

SOAR-EDR HOME LAB

SOAR-EDR Automated Incident Response Playbook

This project demonstrates a real-world **Security Operations Center (SOC)** workflow that integrates an **Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR)** platform with a **Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR)** solution to detect threats and automatically isolate compromised machines with analyst approval.

The lab simulates an attack, detects it at the endpoint level, triggers automated alerts, requests human approval, and performs controlled containment — just like a modern SOC environment.

Project Objective

The objective of this project is to design and implement an automated incident response workflow that:

- Detects malicious activity on an endpoint
- Sends detection alerts to a SOAR platform
- Notifies security analysts via Slack and Email
- Allows an analyst to decide whether the machine should be isolated
- Automatically isolates the endpoint if approved
- Verifies and reports the isolation status


This project reflects how security teams combine automation with human decision-making to reduce response time while avoiding accidental disruptions.

Technologies Used

TOOL	ROLE IN THIS PROJECT
LimaCharlie (EDR)	Endpoint monitoring, detection, and response actions
Tines (SOAR)	Workflow automation and playbook orchestration
Slack	Real-time SOC alert notifications
Email	Secondary alerting channel
LaZagne	Simulated credential dumping attack tool
Windows 10 (Virtual Machine)	Target endpoint for attack simulation
VirtualBox	Virtual lab environment

Lab Architecture Overview

The lab consists of a Windows 10 virtual endpoint monitored by LimaCharlie. When suspicious activity is detected, LimaCharlie forwards the event data to Tines through a webhook. Tines processes the event, sends alerts, requests analyst input, and performs automated containment if approved. The final containment status is then reported back to the SOC team.



This architecture demonstrates the full lifecycle of **Detection → Alerting → Human Decision → Automated Response → Verification**.

⚙️ Step-by-Step Implementation

1 Endpoint & EDR Deployment

A Windows 10 virtual machine was deployed in VirtualBox to serve as the monitored endpoint. In LimaCharlie, an installation key was generated, and the sensor installation package was downloaded using the generated link. The sensor was installed on the Windows VM using this key.

```

Installing the sensor requires administrator (or root) execution.
Windows EXE: lc_sensor.exe -i YOUR_INSTALLATION_KEY
Windows MSI: lc_sensor.msi InstallationKey="YOUR_INSTALLATION_KEY"
MacOS: chmod +x lc_sensor ; ./lc_sensor -i YOUR_INSTALLATION_KEY
Linux: chmod +x lc_sensor ; ./lc_sensor -d YOUR_INSTALLATION_KEY

Note: On Linux the exact persistence mechanism, like launchd, is left to the administrator, therefore the -d argument
launches the sensor from the current working directory without persistence. The sensor does not daemonize itself.

Note: A sample installer script is available here that works on Debian and CentOS families. A systemd installer script can be
found here.
Chrome(+OS): See our documentation here.
Docker: See our documentation here.

```

```

pinned SSL certificates (SSL interception is not supported)
9157798c50af372c.lc.limacharlie.io
or using non-pinned SSL certificates (SSL interception
supported)
9157798c50af372c.edr.limacharlie.io
Chrome Agent to cloud: agents require access over port
using normal SSL certificates websockets
9157798c50af372c.wss.limacharlie.io
Artifact Collection Ingestion and Payload execution: agents
require access over port 443 to ingest artifact or download
payloads
9157798c50af372c.ingest.limacharlie.io
Replay API: agents do NOT require access
9157798c50af372c.replay.limacharlie.io

```

Sensor Downloads [VIEW DOCS →](#)

EDR

WINDOWS

- Windows 32 bit
- Windows 64 bit
- Windows msi32
- Windows msi64

MACOS

- macOS Universal

LINUX

- Linux 32 bit


CHROMIUM(/OS)

- Chrome
- Edge

Adapter

LINUX

- Linux 64 bit
- Linux arm
- Linux arm64



BSD

- FreeBSD 64 bit
- OpenBSD 64 bit
- NetBSD 64 bit

MACOS


- macOS Universal

WINDOWS

- Windows 64 bit

Your browser is managed by your organization

Today



The screenshot shows the Sensors page of the LimaCharlie web application. The top navigation bar includes links for Dashboard, Query Console (BETA), Sensors, Artifacts, Detections, Automation, Extensions, Outputs, Organization Settings, and Access Management.

The main content area displays a search bar with filters for "Quick Search", "is_online is true", and an "ADD FILTER" button. Below the search bar, it shows "3 sensors | 2 billed on usage | 1 billed on quota (maximum 2)".

