Civil Servants' Corruptibility in Sectoral Context. Evidence on the Moderating Role of Public Service Motivation from Four Jurisdictions

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Abstract

Public sector corruption is one of the most pressing issues of our time, undermining citizens' trust in public institutions worldwide. This study explores the degree to which sectors function as normative frames for civil servants' intent to accept bribes. Combining classic theories of planned and administrative behavior with the concepts of value signaling and public service motivation, this study reveals that the effect of sectoral contexts on civil servants' corruptibility is limited and contingent upon dispositional and contextual factors as well as bribery type. Tested with a novel 3x3 vignette-based quasi-experiment conducted with senior civil servants (*N*=1,694; *Obs*.=3,254) from four jurisdictions, results suggest that civil servants' willingness to accept bribes varies dramatically across administrative traditions, and that PSM and moral disengagement are more reliable predictors for corruptibility than bribery type and sectoral contexts. These findings have important implications for the assessment of integrity risks and the design and implementation of effective anti-corruption policies in public, private, and hybrid organizations worldwide.

Keywords: *Administrative Corruption, Bribery, Publicness, Public Service Motivation, Multi-Country Survey Research, Quasi-Experiment*

Introduction

Public sector corruption is one of the most pressing unresolved issued of our time. Particularly, bribery in public administration bribery – abuse of public office for private gain – erodes citizens' trust in governmental institutions and threatens the stability and constitutional state of democracies worldwide (De Waele et al., 2021; Meyer-Sahling et al., 2018). Civil servants accepting bribes violates the core principles of public bureaucracy, whose purpose is to serve the public interest indiscriminately, selflessly, and efficiently in the spirit of public values deeply rooted in administrative traditions (Nabatchi, 2018). Bribery is "the corrupt payment, receipt, or solicitation of a private favor for official action" granted by influential agents from authorities across all sectors in society (Ramdani & van Witteloostuijn, 2014, p. 1). As a symptom of social decay, untamed bribery leads to the collapse of governmental institutions by undermining societal trust, subverting moral norms, and rendering public institutions utterly ineffective (Bellé & Cantarelli, 2017). Consequently, bribery in public administration results in discriminatory, destructive, and non-appreciative relationships between citizens and organizations on the one hand and public authorities and institutions on the other hand, hampering societal growth and social cohesion by undermining the moral core principles of administrative conduct, particularly the principles of equity, accountability, and neutrality (Nabatchi, 2018; Ramdani & van Witteloostuijn, 2014; Wei, 1999).

Despite prolific—yet often inconclusive—research into the antecedents and consequences of corporate and political bribery from a macro perspective (Jancsics, 2019; Jávor & Jancsics, 2016; Meyer-Sahling et al., 2018), the effect of the sectoral context as a moral frame for civil servants' corrupt behavior is a theoretical puzzle with high practical relevance for public integrity, calling loudly for more research (Da Hora & Sampaio, 2019; De Graaf et al., 2018; Hanna & Wang, 2017). Based on the theory of planned behavior and the classic idea of sectoral frames as normative benchmarks for administrative behavior (Simon, 1947/1997), this study

investigates the effect of sectoral context (public, private, or hybrid) on civil servants' corruptibility, i.e., their behavioral intent to engage in acts of bribery based on the perceived acceptability of engaging in corruption. We argue that sectors are moral institutions that signal salient cues for moral behavior and hence affect individuals' psychological ability to derive moral justification when given the opportunity of exploiting public office for private gain. Following recent research by, among others, Meyer-Sahling et al. (2019), De Waele et al. (2021), and Ripoll (2019), we also examine the role of public service motivation (PSM) as a potential catalyst for this sectoral framing effect as a particularly strong psychological disposition related to pro-societal – in contrast to self-serving – behaviors that violate norms of public integrity (De Graaf et al., 2018).

Specifically, this study reports findings from a between-subject randomized 3x3 vignette-based framing quasi-experiment on the intent of accepting bribe offers of varying severity nested in a sector-specific context. Data were raised with active civil servants from four jurisdictions – Switzerland (n=357), Hong Kong (n=586), Taiwan (n=409), and the United States (n=342) – to scrutinize the generalizability of our findings on micro-level behavior across the macro level contexts of administrative traditions. We develop and test a multidisciplinary theory combining the institutional meso context (i.e., sector) with an important psychological ethical micro disposition (i.e., PSM), with civil servants' corruptibility—i.e., their intent to accept bribes—as the outcome. This design responds to recent calls for rigorous experimental research exploring the behavioral micro-foundations of corruption and unethical behavior in the public sector (Bellé & Cantarelli, 2017; De Waele et al., 2021; Gans-Morse et al., 2018; Ripoll & Ballart, 2020; Schott & Ritz, 2018). Since our study combines unique data from four jurisdictions that vary relatively little in their macro incidence of bribery (Paulus & Kristoufek, 2015; Transparency International, 2021) yet differ considerably regarding their administrative traditions, national cultures, and public personnel policies, we combine the scholarly merit of both the method of agreement and difference (House et al., 2004; Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2019; Walker et al.,

2019a), to assess the generalizability of findings across administrative traditions. Analyses reveal that sectoral context functions as a salient frame for moral justification by priming civil servants' intention to engage in corrupt behavior but the effect sizes are contingent upon bribery type. Furthermore, high-PSM individuals exhibit a lower intention for corrupt behavior, but these relationships vary significantly between jurisdictions, pointing toward the pervasive impact of administrative traditions as psychological reference points for moral behavior in public administration.

The remainder of this study is structured as follows. The next section presents insights from the social cognition discourse on the role of sectoral context and PSM for moral judgment and decision making in civil service to derive three main hypotheses on corruptibility in context. After describing the quasi-experiment and the treatment design, hypotheses were assessed with linear regression modelling. The study concludes by discussing its findings' implication for theory and practice to identify directions for future research that will further develop the conceptual understanding of administrative corruption as a nexus between micro, meso, and macro-level factors.

Theory

Corrupt administrative behavior is the consolidation of various forms of unethical intentions and self or other-serving motives translated into actions that defy societal norms of public integrity. Classic definitions of corruption range from social norm violations to punishable crimes codified by law, including a vast landscape of grey areas (Heidenheimer, 2017). In the current study, we research civil servants' corruptibility, i.e., their intent to act corruptly when incentivized to do so by another agent. Bribery is a complex, multidimensional socio-cultural phenomenon that does not only violate 'hard'—i.e., legal and codified—norms in societies but also 'soft' norms related to professional and social values and individual motives that guide behavior (Bellé & Cantarelli, 2017; De Graaf et al., 2018; Gelbrich et al., 2016). The *hard*

corruption pole is often referred to as 'black corruption' (Heidenheimer, 2017), clear examples being high-stake fraud, nepotism, and state capture. The *soft* form of corruption is coded 'white', illustrative examples being integrity violations and dishonesty. Between these two poles, a spectrum of so-called 'grey' corruption resides, for instance, cronyism, low-stake noncompliance, and rule-bending, which involve ambivalent acts that some elements of society would want to see punished, while others would be indifferent (Prenzler, 2021).

Following Cressey's (1953) classic fraud triangle concept, individuals' likelihood of engaging in corrupt behavior – their "corruptibility" (Zhang et al., 2019) – depends on three factors: (a) the opportunity to act corruptly, (b) the motivation to do so, and (c) individuals' ability to rationalize their behavior once they engage in corrupt behavior in order to maintain their moral concept of self (Abraham et al., 2018; Bandura, 2002). This concept of corruptibility is in line with the classic *theory of planned behavior* (TPB), a widely used theory to predict the translation of traits, motives, and beliefs into behavioral intention and action (Ajzen, 1991). The intention to engage in or refrain from engaging in a specific behavior (such as acts of corruption) is contingent upon the interplay of *normative*, *behavioral*, and *control beliefs*, as well as basic priming *background variables* concerning *individual*, *socio-cultural*, or *informational* factors of the choice setting (Ajzen, 1991). We explain the relevance of these beliefs and factors and their relationships with administrative corruption in the following sections.

Normative beliefs: Sectoral Context as Moral Frame for Behavior

Normative beliefs are individuals' injunctive expectation that a given referential social group (e.g., peers, co-workers, supervisors, or the archetype of a "good" bureaucrat) would approve or disapprove of engaging in the specific behavior under consideration within the given situational, organizational, or sectoral *context*. Normative beliefs also concern the descriptive belief of whether other important referent individuals or groups actually and regularly perform said behavior creating social pressure (Ajzen, 2020).

Context provides meaning for the interpretation of choice options and the moral justification of behavior. In situations that allow the extraction of private benefit from public office, moral action theory suggests that individuals' likelihood of accepting bribes is contingent upon an array of rational-cognizant factors (Feng & Johansson, 2018) because individuals will explicitly or implicitly seek to rationalize their choice by deriving ethical permission for their decisions in order to maintain their moral concept of self (Pope, 2017). Contextual factors can serve this function by providing saliant psychological cues that signal moral benchmarks and hence activate context-specific normative beliefs previously internalized by the individual through processes of social learning (Schwarz, 2007).

In the context of their professional lives, an essential and probably the most salient moral benchmark for individuals' behavior is their *sector* of employment: public, private, or hybrid. Sectoral contexts prime cognition because their implicit and explicit 'givens' communicate specific value paradigms that function as ideal-type guideposts for behavior and decision making. In his perennial work *Administrative Behavior*, Herbert Simon (1947/1997) points out that human decision-making and rationality are fundamentally bounded by their context and agency because "human rationality operates […] within the limits of a psychological environment" which mark the foundation of judgement (Simon, 1947/1997, p. 108). These 'givens' translate into tangible and intangible frames and systems—i.e., institutional logics, organizational cultures, and moral paradigms—that shape civil servants' attitudes, objectives, and motives. Against these sectoral 'givens', any decision to be made is evaluated, to determine its *moral acceptability in context*. Unsurprisingly, these normative frames differ fundamentally between the realm of the public and the private sector, and in any hybrid mixture of both contexts (Fottler, 1981; Nabatchi, 2018). Since sectors provide institutional and psychological benchmarks for moral behavior by defining the soft norms and implicit patterns of behavior against which salient cues for decision-making are evaluated, interpreted, and *framed* against to make sense (Weick et al., 2005), we suggest that individuals respond differently to bribe offers in different sectoral contexts, i.e., the private,

public, and hybrid sector. It is important to investigate the role of sectors for corruption research because (a) decision-making behavior is often sector specific (Weißmüller et al., 2021), and (b) sectors as moral frames may affect the effectiveness of transferring viable anti-corruption strategies across sectors (Gans-Morse et al., 2018).

