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В сборник, подготовленный Центром восточных исследований ВГУ, включены работы на английском и русском языках, посвященные различным проблемам истории и современного состояния востоковедения, исследования по истории, культуре и политике Востока.

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**ОПЫТ ИЗУЧЕНИЯ АРАБСКОГО ЯЗЫКА В МУЛЬТИЛИНГВАЛЬНОЙ СРЕДЕ
(НА ПРИМЕРЕ ЛИНГВИСТИЧЕСКОЙ СТАЖИРОВКИ В УНИВЕРСИТЕТЕ
SUP'MANAGEMENT г. ФЕС, МАРОККО)**

Практика обучения арабскому языку в высших учебных заведениях лингвистического профиля свидетельствует о том, что студенты-лингвисты испытывают большие трудности при овладении видами коммуникативной деятельности на арабском языке, особенно на начальном этапе. В случае языковой стажировки студентов РГФ, обучение проходило на французском языке. На первый взгляд такое сочетание усложняет задачу, но в итоге, опыт показал эффективность и успешность подобной практики.

Установлено, что трудности связаны, прежде всего, с особенностями арабского языка и психологической неуверенностью обучаемых в реальной возможности освоить арабский язык[1]. В нашем случае трудности связаны еще и с тем, что арабский язык – второй иностранный, и количество часов, предлагаемых для изучения данной дисциплины ограничено.

Безусловно, изучение любого языка не ограничивается только лишь теорией, очень важно практическое применение языковых навыков, и именно поэтому лингвистическая практика в стране изучаемого языка является довольно продуктивной. Кроме этого, сегодня возникает потребность в формировании у обучаемых компетенций в области коммуникации не только в рамках арабского литературного языка, но в рамках конкретного регионального диалекта [5]. В настоящее время арабские диалекты классифицируются по двум основным параметрам - социальному и территориальному. По социальной характеристике их делят на кочевые и оседлые, а последние, в свою очередь, - на городские и сельские. На социальное членение диалектов накладывается география. По географическому признаку современные арабские диалекты делятся на две большие группы: восточную (машрикскую), складывающуюся из четырех подгрупп - месопотамской, аравийской, центрально-арабской и египетско-суданской, - и западную (магрибскую, или североафриканскую). Основные территориальные диалекты арабского языка, такие как иракский, сирийский, египетский, диалекты Аравийского полуострова и Северной Африки, имеют свои достаточно ярко выраженные признаки на фонетико-морфологическом и лексическом уровнях [1]. Степень взаимопонимания между носителями разных диалектов относительна и субъективна. На взаимопонимание влияют также условия и тематика беседы. Сугубо местная или профессиональная тематика (национальная кухня, местное хозяйство, быт, обычаи и т. п., т. е. все то, что характеризуется употреблением местной лексики и выражений) ослабляет взаимопонимание и требует пояснений. Напротив, общественно-политические и культурные темы (которые во многом опираются на общелитературную лексику и выражения) обеспечивают более высокую степень взаимопонимания[5]. Поэтому изучение арабского диалекта в языковой среде страны пребывания представляется важным, так как классический арабский язык представлен только в учебной литературе, языке СМИ. А на улице говорят на местном варианте арабского, понимать который также необходимо. Такая уникальная возможность - изучать арабский в условиях мультилингвизма- появилась у нас во время летней лингвистической практики в Марокко в университете Sup' Management.

Согласно определению, данному Департаментом по языковой политике Совета Европы, мультилингвизм- языковая ситуация в определенной стране или регионе, где

сосуществуют одновременно несколько языков. Такая языковая ситуация и характерна для Марокко, в которой несколько языков живут, развиваются, смешиваются в зависимости от этнической принадлежности, социально-экономической ситуации и географического происхождения марокканцев[2]. Арабский язык официально является основным языком, на котором говорят все, французский занимает второе место (около 65% населения), затем местный вариант берберов, (самоназвание амазиги), на котором говорят около 42% населения. Наконец, есть ещё испанский (10%) - в нескольких регионах на севере страны, которая была сто лет назад частью испанской колониальной империи [3].

На самом деле марокканское культурно-языковое разнообразие еще более тонкое. Арабский язык разделен на несколько диалектов, которые отличаются по происхождению: городской, сельский или горный и историей общин, как, например, иудейское сообщество и их иудео-арабская речь. Диалектный арабский язык - «дарижа», в отличие от стандартного арабского, это смесь арабского, европейских вкраплений и тамазигта, языка берберов, автохтонов Магриба [3].

Цель данной статьи - представить опыт изучения арабского языка в мультилингвальной среде. Интенсивный курс изучения арабского языка, предложенный в университете Марокко, рассчитан на 72 часа. Преподавание арабского велось на французском языке, который имеет официальный статус языка образования Марокко. Для нас это оказалось также важным моментом, так как французский язык изучается нами в качестве первого иностранного языка на факультете РГФ. Это позволило нам одновременно практиковать оба языка: арабский и французский. При этом первый был целью, а второй средством обучения. На парах активно велось обучение всем видам речевой деятельности: чтению, аудированию, говорению и письму. Изучались основы грамматики арабского языка, велась работа с диалогами, которые переводились на французский язык.

Значительные трудности мы испытывали при овладении произносительными навыками арабского языка. В силу того, что органы речи, особенно гортань, функционирует в более напряженном режиме при говорении на арабском языке, то первоочередной задачей, является правильное (точное) произношение сложных арабских звуков. Произносительные навыки вообще, и в арабском языке в частности, очень хрупкие, неустойчивые [1]. Поэтому им уделялось большое внимание в течение всего периода обучения, особенно сложным арабским звукам - гортанным и эмфатическим, произношение которых отрабатывали в различных вариациях. Интенсивная тренировка в освоении арабского произношения, а также скрупулезное объяснение преподавателем наиболее сложных фонетических явлений позволили нам автоматизировать произносительные навыки арабского языка.

На каждом занятии преподаватель применял различные формы обучения: индивидуальную, парную и групповую. В ходе групповой работы было особенно интересно обсуждать темы, касающиеся жизни арабской молодежи, что позволило сделать вывод о том, что между молодыми людьми из разных стран и континентов не так и много различий.

При работе с текстом преподаватель предлагал следующий алгоритм. Сначала он читал текст вслух, затем его читали студенты. Не пользуясь словарем, обучающиеся должны понять общее содержание текста. При этом, понимание текста происходило при актуализации прошлых знаний, связывании их с новой информацией, полученной при прослушивании и чтении. Затем каждый текст разбирался подробно. Преподаватель представлял новую лексику как безпереводными способами: приведением синонимов и антонимов, использованием словообразовательной цепочки, объяснением на арабском языке и т.д., так и используя перевод. Особенностью переводного способа,

использованного на наших занятиях в Марокко, был перевод на французский язык, который также является для нас иностранным. Таким образом, в ходе наших занятий арабским языком мы углубляли и знания по французскому языку.

При выполнении упражнений приоритет отдавался упражнениям на формирование навыков диалогической и монологической речи. Однако преподаватель уделял достаточно внимания и для обучения письменной речи. Так, в конце каждой учебной темы мы писали мини-сочинения, которые затем, после проверки преподавателем, читали и обсуждали все вместе в классе. Мы также познакомились с разными видами арабского почерка и особенностью печатных шрифтов. Хотя, конечно, письменная речь ещё остается достаточно сложным видом речевой деятельности для нас.

Большое внимание при обучении арабскому языку необходимо уделять культуре арабов. Преподавание иностранного языка, как известно, непосредственно связано с ознакомлением и проникновением в культуру стран изучаемого языка. Как замечает С.Г. Тер-Минасова: «Языки должны изучаться, в неразрывном единстве с миром и культурой народов, говорящих на этих языках» [4, с.28]. Знакомство с арабской культурой и культурой Марокко происходило как во время занятий языком, так и в после учебное время. Преподаватель арабского провёл экскурсию в старую часть Феса – медину, во время которой мы общались исключительно по-арабски, тем более, находясь под сенью старейшего в мире университета Карауин. Мы имели возможность в свободные вечера ознакомиться с жизнью города Феса, общались с местными жителями. Поскольку мы находились в Марокко в период Рамадана – мусульманского поста, мы приобрели универсальный словарный запас и знания, касающиеся этой важной стороны жизни исламского мира. В выходные дни совершали путешествия по стране. В небольшом городке Бхалиль, мы пообщались с представителями другой народности населяющей Марокко, берберами-троглодитами и побывали в их жилище – пещерах, где угостились традиционным чаем. Во время наших прогулок и поездок для общения мы использовали французский язык и местный вариант арабского -дарижу.

Опыт пребывания в Марокко, безусловно, оказался очень полезным, как в языковом плане, так и в культурном. Восточная и христианская культуры на первый взгляд весьма различны, но между нами нет той пропасти, которая существует в наших умах. Мы можем устанавливать диалог, в процессе которого происходит культурное обогащение, а вследствие этого расширение границ сознания и познания мира и самих себя.

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ОСОБЕННОСТИ ДЕЛОВОГО ОБЩЕНИЯ В МАРОККАНСКОЙ АДМИНИСТРАТИВНОЙ СИСТЕМЕ (ПО ИТОГАМ ПРОХОЖДЕНИЯ ПРОИЗВОДСТВЕННОЙ ПРАКТИКИ)

Летом 2017 года, нам, троим студентам факультета Международных отношений была предоставлена возможность прохождения научно – производственной практики в марокканском университете Sup'Management¹ в г. Фес, в течение 3-х недель. Впечатлений и опыта, даже за такой короткий срок, мы получили массу, хотелось бы немного рассказать об ожиданиях и представлениях, с которыми мы ехали и реальности, с которой познакомились.

Мы, как студенты–международники, имели некоторое представление о государствах Африки и арабо-мусульманского мира, в частности, Магриба² и Марокко. Надо честно признать, что представления оказались весьма далеки от реальности. Имелись и определенные предубеждения, которые были порождены как недостаточными знаниями о регионе и стране, так и стереотипами, сформированными СМИ. Мы понимали, что едем в страну с другим жизненным укладом, со своей спецификой административной системы, экзотической для нас культурой, которой нас пугивали даже преподаватели факультета. Но «другое», не значит плохое, в чем нам и удалось убедиться на собственном опыте.

Открытость марокканцев и искреннее желание помочь, стало для нас первым открытием. Буквально с момента посадки в самолёт и до прибытия на место, нас опекали попутчики. Если марокканец увидит растерявшегося незнакомца, в 90% случаев он подойдет и поможет ему. В чем нам и удалось убедиться на собственном опыте. Конечно, такому поведению есть объяснение, исходящее из общих восточных традиций гостеприимства, согласно которым гость – это святое или «барака» - благодать. В былые времена гость – был источником информации и новостей; это ходячая реклама, того, кто его принимал; гость – возможный компаньон по бизнесу и даже друг. Мы на себе ощутили всю эту гамму отношения к себе, на практике. Надо признать и такой парадокс межкультурного общения, о котором пишет И.А. Василенко: для того, чтобы понять другую культуру, нужно быть открытым по отношению к ней; но когда человек открыт, он уязвим³. Конечно, об этом моменте не следует забывать.

Во время прохождения практики, мы увидели изнутри особенности работы административной сферы вуза. Первое, что нас удивило – это количество женщин в администрации университета и на руководящих постах: современных, ухоженных, прекрасно говорящих по-французски. Нашу практику курировали мадам Сана Хлифи, ответственная за международные связи и её помощница, мадемуазель Рава, почти наша ровесница, общительная и динамичная девушка. В первый же день нашего пребывания, она на своей машине провезла нас по Фесу с обзорной экскурсией. Фес оказался таким, как

¹ www.supmanagement.ma

² *Магриб* (араб. المغرب [эль-Магриб] «там, где закат») — название, данное средневековыми арабскими моряками, географами и историками странам Северной Африки, расположенным к западу от Египта.

³ И. А. Василенко. Диалог цивилизаций: социокультурные проблемы политического партнерства. М.: Эдиториал УРСС, 1999, 272 стр.

нам показывали в знаменитом фильме «Клон»: тесный, средневековый, почти сказочный, в рияде⁴ которого мы жили. И одновременно другой – мегаполис, с современными зданиями и огромными королевскими владениями⁵, полный модных автомобилей. Во время поездки Рава рассказала о куче мероприятий по практике и вне её, которые были для нас запланированы. Потом, правда, были изменения: не совсем те мероприятия и в другое время, но это тоже такая особенность.

Так вот, оказывается, в Марокко женщины самые свободные в арабском мире, они играют в обществе активную роль. Представлены также в органах законодательной и судебной власти. Так, 60 из 395 мест в парламенте зарезервированы за женщинами⁶. С 2006 года в стране началась подготовка женщин-имамов (женское мусульманское духовенство). Однако, многие образованные марокканцы и сами женщины считают, что остаётся еще много проблем в области защиты их прав, особенно от насилия в быту⁷. Сентябрьская сессия 2017 г. генеральной Ассамблеи ООН выпустила документ, в котором даны рекомендации в этой области марокканскому государству, как в части насилия, так и в вопросе неравенства возможностей⁸.

Ещё одним открытием было то, что отношение к организации труда, точнее, чувство времени в Марокко сильно отличается от привычного нам. Внешне марокканцы работают в расслабленном темпе, без той суровости, которую мы часто наблюдаем в наших офисах. Периодически прерываются на обсуждение личных вопросов, даже по телефону. С каждым входящим разговор начинается с вопросов-ответов о делах, доме, пусть и несколько формальных, но беседа затягивается. Попытки ускорить какой-либо процесс, конкретизировать задачу, натывается на отстранённое «инш'алла» - «если даст Бог!». Тем не менее, и это осталось для нас загадкой, марокканцы все успевают сделать в срок, притом сохраняют любезность и доброжелательный настрой. В этой части, деловой этикет в Марокко похож на европейский. Однако сильно заранее мероприятия не планируются. Потому что, либо что-то отменится-изменится, либо, как они сами говорили со смехом – «забудут, это ж Африка!».

Пожалуй, человек нашего склада, впервые попадая в такой трудовой коллектив, проходит несколько стадий адаптации: от удивления и отрицания, до принятия правил игры. Их неторопливость, кажущаяся непунктуальность, «изменение планов по ходу пьесы» довольно быстро перестают возмущать и обескураживать, и начинают казаться очень даже органичными в этом жарком климате. Возможно, это также связано с преобладанием важности в деловой этике марокканцев неформальных, личных связей.

Несмотря на особенности, принципы межкультурной марокканской коммуникации настолько гибкие, что, с марокканцами всегда можно договориться, вне зависимости от ситуации. В разговоре они стараются избегать слова «нет». Даже если марокканец не

⁴ Риад – это традиционный марокканский дом или дворец с внутренним двориком, иногда с садом и фонтаном, расположенный в исторической части города. Сегодня эти дома служат гостиницами; в одной из них мы жили

⁵ Королевский дворец в Фесе («Дар эль Махзен») занимает площадь около 80 гектаров земли и включает в себя мечети, красивые сады, древние медресе и школы коранических исследований, датирующиеся XIV веком. Сам дворец был построен в XVII веке. Часть зданий дворца занимает король Марокко, который сюда регулярно приезжает.

⁶ <http://www.aufeminin.com/debats-de-societes/dossier-special-droits-des-femmes-maroc-d53351c611617.html> дата обращения: 24.12.2017

⁷ <http://arabmir.net/node/2835>, дата обращения 30.11.2017

⁸ https://www.upinfo.org/sites/default/files/document/morocco/session_27_-_may_2017/a_hrc_36_6_f.pdf, дата обращения: 20.12.2017

согласен с собеседником, он всё равно, сперва его выслушает и, может быть, согласится с ним и лишь потом выскажет свою позицию. В мягкой форме, так, что надо иметь изрядный опыт общения, чтобы понять, что это всё-таки «нет». Они не произносят продолжительных монологов, им больше импонирует живая беседа. Те марокканцы, с которыми мы общались в стенах университета и за его пределами, демонстрировали неплохую общую эрудицию, удивляли знаниями истории и из области международных отношений, о нашей стране. Причём много информации, как оказалось, они получают из передач российского канала RT.

Мы понимали также, что как будущие дипломаты, мы представляли свою страну и отчасти её политику. Даже если во время общения не было слишком прямолинейных суждений, мы понимали, что «для человека политического, понимать партнера другой культуры, значит переноситься в другое социокультурное измерение»⁹.

⁹ И. А. Василенко. Диалог цивилизаций: социокультурные проблемы политического партнерства. М.: Эдиториал УРСС, 1999, 272 стр.

ПРАКТИКА В УНИВЕРСИТЕТЕ SUP'MANAGEMENT (МАРОККО)

Начиная свой рассказ о прохождении производственной практики в Королевстве Марокко летом 2017 года, необходимо представить университет-партнёр ВГУ - Sup'Management. Международная сеть университетов Sup'Management, основанная в 1995 году, занимает важное место в образовательном пространстве не только Марокко, но и всего континента как инновационный образовательный проект, созданный для подготовки кадров, способных эффективно действовать на рынке труда.

Университет Sup'Management развивает многочисленные направления международного партнерства, начиная с присутствия в нескольких странах африканского континента и заканчивая ассоциацией с Интернациональным Исследовательским Объединением в сфере экономики (EconomistIntelligenceUnit), действующем на территории Соединенных Штатов Америки и странах Латинской Америки, что представляет собой практически уникальное явление в образовательной среде Марокко и других африканских стран. Международная открытость заявляется основополагающим элементом политики сети данных университетов. Партнерами университета г. Фес являются также вузы Франции, Испании и Швейцарии. С 2017 года Воронежский госуниверситет подписал договор о научно-педагогическом сотрудничестве с Sup'management.

Данная сеть по праву считается лидером в образовательной сфере африканского континента: до 2500 студентов из 23 стран ежегодно обучаются в образовательных центрах Sup'Management по следующим направлениям: Школа бизнес-администрирования (School of Business Administration), Школа инжиниринга (School of Engineering), Школа туризма (School of Tourism), Школа дипломатии и государственного управления (School of Diplomacy & Governance), Школа возобновляемой энергетики (School of renewable Energy).

Большое внимание уделяется научной деятельности; в составе Sup'Management функционируют четыре центра инноваций и развития:

- Центр экономических исследований Юг-Юг (OSSIE). Главная задача Центра экономических исследований Юг-Юг – предоставление информации в соответствии с запросами участников экономических процессов, а также исследователей, работающих на базе Sup'management.

- Исследовательский центр CERF, который занимается организацией и введением в практическое использование разработок в сфере управления.

- Ecole Doctorale позволяет получить докторскую степень на базе университетов-партнеров в США, Никарагуа и Мексике.

- Панафриканский Гражданский Форум представляет собой площадку обмена экспертными мнениями и способ распространения знаний.

Вообще Марокко для западных стран – это форпост в остальную, внутреннюю Африку. Большое количество иностранных компаний и банков, дорогих особняков европейских знаменитостей – свидетельство существующего доверия. Само же королевство позиционирует себя образовательным центром для африканских стран-франкофонов. Вся система образования в нем европейская, преподавание ведётся на французском языке. Мы обратили внимание, что в стенах университета во внеаудиторном

общении арабский язык (как стандартный, так и разговорный – дарижа) не используется, а только на занятиях.

Вся административная система функционирует на французском языке. В университете изучают английский, арабский, испанский и русский как иностранные языки. Приятно удивило, что как и в ВГУ, там организуют студенческие тусовки: существует English Club; на более массовые мероприятия с французским языком студенты ходят в Institut Français. Судя по интересу к нашей стране и к нам, там явно не хватает русского клуба! Когда мы выступали на гала-концерте с песней на русском языке, публика нас поддерживала на русском без акцента: «хорошо! молодец!» А мы потрясённо смотрели выступления студентов из нескольких стран Африки, восхищаясь их природной органичностью, пластикой и музыкальностью, проникнувшись, таким образом, пониманием многообразия и красоты африканских цивилизаций. Открытием для нас стало выступление марокканской группы барабанщиц, такая эклектика ультрасовременных девушек и нескольких парней, которые танцевали под отбиваемый ритм, вовлекли и нас в этот танец.

Для нас, как для студентов факультета Международных отношений, очень важно было не только проникнуться многообразной культурой, опыта общения с которой у нас до этого не было, но и принять участие в рабочих поездках, где мы выступали как сотрудники Sup'management. С профессиональной точки зрения мы получили опыт организации поездки: звонки и переговоры по поводу программы, транспорта, организации встречи делегации из Сенегала, которая прибыла в это время в университет.

Целью приезда сенегальской делегации был короткий курс повышения квалификации в области менеджмента и ознакомление с логистикой экономическо-торгового порта города Надор, на севере Марокко. О поездке было известно заранее, и мы познакомились с терминами, касающимися портовой логистики на французском и на русском языке, освежили знания о Сенегале. В роли сопровождающих Сенегальской делегации, мы укрепили наши коммуникационные навыки, умение выстраивать диалог в профессиональных вопросах, используя наработанные знания, как в языковой, так и научно-практической сферах. Мы участвовали в двусторонних переговорах между представителями Сенегала и Марокко по вопросу расширения сотрудничества в сфере логистико-коммуникационных технологий и повышения квалификации кадров. Несмотря на то, что мы скорее присутствовали, чем были действующими лицами, такой живой опыт ведения переговоров на французском языке, был у нас впервые. Конечно, знания, полученные на занятиях по иностранному языку, на занятиях по другим предметам были весьма полезны. Но вот чисто практические навыки: ведение протокола во время переговоров со сроками исполнения и именами ответственных – были для нас весьма полезны. Главный вывод, который мы единодушно сделали – ведение переговоров, это итог очень большой подготовительной работы, изучение вопросов переговоров, использование заготовок, продуманных ответов.

Ещё одной запоминающейся экскурсией стало знакомство с оффшорной зоной г.Феса Fes-Shore, в которой мы находились несколько часов. Внешне, Fes-Shore представляет собой огороженный квартал, немного не обжитого вида, внутри которого стоят несколько 4-5 этажных зданий. Территория представляет из себя довольно большую площадь – 22 гектара, с зелёным газоном с молодыми деревьями и, удивительно, есть часть, похожая на огород, а также несколько автостоянок. Внутри зданий расположены офисные помещения, обычного вида. Сотрудники рассказали нам, что этот комплекс функционирует как абсолютно автономная площадка: со своим электроснабжением, скважиной воды, интернетом и, естественно, банкингом. Есть ресторан, который действительно снабжается зеленью и овощами со своего огорода. Нам показали систему

сигнализации, видеонаблюдения, показали рабочие залы. Нас удивила открытость, с которой нам, иностранным студентам, провели экскурсию. Так что мы получили представление о том, как функционирует крупная экономическая площадка, основанная на международном сотрудничестве и, что немало важно, на принципах полной автономии.