A table lists three sensors:

Type	Hostname	Tags	Last Seen/Alive	Online	Isolated	Sealed
ext-reliable-tasking	desktop-16ec9pn	EXT:RELIABLE-TASKING LC:SYSTEM	2026-01-31 17:34:19	✓	-	-
ext-yara		EXT:EXT-YARA LC:SYSTEM	2026-01-31 17:45:05	✓	On network	No

After installation, the endpoint appeared in the LimaCharlie Sensors list, confirming that the EDR agent was successfully communicating with the platform and collecting telemetry.

2 Simulating Malicious Activity

To generate realistic security telemetry, the credential recovery tool **LaZagne** was executed on the Windows endpoint. LaZagne attempts to extract stored credentials, which makes it useful for simulating credential dumping behavior seen in real attacks.

[Releases / v2.4.7](#)

Release v2.4.7 Latest

github-actions released this Apr 10, 2025 · v2.4.7 · a678a97

Lazagne 2.4.7


Assets 3

LaZagne.exe	9.67 MB	Apr 10, 2025
Source code (zip)		Apr 10, 2025
Source code (tar.gz)		Apr 10, 2025

15 people reacted

SENSORS > TIMELINE

Timeline

DATE RANGE ADD FILTER TREE VIEW 

That's all for this sensor! No more past events to fetch.

2026-01-31 18:08:17	NEW_DOCUMENT	Path: C:\Users\itsok\Downloads
2026-01-31 18:10:16	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID): LaZagne.exe (55)
2026-01-31 18:10:17	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID): LaZagne.exe (56)
2026-01-31 18:10:17	CODE_IDENTITY	Hash: dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c
2026-01-31 18:10:18	FILE_TYPE_ACCESED	Process (PID): LaZagne.exe (55)
2026-01-31 18:10:18	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID): cmd.exe (3092)
2026-01-31 18:10:18	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID): cmd.exe (4536)
2026-01-31 18:10:18	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID): cmd.exe (5516)
2026-01-31 18:10:18	NEW_PROCESS	Process (PID): cmd.exe (5600)
2026-01-31 18:10:19	FILE_TYPE_ACCESED	Process (PID): LaZagne.exe (56)

You're up-to-date! [JUMP TO PRESENT](#)

[DOWNLOAD](#)

c91f492499ffd08e4c1e8cf6697e4589

SCROLL INTO VIEW 

TIME: 2026-01-31 18:10:16 HOSTNAME: desktop-16ec9pn

EVENT ROUTING

```

{
  "event": {
    "BASE_ADDRESS": 140694822191104,
    "COMMAND_LINE": "LaZagne.exe",
    "FILE_IS_SIGNED": 0,
    "FILE_PATH": "C:\Users\itsok\Downloads\LaZagne.exe",
    "HASH": "dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a09078b84007d5268",
    "MEMORY_USAGE": 5140480
  },
  "PARENT": {
    "BASE_ADDRESS": 140700617998336,
    "COMMAND_LINE": "cmd.exe",
    "CREATION_TIME": 1769881300670,
    "FILE_IS_SIGNED": 1,
    "FILE_PATH": "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe",
    "HASH": "265b69033cea7a9f8214a34cd9b17912909af46c7a47395dd7bb893a24507"
  }
}

```

Executing LaZagne produced process creation and command-line telemetry in LimaCharlie. This data was later used to build a detection rule.

3 Detection Engineering in LimaCharlie

A Detection & Response (D&R) rule was created in LimaCharlie to detect execution of `lazagne.exe`. Real telemetry from the endpoint timeline was used to test the detection logic to ensure accuracy and reduce false positives.

Detection & Response Rules 11 [VIEW DOCS →](#)

Detection & Response rules automate actions based on the real-time events streaming into LimaCharlie.

All Rules	Quick Search	ADD FILTER		
Name	Last Modified	Updated By	Tags	Status
Lazagne Event	2026-01-31 19:35:28	itsok9217@gmail.com	LC:SYSTEM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ext-exfil-sync	2026-01-31 17:30:39	_ext-exfil-8f90c28...	LC:SYSTEM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ext-yara-scan-event	2026-01-31 17:30:12	_ext-yara-db5a5624...	LC:EXT LC:SYSTEM +1 more	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
ext-yara-sync	2026-01-31 17:30:12	_ext-yara-db5a5624...	LC:SYSTEM EXT:EXT-YARA	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>

- Created the New rule in D&R rules section (Lazagne Event)