As said, corruption occurs if opportunity is combined with motivation and justification. In morally challenging situations that provide opportunity for corruption, individuals explicitly or implicitly seek to derive a moral justification for their subsequent decisions from contextual factors (Cressey, 1953; Pope, 2017; Rose & Peiffer, 2016). For civil servants, the public sector provides this intuitive institutional moral frame, functioning as the moral benchmark for the acceptability of behavior because sector-specific institutional logics define the social norms and implicit patterns of behavior expected from civil servants. Indeed, a large body of research reveals that individuals differentiate sharply between the spheres of the public and the private sector because they are associated with dissimilar values frames and logics (Nabatchi, 2018; Rainey & Bozeman, 2000; Simon, 1947/1997). This relates particularly to stronger self-focused utility maximization by private agents than by their public counterparts, because a public sector frame incentivizes agents to follow a much broader range of goals that ultimately serve the maximization of *societal* value rather than self-interest (Andersen et al., 2013). This long-standing argument finds support in recent experimental research showing that sectoral affiliation directly affects individuals' micro-level behavior (Weißmüller et al., 2021; Weißmüller, 2022; Weißmüller & Vogel, 2021). These studies suggest that the sectoral context will reduce civil servants' capacity to derive moral justification for engaging in corrupt behaviors in moral contexts associated with public values, i.e., the public sector, as well as in hybrid sector contexts to some extent because hybrid organizations combine both public and private sector logics (Mair et al., 2015). While hybridity may result in moral ambiguity, the argument is that the strong imprint of public sector logics and motives still prevail, albeit probably to a lesser degree than in

the public sector (Wittmer, 1991). Following the rationalization logic of behavioral transitivity, we propose our first threefold main effect hypothesis:

Hypothesis H1a. Civil servants' intent to accept bribes is lower in a public vis-à-vis private sector context.

Hypothesis H1b. Civil servants' intent to accept bribes is lower in a public vis-à-vis hybrid sector context.

Hypothesis H1c. Civil servants' intent to accept bribes is lower in a hybrid vis-à-vis private sector context.

Behavioral beliefs: Public Service Motivation

Behavioral beliefs are individuals' attitudes toward a certain behavior based on a person's beliefs regarding the subjective probability that engaging in a specific behavior will result in certain outcomes (Ajzen, 2020), for instance that accepting a bribe (the behavior) violates core principles of conduct in public administration (the outcome) or will lead to prosecution and punishment (the experience). Since bureaucrats' identities, their perception of rules and norms are based on the logic of appropriateness (March & Olsen 1995), behavioral beliefs are strongly linked with motives to serving the public interest and public values, such as public service motivation (PSM).

PSM is a widely researched and debated concept of ethical motivation in the public sphere. Defined by Perry (1996, p. 6) as "an individual's predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions," the concept of PSM has evolved greatly, with much scholarship examining PSM's definitions, measures, antecedents, and consequences, above all at the individual micro-level of analysis (Ritz et al., 2016). Meanwhile, PSM has become one of the most prominent concepts to explain ethical behavior, as PSM involves the motivation to serve others and the public interest (Gans-Morse et al., 2021; Ripoll, 2019). Indeed,

there is growing interest in researching the relationship between PSM and (un)ethical behavior in general, but also in its relation to corruption particularly (De Waele et al., 2021; Gans-Morse et al., 2021; Y. J. Kim & Kim, 2016). The overarching consensus is that PSM is positively associated with a higher moral code (Ripoll, 2019), selfless prosocial motivations that benefit others and society at large (van Witteloostuijn et al., 2017), honesty (Olsen et al., 2019), and a higher likelihood of acting more ethically in general (Ripoll, 2019). In their review of factors effectively preventing bureaucratic corruption, Gans-Morse et al. (2018) point out that the intrinsic motivation related with PSM may help prevent corruption, but the authors also stress that empirical evidence is still scarce. PSM is directly associated with individuals' commitment to the public interest, their compassion, their self-sacrifice, and their attraction to policymaking (Esteve et al., 2016), and indirectly with altruism (Meyer-Sahling et al., 2019), social value orientation (Ritz et al., 2020; Weißmüller et al., 2022), prosocial behavior (Esteve et al., 2016; van Witteloostuijn et al., 2017), and organizational citizenship behavior (Awan et al., 2020). Together, this research strongly suggests that high-PSM individuals will be less likely to succumb to bribe offers.

Hypothesis H2. PSM is negatively associated with the intent to accept bribes.

While it is logical to assume that PSM – individuals' selfless disposition to serve others and society at large by their engaging in public service – should have a negative relationship with individuals' corruptibility, prior research is not yet conclusive regarding its effect on decision making. For instance, Andersen et al. (2013), Kwon (2014), Ripoll and Ballart (2020), and Gans-Morse et al. (2021) show that PSM is positively related with altruistic behavior and integrity, and negatively associated with the willingness to engage in corruption. In contrast, conceptual and empirical research by, e.g., Schott and Ritz (2018), Seidemann and Weißmüller (2022), Weißmüller et al. (2022), and Ripoll and Schott (2020) point toward a dark side of PSM in that high-PSM individuals are actually more likely to engage in rule breaking and defective behavior

under some circumstances. These divergent findings may be understood by focusing on the impact of PSM as a highly context-specific motivation.

Since individuals' PSM is relatively stable over time (Vogel & Kroll, 2016), a central claim in the field of PSM research is that high-PSM people exhibit dissimilar behaviors vis-à-vis low-PSM people, and that high-PSM individuals are specifically likely to self-select into public sector employment in the expectation of high person-organization fit in their determination to serve the public interest (Ritz et al., 2022; Vandenabeele & Jager, 2020). This renders PSM a central construct for micro-level research into integrity-related behavior in a *sectoral* context (Weißmüller et al., 2022). Following others, we argue that PSM is a critical determinant that guides ethical behavior, but particularly strongly so in the sphere of the public sector (Awan et al., 2020; Y. J. Kim & Kim, 2016; Ripoll, 2019).

Institutional cues for moral behavior vary across sectors because they are based upon fundamentally different value paradigms (Nabatchi, 2018). In the private sector, the self-interest of profit-maximizing logics prevails (Weißmüller et al., 2021). In the public sector, the normative cues are explicitly and heavily emphasizing the public interest, rooted strongly in the Weberian tradition of bureaucracies but also in the principal clusters of values associated with PSM, i.e., among others rule-abidance, professionalism, and a balance of interest (Andersen et al., 2013). Hybrid organizations are between a rock and a hard place, signaling a combination of both types of cues (Jay, 2013). Hence, for high-PSM individuals, the effect of a public sector cue should be psychologically more salient compared to private and hybrid sector cues because the relevance of the public interest as the benchmark for moral behavior is more pronounced, and hence more likely to trigger public value-oriented—in contrast to self-serving corrupt—behavior through activating a public sector-specific moral identity (Weißmüller et al., 2021). This leads to a threefold moderator prediction: PSM moderates the relationship between sectoral context and the likelihood of accepting bribes in that

Hypothesis H3a: PSM's moderation effect is stronger in a public vis-à-vis a private sector context.

Hypothesis H3b: PSM's moderation effect is stronger in a public vis-à-vis hybrid sector context.

Hypothesis H3c: PSM's moderation effect is stronger in a hybrid vis-à-vis a private sector context.

Figure 1 summarizes the theoretical model.

[Figure 1 about here]

Background variables

While the current study focusses primarily on the effects of normative and behavioral beliefs, a theoretical model based on the TPB is only complete when also mentioning its other two important components, which were controlled for during hypotheses testing (see also Figure 1). *Control beliefs* are factors related to self-efficacy in behavioral control, such as external pressure but also individual dispositions such as moral disengagement, i.e., individuals' ability to cognitively and affectively dissociate their moral concept of self from psychological burden associated with engaging in socially undesired actions, leading to higher tolerance of moral ambiguity (Bandura, 2002).

In the context of public sector corruption research, typical *background variables* nested within the individual decision maker are socio-demographic, experiential or attitudinal differences such as age, gender, and risk aversion but also knowledge about corruption through education and anti-corruption trainings. Socio-cultural background variables concern decision makers' environment, such as implicit cultural or organizational norms, e.g., administrative traditions and institutional logics. Informational background variables concern the decision task

itself that stimulates the psycho-cognitive decision-making process, e.g., the type of bribe offered, its degree of secrecy, and the agents involved.

Materials & Methods

Study design

Hypotheses were tested with original data raised between May and October 2019 with a vignette-based survey quasi-experiment conducted with active civil servants from four jurisdictions (Switzerland, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and the Unites States). Given that these jurisdictions exhibit dissimilar administrative traditions, our multi-country approach allows us to investigate the robustness and generalizability of our findings and facilitates the identification of important boundary conditions. The survey quasi-experiment comprised four steps: (i) a short thematic introduction; (ii) a socio-demographic questionnaire including a scale measuring the independent PSM variable; (iii) a short filler task to inhibit spillover and halo effects; and the randomized (iv) vignette experiment, followed by a short debriefing.

