

AndroGUARD: Mitigation of Sensor Fingerprinting on Android

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Outline

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Background
- 3 Sensor Fingerprinting
- 4 Methodology
- 5 Approach
- 6 Implementation
- 7 Evaluation
- 8 Discussion & Limitations



Introduction

- Misuse of the Android API
- Used for targeted advertisements
- Does not require user permission



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Browser Fingerprinting Methodologies

- Analyzing various browser-specific attributes
- Can be used to distinguish users across sessions



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Browser Fingerprinting Protections

- Blocking the execution of JavaScript
- Introduction of controlled randomization



Figure: JSherter

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Smartphone Fingerprinting

- Zero permission identifiers
- Personalized configurations



Fingerprinting Sensors

- Measurement inaccuracy of sensors
- Simple to fingerprint via machine learning algorithms
- Is constant over the sensors lifetime



Main Question

How to protect against
sensor fingerprinting



Proposed Solutions

- Calibration
- Noise Generation



Calibration

- Systematic adjustment of sensor readings
- Correcting the sensor data



Proposed Solutions

- Calibration
- Noise Generation



Noise Generation

- Introduces variability into the sensor data
- Masks the original values



Challenges

- Calibration
- Noise Generation



Calibration

- Requires user awareness and interaction
- Requires precision



Challenges

- Calibration
- Noise Generation



Noise Generation

- Degrade the functionality of applications
- Code has to be modified




Our Methodology

- Noise Generation
- Patch application via A2P2 framework




Modifying the Sensor API

- Intercept calls to `registerListener` method
- Provide modified values to `onSensorChanged` method



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Noise Generation

- Adds random gain and offset to every value
- masks values



Loss of Precision



Implementation

- Intercept Method
- Noise Generating Function
- Random Value Generation Function



Intercept Method




Figure: The function calls from the system are intercepted by our patch and forwarded after modification to the original function.

Implementation

- Intercept Method
- Noise Generating Function
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Application of Patch

- Intercept the original method
- Apply appropriate random noise
- Return obstructed sensor data to original method



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
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
Testing

- Incorporates the patch into a valid APK
- Intercepts the original function calls
- Executes the patch





Functionality

- Incorporates the patch into a valid APK
- Intercepts the original function calls
- Executes the patch




Effectiveness



Usability

- Incorporates the patch into a valid APK
- Intercepts the original function calls
- Executes the patch




Noise Level Adjustment

- Incorporates the patch into a valid APK
- Intercepts the original function calls
- Executes the patch



Discussion & Limitations

- Comparing values before and after the patch
- Could not be done sufficiently due to limited access to supported hardware



Conclusion

- Masking the sensor values decreases fingerprintability
- Modifying the `SensorEventListener` makes it easy to incorporate the patch into the Android API

