

SOAR-EDR HOME LAB

SOAR–EDR Automated Incident Response Playbook

This project demonstrates a real-world **Security Operations Center (SOC)** workflow that integrates an **Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR)** platform with a **Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR)** solution to detect threats and automatically isolate compromised machines with analyst approval.

The lab simulates an attack, detects it at the endpoint level, triggers automated alerts, requests human approval, and performs controlled containment — just like a modern SOC environment.

Project Objective

The objective of this project is to design and implement an automated incident response workflow that:

- Detects malicious activity on an endpoint
- Sends detection alerts to a SOAR platform
- Notifies security analysts via Slack and Email
- Allows an analyst to decide whether the machine should be isolated
- Automatically isolates the endpoint if approved
- Verifies and reports the isolation status


This project reflects how security teams combine automation with human decision-making to reduce response time while avoiding accidental disruptions.

Technologies Used

TOOL	ROLE IN THIS PROJECT
LimaCharlie (EDR)	Endpoint monitoring, detection, and response actions
Tines (SOAR)	Workflow automation and playbook orchestration
Slack	Real-time SOC alert notifications
Email	Secondary alerting channel
LaZagne	Simulated credential dumping attack tool
Windows 10 (Virtual Machine)	Target endpoint for attack simulation
VirtualBox	Virtual lab environment

Lab Architecture Overview

The lab consists of a Windows 10 virtual endpoint monitored by LimaCharlie. When suspicious activity is detected, LimaCharlie forwards the event data to Tines through a webhook. Tines processes the event, sends alerts, requests analyst input, and performs automated containment if approved. The final containment status is then reported back to the SOC team.



This architecture demonstrates the full lifecycle of **Detection** → **Alerting** → **Human Decision** → **Automated Response** → **Verification**.

⚙️ Step-by-Step Implementation

1 Endpoint & EDR Deployment

A Windows 10 virtual machine was deployed in VirtualBox to serve as the monitored endpoint. In LimaCharlie, an installation key was generated, and the sensor installation package was downloaded using the generated link. The sensor was installed on the Windows VM using this key.

Installing the sensor requires administrator (or root) execution.

Windows EXE: `lc_sensor.exe -i YOUR_INSTALLATION_KEY`

Windows MSI: `lc_sensor.msi InstallationKey="YOUR_INSTALLATION_KEY"`

MacOS: `chmod +x lc_sensor ; ./lc_sensor -i YOUR_INSTALLATION_KEY`

Linux: `chmod +x lc_sensor ; ./lc_sensor -d YOUR_INSTALLATION_KEY`

Note: On Linux the exact persistence mechanism, like launchd, is left to the administrator, therefore the `-d` argument launches the sensor from the current working directory without persistence. The sensor does not daemonize itself.

Note: A sample installer script is available [here](#) that works on Debian and CentOS families. A systemd installer script can be found [here](#).

Chrome(+OS): See our [documentation here](#).

Docker: See our [documentation here](#).

pinned SSL certificates (SSL interception is not supported)

`9157798c50af372c.lc.limacharlie.io`

or using non-pinned SSL certificates (SSL interception supported)

`9157798c50af372c.edr.limacharlie.io`

Chrome Agent to cloud: *agents require access over pc using normal SSL certificates websockets*

`9157798c50af372c.wss.limacharlie.io`

Artifact Collection ingestion and Payload execution: *agents require access over port 443 to ingest artifact or download payloads*

`9157798c50af372c.ingest.limacharlie.io`

Replay API: *agents do NOT require access*

`9157798c50af372c.replay.limacharlie.io`

Sensor Downloads [VIEW DOCS](#) →

EDR	WINDOWS	MACOS	LINUX	CHROMIUM (/OS)
	Windows 32 bit	macOS Universal	Linux 32 bit	Chrome
	Windows 64 bit		Linux 64 bit	Edge
	Windows msi32		Linux 32 bit .deb	
	Windows msi64		Linux 64 bit .deb	
			Linux 32 bit .deb	
			Linux 64 bit .deb	