Following recent studies exploring the role of sectoral context on deviant behavior (De Waele et al., 2021; Weißmüller et al., 2021; Weißmüller et al., 2022), we opted for a vignette-based 3x3 treatment design. Vignettes are highly immersive short written scenarios that invite the respondents to imagine themselves in a specific situation, and subsequently ask them to express how they would behave in said scenario if they were this person. Vignettes are powerful instruments to reveal context-dependent behavior with high internal and external validity, whilst providing the benefit of highly controlled conditions typical for experiments (Gould, 1996). Vignette studies circumvent reporting biases related to social desirability, a critical issue in corruption research (Aguinis & Bradley, 2014), and they allow for simultaneously creating topical variance on two or more different dimensions which is ideal for our research question, namely identifying the effect of sectoral context (*public*, *private*, and *hybrid*) on corruptibility, while at the same time allowing for nuanced treatment variation regarding the type of corruption

for rigor. In contrast to using self-report data, this experimental design allows us to test causal mechanisms instead of mere correlational relationships (Jilke et al., 2016), and follows recent examples of experimental studies on deviant behavior (e.g., by Rose and Peiffer, 2016, and De Waele et al., 2021).

Vignette and Treatment Design

Our vignettes describe situations in which bribes of varying severity—following Heidenheimer's (2017) classification of corruption (*white*, *grey*, and *black*)—are offered to the respondent in a hypothetical scenario. To capture the effect of different sectors as moral frames for (un-)ethical decision making, we designed three versions of these scenarios, reflecting a *public*, a *private*, and a *hybrid* sector context, respectively. This logically results in a 3x3 design (see Online Appendix A for more detail). Specifically, the nine different vignette scenarios were created by matching each of the three bribery scenarios with sector-specific characterization of the (potential) bribe-taker's professional role and agency unequivocally signaling that the decision (on whether to accept the bribe offered) was set in either a *public* sector context (i.e., employee of a governmental agency), a *private* sector context (i.e., employee of a private international company), or a *hybrid* sector context (i.e., employee of a company with public-private equally shared ownership, values, and tasks). In a pretest, the plausibility of all vignettes was optimized for realism with experts from the target population of civil servants in each jurisdiction. Each respondent randomly received two vignette treatments in random order and treatment balance was achieved in each jurisdiction (see Table 1).

[Table 1 about here]

All three vignette scenarios create a moral dilemma between self-serving choice vs. professional integrity typical for public sector corruption. This design is theoretically grounded in von Alemann's (2004) definition that acts of corruption typically feature several components: A bribe-offerer wants a rare good (e.g., a license, preferential treatment, or concession) that the

potential bribe-taker may grant due to their administrative or political power. A proposition of a personal incentive is offered in secret (e.g., in the form of free riding, a service, or money) that violates socially accepted norms or procedures. If accepted, the damage is afflicted upon a non-involved third party—the general public—creating diffuse societal harm (von Alemann, 2007, p. 7).

Varying not only sectoral context but also bribery types is important because this procedure creates more treatment variation to allow for a more nuanced measurement of the likelihood of accepting bribes at the micro level of behavior in context, following the shades of corruption conceptualization by Heidenheimer (2017). Specifically, the white bribery vignettes describe a scenario of the illegitimate waiver of restaurant inspection, modelling a low-harm low-moral conflict situation. The grey bribery vignettes model individual extortion of nonfungible benefits on a business trip in exchange for partisan decision making, suggesting medium-harm medium-level of integrity violations. The black bribery vignettes describe the offer of a considerable sum of bribe money for withdrawing witness testimony before court against a guilty felon in a corruption case, modelling a high level of both societal harm and professional norm violation. For each jurisdiction, the stakes described in the vignette scenarios were adapted to local purchasing power to increase treatment realism and outcome validity. To warrant external validity, treatment *realism* was controlled with a single four-point item measured directly after the presentation of the respective treatment scenarios.

Dependent Variable

We use a validated four-item five-point Likert-type scale by De Waele et al. (2021) to measure our dependent variable, the intent to accept a bribe offer in the given vignette scenario. After each vignette treatment, respondents were asked to indicate (1) how likely they were to accept the bribe in the context of the vignette scenario (*likelihood*), (2) how justified accepting the bribe was in this scenario (*justification*), (3) how comfortable they would feel doing so

(*affect*), and (4) the degree to which they felt accepting the bribe was a *mistake*, a reversed item. These four items are mean scored to create our dependent variable *corruptibility*.

Independent and Control Variables

PSM was measured using the common twelve-item seven-point Likert-type scale validated in prior research (S. Kim et al., 2013). All items were translated in a double-blind procedure into Chinese (traditional Chinese script) and German with due diligence (see Online Appendix B for translation). Following recent examples arguing in favor of a unidimensional conception of PSM – e.g., Schott and Ritz, (2018) or Weißmüller et al., (2022) – we use the PSM scale as a single-factor mean-scored construct, just like originally conceptualized by Perry (1996).

Extant research suggests that certain socioeconomic characteristics and traits may modulate individuals' likelihood of engaging in corrupt behavior, particularly *moral disengagement* and individuals' *risk propensity*. We use Moore's (2008) eight-item seven-point Likert-type scale to capture this control variable. Since engaging in bribery encompasses the likelihood of detection, and hence encompasses risk (Djawadi & Fehr, 2013), we control for individuals' *risk preference* with Madden, Petry, and Johnson's (2009) probability discounting questionnaire, using Weißmüller's (2022) algorithm to calculate individual discounting parameters (ln$h$). These parameters are then standardized so that scores of ln$h$<1 indicate risk aversion and ln$h$>1 denote risk affinity. We also include respondents' *age*, *gender*, and *level of education* to account for potential between-subject differences (Gatti et al., 2003).

Sample

We conducted our study in four industrialized jurisdictions that have both similarities and differences because (a) a multi-country study increases the external validity of our findings and the reliability of our methods, heeding recent calls for more relevance and rigor in public administration research (Walker et al., 2019a); (b) studying corruptibility in countries typically

regarded as relatively low in corruption and high in institutional quality (Paulus & Kristoufek, 2015; Transparency International, 2021) ventures into a particularly important conceptual and empirical blind spot of public sector corruption research, which often neglects developed countries since their societies tend to lack awareness of corruption issues (Paulus & Kristoufek, 2015; Transparency International, 2021), (c) each of these countries are typically associated with dissimilar administrative tradition, i.e., they differ regarding their fundamental macro environmental design that governs the principles of administration (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2019). This unique international dataset allows us to investigate the generalizability of our findings across these paradigmatic systems.

The pooled dataset comprises 3,254 responses by 1,694 active civil servants from four jurisdictions, Switzerland (*Obs.*=694, *n*=357), Hong Kong (*Obs.*=1,064, *n*=586), Taiwan (*Obs.*=817, *n*=409), and the United States (*Obs.*=679, *n*=342). For rigor, only complete responses were included. Participation was voluntary and guaranteed because corruption is a delicate topic that may result in social desirability response bias (Fisher & Katz, 2000), albeit we only test hypothetical scenarios to comply with ethical standards. Incentives were only symbolic[1] in accordance with national anti-corruption guidelines for civil servants. Invitations were distributed via official e-mail lists in various civil service organizations in the respective jurisdiction's core administration, hence resulting in convenience samples. Both the pooled data and the individual samples are of adequate sample size for statistically reliably detecting small differences in between-group testing: $d=|0.25|$ with power=0.8 (Ellis, 2010).

Table 1 provides an overview of the sample characteristics, pooled and by jurisdiction, respectively.

[1] We donated the equivalent of US$ 2.25 to UNICEF for each participant who finished the experiment; this amount was adjusted to local currency and purchasing power equivalent.

45.2% of respondents in our pooled sample identify as female. They are on average 44.8 (*SD*=11.0) years old, with high levels of PSM (*M*=5.12, *SD*=.92). The average civil servant sampled is risk averse (*M*=.84, *SD*=.37) and exhibits a low degree of moral disengagement (*M*=2.38, *SD*=.91). Treatment distribution was balanced across subsamples and treatment configurations.

Measurement and Construct Validity

Following best practice recommendations by Hinkin (1998), the aforementioned three multi-items scale measures (i.e., *corruptibility*, *PSM*, and *moral disengagement*) were tested for construct distinctiveness and convergent validity by varimax-rotated conducting exploratory (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) using maximum likelihood estimations (see Online Appendix C for by-jurisdiction details). SEM confirms the corruptibility scale's high discriminant and convergent validity, and high robustness against sampling effects for each jurisdiction as well as the pooled sample, resulting in robust single factor constructs, with factor eigenvalues ranging 1.73 to 2.75, Cronbach's α varying from .75 to .91, and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) criterion being in the .75–.84 interval. Both the PSM and moral disengagement scale converge with high goodness of fit (GFI: .68–.99) and exhibit high discriminant construct validity with very high Cronbach's α (PSM: .83–.92; moral disengagement: .77–.91) and satisfying to high convergent validity (AIC: .36–.92). Harman's single factor test was used to control for endogeneity. These procedures revealed that common source bias was not an issue and that the scales were sufficiently distinct, underlining their appropriateness in the context of all four jurisdictions. We control for common method bias caused by latent factor(s), CFA trait/method modelling was applied with all main study variable items and a hypothetical unobserved latent factor as recommended by Podsakoff et al. (2003) and Richardson et al. (2009). Structural equation modelling revealed no significant relationships of the study variables with a

latent, unobserved marker, corroborating the reliability of the findings presented in the next sections.

Findings

We estimate linear regression models with heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at the level of the individual respondent for hypotheses testing with the pooled data. The baseline corruptibility of the pooled sample is relatively low (pooled data: M=1.54, SD=72). As per design, the distinct types of bribery presented in the vignettes created sufficient response variance but no significantly different results when independent variables and covariates are not accounted for (see Online Appendix D for more detail on corruptibility response effect sizes by jurisdiction and vignette, and Online appendix E for the correlation matrix).