Географическая близость к Европе и долгое влияние европейцев на эту часть Африки дают о себе знать в том языковом и культурном балансе, который проявляется и в повседневной жизни и в административной системе Марокко.

Знания, которые мы получили в этой поездке, формируют нас как специалистов широкого профиля.

ЛИБРОЦЕНТРИЧНЫЕ МОДЕЛИ МИРА: ОРИЕНТ И ОКСИДЕНТ (КНИГА КАК ФАКТОР ГЕНЕЗИСА ПЕРЕМЕН)

На протяжении всей истории человечества книга выступала своеобразным маяком в мире перемен, сохраняя память ушедших поколений в бушующих потоках времени, и по сей день представляет собой нечто большее, чем просто текст, документ, источник данных, сведений, комплекс суждений и умозаключений. В данной статье феномен книги и книжной культуры анализируется с позиции книговедения, а также рассматривается в рамках историко-культурного и культурно-философского аспектов. Своеобразие анализа книги в теории культуры заключается в выяснении природы ее гуманистического и идеального содержания, описывающего книгу как метод развития человеческой личности.

Ключевые слова: книга, книжное дело, письменный язык, книжная культура, книговедение.

Throughout the history of mankind, the book has advocated as a peculiar pendulum in the world of changes, preserving the memory of past generations, and to this day it manifests itself more than just a text, a document, a source of data and information, a complex of judgments and conclusions. In this article, the phenomenon of a book and book culture is analyzed from the standpoint of bibliology, and is also considered within the framework of historical, cultural and philosophical aspects. The peculiarity of the analysis of the book in the theory of culture lies in clarifying the nature of its humanistic and ideal content, which describes the book as a method of developing the human personality.

Key words: a book, the book publishing industry, written language, book culture, bibliology.

Книга как результат общечеловеческой культуры отражает два ее вечных начала – материальное и духовное, которые произрастают из неизмеримых глубин человеческой цивилизации. Слово «культура», как известно, происходит от латинского «cultura», что означает «возделывание, воспитание, образование, развитие, почитание» [1]. В этом и заключается залог бессмертия книги, так как на каждом этапе эволюции она является продуктом материальной культуры и духовной жизни человека.

Говоря о начале жизненного цикла такого явления, как книга, необходимо отметить, что свое время ее утверждение совпало с радикальными изменениями в формах восприятия и мышления, социальной организации и способах жизни. Все это позволило говорить не просто о книге, но об особой так называемой «книжной культуре» человека.

Книжная культура Востока имеет долгий путь развития. Возникновение первой восточной письменности датируется IV тысячелетием до н.э. [2]. Начиная с последней трети V в. до н.э., появлялись новые, не существовавшие прежде методы копирования и распространения книг. Они благоприятствовали развитию того, что изначально являлось привилегией ограниченного круга людей, которые в

больших объемах покупали и коллекционировали книги. В древности человек предстает как любознательное существо; невозможно представить античный мир и без наставника-учителя. Без передачи необходимых знаний и духовного опыта ни одно общество не оправдывает надежды на долгое существование.

Таким образом, можно смело утверждать, что обучающие тексты заложили фундамент для формирования системы культурных ценностей Востока, именно поэтому сложно переоценить роль письменности даже на устном этапе развития цивилизации. Изобретение письма явилось величайшим достижением человеческого разума.

Важнейшим периодом в истории возникновения письменного языка и книг стала эллинистическая эпоха от захвата власти Александром до включения Египта как части Ориента в Римскую империю, которая актуализировала невесточные традиции. Правители великих эллинистических империй превращали свои столицы в культурные центры. Уже тогда строились крупные библиотеки, которые вмещали в себя книги древней и классической греческой литературы. Самые первые книги были полностью написаны от руки. Изготавливать их было достаточно трудно. Стоили они очень дорого, и купить их могли только богатые люди. Книга ассоциировалась с наличием высокого положения человека в обществе.

Для развития отраслей промышленности людям были необходимы письменные тексты, поэтому популярность книг набирала обороты. Рукописи стали неудобны, так как на процесс их изготовления уходило огромное количество времени. Технологии эволюционировали более динамично на Западе, научно-технический прогресс развивался и становился движущей силой того времени, и в результате все эти факторы способствовали появлению книгопечатания. Книги в эпоху книгопечатания широко распространялись и становились доступными, и практически каждый человек мог себе позволить их приобрести. Поэтому, в период новой истории Ориент начал отставать от коллективного Запада.

На сегодняшний день уже сложилось определенное представление о формировании и развитии книжного дела в системе ценностей. Однако в такой области знания, как история культуры, образ книги достаточно парадоксален. Никто не оспаривает того факта, что книга возникает на достаточно высокой ступени развития человеческой культуры, а именно на этапе цивилизации, где учреждаются структуры органов государственной власти, правовая система, институты духовной культуры т.д. Зарождение книги на Востоке часто связывают с формированием и развитием познавательных потребностей человека, так как многие ученые считают, что книги и чтение рассматриваются в качестве орудия знания и предмета для размышлений и истолкований различных идей и взглядов, но это сомнительно, потому что человек Ориента не выделен из коллектива, но растворен в нем.

Однако Эрнест Геллнер, известный британский социолог, культуролог и исследователь западных и восточных национализмов, полагал иначе. Он утверждал, что источниками возникновения книги являлись хозяйственные потребности людей. «По-видимому, письменное слово входит в историю вместе с казначеем и сборщиком налогов: древнейшие письменные знаки свидетельствуют, прежде всего, о необходимости вести учет» - читаем мы у Геллнера, рассматривающего в своей книге «Нации и национализм» проблему письменности. По мнению философа, сфера хозяйственной деятельности в аспекте учета и контроля являлась основной в области применения навыков записи и разбора

письменных текстов [3].

Началом этапа изучения книги как феномена культуры считается XVI век, когда Ориент и Оксидент окончательно разошлись в своем развитии. Именно тогда Мишель Монтень первым высказал идею о книге как продукте культуры и высшей культурной и духовной ценности. По мнению Монтеня, трудно произвести переоценку роли книги в жизни человека, так как в ней концентрируется опыт человечества [4, 74]. Запад институционализировал свое политическое и культурное превосходство на миром Ориента. Западные интеллектуалы внесли значительный вклад в оправдание превосходства Оксидента и подчиненного статуса Ориента.

Паоло Верджерио (1370-1444) назвал книгу главным инструментом сохранения родовой человеческой памяти, считая ее самым эффективным методом трансляции достижений и опыта от одного поколения к другому. Фрэнсис Бэкон рассматривает книгопечатание как проект прикладного знания, человеческую природу. Выдающийся представитель эпохи Просвещения Жан-Жак Руссо критикует литературу, культуру, искусство и науку. При этом причину негативного, развращающего влияния на общественные нравы он находит именно в развитии книги, которая, по его мнению, злонамеренно ставит перед собой задачу учить людей безнравственности. Мнение Руссо крайне негативное: «Злоупотребление чтением убивает науку. Чрезмерное пристрастие к чтению создает лишь самонадеянных невежд» [5], но в начале 20 века под воздействием идей Поля Отле книга стала объектом научного изучения уже в рамках комплексной науки, изучающей процессы создания, распространения книжного дела и использования произведений письменности в обществе – книговедения.

Феномен книги исследуется специалистами в трех аспектах – гносеологическом, теоретическом, культурном [6,7]. Во все времена книга воспринималась не только как орудие передачи знаний, но и как метод познания окружающей действительности. Посредством книги человек познает мир вокруг себя, ученый приобретает знания о предмете своего исследования, формирует представления о различных объектах своей науки, явлениях и процессах, закономерностях их протекания, анализирует степень разработанности, достоверности и изменчивости научного знания. Отсюда книга рассматривается как гносеологический феномен [8]. Однако со временем складывался и теоретический феномен книги. Здесь ученый обращает внимание не только на ее гносеологическую природу, но и на методологический анализ книги, который рассматривается в контексте ее генетической связи с объектами истории и является способом отражения и познания современного мира.

С точки зрения культуры Запада основным назначением книги является ее роль в формировании личности и человеческих способностей, в то время как ориентальные культуры сфокусированы на сохранении и закреплении традиции. Данный феномен наиболее явно и четко был рассмотрен у канадского ученого М. Маклюэна. Согласно данной концепции, книга раскрывает свой истинный смысл, когда мы рассматриваем ее как некое орудие развития человека и искусственно созданной среды его обитания. Таким образом, книга и книгопечатание становятся у Маклюэна определяющими факторами в формировании личности, способов жизни людей как субъектов деятельности и их роли в мире духовной культуры [9].

Таким образом, каждая эпоха формировала своё отношение к чтению и письменности. На протяжении всех веков книга подтверждала свои преимущества

как наиболее эффективный способ формирования и закрепления знаний с целью их передачи в пространстве и во времени. Книга выступает важнейшим средством реализации ценностных ориентаций человека и ценностной системы в целом посредством социальной коммуникации. Очень важно, чтобы книга учитывала все функции продуктов человеческой деятельности и ее последствия, содержала полноту ее характеристик, аксиологических ориентиров для современного восприятия. Только в данном случае книга может быть подлинным орудием и двигателем прогресса. Этот прогресс, в свою очередь, продолжается до сих пор, и нет оснований предполагать, что он когда-нибудь закончится в своем развитии.

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«ОДИН ПОЯС, ОДИН ПУТЬ»: НАПРАВЛЕНИЯ И ПЕРСПЕКТИВЫ РЕАЛИЗАЦИИ, ИНТЕРЕСЫ РОССИИ

Конец 20 – начало 21 веков были ознаменованы значительными переменами в международной политике и изменениями в расстановке сил на мировой арене. Распад Советского Союза, минимизация роли Российской Федерации как его правопреемницы с уровня великой державы до регионального государства, появление новых политических акторов привели к тому, что ряд стран воспользовался изменившейся международной конъюнктурой. Несколько государств, включая Бразилию, Индию и Китай, начали играть большую роль в мировой политике, чем та, которой они довольствовались на том этапе, когда мир был, бесспорно, двуполярным. Среди новых лидеров мирового развития занимает Китай, который в период последнего десятилетия 20 века и в начале века демонстрировал устойчивые темпы экономического роста и увеличения своего политического влияния. Китай смог стать динамично растущей и изменяющейся экономикой и государством, которое в состоянии конкурировать с США и предлагать собственную повестку дня. Концепция «Один пояс и один путь» стала подтверждением растущего влияния Китая в мировой политике как страны, которая в состоянии свободной и независимо формировать и предлагать повестку дня для мировой политики в целом и развития региональных международных отношений в частности.

В центре авторского внимания в настоящей лекции будут проблемы концепции «Один пояс и один путь» [10; 12; 13] в контекстах как растущего международного влияния Китая, так и в рамках региональных международных отношений с государствами, которые все более входят в орбиту китайского внешнеполитического влияния, включая страны постсоветского пространства.

Концепция «Один пояс и один путь» была впервые озвучена председателем КНР Си Цзиньпином во время визитов в страны Центральной Азии и в Индонезию осенью 2013 года. Си Цзиньпин подчеркивает, что данный проект необходим «для того, чтобы сделать экономику ближе друг к другу, сотрудничать друг с другом ради более углубленного развития на более широком пространстве... мы можем использовать инновационную модель сотрудничества, чтобы совместно строить новый Шелковый путь... чтобы постепенно создать условия для регионального сотрудничества» [1]. Выбор стран для обнародования этой концепции развития не был случайным и свидетельствовал о значительных амбициях Китая закрепить за собой статус лидирующей экономики и ведущего политического игрока в регионе.

Реализация проекта стала возможной только во второй половине 2010-х годов в силу двух факторов. Во-первых, мир до 1991 года был биполярным и КНР не могла претендовать на статус центра, когда два таковые, представленные СССР и США, уже существовали. Во-вторых, Китай смог эффективно воспользоваться результатами распада СССР, потому что новая политическая и экономическая архитектура постсоветских пространств позволила более активно проводить экспансии на рынки новых государств. После обнародования проекта Китай инициировал кампанию его популяризации, в рамках которой был снят шестисерийный документальный фильм [7; 8].

Эксперты полагают, что проект приведет к росту влияния КНР в мире: «анализ предложенного варианта действий по совместному строительству «пояса и пути» показывает, что от реализации проекта Китай ожидает расширения масштабов своей

открытости внешнему миру и укрепления взаимовыгодного сотрудничества со странами-участниками. Не менее важную роль в проекте играет и реализация геополитических целей КНР, а именно – расширение взятых Пекином на себя политических обязательств и международной ответственности в соответствии со своими экономическими способностями. Государственные лидеры КНР отрицают политическую направленность интеграционных проектов, подчеркивая, что «мы не экспортируем социальный строй и модель развития и не навязываем их в ходе строительства "Одного пояса и одного пути"». Вместо того, чтобы повторять стереотипы геополитической игры, мы будем формировать новую форму взаимовыгодного сотрудничества» [11].

Подобная позиция властей КНР свидетельствует о достаточно осторожной и последовательной стратегии втягивания партнеров по региону в сферу экономического и впоследствии политического влияния. Следование данной стратегии в будущем может содействовать укреплению роли и влияния Китая, его превращению в ведущую державу не только в рамках региона, но и Евразии в целом. Планы китайского руководства являются в этом отношении достаточно амбициозными. общих положениях концепции прямо указано, что Китай готов вносить более весомый вклад в развитие всего человечества» [5]. В перспективе эта концепция имеет шансы стать крупнейшим интеграционным проектом, потому что его реализация охватит территорию, где проживает 63 % населения планеты (4.4 млрд. человек), которые производят 40 % мирового ВВП [7; 8], хотя основная заслуга в этом лежит преимущественно на экономике КНР.

Концепция, с одной стороны, не отличается значительной оригинальностью потому что механизм ее возможной реализации заимствован теоретиками и идеологами китайской внешней политики из проектов экономической европейской и североамериканской интеграции. Модель экономической интеграции, предложенная в НАФТА, стала идеальной формой, которую использовали теоретики «Одного пояса и одного пути», потому что китайский проект интеграции и сотрудничества предусматривает одновременное участие как развитых (Китай), так и развивающихся экономик стран-партнеров.

Концепция предусматривает преимущественно экономическую интеграцию путем использования, развития и укрепления как действующих международных соглашений, так и заключения новых. Предполагается, что участники проекта будут сближать свои экономики, а территория исторического Шелкового пути станет пространством экономической интеграции. Концепция, предложенная политическим руководством КНР, стала попыткой создания новой зоны совместного сопроцветания, потому что Китай формально не заявляет о своих претензиях на лидерство, но фактически стремится играть ведущую роль в «настоящем хоре всех стран вдоль маршрутов проекта» [1].

Концепция «Один пояс и один путь» в этой ситуации фактически стала попыткой политических и экономических элит КНР объединить более ранние проекты «Экономического пояса Шёлкового пути» и «Морского Шёлкового пути XXI века», что предусматривало ведущую роль Китая и сокращение реального политического и экономического влияния стран-партнеров, которые вынуждены играть роль региональных государств или «младших партнеров» современной Китайской Народной Республики. Концепция «Один пояс и один путь» предусматривает поглощение других проектов, включая «Экономический пояс Шелкового пути» и «Морской Шелковый путь».

В рамках проекта «Экономического пояса Шёлкового пути» предусматривается и планируется создание трех транс-евразийских экономических коридоров, включая северный (Китай – Центральная Азия – Россия – Европа), центральный (Китай – Центральная Азия – Западная Азия – Персидский залив – Средиземное море) и южный (Китай – Юго-Восточная Азия – Южная Азия – Индийский океан). Примечательно, что

ведущая роль в этих трех проектах принадлежит КНР, а Россия оказалась в числе транзитных стран, причем – менее важных и значимых чем географически более близкие постсоветские государства.

Эта иерархия партнеров отражает реальные экономические роли участников проекта. «Морской Шелковый путь» планируется без участия России, даже в форме трансфера технологий, которые могли бы использоваться КНР для строительства судов необходимых для реализации и обслуживания проекта.

Россия в свою очередь пытается актуализировать роль как источника инноваций и модернизации, в частности – в сфере энергетики. Министр энергетики Александр Новак подчеркивает, что «Россия не ограничивает свою роль только поставками энергоресурсов и готова предоставить свои компетенции в создании, эксплуатации и управлении масштабными энергосистемами» [2]. Подобные утверждения, как правило, являются продуктами для внутреннего российского потребления в силу того, что возможная реализация проекта предусматривает пассивное участие России, как страны по территории, которой может проходить транзит в то время как китайская сторона декларирует свою решимость более активно развивать сотрудничество с постсоветскими государствами, например, Казахстаном, в экономику которого, по мнению экспертов, китайские инвесторы в ближайшие годы готовы вложить 70 млрд долларов [9]. Кроме этого, сами китайские эксперты полагают, что инвестиции КНР в экономику стран-партнеров по проекту могут составить три триллиона долларов [3]. По мнению аналитиков, КНР, с одной стороны, имеет все причины для столь масштабных и значительных инвестиций, потому что они могут окупиться в тридцать лет [3; 5; 8].

С другой стороны, проект сопровождается значительными рисками, потому что политическая, социальная и религиозная нестабильность в странах, которые могут принять участие в проекте, негативно отразится на судьбе китайских вложений, но российские эксперты настроены оптимистично и полагают, что «Россия и Китай не являются конкурентами, Евразийский экономический союз и «Экономический пояс Шелкового пути» станут важным механизмом содействия экономическому развитию Евразии, сопряжение Евразийского экономического союза и «Экономического пояса Шелкового пути» станет новой отправной точкой двусторонних отношений. Неудержима тенденция расширения регионального сотрудничества Китая и России. Нет оснований тревожиться по поводу возможной конкуренции между Китаем и Россией в самом центре Евразии» [4; 5].

Участие России в проекте может принести значительные выгоды, но они ограничатся развитием инфраструктуры и возможной дальнейшей диверсификации направлений экспорта российских энергоносителей на территорию КНР. Некоторые российские эксперты полагают, что при реализации концепции КНР будет рассматривать Россию как ключевого партнера, потому что «для Москвы сотрудничество с Китаем предоставит возможность модернизации малоразвитых регионов Дальнего Востока и Сибири, которые нуждаются в инвестициях и современной инфраструктуре» [4]. Примечательно то, что российские эксперты еще до начала полномасштабной реализации проекта готовы принять статус России как младшего партнера, потому что признают невозможность самостоятельно развивать регион Дальнего Востока без иностранных, китайских, инвестиций. Заинтересованность КНР в участие России вполне понятна, но эти интересы связаны с восприятием России как транзитной страны. В этом контексте РФ интересуется КНР не как экономический партнер, но в большей степени как транзитная территория. Поэтому некоторые российские эксперты признают, что Россия является тем государством, которое «не смогло извлечь практической пользы из китайской инициативы» [6].

Проект предусматривает, с одной стороны, интеграцию российских Транссиба и Байкало-Амурской магистрали с китайскими железнодорожными сетями, что будет содействовать интеграции российских логистических путей с китайскими. Кроме этого китайские инвесторы проявили свою заинтересованность в строительстве высокоскоростной пассажирской железнодорожной магистрали из Пекина в Москву через территорию Казахстана. С другой стороны, участие РФ в этом проекте может стать условием для модернизации российских железных дорог китайскими партнерами, которые проявляли свое желание принять участие в проектах, направленных на ускорение движения поездов и более эффективное использование доступной инфраструктуры, унаследованной от СССР.

Роль РФ в этом проекте представляется более чем скромной, особенно в контексте того, что КНР учредил Фонд «Экономического пояса Шелкового пути», куда вложил 40 млрд долларов. По мнению ряда российских экспертов, «для международного сообщества инициатива «Один пояс – один путь» может означать начало нового финансового миропорядка», потому что он «позволит наиболее динамично развивающимся государствам Азии получать инвестиции от финансового института, который не ставит обязательным условием следование прозападным моделям развития. Следствием этого может стать снижение роли МВФ и Всемирного Банка, которые до сих пор обеспечивали финансовое преимущество западных стран в мировой экономике.

В случае успешной реализации китайский проект станет одним из главных факторов формирования международных отношений нового типа, основополагающим мотивом которых будет сотрудничество и выигрыш всех участников на основе новой мировой финансовой архитектуры» [4; 5]. Эти оптимистические прогнозы, к сожалению, не учитывают реальной роли российской экономики в мировой. Возможные и вероятные преимущества России в новой финансовой международной системе могут быть минимизированы сырьевым характером экономики. Реформа международной финансовой архитектуры для России станет только сменой внешних центров влияния в то время как экономика КНР может получить значительные выгоды и преференции.

Подобная модель реализации программы представляется для Российской Федерации крайне непродуктивной, что позволяет российским экспертам предлагать ее корректировки и изменения. Программа, с одной стороны, окажется эффективной и соответствующей интересам России в том случае, если позволит создать реальные условия для экономического роста. Причем, этот рост должен быть обеспечен не за счет поставок ресурсов и использования территории РФ для транзита. С другой стороны, Россия на современном этапе не в состоянии внести значительные и серьезные коррективы и изменения в проект, предложенный китайской стороной, что вполне объяснимо ощутимой разницей в тех политических и экономических ресурсах роста, которыми обладают обе страны. Россия, как государство, вклад которой в мировую экономику составляет по разным оценкам от 1 до 3.2 %, не может эффективно конкурировать с КНР, аналогичный показатель которой равен 14.9 %.

Таким образом, проект «Один пояс – один путь», несмотря на декларируемый эгалитарный характер инициативы, стал попыткой сближения экономик стран, которые относительно друг друга могут быть определены как развитые и развивающиеся. Если КНР воспринимается как экономический локомотив проекта, то остальным участникам отведена роль развивающихся и второстепенных партнеров. Единственным условием продуктивного участия РФ в проекте может стать отказ от сырьевой ориентации в экономике, проведение инфраструктурных реформ и радикальная ревизия региональной политики, что в перспективе может создать условия для экономического роста и привлечь иностранные

инвестиции. В противном случае участие РФ в китайском проекте «Один пояс – один путь» ограничится ролью транзитной территории.