Adapter

LINUX	BSD	MACOS	WINDOWS
Linux 64 bit	FreeBSD 64 bit	macOS Universal	Windows 64 bit
Linux arm	OpenBSD 64 bit		
Linux arm64	NetBSD 64 bit		

Today



```
FLARE-VM Sat 01/31/2026 9:41:51.22
C:\Users\itsok\Downloads>hcp_win_x64_release_4.33.25.exe -i AAAABgAAQsFAAAAIzkxNTc30ThjNTBhZjM3MmMubG
MubGltYwNoYXJsaWUuaW8AAAAAEBEAIbuwAAQwFAAAAIzkxNTc30ThjNTBhZjM3MmMubGMubGltYwNoYXJsaWUuaW8AAAAAEBEIBuwAA
AAIBAAAAAQAAAAAHAHAANPj0Mwg20DhnUjuTnPdH/8AAAAJBWAAABDFE5eb/SHmZSQAyPlYwJ3AAAAABACAAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAADAAAAAAAYDAAAAAAQ4HAAABJjCCASiWdQYJKoZIhvcNAQEBBQADggEPADCCAQoCggEBAL2SpxyNnur8WPuR
UzJqn8rXqc1hMD/E2sy4lWZraFmCDB0IpxHEDWJrj0NvNkUtA55RPAws5CEPi0iVrxFHYjrpXWxF8kzjZMFJzn/kWDFIqWeoL9EwBKJ
ZB0Be1D/MqSBOKHrfGe0+AbCpAERDpsZFzLPfMpyAijnyNDxIgBYLe/adQmmittf4w1Tx3w46q/ND/XR24EJL/1zqwwG61GUCoL3VV
/DToqWYXCy7Swdt8f1hicr8QgSVVeJ8o4/qTVKP9S40QuZe0fpiEE0W0eDUnpIg3uMUHp2QDuLwXjKh6HuD7i8DUkXX37hzcJdMEsd
cg+ZBo8Zwzo70tDDvDvW8CAwEAAQ==
```

LimaCharlie Agent Installer
<https://limacharlie.io>

```
*** SUCCESS
*** Agent installed successfully!
```

```
FLARE-VM Sat 01/31/2026 9:44:19.90
C:\Users\itsok\Downloads>
```

Dashboard

Query Console BETA

Sensors

Sensors List

Event Collection

Payloads

Deployed Versions

Installation Keys

Artifact Collection

External Adapters

Artifacts

Detections

Automation

Extensions

Outputs

Organization Settings

Sensors

VIEW DOCS →

ADD SENSOR

Sensors are the primary input for data into LimaCharlie. They run on a variety of supported platforms and send JSON events to LimaCharlie's cloud in real-time. Embedded platforms (e.g. Windows, Mac, Linux) expose deeper capabilities like sending commands and collecting artifacts. Sensors tagged `lc:system` are generated by LimaCharlie Extensions and do not count towards the quota.

Quick Search

is_online is true

ADD FILTER

3 sensors

2 billed on usage

1 billed on quota (maximum 2)

Type	Hostname	Tags	Last Seen/Alive	Online	Isolated	Sealed
	ext-reliable-tasking	EXT:RELIABLE-TASKING LC:SYSTEM	2026-01-31 17:34:19		-	-
	desktop-16ec9pn		2026-01-31 17:45:05		On network	No
	ext-yara	EXT:EXT-YARA LC:SYSTEM	2026-01-31 17:30:45		-	-

After installation, the endpoint appeared in the LimaCharlie Sensors list, confirming that the EDR agent was successfully communicating with the platform and collecting telemetry.

2 Simulating Malicious Activity

To generate realistic security telemetry, the credential recovery tool **LaZagne** was executed on the Windows endpoint. LaZagne attempts to extract stored credentials, which makes it useful for simulating credential dumping behavior seen in real attacks.