In the regression results table (see Table 2), we differentiate between the three types of corruption manipulated in the treatment and for each type, two models are estimated. The first model (models I, III, and V) presents direct effect estimates to test H1a-c and H2. The second model (models II, IV, and VI) adds interaction terms to assess H3a-c. All models in Table 2 are well specified [F(*df*, N)=11.76–22.24, all $p<.000$] and explain a satisfying amount of variance (adjusted R^2=.150–.191), and multicollinearity is not an issue (mean *VIF* range=1.37–1.42). Figure 2 displays the marginal treatment effects of the sectoral context on respondents' intent to accept a bribe by the type of bribe offered. The results for the pooled data are displayed on the left side and results by jurisdiction on the right side to facilitate cross-jurisdiction comparison (see also next section).

[Table 2 here]

We hypothesized that civil servants' intent to accept bribes would be contingent upon the sectoral context framing a bribe offer, and that the effect of a sectoral frame for decision making would be transitive, i.e., $corruption\ intent_{public} < intent_{hybrid} < intent_{private}$ (H1a-c). H1a and H1b find tentative support since respondents' corruption intent is higher in the hybrid (b=.09, p=.088)

and the public sector (*b*=.09, *p*=.088) framing scenario compared with the public sector framing scenario, which serves as the benchmark, albeit both effects are only marginally significant and are only observable in the black corruption treatment. Because there are no significant differences between the hybrid and the private sector effect, H1c is rejected. The marginal effects plot (Figure 2) further illustrates this effect.

[Figure 2 here]

In accordance with H2, we find a consistent, significant, and negative associations between PSM and corruption intent across all types of bribes offered (*b*=-.07–-.08, *p*=.003–.039), supporting H2. Inspecting PSM's marginal effects plot (Figure 3) further underlines the linearity and stability of the negative relationship between PSM and corruptibility with neglectable variation between sectoral contexts and bribery shades.

Furthermore, model II reveals a bribery type-conditional moderation effect of PSM on the relationship between corruption intent and sectoral context. Respondents' level of PSM reduces their intent to engage in corruption in the public compared with the private sector scenario (*b*=.09, *p*=.062) and the hybrid sector scenario (*b*=.06, *p*=.309), providing only tentative support for H3a and H3c because the private sector effect is only marginally significant. Since PSM's moderation effect is not significant for the hybrid sector context – in none of the three bribery types – H3b finds no support.

[Figure 3 here]

Albeit statistically significant, the direct effect of PSM on respondents' intent to accept a bribe is modest compared with the adverse effect of the control variable moral disengagement. Morally disengaged civil servants in our sample score significantly higher on corruptibility across all types of bribes offered (*b*=.22–.26, all *p*<.000). Furthermore, models III and IV indicate that the likelihood of engaging in grey corruption is significantly affected by the level of perceived treatment realism in that higher levels of realism are associated with a higher intent to

engage in corruption but only in the grey bribery scenario (*b*=.09, *p*<.000), and younger respondents are less likely to engage in grey corruption but this age effect is marginally small (*b*=.01, *p*<.000).

The regression estimates point toward significant variance in response behavior on the subsample level for the grey and black corruption settings, calling for further by-jurisdiction exploration (see next section).

Explorative Analysis by Jurisdiction

We assess the generalizability and robustness of our findings by repeating the aforementioned steps of analyses by jurisdiction (see results of clustered regression modelling in Online Appendix F). This reveals important patterns of effects, pointing strongly towards context and bribery-type dependency.

First, there sectoral context (H1a-c) does not significantly predict corruption intent in three out of the four samples (Switzerland: hybrid: *b*=-.09–.08, *p*=.371–.855, private: *b*=-.10–.11, *p*=.327–.984; Hong Kong: hybrid: *b*=.02–.11, *p*=.202–.939, private: *b*=.03–.10, *p*=.230–.887; United States: hybrid: *b*=-.07–.16, *p*=.160–.886, private: *b*=-.06–.09, *p*=.537–.721). H1a and H1c find partial support in the Taiwanese sample but only in the case of a grey bribery offer (grey hybrid: *b*=.01, *p*=.829; grey private: *b*=.15, *p*=.033).

Second, the corruption-inhibiting effect of PSM only generalizes across all types of bribe offers in two of the four jurisdictions sampled with the strongest effects in Taiwan (*b*=-.10–-.24, *p*=.000–.020), followed by Hong Kong (*b*=-.11–-.17, *p*<.000 –.013). For the Swiss data, the corruption-inhibiting effect of PSM is only prevalent in the context of black corruption (b=-.12, p=.058) and only marginally significant. PSM has no significant relationship with corruptibility in the U.S. data, irrespective of the type of bribe offered or the sectoral context framing the decision (b=-.01–.06, p=.176–.850).

Third, because of the marginal prevalence of direct sector and PSM effects, H3a-c find no support in the Hong Kong and U.S. data. H3b and H3c find indicative support with the Swiss data but only in the white corruption setting and the interaction effect is only marginally significant (white × hybrid × PSM: b=.33, p<.054). H3a is partially supported by evidence from Taiwan but only in the grey corruption setting where PSM's moderation effect is indeed stronger in a public vis-à-vis a private sector context (grey × private × PSM: b=.17, p<.062).

Fourth, the positive relationship between moral disengagement and corruptibility generalizes across all types of corruption for the samples raised in Hong Kong (white: b=.17, p=.002; grey: b=.13, p=.013; black: b=.18, p<.000) and the United States (white: b=.39, p<.000; grey: b=.33, p<.000; black: b=.39, p<.000), but only for grey and black corruption offers in Switzerland (white: b=.26, p=.005; grey: b=.30, p<.000; black: b=.09, p=.093) and Taiwan (white: b=.13, p=.013; grey: b=.10, p=.022; black: b=.10, p=.112).

Discussion

General Discussion

The goal of this study was to investigate the degree to which sectoral contexts (public, hybrid, and private) and PSM affect civil servants' intent to engage in corruption. Quasi-experimental evidence from four jurisdictions reveals that the sectoral context indeed affects corruptibility under certain conditions, providing novel evidence on the context-sensitivity of moral decision making. However, the size and direction of these sectoral effects is contingent upon corruption type, with significant variation across jurisdictions, while individual characteristics and motives exercise reliable direct effects. This speaks to prior research by e.g., Jávor and Jancsics (2016), and De Waele et al. (2021) who demonstrated the critical importance of accounting for micro-level characteristics and traits (De Graaf et al., 2018) to

explain corrupt behavior in sectoral context, but also highlights several important implications for theory and practice.

First, we find that the civil servants in our sample exhibit a higher degree of corruptibility in private vis-à-vis public sector contexts but only for black bribery. This points towards a limited psychological dichotomy separating the spheres of the public and the private sector in the context of integrity violations. Recent studies showed that sectors may function as salient cognitive frames for decision making in moral dilemmas (Weißmüller et al., 2021; Weißmüller & Vogel, 2021). However, our samples consist of experienced civil servants who are likely to having internalized the the institutional logics and value paradigms that are characteristics for public bureauctracies (Simon, 1947/1997). Since the sectoral treatment effects are small and contingent upon darker shades of corruption, our findings suggest that civil servants do, indeed, derive moral justification for their actions based upon their evaluation of the moral acceptability of their behavior in context, their moral compass is relatively stable across sectoral contexts. Why are the civil servants in this study's samples more likely to engage in darker shades of corruption (i.e., corruption $intent_{black} > intent_{grey} > intent_{white}$)? One explanation is signal clarity and high stakes. From a psychological perspective, being offered a brown envelope with cash in exchange for not giving testimony is an obvious integrity violation and a clear-cut moral dilemma between pro-self and pro-societal values, which does not require more cognitive effort in decision making. Our finding is particularly valuable because it indicates that moral dilemmas involving more ambiguous value conflicts may pose a psychologically more strenuous challenge compared with blatant incentive for corruption (Greene et al., 2008). Moral ambiguity reduces perceived self-efficacy (Endres et al., 2009) and may hence prevent individuals from engaging in these acts of corruption, irrespective of risk of persecution or societal harm. More research is needed on the effects of ambiguity tolerance, value dilemmas, and harm awareness vis-à-vis fear of persecution to determine how the type of bribe offered relates to individuals' likelihood of accepting bribes.

Second, PSM is negatively associated with the intent to accept bribes in three out of four jurisdictions – in Switzerland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, while there is no significant effect in the U.S. data. Given that the former three jurisdictions are associated with different administrative traditions (Bevir et al., 2003), this means that the coherence in PSM's effect size and direction cannot be explained by a hypothetical underlying macro-level effect associated with different public value hierarchy. Rather, it validates the relevance of PSM as an important motivational micro-level component of public integrity. The finding that PSM is associated negatively with civil servants' intent to accept bribes fits well with the established scholarship of PSM as a strong predictor for ethical conduct and inhibitor for unethical behavior (Ripoll, 2019; Ripoll & Ballart, 2020). Specifically, these empirical results extend prior research on the generalizability of the relationship between PSM and unethical behavior by Gans-Morse et al. (2021). Conducting a dice experiment with 1,870 university students revealed a robust negative association between PSM and corruptibility in a bribery game in Russia and Ukraine. However, Gans-Morse et al. (2021) also find that dishonesty and corruption are two fundamentally distinct concepts, particularly with respect to their relationship with PSM. Their research demonstrates that hypotheses regarding PSM's connection with behavioral ethical outcomes generalizes to the two former-Soviet Union countries. However, at least Ukraine is still strongly influenced by Western values and norms, so that more research with other non-Western countries on these relationships is still needed to assert the generalizability and robustness of these results. Our empirical findings with data from Switzerland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan clearly support this claim and enhance their theoretical significance by showing that the PSM-corruptibility relationship clearly applies to (a) civil servants and (b) non-Western jurisdictions as well. This is an important contribution because it further elevates PSM conceptually from a work motivation merely used to describe job-related outcomes, performance, and employment sector choice (Ritz et al., 2016) but rather, in accordance with Gans-Morse et al. (2021), our results stress that individuals' level of PSM is an important predictor for public integrity. PSM's corruption-preventive effect can be explained as

civil servants' deeply internalized behavioral belief and intrinsic motivation to serve the public interest (De Waele et al., 2021; Gans-Morse et al., 2021; Meyer-Sahling et al., 2019; Weißmüller & De Waele, 2021) which translates into an effective self-regulation mechanism. Practitioners are encouraged to activate PSM's preventive effect when designing anti-corruption trainings for civil servants, e.g., by explicitly targeting PSM-related concepts in integrity and compliance-related messaging addressed to civil servants.

