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## HTTP's Basic Authentication: A Story

The first thing that we saw in Wireshark when we began the process of accessing Jeff's secret website was a series of DNS queries, which turned the link into an IP address. Having the IP address allowed the client to initiate a TCP connection.

```
39 35.792970269
                192.168.12.129
                                      192.168.12.2
                                                           DNS
                                                                       80 Standard query 0xe972 A cs338.jeffondic
40 35.793025475
                                                                       80 Standard query 0xab70 AAAA cs338.jeffor
                192.168.12.129
                                      192.168.12.2
                                                           DNS
41 35.795599805
                192.168.12.2
                                      192,168,12,129
                                                           DNS
                                                                      390 Standard query response 0xe972 A cs338.
42 35.806923805
                192.168.12.129
                                      192.168.12.2
                                                           DNS
                                                                      80 Standard query 0x3f3f A cs338.jeffondio
43 35.806967753 192.168.12.129
                                      192.168.12.2
                                                           DNS
                                                                       80 Standard query 0xee38 AAAA cs338.jeffor
44 35.809844238 192.168.12.2
                                      192.168.12.129
                                                                      390 Standard query response 0x3f3f A cs338.
                                                           DNS
45 35.823352532 192.168.12.2
                                      192.168.12.129
                                                                      159 Standard query response 0xab70 AAAA cs:
46 35.823452606 192.168.12.2
                                      192.168.12.129
                                                                      159 Standard query response 0xee38 AAAA cs:
```

Beginning at frame 47, there are two TCP handshakes. The client initiates two connections, both from client port 54312. One goes to the server's port 80 (signifying an HTTP connection) and the other to server's port 443 (HTTPS connection). It does so by sending [SYN] flags to both these server locations using TCP. The servers acknowledge this and send back [SYN][ACK]. Finally, the client sends [ACK] to both server ports. The TCP handshake is complete and two connections are established.

-					
4	7 35.823707983	192.168.12.129	45.79.89.123	TCP	74 54312 → 80 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=14
4	8 35.823838741	192.168.12.129	45.79.89.123	TCP	74 38680 → 443 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1
4	9 35.868902554	45.79.89.123	192.168.12.129	TCP	60 80 → 54312 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240 Li
5	0 35.868955650	192.168.12.129	45.79.89.123	TCP	54 54312 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
5	1 35.868902870	45.79.89.123	192.168.12.129	TCP	60 443 → 38680 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=64240
5	2 35.869008324	192.168.12.129	45.79.89.123	TCP	54 38680 → 443 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0

Next, wireshark displays frames 53 through 64 in pink! These frames use TCP and TLS protocols to attempt to establish a secure and encrypted connection through the server's port 443. Frame 53 is the client sending the server a "Client Hello." The server acknowledges this and sends back a "Server Hello." After this, a process similar to the TCP handshake occurs, where the TLS protocol allows the client and server to exchange keys that they could use in an encrypted connection. However, we (the client) send an "Encrypted Alert," which is the beginning of the TLS connection termination process. The client follows it with a [FIN] flag, and the server acknowledges this. However, the server does not send a [FIN] back, and tries to send another key in frame 66. Since this is unexpected, frame 67 shows the client response, which includes the [RST] flag because the client is no longer expecting to be in the secure connection.

```
53 35.871274681 192.168.12.129
                                                                                                    TLSv1.2 571 Client Hello
                                                                45.79.89.123
                                                                                                                       60 443 → 38680 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=518 Win=64240 Len=0
                            45.79.89.123
45.79.89.123
                                                                192,168,12,129
                                                                192.168.12.129
192.168.12.129
45.79.89.123
192.168.12.129
                                                                                                   TLSV1.2 4150 Server Hello
TCP 54 38680 - 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=4097 Win=61320 Len=0
TCP 54 38680 - 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=4577 Win=62780 Len=0
TCP 54 38680 - 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=4577 Win=62780 Len=0
 55 35.917266021
 56 35.917200021
56 35.917300703
57 35.918801608
58 35.918815482
                            192.168.12.129
45.79.89.123
192.168.12.129
                                                                                                   TCP 54 38680 - 443 [ACK] Seq=518 Ack=4577 Win=52700 Len=0
TLSV1.2 212 Client Key Exchange, Change Cipher Spec, Encrypted Handshake Message
TCP 60 443 - 38680 [ACK] Seq=4577 Ack=676 Win=64240 Len=0
                                                                 45.79.89.123
 59 35.925839604 192.168.12.129
                                                                45.79.89.123
 60 35.926086043
                            45.79.89.123
                                                                192,168,12,129
61 35.926169946 192.168.12.129
62 35.926312288 192.168.12.129
                                                                 45.79.89.123
                                                                                                    TLSv1.2
                                                                                                                      85 Encrypted Alert
                                                                                                                      54 38680 → 443 [FIN, ACK] Seq=707 Ack=4577 Win=62780 Len=0
                                                                45.79.89.123
```

