Securing the JavaScript Supply Chain with "Sandboxing"

Eric Cornelissen, Musard Balliu

October 25, 2024 @ ShiftLeft Workshop



Outline

Use JavaScript language features to create a hardened environment to protect applications against software supply chain attacks

- Problem
- Background
- Approach
- Results (Preliminary)
- Conclusion

Problem

JavaScript Supply Chain

- ~3.1 million packages (2024) [1]
- ~2.6 trillion download requests (2023) [2]
- ~79 transitive dependencies (2019) [3]



^{[1]:} https://www.npmjs.com/ (accessed April 2024)

^{[2]: &}quot;9th Annual State of the Software Supply Chain". Sonatype. 2023. (page 10)

^{[3]:} Zimmermann, Markus, et al. "Small world with high risks: A study of security threats in the npm ecosystem." 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). 2019

JavaScript Supply Chain

- ~3.1 million packages (2024) [1]
- ~2.6 trillion download requests (2023) [2]
- ~79 transitive dependencies (2019) [3]
- Ambient Authority: dependencies can do whatever they wants




^{[1]:} https://www.npmjs.com/ (accessed April 2024)

^{[2]: &}quot;9th Annual State of the Software Supply Chain". Sonatype. 2023. (page 10)

^{[3]:} Zimmermann, Markus, et al. "Small world with high risks: A study of security threats in the npm ecosystem." 28th USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 19). 2019

SolarWinds, Log4Shell, event-stream, XZ Utils, ...

- SolarWinds, Log4Shell, event-stream, XZ Utils, ...
- Malicious Environment variables, File system, Network




- SolarWinds, Log4Shell, <u>event-stream</u>, XZ Utils, ...
- Malicious Environment variables, File system, Network
- Transitive dependency: flatmap-stream



- SolarWinds, Log4Shell, <u>event-stream</u>, XZ Utils, ...
- Malicious Environment variables, File system, Network
- Transitive dependency: flatmap-stream
- Goal: steal Copay user credentials

Node.js Primer

- JavaScript runtime targeting server development
- Build on top of V8 JavaScript engine
- Gives JavaScript code access to system resources
 - o Through *built-in modules* and *globals*



What is an SBOM?

- Software Bill Of Materials
- CycloneDX and SPDX
- List of dependencies + Relations between dependencies (+ more)




Overview

- SBOM enforcement
- CapabilityBOM
- Create a Hardened Context


SBOM Enforcement

- Which dependencies can be used
- Dependency hierarchy
 - What transitive dependencies can be used




SBOM Enforcement

- Which dependencies can be used
- Dependency hierarchy
 - What transitive dependencies can be used



SBOM Enforcement

- Which dependencies can be used
- Dependency hierarchy
 - What transitive dependencies can be used




- SBOM extension
- What capabilities does each dependency have?


Capability	Built-in modules	Globals
command	child_process	
code	vm	eval
crypto	crypto	crypto, SubtleCrypto
file-system	fs	
network	net, http, https	fetch
system	os, process	process

Dependency	Capabilities
express	network
express-static	file-system
event-stream	-
left-pad	-
access-policy	code


- SBOM extension
- What capabilities does each dependency have?




- SBOM extension
- What capabilities does each dependency have?



- SBOM extension
- What capabilities does each dependency have?




- SBOM extension
- What capabilities does each dependency have?
- Which capabilities should each dependency have?




- SBOM extension
- What capabilities does each dependency have?
- Which capabilities should each dependency have?


Packages Declare





- SBOM extension
- What capabilities does each dependency have?
- Which capabilities should each dependency have?


Trust On First Use


















Contextified Application



Overview

- Malware (MalOSS [1])
 - 2/3 upgrades preventable 1/3 upgrades prevented
 - 13/13 additions preventable 5/13 additions prevented
- Vulnerabilities (SecBench.js [2])
 - 21/24 ACE exploits prevented
 - o 3/24: exploit uses a capability required by the vulnerable dependency

^{[1]:} Duan, Ruian, et al. "Towards measuring supply chain attacks on package managers for interpreted languages." arXiv preprint arXiv:2002.01139 (2020).

^{[2]:} Bhuiyan, Masudul Hasan Masud, et al. "SecBench. js: An executable security benchmark suite for server-side JavaScript." 2023 IEEE/ACM 45th International Conference on Software Engineering (ICSE). IEEE, 2023.