Third, our study also reveals that PSM has no significant effect on civil servants' corruptibility for the data sampled in the United States. This outlier from the robust pattern of negative relationships is particularly surprising since PSM conceptual origin lies in the U.S. as does much of its empirical evidence (Ritz et al., 2016). This pattern deviation can be regarded as reliable since recent research using multi-country survey data by Mikkelsen et al. (2021) showed that PSM does not suffer from measurement invariance, meaning "the causes and consequences of PSM may, in fact, be reasonably comparable across most cultural settings" (2021, p. 741). Consequently, the U.S. outlier cannot be explained by incomparability of the latent measurement between cultures but stands as a substantial finding. While all of our four jurisdictions are typically regarded as highly developed, relatively low-corruption jurisdictions (United States: score=67, rank=27) the U.S. rank last compared with the other three jurisdictions (Switzerland: CPI=84, rank=7; Hong Kong: CPI=76, rank=12; Taiwan: CPI=68, rank=25) on the corruption perception index (Transparency International, 2021), prior work indicates that differences in administrative traditions (Bevir et al., 2003), national cultures (Bandura, 2002; Ramdani & van Witteloostuijn, 2014), and institutional qualities (P. Fleming et al., 2020; Weick et al., 2005) may account for this variance to some degree. Our findings suggest that in the U.S., a typical example of the Anglo-Saxon public interest tradition (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2019), the role of PSM as a behavioral belief is less effective than in the other samples, which were professionally socialized in the *Rechtsstaat* tradition heavily influenced by rule-based traditions of Weberian (Weber et al., 2007) and Confucian/Confucian-

Anglo-Saxon hybrid bureaucracy, respectively (Painter & Peters, 2010; Yang & Rutgers, 2017). The two latter traditions are both characterized by strong civil service ethos rooted in strong ties with moral identities and the internalization of institutional logics specific to the public sector (Meyer et al., 2014). In contrast, the public interest tradition is characterized by higher administrative pragmatism, less distinction between public and private institutional logics and values (Ritz et al., 2022; Weißmüller et al., 2021), and a more skeptical perspective on administration as part of a government often perceived as a necessary evil in need for constant control (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017). Consequently, the U.S. sample outlier may reveal that PSM may not function as a self-regulating mechanism in the U.S. administrative tradition, calling for more exploration in future research.

Fourth, comparing the regression outcomes across the four jurisdictions studied allows assessing the degree of universality of the findings (Walker et al., 2019b), and reveals significant variation across jurisdictions. This highlights the continuous relevance of conducting comparative research because different administrative traditions, such as the rule-based Weberian (2007) versus the client service-oriented Anglo-Saxon tradition (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2017), encompas different social norms and implicit patterns of behavior expected from civil servants, which prime their integrity-related behavior so that corruption intent is contingent upon such traditions (Bandura, 2002; Reynolds et al., 2010).

The data reveals significant response differences between the four sampled jurisdictions. This highlights two different but equally important theoretical contributions to the conceptual understanding of public sector corruption. This indicates that administrative traditions matter as reference frames for moral behavior. This finding is in line with prior research on the sectoral context dependency of decision making (e.g., Weißmüller and Vogel (2021), Weißmüller et al. (2021), Peters (2021), and Kuhlmann and Wollmann (2019)), and underscores the paramount influence of administrative traditions in their function as implicit and explicit benchmarks for individuals to interpret the appropriateness of their own and others' administrative behavior

(March & Olsen 1995). As "stewards of the constitutional principles, the rule of law, and professional standards" (Boruvka & Perry, 2019, p. 568) bureaucrats are supposed to adhere strictly to the "rules of their office with dedication and integrity" (2019, p. 568) and serve and act in accordance with the normative order in which their employing bureaucracy is embedded. Boruvka & Perry (2019) point out that this normative order is context-specific, which means that different administrative traditions will provide dissimilar hyper norms, explaining the observed differences between civil servant motivation and integrity-related outcomes when compared across administrative traditions. Administrative traditions do not only concern idiosyncratic organizational, political, sociological, and legal aspects but also infuse civil servants' work environments with intangible principles which function as the implicit paradigms, institutional logics, values, and motives that govern individuals' behavior (MacCarthaigh & Saarniit, 2019; Schachter, 2002; Simon, 1947/1997). However, the current study shows that the extent to which these implicit principles translate into moral behavior and affect ethical decision making is limited.

Limitations & Future Research

As with any empirical research, this study's methods are subject to some limitations, which call for future research.

First, all survey experiments are associated with limits to their external validity due to their level of abstraction (Jilke et al., 2016). While the vignette treatment design was informed by expert insights and was controlled for realism, but they are archetypical, hence allowing only for limited detail that cannot represent the full complexity of the idiosyncratic individual, institutional, and social contexts in which acts of bribery materialize in the real world. This study examines the effect of dispositional micro-characteristics within specific sectoral frames that typically emit saliant signals regarding the adequacy of behavior. The artificiality of behavioral experiments provides the opportunity to control many other variables irrelevant for the micro-

level phenomenon tested, whilst allowing for a systematic manipulation of the contextual parameters of interest. This study's quasi-experimental design involves, hence, a strength rather than a weakness, given the state of the art in the field (Jilke et al., 2016).

Second, this study's design formally qualifies as a *quasi*-experiment because the nature of sector-specific framing inhibits having a 'pure' control group that would receive no sectoral treatment. Unfortunately, this issue is inherent in sector-based framing experiments because respondents are socio-culturally primed to assume that the absense of sectoral information implicitly denotes private sector association, even if no informational cue is given. This effect may contaminate any control group by setting uncontrolled and unknown default effects (Weißmüller et al., 2021), so that not incorporating a control group follows logically from using a sector-related treatment scenario and increases rather than limits the validity of the empirical findings.

A third limitation concerns the sampling procedure. Due to the elite nature of the target population and the delicate topic of the study, sampling was voluntary and guaranteed a high degree of anonymity to gain access and avoid social desirability response bias (Fisher & Katz, 2000). Consequently, the resulting convenience sample does not allow for in-depth analyses on hypothetical sub-clusters within each country's sample population, for instance, by civil servants' employing organization or level of government. Moreover, this study cannot control for self-selection (if any). The sampled participants have relatively high PSM and are relatively senior. This means that the data does not capture the full spectrum of public administration personnel, calling for future research to compare and contrast the effect of managerial seniority but also closeness to the street-level on corruptibility.

The above reflections underscore the importance of further examining the cross-country generalizability or lack thereof of sectoral framing effects and PSM moderation across a much wider set of jurisdictions, encouraging future research. For instance, how would replicating the

study in a typical "high-corruption" country change the results? What specific features of countries – as rooted in national administrative, cultural, and institutional features – may influence the likelihood of bribery, as well as the effect of sectoral framing and PSM moderation? The variance observed across samples from different administrative traditions is a caveat for the generalizability of insights on public sector corruption across international settings. Although theory suggests that basic psycho-cognitive processes of sense-making and decision making should be stable across contexts and jurisdictions (Ajzen, 2001), we find that civil servants professionally socialized in different administrative environments will respond very differently to opportunities to extract private gain from their public office, pointing toward a caveat with regards to an implicit normativity pervasive of all corruption research. The types of behaviors that individuals consider as legitimate – i.e., the adequacy of behavior in context – and what counts as "corrupt" behavior is a socially learned construct based on societal norms and individual experience (Pertiwi, 2020). Acting corruptly is only a hyper norm violation if public administration is considered a legitimate and reputable institution working toward the betterment of society. This means that we need more research on the nexus between micro-level corruptibility within meso and macro level factors such as the quality of institutions and societal and cultural norms to fully understand *why* corruption occurs (De Graaf, 2007). Moreover, future research could explore other manifestations of corruption, as well as specific work-related meso and micro-level antecedents, such as the role of oragnizational structures and discretion (C. J. Fleming, 2020), adverse organizational power dynamics, and work-related strain such as red tape and burnout (Zhang et al., 2019) to explore the origins of civil servants' moral disengagement as the potential result of psychological resource drain further. As a final future research suggestion, we would like to emphasize the need to triangulate by adding other research designs, with complementary (dis-)advantages, next to our quasi-experimental vignette setup.

Conclusions

This study deepened the understanding of the connection between sectoral context, PSM, and civil servants' tolerance for corruption. Corruption is a wicked problem across the world, causing damage individually on a case-by-case basis but also for communities and societies collectively (Meyer-Sahling et al., 2018; Schuster et al., 2020). Endemic corruption undermines countries' economic development and increases social inequality (Wei, 1999). Developing a deeper understanding of the moral antecedents of corruption is key to deriving effective anti-corruption strategies (Gans-Morse et al., 2018). This study provides novel empirical evidence on the impact of sectoral context and PSM (both in isolation and in tandem) on bureaucrats' corruptibility. Experimental evidence from four jurisdictions shows that (a) sectoral context matters as a frame for moral justification, (b) bribe severity matters, and (c) PSM may function as a remedy to a certain extend but is superseded if bureaucrats feel morally disengaged. In this, we respond to calls by (among many others) Meyer-Sahling et al. (2019), Gans-Morse et al. (2021), De Graaf (2007), and Sulitzeanu-Kenan et al. (2021) by providing a more nuanced understanding of the role of both macro-level context and micro-level motives that determine the likelihood of defecting from public integrity. If we want to find viable solutions to administrative corruption, anti-corruption strategies need to consider both the micro level of motivation as well as the effects of the contextual environment.