Response

```

1 - action: report
2   metadata:
3     author: PROJECT-1
4     description: Detects Lazagne
5   falsepositives:
6     - Unlikely
7   level: medium
8   tags:
9     - attack.credential_access
10  name: PROJECT-01 - HAKCTOOL - Lazagne
11

```

- This is the Response Rule for the below Detection


Detect

```

1 events:
2   - NEW_PROCESS
3   - EXISTING_PROCESS
4 op: and
5 rules:
6   - op: is windows
7   - op: or
8     rules:
9       - case sensitive: false
10      op: ends with
11      path: event/FILE_PATH
12      value: lazagne.exe
13     - case sensitive: false
14     op: ends with
15     path: event/COMMAND_LINE
16     value: all
17     - case sensitive: false
18     op: contains
19     path: event/COMMAND_LINE
20     value: lazagne
21     - case sensitive: false
22     op: is
23     path: event/HASH
24     value: dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a09078b84007d526
25

```

- This is the Detection Rules written according to the Lazagne.exe Event by viewing the Timelines in the LimaCharlie



```

1  {
2    "event": {
3      "BASE_ADDRESS": 140694822191104,
4      "COMMAND_LINE": "LaZagne.exe all",
5      "FILE_IS_SIGNED": 0,
6      "FILE_PATH": "C:\\Users\\itsok\\Downloads\\LaZagne.exe",
7      "HASH": "dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a09078b84007d5268",
8      "MEMORY_USAGE": 5218304,
9      "PARENT": {
10        "BASE_ADDRESS": 140700617998336,
11        "COMMAND_LINE": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
12        "CREATION_TIME": 1769881300670,
13        "FILE_IS_SIGNED": 1,
14        "FILE_PATH": "C:\\Windows\\System32\\cmd.exe",
15        "HASH": "265b69033cea7a9f8214a34cd9b17912909af46c7a47395dd7bb893a24507e59",
16        "MEMORY_USAGE": 4956160,
17        "PARENT_ATOM": "606e3c08a366ed5514677e5f697e3faf",
18        "PARENT_PROCESS_ID": 2432,
19        "PROCESS_ID": 5876,
20        "THIS_ATOM": "f24176b364e04e861e349b88697e3fb5",
21        "THREADS": 1,
22        "TIMESTAMP": 1769881525506,
23        "USER_NAME": "DESKTOP-16EC9PN\\itsok"
24      },
25      "PARENT_PROCESS_ID": 5876,
26      "PROCESS_ID": 5124,
27      "THREADS": 3,
28      "USER_NAME": "DESKTOP-16EC9PN\\itsok"
29    },
30    "routing": {
31      "arch": 2,
32      "did": "",
33      "event_id": "12efa4b3-23b2-493b-8213-273423d7af6c",
34      "event_time": 1769885603967,
35      "event_type": "NEW_PROCESS",
36      "ext_ip": "103.238.230.194",

```


After successful testing, the rule was saved. When LaZagne was executed again, the detection triggered and appeared in the Detections section, confirming the detection rule was functioning correctly.



Match. 4 operations were evaluated with the following results:

- true => (is windows) {op:"is windows"}
- true => (~ends with) {"case sensitive":false,op:"ends with",path:"event/FILE_PATH",value:"lazagne.exe"}
- true => (or) {"op":"or","rules":[{"case sensitive":false,op:"ends with",path:"event/FILE_PATH",value:"lazagne.exe"}, {"case sensitive":false,op:"ends with",path:"event/COMMAND_LINE",value:"all"}, {"case sensitive":false,op:"contains",path:"event/COMMAND_LINE",value:"lazagne"}, {"case sensitive":false,op:"is",path:"event/HASH",value:"dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a09078b84007d526"}]}
- true => (and) {"events":["NEW_PROCESS","EXISTING_PROCESS"],op:"and","rules":[{"op:"is windows"}, {"op:"or","rules":[{"case sensitive":false,op:"ends with",path:"event/FILE_PATH",value:"lazagne.exe"}, {"case sensitive":false,op:"ends with",path:"event/COMMAND_LINE",value:"all"}, {"case sensitive":false,op:"contains",path:"event/COMMAND_LINE",value:"lazagne"}, {"case sensitive":false,op:"is",path:"event/HASH",value:"dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a09078b84007d526"}]}]

- Here we can see the Test results of input Event (that is the Lazagne Event from Timeline) and we got the all true



SOURCE	DATE	RANGE
desktop-16ec9pn	2026-01-31 19:43:24	

You're up-to-date!