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MIGRATION IN NIGERIA: CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS AND PERSPECTIVES

This paper intends to critically assess the relationship between migration and development taking Nigeria experience as a case study. The increasing focus on the developmental implications of human migration, and the need to mainstream migration into other sectoral policies, have created a demand for new types of evidence. The article tells about the issues related to the migration policy of Nigeria and the activities of the Government aimed at struggling with illegal migration, implementing and designing various international cooperation programs and activities.

Keywords: Nigeria, migration policy, internal and external migration, illegal migration, migration and development programs.

The position of Nigeria in the African continent and in the West African sub-region has placed on her both a set of obligations and constraints that have led to far-reaching implications for her survival as a nation. Being one of the great economies in Africa (alongside South Africa and Egypt) and Africa's most populous country with a population of more than 150 million, Nigeria still continues to experience high internal and external migration due to the size of its population, its harsh economic climate, porous borders and poor economic performance reflected by human development indices. [2]

Today Nigeria is burdened with corruption and endemic poverty with nearly 70 percent of its population living below the poverty line. Scarce employment opportunities, corruption and poverty force thousands of Nigerians to emigrate every year in search of better quality life. Illegal migration is fast on the increase and is largely facilitated by forgery of passports, visas, false asylum claims, bogus marriages under false pretense, human smuggling, and human trafficking and a host of other avenues. Irregular emigration does occur, despite the associated risks. The estimated total number of nationals abroad varies, as well as the number of nationals apprehended at the border. [1,3]

For example, the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief Ojo Maduekwe, disclosed the following in a workshop in Abuja: «Not less than 59,000 Nigerians are currently in Northern African countries without valid travel documents. This number represented those who were in transit waiting for the opportunity to migrate to the West. Figures available to the Ministry showed that 8,000 of the illegal immigrants were in Morocco, 16,000 in Algeria, 20,000 in Libya and about 15,000 in Mauritania». He also noted that there are increased rates of repatriation of Nigerian migrants from different destinations abroad, especially from the European Union. In addition, the Minister said: «Information provided by our missions abroad indicated that, apart from those held for simple immigration offences, the majority of those in prison are being held for drug-related offences. Reports had it that over 10,000 migrants has died between 1999 and 2002 while trying to crossover from North Africa to Europe. The circumstances of their departure such as using unofficial routes and without proper documentation have made them vulnerable to criminal gangs. These gangs recruit them into all manner of illicit business, with long jail sentences as consequences when they get caught. In 2007 alone, almost 6,500 Nigerian citizens were apprehended in the European Union for illegal

immigration». [5] Thus, development in Nigeria has greatly been affected by the increase of irregular migration.

It's important to say that the rate of internal migration in Nigeria is skyrocketing as there has been high rate of inter-state migration by young able-bodied men who are in search of better opportunities and greener pastures.

While migration across international borders has always taken place, the formation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and agreements signed by the 17 member States on free movement within the sub-region have further increased the flow of legal and illegal migrants into Nigeria. [4]

Nigeria is particularly concerned about the degrading treatment of migrants, in particular those who belong to vulnerable groups, and calls on States to fulfill their labour and human rights obligations to migrants, for that is the essence of development, as all people aspire to better standards of life in greater freedom.

The Government is convinced that specific policy measures should include capacity-building, especially in African countries; the mobilization of national populations in the Diaspora; the cheaper, safer and faster transfer of remittances; the sharing of more information on remittances; and the integration of migration issues into national development strategies.

Also, the Government has adopted a National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy as a framework to eradicate poverty, promote wealth creation and guarantee lasting prosperity for all Nigerians. Furthermore, Nigeria is working vigorously to achieve the goals and targets set out in the Millennium Development Goals and the New Partnership for Africa's Development.

Cognizant of the importance of migration, the Government has established institutions to deal with the phenomenon, while three Special Assistants have been appointed to advise the President on Diaspora matters, human trafficking and child labour, as well as on migration and humanitarian affairs.

Notwithstanding, there are other programs currently in Nigeria that are related to Migration and development. One of these is the Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI) which is implemented in Nigeria by the UNDP. The overall objective of the JMDI is the joint is to support civil society organizations and local authorities in harnessing the benefits of migration and development. JMDI aims to set and reinforce network of actors working on migration and development identifying good practice this field and share this information with practitioner and policy makers with a view to feeding into policy making on migration and development.

Also the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) is currently implementing three projects in the area of human trafficking and smuggling. The preventing and combating trafficking of minors and young women from Nigeria to Italy project aims at addressing the issue of minors and young women trafficked from Nigeria to Italy for sexual exploitation, by creating on the one hand, conditions that decrease the vulnerability of women and children to trafficking and on the other hand by strengthening the anti-trafficking capacities of the Nigeria government. [7]

In addition, Nigeria also has laws on immigration and emigration, most of which meet international standards. One of which is the immigration act of 1963 (Chapter 171) of the laws of the federation of Nigeria 1970 which provide the conditions of entry, stay and departure of foreign nationals to and from Nigeria. Another home based legislation is the labour act (Chapter 198) of the laws of the federation of Nigeria 1990, which is been amended by the National Assembly, government employment issues in Nigeria, the

legislation covers both the situation of Nigeria and non Nigerian workers. Another is the international convention on the protection of the rights of all migrants, workers and members of the family, which Nigeria ratified in 2009. [6]

In conclusion I would like to stress the importance of the issue of this article:

International migration is an age-old phenomenon which, over the ages, has seen people of all colors and creeds move around the world for various reasons. Without a doubt, migration has enormous benefits and can be a potent force for development. But its challenges are equally enormous. Against this background, Nigeria is convinced that better-managed migration can bring win-win benefits to all countries. The asymmetries in the material wealth of countries and the demand for cheap labour in industrialized countries, coupled with unemployment and poverty, are some of the factors that propel international migration.

While each country has the right to determine its migration policies, the exploitation, maltreatment, forceful repatriation and other dehumanizing treatment of migrants who are asylum-seekers — including their placement in concentration-style camps — prevalent in some countries as measures to manage migration are indefensible in the twenty-first century.

The Government of Nigeria believes that international community must therefore resist the temptation to build thick walls of exclusion or resort to xenophobia or other forms of discrimination under the pretext of measures to ensure national security. Only in this way, countries all around the world will work collectively to find practicable and dignifying solutions to the problems associated with migration.

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**...OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS...,
OR SOVIET INTELLECTUALS IMAGINE ORIENT:
INTELLECTUAL HISTORIES AND ARCHAEOLOGIES OF SOVIET
ORIENTALISM**

Introductory remarks to intellectual worlds of Soviet Orientalism

Contemporary historians of post-modern era tend to perceive social, political, cultural, and intellectual phenomena, processes, and institutions as imagined communities and invented traditions. This approach emerged in the Western historiography in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but until the middle of the 1990s these ideas were virtually unknown in Russian historiography, including Oriental Studies. The translations of some texts belonged to classic works of Western historiography in Russian were published too late, even in context of other post-Soviet and post-communist historiographies. The few attempts of translations and publications of Western classical texts written in theoretical and methodological context of inventionist paradigm were not integrated in Russian historiography and remained virtually ignored by the scholars' communities. Only several historians involved in the identities, nations and nationalism studies reacted to the publications of these classical texts in Russian. Western theoretical and methodological approaches, intellectual practices in contemporary Russian historiography are almost exclusively integrated in the texts focused on analysis of nations, nationalisms, identities and different forms of historical imagination. The 2000s were marked by new trends in Russian rethinking of Western theoretical concepts of imagination and invention as influential and powerful mechanisms of social transitions of traditional and archaic communities to modern ones which are known as nations. Russian historians and their foreign colleagues attempted to apply theories proposed in the 1970s and 1980s for studies of Russian intellectual history, cultural history and a history of ideas. Therefore, various historical forms and dimensions of Russian and Soviet history in the 2000s and 2010s were re-invented and re-imagined and mentally migrated in the center of attention of intellectuals who studied and analyzed academic communities' organization and processes of reproduction of knowledge, including collective representations and ideas about Orient in different forms and versions of national identities and historical memories.

Soviet historical and cultural imaginations problems in the context of invention and imagination of different forms of the greater Oriental discourse will be in the centre of author's attention in this article. The aim of the author is the analysis of the formation and development of individual images and collective representations about Orient in political imagination in the context of different dimensions of Soviet identity. These processes had a lot of features because Russian Empire and the Soviet Union were not the classical colonial empires.

The author plans to study and analyze the process of imagination and invention of Orient in Soviet intellectual and historiographical contexts. The author presumes that the problems touched upon in this article can be divided into two groups. Firstly, the author will analyze the forms of Soviet academic Orientalism. The author will analyze tactics and strategies of Soviet historians and orientalists, who formed, developed and proposed collective understandings of imagined and ideal historiographical Orient. These ideas in the Soviet historiography became the basis for development of Soviet academic Orientalism. Secondly, the author plans to study tactics and strategies of formation and development of Oriental images and concepts in the collective memories and personal memoirs of Soviet military advisors, interpreters and their families' members who in the 1950 – 1980s served and lived in non-European countries of the Greater Orient, including Arabic Middle East and Africa. The Author presumes that it's possible to analyze narratives of military interpreters as forms of military and even para-military Orientalism.

This part of the book, as its rest parts also, will be based on theoretical ideas and concepts formulated in Western historiography in the 1970s and 1980s. The works of Edward Said, Benedict Anderson, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger form the methodological basis of this article. The ideas of these intellectuals are well-known in contemporary historiography and the author will limit only by a few introductory remarks. Edward Said was the founding father of Orientalism concept in contemporary historiography. Edward Said was among the first Western writers who pointed out importance and necessity of imaginations studies in the context of mutual self-representations developments. Edward Said suggested that modern collective ideas of Orient in the West developed as a result of their conscious invention by Western intellectuals who preferred to think in European centered coordinates system.

The basic ideas of this controversial concept of Edward Said can be sum up as followings statements: Orient was imagined and invented by Western authors as intellectual and cultural opposition to the West; Western intellectuals were inclined to ascribe unattractive qualities and characteristics to Orient and actualized factor of its predominantly technical backwardness and dependence from successful and developed West; Orient is based on stability and Eastern countries are unable to develop independently because Eastern religious teachings and traditions assisted to this stability and stagnation; Orient is a passive object of world history and historical processes – Orient could not and can not imagine and invent himself: East is not only geography, but it is also a modern product and result of European and Western intellectual activities; despite these features Orient is extremely dangerous for the West, and this idea was among central and system in intellectual bases of legitimation and justification of European dominance and Western colonialism.

These post-modern ideas were developed by other intellectuals in Western historiography. Benedict Anderson actualized factor and role of imagination in the political, cultural and intellectual history; Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger particularized these ideas in the context of perception of political rituals and intellectual practices as a collective and invented traditions. Soviet collective understandings of Orient were institutionalized in academic historiography as an intellectual landscape of development and transformation

of the Soviet form of Orientalism. The author will be focused in this article on cultural practices and strategies of Soviet historians and intellectuals who formed Soviet Orientalism. The different individual forms of Orientalism developed as a part of personal experience of the Soviet officers and interpreters who in the period between 1950s and the 1980s served in the non-Western states. The process of Soviet re-thinkings of Oriental political, economic, cultural, social and religious realities and attempts to map and localize them in the Soviet identity will be also analyzed by the author.

Orientalism as a forgotten and ignored part in a history of Russian Oriental Studies

The academic literature focused on the problems of the Soviet or Russian experience of Orientalism in the broader context is not huge and can be presented by some bibliographical positions. The texts of the Soviet [Kuznetsova, Kulagin, 1970, Struve, 1960; Chistiakov, 1963; Kuznetsov, 1963; Romodin 1953, Iarotskii, 1963; Baziiants, 1963; Lunin, 1963] and Russian [Nazirova, 1992] periods are focused predominantly on a history of Russian or Soviet Oriental Studies. These texts are interesting only in the historiographical context. Soviet historians [Akramov, 1963; Gnevusheva, 1987] understood that studies focused on activities and legacies of Orientalists were not so dangerous from ideological viewpoint as attempts to understand theoretical and methodological foundations and origins of Soviet Oriental studies is Marxist paradigm. Soviet Oriental Studies as well as other fields of humanities in the Soviet Union lost its formal freedom and independence by the beginning of the 1920s. Oriental studies were institutionalized [Kuznetsova, Kulagina, 1983], and new scientific and academic institutions and associations were forced to carry out political and ideological functions.

Soviet Oriental studies developed under control of the Communist party and its functionaries [Mukhitdinov, 1957] and regularly actualized political and ideological dimensions of formally academic Oriental Studies. The most of the Soviet orientlists were dependent from decisions and directives of the ruling party. Soviet historians preferred to intentionally ignore Orientalist tendencies and elements of Orientalism in a history of Russian and Soviet Oriental Studies. They actualized the progressive and ideological components of Oriental Studies, and recognition of facts that Russian and Soviet Orientalists actually used Orientalist practices and strategies were politically impossible. The texts which were focused on a history of Oriental Studies and published during Soviet period actualized only formal, organizational and eventual aspects of Oriental Studies. Soviet historians [Lunin, 1965; Lunin, 1979] wrote exclusively outside history of Russian Oriental Studies and deliberately ignored and avoided theoretical and methodological problems of Oriental Studies. Soviet historians believed that it was better to write biographies of Orientalists, history of Oriental institutions and journals, and avoided any mentions and recognitions that Russian and Soviet Historians had a lot in common with Western Orientalists who imagined, invented and constructed their ideologically marked and politically biased images of Orient. These texts in contemporary and actual

historiographical perspective are interesting solely in the context of a history of ideas, history of Soviet historiography and intellectual history of science.

Some texts of Soviet historians [Lunin, 1958, Dantsig, 1973] formally could be attributed to Orientalist paradigm because their authors actually described how collective representations, intellectual tactics and cultural strategies of invention and imagination of Orient developed in Russian and Soviet historical imagination, but Orientalist paradigm was not consistently implemented by these historians. Soviet historians in fact developed typical Orientalist narratives in their texts, but Soviet orientalism was based on stable ideological foundations. Soviet historians cultivated and developed traditional Oriental narratives about inability of Orient to develop independently. Soviet intellectuals actively promoted the concept about progressive Soviet influence. Nina Kuznetsova and Liudmila Kulagina promoted typical Orientalist narratives, but they were ideologically masked and seemed politically correct from the ideological point of view:

the October Revolution was an example for all the dependent and colonial countries of the East ... it demonstrated what can people do when they won freedom and independence [Kuznetsova, Kulagina, 1970, 4].

Soviet historians also actualized the special role of Vladimir Lenin [Heifets, Shastitko, 1983] in the development of Oriental Studies, which assisted to general ideologization of humanities in the Soviet Union. These narratives in some Soviet texts got forms of messianic discourse that united Soviet and Western classical canons of Orientalism. Soviet historian Petr Shastitko in radical-messianic way, on the one hand, pathetically declared that "Russian sky in the October 1917 painted in crimson colour of a new dawn. The peoples of the colonial world saw the gleam of dawn. Vague hopes were born in the smoky factories, in the fields, withered in squalid huts. The oppressed peoples instinctively felt that events in Russia will affect their fate" [Shastitko, 1985, 7]. On the other hand, Petr Shastitko did not deny that Oriental studies in the USSR become an instrument of the Soviet ideologically verified foreign policy:

Orientalists were directly involved or interested in witnesses of difficult struggle of the East, they sensitively captured and fixed the pulse of political life among the peoples of Asian countries [Shastitko, 1985, 104].

The ideas of political messianism made Soviet historians to believe in fact that

Soviet Oriental studies, based on Marxist-Leninist methodology, assist to peoples' friendship, peace and social progress [Baziiants, 1983, 84].

The ideological servility and political engagement formed the main characteristics of Soviet Oriental Studies. Soviet Oriental Studies in this context

had much in common with Western classical Orientalism, because Soviet Orientalists tried to change and transform Orient. Soviet Orientalists were different from Western Orientalists only in their ideas and political values, they transplanted on Orient for its studies. Petr Shastitko actualized messianic role of the Soviet Union in communion of Oriental peoples to progressive Soviet ideas and political values. These narratives in Soviet historiography actually had Orientalist character, but in contrast to classical Western Orientalism, Soviet historians declared that it is necessary to familiar Oriental peoples with values and ideas of communism. These narratives actually become an informal recognition of non-historical character of Orient people, because Soviet historians imagined them as passive recipients of progressive Soviet influence.

Historiography: Western classics in Russian context

It is rational to assume that any Russian historian who decides to study phenomenon of Soviet orientalism will face with difficulties of historiographical character. On the one hand, Orientalism in theoretical and methodological contexts belongs to extremely developed interdisciplinary approaches in Western historiography where several schools of post-colonial analysis are based on ideas which originally were proposed by Edward Said. Western historiography is capable to provide the historian with a significant corpus of texts focused on Orientalism. The problems of Orientalism in Soviet historiography were deliberately ignored politically and ideologically. New trends in rethinking of intellectual experience and history of Oriental Studies became possible only in the 1990s and 2000s. The monographs Vera of Tolz and Robert Gerasi can be mentioned as rare attempts to analyze a history of Oriental Studies in Russia in the context of Orientalism. Some of the author's monograph can also be understood as attempts to analyze historical moments in the intellectual transformations and academic evolutions of Soviet Oriental Studies and various forms of national imaginations in the context of Orientalism. Orientalism in modern Russian historiography was more readily understood, accepted and demanded by historians involved and engaged in the studies of nationalisms, nations and identities. The history of Russian classical literature was more prone to Orientalist approach than academic Oriental studies. Classical Oriental studies focused on a history, politics, and economics of Eastern states did not so willingly and actively use and integrate Orientalist approach in Russian historiographical context. There are several reasons for this historiographical rejection of Orientalism methods which were originally proposed for Nationalism Studies where it reached the greatest successes and progresses. Orientalism, as an inter-disciplinary method and approach, actualizes inevitable factor of European colonialism, including Russian one, in the transformations of the Orient and formation of its collective images in European identity. Russian historian Mariia Turovets believes that "a theory of Edward Said is both fruitful and not applicable to Russia" [Turovets, 2013]. The author presumes that this work can be perceived and understood as provocative, discussive, and debatable in Russian academic community. Only few scholars among Russian orientalists are ready to recognize colonial

genealogy and origins of Oriental Studies, they belong to. The definitions like “Soviet Orientalists as colonizers”, used by the author in his earlier texts [Kirchanov, 2008; Kirchanov, 2010; Kirchanov, 2013], can be perceived as politically and ideologically incorrect by representatives of older generation in Russian community of Orientalists.

Soviet Oriental Studies in the 1920 and 1930s: forming of orientalists

Soviet orientalism began to emerge and develop in the 1920s. The Soviet authorities actively formed new canon of Orientalist perceptions of Orient because they were directly interested in ideologization of Oriental Studies. The Soviet Union by the beginning of the 1920s included some Eastern regions, which had to be Sovietised. Sovietization as a form of forced and authoritarian modernization assisted to the rise of academic knowledge and interest in these regions which were planned for Sovietization. Soviet Orientalism in this context was invented as a doctrine based on the certain theoretical approaches with possibilities of their practical application in the sovietized Oriental Soviet republics. Soviet Orientalists who formed their own versions and forms of Orientalism in the period between the two world wars had their specialized institutions, including Scientific Association of Oriental Studies (Nauchnaia Assotsiatsiia vostokovedennia) and Research Association for studies of national and colonial problems (Issledovatel'skaia Assotsiatsiia izucheniia natsional'nyh i kolonial'nyh problem). The first one published journal “Novyi Vostok”, and other periodical with more ideologically correct and valid title “Revoliutsionnyi Vostok” was published by the second institution. Soviet Orientalists in the 1920s and 1930s formulated and proposed the main, central and system positions and statements of Soviet Orientalist discourse. They also denied continuity with historically previous pre-revolutionary Oriental Studies. Scientific Association of Oriental Studies pathetically declared that

the East in tsarist times was only object of Russian policy of conquest and economic expansion ... foreign policy and military history of Russia in the last (19th) century was the history of the struggle with other imperialist countries for the possession of the East ... Tsarist Russia was seen by the eyes of all the Asian nations, especially by Muslim world, as the most important and irreconcilable enemy of the East [Pavlovich, 1922].

The similar ideas were expressed and developed in the texts of other Soviet Orientalists [Meyerson, 1930], who invented image of Russian Empire as a colonial country where Eastern peoples were victims of oppression and exploitation, but this idea in the Soviet Orient discourse of interwar period had predominantly ritual character. The pre-revolutionary Russian orientalists were identified as Orientalists by Soviet authors [Pavlovich, 1925] and this definition was a form of formal and declarative rejection from historical heritage. Soviet Orientalists in fact were typical Orientalists who imagined and invented their

own versions of Orient and integrated them into Soviet ideological canon and context. The institutionalization of Scientific Association of Oriental Studies chronologically coincided with attempts to formulate and propose a program of comprehensive and detailed studies of Orient, its history, politics, economics, religions, cultures and languages. Formally Soviet historians in the interwar period did not recognize and denied their genetic and methodological connections and interrelations with Western “bourgeois” historiography, but they actually developed only Soviet version of the greater Orientalist discourse. The Soviet historian, and one of Soviet Oriental Studies leaders of the 1920s Mihail Pavlovich (also known as S. Vel’tman) pathetically claimed that

scientific objectives are not the main in studies of Oriental societies that exist in England, France, Italy, Germany and other countries ... they serve their governments for economic and political conquest of the Orient [Pavlovich, 1927]

He also insisted that Soviet Orientalists tried to “promote economic and spiritual liberation of the East” [Pavlovich, 1927], but in fact Soviet and Western scholars tried to imagine Orient as a passive category and integrate it into their own versions and invented an imagined geographies of other landscapes for possible Sovietization or modernization. Soviet interwar Orientalists imagined Orient in the context of Lenins’ ideas and inventes it as a space for Soviet political, economic, social and cultural experimentations. The figure of Vladimir Lenin was orientalized by Soviet historians and political activists of the 1920s [Narimanov, 1924; Hodorov, 1924] and integrated in the greater Eastern / Oriental context. Mihail Pavlovich pathetically declared:

centuries will pass, the names of Buddha, Mohammed and Jesus will be forgotten, but the memory about titanium Vladimir Lenin as a great man and a legendary hero who raised the banner of struggle and a burning torch of liberty, will live forever in the hearts of the peoples of Orient... Lenin died, Lenin lies in his grave, his is body slowly smoldering, but his spirit will live forever, and it will call the peoples of the East to fight for final liberation [Pavlovich, 1924].