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Table 1: *Descriptive Sample Statistics*

	Pooled data	**Switzerland**	**Hong Kong**	**Taiwan**	**United States**
N	1,694	357	586	409	342
Obs.	3,254	694	1,064	817	679
Corruptibility (baseline)[a], *M* ± *SD*	1.54 (.72)	1.41 (.66)	1.46 (.65)	1.68 (.67)	1.66 (.89)
Quasi-experimental treatment:					
Realism, *M* ± *SD*	2.69±.86	2.38±.83	2.38±.83	2.90±.80	2.87±.85
Sector frame distribution (%)					
Public sector context	33.3	33.3	33.3	33.3	33.3
Hybrid sector context	33.3	33.3	33.3	33.3	33.3
Private sector context	33.3	33.3	33.3	33.3	33.3
Shade distribution (%)					
White corruption	33.2	32.7	33.7	33.7	32.3
Grey corruption	33.4	33.3	33.4	33.1	33.9
Black corruption	33.4	34.0	32.9	33.2	33.8
PSM, *M* ± *SD*	5.12±.92	5.12±.75	5.14±.92	5.26±.82	4.94±1.15
Moral disengagement, *M* ± *SD*	2.38±.91	1.95±.68	2.59±.81	2.79±.76	2.05±1.10
Risk aversion (ln*h*), *M* ± *SD*	.84±.37	.89±.32	.86±.35	.91±.28	.66±.47
Gender, female (%)	45.2	28.1	37.8	67.1	50.1
Age in years, *M* ± *SD*	44.77±10.98	51.8±7.9	42.7±11.1	40.5±9.7	46.0±11.4
Anticorruption duties (%)	16.7	20.2	6.3	17.9	27.4
Leadership position (%)	50.9	80.3	58.0	26.3	35.8

Notes: [a] Detailed by-jurisdiction descriptive results of corruptibility by treatment are presented in Online Appendix D.

Table 2: *Clustered regression results on Corruptibility, pooled data*

Model	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Type of Corruption	white	white	grey	grey	black	black
Public sector			*– reference category –*			
Hybrid sector	.02	-.27	.01	-.14	**.09†**	-.33
	(.05)	(.30)	(.05)	(.41)	(.05)	(.34)
Private sector	.01	-.46	.08	-.53	**.09†**	-.34
	(.05)	(.26)	(.05)	(.35)	(.05)	(.31)
PSM	**-.07****	**-.12*****	**-.07***	**-.11***	**-.08****	**-.13****
	(.02)	(.04)	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.05)
Public sector × PSM			*– reference category –*			
Hybrid sector × PSM		.06		.03		.08
		(.06)		(.08)		(.06)
Private sector × PSM		**.09†**		.12		.08
		(.05)		(.07)		(.06)
Realism	-.01	-.01	**.09*****	**.09*****	-.00	-.00
	(.03)	(.03)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)	(.03)
Moral disengagement	**.26*****	**.26*****	**.22*****	**.22*****	**.23*****	**.23*****
	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)
Risk averse	-.05	-.04	-.03	-.03	.06	.06
	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Female	-.02	-.02	.02	.02	**.09†**	**.09***
	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)	(.04)
Age	-.00	-.00	**-.01*****	**-.01*****	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Anticorruption duties	.03	.03	.05	.06	.05	.05
	(.05)	(.05)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)	(.06)
Leadership position	.01	.01	-.01	-.01	-.06	-.06
	(.04)	(.04)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
United States			*– reference category –*			
Switzerland	-.01	-.01	**-.28*****	**-.28*****	**-.22****	**-.22****
	(.06)	(.06)	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)	(.07)
Hong Kong	-.09	-.09	**-.59*****	**-.58*****	**-.25*****	**-.25*****
	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.07)	(.07)
Taiwan	.04	.04	**-.72*****	**-.72*****	**.21****	**.20****
	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)
Intercept	1.44***	1.69***	1.90***	2.14***	1.53***	1.79***
	(.20)	(.24)	(.21)	(.28)	(.22)	(.29)
Obs.	1,081	1,081	1,086	1,086	1,087	1,087
F (df)	13.42***	11.76***	14.28***	12.72***	22.24***	19.82***
df	13	15	13	15	13	15
Mean VIF	1.42	.	1.37	.	1.39	.
RMSE	.60	.60	.68	.68	.67	.67
Adj. R^2	.150	.152	.185	.187	.190	.191

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, † $p<.1$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$, *** $p<.001$.

Figure 1: ***Theoretical Model based on the Theory of Planned Behavior***



Figure 2: *Marginal treatment effects on Corruptibility*



Notes: Large panel: pooled data; *Obs.*=3,254; small panels: by jurisdiction. Whiskers denote 95%-CIs.

Figure 3: *Marginal Interaction Effect of PSM × Sector on Corruptibility*



Notes: Large panel: pooled data; *Obs.*=3,254; small panels: by jurisdiction. Whiskers denote 95%-CIs.

APPENDICES (Supplementary Online Material)

Appendix A. Vignettes and Scenario Treatments

Comprehensive codebook as well as treatment translations in Chinese and German available from the authors upon request.

<table>
<tr><th colspan="4">INTRODUCTION TO SCENARIOS</th></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">In the following situations, you have to judge to what extent you tend to agree or disagree. Bear in mind that there are no correct or incorrect answers. Therefore, please select the option that aligns with your personal preferences. What would you do in the following two situations?</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td colspan="3">Random selection into 1 out of 3 SECTORAL FRAMES (I, II, or III)</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>I. PUBLIC
2 out of 3 corruption vignettes (a, b, or c), random selection, random order.</td><td>II. PRIVATE
2 out of 3 corruption vignettes (a, b, or c), random selection, random order.</td><td>III. HYBRID
2 out of 3 corruption vignettes (a, b, or c), random selection, random order.</td></tr>
<tr><td>Vignette</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">(a) White corruption</td><td>You work as an inspector at the governments' Agency for Food Quality. Your main duty is controlling restaurants regarding compliance with the food safety instructions. This agency is owned by the general public and has no profit orientation. It is strongly committed to the public's general interest, public values, and public welfare.</td><td>You work as an inspector for a private company that is officially charged with controlling restaurants regarding compliance with the food safety instructions. This company is a private corporation that is profit oriented.</td><td>You work as an inspector for a company that is officially charged with controlling restaurants regarding compliance with the food safety instructions. This company is owned partially by the state (50%) and by private investors (50%), and it has both profit-oriented goals and is strongly committed to the public's general interest, public values, and public welfare.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">One day, you have to control your favorite restaurant. You know the owner of the restaurant well since you visit this restaurant on a weekly basis. The owner of the restaurant offers you a free meal together with your wife and children if you waive the inspection and give him a maximum score. Overall, what is the risk since you have never been food poisoned before? [followed by corruptibility scale, Weißmüller, De Waele, & van Witteloostuijn (2022)]</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">(b) Grey corruption</td><td>You work as a diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and you are involved in negotiations regarding a particularly important international collaboration treaty that should eventually result in a free trade agreement between the country you represent and a partnering country.</td><td>You work as a manager in the international business development unit of a private company, and you are involved in a particularly important official trade mission that aims to set-up a collaboration treaty that should eventually result in a free trade agreement between your country and a partnering country.</td><td>You work as a diplomat at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The mission of the Ministry states that the organization is strongly committed to public values and ethical codes of conduct. Furthermore, the Ministry highly values efficiency and cost effectiveness. For instance, you and your team colleagues are partially remunerated based on the number of collaboration treaties you initiate between the country you represent and partnering countries. You are involved in negotiations regarding a particularly important international collaboration treaty that should eventually result in a free trade agreement between the country you represent and a partnering country.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">One day, you are on a mission to the partnering country. As you arrive at your hotel, you find the keys of a very exclusive sport car lying on your bed together with the message: 'For a fruitful collaboration between our countries'. [followed by corruptibility scale, Weißmüller, De Waele, & van Witteloostuijn (2022)]</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">(c) Black corruption</td><td>You work at the anti-drug department at the Ministry of Internal Affairs.</td><td>You work at an international shipping company.</td><td>You work at an international shipping company that has sent you to a special department established in collaboration with the Ministry of Internal Affairs to fight drug trafficking. This department is special, because it is both strongly committed to the public's general interest, public values, and public welfare, as well as being oriented toward profit-oriented goals. For instance, you and your team colleagues are being partially remunerated based on the amount of confiscations of drugs money within your department.</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="3">As a whistle-blower, you are asked to testify against an important officer at your department because he is suspected of having received bribes for warning drug cartels upfront when controls by the anti-drug department were to be carried out. You certainly know that the suspect is guilty and, therefore, deserves to be punished accordingly. However, the day before your testimony you receive an envelope in your mailbox with the message 'Silence is gold'. The letter further states that you will receive another envelope containing €10'000 if you decide not to testify. [followed by corruptibility scale, Weißmüller, De Waele, & van Witteloostuijn (2022)]</td></tr>
</table>

Appendix B. Multilingual Translations of PSM Scale

12-item seven-point Likert-type scale; range: min.=1, max.=7;
"Please indicate the degree to which you agree with the following statements."

B.1 Chinese

Traditional Chinese version used in Hong Kong and Taiwan.

PSM 1:	我對於對社區或國家有益的公共計畫有興趣。
PSM 2:	我喜歡與人分享對於公共政策的看法。
PSM 3:	看到民眾從我並未參與的公共計畫中獲得好處，也會讓我覺得很滿足。
PSM 4:	我認為公共服務是公民應盡的責任。
PSM 5:	對我而言，有意義的公共服務是很重要的。
PSM 6:	我樂於見到政府官員做出對整體社區有益的決定，即使那會損及我的個人利益。
PSM 7:	當我見到他人處於困苦中時，我感到難過。
PSM 8:	日常事件常提醒我人與人之間是相互依賴的。
PSM 9:	我同情弱勢族群的遭遇。
PSM 10:	對我而言，對社會有貢獻比個人成就更重要。
PSM 11:	我願意為了營造一個更好的社會而做出很大的犧牲。
PSM 12:	大我比小我重要。

B.2 English (Kim et al., 2013)

Used in Hong Kong and in the United States.