AlessandroZ / LaZagnePublic

Notifications

Fork2.1k

Star10.6k

<> Code

Issues10

Pull requests2

Actions

Projects

Wiki

Security

Insights

Releases / v2.4.7

Release v2.4.7Latest

Compare

github-actions

 released this Apr 10, 2025

v2.4.7

a678a97

Lazagne 2.4.7

Assets3

LaZagne.exe9.67 MBApr 10, 2025

Source code (zip)Apr 10, 2025

Source code (tar.gz)Apr 10, 2025

15

4

3

1

16 people reacted

SENSORS > TIMELINE

Timeline

DATE

RANGE

2026-01-31 18:08:17

lazagne

ADD FILTER

TREE VIEW

That's all for this sensor! No more past events to fetch.

2026-01-31 18:08:17	NEW_DOCUMENT	Path: C:\Users\itsok\Downloads
2026-01-31 18:10:16	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID): LaZagne.exe (58)
2026-01-31 18:10:17	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID): LaZagne.exe (58)
2026-01-31 18:10:17	CODE_IDENTITY	Hash: dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a09078b84007d5268
2026-01-31 18:10:18	FILE_TYPE_ACCESSED	Process (PID): LaZagne.exe (58)
2026-01-31 18:10:18	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID): cmd.exe (3092)
2026-01-31 18:10:18	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID): cmd.exe (4536)
2026-01-31 18:10:18	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID): cmd.exe (5516)
2026-01-31 18:10:18	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID): cmd.exe (5600)
2026-01-31 18:10:19	FILE_TYPE_ACCESSED	Process (PID): LaZagne.exe (58)

You're up-to-date!

JUMP TO PRESENT

DOWNLOAD

c91f492499ffd08e4c1e8cf6697e4589

SCROLL INTO VIEW

GO TO PARENT

VIEW TIMELINE

COPY EVENT

BUILD D&R RULE

TIME

HOSTNAME

2026-01-31 18:10:16

desktop-16ec9pn

EVENT

ROUTING

"event": {
"BASE_ADDRESS": 140694822191104
"COMMAND_LINE": "LaZagne.exe"
"FILE_IS_SIGNED": 0
"FILE_PATH": "C:\Users\itsok\Downloads\LaZagne.exe"
"HASH":
"dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a09078b84007d5268"
"MEMORY_USAGE": 5140480
"PARENT": {
"BASE_ADDRESS": 140700617998336
"COMMAND_LINE": "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"
"CREATION_TIME": 1769881300670
"FILE_IS_SIGNED": 1
"FILE_PATH": "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe"
"HASH":
"265b69033cea7a9f8214a34cd9b17912909af46c7a47395dd7bb893a24507"

Executing LaZagne produced process creation and command-line telemetry in LimaCharlie. This data was later used to build a detection rule.

3 Detection Engineering in LimaCharlie

A Detection & Response (D&R) rule was created in LimaCharlie to detect execution of `LaZagne.exe`. Real telemetry from the endpoint timeline was used to test the detection logic to ensure accuracy and reduce false positives.

Dashboard

Query Console BETA

Sensors

Artifacts

Detections

Automation

- D&R Rules
- False Positive Rules
- Reliable Tasking
- File/Reg Integrity
- YARA Rules
- YARA Scanners
- Lookups

Detection & Response Rules 11 [VIEW DOCS](#) →

ADD RULE

Detection & Response rules automate actions based on the real-time events streaming into LimaCharlie.

All Rules

Quick Search

ADD FILTER

<input type="checkbox"/>	Name	Last Modified	Updated By	Tags	Status
<input type="checkbox"/>	Lazagne Event	2026-01-31 19:35:28	itsok9217@gmail.com		<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	ext-exfil-sync	2026-01-31 17:30:39	_ext-exfil-8f90c28...	LC:SYSTEM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	ext-yara-scan-event	2026-01-31 17:30:12	_ext-yara-db5a5624...	LC:EXT LC:SYSTEM +1 more	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/>	ext-yara-sync	2026-01-31 17:30:12	_ext-yara-db5a5624...	LC:SYSTEM EXT:EXT-YARA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

- Created the New rule in D&R rules section (Lazagne Event)

Response

1

2

3

4

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8

9

10

11

- action: report

metadata:

author: PROJECT-1

description: Detects Lazagne

falsepositives:

- Unlikely

level: medium

tags:

- attack.credential_access

name: PROJECT-01 - HAKCTOOL - Lazagne

- This is the Response Rule for the below Detection

Detect

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

events:

- NEW_PROCESS

- EXISTING_PROCESS

op: and

rules:

- op: is windows

- op: or

rules:

- case sensitive: false

op: ends with

path: event/FILE_PATH

value: lazagne.exe

- case sensitive: false

op: ends with

path: event/CMDLINE

value: all

- case sensitive: false

op: contains

path: event/CMDLINE

value: lazagne

- case sensitive: false

op: is

path: event/HASH

value: dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a09078b84007d526

- This is the Detection Rules written according to the Lazagne.exe Event by viewing the Timelines in the LimaCharlie

SCAN HISTORY TARGET EVENT

EventEXPAND

123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536

```
"event": {
  "BASE_ADDRESS": 140694822191104,
  "COMMAND_LINE": "LaZagne.exe all",
  "FILE_IS_SIGNED": 0,
  "FILE_PATH": "C:\\Users\\itsok\\Downloads\\LaZagne.exe",
  "HASH": "dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a09078b84007d5268",
  "MEMORY_USAGE": 5218304,
  "PARENT": {
    "BASE_ADDRESS": 140700617998336,
    "COMMAND_LINE": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "CREATION_TIME": 1769881300670,
    "FILE_IS_SIGNED": 1,
    "FILE_PATH": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
    "HASH": "265b69033cea7a9f8214a34cd9b17912909af46c7a47395dd7bb893a24507e59",
    "MEMORY_USAGE": 4956160,
    "PARENT_ATOM": "606e3c08a366ed5514677e5f697e3faf",
    "PARENT_PROCESS_ID": 2432,
    "PROCESS_ID": 5876,
    "THIS_ATOM": "f24176b364e04e861e349b88697e3fb5",
    "THREADS": 1,
    "TIMESTAMP": 1769881525506,
    "USER_NAME": "DESKTOP-16EC9PN\\itsok"
  },
  "PARENT_PROCESS_ID": 5876,
  "PROCESS_ID": 5124,
  "THREADS": 3,
  "USER_NAME": "DESKTOP-16EC9PN\\itsok"
},
"routing": {
  "arch": 2,
  "did": "",
  "event_id": "12efa4b3-23b2-493b-8213-273423d7af6c",
  "event_time": 1769885603967,
  "event_type": "NEW_PROCESS",
  "ext_ip": "103.238.230.194",
```

After successful testing, the rule was saved. When LaZagne was executed again, the detection triggered and appeared in the Detections section, confirming the detection rule was functioning correctly.

TEST EVENT

Match. 4 operations were evaluated with the following results:

- true => (is windows) {"op":"is windows"}
- true => (~ends with) {"case sensitive":false,"op":"ends with","path":"event/FILE_PATH","value":"lazagne.exe"}
- true => (or) {"op":"or","rules":[{"case sensitive":false,"op":"ends with","path":"event/FILE_PATH","value":"lazagne.exe"}, {"case sensitive":false,"op":"ends with","path":"event/COMMAND_LINE","value":"all"}, {"case sensitive":false,"op":"contains","path":"event/COMMAND_LINE","value":"lazagne"}, {"case sensitive":false,"op":"is","path":"event/HASH","value":"dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a09078b84007d526"}]}
- true => (and) {"events":["NEW_PROCESS","EXISTING_PROCESS"],"op":"and","rules":[{"op":"is windows"}, {"op":"or","rules":[{"case sensitive":false,"op":"ends with","path":"event/FILE_PATH","value":"lazagne.exe"}, {"case sensitive":false,"op":"ends with","path":"event/COMMAND_LINE","value":"all"}, {"case sensitive":false,"op":"contains","path":"event/COMMAND_LINE","value":"lazagne"}, {"case sensitive":false,"op":"is","path":"event/HASH","value":"dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a09078b84007d526"}]}]}

- Here we can see the Test results of input Event (that is the Lazagne Event from Timeline) and we got the all true

Overview

Analytics

Artifacts

Autoruns

Console

Detections

Drivers

Event Collection

File System

Integrity Monitoring

Live Feed

SENSORS / DETECTIONS

DetectionsVIEW DOCS

SOURCEDATERANGE

desktop-16ec9pnX▼2026-01-31 19:43:24Quick SearchADD FILTER


You're up-to-date!