In the 1927 S. Dimanshtein stressed that Soviet Union made significant progress in transformation of Orient:

ten Octobers stand in the way of progressive mankind on the path to final liberation from the yoke of capital [Dimanshtein 1927, III].

Soviet Orientalists absolved Orient and they proposed to divide imagined and abstract Orient into two different Orients – Soviet and capitalist or colonial. Soviet Orient was imagined and invented in Soviet historiography as the correct form of the East, and the negative qualities and characteristics were actively attributed to the colonial East. Soviet Orientalists between the two world wars

did not deny that they are actively involved in the process of transformation of sovietized Eastern territories of the former Russian Empire. Mihail Pavlovich wrote that the Soviet Orientalists acted

purely practically and debated on problems such as the question of the Turkish alphabet, Turkological congress in Baku, implementation of measures for cultural rise of Turkic peoples ... we are looking for path for revolutionary development of East [Pavlovich 1927 3, 6].

Soviet Orientalism in this context proposed and invented their own type of Orientalism. Orientalism of affirmative action assisted to technically progressive changes and transformations of Eastern societies, but these processes were possible after the Sovietization and they could be realized solely in the context of system that formally was Soviet, but in fact had Western intellectual and cultural origins. Soviet transformations of Orient were form of its Westernization, but Western model of development was not implemented consistently and dramatically, Soviet formators of Orient acted hesitantly and preferred ideologically to integrate East in new canon of collective beliefs and intellectual representations about it. Soviet Orientalists actively developed narratives of simultaneous co-existence of two different Orients. They presumed that

East and West were two completely different and opposing worlds of proletarian East and West... there is no separate East and West, there is a common humanity and its task is building of socialism [Ol'denburg, 1931].

Orient in the context of Soviet political and historiographical imagination was invented in instrumentalist and practical understandings, but this approach assisted to absolutization of East and attempts of Soviet intellectuals to propose new images and interpretations of Oriental experience. Soviet Orientalists in the 1920s and 1930s actively constructed their images of Orient in general and in particular. The invention of Soviet Central Asia was one of the particular forms of Orientalist imagination in Soviet historiography. Central Asia was invented by Soviet Orientalists as a region that included Soviet Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and also non-Soviet Afghanistan and Uyguristan. Iranian concept in the 1920s and 1930s competed with theory of the Greater Central Asia in Soviet Orientalist historical imagination. The Society for Tajikistan and Iranian Peoples Studies [Korzhevskii, 1925, 1926, Andreev, 1926, 1927, Semenov, 1926, Bartol'd, 1926 Gavrilov, 1927] tries to propose and develop concept of Tajikistan as a new invented tradition, but its texts and field studies had Orientalist orientation because any attempts to study this region were reduced to imagination and invention of Iranian world from Soviet viewpoint. Central Asia in Soviet historical imagination was imagined as a unique invented tradition that had historical [Schmidt, 1927; Mallitskii 1927, Gavrilov, 1927, Arhangel'skii, 1927], archeological [Gorodetskii 1927, Ivanov, 1927, Ostroumov, 1927], anthropological [Malov 1927, Polivanov, 1927], ethnographic [Sadykov, 1927 Andreev, 1927; Zarubin 1927, Peshchereva

1927], philological [Oshanin 1927] and economic [Garritskii 1927, Cherdyntsev, 1927] dimensions and forms.

Soviet Orientalists in this context acted like a real Orientalists who imagined Central Asia as a region localized and mapped on the mental maps, catalogized and organized in the imagined and invented historical region. Soviet Orientalists were also engaged into the process of invention and imagination of their own East with ideal qualities and characteristics. They believed that Soviet Orient, where “socialist road” [Akopian, 1935] was chosen, was successfully “sovietized” [Hakobian, 1935], used principles of “Lenin-Stalin national policy” [Algashinskii 1935] and also released from “imperialist oppression and united to socialist building with the rest of the country” [Reuters, 1935, 10]. Soviet Orientalists insisted that these actions of Soviet government encouraged progressive social and economic transformations and changes, promoted “the flourishing of socialist culture” [Darakhvelidze, 1935] in the territories of liberated Soviet Orient. Soviet Orientalist discourse was developed by Russian orientalists who were very active in the education of “national cadres of the proletariat” [Gurari, 1935] as the local national staff for further promotion and implementation of Soviet transformation policy of the Sovietized Orient.

The representatives of sovietized national cultural and intellectual communities in Eastern regions of USSR actually cultivated and developed Orientalist narratives. Orientalism in Soviet national policy was actualized in Caucasus where political and ideological contradictions and conflicts between Azerbaijanis and Armenians were not resolved and resettled, but Soviet political elites actually cultivated loyalty among local intellectual communities. Soviet national experiments in Transcaucasia degraded in ugly and inconsistent forms. For example specially trained pro-Soviet intelligentsia in Armenia was involved in development of Orientalist narratives because Armenian intellectuals occupied special place among authors who formed a collective Soviet and politically right image of Azerbaijan. These forms of division of intellectual labor between various national intellectual communities in Soviet Union become an effective mechanism for ideological and political control. Armenian Orientalists were forced to write about Azerbaijan SSR and cultivated its positive images, they fixed “successes of the socialist reconstruction in Azerbaijani villages” [Hakobian, 1935; Hakobian, 1936] and the “flowering of culture of Azerbaijan SSR” [Avetisian 1935]. The dubious privilege in the sphere of critic and exposure of “class nature” of Armenian “bourgeois nationalism” was also retained for Armenian authors [Lalaian, 1936]. Political rhetoric about Eastern Republics in the Soviet discourse of the 1920s and 1930s had Oriental and partially post-colonial character because representatives of local political elites played the leading roles in transformation of their regions. They expressed their political and ideological loyalties to Moscow and declared that

Central Asia is a bright proof of process when backward peoples of the former tsarist empire become equal members of the great family of nations, members of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ... all backward people became members of this family, they developed their culture and participate in

the building of socialism with more cultural and more industrialized nations [Kul'besharov, 1927].

Soviet Orientalists in this context used tactics and strategies of Western Orientalists because they imagined, studied and catalogized landscapes and territories of Orient. The representatives of local political sovietized elites [Erbanov 1936, Ikramov, 1936] also supported Orientalist paradigm of national policy, because they idealized and proposed ideologically codified and politically marked images of Orient as an integral and indispensable part of Soviet political project. Orientalist paradigm in perception of East periodically was actualized by representatives of Soviet political elite. Viacheslav Molotov in the 1936 when he met with representatives of proletariat from Azerbaijan declared that "Soviet Azerbaijan is an example for the peoples of the East" [Molotov, 1936]. The same symbolic political message came from Viacheslav Molotov to representatives of Soviet Armenia [Molotov, 1936]. Sergo Ordzhonikidze in the 1936 declared that "Azerbaijanis have become an advanced nation in Turkic cultural and economic sense" [Ordzhonikidze, 1936]. Soviet political elites also tried to develop and promote official narratives about successes of Sovietization in the former colonies of Russian Empire in Central Asia and declared that

under the banner of Lenin-Stalin national policy... under the wise leadership of the Bolshevik Party" liberated Soviet nations of Asia "confidently go forward to new victories of socialism [Beria, 1936].

These political sentiments assisted to overall intellectual indoctrination of Oriental Studies in Soviet Russia between the two world wars. Soviet Orientalists in this context were not interested in theoretical and methodological problems of Orientalism. Only S. Vel'tman [Vel'tman, 1924; Vel'tman, 1927] in the second half of the 1920s came closer than the other intellectuals to understanding of Orientalism in forms which would be proposed in the end of the 1970s by Edward Said. Vel'tman tried to analyze the basic tactics and strategies of formation and development of Oriental images in Western and Soviet literatures, as well as possible ways and trajectories of their transformations and developments. Orientalist approaches of this type in Soviet historical imagination between the two world wars were minimized because Soviet authors preferred to describe achievements in national industrializations of the Eastern regions, development and progress of local governments and party apparatus, successes in education and progress of national languages. Soviet Orientalists [Borozdin 1927] just fixed, stated, and systematized Soviet achievements in Oriental studies. These provisions and politically marked declarations formed the hard-core of Soviet orientalism. Soviet Orientalists as Western Orientalists suggested their own understandings and definitions of Orient as

colonial and semi-colonial world ... yellow and black continents [Pavlovich, 1925].

The communist ideology was also organically integrated in Soviet system of Orientalism in the 1920s and 1930s. The invented tradition of “Soviet East” [15 years ...] became a central category in Soviet Orientalism and historical imagination where it was imagined as exclusive right form Orient [Siunchelei 1934, Mordinov, 1934, Ignatov, 1935] and universal model for other Eastern countries and peoples. Soviet Orientalists [Alkin 1934; Sahat-Muradov 1934; Zorin, 1934; Dasnazorov 1934; Tabolov 1935; Togmitov 1935] actualized Orientalist paradigm in their attempts to develop Oriental images because they preferred to describe formal successes and achievements of Soviet national policy and transplantation of Soviet political institutions in Oriental geographical, cultural and economic contexts. This form of Orientalism actualized positive trend in national policy that was based on radical rejection from archaic relationship before center and edge regions as metropolity and colonies. Soviet Orientalists [Kuchumov 1931; Plotkin 1931; Kabo, 1931] tried to catalogize Orient and integrate it in the imagined revolutionary context: if Western Orientalists proposed idealized images Orient as an archaic region, Soviet authors insisted that Orient was prone to an active revolutionary struggle against imperialism. Soviet historians idealized and orientalized East in ideologically and politically calibrated system of coordinates.

Soviet Orientalists [Chervonnyi, 1928] believed that the non-capitalist model of development is universal for Eastern countries. They also emphasized that the universal non-capitalist way for Orient was proposed by Soviet Union. Soviet East in this intellectual context was imagined as the most politically and ideologically right form of the East, but Soviet historians [Karpych 1931, Hasanov 1931, Chugaev, 1931] actually used Orientalist intellectual practices and strategies because they invented and imagined their own perfectly sovietized and ideologically corrected and purified Orients. Soviet Orientalists preached the idea that Orient will adopt Soviet model of development and its people masses will choose “socialist dictatorship” [Novikov, 1930]. Soviet Orientalists [Gotfrid, 1932 Naumov, 1932 Kunduhov 1930, Ul’ianovskii, 1930] were always ready to repulse their ideological opponents, who were not agree with idea that Soviet Orient is a universal landmark and a guiding star for the rest of Orient in general. Soviet ideologues insisted that Soviet Orientalism should be practical [Pavlovich, 1925, 212 – 215] and Soviet Union had needs in specialists in Oriental progress [Pavlovich, 1925, 1 – 14] with necessary political views and ideological preferences.

The Soviet Union between the two world wars, as well as Western colonial states, needed in practicing orientalists for “cultural and economic recovery” of the Soviet East and further implementation of “national policy of the Soviet power” [Kul’besharov, 1927] in Oriental regions. This Soviet policy was different from Western strategies of control over Orient only by its formal objectives and goals of authorities in the controlled Oriental regions. Soviet Orientalists as Western Orientalists believed that Orient was not able to develop independently. They also believed that Soviet Union had moral right to bring communist values to Orient when West was interested in the same, but in absolutely other political and ideological context. Soviet Orientalists in the 1930s proposed new tactics and strategies for transformation of Orient in forms of its integration in absolutely unknown for it political, social and economic

relations. The ideas of progressive influence of Soviet political and economic transformations dominated in the interwar Soviet Oriental studies [Borozdin 1927, Nemchenko 1927, Reshidov, 1936], when Soviet Orientalists analyzed East in the context of its positive transformations initiated and inspired by Soviet national policy. The idea of refusal from nomadic lifestyle [Pogorel'skii 1934, Blum, 1935] was imagined in Oriental studies between the two world wars as a success and achievement of Soviet politics in the Eastern regions. These narratives actualized latent Orientalist elements, trends and sentiments in Soviet historical science, and Soviet authors idealized and glorified radical transformation of Oriental societies that in previous periods had a stable reputation of traditional, archaic and primitive groups. Soviet Orientalists [Vel'tman, 1925] recognized that Soviet authors were inclined to imagine ideal "conditional East". Soviet Orientalists in this context had a much in common with Western Orientalists. Soviet Orientalists expressed semi-colonial narratives, but they successfully masked them in clothes of radical revolution rhetoric:

mighty battalions of the Red Army are noisy as a stream,
slow as the clouds, more ominous than the royal army...
they are not pouncing on the waking East ... wicks guns are
smoking not for disruption and destruction of stronghold of
liberation movement in the East ... the Soviet Union carries
other torches for Orient [Pavlovich, 1924, XI].

The messianic components become common place in ideology of Soviet orientalism of the interwar period. Soviet Orientalists pathetically declared and proclaimed that

the oppressed masses of India in the days of Lenin's death,
in the days of the great loss added its voices to the common
choir of the toiling masses of the world ... the meaning of
October is clear in backwards for the oppressed masses of
the Near, Middle and Far East... the peoples of Arabia and
African colonies are fighting in an unequal battle against the
armies of the imperialists who directed their attention to
Soviet Republics... they are feeling that Soviet land is their
only friend and protector in this struggle ... these people
found their way to Moscow for celebrating with us the victory
of the working class over Tsarist Russia and international
capital as mortal enemies of Eastern peoples [Voitinskii
1924, XV].

Soviet orientalism in this context developed typical Orientalist idea that Eastern peoples are not able to develop without external leadership, but this concept in Soviet Orientalism was hidden and masked by ceremonial declarations and ideological maxims. The narrative about successes of Soviet Oriental transformations was one of the central points in the ideology of Orientalism in the Soviet Union. Soviet Orientalists searched and found

progress in destruction of archaic institutions and relations because they believed that Soviet government proposed qualitatively different, modern and correct forms of social, political and economic organization for non-European nations. Soviet Republic was imagined as universal and the best form for modernized and sovietized Eastern groups which, as Soviet Orientalists stated, turned from primitive tribes in nations as a result of “Leninist-Stalinist national policy” [Alkin, 1935, 129]. Other Soviet Orientalists of inter-war period [Telezhnikov, 1931] also actively promoted and developed revolutionary narratives and myths because they believed that East was able to accept and adopt “national-revolutionary state” as a universal form of statehood. These transformations of old, archaic and class state forms were imagined as possible in context of progressive Soviet support only and influence on political institutions of Oriental peoples. Soviet Orientalists believed that Soviet policy radically changed “many backward regions of tsarist Russia” [Siunchelei 1935, 150] and turning them into dynamically developing and progressing Soviet republics. Soviet Orientalists in the interwar period developed typical Orientalist thesis that Soviet Orient before Sovietization was archaic and belonged to the number of non-developing peripheries. Ilias Alkin, for example, argued that in the pre-Soviet period Tajiks “lived under the double yoke of military-feudal imperialism of tsarist Russia and the feudal-theocratic Emirate with its absolute power and complete arbitrariness of officials, clergy, merchants, moneylenders, clan and tribal elders. There was no industry and there was not even a kilometer of railways, European agricultural implements were not known ... there was not even a single doctor” [Alkin, 1935, 130 – 131]. Soviet Orientalism in inter-wars period transformed into Orientalism of new type, Orientalism of affirmative action that was focused on practical problems solving, and Soviet Orientalists declared that “new Orientalism tended to perceive every political fact in its internal dimension and understand its economic and class essence” [Gurko-Kriazhin, 1927].

Academic Soviet Orientalism

Russian historian Evgenii Shteiner [Shteiner, 2009] believes that “the East.... it is the East, and it resolutely ignored the way East was portrayed and ways it was spoken about”, but the Western European tradition of academic Oriental studies, including Russian historiography, originally occurred and developed precisely in this coordinate system, where Orient was invented and imagined beyond its geographical boundaries. Academic Soviet forms of Orientalism were too diverse. Soviet Orientalists could perceive, imagine and reinvent themselves as Orientalists, but they also masked ideological and political Orientalism by declarations and maxims that become the norm in Soviet historiography. Russian historian Il’ia Kukulin believes that

soviet Orientalists saw themselves as the heirs of the imperial conquest tradition and reformers or revolutionaries who want to break with this tradition and establish equal relations with the natives [Kukulin, 2014].

Academic Oriental Studies which were focused on a history, culture, religion, literature, social and economic processes were the basis for the development of Soviet Orientalism in its orthodox version. Soviet academic tradition of Orientalism had two functions. On the one hand, Soviet historians and orientalists were active in formal and sanctioned academic Oriental studies. On the other hand, Soviet tradition of Oriental Studies was not separable from the communist political doctrine. Therefore, Soviet Oriental solve political problems when they criticized Western imperialism and colonialism, created and promoted a positive and attractive images of Soviet social, political and economic experience as a universal model for the rest of Orient. Analyzing Soviet academic Orientalism it is necessary to remember that Orientalism, which was in active use among representatives of the Soviet intellectual community, developed in two dimensions. Soviet Orientalists tried to understand Orient theoretically and offer methodological bases and backgrounds for development of Soviet version and perception of Oriental images. The main corpus of texts that formed Soviet discourse of Orientalism was presented by numerous academic books and articles focused on different problems of Eastern history, politics, economy and culture.

The number of intellectuals who formed and also institutionalized discourse of Soviet orientalism was extremely limited. The Institute of Oriental Studies of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and special faculties and educational institutions in Leningrad and Moscow formed and reproduced as Soviet Oriental discourse, as intellectuals who this discourse formed, invented, imagined and represented in USSR and abroad. Institute of Oriental Studies was among few specialized academic institutions that existed in the Soviet republics where they did the same – formed and developed local national versions of Soviet orientalism, but the last one was intended primarily for domestic national application. Soviet Oriental discourse also was reproduced and popularized in specialized academic journals. Intellectual database of Soviet orientalism in this context was limited, but despite this situation the number of Oriental publications (books and articles) in general, published in the Soviet period, was very significant. These publications activities of Soviet intellectuals provide us with opportunity to presume and even state that unique Soviet version of Orientalism was institutionalized in the USSR.

Soviet academic orientalism had developed and institutionalized theoretical and methodological backgrounds. Vladimir Nikiforov Igor' D'iakonov, Leonid Vasil'ev and some other intellectuals were among founding fathers of Soviet academic discourse of Orientalism and its theoretical foundations. Their theoretical concepts were attempts to legitimize socio-economic and ideological Soviet version of Orientalism. Soviet orientalism was founded and based on Sovietised form and simplified version of Marxism. Marxism in Soviet orientalism was instrumentalized and in fact it was used as a tool for development and promotion of dichotomy "Orient / Occident" concept, but Soviet historians did never recognize this fact. Despite the criticism of Western bourgeois historiography and ideological pathos of this critic, its rejection and non-recognition was formal. Russian historian and critic Andrei Iserov believes that Orientalism developed as "historiography relations between more

developed and less developed countries” [Iserov, 2013]. Soviet historians and orientalists in this context assisted to the institutionalization of the symbolic roles of developed and developing countries, post-colonial and Western states. Soviet historiography as the Western Orientalism imagined and invented the world as world divided into developed and undeveloped, independent and dependent. The undeveloped world in Soviet Orientalist imagination played a passive role. Soviet Orientalists sincerely believed that post-colonial and developing Orient must accept communist values. Soviet historians preferred to avoid recognition that their concepts had Western roots and origins. Soviet Orientalists tried to mask post-colonial and Oriental character of their studies which were focused on Orient. Some Soviet historians, analyzing problems of the genesis and early history of class societies, relegated problems of pre-capitalist social history in genesis of potential market and capitalist relations and institutions in the sphere of private property and the various forms of oppression and exploitation. These forms of social relations in the late Soviet historiography were imagined as universal, and this concept in Orientalist Studies actualized concept of diametrical differences in social, economic and political developments of West and Orient. Orient in Soviet historical imagination was linked with

the principles of total public organization of redistributive social and economic life because ... the palace and temple sectors absorbed and assimilated community sector [Pavlenko, 1989, 121, 125].

Marxism in this context had functions of Orientalist ideas legitimization in Soviet historiography. The communist ideology in the Soviet version of Orientalism assisted to its gradual methodological and theoretical decline. Andrei Iserov believes that

Western man can not write about Arabs well ... he also can not write well and good about blacks too... because he unconsciously manifests the culture of hegemony... the main thing is not an academic level of writing... provincial spirit of formal belongingness is more important than interests of those he defends [Iserov, 2013].

Soviet Orientalists did not try and did not aspire to write positively about Arabs, blacks and others. They were invented by them as imagined communities in the context of a history of class struggle, social, economic and political transformations. Soviet historians theoretically denied the opportunity and ability to transform Oriental societies and achieve the level of development of European capitalist societies. Iurii Pavlenko in the late 1980s, for example, argued and stated that

only the class and class society of European type were able to achieve the formational phase of capitalist development [Pavlenko, 1989, 270].

Marxist rhetoric in this context had a revealing function and legitimized Soviet orientalism, which only masked itself in communist rhetoric, and actually had a much in common in tactics and strategies of imagination and invention of collective Oriental images with classical Western Orientalism. These ideas in the Soviet historiography were more private than general for loyal historians, but these concepts formed theoretical and methodological foundations that institutionalized the hard-core of Soviet orientalism with its unique intellectual theoretical and conceptual theories.

