hostile targets, and available weapons during stage $t$ , respectively."     |
| Parameters                |                                                                                                               |
| $P_{ik}$                  | Estimated effectiveness/probability that weapon $w_k \in W$ neutralizes threat $T_i \in T$ if assigned to it. |
| $\pi_{ij}$                | Estimated probability threat $T_i \in T$ destroys asset $A_j \in A$ .                                         |
| $V_{ik}$                  | Threat value of the threat-asset pair $(T_i, A_j)$ .                                                          |
| $\omega_j$                | Protection value of asset $A_j$ .                                                                             |
| $C_{ik}$                  | Resource usage cost for assigning $w_k$ to $T_i$ .                                                            |
| Variables                 |                                                                                                               |
| $X_{ik}$                  | Is 1 if resource $w_k$ is assigned to $T_i$ , 0 otherwise.                                                    |
| $[X_{ik}^s]_{I \times K}$ | Decision matrix at stage $s$ .                                                                                |
| $h$                       | Index of stages $t, \dots, S$ .                                                                               |

- Dynamic WTA (DWTa) suffer from curse of dimensionality.
- WTA problem has two perspectives: *single platform perspective* and *force coordination perspective*. The former is single platform defending one asset against incoming threats, the latter is a command and control platform defending multiple assets.
- Within these perspectives exist two paradigms: *threat-by-threat* and *multi-threat*. The former being sequential targeting and the latter being parallel targeting.

- There also exists two different prioritizations of defense, as shown by basic models 1 and 2.
- Static WTA (SWTA) constraints:  $X_{ik} \in \{0, 1\} \forall i \in \{1, 2, \dots, |T|\}, \forall k \in \{1, 2, \dots, |W|\}$  given the equations:  $\sum_{i=1}^{|T|} X_{ik} = 1 \quad \forall k \in \{1, 2, \dots, |W|\}$  if each firing unit must be assigned a target and  $\sum_{i=1}^{|T|} X_{ik} \leq 1 \quad \forall k \in \{1, 2, \dots, |W|\}$  otherwise, with  $X_{ik}$  being a target  $i$  being assigned to a resource  $k$  in the constraint matrix  $X$ .
- Dynamic WTA (DWTa) problems have more constraints as follows:

Weapon multi-target constraint: This constraint describes multi-target systems. As each multi-target system can also be considered as separate systems,  

$$n_k = 1 \forall k \in \{1, 2, \dots, W\}.$$

$$\sum_{i=1}^{|T|} x_{ik}(t) \leq n_k \quad \forall t \in \{1, 2, \dots, S\}, \forall k \in \{1, 2, \dots, |W|\}$$

Strategy constraint: This constraint limits system-usage cost per target at stage  $t$ .  $m_i$  depends on performance of available resource  $k$  on target  $i$ . For missile systems,  $m_i = 1$ , and for artillery systems,  $m_i \geq 1$ .

$$\sum_{k=1}^{|W|} x_{ik}(t) \leq m_i \quad \forall t \in \{1, 2, \dots, S\}, \forall i \in \{1, 2, \dots, |T|\}$$

Resource constraint: This constraint governs over ammunition availability.

$$\sum_{t=1}^S \sum_{i=1}^{|T|} x_{ik}(t) \leq N_k, \quad \forall k \in \{1, 2, \dots, |W|\}$$

Engagement feasibility constraint: This constraint is over the resource-target relationship: if a target  $i$  can be hit by a resource  $k$  at stage  $t$ , then  $f_{ik}(t) = 1$ , and  $f_{ik}(t) = 0$  otherwise.

$$x_{ik}(t) \leq f_{ik}(t), \quad \forall t \in \{1, 2, \dots, S\}, \forall i \in \{1, 2, \dots, |T|\}$$

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