PSM 1:	I am interested in those public programs that are beneficial for my country or the community I belong to.
PSM 2:	Sharing my views on public policies with others is attractive to me.
PSM 3:	Seeing people getting benefits from a public program where I would have been deeply involved in would bring me a great deal of satisfaction.
PSM 4:	I consider public service my civic duty.
PSM 5:	Meaningful public service is very important to me.
PSM 6:	I would prefer seeing public officials do what is best for the whole community even if it harmed my interests.
PSM 7:	It is difficult for me to contain my feelings when I see people in distress.
PSM 8:	I am often reminded by daily events how dependent we are on one another.
PSM 9:	I feel sympathetic for the plight of the unprivileged.
PSM 10:	Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievements.
PSM 11:	I am prepared to make enormous sacrifices for the good of society.
PSM 12:	I believe in putting duty before self.

B.3 German

Used in Switzerland.

PSM 1:	Ich interessiere mich für öffentliche Programme, die dem Land oder der Gemeinde, in dem bzw. in der ich lebe, zu Gute kommen.
PSM 2:	Ich tausche mich gerne mit anderen über meine politischen Vorstellungen aus.
PSM 3:	Es würde mir sehr gefallen, wenn es Menschen durch mein Engagement für das Gemeinwohl besser ginge.
PSM 4:	Ich sehe die Arbeit im öffentlichen Dienst als meine Bürgerpflicht.
PSM 5:	Eine sinnvolle Arbeit im öffentlichen Sektor ist wichtig für mich.
PSM 6:	Ich bevorzuge es, wenn Amtsträger ihr Handeln am Wohle der Gesellschaft ausrichten, selbst wenn es meinen eigenen Interessen zuwiderläuft.
PSM 7:	Es ist schwer für mich, meine Gefühle zu unterdrücken, wenn ich Menschen in Not sehe.
PSM 8:	Alltägliche Dinge erinnern mich oft daran, wie sehr wir alle aufeinander angewiesen sind.
PSM 9:	Ich habe Mitgefühl mit den Benachteiligten der Gesellschaft.
PSM 10:	Etwas für die Gesellschaft zu erreichen, ist mir wichtiger als persönliche Erfolge.
PSM 11:	Ich bin bereit, große Opfer für das Gemeinwohl zu bringen.
PSM 12:	Ich bin überzeugt, dass die eigenen Interessen den Aufgaben und Pflichten untergeordnet werden sollten.

Appendix C: Construct Validity Testing

Table C.1

Scale reliability testing, absolute and comparative fit indices (SEM-based CFA)

	Variable	Dataset	χ^2(df)	df	RMSEA [90% CI]	GFI	CFI	TLI	AVE	AIC	α	Construct validity	
												discriminant	convergent
1	Corruptibility	Pooled	3.45	2	.015 [.000-.040]	.991	1.00	.99	.58	.432	.831	high	high
		Switzerland	8.09*	2	.063 [.022-.110]	.994	1.00	.99	.59	.366	.841	high	high
		Hong Kong	11.41**	2	.067 [.033-.106]	.993	.99	.98	.56	.340	.813	high	high
		Taiwan	8.58*	2	.064 [.024-.110]	.992	.99	.98	.52	.355	.790	high	high
		United States	5.39†	2	.050 [.000-.103]	1.00	1.00	.99	.65	.863	.688	high	high
2	PSM	Pooled	5,179.85***	54	.169 [.165-.173]	.724	.73	.67	.40	.750	.886	high	limited
		Switzerland	990.11***	54	.149 [.141-.158]	.681	.69	.62	.31	.468	.833	high	limited
		Hong Kong	1,485.76***	54	.148 [.151-.165]	.774	.78	.73	.44	.758	.901	high	limited
		Taiwan	1,830.59***	54	.201 [.196-.209]	.684	.69	.62	.45	.613	.905	high	limited
		United States	993.14***	54	.160 [.152-.169]	.797	.81	.76	.49	1.222	.917	high	limited
3	Moral disengagement	Pooled	1,387.28***	20	.143 [.137-.150]	.846	.85	.79	.40	.676	.824	high	limited
		Switzerland	260.28***	20	.124 [.111-.138]	.819	.83	.76	.31	.358	.774	high	limited
		Hong Kong	432.89***	20	.139 [.128-.151]	.824	.83	.76	.35	.497	.765	high	limited
		Taiwan	401.25***	20	.153 [.140-.166]	.779	.79	.70	.33	.438	.765	high	limited
		United States	255.55***	20	.132 [.118-.146]	.926	.93	.90	.58	1.093	.908	high	high

Notes: χ^2(df)= model chi-square; RMSEA= root mean square error of approximation; GFI=Goodness-of-fit-statistic; CFI = Comparative fit index; AIC= Average interitem covariance; α= Scale reliability coefficient (Cronbach's α); † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Appendix D: Descriptive Results by Jurisdiction

Table D.1: *Descriptive Results of Corruptibility by Sectoral Context and Bribery Type*

Sample Bribery type	**Sectoral context**	**Obs.**	**M**	**SD**	***t*-test** ***sectors***	***t***	***p***	***d***
Pooled data								
White	public	372	1.48	.66	public vs private	.178	.859	.013
	hybrid	371	1.48	.64	hybrid vs public	.199	.843	.015
	private	364	1.48	.65	private vs hybrid	.019	.985	.001
Grey	public	382	1.50	.72	public vs private	-1.383	.167	-.101
	hybrid	369	1.47	.74	hybrid vs public	.548	.584	.040
	private	364	1.58	.80	private vs hybrid	1.868	.062	.138
Black	public	374	1.60	.76	public vs private	-1.266	.206	-.093
	hybrid	373	1.63	.72	hybrid vs public	-.563	.574	-.041
	private	368	1.67	.77	private vs hybrid	.739	.460	.054
Switzerland								
White	public	86	1.46	.83	public vs private	1.696	.092	.261
	hybrid	85	1.37	.56	hybrid vs public	.821	.413	.126
	private	83	1.27	.62	private vs hybrid	-1.125	.262	-.174
Grey	public	90	1.45	.61	public vs private	-.844	.400	-.128
	hybrid	85	1.47	.62	hybrid vs public	-.160	.873	-.024
	private	84	1.54	.77	private vs hybrid	.688	.492	.106
Black	public	87	1.41	.73	public vs private	-.200	.841	-.030
	hybrid	89	1.28	.47	hybrid vs public	1.437	.153	.217
	private	88	1.44	.64	private vs hybrid	1.820	.071	.274
Hong Kong								
White	public	119	1.47	.61	public vs private	.087	.931	.011
	hybrid	122	1.47	.67	hybrid vs public	.016	.987	.002
	private	118	1.46	.56	private vs hybrid	-.066	.947	-.009
Grey	public	124	1.45	.69	public vs private	.711	.478	.092
	hybrid	117	1.38	.60	hybrid vs public	.904	.367	.117
	private	114	1.39	.64	private vs hybrid	.175	.861	.023
Black	public	120	1.45	.69	public vs private	-.759	.449	-.100
	hybrid	117	1.53	.64	hybrid vs public	-.923	.357	-.120
	private	113	1.52	.72	private vs hybrid	-.113	.910	-.015
Taiwan								
White	public	92	1.56	.57	public vs private	-1.572	.118	-.231
	hybrid	90	1.64	.57	hybrid vs public	-.998	.320	-.148
	private	93	1.70	.61	private vs hybrid	.591	.555	-.087
Grey	public	91	1.32	.48	public vs private	-1.685	.094	-.251
	hybrid	90	1.31	.43	hybrid vs public	.111	.911	.017
	private	90	1.44	.52	private vs hybrid	1.858	.065	.277
Black	public	91	2.00	.76	public vs private	-.668	.505	-.099
	hybrid	89	2.02	.72	hybrid vs public	-.178	.859	-.027
	private	91	2.08	.74	private vs hybrid	.502	.617	.075
United States								
White	public	75	1.44	.64	public vs private	-.057	.955	-.010
	hybrid	74	1.40	.72	hybrid vs public	.403	.688	.066
	private	70	1.45	.77	private vs hybrid	.414	.679	.069
Grey	public	77	1.84	.98	public vs private	-1.226	.222	-.198
	hybrid	77	1.80	1.14	hybrid vs public	.246	.806	.040
	private	76	2.05	1.09	private vs hybrid	1.375	.171	.222
Black	public	76	1.56	.72	public vs private	-.912	.363	-.148
	hybrid	78	1.73	.83	hybrid vs public	-1.320	.189	-.213
	private	76	1.68	.84	private vs hybrid	-.372	.711	-.060

Note: *t*-testing and Cohen's *d* Welch-adjusted.