The theoretical foundations of Soviet academic Orientalism

Soviet orientalists Vladimir Nikiforov and Vasilii Iliushechkin were among Soviet historians who tried to start a discussion and debates about the specifics and peculiarities of historical, social, economic and political developments of Orient. The most of arguments and ideas of Vladimir Nikiforov were focused on problems and peculiarities of unique characteristics of non-European Oriental societies. Soviet Orientalism in this context developed in a unique intellectual situation, determined by Vladimir Malahov as "European view on non-European part of mankind" [Malahov, 2003]. Like other Soviet historians Vladimir Nikiforov [Nikiforov, 1975] and Vasilii Iliushechkin [Iliushechkin, 1980] actively quoted classics of Marxism and Leninism, but the ideas of Marxism in their concepts were reduced to primitive instrumentalist role in legitimization of their ideas. Soviet Orientalism in this context had a lot in common with Western orientalism. Russian critic Masha Kucherskaia believes that Orientalism as a concept and a sum of intellectual practices was intended to legitimize "the dominance of the West over the East in a certain discursive practices" [Kucherskaya, 2007].

Soviet historians as Orientalists proposed their discursive practices for invention and imagination of collective images of Orient, but these strategies in this context were not original. Vladimir Nikiforov quoted and cited classical Marxist texts, but theoretical foundations of Marxism were not developed in his works. The similar fate of ideological instrument was projected for ideas of Karl Marx in texts of Vasilii Iliushechkin. They were used to mask revision of Marxism and they also were form of legitimization of their own concepts. Vladimir Nikiforov developed one of the tenets of classical Orientalism and imagined non-European Oriental societies as stagnant and stable. Vasilii Iliushechkin [Iliushechkin, 1980, 8] carefully pointed out that the specifics of Orient were conceived and realized only by Western scholars. Vladimir Nikiforov as the Soviet historian was forced to accept ideological foundations of Soviet historiography and he avoided to declare these ideas openly. Vladimir Nikiforov formally proposed a compromise definition, but it actually had Orientalist backgrounds. Arguing with Western and partly with Soviet historiography Vladimir Nikiforov formally denied radical features of historical and political developments of Orient [Nikiforov, 1975, 277], but in fact he like other Soviet historians institutionalized Orient as invented tradition. In the same time Orient as Soviet invented tradition was radically different from Western models of Orientalist imagination. Vladimir Nikiforov suggested that among non-

European Oriental countries were states of “isolated development” [Nikiforov, 1975, 194], which symbolized and actualized general patterns and characteristics of Oriental model of development in general. West as imagined community and invented tradition was opposed to Oriental trends which also were invented and imagined. Vladimir Nikiforov presumed that

politically and ideologically Greco-Roman society differed from the ancient Oriental societies... it is impossible to find development of democratic ideas and institutions anywhere in a history which will have something in common with Greece and Rome [Nikiforov, 1975, 262].

Orient was invented and imagined by Soviet historians as universal and common form of the most general trends in social development. Vladimir Nikiforov believed that “common tendencies were characteristic for histories of Mesopotamia, China, India, and other countries” [Nikiforov, 1975, 260]. China becomes the first object of Orientalist rethinking in Soviet version of historical imagination. Vladimir Nikiforov in the best traditions of Western Orientalism declared that

China is among the most detached and separated greatest civilizations from the other ones... China before the Christian era was deprived of contact with other developed countries and it practically did not depend on the advanced effects and influences [Nikiforov, 1975, 194].

The victims of European colonization in the concept of Vladimir Nikiforov were imagined as “early class states that reserves amazing ancient structures, which assisted to their isolation from the more developed countries” [Nikiforov, 1975, 247]. Soviet historiography preferred to divide the world into developed and undeveloped, and Soviet historians in this context institutionalized paradigm of the progressive development of the West and dependent development of Orient. Therefore, it was a perfectly normal and natural that Orient was invented in the theoretical texts of Soviet Oriental studies as imagined construct and collective idea with European and Western roots and origins. Soviet Orientalists as Western Orientalists spoke and debated about Orient, and the maintained situation of Oriental silence. The Orient in Soviet historiography was imagined how silent invented tradition and form of other non-European way of development. The idea of intervention was one of the central concepts of Vladimir Nikiforov in his theory of economic and social development of Orient. Vladimir Nikiforov presumed that

some backward and periphery societies for long periods evolved separately ... they lost their independence when they established contacts with more developed civilizations [Nikiforov, 1975, 242].

Italian historian Fabio Belafatti believes that classical Western Orientalism developed as a form of

distorted thinking... and this way of thinking are demonstrated to by people in the West, when they are talking about other parts of the world [Belafatti, 2015].

Soviet historians were bearers and gonfalons of this sin system because they localized Orient on mental maps in those regions which were imagined by them as landscape for future radical changes and transitions of archaic economic, political and social relations and institutions. Soviet historiography in this context actualized one of the system characteristics of Orientalism, based on the belief that Orient is not able effectively and successfully develops independently without external political, cultural and economic incentives. Therefore, Soviet historians, as their Western counterparts, invented and imagined their own Orient. Soviet historians in this context actualized and awakened the latent social racism and cultural imperialism of Soviet historiography. Soviet Orientalism actually turned the influence of Europe, including Russia, in the decisive factor for development and transformation of non-European societies. Soviet Orientalists were not consistent in their individual and collective attempts to develop and promote their concepts and viewpoints of Orient as an extremely undeveloped region. They “discovered” private property in different edges of Orient, but these ideas were just an attempt to understand Orient, imagine and invent it in definitions and categories of clear and adequate economic institutions which were understandable for Western and Soviet political identities. Therefore, the interpretations and understandings of Oriental history by Soviet intellectuals were predominantly Orientalist because the East was collectively described, imagined and invented by in Soviet system of human knowledge that in spite of its ideological features was peripheral regional form of de facto Western approaches in Humanities including political, social and economic analysis.

The political backgrounds of the Soviet Orientalism

Political science was not developed in the USSR in its Western forms, but Soviet intellectuals actively studied political processes in Oriental countries. The studies of Oriental and non-Western political processes and institutions in Soviet historiography was a form of Orientalism. Soviet authors who studied political processes in the East actively used methods and approaches of Orientalism, they repeated and expanded stereotypes about Orient that were developed in Soviet and party Western historiographies. Despite the fact that Soviet historians actively criticized Western historiography and accused Western historians in artificial and contrived them in exaggerating of differences between Orient and West [Landa, 1980:287], they actually repeated the great number of collective ideas and narratives which were earlier proposed and developed in Western historiography because Soviet and Western historiographies were actually two versions and forms of collective European

knowledge about the non-European world. Soviet historians tended to perceive Orient as something unified and stable, although Soviet historiography was based on an artificial division of Orient into two groups of countries – states of socialist orientation and capitalist countries [Dlin, 1980:36]. This dichotomy was an invention of Soviet historiography which developed as Orientalist historiography because Orientalism also expressed itself in artificial division of Orient into different types of countries. This typology was the result of ideologically motivated orientation of Soviet Orientalist, historians in the USSR, as the Western Orientalists, imagined and invented their own Orients.

Soviet historiography differed from the Western version of Orientalism only in some particular cases of Oriental Imagination. Soviet historians deliberately imagined Orient as a fragmented and divided into a socialist and capitalist Orient. Soviet historians, as Western Orientalists, believed that the East is very stable and conservative region. Soviet Orientalists in the early 1980s pathetically declared that the sustainability and stability of the Orient was the legacy of the colonial era and “the reaction of the past” [Levkovskii, 1980:21.]. Therefore, Soviet historians and Orientalists believed that “exceptional stability of traditions, structures and institutions” [Landa, 1980:288.] formed systemic characteristics and peculiarities of Eastern societies, and capitalism was artificially transplanted to the East from Western economic context [Dlin, 1980:42.]. Soviet historians invented and imagined Eastern social and economic structures and relationships as predominantly archaic and traditional relations and institutions, including, for example, “patriarchal community” [Landa, 1980:288, 301]. The structure of Oriental societies in general was understood in Soviet historiography as extremely stable, and collective historiographical understanding on Eastern social type was reduced to its perception as traditional. Soviet Orientalists also believed that Orient cannot develop without external political and ideological incentives. The socialist orientation [Sapozhnikov, Sevortian, 1980:427] of some Eastern countries in the Soviet historiography was understood as one from these numerous stimuli. Soviet historians actually cultivated and promoted a narrative about progressive Soviet influence. Soviet historiography in this context had a much in common with Western historians and intellectuals who believed that communion and familiarization of Orient with values of the market and democracy was extremely important and positive for non-European rest of the world. Soviet historians, unlike their Western colleagues, only proposed other ideological emphasis and believed that

the socialist-oriented countries are making progress towards socialism, and socialism is the general direction of development for mankind in general [Sapozhnikov, Sevortian, 1980:451.].

These socialist and ideologically marked narratives in Soviet Oriental studies were just a formal expression of political loyalty of historians who recognised the fact that Orient was not able to develop autonomously and independently, but it was historically doomed to copy and transplant Western forms of political and economic organization. Soviet in this context was

imagined as a part of the greater European and even Western discourse, but Soviet intellectuals preferred to ignore formal European character of political culture they belonged to. Soviet historians in this context actualized positive Soviet influence and these narratives formed Orientalist perception of the East that was imagined as a passive recipient of the progressive Soviet influence. These politically marked ideas identified Soviet version of Orientalism as Orientalism that did not base on colonial narratives, but had predominantly intellectual and ideological justifications. It is not surprising that Soviet historians refused to recognize independent status of Eastern capitalism. They insisted that capitalist relations in Eastern economies were the result of Western economic expansion and influence. Soviet Orientalists insisted that Orient, on the one hand, developed as too traditional region, and demographic problems were perceived by them as expression of traditional and archaic nature of Eastern societies because traditional countries were not able to control the birth rate [Lozovaia, 1980:47.]. This social stability of Orient was conceptualized by Soviet historians as a consequence of

the slowdown in expansion of the old pre-capitalist modes of production and relations and progress emergence of social working classes [Landa, 1980:303].

Therefore, Orient in topos of Soviet historical imagination appeared as backward and archaic society where social and class conflicts were latent and had undeveloped character. On the other hand, Soviet historians [Levkovskii, 1980:61] believed that capitalism in Orient did not arise in this region historically, but capitalist relations were artificially transferred to the region by Western colonialists. Soviet historians searched for the causes of these difficulties in adaptation of capitalism and its further development in sustainability of traditional institutions, including the community. The community in Soviet historical imagination was not perceived as a “harmful relic of the past” because

the social life of the community and its archaic remnants were very resistant to the traditional structure of the Eastern society [Landa, 1980:289.].

Soviet Orientalists recognized that it was extremely difficult for Western capitalism to compete with traditional Oriental communities because it had too strong and adaptive capacities, and capitalist relations were artificially transplanted into the non-European economies by Western colonizers. Therefore narratives about economic stability and stagnation, conservative model of development of the Eastern economies dominated in Soviet historiography. Soviet Orientalists believed that resources orientation of the economy and special role of the oil industry [Arsharuni, 1980:127.] institutionalized dependent status of the Eastern economies. The backwardness narrative of idea about peripheral status and archaicness of Orient became a commonplace in Soviet historiography. Soviet Orientalists constantly emphasized in the early 1980s

that the Eastern economies were undeveloped and the East in general developed and existed as mixed economies [Levkovskii, 1980:35], which combined simultaneously capitalist and archaic political and social elements, institutions, and relations.

Leningrad school of Igor D'iakonov in Soviet Orientalism

Igor' D'iakonov, the founding father of Leningrad school in Soviet orientalism, was among intellectuals who believed, that historians, involved in Oriental Studies, should study a wide number of issues and problems, including the general and local features in the historical development of Eastern societies, general trends in the development in their transformations and evolutions. Soviet historians also believed that the dichotomy "Europe / West" – "Orient / Asia" was among central problems because historical ways of these societies could be different or had a lot in common [D'iakonov, Iakobson, Iankovskaia, 1982:9.]. Some Soviet intellectuals believed that the historical features that formed and determined a unique way of Orient were the result of dominance in this region of special form of economic relations determined by the, as "Asiatic mode of production". The proponents of this theory believed that geographical features and collective needs for centralized irrigation identified social, economic and political characteristics of the Orient [D'iakonov, Iakobson, Iankovskaia, 1982:14].

Soviet Orientalists presumed that these features led to deformations in development of private property institution that was not developed in Oriental societies in forms which were common for the West. Igor' D'iakonov as Soviet orientalist believed that cultural features of Orient were the result of its geographical position, which encouraged local communities to centralize its regional agricultural efforts and practices [D'iakonov, 1983:32.]. Soviet historians presumed that active intervention and participation of Oriental despotic state in economic life archaic eastern societies [D'iakonov, Iakobson, Iankovskaia, 1982:19] determined forms and the main trends and trajectories of their social and economic developments and transformations. Sumer was invented in Soviet historical imagination as a classic version of Oriental development. Igor' D'iakonov actualized local features of Orient which enabled to distinguish it from other historical forms of development. Igor' D'iakonov believed that the absence of private property [D'iakonov, 1983:57] or a weak development of its system were among the central features of Oriental societies. Soviet Orientalists in this context actually reproduced Orientalist grand narratives, but this fact was not recognized by them. Soviet Orientalists in their texts attributed the same characteristics and features to Orient, which were ascribed to it in Western Orientalism.

Igor' D'iakonov was among Soviet historians who developed and cultivated the concept of Oriental despotism. Igor' D'iakonov, on the one hand, developed, promoted and cultivated narratives about the unlimited nature of monarchical power in Mesopotamia [D'iakonov, 1983:66 - 67] that in fact it was an attempt to oppose Oriental despotism to Western political and economic projects. On the other hand, Igor' D'iakonov insisted that a significant economic

centralization was characteristic for society of the ancient Orient because agricultural lands “were merged into a unified state economy” [D’iakonov, 1983:72]. Therefore, Igor’ D’iakonov defined nature of this political power and state as an oppressive and presumed that all sectors in economy were centralized and unified [D’iakonov, 1983:73 – 74]. This idea crossed and intertwined with Western version of Orientalism where concept of Oriental authoritarianism transformed in one of the central and systemic marker for identification of non-European societies.

Soviet Orientalists of the 1980s criticized Western historiography, they also did not accept and perceive in the positive way the concept of Orientalism, proposed by Edward Said in the late 1970s. In the same time their political and ideologically motivated ignorance of just forming Orientalist approach in historiography did not limit intellectual maneuvers of Soviet historians who used some key ideas of strictly criticized by them Western historiography, including Orientalism. Soviet Orientalists also actualized the role of the religious factor. The religion was invented and imagined by them as a system feature and characteristic of Oriental societies. Soviet Orientalists analyzing the historical phenomenon of Oriental societies believed and presumed that the public sector was among the defining economic factors [D’iakonov, 1983:41.] because temples were active economic actors which mobilized the great numbers of local inhabitants for realizations of projects and the last ones were realizable only in despotic states. Soviet Orientalists in this context, actually repeated ideas of Western Orientalists, and actualized a narrative of considerable stability and sustainability of non-Western societies based on the leading role of the state. Soviet academic Orientalism recognized that Oriental model of development was universal. Soviet historians believed that it was the basis for further development of early European cultures and civilizations, including the Minoan one [Andreev, 1983:276 – 295.]. “Europe” definition and historiographical contexts, it was used in, were too conditionally. “Europe” was imagined as solely geographical category because Soviet historians believed that Minoan culture had much in common with Oriental despotism. Minoan civilization was imagined in Soviet historiography actually as a version of Oriental temple centralized economy with strong despotic power. Soviet Orientalists in this context absolutised versatility and stability of Oriental model that was transplanted into European historical process.

Moscow Orientalism of Leonid Vasil’ev

Moscow Orientalists prefer to interpret the basic problems of Eastern history that formed hard-core of Soviet orientalism in general theoretical and methodological perspectives. Leonid Vasil’ev is known as the author of original version of Oriental history. Leonid Vasiliev during many years was lecturing for students of Moscow State Institute of International Relations and Institute of Asia and Africa in Moscow State University [Vasil’ev, 1984; Vasil’ev, 1985; Vasil’ev, 1988.]. Theoretical foundations of Oriental history in understanding of Leonid Vasil’ev were formed by him in the 1960 – 1980s, and they institutionalized Soviet version of Orientalism. Leonid Vasil’ev in his theoretical

reflections and consideration about Orient was more close to the Western Orientalism than other Soviet historians and Orientalists. The concept of Leonid Vasil'ev was based on essential oppositions between East and West as the two absolutely different and opposite ways and different directions in development of civilization. Orient was imagined by Leonid Vasil'ev as a "non-European world in general" [Vasil'ev, 2001:7.]. Analyzing Oriental phenomenon, Leonid Vasil'ev presumed that it is not possible to determine it exclusively in the geographical context. The concepts of Orient, as Leonid Vasil'ev presumed, belong to historical, political, cultural and social sciences [Vasil'ev, 2001:11.]. Orient as a concept in the theory of Leonid Vasil'ev is based on "Orient" / "Occident" dichotomy as opposition between Eastern and Western elements [Vasil'ev, 2001:15.]. The dichotomy, as Leonid Vasil'ev believes, has its historical roots in the cultural and political characteristics that defined various historical paths in developments and transformations of these regions. Leonid Vasil'ev is not inclined to date historical and cultural differences by 19th and 20th centuries, presuming that the system characteristics, differences, oppositions and contradictions between East and West originally were understood and simultaneously invented by ancient Greeks, who

broke with the traditional structure of the Eastern type and choose the structure of a different type ... the idea of despotism in the minds of the Greeks was clearly linked to Orient [Vasil'ev, 2001:17.].

Analyzing historical features which formed East and West, Leonid Vasil'ev believed that the West (Greece) became the birthplace of political institutions which were not able to arise and develop in Orient. West or Occident, as historical opposition and alternative to Orient, achieved the great historical successes and proposed more attractive model of development, that later provided Occident with military, political and economic successes in its attempts to discover, map and colonize Orient. Comparing East and West, Leonid Vasil'ev suggested that Oriental state was radically different from Western model of political and historical development:

Eastern state does not represent the interests of the ruling class of the owners because there are no owners or classes. The state stands above society and inhibits the society [Vasil'ev, 2001:30.].

Leonid Vasiliev insists that "the fundamental differences in structures" [Vasil'ev, 2001:79.] are characteristic for Orient and West. Leonid Vasil'ev cultivated traditional Orientalist narrative that politically East developed in a different coordinate system based on two principles. These principles were the followings: economic activity was only formally reduced to the economic and production of fixed rules; the system of law and rights did not exist in the society in its Western understanding; owners were depressed and dependent from power [Vasil'ev, 2001:81.]. Leonid Vasil'ev, as Western Orientalists, actively developed the idea that social structure of the East can not assist to

development of capitalism. Social structures of Oriental type only institutionalize undemocratic political institutions and traditions. Orient was defined by Leonid Vasil'ev as "a world based on different orders" [Vasil'ev, 2001:17.]. These other Oriental orders predetermined that

the market and private property in the Eastern structure were not free and therefore it is not correct to compare them with the market and private property in Europe [Vasil'ev, 2001:79.].

The concept of Leonid Vasil'ev can be defined as Orientalist because he recognized and popularized the central ideas and assumptions of Western Orientalism. The idea that Orient is static and stable is one of the central tenets of classical Orientalism. Leonid Vasil'ev believes that

the era of Eastern Middle Ages is too conditional because there structures of state and society were unchanged ... a medieval East was not something essential new [Vasil'ev, 2001:493.].

Developing Orientalist approach in Soviet Oriental Studies Leonid Vasil'ev actualized the idea that Eastern state was very stable and popular uprisings in Oriental countries did not seek to radically changes of political, social and economic relations, but they were interested predominantly in restoration of archaic rules which dominated earlier. Leonid Vasil'ev believed that

traditional Oriental society was fully consistent with its state and it was interested in its preservation ... society in the form of revolts usually was against eliminations and it proposed to the return to desirable forms... society, as the state in general, was interested in the stability and conservative stability [Vasil'ev, 2001:509.].

Leonid Vasil'ev actually broke with theoretical and methodological rules of Soviet historiography which was based on universality of idea that some historical periods and socio-economic formations were revocable by other more developed and complex formations. Therefore, the institutions, relationships and principles of gift and redistribution [Vasil'ev, 2001:52 – 55.] in the Eastern societies were more relevant and effective than in other societies. Leonid Vasil'ev proposed the "power – property" concept. "Power – property" was defined by him as

an alternative to ancient, feudal and bourgeois European private property in non-European structures ... it is not a property, it is power because functions of owner are expressed in participation in power [Vasil'ev, 2001:69, 72.].

Political power in societies of this type usually combines various roles, including tyrant and (re)distributor of products [Vasil'ev, 2001:74.]. Leonid

Vasil'ev believed that "administrative command system of distribution in non-European states and Oriental despotism" developed as universal forms of organization of political power which was able to form a "stable and effective mechanisms of redistribution" [Vasil'ev, 2001:78, 97.]. The (re)distribution in these systems was centralized and also had state character. "Power – property" in non-European societies assisted to institutionalization of coercion and violence as a central elements in the control system.

The laws of ancient Oriental societies were closely linked with religious rules and regulations and this led to institutionalization of non-violent forms of violence [Vasil'ev, 2001:76.], which had their roots and origins in religion. Soviet Orientalists who cultivated these narratives actually transplanted them in Soviet historiography from Western Orientalism, including the idea that Orient as historical antithesis to Western world is historically inclined to undemocratic political forms. Historic triumph of power and property in non-European societies radically changed the system of redistribution, turned it into support system for political elites. This form of organization of power was based on separation of elite representatives from the direct producers. The concept of "power – property" belonged to a number of original concepts of historiography and became one of invented traditions of Soviet historiography. This theory actualized involvement of Soviet Oriental Studies in Western tradition of Orientalism because Soviet historians as Western intellectuals developed and cultivated narrative about original predisposition of Orient to non-democratic forms of government. The idea of "power – property" in the Soviet historiography became the soft expression of central tenets and intellectual backgrounds of Orientalism because Orient was imagined as a society that was based on conservative stability. Leonid Vasil'ev actively compared historical and political, social and economic processes of Eastern societies and suggested that the features of Orient were not situational, but they were based on "traditional structure, which was too different from the European". Leonid Vasil'ev divided the world into "European" and "non-European" and insisted that

non-European world and traditional Orient is not identical to the concept of ... traditional East... it is the key to understanding of non-European world... a history of the East should be adopted and described in the way it was [Vasil'ev, 2001:25].

Leonid Vasil'ev also developed its own version of Orientalism and suggested that

the basis of the Eastern structure is a total absorption of the individual and collective lack of personality as a self-sufficient personal integrity [Vasil'ev, 2001:29.].