That's all! No more past detections to fetch.

- That detections logs falls under the Detections Section in LimaCharlie

You're up-to-date!

2026-01-31 19:40:08 PROJECT-01 - HAKCTOOL - Lazagne → desktop-16ec9pn

2026-01-31 19:40:07 PROJECT-01 - HAKCTOOL - Lazagne → desktop-16ec9pn

That's all! No more past detections to fetch.

3c44f8bf-e211-4b6c-a0b3-6742697e5a9c

VIEW TIMELINE → COPY SOURCE MARK FALSE POSITIVE ↗ VIEW RULE →

CATEGORY	TIME
PROJECT-01 - HAKCTOOL - Lazagne	2026-01-31 19:40:08

SOURCE
desktop-16ec9pn

DETECTION ROUTING AI EXPLAIN

```
event : {  
    "BASE_ADDRESS": "140694822191104",  
    "COMMAND_LINE": "LaZagne.exe all",  
    "FILE_IS_SIGNED": 0,  
    "FILE_PATH": "C:\Users\itsok\Downloads\LaZagne.exe",  
    "HASH": "dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a09078b84007d5268",  
    "MEMORY_USAGE": 7987200,  
    "PARENT": {  
        "BASE_ADDRESS": "140694822191104",  
        "COMMAND_LINE": "LaZagne.exe all",  
        "FILE_IS_SIGNED": 0,  
        ...  
    },  
    ...  
}
```

This step demonstrates practical detection engineering using real endpoint telemetry.

4 Sending Detections to SOAR (Tines)

To automate incident response, LimaCharlie detections were forwarded to Tines using a webhook integration. A webhook was created in Tines, and its URL was configured as an output destination in LimaCharlie.

Build Summary Test Status Logs

Webhook Retrieve Detections

Run Test Events

⚠ Until you publish this Story, Webhooks will only function while you're working on it.

Name: Retrieve Detections

Description: Retrieve LimaCharlie Detections

Webhook URL: https://delicate-fire-6880.tines.com/webhook/your-first-story/

Path: your-first-story

Secret: 546f33e3977876a5d39d5c5ca38b6604

Search SOAR-EDR 101[Dashboard](#)[Query Console BETA](#)[Sensors](#)[Artifacts](#)[Detections](#)[Automation](#)[Extensions](#)[Outputs](#)

No Outputs connected yet.

[Outputs](#) allows you to integrate data from LimaCharlie into other cloud tools. Stream sensor events, detections, and logs out to Slack, S3, GCS, SMTP, and more.

[ADD OUTPUT](#)[VIEW DOCS](#)[Organization Settings](#)[Access Management](#)[Billing](#)[Platform Logs](#)

- In OUPUT Section , we need to select th application we choosen if not we can go with Webhook option to insert the URL to retrieve the Event.



STEP 2/4



Syslog

[VIEW DOCS →](#)



Tines

[VIEW DOCS →](#)



Torq

[VIEW DOCS →](#)

Help & Resources

Outputs are configurable streams of data out of LimaCharlie in real-time. Data is received in the cloud.

- [Outputs Documentation](#)



STEP 3/4

Configure Output of Detections → Tines

NAME

SOAR-EDR 101

DESTINATION HOST i

https://delicate-fire-688C

► Advanced Options

SAVE OUTPUT

Help & Reso

Outputs are config streams of data ou LimaCharlie in real data is received in

- [Outputs Documen](#)

When the detection rule triggered again, the event data was successfully received by Tines. This established a working pipeline between the EDR and SOAR platforms.



STEP 4/4

SOAR-EDR 101 configuration saved!

This is a good time to check your destination and see if you're receiving data on that end.

Here are some samples of what you should see:

Samples for SOAR-EDR 101

REFRESH SAMPLES

```
"root": {
  "author": "itsok9217@gmail.com",
  "cat": "PROJECT-01 - HAKCTOOL - Lazagne",
  "detect": {
    "event": {
      "BASE_ADDRESS": 140703025594368,
      "COMMAND_LINE": "LaZagne.exe",
      "FILE_IS_SIGNED": 0,
      "FILE_PATH": "C:\Users\itsok\Downloads\LaZagne.exe",
      "HASH": "dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a09078b84007d5268",
      "MEMORY_USAGE": 5128192
    },
    "PARENT": {
      "BASE_ADDRESS": 140695528603648,
      "COMMAND_LINE": "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe",
      "FILE_IS_SIGNED": 1,
      "FILE_PATH": "C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe",
      "HASH": "265b69033cea7a9f8214a34cd9b17912909af46c7a47395dd7bb893a24507e59",
      "MEMORY_USAGE": 4292608
    }
  }
}
```