Appendix E. Correlations

Table E.1: *Correlation matrix, pooled data*

Variables	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1 Corruptibility	.													
Contextual frame														
2 Public	-.02	.												
3 Hybrid	-.01	-.51***	.											
4 Private	.03	-.50***	-.49***	.										
Treatment														
5 White bribery	-.06***	-.01	.00	.00	.									
6 Grey bribery	-.03	.01	-.00	-.00	-.50***	.								
7 Black bribery	.09***	-.00	.00	.00	-.50***	-.50***	.							
8 Realism	.09***	-.02	-.02	.04*	.12***	-.11***	-.01	.						
9 PSM	-.13***	-.06***	.03	.03	-.02	.02	.00	.08***	.					
Control variables														
10 Moral disengagement	.30***	.03	-.04*	.01	-.00	.02	-.02	.09***	-.10***	.				
11 Female	.05**	.03	-.00	-.03	.01	-.01	.01	.03	-.03	-.01	.			
12 Age	-.16***	-.00	.01	-.01	-.01	.01	.00	-.12***	.08***	-.31***	-.18***	.		
13 Risk aversion	-.01	.01	-.00	-.01	-.00	-.01	.01	.00	.05**	.07***	-.05**	-.06**	.	
14 Anticorruption duties	.04*	.00	.01	-.01	.01	-.01	.00	.05**	.07***	-.02	-.08***	.02	-.05**	.
15 Leadership position	-.10***	-.00	-.02	.02	-.01	-.00	.01	-.09***	.11***	-.12***	-.18***	.30***	.04*	.10***

Note: N=1,694; † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Appendix F: Supportive Analyses

Table F.1: *Clustered Regression Results on Corruptibility, Swiss data*

Model	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Type of Corruption	white	white	grey	grey	black	black
Public sector			*– reference category –*			
Hybrid sector	.02	**-1.67†**	.08	.72	-.09	-.57
	(.11)	(.88)	(.09)	(.63)	(.10)	(.84)
Private sector	-.10	-1.40	.11	.61	-.00	.61
	(.11)	(.93)	(.11)	(.77)	(.11)	(.89)
PSM	-.03	**-.23†**	-.04	.03	**-.12†**	-.12
	(.07)	(.12)	(.06)	(.10)	(.06)	(.14)
Public sector × PSM			*– reference category –*			
Hybrid sector × PSM		**.33†**		-.12		.09
		(.17)		(.12)		(.16)
Private sector × PSM		.26		-.10		-.12
		(.17)		(.15)		(.16)
Realism	.02	.02	.08	.07	-.02	-.02
	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Moral disengagement	**.26****	**.25****	**.30*****	**.30*****	**.09†**	.09
	(.09)	(.09)	(.06)	(.07)	(.06)	(.06)
Risk averse	**.19***	**.21***	.02	.02	.02	.07
	(.08)	(.10)	(.11)	(.12)	(.13)	(.13)
Female	.07	.06	.01	.01	-.07	-.08
	(.10)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)	(.09)
Age	.00	.01	**-.01***	**-.01***	.01	.01
	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)
Anticorruption duties	**-.16†**	**-.18***	.12	.12	-.03	-.02
	(.09)	(.09)	(.11)	(.11)	(.08)	(.08)
Leadership position	.08	.07	-.09	-.08	-.12	-.12
	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)	(.10)	(.09)	(.09)
Intercept	.56	1.51*	1.55***	1.21*	1.62**	1.59
	(.48)	(.70)	(.45)	(.58)	(.56)	(.90)
Obs.	228	228	230	230	236	236
F (df)	1.91*	1.57†	3.91***	3.59***	1.50	1.52†
df	10	12	10	12	10	12
Mean VIF	1.14		1.13		1.13	
RMSE	.68	.67	.62	.62	.60	.60
Adj. R^2	.051	.069	.122	.117	.013	.017

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, † $p<.1$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$, *** $p<.001$.

Table F.2: *Clustered Regression Results on Corruptibility, Hong Kong data*

Model	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Type of Corruption	white	white	grey	grey	black	black
Public sector			*– reference category –*			
Hybrid sector	.02	.25	.01	.22	.11	-.42
	(.08)	(.52)	(.08)	(.63)	(.08)	(.56)
Private sector	.03	-.33	.01	-.50	.10	-.46
	(.07)	(.47)	(.08)	(.51)	(.09)	(.50)
PSM	**-.11****	**-.11**†	**-.17*****	**-.19***	**-.11***	**-.18***
	(.04)	(.06)	(.05)	(.08)	(.04)	(.08)
Public sector × PSM			*– reference category –*			
Hybrid sector × PSM		-.05		-.04		.10
		(.10)		(.12)		(.10)
Private sector × PSM		.07		.10		.11
		(.09)		(.09)		(.10)
Realism	.07	.07	**.09***	**.08***	-.00	.00
	(.04)	(.04)	(.03)	(.03)	(.05)	(.05)
Moral disengagement	**.17****	**.17****	**.13***	**.14****	**.18*****	**.18*****
	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)	(.05)
Risk averse	-.10	-.10	-.09	-.09	-.06	-.05
	(.10)	(.10)	(.08)	(.08)	(.11)	(.11)
Female	-.01	-.02	.05	.04	**.19***	**.18***
	(.06)	(.06)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)
Age	.00	.00	**-.01***	**-.01****	**.01***	**.01**†
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)
Anticorruption duties	.17	.16	.17	.17	.07	.08
	(.14)	(.14)	(.13)	(.13)	(.16)	(.16)
Leadership position	**-.14**†	**-.13**†	-.02	-.03	-.12	-.12
	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.07)	(.08)	(.08)
Intercept	1.49***	1.51***	2.14***	2.24***	1.31***	1.69***
	(.34)	(.43)	(.32)	(.39)	(.35)	(.51)
Obs.	359	359	355	355	350	350
F (df)	4.72***	4.13***	5.49***	4.70***	4.24***	3.96***
df	10	12	10	12	10	12
Mean VIF	1.15		1.14		1.12	
RMSE	.58	.58	.61	.61	.65	.65
Adj. R^2	.100	.100	.113	.115	.081	.079

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, † p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001.

Table F.3: *Clustered Regression Results on Corruptibility, Taiwanese data*

Model	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Type of Corruption	white	white	grey	grey	black	black
Public sector			*– reference category –*			
Hybrid sector	.07	-.29	.01	**-.76†**	.14	.70
	(.08)	(.55)	(.06)	(.43)	(.11)	(.69)
Private sector	.09	-.39	**.15***	-.72	.15	.29
	(.08)	(.50)	(.07)	(.57)	(.11)	(.68)
PSM	**-.19*****	**-.25*****	**-.10***	**-.20****	**-.24*****	**-.21***
	(.04)	(.07)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)	(.09)
Public sector × PSM			*– reference category –*			
Hybrid sector × PSM		.07		.15		-.11
		(.10)		(.08)		(.13)
Private sector × PSM		.09		**.17†**		-.03
		(.09)		(.10)		(.13)
Realism	-.05	-.05	.03	.03	.04	.04
	(.05)	(.05)	(.03)	(.03)	(.07)	(.07)
Moral disengagement	**.13***	**.13****	**.10***	**.10***	.10	.10
	(.05)	(.05)	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)
Risk averse	.06	.06	.04	.03	.20	.20
	(.09)	(.09)	(.10)	(.10)	(.15)	(.15)
Female	-.09	-.09	-.06	-.06	.12	.12
	(.08)	(.08)	(.06)	(.06)	(.10)	(.10)
Age	**-.01***	**-.01***	-.00	-.00	-.00	-.00
	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)
Anticorruption duties	-.08	-.08	.03	.03	.13	.13
	(.10)	(.10)	(.07)	(.07)	(.12)	(.12)
Leadership position	.08	.09	.09	.08	-.06	-.06
	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.11)	(.11)
Intercept	2.77***	3.05***	1.54***	2.02***	2.69***	2.49***
	(.38)	(.45)	(.34)	(.42)	(.48)	(.61)
Obs.	275	275	271	271	271	271
F (df)	7.22***	6.00***	2.29***	2.74***	4.33***	3.89***
df	10	12	10	12	10	12
Mean VIF	1.22		1.21		1.25	
RMSE	.54	.54	.47	.47	.70	.70
Adj. R^2	.145	.141	.055	.065	.104	.099

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, † $p<.1$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$, *** $p<.001$.

Table F.4: *Clustered Regression Results on Corruptibility, United States data*

Model	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Type of Corruption	white	white	grey	grey	black	black
Public sector			*– reference category –*			
Hybrid sector	-.01	-.43	-.07	-.64	.16	-.60
	(.09)	(.40)	(.16)	(.82)	(.11)	(.61)
Private sector	-.06	-.19	.09	-.58	.04	-.55
	(.09)	(.41)	(.15)	(.76)	(.11)	(.49)
PSM	.03	-.00	.01	-.07	.06	-.03
	(.03)	(.06)	(.06)	(.10)	(.04)	(.07)
Public sector × PSM			*– reference category –*			
Hybrid sector × PSM		.08		.12		.15
		(.08)		(.16)		(.12)
Private sector × PSM		.03		.13		.12
		(.08)		(.15)		(.09)
Realism	**-.12***	**-.12***	**.21***	**.21***	.01	.02
	(.05)	(.05)	(.08)	(.08)	(.06)	(.06)
Moral disengagement	**.39*****	**.39*****	**.33*****	**.33*****	**.39*****	**.38*****
	(.04)	(.04)	(.06)	(.06)	(.05)	(.05)
Risk averse	-.04	-.04	.07	.08	**.16†**	**.15†**
	(.08)	(.08)	(.13)	(.13)	(.09)	(.09)
Female	.01	.01	.01	.02	-.03	-.03
	(.08)	(.08)	(.13)	(.13)	(.09)	(.09)
Age	-.00	-.00	**-.01***	**-.01***	**-.01***	**-.01***
	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)	(.01)	(.00)	(.00)
Anticorruption duties	.12	.12	-.17	-.16	-.13	-.12
	(.10)	(.10)	(.16)	(.16)	(.10)	(.10)
Leadership position	.05	.05	-.15	-.15	-.04	-.04
	(.09)	(.09)	(.14)	(.14)	(.10)	(.10)
Intercept	1.04**	1.20**	1.24**	1.63*	.80†	1.22*
	(.35)	(.44)	(.47)	(.67)	(.41)	(.47)
Obs.	219	219	230	230	230	230
F (df)	10.14***	8.68***	8.72***	7.72***	10.88***	11.16***
df	10	12	10	12	10	12
Mean VIF	1.18		1.22		1.18	
RMSE	.56	.56	.96	.97	.68	.68
Adj. R^2	.377	.374	.190	.188	.268	.270

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, † $p<.1$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$, *** $p<.001$.