Leonid Vasil'ev, analyzing the central characteristics of European colonialism in the Orient, tried to avoid any mentions of Oriental perception in European cultural context [Vasil'ev, 2001:9 – 20.]. Leonid Vasil'ev as moderate Orientalist preferred to limit himself by a simple short-list of invented features of Eastern model in context of European colonialism. Leonid Vasiliev in this

context re-actualized viewpoint which is too close to historical origins of classical Western Orientalism where the thesis about undemocratic and despotic nature of Oriental political power was transformed in one of the central and systemic. Leonid Vasil'ev in this context also awakened traditional narrative for Western Orientalism about stability and conservatism of Orient in the context of its radical differences from the Western world which is based on dynamic and progressive transformations.

Formation of Soviet Orientalist discourse

Academic studies of Soviet Orientalists between the two world wars were radically different from the pre-revolutionary Russian Oriental Studies. Oriental studies since the 1920s become a victim of indoctrination policy and Sovietization. Soviet Orientalists lost institutional, methodological and theoretical independence because new Orientalists were loyal to Soviet regime. Soviet intellectuals between two world wars forcibly or voluntarily put Orientalism in Procrustean bed of Soviet version of Marxism. Soviet Oriental Studies in the 1920s and 1930s developed as instrumentalist science that was actively used by Soviet political elites to solve practical and ideological problems. Soviet Oriental Studies were formally fragmented and developed as studies and analysis of Soviet and Foreign Orients, but it was virtually unanimous in its methodological and theoretical foundations and approaches. Soviet scholars engaged in academic studies of Eastern states and economies in the period between the two world wars, as Western and American orientalists, were also Orientalists. Soviet and Western Orientalists in fact acted in a unified system of theoretical and methodological coordinates, they imagined and invented their own ideal images of the East.

These images and concepts had only formal distinctions, and character features of understanding and perception of Orient in the Soviet Union and Western states have never had a system differences. Soviet and Western orientalists actually spoke in the same methodological language, theoretically and conceptually their texts had much in common. Theoretical proximity of Soviet and non-Soviet Oriental Studies expressed mainly in the inclination of the 1920s and 1930s authors in invention of their ideal Orient. It is also noteworthy that Soviet and Western authors were inclined to invent and ascribe the same systematic features and characteristics to Orients they imagined for their political needs. Soviet and non-Soviet Orientalists understood original and authentic Orient as territories where primitive, undeveloped, archaic social, political, and economic relations and institutions dominated. Therefore, they truly believed that they should transform Orient in more Western cultural system of coordinates and make it closer to modern standards, relations and institutions. Soviet Orientalists transformed sovietized edge territories of former Russian imperial East and transformed it into unique platform for realization of Soviet colonial project focused on social, economic and political transformation and modernization of Orient. Soviet Orientalism in the context developed as Orientalism of positive socio-economic and political affirmation.

Soviet Orientalism as a model

Soviet academic Orientalism conceptually developed and transformed as biased and partisan system of academized scientific knowledge about Orient. Soviet Orientalists politically and ideologically, theoretically and methodologically had a much in common with Western Orientalists, although this genetic relationship was not recognized and it was denied from ideological viewpoint. Soviet historians imagined and invented their own ideal and perfect East. Soviet Orientalists were ready to argue fiercely with their Western colleagues and accused them in fraud and denial of Marxism that was recognized in Soviet Oriental studies as a universal dogma. Soviet Orientalists were Orientalists themselves because they imagined and invented their own images of Orient and used Western theoretical and methodological approaches. Marxism was not a Russian invention; it was transplanted into the Russian and Soviet academic context. Therefore Soviet Orientalists constructed their images of Orient in a coordinate system of simplified and sovietized Marxism. Classic ideas and tenets of Western Orientalism were deeply integrated into Soviet orientalism. Soviet Orientalism was different from Western versions only in context of deeper ideologization of the final scholar product.

Orient was invented by Soviet authors in the same paradigm with Western historians as inevitable intellectual and cultural opposition to developed countries, but Western authors only stated idea about positive Western influence on Orient, and Soviet historians tried to prove that East can be changed and modernized in the Soviet communist system of coordinates. Western intellectuals preferred to ascribe unattractive qualities and characteristics to Orient and actualized factor of its predominantly technical backwardness. Soviet Orientalists did the same, actualized local factors and Oriental features as symptoms of undeveloped systems that was defined by them as feudal, archaic and reactionary. Therefore, Soviet Orientalism had also indoctrination functions. The idea that Orient is based on stability and Eastern countries are incapable for independent development becomes a common place in the Soviet Orientalism, although these ideas were not popularized by Soviet historians openly and actively. Soviet authors argued that introduction of Orient by progressive ideas can be useful for it and provided Orient with external stimuli. These ideas formed politically and ideologically marked image of Orient in the Soviet historiography where ideology defined the main vectors and trajectories of its transformation in Soviet historical consciousness and political imagination.

Preliminary conclusions: Soviet academic Orientalism

Soviet Orientalism developed as a set of collective representation of Soviet intellectuals about East or Orient. These collective views were very diverse, they had different forms and expressions, various cultural and intellectual dimensions. Soviet orientalism partially actualized traditions and

intellectual achievements of Russian pre-revolutionary version of Orientalism. Russian political Imperial elite had the experience of imagination and actual domestication of Muslim external and periphery edges of Russian Empire. Soviet elites actively used the imperial experience, but they did not recognize this continuity and proposed significant changes in strategy in territories which formed Soviet Orient. Therefore, the Soviet orientalism developed differently than the pre-revolutionary Russian Orientalism. Historiographical Orientalism was intended to institutionalize the basis and backgrounds for Soviet peaceful penetration in Eastern and Asian countries. It was imagined to legitimize Soviet participation in the political process in the East.

Soviet historians, economists and political scientists institutionalized and invented images of Orient that corresponded to ideological and political preferences of Soviet elites in their collective attempts to Sovietize and modernize Orient. The formation of Soviet Orientalism developed as collective interpretation of historical, social, political and economic events, realities and peculiarities of non-European world and landscape. Soviet academic Orientalism had some forms and dimensions. It developed in collective historical grand narratives which were focused on the formal politically, socially, and ideologically correct Soviet Orient. Soviet Orientalism was also interested in promotion of political myth about historical progress and triumph of the sovietized Orient that was invented in Soviet historical and political imagination as a universal political and social model for other non-European regions. The political experience of the Soviet Orient was accepted as proof of political and ideological correctness and inevitability of Orientalism.

Soviet experience in Central Asia was invented in Soviet identity as collective confirmation of ideological correctness of Soviet tactics and political strategies in Oriental peripheries which transformed and modernized. Soviet tactics and strategies in Central Asia confirmed that European countries (Soviet Union could be imagined as part of Western world) were able to change and transform the social, political and economic institutions of Oriental society. Soviet Central Asia in this context was invented tradition and a successful attempt of European Soviet politicians and historians to invent East / Orient in the Western centered system of coordinates. The history of Soviet orientalism actually became a history of social and methodological prejudices of Soviet intellectuals who projected, created, imagined, and invented their collective images of the East. The development of Soviet academic Orientalism was also a result of politically motivated manipulations with history.

Soviet Oriental Studies were not limited exclusively by academic studies of Eastern, Asian and African countries. Soviet collective ideas and representations about Orient and invented Oriental images in Soviet historiography reflected social and cultural status of academic Soviet Oriental Studies. Soviet academic Orientalism developed as too stable and conservative field and trend in Humanities, its methodological and theoretical foundations and backgrounds were practically unchanged during its existence in general. Soviet Oriental Studies became an important political factor because Soviet orientalism was an attempt to legitimize and idealize forced and even violent modernization of predominantly traditional and archaic societies which actually were not ready to accept Western tactics and strategies of the political,

economic and social modernization, European values, standards, and ways of life. Soviet orientalism was not independent and autonomous in its development because Orientalism from the beginning was only passive subject in ideological and political needs of Soviet political elites who proposed new ways, visions and strategies of development for sovietized, colonial or post-colonial Orient.

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**SOVIET MILITARY ORIENTALISM:
BETWEEN IDEOLOGIZATION AND CONSUMERISM**

Military Orientalism: formal and informal backgrounds

Orientalist motives and sentiments during Soviet period developed simultaneously in historiography and in memoirs of Soviet military advisers, interpreters and their families' members who received unique experience of living in non-European countries and communicated with non-Western cultures and religious traditions. The texts that formed the corpus of sources on a history of Soviet military Orientalism is too diverse. Some texts provide us with very interesting and unique memories, other ones are based on attempts to connect memories and ideological, mainly communist, nationalist or pro-Soviet reflections, ideas and considerations of authors. The texts that belong to the canon of Soviet military Orientalism provide scholars with number of different collective representations, politically and ideologically marked ideas, thoughts and feelings that formed one of Soviet perceptions of Orient. The recognition that Russian Empire / Soviet Union / Russian Federation got a unique experience of Orientalism and assisted to development and promotion of Orientalist understandings and perceptions of East encouraged discussions and debates among various Russian authors [Ioffe, 2009, Ioffe, 2006].

The range of their viewpoints differs from recognition of Russian participation in genesis and further development of Orientalist canon to a radical rejection of this approach in a form of politicization and indoctrination of progressive role of Russia in the East [Popenkov 2011, Popenkov, 2015] or collective communistic stereotypes inspired by Soviet political propaganda [Isaenko, 2006] in context of criticism and exposures of aggressive plans of Western world. The formal critique of Orientalism also is more common and normal in contemporary historiography than classical Orientalist approach. Analyzing texts of Soviet military Orientalism, it is necessary to remember that Soviet people had practically no possibility of free visits of other countries, including socialistic ones. The trips of Soviet people in socialist countries were less desirable than their visits of capitalist countries because Soviet ideology formed a negative image of capitalism in general, but familiarity with other versions and forms of socialism also was politically and ideologically dangerous because it could weaken confidence in correctness of Soviet model of political and economic development. In the Soviet period very small part of Soviet citizens, including diplomats, athletes, military advisers and translators, representatives of the party and academic elite, journalists had opportunity to visit capitalist countries and live in them permanently.

Some Soviet military interpreters who worked in Oriental countries had university education, they studied Oriental languages and histories and, therefore, they were able to accept and understand Orient in different forms.

They were more ready to accept Eastern realities than military advisers who had only military education and, as a rule, they did not know foreign languages. Some interpreters [Kamenev, 2009] had the experience of fieldwork in Oriental languages studies, and they were better prepared for prolonged work in non-European countries. Other Soviet military interpreters positioned themselves as translators and did not express any Oriental academic ambitions. Mihail Razinkov, for example, in one of his autobiographical texts writes that

we have taught Arabic language in Military Institute of Foreign Languages in Moscow, but I do not presume that I am an Orientalist or Arabist in the traditional understandings of these areas of activity, although Arabic is my main specialty. Why?... I was not engaged in science... I was just a practitioner – military interpreter, who was trained to translate everything from spoken language to complex scientific, technical and military texts ... I studied mostly Arab world or, as Arabs say, Arab homeland in everyday life and its everyday dimensions [Razinkov, 2009].

Other Soviet translators express the opposite viewpoint and position themselves as Orientalists and try to actualize their membership in professional community, they do not belong to. Some Soviet military advisers and translators in their memoirs about Orient prefer to fulfill them with a lengthy discourses, quotes, and citations from academic publications about Oriental history and religion. This was actually the birth trauma of Soviet military Orientalism, which as Western Orientalism imagined and invented its own Orient. It was also very important for Soviet military orientalists to fix, catalogize, documentize, and map Orient in mental maps and integrated into the imagined and invented Soviet geography of foreign landscapes. The texts of Soviet military interpreters' memories about their activities and life in Eastern countries have a dual nature. They form a unique discourse of Soviet historical memory about Orient. They fix Soviet experience and collective understandings of Orient in general, because number of Soviet citizens who had opportunities to live in capitalist Oriental, Asian and African countries was extremely low.

It is also difficult and problematic to compare these texts with other Soviet narrative sources of the same period about Orient because they just are not available. Soviet military interpreters who lived and worked in Eastern countries had different educational, cultural and social backgrounds. They could be graduates of Military Institute of Foreign Languages, Moscow State University, Moscow State Institute of International Relations. All of them were sent to non-European states by Soviet government, and in fact they were government officials who just worked abroad. The Soviet state controlled education and indoctrination necessarily preceded professional activities of military and civilian interpreters in Asia, East and Africa. These factors influenced and also determined formation and further developments of their ideas about Orient. Soviet military advisers and translators who lived in Asia, Arabic East and Africa were dependent politically and economically from the Soviet authorities. Service

in developing countries was a form of ideological obligation. Therefore, some Russian historians believe that

throughout the history of relations between East and West, starting from antiquity, the West always took biased position in the East [Govorunov, Kuz'menko, 2014].

Soviet military advisers and translators, who served in the Eastern countries, were no exception from this universal logic of imagination and invention of collective images of the East. Russian critics, scholars and commentators of Orientalism believe that the East in classical canon of Orientalist discourse

was presented as a static, and incapable of independent development. East dynamics with its own laws of social evolution was depicted as static because it was a non-western. Special and particular Eastern type of development was presented as a lack of development, because it did not provide us with western standards of development and linear progress... Orientalist elaborated mythology, based on the myth about Eastern inert, ossified East. European scientists, writers, poets, and travelers were actively involved in creation of this myth [Ponomareva, 2008].

Soviet military advisers and translators have a much in common with those of Western Orientalists who formed a unique political and cultural languages for description and perception of the East and identified coordinates that formed our collective understandings of Orient. Soviet interpreters in their memoirs fixed and recorded several characteristics of Orient they lived in. Orient was perceived and understood by Soviet translators as the world that existed and developed in another, different from the Soviet one, system of coordinates.

Archaization of non-West in Soviet military Orientalism

Imagination and invention of Orient was a form of understanding of the other world that was completely different from Soviet social, political and cultural realities. Soviet military advisers and translators could relate Orient with categories of "backwardness" and "archaicness", but these preferences were not universal. For example, Libya in Soviet political imagination dropped out this universal logic of inventing of archaism and primitivism as the central features of Orient. Soviet officers, who served in Orient and Africa, imagined and invented collective images of the East that belonged to the greater Orientalist discourse. Soviet military advisers and translators presumed that Syria had unique characteristics and features:

people are friendly, sociable, and sympathetic. Very civilized country... there were no talks about religion and clashes of nationalities... the virtual absence of theft... full security... it was possible to walk the streets at night, and no one will touch us [Ryskulov, 2013].

Syria and other eastern countries in Soviet historical imagination were presented as synthetic topos of Orient and represented majority of non-European qualities and Eastern virtues. Soviet interpreters who actively imagined Orient had much in common with Western Orientalists: they did the same things – imagined, invented and proposed their own perfect versions and understandings of Orient. Soviet military specialists who served in Arab countries fixed different attributes and characteristics of backwardness and savagery of the local Oriental population:

there were not special containers for garbage in houses...
hardworking residents exhibited garbage at the entrance...
lazy ones thrown from it from the windows...[Hramov, 2012]

Soviet military advisers and translators as representatives of orthodox Orientalism were inclined to accept the East as something unchangeable, sustainable, conservative and stable. They as Western Orientalists tended to generalize East and develop its collective images. This approach assisted to rise of negative stereotypes and collective perceptions of Orient. The narrative about Orient as mysterious lands which were far from European cultural traditions was an attempt to generalize East. Russian critics of Orientalism believe that

the degree of generalization is too high that Orient is imagined without certain time and space. These summative generalizations are ultimately ahistorical. East is imagined as the conserved in its principal features which were unchangeable for many centuries [Govorunov, Kuz'menko, 2014].

Orient in Soviet historical imagination was too convenient for formation and promotion of its images as stable region based on stagnation. Orient was imagined and invented as something amorphous that needed foreign control. Ethiopia in Soviet ideological imagination was a victim of this ideologically marked approach. Soviet military advisers and interpreters proposed image of Ethiopia as an extremely underdeveloped country:

I do not accidentally connected kids, horses and dogs in one story. The attitudes to them in this country were equally fierce. Horses, which were used as a horse-drawn and passenger transport, were mercilessly whipped and thrashed with sticks. Dogs were beatable by stones... they

were kicked and beaten with sticks and whips.... people did not feed any horses, dogs or cats ... they were thin and mangy, emaciated and half-wild, with traces of wounds and beatings... they eat only that they extracted by themselves... in general, it was impossible to see children without tears. The smallest among them were completely naked... the elder ones were half-naked... they were filthy, rickety, snotty, with sores and ulcers in the living flies... they were also hungry and barefoot. Often children and adults wore two or three trousers and t-shirts. All of them were turned and severed in different places, and the holes overlapped one another. Nobody repaired or wash clothes, them perished directly on the body... The documents certifying identity of children, were issued only when the child was five years old... it was a result of high mortality rate among children under five years, and the government did not even spent money on birth certificates [Vospominaniia... 2012].

Soviet military advisers and translators in this context were not original; in fact their impressions were typical for Europeans and repeated the collective ideas, moods and fears that some decades earlier were expressed by British authors. English writer George Orwell, for example, proposed the following synthetic version of perception and understanding of Orient, and his impressions were not racist, but they actualized common Western perception of non-West:

The people have brown faces – besides, there are so many of them! Are they really the same flesh as yourself? Do they even have names? Or are they merely a kind of undifferentiated brown stuff, about as individual as bees or coral insects? They rise out of the earth, they sweat and starve for a few years, and then they sink back into the nameless mounds of the graveyard and nobody notices that they are gone. And even the graves themselves soon fade back into the soil [Orwell, 1954:187].

Soviet military advisers and interpreters tended to accept Orient as true believing Orientalists and supporters of colonialism in its soft and affirmative forms. The general ideas of Soviet military translators belonged to general Orientalist paradigm. They presumed that Orient was a mixture of Oriental and Western traditions:

in Cairo all local Arabs seemed the same... Even women were with bright makeup, eyes were summed up Nefertiti style... city woman were walking in colorful blouses and colorful mini-skirts [Pavliukov, 2015].

Soviet officers tried to integrate non-Europeans in Soviet cultural canon, and these their attempts actually formed new dimensions in the greater Orientalist discourse. Soviet military advisers and interpreters behave like Western colonizers who mastered, discovered and imagined new territory. The non-West was imagined by them as exotic world. Soviet military advisers and translators, who in the 1980s worked in Africa, endowed this world with different attributes of a romantic discourse and imagined themselves as pioneers in un-discovered and not-mapped wild territories. Military translator Aleksandr Tihomirov, who served in Angola, for example, fixed in his memoirs moment of meeting with the pygmies. He was greatly surprised and impressed by them and preferred to describe this moment in traditions of adventure prose that also was a form of European Orientalism in the 19th century:

clearing was next to the road, a little kimbas were standing here. I thought that it was some kind of cotes because houses were very small... but I saw that children with spears get out... and after we come closer I saw that these children had faced a completely adults... Then it became clear: they were true pygmies. They jumped out quickly and looked at us by their crazed eyes. I realized that they have never seen whites before us... they ran up to us, groped our uniform, shown fingers and tried to touch our faces and hands. Our Angolan comrades felt themselves so powerful and civilized! We proposed biscuits and Pygmies ate it with pleasure [Tihomirov, 2011:154].

The similar motifs dominated in Soviet collective representations about Yemen. Soviet translators and other officials testified traditional and archaic attitude to women:

Yemeni women were mostly in black hijabs (loose-fitting dresses to toe) with covered and hidden faces. Those who dared to open their faces were severely punished according to Sharia law [Popenkov, 2013].

Soviet military advisers watched non-European attitudes towards women in African countries. Aleksei Baranov, who in the 1980s served in Angola, recalled that

we went out to the balcony to smoke and the first thing, I saw, really struck me: African woman was carrying on her head a gas cylinder (50 liters) and she was not holding it at all. At the same time she was pregnant, the baby tied behind her back, and she was holding the hand of another one... these images were repeated later, but in the first time it made a tremendous impression [Baranov].

The facts of attitude to women like these were perceived by Soviet advisers as one more proof of unique non-European cultures of Orient, but these narratives also assisted to development of Soviet discourse of Orientalism. Social realities of non-Western and non-European states strengthened presumption of Soviet advisers that the Eastern world was radically different from Europe and the USSR. Oriental attitude towards women was understood by Soviet military advisers and translators as another dimension of backwardness of countries, they worked in. Social realities fixed by Soviet officials in their memoirs proved special historical path and archaichness of Orient and its mentally and psychologically played a social and cultural role that had much in common with symbolic and ascribed statuses of European colonizers.

Soviet military advisers and translators in Eastern and African countries were actually Orientalists and Orientalism was their universal cultural code and language. Orientalism was paradigm that determined the main vectors and strategies of formation and development of collective and individual concepts and ideas about Orient. Orientalism in this intellectual context becomes “the universal models of distortion of East in general and in the narrower sense the Muslim East” [Zhusil’bek, 2011]. Soviet citizens in Africa were just one more special kind of Europeans, who only formally differed from other Europeans by their political faith in communism as a political ideology, but they, like other Europeans, imagined and invented Orient as completely different world based on archaichness, savagery and backwardness. Some features and forms of Oriental realities seemed attractive for Soviet translators. Anatolii Ivanov, who arrived in Egypt in the 1960s, memoirised that the first Egyptian city he visited was

Heliopolis, built in the Euro-Moorish style, was full with wide green streets, dozens of fashionable shops, clubs, restaurants, swimming pools and outdoor cinema halls [Ivanov 2011:21].

Yemen was also imagined by Soviet advisers and translators as very archaic region and “a country of contrasts, where early medieval and late modern were combined and mixed” [Ivanov 2011: 69]. Non-European countries in Soviet imagination were invented as a topos of classic archaichness and modern undeveloped societies. Ethiopia was imagined as an underdeveloped country and the first impressions of Soviet advisers and their families were the followings:

...wonderful mountain scenery... we passed several villages with huts, where the local population lived [Vosspominaniia... 2012].

Other Soviet military translators left similar memories and impressions about Africa imagined by them as wild and untapped part of vast collective Orient. It was not a geographical, but a mental and cultural Orient:

we were impressed by an abundance of garbage on the streets, poverty, slums, primitive huts made of several pieces of slate and cardboard boxes... traffic was not regulated... It was another country, another world, other people [Korygin, 2015].

