

Chapter 8:

Security in Computer Networks

- Security Goals
- Cryptography
- Authentication
- Digital Signature

Security Goals

□ Confidentiality

- to assure that information is available and disclosed only to the authorized parties
- privacy - assures that individuals control what information related to them may be collected and stored and by whom and to whom that information may be disclosed

□ Integrity

- data integrity – assures that information can be modified only by authorized parties and only in authorized ways
- system integrity – assures that a system performs its intended function in an authorized way, free from unauthorized manipulation of the system

Security Goals

□ Availability


- assures that systems work promptly and service is not denied to authorized users

□ Authenticity


- user authenticity – individuals can assure the validity of the identity of peer
- message authenticity – receivers can assure the originality of the message

Security Attacks

□ Normal information flow




□ Interruption: attack on availability




Security Attacks

□ **Interception:** attack on confidentiality




□ **Modification:** attack on integrity



Security Attacks

□ Fabrication: attack on authenticity



Security Attacks

Passive attacks:

□ Interception

- attacks confidentiality a.k.a., eavesdropping (or sniffing)
- Encryption is an effective means to protect interception

□ Traffic Analysis

- attacks confidentiality, or anonymity

□ Difficult to detect

- the emphasis is on prevention

Security Attacks

Active attacks:

- Interruption: attacks availability
 - e.g., denial-of-service attacks
- Modification: attacks integrity
 - e.g., man-in-the-middle attacks, masquerading
- Fabrication: attacks authenticity
 - e.g., replay attacks

Security Manager

Security manager should consider

□ Prevention

- taking measures that prevent damage from possible attacks
- (e.g.) strong passwords, one-time passwords

□ Detection

- measures that allow detection of when an asset has been damaged, altered, or copied
- E.g., access logging, intrusion detection system

Security Manager

Security manager should consider

□ Recovery

- restoring systems that were compromised
- (e.g.) periodic backup

□ Assets


- should know the assets to protect and the value of the assets
- Assets: hardware, software, data, and person

Secure or Not?

What does it mean for information to be secure?

- The **cost** of breaking the security exceeds the value of the secured service or information
- The **time** required to break the security exceeds the useful lifetime of the information

Network Security Model



Network Security Model

□ Security techniques has two components:

- A **security-related transformation** on the information to be sent
- Some **secret information** shared by the principals

□ Trusted third party:

- responsible for distributing the secret information to the principals
- Arbitrate disputes among the principals

Cryptography

□ Cryptography relies on

- Ciphers: *mathematical functions used for encryption and decryption of a message*
- **Encryption** : the process of disguising a message in such a way as to hide its substance
- **Ciphertext**: an encrypted message
- **Decryption** : the process of returning an encrypted message back into plaintext.



Ciphers

- The security of a cipher which depends on the secrecy of its *restricted* algorithm is not good
 - Whenever a user leaves a group, the algorithm must change
 - Secrecy can be broken by people smarter than you
- Modern cryptography relies on *keys*, a selected value from a large set (a key-space)
 - e.g., a 1024-bit key $\Rightarrow 2^{1024}$ values!
 - Security is based on secrecy of the key, not the details of the algorithm
 - Change of authorized participants requires only a change in key

Cryptosystem

□ Conventional cryptosystem

- Secret-key cryptosystem, symmetric cryptosystem



- key distribution issue
- (e.g.) DES, 3-DES, AES, SEED-128, SEED-256

Cryptosystem

□ Public-key cryptosystem

- Asymmetric cryptosystem: (public-key, private-key)




- (e.g.) RSA, Elliptic curve
- encryption : only the private key can decrypt a message encrypted with the public key
- digital signature : only the public-key can decrypt a message encrypted with the private key
- slower than secret-key algorithms

Cryptosystem


□ Hybrid of symmetric and public-key approaches

- Public key cryptosystem is used to distribute a session key (key for conventional cryptosystem) among peers
- Conventional cryptosystem is used to encrypt/decrypt messages




Cryptosystem

- Hash algorithms (H) : produce a "fingerprint"
 - H : one-way function (SHA-1, SHA-256, MD5, etc.)
 - H can be applied to a block of data at any size and produces a fixed length output
 - $H(x)$ is easy to compute for any given x
 - For any given block ($x, h=H(x)$), it is computationally infeasible to find y such that $H(y) = h$