We believe that all of the <u>TLS handshaking</u> and disconnecting occurs because we used an incognito browser to access the webpage, but the webpage does not use HTTPS or TLS. Because the browser is incognito, it tries to establish a secure connection by default. We used wireshark to see how an incognito browser connected to a different website and saw a very similar TLS handshake happen. However, because Jeff's website is HTTP, the secure connection is terminated and the browser tries to access it through port 80 instead of port 443.



After the secured connection fails to establish, a new TCP handshake happens to initiate a connection between the client port 54314 and server port 80 (HTTP). This is a new client port, and is separate from the connection we established earlier. Using the new port, the client makes a GET request for the webpage in frame 70 with the HTTP protocol. This GET request does not have an authorization header, since this is before we have typed in the password. The server acknowledges the request in TCP, and then sends an HTTP packet that says the GET request is unauthorized, and includes the HTML for the 401 Authorization Required page.

70 35.973078731	192.168.12.129	45.79.89.123	HTTP	403 GET /basicauth/ HTTP/1.1
71 35.973363961	45.79.89.123	192.168.12.129	TCP	60 80 → 54314 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=350 Win=64240
72 36.018729690	45.79.89.123	192.168.12.129	HTTP	457 HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized (text/html)
73 36.018747651	192.168.12.129	45.79.89.123	TCP	54 54314 → 80 [ACK] Seq=350 Ack=404 Win=638

At this point in our connection, we got several duplicate packets, which wireshark displayed in red. They each had a [TCP Dup ACK 1#1] flag. Ultimately, we ignored these because they are not necessarily a part of our basic authentication connection.

```
74 37.375198321 192.168.12.129 54.192.58.25 TCP 54 [TCP Dup ACK 5#3] 46946 - 443 [ACK] 75 37.375310232 192.168.12.129 142.250.190.67 TCP 54 [TCP Dup ACK 6#3] 35420 - 80 [ACK] 76 37.375312284 192.168.12.129 72.21.91.29 TCP 54 [TCP Dup ACK 7#3] 60410 - 80 [ACK] 77 37.375689518 54.192.58.25 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 8#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 78 37.375689764 142.250.190.67 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 9#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 10#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 80 38.147335846 192.168.12.129 54.192.58.23 TCP 54 [TCP Dup ACK 11#3] 45326 - 443 [ACK] 81 38.147799390 54.192.58.23 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 11#3] 45326 - 443 [ACK] 81 38.147799390 54.192.58.23 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 192.168.12.129 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 TCP 60 [TCP Dup ACK 12#3] [TCP ACKed unseer 79 37.375689805 72.21.91.29 TCP 60 [TCP Dup
```

After the first GET request fails to authenticate, the client sends a TCP frame with the [FIN] flag from client port 54312, which was the original connection. The server acknowledges it, and that connection is terminated.

	01 00.14110000	04.102.00.20	102,100,12,120	101	To the pub you 1543 from your angles acquirent
1	82 40.872146557	192.168.12.129	45.79.89.123	TCP	54 54312 → 80 [FIN, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240
ı	83 40.872486443	45.79.89.123	192.168.12.129	TCP	60 80 → 54312 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2 Win=64239 Len=0
1	84 40.917416154	45.79.89.123	192.168.12.129	TCP	60 80 → 54312 [FIN, PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2 Win=6
ı	85 40.917438940	192.168.12.129	45.79.89.123	TCP	54 54312 → 80 [ACK] Seq=2 Ack=2 Win=64240 Len=0
- 1	96 40 050000010	100 160 10 100	70 04 04 00	TCD	E4 [TCD Dum ACK 1#4] 60412 80 [ACK] Cog=1 Ack

Then we see some TCP Keep-Alive requests, presumably while the website waits for us to put in our username and password. We also see a few more Dup packets.