Orient in the context of Soviet imagination appeared as wild and archaic world that Soviet advisers tried to conquer, transform and improve. The memories of Soviet advisers, interpreters and their families' members are full with Orientalist images and motifs. Soviet historical imagination and attempts to construct images of Orient in this context had a much in common with Western Orientalism. Orient in the imagination of Soviet military advisers and interpreters appeared as topos of collective non-European savagery, backwardness and archaic. Anatolii Ivanov recalled that regular punishments and executions were the norm in Yemen of the early 1960s:

we were asked by our guides... about our desire to watch the procedure of punishment of persons accused of serious crimes... every week the executioner cut off head of one or two criminals in fortress wall and presented their heads on the table at the entrance to the market. Of course, we refused [Ivanov, 2011:78].

The similar facts were fixed by other Soviet military advisers and translators who worked in Yemen in the 1980s:

Yemenis today brought a stack of invitations to public punishment of the thief. They will cut off his hand. We got two invitations. Who wants to go? People hooted and did not demonstrate desire to watch execution of criminals and the punishment of the thieves which took place in the central square ... If it was a penalty, unfortunate was just beheaded. The relatives of the condemned always presented on execution and only the murdered head rolled off his shoulders, they rushed to dead body and began to coat their hair and faces by still warm blood. The authorities acted differently with the thieves. If the person stole the first time and was caught – his left hand was cut off. If the person stole the second time – his right leg to the knee was cut off... the spectacle was a wild [Popenkov, 2013].

These local justice practices were imagined as forms of savagery and barbarism by advisers from the Soviet Union who represented Soviet culture as Sovietized form of Western culture. Ethiopia in Soviet military advisers' imagination also was far from Western and Soviet standards, assess of its achievements were too restrained, especially – in the context of mass killings that shocked Soviet interpreters:

we were driving from the airport in the center of the city, and I thought: we are accused that lot of people is drinking in our country... and there are many drunks on the roads... later I realized that they were lying in unnatural positions... a living person was not able to lie in such poses... I was told that they shoot each other during night... and dead corpses were not cleaned for deterrence of the rest [Kachan, 2011].

Postcolonial motives were characteristic for Soviet military interpreters who served in Ethiopia. Postcolonial simultaneous coexistence of different cultures expressed in political ideology and propaganda posters:

along the road, which we were traveling, as along other roads, it was possible to see large number of posters and banners which were full with advertisements of ideological content. I saw the portraits of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels and Vladimir Lenin depicted together shoulder to shoulder in profile... it was possible to understand by form of their beards where Karl Marx or Friedrich Engels was, but features of their faces were local Ethiopian [Vospominaniia ... 2012].

The communist values, transplanted on Orient, were perceived, integrated and assimilated in local realities in different ways. The various Oriental countries were not ready to these ideological transplantations and manipulations because communism in Soviet variant was not understandable for them. Soviet representatives in the same time also faced with other social relations including exploitation with its un-developed capitalist stimuli. Soviet translators fixed them and they willingly integrated into these relationships. Anatolii Ivanov, for example, remembered that Soviet military interpreters in Egypt allowed themselves to do something that was impossible in the USSR. Anatolii Ivanov insisted that Egyptian administration hired for Soviet specialists

servant Hassan, who cleaned three-room suite, washed clothes and prepared meals... he purchased products, fruits, and drinks [Ivanov, 2011:28].

Soviet military advisers in Afghanistan before Soviet invasion also had servants. The tactics and strategies of relations between Soviet officers and local servants were different. The memories of some Soviet military advisers and interpreters fixed facts and events of typical Orientalist behavior of Soviet people who represented absolutely other form of social and political culture. Iurii Pozhidaev, who served in Afghanistan in the 1978, remembered that

in the morning old and not very healthy commander of division, general Mohammed Saryab met with us and provided us with his house... he moved to another one

that was situated not far from a big garden. The next day we got Uzbek cook with hands which were black from fingers to the elbows... and our life began to improve. Uzbek was made to wash his hands by a brush, and in some day he was taught how to serve meals... he also was taught to quote a phrase from the movie "Gentlemen of Fortune" "*Kushat' podano*"... the second legendary phrase "*Sadites' zhrat', pozhaluista*" was taught for a month. The word "zhrat'" because of differences in the articulation (a combination of two consonants is unusually for Afghans) was difficult to utter [Pozhidaev, 2015].

The tactics described by Iurii Pozhidaev is vivid example of Orientalist perception of non-European Eastern realities, when different cultures and identities faced and clashed. The servants were also used by Soviet advisers and translators in other non-European countries, including Zanzibar. Oleg Teterin, who served there as a military translator in the early 1960s, remembered that

we got two black cooks as a part of legacy of British resident... they were always smiling and warning, two pure men in white starched and ironed lab coats and white caps. They famously prepared favorite British porridges and puddings [Teterin, 2011:112].

Soviet advisers in some African countries acted as true Orientalists and occupied houses where British residents lived before them. These changes in formal belongness of houses, built in colonial era, symbolized and actualized Orientalist nature of Soviet advisers, because British Europeans were simply replaced by another ones from the Soviet Union. For example, Oleg Teterin, who in the early 1960s worked as a military translator in Zanzibar, wrote that "British Resident in Zanzibar lived in this spacious house before the January revolution" [Teterin, 2011:111]. Soviet military advisers, experts and translators in Africa behaved as Orientalists. They actively used British colonial heritage and tried to Sovietize it: for example, a military hospital named after George VI was renamed in Vladimir Lenin hospital [Teterin, 2011:112].

Orient as recipient of Western experience in military Soviet imagination

Soviet military translators [Popenkov, 2009], who served in Libya, fixed in their memoirs significant developments and achievements of the Libyans in their domestication of Western experience in spheres of technology and military equipment. Some Soviet translators [Pavliukov 2014], who served in Egypt or Syria, acknowledged that formal Eastern countries were the bridge between Soviet Union and Western Europe because Soviet translators were able to buy books of prohibited and imagined as anti-Soviet Western writers in Cairo or

Damascus. The transplantation of Western values in some cases was too formal: for example, Western movies, as Soviet translators remembered, actualized predominantly Libyan specificity [Popenko, 2011] and were interesting exclusively for the Libyans, but this interest was interest of the former colonized in culture of the former colonizers. Anatolii Ivanov, who worked and lived in Egypt in the early 1960s, believed that Egyptian authorities deliberately and consciously flirted with USSR, but actually they just used Soviet aid as they wished:

visit of Nikita Hrushchev and his negotiations with Gamal Nasser did not affect on Egyptian policy in general... it only formally became left, shortly before visit of Hrushchev Egyptian Communists were released from prison, but Egyptian policy remained a purely nationalistic. The country continues to haunt leftists... since 1959 the annual anti-Soviet months organized specifically during May holidays became a norm [Ivanov, 2011:38 – 39].

Soviet interpreters in their memoirs recorded and recalled that Eastern countries, they worked in, were postcolonial states. Anatolii Ivanov, for example, wrote in his memoirs that in Egypt of the 1960s beginning, simultaneous presence and coexistence of European and Arab styles and traditions was among the main features of cultural and social landscape. Anatolii Ivanov fixed linguistic dimensions and expression of post-colonial situation in Egypt:

I asked Egyptians to speak English... they all nodded... but it did not mean anything... anyone who knows five or six English words in Egypt believes that he speaks English [Ivanov 2011:91].

Soviet military translators in Africa faced with the same problems. For example, Oleg Teterin remembered that

the officers told us that English translation was not successful... ordinary soldiers did not understand them, sergeants did not understand English also... lieutenants knew the language, but it was no sense... Military instruction faced with great difficulties, and we lost time... Soldiers, Zanzibar recruits, trained by Soviet instructors, were mostly former peasants and they were illiterate... they come to army from the poorest segments of local population... they hardly knew everyday colloquial English... and it was impossible to speak about knowledge of military terms by them [Teterin, 2011:114].

Soviet military advisers testified the bad attitudes of Arab officers to soldiers during exercises, when

starving Syrian soldiers organized race for snakes, caught and cooked them. Snakes were writhing and biting, but it did not save them from Syrian soldiers who were fed very badly. Syrian soldiers during three days exercises were provided only with flask of water, three or four tortillas and one or two banks of canned meat [Popenko, 2009].

Soviet advisers and translators in these social contexts were unwilling witnesses of traditional social relations in Arabic world, they fixed that ideas about personality were undeveloped and dissolved in the collective social representations. These ideas formed Soviet collective and synthetic image of Orient as predominantly traditional region. Other Soviet translators also fixed low level of training of Arabic officers: the war between Arabic countries and Israel confirmed it because, as Soviet military advisers and translators remembered [Grigorovich, 2008], Arabs tried to run away as soon as they got this opportunity. Soviet military advisers remembered that Arab soldiers [Koval'skii, 2008] were very passive people who were not able to be active and initiative. Soviet military translators [Alekseev, 2008: 91], who served in Africa, remembered that Angolan soldiers were not motivated to fight because they were violently and involuntary mobilized in the army. Soviet military advisers imagined Afghan soldiers in the same categories:

I come to the soldier with a grenade launcher... Grenade was sheathed as it was necessary in a peaceful time. I asked: "How will You shoot? Take off case! Where a hand grenade?". He pulled out a grenade from his pocket. "Where is the fuse?!". "In another pocket" - he answered. I was yelling. The soldier understood that something was wrong, his hands were shaking... he equipped and prepared a hand grenade, but forgot that it was necessary to push grenade before it [Mitiaev, 2008:52].

The similar motifs were presented in texts of Soviet military advisers and translators who served in Africa. Angolan military pilots, as Soviet translators remembered, were not careful with military equipment, including aircrafts. Aleksandr Shul'ga, who in the second half of the 1980s served in Angola, recalled that

Angolan pilot landed, but with the great over-flight, but he did not roll out... he got off plane wet... Angolans were the guys that could easily catapult and they did not think about prices of aircraft (Su-17), when their country had only 8 aircrafts [Shul'ga, 2008:129].

Soviet advisers and translators fixed extremely low level of training of local soldiers and they also attributed Oriental perfidy to Arab and Afghan officers who tried to hide their mistakes and killed Soviet military advisers:

they could shoot as unwitting witnesses of their cowardly or inept actions... “our Afghan friends” killed several advisers and interpreters ... they saw in them witnesses, inspectors, spies... and they had no needs in competent advisors [Polikanov, 2014:54].

Soviet advisers in Egypt as Orientalists perceived local realities. Anatolii Ivanov stated considerable difficulties of Egyptian officers in development of Soviet military hardware:

when I asked some of our specialists in the first months in Egypt about the successes of Egyptian charges, the answer was simple: the development of machines is too difficult because of too low qualification of local pilots and especially technical staff [Ivanov 2011:44].

The Egyptians in the collective political Soviet imagination figured as children or younger brothers who needed permanent control. Soviet translators in Africa faced with similar problems because level of education of Angolan officers was not high, and Soviet military advisers did not accustom to normal for Africa reports where their local wards informed them that “the helicopter clashed with the tank” [Shul’ga, 2008:126]. It was assumed that Soviet military advisers and translators must help and assist local wards in non-European countries to take up achievements of Soviet science and technologies. In fact, this attitude was hidden in soft forms of Orientalism. Oleg Teterin described in his memoirs social realities, Soviet interpreters faced with, for example of Zanzibar where majority of local inhabitants was uneducated and illiterate. In the amr time local population was idealized by Soviet officers who presumed that

the vast majority of Zanzibaris had upbeat mood. There was no hint of the fact that someone is dissatisfied with something ... the city was quiet and safe, we have not heard anything about thieves or bandits. The streets were covered, but not everywhere [Teterin, 2011:126].

Ethiopia was imagined by Soviet citizens in the same way. Ethiopians in Soviet political imagination appeared as extremely lazy people who preferred to enjoy by gifts of nature and almost did not work:

ideal conditions made them too relaxed people on genetic level... no one never bring a bucket of water and pour over the beds. Locals did not understand our women, who poured their beds. What for? They think that it will rain and pour [Vospominaniia... 2012]

Soviet military advisers were forced to put up with these attitudes of the local population and passively accept it because they were not able to affect in any

way on traditions and habits of Ethiopians. Other Soviet military advisers who served in Africa also fixed in their memoirs the dominance of traditional culture among local communities. Aleksei Baranov, who served in the 1980s in Angola, recalled that after the lecture he had an interesting conversation with a local officer:

...it became clear after a long conversation, that they do not even know how Earth revolves around the Sun. I tried to explain it and took the ball and began to shine a flashlight on the ball... I asked them to imagine that this is the Earth and this is the sun... I tried to explain how it rotates around its axis... I was doing it probably for an hour... I explained it and then one of the officers (not a soldier!!) came to me and said: "You, comrade, told the wrong". "Why? What was wrong?" and he answered: "The sun is born every day and every night is dying". That's all. It was a result of 300 years of colonialism. People lived without names... [Baranov, 2011:133]

The similar facts were fixed by other Soviet military interpreters [Iakushev, 2012], which testified the lowest level of education among officers in Arabic armies and local population in general. Vladimir Korol'kov developed typical Orientalist narrative and compared non-Europeans with children:

the woman was staying and she was eating sugar from package. I asked my guard to question her why she is eating sugar? Why? She said that she was eating it for health. They ate any pills in the same way. It was believed that any tablet uniquely adds health... the natives were joying when whites provided them with tablets... they believed that whites took care of their health... I began to practice the local language. I went with a "Polaroid" camera to two local beauties and wondered in local dialect about possibility to take a picture with them. One of them fell into a deep swoon, and the second one run away with a cry. Local guard tried to explain that they saw a white man only twice... and when he come with something incomprehensible and started to speak in their dialect... it was understood by them as a miracle or witchcraft [Korol'kov, 2011:173].

Orient as universal topos of Otherness in Soviet military imagination

Soviet military interpreters simultaneously indicated that Arabs were also too archaic and traditional because local officers almost never missed an opportunity to steal something and get the benefits. Arabs could kidnapped Soviet advisers and translators [Dudchenko, 2015], which was a form of Oriental cunning and craftiness. The Soviet translators also fixed facts of savagery, social and economic backwardness that were not integratable into Soviet system of political and ideological coordinates. Yemen was imagined by

Soviet military advisers in this typical Orientalist paradigm and coordinates system as “fantastic, ancient Muslim Arab country with a backward illiterate population” [Chernyshev, 2007]. The similar sentiments and narratives dominated when they tried to propose their own images of Egypt. Egypt in Soviet political imagination was invented as a topos and a living embodiment of a non-European and Oriental Arabian exoticism. Soviet military interpreter Iurii Gorbunov, who served in Egypt in the early 1960s, recalled his first impressions about the country in the following way:

We looked at the Eastern exoticism: the streets were clogged with passenger cars of all brands, buses, trucks bizarre ... the pyramids of apples were seen by us in the little shops, baskets that stood on the sidewalk were full of oranges and mandarins. The policemen were dressed in black uniforms and white leggings. Everything was mixed up: people, cars, two-wheeled carts with donkeys; fumes, gasoline, the roar of engines, voices of people who spoke in a strange guttural language... Cairo impressed us as hodgepodge of Eastern and European architecture, minarets, lots of little shops, and crowds of people. It seemed that all citizens do not live in their houses, but spent the time in the streets ... The smell of gasoline was mixed with some oriental spices ... I could not believe that I came to this exotic Eastern country [Gorbunov, 2014].

These impressions were typical for post-colonial and Orientalist discourse because East was not perceived as something self-sufficient and independent, Orient was invented from the outside, it was just invented and constructed by Soviet authors who represented Soviet identity which belonged to the greater European cultural canon. Cultural practices and strategies which were used by Soviet military advisers and translators for invention of Egyptian images also was integrated into a greater Orientalist discourse of European cultural tradition that made Soviet and non-Soviet Europeans in Orient closer each other even in situation when they preferred to keep their own ideological purities. Soviet military translators provided Syrians in their imagination with special and unique characteristics, believing that

Syrians were the mixture of civilizations, unsophisticated sages and warriors. They were other Arabs [Akopov, 2007].

Viacheslav Barabulia, who in the second half of the 1980s served in Angola, recalled that the first impressions about non-European world were shocking because he “could not imagine that in the world there are cities where only negros and mulattos lived” [Barabulia, 2009:203]. Other Soviet advisers and translators idealized non-Europe in a negative context. Gennadii Sergienko expressed his impressions about presence and service in Angola succinctly: “it was stuffy and dirty... I felt a smell of the ocean, which I had never seen” [Sergienko, 2011:46]. Vadim Sagachko recalled that Angola “hit us by the outskirts of terrible poverty, waste and garbage in the streets, a lot of battered

cars of various brands, which were scurrying throughout the streets and it was seemed that drivers were driving without any rules" [Sagachko, 2008:204]. These social realities, which formed basis of culture in non-European societies, were fixed by Soviet advisers and translators as normal and natural features of Orient. Soviet advisers also imagined Orient as a territory that was designed for their moral conquest. The image of "red earth" become common place in the memories of Soviet advisers and translators in Angola and transformed in universal topos, which symbolized European peculiarities. The similar motifs also prevailed in the memories of other Soviet military advisers. Petr Ivanovskii remembered that

we saw a terrible picture: the red African soil and the city of Luanda, plastered on the perimeter of makeshift shacks that were called slums [Ivanovskii 2008:133].

Dmitrii Strel'tsov, who served in Angola in the late 1980s, recalled that

the streets were gray, papers were flying around houses which were destroyed or were not completed... huts neighboured with beautiful architecture of the old town.... We got mixed impressions ... red earth struck us ... and it was impossible to confuse its scent with something more... it remains forever [Strel'tsov, 2008:108].

Non-Europe and non-West shocked the Soviet military advisers, interpreters and experts in the countries they worked in. The non-West in Soviet political imagination was orientalized and imagined as a wild archaic world:

the first impressions we got after arrival in the country were a red earth and the incredible smell of this earth... it pursued everywhere. I've seen a lot of in my life, but something like this was not seen or felt anywhere else... and it was impossible to adopt to this smell... we had the only salvation because we lived coffee province and aroma of blooming coffee slightly drowned this odor for a few months [Adohina, 2009:226].

These strategies in inventions and descriptions of Orient, formation of its collective imag were actively used for actualization of mental and intellectual distance between East and West in sensual and emotional contexts. Russian literature critic Araks Pashaian presumes that

Orientalism did not define East geographically as East, but it determined East in cultural sense as Orient. The colonization of the East by Europeans meant not only economic possession, but its comprehension. The East was Other for the West, different from its own world. East was a place that could be described and studied, inhabited

and trained... it was possible simultaneously to manage Orient and protect from it. Orientalism, in fact, was Western method to establish dominance over the East [Pashaian, 2006].

Soviet military advisers and translators who worked and served in Arabic and African countries were just Orientalists of this sort. The actual and real geographies were less important for them than other invented collective and mental images of Africa or Arabic countries as territories which formed and represented Orient in their identities. The representatives of Soviet political culture were too indoctrinized and they provided Orient with qualities and characteristics, which were imagined and invented by them as unique and inimitable. Soviet military advisers and interpreters in their attempts to construct Orient went the ways that a few decades earlier were passed by British and French Orientalists. Orient in Soviet political imagination appeared as an extremely dangerous world, which was full with numerous threats and dangers. These ideas which dominated in Soviet mass political culture assisted to rise of understandings among Soviet advisers and translators, that Orient is territory that should be changed. Soviet intellectuals presumed that formal social and archaic structures of Orient could be replaced by formally new and more advanced institutions and relationships. Orient was imagined by Soviet translators as absolute and collective Other in the context of its backwardness and archaichness. For example, Anatolii Ivanov recalled in his memoirs landing of the first Soviet aircraft in Yemen. Anatolii Ivanov remembered that

instead of the advertised by Egyptian colleagues international airport, we saw a dirty lane, hard-packed asphalt covered with a layer of the used plastic bags and garbage... the goats were roaming on runway in searching of food [Ivanov, 2011:66].

Soviet military interpreters, who worked and served in Egypt, attributed typically Orientalist characteristics and attributes to the country, including tendency of authoritarianism and the inability to develop democratic norms. Developing these narratives Soviet advisers and translators in their memoirs, actualized typically Orientalist narratives and cultivated idea about primordial Arabic cunning. The collective experiences of Soviet military specialists had mostly Oriental character. Anatolii Ivanov [Ivanov, 2011:29] pointed out that Egyptian authorities themselves acted as postcolonial because they tried to use colonial quarter of the city as an attractive façade. Soviet translators remembered that Arabic authorities did not care about development and improvement of Arabic parts of cities.

Soviet military Orientalism as one more white invention of the East

Soviet advisers as Western orientalists fixed facts of backwardness and archaichness of collective, imagined and invented by them non-West. They

promoted development of Orientalist collective discourse in political imagination. Soviet officials in Oriental and Eastern states attempted to map locals in collective Orientalist cartography and locate them in informal social and cultural hierarchies. Soviet advisers and translators compared themselves with Western pioneers in Africa who successfully colonized it. This perception generally belonged to the greater Orientalist discourse and based on perception of Orient as an amorphous landspace that could not understand, invent and imagine itself without European intellectual impact. Soviet military advisers and translators in non-European states and local population of Orient had diametrically different and opposite identities which were based on different backgrounds. Soviet advisers and translators were different from their local wards because they could read, write, and had a higher (linguistic or military) education. The different social and religious groups among the population in Oriental countries, they contacted with, as a rule, were illiterate, the locals did not know how to read and write. Quran, the main and central text of Muslims, also was known for the great part of them only in citations which were learned by heart from their mullahs. Alexander Kamenev [Kamenev, 2012; Kamenev, 2006], who served in the 1980s in Afghanistan in the position of a military interpreter, fixed on his memoirs facts that local residents respected translators because they could know Pashto better than Pashtuns. Anatolii Ivanov recorded other classic features and characteristics of Orient and wrote about the laziness of Egyptian officers, their tendency to ignore ideas and advices of Soviet military advisers, that assisted to rise of negative attitudes among Soviet officers to their colleagues who were not able to fight:

in the first hours of the Six-Day War in the 1967 they lost on the ground about 270 aircrafts, 60 Egyptian aircrafts were lost in dogfights, 9 airports were destroyed, several radio stations and air defense positions with air defense missile systems, bridges through the Suez Canal also were lost by them [Ivanov 2011, 34].