The screenshot shows the Tines interface with a "Webhook Retrieve Detections" step selected. The payload is displayed as JSON:

```
"cat": "PROJECT-01 - HAKCTOOL - Lazagne",
"detect": { },
"event": { },
"BASE_ADDRESS": 140703025594368,
"COMMAND_LINE": "LaZagne.exe",
"FILE_IS_SIGNED": 0,
"FILE_PATH": "C:\\Users\\itsok\\Downloads\\LaZagne.exe",
"HASH": > "dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a0907...",
"MEMORY_USAGE": 22839296,
"PARENT": { 13 },
"PARENT_PROCESS_ID": 5060,
"PROCESS_ID": 4644,
```

- And we see the Event retrieved in the webhook we created.

5 Alerting the SOC Team


Within Tines, automated alert actions were configured to notify analysts:

- A Slack message containing detection details
- An email notification with the same information

The screenshot shows the Tines interface with a "Webhook Detection alert" step connected to a "Slack Send a message" step. The configuration details for the Slack step are shown:

- Channel / User ID: C0AC4R49H5K
- Message: Hello, *world*
- Optional inputs: + Optional inputs

- before using the slack template in tines , we need to add the credential of the slack in tines.



- Here we can see the Logs that , a msg has been send to that slack.


The screenshot shows a Slack channel interface. On the left, there's a sidebar with various sections like 'Huddles', 'Directories', 'Starred', 'Channels' (with '# all-soar-edr-101' highlighted), 'Direct messages', 'Apps' (with 'Slackbot' and 'Tines' listed), and 'Add channels', 'Add channels', 'Add apps'. The main area shows a message from 'Tines' at 4:23. The message content is:

```

LaZagne.exe
cb9b89d0-480c-4a46-98d2-8f70743637d9
dc06d62ee95062e714f2566c95b8edaabfd387023b1bf98a090
78b84007d5268
https://app.limacharlie.io/orgs/d3e3d0cc-20db-40c7-9d48-
ee4e73dd87ff/sensors/cb9b89d0-480c-4a46-98d2-
8f70743637d9/timeline?
time=1769940180&selected=77bb3d7b057798b3f067089c69
7f24d5
4:23 Title: PROJECT-01 - HAKCTOOL - Lazagne
Time: 1769940180437
Computer: desktop-16ec9pn
Source_IP: 10.0.2.15
Username: DESKTOP-16EC9PN\itsok
File Path: C:\Users\itsok\Downloads\LaZagne.exe
CMD_Line: LaZagne.exe
Sensor_ID: cb9b89d0-480c-4a46-98d2-8f70743637d9
Link: https://app.limacharlie.io/orgs/d3e3d0cc-20db-40c7-9d48-
ee4e73dd87ff/sensors/cb9b89d0-480c-4a46-98d2-
8f70743637d9/timeline?
time=1769940180&selected=77bb3d7b057798b3f067089c69
7f24d5

```

- Here is the message that came from the Tines about the Detection Retrieved. (WITH A DETAILS)



- Using the mail template , and using a temporary mail from SquareX.

- And we can see the Detailed mail about the Detection

The alert messages included key forensic information such as:

- Computer name
- Username
- Process name
- Command line arguments
- Timestamp of detection

This ensures analysts have sufficient context to evaluate the threat before taking action.

6 Human-in-the-Loop Decision Page

A Tines Page was created to allow an analyst to make a containment decision. The page presented a simple question:

“Do you want to isolate this computer? (YES / NO)”


USER PROMPT

Title: PROJECT-01 - HAKCTOOL - Lazagne
 Time: 1769940180437
 Computer: desktop-16ec9pn
 Source_IP: 10.0.2.15
 Username: DESKTOP-16EC9PN\itsok
 File Path: C:\Users\itsok\Downloads\LaZagne.exe
 CMD_Line: LaZagne.exe
 Sensor_ID: cb9b89d0-480c-4a46-98d2-8f70743637d9
 Link: <https://app.limacharlie.io/...d5>

Isolate

Submit

- here are included the info about the detection happen in the computer with main details to do further investigation.



This step introduces a human approval checkpoint before performing disruptive response actions like network isolation. This mirrors real SOC procedures where containment must often be approved by an analyst.