In frame 99, the client sends a GET request through HTTP. This request has an authorization header. Within this header, we can see the credentials, which are readable to us as "cs338:password" because Wireshark interprets them for us. The actual data sent over the network is the bytes highlighted at the bottom of our screenshot. This is just the byte representation of the user credentials which have been encoded using base 64, per the Basic HTTP Authentication Scheme (section 2).

Within the Hypertext Transfer Protocol header of frame 99:

```
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1\r\n
      Credentials: cs338:password
    [HTTP request 2/3]
                                                           e/webp, * /*;q=0.8
0100 65 2f 77 65 62 70 2c 2a
                                2f 2a 3b 71 3d 30 2e 38
      0d 0a 41 63 63 65 70 74
                                2d 4c 61 6e 67 75 61 67
                                                            Accept -Languag
                                                           e: en-US ,en;q=0.
      65 3a 20 65 6e 2d 55 53
                                2c 65 6e 3b 71 3d 30 2e
                                74 2d 45 6e 63 6f 64 69
      35 0d 0a 41 63 63 65 70
                                                           5 Accep t-Encodi
      6e 67 3a 20 67 7a 69 70
                                2c 20 64 65 66 6c 61 74
                                                           ng: gzip
                                                                       deflat
                                                           ng: gzip , deflat
e DNT: 1 Conne
            0a 44 4e
                     54 3a 20
                                31 0d 0a 43 6f 6e 6e 65
      65 0d
                                                           ction: k eep-aliv
      63 74 69 6f 6e 3a 20 6b
                                65 65 70 2d 61 6c 69 76
      65 0d 0a 55 70 67 72 61 64 65 2d 49 6e 73 65 63
                                                           e Upgra de-Insec
      75 72 65 2d 52 65 71 75
                                65 73 74 73 3a 20 31 0d
                                                           ure-Requ ests: 1
0190 0a 41
                                                            Authori
               74 68 6f
                                7a 61
                                         69 6f
      42 61 73 69 63 20 59 33
46 7a 63 33 64 76 63 6d
                                4d 7a 4d 7a 67 36 63 47
                                                            Basic Y3 MzMzg6cG
                                51 3d 0d 0a 0d 0a
                                                            Fzc3dvcm Q=.
```

To be clear, the user credentials were encoded, not encrypted. Anyone who intercepts the GET request with the credentials, can see that it's encoded using the Basic Authentication scheme, and use a simple base 64 decoder program to get the original credential string back. As <a href="mailto:section4">section 4</a>, Security Considerations, of the Basic Authentication scheme documentation states, "This scheme is not considered to be a secure method of user authentication unless used in conjunction with some external secure system such as TLS."

After the server receives our GET request, it acknowledges the request, authenticates our credentials, and then sends the actual HTML of the restricted website via HTTP. The client acknowledges, and then we send a GET request for a favicon, which does not exist, so the server sends back a 404 error. After this, nothing else interesting happens until we close the webpage, which we did not capture via Wireshark, since we've seen it before.

_	Ш	99 50.525998754	192.168.12.129	45.79.89.123	HTTP	446 GET /basicauth/ HTTP/1.1
		100 50.526258423	45.79.89.123	192.168.12.129	TCP	60 80 → 54314 [ACK] Seq=404 Ack=742 Win=64240 Len=0
		101 50.572869689	45.79.89.123	192.168.12.129	HTTP	458 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
		102 50.572886619	192.168.12.129	45.79.89.123	TCP	54 54314 → 80 [ACK] Seq=742 Ack=808 Win=63837 Len=0
		103 50.637765866	192.168.12.129	45.79.89.123	HTTP	363 GET /favicon.ico HTTP/1.1
		104 50.638062086	45.79.89.123	192.168.12.129	TCP	60 80 → 54314 [ACK] Seq=808 Ack=1051 Win=64240 Len=0
	+	105 50.683759267	45.79.89.123	192.168.12.129	HTTP	383 HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found (text/html)
	L	106 50.683775946	192.168.12.129	45.79.89.123	TCP	54 54314 → 80 [ACK] Seq=1051 Ack=1137 Win=63837 Len=0