2026-01-31 19:40:08PROJECT-01 - HAKCTOOL - Lazagne → desktop-16ec9pn{"event":{"BASE_ADDRESS":140694822191104,"COMMAND_LINE":"LaZagne.exe all","FILE

2026-01-31 19:40:07PROJECT-01 - HAKCTOOL - Lazagne → desktop-16ec9pn{"event":{"BASE_ADDRESS":140694822191104,"COMMAND_LINE":"LaZagne.exe all","FILE

That's all! No more past detections to fetch.


- That detections logs falls under the Detections Section in LimaCharlie




This step demonstrates practical detection engineering using real endpoint telemetry.

4 Sending Detections to SOAR (Tines)

To automate incident response, LimaCharlie detections were forwarded to Tines using a webhook integration. A webhook was created in Tines, and its URL was configured as an output destination in LimaCharlie.





- In OUPUT Section , we need to select th application we choosen if not we can go with Webhook option to insert the URL to retrieve the Event.



STEP 2/4



Syslog

VIEW DOCS →



Tines

VIEW DOCS →




Torq

VIEW DOCS →


Help & Resources


Outputs are configurable streams of data out of LimaCharlie in real-time. The data is received in the cloud.

- [Outputs Documentation](#)



When the detection rule triggered again, the event data was successfully received by Tines. This established a working pipeline between the EDR and SOAR platforms.






- And we see the Event retrieved in the webhook we created.


5 Alerting the SOC Team

Within Tines, automated alert actions were configured to notify analysts:


- A Slack message containing detection details
- An email notification with the same information




- before using the slack template in tines , we need to add the credentail of the slack in tines.



- Here we can see the Logs that , a msg has been send to that slack.



- Here is the message that came from the Tines about the Detection Retrieved. (WITH A DETAILS)



- Using the mail template , and using a temporary mail from SquareX.

[Square]^x
Be Fearless Online

+ Add to Browser

Disposable Browsers ?

- High-Speed anonymous browsing from any worldwide location
- Safely open suspicious websites without losing privacy
- Dispose the browser at anytime

Germany

Start

Disposable File Viewer ?

- Safely view documents from unknown senders
- Automatic integration with downloaded documents
- Fully private and disposable

Start

Disposable Email ?

- Keep your primary mailbox clean and secure
- Temporary, secure and anonymous email address
- Eliminate spam, unwanted ads, and malicious cyber threats

Inbox

affectio...ing9@typingsquirrel.com

[Regenerate](#) [Edit](#)

[Square]^x
Be Fearless Online

+ Add to Browser

←

Inbox [↗](#)

SOAR-EDR 101 <mail@tines.io>

Details of the retrieved Detection

2/1/2026, 3:50:59 PM

[Square]^x
Be Fearless Online

+ Add to Browser

←

Details of the retrieved Detection

from: SOAR-EDR 101 <mail@tines.io>

to: affectionatewing9@typingsquirrel.com

on: 2/1/2026, 4:29:38 PM

Title: PROJECT-01 - HAKCTOOL - Lazagne

Time: 1769940180437

Computer: desktop-16ec9pn

Source_IP: 10.0.2.15

Username: DESKTOP-16EC9PN\itsok

File Path: C:\Users\itsok\Downloads\LaZagne.exe

CMD_Line: LaZagne.exe

Sensor_ID: cb9b89d0-480c-4a46-98d2-8f70743637d9

Link: https://app.limachartlie.io/orgs/d3e3d0cc-20db-40c7-9d48-ee4e73dd87ff/sensors/cb9b89d0-480c-4a46-98d2-8f70743637d9/timeline?time=1769940180&selected=77bb3d7b057798b3f067089c697f24d5

- And we can see the Detailed mail about the Detection

The alert messages included key forensic information such as:

- Computer name
- Username
- Process name
- Command line arguments
- Timestamp of detection

This ensures analysts have sufficient context to evaluate the threat before taking action.