7 Automated Endpoint Isolation (If YES)

If the analyst selected **YES**, Tines triggered an API request to LimaCharlie to isolate the endpoint. This placed the Windows machine into network isolation mode, preventing it from communicating with other systems.

LIMA CHARLIE

Search SOAR-EDR 101

Dashboard

Query Console BETA

Sensors

Artifacts

Detections

Automation

Extensions

Outputs

Organization Settings

Access Management

Billing

Platform Logs

REST API [VIEW DOCS →](#)

USERS & ROLES REST-API

API Details

API Root: <https://api.limacharlie.io/v1>
 API Doc: <https://api.limacharlie.io/static/swagger/>
 OID: d3e3d0cc-20db-40c7-9d48-ee4e73dd87ff [Copy](#)
 Org JWT: ***** [Copy](#)


User-Generated API Keys

No API keys created yet.

Service-Managed API Keys

Name

- here we need to use the API key to use the LIMACHARLIE template in tines to isolate the network access of the windows machine , so this API will be insert at the build page of the template



- Using the Isolate Sensor of Limacharlie to isolate the machine , Here we are isolating using the (SID) that is Sensor ID to identify the machine.

Test: Get Isolation Status

Events Log Memory Metadata


Search this payload...

```
[  
 {  
   "get_isolation_status": {  
     "body": {  
       "is_isolated": false,  
       "should_isolate": false  
     },  
     "headers": { 12 },  
     "status": 200,  
     "meta": { 3 }  
   }  
 }]
```

Cancel Test

The isolation status was verified in LimaCharlie, where the sensor showed that network isolation was active. A final Slack message was sent to inform the SOC team that the endpoint had been successfully isolated.

The screenshot shows the LimaCharlie web interface. On the left, there's a sidebar with navigation links: Overview (which is selected and highlighted in blue), Analytics, Artifacts, Autoruns, Console, Detections, Drivers, Event Collection, File System, Integrity Monitoring, and Device Health. The main content area is titled "SENSORS > OVERVIEW" and shows a summary for the sensor "desktop-16ec9pn". It includes sections for "HOSTNAME" (desktop-16ec9pn), "NETWORK ACCESS" (Isolated, with a "REJOIN NETWORK" button), and "SEAL STATUS" (Not Sealed, with a "SEAL" button). The overall theme is dark with blue highlights for active sections.





- after the isolation , running a ping operation to check the network connection and we can see that we are not getting any response back (getting GENERAL FAILURE), Cuz we are isolated the Machine .

This step demonstrates automated containment with verification.

8 No Isolation Path (If NO)

If the analyst selected **NO**, the system did not isolate the endpoint. Instead, Tines sent a Slack message stating that the machine was not isolated and required further investigation. This maintains visibility while allowing analysts to continue manual investigation.





- here if the analyst (user prompt) selected "NO" then details containing about the detection will be sent to slack that "the computer is not isolated ", do furthur investigation.

The screenshot shows a Slack channel interface with a sidebar and a main message area.

Sidebar:

- Channels: # all-soar-edr-101 (highlighted in purple)
- Direct messages
- Apps: Slackbot, Tines (highlighted in purple)

Main Area:

Message from Tines APP 12:22 AM:


```
Time: 1769940180437
Computer: desktop-16ec9pn
Source_IP: 10.0.2.15
Username: DESKTOP-16EC9PN\itsok
File Path: C:\Users\itsok\Downloads\LaZagne.exe
CMD_Line: LaZagne.exe
Sensor_Id: cb9b89d0-480c-4a46-98d2-8f70743637d9
Link: https://app.limacharlie.io/orgs/d3e3d0cc-20db-40c7-9d48-ee4e73dd87ff/sensors/cb9b89d0-480c-4a46-98d2-8f70743637d9/timeline?time=1769940180&selected=77bb3d7b057798b3f067089c697f24d5
```

Message from Tines APP 12:22 AM:

The Computer: desktop-16ec9pn
is not isolated.

Final Playbook Workflow

1. Suspicious process executes on the endpoint
2. LimaCharlie detects the activity
3. Detection event sent to Tines via webhook
4. Slack and Email alerts sent to analysts
5. Analyst decision requested through Tines page
6. If YES → Endpoint isolated automatically
7. Isolation status verified and reported



This workflow reflects a real-world SOC playbook combining automation and analyst oversight.

🎯 Skills Demonstrated

- Endpoint Detection & Response deployment
- Detection engineering using real telemetry
- SOAR playbook design and automation
- Webhook-based platform integration
- API-driven security response actions
- Human-in-the-loop incident response
- Real-time SOC alerting and communication