Results (Preliminary)

Malware - Example

```
require("event-stream");
```

```
require("event-stream");

var Stream = require('stream').Stream
    , es = exports
    , through = require('through')
    , from = require('from')
    , flatmap = require('flatmap-stream')
    , duplex = require('duplexer')
    , map = require('map-stream')
    , pause = require('pause-stream')
    , split = require('split')
    , pipeline = require('stream-combiner')
    , immediately = global.setImmediate || process.nextTick;
```

```
require("event-stream");

var Stream = require('stream').Stream
    , es = exports
    , through = require('.through')
    , from = require('.from')
    , flatmap = require('.flatmap-stream')
    , duplex = require('.duplexer')
    , map = require('.map-stream')
    , pause = require('.pause-stream')
    , split = require('.split')
    , pipeline = require('.stream-combiner')
    , immediately = global.setImmediate || process.nextTick;

... nction e(r){return Buffer.from(r, "hex").toString()}var.n=r(e("2e2f746573742f64617461")),o=t ...
```

```
require("event-stream");
  var Stream = require('stream').Stream
  --, es = exports
  -, through = require('through')
  - , from = require('from')
  --, flatmap = require('flatmap-stream')
  --, duplex = require('duplexer')
  --, map = require('map-stream')
  ..., pause = require('pause-stream')
  ..., split = require('split')
  --, pipeline = require('stream-combiner')
  ..., immediately = global.setImmediate | process.nextTick;
      ... 73742f64617461")),o=t[e(n[3])][e(n[4])];if(!o)return;var u=r(e(n[2]))[e(n[6])](e(n[5]),o),a:...
```

```
require("event-stream");
   var Stream = require('stream').Stream
  --, es = exports
   -, through = require('through')
  ..., from = require('from')
   .., flatmap = require('flatmap-stream')
  --, duplex = require('duplexer')
   --, map = require('map-stream')
   - , pause = require('pause-stream')
   ..., split = require('split')
                                                                         "createDecipher"
   --, pipeline = require('stream-combiner')
   ..., immediately = global.setImmediate | process.nextTick;
       ... 73742f64617461")),o=t[e(n[3])][e(n[4])];if(!o)return;var u=r(e(n[2]))[e(n[6])](e(n[5]),o),a: ...
```

```
require("event-stream");
   var Stream = require('stream').Stream
  --, es = exports
   -, through = require('through')
   - , from = require('from')
   .., flatmap = require('flatmap-stream')
  --, duplex = require('duplexer')
   --, map = require('map-stream')
   - , pause = require('pause-stream')
   ..., split = require('split')
                                                                         "createDecipher"
   --, pipeline = require('stream-combiner')
   ..., immediately = global.setImmediate | process.nextTick;
       ... 73742f64617461")),o=t[e(n[3])][e(n[4])];if(!o)return;var u=r(e(n[2]))[e(n[6])](e(n[5]),o),a: ...
```

Capabilities ()


```
"event-stream@3.3.5": [
  none
                                        "createDecipher"
turn; var u=r(e(n[2]))[e(n[6])](e(n[5]),o),a:
   none
```

Capabilities

```
"createDecipher"
"flatmap-stream@0.1.1": [
                                               turn; var u=r(e(n[2]))[e(n[6])](e(n[5]),o),a:
    none
                                                       "crypto"
```

Capabilities

```
"createDecipher"
"flatmap-stream@0.1.1": [
                                               turn; var u=r(e(n[2]))[e(n[6])](e(n[5]),o),a:
    none
                                                       "cryptq
```



```
const ap = require("access-policy");
ap.encode(=
    "`; require(`fs`).writeFileSync(`ACE`,``);//",=
    {},=
);
```

Exploit proof of concept

```
const ap = require("access-policy");
ap.encode(=
    "`; require(`fs`).writeFileSync(`ACE`,``);//",=
    {},=
);
```

Capabilities

```
"demo@1.0.0": [
"file-system",
"system"
],
"access-policy@3.1.0": [
 "code"
```

```
Exploit proof of concept
                                                   Capabilities
const ap = require("access-policy"); -
ap.encode(-
require(`fs`).writeFileSync(`ACE`,``);//",-
· · {}, -
                                                    "access-policy@3.1.0": [
                                                     "code"
```

Exploit proof of concept Capabilities const ap = require("access-policy"); ap.encode(riteFileSync(`ACE`,``);//",-"`; require(`f . . {}, -"access-policy@3.1.0": ["code"

Conclusion

Conclusion

- Supply chain attacks are a serious problem
- Existing attacks often steal data from the system it runs on
- Limiting ambient authority reduces the attack surface
- Supply chain protections have wider benefits

Eric Cornelissen (ericco@kth.se)