TU Graz

SCIENCE
PASSION
TECHNOLOGY

AndroGUARD: Mitigation of Sensor Fingerprinting on Android

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Outline

Introduction

- Misuse of the Android API
- Used for targeted advertisements
- Does not require user permission

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Smartphone Fingerprinting

- Similar to browser fingerprinting
- Not as known as browser fingerprinting
- Zero permission identifiers



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

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

Fingerprinting Sensors

- Measurement inaccuracy of sensors
- Simple to fingerprint via machine learning algorithmus
- Constant over the sensors lifetime



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

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

Main Question

How to protect against sensor fingerprinting

Proposed Solutions

Calibration

- Systematic adjustment of sensor readings
- Correcting the sensor data

Noise Generation

- Introduces variability into the sensor data
- Masks the original values

Challenges

Calibration

- Requires user awareness and interaction
- Requires precision

Noise Generation

- Degrade the functionality of applications
- Code has to be modified

Our Methodology

- Noise Generation
- Patch application vie A2P2 framework



Modifying the Sensor API

- Intercept calls to registerListener method
- Provide modified values to onSensorChanged method



Noise Generation

- Adds random gain and offset to every value
- Masks values
- Loss of precision

Implementation

- Intercept Method
- Noise Generating Function
- Random Value Generation Function

Intercept Method



Figure: The function calls from the system are intercepted by our patch and forwarded after modification to the original function.

Implementation

- Intercept Method
- Noise Generating Function
- Random Value Generation Function

Noise Generating Function

$$value_{new} = \frac{(value_{old} - offset_{sensor})}{gain_{sensor}}$$

Implementation

- Intercept Method
- Noise Generating Function
- Random Value Generation Function

Application of Patch

- Straightforward application
- Only requirements are
  - JAVA JRE
  - A2P2
  - APK to be modified

Testing

- Functionality
- Effectiveness
- Usabilty

Functionality



Figure: recorded values before the patch



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Effectiveness



Figure: knn decision boundaries before the patch



Figure: knn decision boundaries after the patch

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Noise Level Adjustment

- Increasing noise decreases fingerprintability
- Increasing noise decreases functionality



Discussion & Limitations

- Limited amount of test devices
- Could not be done sufficiently due to limited access to supported hardware

Conclusion

- Easy application of the patch
- Masking the sensor values decreases fingerprintability