Cryptosystem

- Hash algorithms and message authentication
 - Message Authentication using **public-key algorithm**




K_{private} : private-key of B
 K_{public} : public-key of B

Cryptosystem

□ Hash algorithms and message authentication

- Message Authentication using **shared secret**

S: shared
secret



Authentication

□ Password based authentication

- The password file could be stolen
- An eavesdropper can sniff the password off the network

□ Authentication based on the source address

- IP spoofing is possible


□ Authentication based on biometrics : thumb prints, retinal scans

□ Authentication using symmetric keys : Kerberos

□ Authentication using asymmetric cryptosystem

Password-based Authentication

- ❑ Actual password is not stored -> one-way hashes of passwords are kept and are used for comparison
- ❑ encrypted password in `/etc/passwd` → dictionary attack is possible



The diagram shows a single line from the `/etc/passwd` file: `fgdhong: 2Ux9znoiUSpL:531:962:Fred Flintstone:/home/fflintstone:/bin/ksh`. The entry is enclosed in a blue rectangular box. The first field, `fgdhong`, is the username. The second field, `2Ux9znoiUSpL`, is the encrypted password and is highlighted with a red rectangular box. The third field, `531`, is the user ID. The fourth field, `962`, is the group ID. The fifth field, `Fred Flintstone`, is the user's real name. The sixth field, `/home/fflintstone`, is the user's home directory. The seventh field, `/bin/ksh`, is the user's default shell. Below the box, three upward-pointing arrows identify the second, fourth, and sixth fields. The arrow under the second field is labeled "encrypted password". The arrow under the fourth field is labeled "user text field". The arrow under the sixth field is labeled "startup app".

```
fgdhong: 2Ux9znoiUSpL:531:962:Fred Flintstone:/home/fflintstone:/bin/ksh
```

encrypted password user text field startup app

- ❑ **shadowed password**: only the “root” user can read the password hashes in the `/etc/shadow` password file

Protecting Passwords over the network

- ❑ If Alice just sends the password, anyone can read it
- ❑ In *promiscuous* mode, Ethernet cards will pass to the operating system all received IP packets
- ❑ Attackers can use a “packet-sniffer”, like *wireshark* or *tcpdump* on Unix, to read all packets across your network
- ❑ Such programs require root privileges

Authentication Using One-time Password (OTP)


Challenge-response method

- Alice and Bob agree upon a **shared, secret key** (K_{AB})
- Alice requests a log-in challenge from Bob (the remote computer) : $A \rightarrow B$: *access request*
- Bob sends Alice a *nonce* N (challenge): $B \rightarrow A$: N
 - A nonce is a random string used only once ever
- Alice responds (response) : $A \rightarrow B$: $E(K_{AB}, N)$
- Changing nonces for each access prevents replay attack


Single-Sign-On (SSO)

□ SSO service


- User receives an access token (T) after the authentication from SSO server; T can be used in a limited amount of time
- User accesses the application server using the token T



Public-key Certificate




□ How can we get public key of the peer?



Public-key Certificate

□ Man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack

- attacker intervenes in the step of public key exchange




Public-key Certificate

□ Certificate: (owner, public-key, DS of CA)

□ Certification Authority (CA)

- Issues a certificate for a user
- Each certificate is signed by the CA



KR_A : private-key of A


KU_A : public-key of A

We need a correct peer's public key. How?

Public-Key Infrastructure


□ Public-Key Infrastructure (PKI)

- An intra-structure to enable users to get correct public keys of others



X.509 Public-key Certificate

□ X.509 certificate format



Revocation of Certificates

□ Reasons for revocation:


- The user's private key is assumed to be compromised
- The user is no longer certified by this CA

□ CRL (Certification Revocation List)

- Each CA keeps CRL and updates CRL periodically
- Checks certificate's validity from CRL

□ Delta Revocation

- To make revocation more efficient, the delta CRL has been introduced




(b) Certificate Revocation List


Public-Key Infrastructure

□ PKI trust model


■ Hierarchical model




Security in Internet Protocols



IP layer security



Transport layer security



Application layer security

Security in Internet Protocols

□ Security protocols in application layer

- E-mail service : S/MIME, PGP
- DNS service : DNSSEC
- SET protocol

□ Security protocols in transport layer

- SSL (TLS) protocol
- HTTP service (https) : http – SSL – tcp

□ Security protocols in IP layer

- IPsec : VPN