6 Human-in-the-Loop Decision Page

A Tines Page was created to allow an analyst to make a containment decision. The page presented a simple question:

“Do you want to isolate this computer? (YES / NO)”

USER PROMPT

Title: PROJECT-01 - HAKCTOOL - Lazagne
Time: 1769940180437
Computer: desktop-16ec9pn
Source_IP: 10.0.2.15
Username: DESKTOP-16EC9PN\itsok
File Path: C:\Users\itsok\Downloads\LaZagne.exe
CMD_Line: LaZagne.exe
Sensor_ID: cb9b89d0-480c-4a46-98d2-8f70743637d9
Link: <https://app.limacharlie.io/...d5>


Isolate

Yes

No

Submit

- here are included the info about the detection happen in the computer with main details to do further investigation.



This step introduces a human approval checkpoint before performing disruptive response actions like network isolation. This mirrors real SOC procedures where containment must often be approved by an analyst.

7 Automated Endpoint Isolation (If YES)

If the analyst selected **YES**, Tines triggered an API request to LimaCharlie to isolate the endpoint. This placed the Windows machine into network isolation mode, preventing it from communicating with other systems.

LIMA
CHARLIE

<

Search SOAR-EDR 101

Dashboard

Query Console BETA

Sensors

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Automation

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Organization Settings

Access Management

Billing

Platform Logs

ORGANIZATIONS

GR

REST API

VIEW DOCS →

USERS & ROLES

REST-API

API Details

API Root: <https://api.limacharlie.io/v1>

API Doc: <https://api.limacharlie.io/static/swagger/>

OID: [d3e3d0cc-20db-40c7-9d48-ee4e73dd87ff](#)

Org JWT: [*****](#)

User-Generated API Keys

No API keys created yet.

Service-Managed API Keys

Name

- here we need to use the API key to use the LIMACHARLIE template in times to isolate the network access of the windows machine , so this API will be insert at the build page of the template

User prompt

4

USER PROMPT

File
Time
Computer
Source IP
Destination
IP
IP
CAND User
Source IP
Link

Submit

Trigger Yes

2

Trigger No

1

HTTP Request Isolate Sensor

2

Slack Send a message

1

Run

Test

Events

Copy

Share

More

Name

Isolate Sensor

Description

Isolate Sensor

URL

https://api.limacharlie.io/v1/detection_alert.body.detect.routing.sid/isolation

Method

POST

Content type

Custom


json

Headers


+


-

- Using the Isolate Sensor of Limacharlie to isolate the mahcine , Here we are isolating using the (SID) that is Sensor ID to identify the machine.



The isolation status was verified in LimaCharlie, where the sensor showed that network isolation was active. A final Slack message was sent to inform the SOC team that the endpoint had been successfully isolated.







- after the isolation , running a ping operation to check the network connection and we can see that we arenot getting any response back (getting GENERAL FAILURE), Cuz we are isolated the Machine .
This step demonstrates automated containment with verification.


8 No Isolation Path (If NO)

If the analyst selected **NO**, the system did not isolate the endpoint. Instead, Tines sent a Slack message stating that the machine was not isolated and required further investigation. This maintains visibility while allowing analysts to continue manual investigation.






- here if the analyst (user prompt) selected "NO" then details containing about the detection will be sent to slack that "the computer is not isolated ", do furthur investigation.



Final Playbook Workflow

1. Suspicious process executes on the endpoint
2. LimaCharlie detects the activity
3. Detection event sent to Tines via webhook
4. Slack and Email alerts sent to analysts
5. Analyst decision requested through Tines page
6. If YES → Endpoint isolated automatically
7. Isolation status verified and reported



This workflow reflects a real-world SOC playbook combining automation and analyst oversight.

Skills Demonstrated

- Endpoint Detection & Response deployment
- Detection engineering using real telemetry
- SOAR playbook design and automation
- Webhook-based platform integration
- API-driven security response actions
- Human-in-the-loop incident response
- Real-time SOC alerting and communication