Soviet military interpreters and advisers acted in Egypt as Orientalists and actually retained the style and spirit of British Orientalists because local cultural traditions were deliberately ignored by Soviet advisers and translators. They had much in common with British colonizers who dominated in this region some decades earlier: British tried to create conditions that were close to English realities, Soviet military advisers and translators brought relations which were characteristic for Soviet Union, but they, unlike the British, used them solely for internal use and did not try to replace local traditions by them. The transplantation of Soviet political and ideological relations and everyday life attitudes for Soviet military advisers, interpreters and their families' members had several dimensions. Soviet advisers and translators in Asia, Africa and the East, as in the USSR, were under strict ideological control of Soviet authorities. Soviet passports were confiscated by agents of Soviet special services immediately after arrival of Soviet military advisers and interpreters in the international airport of the country, they worked in. For example, family members of military translators remembered that

our passports were taken at the airport, immediately after completion of all formalities: a special person from the personnel of chief military adviser stood at the exit and put them into his “diplomat”. The next time I saw my passport just before the departure in the Union in the same airport half years later. All our military advisers, experts, translators and members of their families were in Ethiopia, but they had no documents [Vospominaniia ... 2012].

Some Arab states, Soviet military advisers and translators were invited to, treated to communist ideology very carefully: in Syria, as some military advisers remembered,

the work of our party and Komsomol organizations was not organized, so they existed under formal masks as trade unions and sports organizations... we continued ideological activities and promoted our Soviet moral values and way of life [Hramov, 2012].

Soviet orientalism in this context had much in common with Western Orientalism, they only had ideological different foundations and other forms of legitimization among local Oriental elites. Soviet military advisers and translators in some African countries were not imagined as a “Soviet”, because local population in the context of post-colonial inertia preferred to call them “whites”, and Soviet military advisers and translators in spite of ideological backgrounds and subtexts of their activities in the East were invented as onemore European group. Soviet translators themselves recognized that local people did not believe them, because

we have terribly far from Egyptian people, from local bourgeoisie and the middle class, from Egyptian intelligentsia and even the officers. We were foreigners, atheists, and infidels for Egyptians. Local authorities were afraid of Soviet people... If the employees of foreign companies in Egypt were able to communicate with local people, taught them English, married Arab women, it was categorically forbidden for Soviet people [Gorbunov, 2014].

Soviet Orientalism in this context was too different from its Western forms and versions: Soviet Orientalists did not try to colonize Orient physically, the experience on their ideological opponents testified that it was unreal and impossible. Soviet Orientlists were inspired by political reasons and they presumed that ideologization of Orient, its integration in Soviet ideological canon or ideologically marked imagined geography will be more successful and productive than colonial initiatives of Western countries. Soviet Orientalists tried to colonize Orient not physically, but mostly mentally and intellectually. Mihail

Margelov, who served in Angola in the late 1980s, stated that locals when they saw the whites were guided by various omens and superstitions:

it was memorable when I met an old gray-haired black man... he was walking on the track, when I come closer... he got off from track and I beat my shadow. He was too old man, who was brought up when colonizers ruled [Margelov, 2009, 249].

Soviet military advisers and translators, as Western Orientalists, tended to capture different features of non-Westerners imagined and invented by them as predominantly traditional and archaic. Soviet military advisers and translators, who served in Angola, fixed various forms of relations between blacks and whites. The spectrum of these relationships ranged from indifference and apathy to distrust and hostility. Military translator Sergei Baiagin recalled that

good relations were established with the commander of the air base. It was almost white. Then he was sent in another base and replaced by other one who was a typical black... We noticed that Angolan people themselves attituded with suspicion and hostility to mulatoes. The word "nigger" was not actively used, they preferred the word "dark" [Baiagin 2011:62].

The residents of non-Western countries, where Soviet military advisers and interpreters worked, tended to see them as whites, and anti-colonial and post-colonial stereotypes and collective representations were extended to them by locals. Oleg Teterin, who in the 1960s worked in Zanzibar, recalled:

my maneuvers was not unnoticed, some people began to turn around in my direction... I was a bad actor. When I was coming closer, I heard: "Mzungu anakaribia" ("White is closer")... one of Zanzibar officers who was standing next to Chinese interpreter, said it softly and they all stopped to talk... this phrase – "White is closer" – impressed me. It turned out that for Zanzibaris I was not Russian (mrusi) or soviet (msoviet), for them we still were "whites"! I have no doubt that we were "wazungu" ("whites") [Teterin, 2011:135]

The activities of Soviet translators and advisors in non-European states were perceived differently and it is impossible to exclude that local population perceived and understood them in the post-colonial context as another or just one more type of white colonizers with formally ideological and political slogans which radically varied Soviet representatives from their British predecessors. Formally, Soviet military advisers and interpreters in Eastern countries were not colonizers, but their behavior, fixed in the memories of military translator Aleksandr Karelin [Karelin, 2010], and assisted to rise of anti-Soviet sentiments among local population because it imagined Soviet advisers and interpreters as another type of white colonizers who replaced British or French ones.

Preliminary conclusions: Soviet military Orientalism

Soviet military Orientalism formed and proposed various versions and perceptions of Orient. Military Orientalism in its Soviet form actualized collective social, economic and political views of Europeans on non-European world including Eastern, Asian, and African countries. Soviet military Orientalism belonged to the number of discourses and intellectual practices generated and developed in context of ideas based on mental fragmentation of the world in the context of imagined categories localized in definitions of "Otherness". Soviet Orientalism developed as sum of invented traditions that actualized different aspects of Soviet perception of Orient. Soviet, American, and Western European Orientalisms had a much in common because Soviet and American intellectuals tried to transform Orient. The attempts to imagine and invent Orient preceded particular political and economic transformations of the East. Soviet military advisers, translators, and interpreters who imagined and invented their own Orients were among ideological inspirers of these transformations. The numerous Soviet attempts of comprehension and understanding of East actually reduced to its invention. Soviet military advisers and interpreters were simultaneously theorists and opponents of Orientalism.

Soviet military Orientalists in their texts actually imagined and invented Orient. They attributed to Orient those qualities which were invented by them as the most correct for description of the region that was extremely far from standards and values they lived in. Soviet military advisers and interpreters during their active service in the East actually actualized their Soviet identity. Soviet identity in Oriental context was in fact a form of Western identity because Soviet military advisers and translators were armed with Soviet communist ideology based on Marxism, but historically their Marxism was borrowed by Soviet political ideologists from European political context. Soviet military orientalists believed that the Soviet Union is a universal model for Eastern societies, but they were extremely cautious and careful in their attempts to attach the East to the Soviet achievements. On the one hand, Soviet advisers can truly empathize with their counterparts in the countries they work in.

Soviet military advisers and translators could not have special Oriental educational. Soviet military interpreters held minor officers positions and they were also dependent from formal military hierarchy. These factors significantly influenced on development of their collective representations about Orient and determined factors including indoctrination, mistrust, and tendency to construct Oriental images in binar "black" and "white" ideologically calibrated coordinates system. Soviet military Orientalism was ideologically "orthodox" and politically "correct" form of orientalism. On the other hand, they condemned attempts of western, predominantly American, intervention in internal and external affairs of Oriental countries. This form of Orientalism was imagined as ideologically wrong version of Western collective representations about East. Soviet military Orientalists being practicing Orientalists combined invention Orient with attempts of their modernization, but despite this formally progressive character of Soviet orientalism it was not able propose and develop authentic alternative

for Orient. Soviet military Orientalism in this context was just one more European attempt to invent Orient among similar intellectual tactics and strategies of Western Orientalists who psychologically lost their positions in the region some decades earlier than their Soviet counterparts.

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ORIENTALIZED BYZANTIUM IN SLAVIC IMAGINATIONS

Byzantium in general, a history of Byzantium, Byzantine historical, cultural and political legacy in particular were interesting for intellectuals in different regions including Balkans and Eastern Europe, because countries which formed local landscapes are imagined and invented as collective cultural, historical and political heirs of Byzantium. The author in this section will attempt to analyze tactics and strategies of imagination and invention of Byzantine Empires' history in Occidentalist or Orientalist coordinate system in context of Balkans and Eastern European historiographies. It is very tempting to analyze some of historiographical ideas of Byzantine studies in the context Orientalism.

The author believes that Byzantinism can be compared with Orientalism in the following context: Byzantium as an object of academic studies was not discovered by Greeks, but European intellectuals, including Eastern European historians, invented and imagine Byzantium in its historical and cultural dimensions. Russian historian Sergei Ivanov believes that "Byzantium is not separated by stone wall from other Humanities" [Ivanov, 2014]. The relationships between Byzantine Studies and Orientalism, as collective academic ideas and representations about non-European world, are a completely natural. Russian historian Vladimir Beneshevich [Beneshevich, 1999], who tried to systematize a history of Byzantine studies and actively used texts of Western authors, actualized Western origins and foundations of systematic studies of Byzantium. The Byzantine Empire in this context, as the Orient, was invented by Western intellectuals and mapped by them in imagined Oriental cultural geography.

The basic postulates of Orientalism are well-known, but they can be also transferred and transplanted into context of Byzantine studies. The ideas and statements proposed and developed by supporters of Byzantine myth in its negative sense genetically have a much in common with Orientalism. This negative Byzantiumness is based on the following statements: Byzantine Empire was very stable and conservative, unique, exotic and mysterious country, very dangerous state, where local and incompatible with European values and principles ideas and institutions dominated. Byzantiumness or Byzantiumism in this context can be imagined as a special or even private case of Orientalism.

This book chapter will not be an attempt to write a history of Byzantine Studies in Russia or in Balkan regions' historiographies. A history of Byzantine Studies has secondary interest for the author because it, on the one hand, is a well studied [Medvedev, 1997; Medvedev, 2000; Medvedev, 2002; Medvedev, 2003; Medvedev, 2006], and, on the other hand, the author is interested only in those pages and moments of Byzantine studies history, which actualize problems of Orientalization, imagination and invention of Byzantium in Orientalist coordinate system. Byzantine Studies in this context can be imagined as one of numerous invented traditions. In the 20th century Byzantine

studies were regognized as extremely honourable field of Himanited and got their specialized institutes, journals and transformed in interdisciplinary intellectual phenomenon which actualized its common features with Orientalism.

The relationships and attitudes of intellectuals in Balkan and Eastern European region to Byzantium and Greece, as their direct ethnical heirs or heirs of its historical enemies, were extremely controversial. The Balkan nations formed as modern political nations and imagined communities in context of cultural, linguistic and political confrontations with re-established Greek state because Greek intellectuals were ethnic Greek nationalists who deny right of Slavic nations to independent political existence and development of their own nation or nationalizing states. Analyzing mechanisms, tactics and strategies of formation and development of Byzantine images in different national historical memories, it is necessary to remember that the collective representation of intellectuals, who wrote about Byzantium, when Byzantine studies did their first steps, were too amorphous and unclear. Russian philologist Viktor Zhivov believed that

interfering in a literature of the 19th century with a negative evaluation of Byzantine influence, we must remember that the writers of this period badly imagined Byzantium. The main their source was Edward Gibbon's book where he described Byzantine culture in a very negative way. Gibbon was an intelligent man, a great scientist, but he had his own ideas about Byzantium: depraved morals and excessive religiosity [Zhivov, 2013].

In the 20th century intellectuals were not actively experiencing and thinking about morality and faith, they believed that problems of nationalism and loyalty were more important. Therefore, political component was actualized in Byzantine Studies. American historian Dmitry Obolensky [Obolensky, 1971; Obolenskii, 1998] emphasized that historians, involved in Byzantine studies, were under great influence of their state nationalisms and inevitably actualize nationalist myths and stereotypes in their texts about Byzantine Empire. Bulgarian intellectuals were among the first who started to fight against Greek hegemony and adventurous attempts of Greek political elites to extend Greek political, cultural and linguistic influence and transform Balkans into a zone of exceptional Greek influence and domination. Macedonian intellectuals, later than their Bulgarian colleagues, joined to anti-Greek historiographical protests because they were contemporaries of anti-Slavic Greek hysteria and attempts of forced assimilation of non-Greek population in Greece. Unique national schools of Byzantine historical and cultural studies developed in Balkan region, where Bulgarian historians played the leading role. Their works and achievements unfortunately are practically unknown in Russian historiography [Ivanov, 2012: 6 – 29] where national historiographical schools are ignored and a history of Byzantine studies is imagined as a history of great national historiographies.

Russian intellectuals in the 19th and the 20th centuries perceived Byzantium in a different coordinate system, because they fancied and imagined themselves as historical and political heirs of Byzantine Empire. The general

attitudes of Balkan, Eastern European and partly Russian intellectuals to Byzantine Empire were too different, and moderate and academic voices in the choir enthusiastic fans of Byzantiumness were not rare. Bulgarian, Serbian and Russian historians in the 20th and the 21st centuries were able to offer academic and moderate version of Byzantine history. These synthetic versions of its history, on the one hand, included problems of political, social, economic and cultural history because most of the texts of Serbian, Bulgarian and Russian historians belong to traditional historiographical canon based on positivist principles and collective preferences to write a history as predominantly eventual or social and economic history. These texts form the body of corpus of academic works which belong to normative historiography. Its representatives were inclined to idealize and sanitize history of Byzantine Empire and its relations with neighboring Slavic states.

The historians who belonged to this historiographical trend [Skrzhinskaia, 2001] preferred to gloss over and ignore attempts of Byzantium to integrate and incorporate into its sphere of influence of Slavic states. These theoretical approaches dominated in historiography focused on a history of relations between Byzantium and Slavs. Soviet historians [Kazhdan, Litavrin, 1998; Litavrin, 1999] tried to imagine and invent a history of Slavic and Byzantine relations as exclusively eventual history or a history of mutual cultural influences and contacts. A history of gradual Orientalization of Slavs by Byzantium was not interesting for Soviet historians who inertially developed positive paradigm and perceived history as primarily and exclusively eventual. Other historians, including Dmitry Obolensky [Obolensky, 1971; Obolenskii, 1998], tried to disavow the expansionist aspirations of Byzantine Empire, and wrote about Byzantine “Commonwealth of Nations” despite the fact that it existed mostly in his imagination as the invented historiographical tradition.

Nikodim Kondakov was among the ideological inspirers and precursors of the pro-Byzantine historiographical tradition based on mythologization, indoctrination of Byzantine cultural and political heritage, and also ignorance of its Orientalization. In the 1899 Nikodim Kondakov in one of his lectures argued that

ancient Russia and Georgia were the most vital transplants of Byzantine art that developed in the context of impact of the East [Kondakov, 1899].

The philosopher Konstantin Leont'ev went further than other fans of idealization of Byzantine Empire, and he began to express ideas which were more common for texts of Greek nationalists. Konstantin Leont'ev wrote:

What is Byzantinism? Byzantium is primarily a special kind of education or culture with its own distinctive features ... Slavism... is a sphinx, an enigma. The abstract idea of Byzantium is very clear and understandable. This general idea is composed of several private religious, national, moral, philosophical and artistic ideas. We are not able to find something like this in pan-Slavism. Imagining pan-Slavism... we have only some amorphous,

spontaneous, disorganized presentations ... Byzantinism means autocracy of State... it means Christianity with certain features that distinguish it from Western churches, heresies and schisms... [Leont'ev, 1876].

These viewpoints arisen and emerged only in Russian Empire, which failed in attempts to transform itself into a Nation-State. The Balkan intellectuals who lived in their Nation-States or actively invent their Nation-State directly neighboured, bordered and contacted with Greek world as heir of Byzantium. They were not inclined to accept Byzantium in positive way. Konstantin Leont'ev [Leont'ev, 1996; Leont'ev, 1873; Leont'ev, 1878], when the acute Bulgarian-Greek polemic was extremely severe, took a pro-Greek position and mocked in his articles on Bulgarian attempts to confront with Greek cultural and religious influences.

The centuries-old experience of historical contacts with Greeks taught Bulgarians to be afraid and accept Greek narratives and collective images as crucial for development of Bulgarian national identity. Bulgarian nationalists developed phobia of Hellenization as an attempt of Greeks to assimilate Slavs, including Bulgarians. Nationalist myths and narratives in texts of some Bulgarian authors had decisive importance in the formation of Byzantine images in Bulgarian historical memory. This perception was based, as Petar Mutaftchiev thought, on excessive Eurocentrism and ignorance of European historical backwardness and underdevelopment in comparison with Orient. Petar Mutaftchiev tried to integrate Byzantium into context of European history of Middle Ages, but he pointed out that it degraded and fallen in a result of East Asian onslaught.

This attitude towards Byzantium was very controversial in Bulgarian intellectual context because some intellectuals preferred to Orientalize Byzantine history. Bulgarian intellectuals did not miss any convenient opportunity to express its disagreements and present their historical claims to Greek world. Greeks were accused in Orientalization of Balkans. Naiden Sheitanov wrote about "vizantiishchina" or Byzantineness as an extremely negative factor in Bulgarian history, which warped and distorted development of Bulgarian identity, including sexual, because Greek Church was interested in "pharisaic denial of sexual folklore", but Bulgarian were able to sane it as their "unofficial Balkan soul" did not see any reprehensible in it [Sheitanov, 1932]. Bulgarian literature idealized West and also did a lot for formation and promotion of images of Others. The concepts of Otherness in Bulgarian identity actualized images of Orient. The best candidates for status of Orient and historic opponents and enemies were not neighboring Serbia and Romania [Mishkova, 2001], but Ottoman Empire and Greece [Velkova, 2000]. The negative attitudes of Greeks were stimulated by historical memory and activities of Bulgarian intellectuals who developed nationalistic discourse. Petko Slaveikov for example proposed very negative and unattractive images of Greeks:

цар Василий Византиец,
царя-българоубиец...

де кого сварят, убиват, градове палят и грабят,
а села пленят и харат [Slaveikov, 1978: 28]

The negative attitudes to Greece in Bulgaria were actualized during the First World War [Dimitrov, 2000; Rusev 1935] when Bulgarian intellectuals mentally tried to Orientalize neighboring Orthodox country [Mitov, 1930; Musakov, 1921; Milev, 1927 Konev, 2001]. Stefan Bobchev in the 1918 read presented report with extremely revealing title "Orientalization of Byzantium and its influence on Southern Slavs" [Bobchev 1921]. Stefan Bobchev was not the first Bulgarian intellectual who developed image of Byzantine Empire as Oriental country. Liuben Karavelov, one of the leading figures in Bulgarian nationalist movement, wrote about the "Turkish-Byzantine civilization" [Chernokozhev, 2002]. The main differences between East and West were localized by Bulgarian intellectuals in terms of ethnicity and religiousity of Christian and Islamic identities. Analyzing Byzantium factor in a history of Serbia and Russia, Petar Mutaфchiev [Mutaфchiev 1931, Mutaфchiev 1941] presumed that Greek influence was form of Orientalization and assimilation of non-Greek groups.

Byzantium, as Petar Mutaфchiev proposed, that Balkan Slavs could be only opponents of Byzantium "hostile culture". The reaction against Byzantiumness was imagined by Bulgarian historians as a positive phenomenon and form of Slavic national protection. Bulgarian historians presumed that Slavic struggle against Byzantium was an attempt to save European identity and stop processes of Orientalization, gradual degradation to Orient, and transformation in Asia. Historical Byzantine heritage was imagined by Bulgarian intellectuals as a major obstacle to cultural and mental Europeanization of Bulgarian historical and political experience. The period of Ottoman rule also was invented by Bulgarian intellectuals as extremely negative, and it was perceived as a time of "racial Babylon on the Balkan Peninsula" [Sheitanov 1933]. The negative images of Orient as Asia in Bulgarian historical imagination were invented in context of this collective "Babylon". The attempts to overcome these forms of Byzantine and Ottoman heritage in Bulgarian identity were expressed in de-Orientalization and anti-Ottoman narratives in Bulgarian national historiography. Bulgarian historians tried to de-Orientalize history of Balkan region and proved inevitable and organic strangeness of Turkish ethnic elements as Eastern and Asian in Bulgaria. Bulgarian intellectuals denied Byzantineness and Ottomanness imagined by them as universal alternatives to collective Occident.

The perception of Byzantium in texts of Konstantin Leont'ev led to results, which Konstantin Leont'ev as a Russian nationalist, was not able to imagine. The radical and unrestrained idealization of Byzantium, attempts to actualize its mystery, uniqueness, stability, conservatism assisted to formation of its negative image. These features of Byzantinism were imagined as factors that actualized Oriental character of Byzantine Empire and put it in one line with Eastern countries. Contemporary Russian historians, including Sergei Ivanov, who believes that "Byzantine component was very weak" [Ivanov, 2009] in Eastern Europe, tried to radically revise perception of Byzantium, assuming that degree of Byzantine influence in Eastern Europe and Balkans were

exaggerated and imagined by later admirers and popularizers of Byzantine myth.

Other Russian intellectuals, including Aleksandr Shmeman and Viktor Zhivov also believed that Byzantine influence was exaggerated. Viktor Zhivov presumed that

it is not serious to talk about Byzantine bureaucracy or despotism in Russia ... Byzantium was the heir of the Roman Empire, it was an organized state with a very skilful and professional class of bureaucrats ... Kievan Rus learned nothing of the kind ... it did not take imperial idea. The rite of enthronement appeared in Russia much later ... the idea of empire arose in the context of the political ideology of Moscow as the Third Rome. It was absolutely unusual for Kievan Rus... nothing like Byzantine bureaucracy never existed in Kiev and Moscow [Zhivov, 2013].

Aleksandr Shmeman believed that

Christian Byzantium was the heir of the richest and deepest Greek culture. Kievan Rus did not have cultural heritage [Shmeman, 2015].

Some authors were able to avoid nationalist drift in Byzantine studies and tried to actualize communication between Byzantine Studies and Oriental Studies. Vasilii Regel', one of the founders of "Vizantiiskii vremennik" journal, explaining and motivating importance and necessity of its publication, in the 1893, actualized direct links between Oriental and Byzantine historical studies:

the desire to maintain our historical links with East requires us to care about the scientific studies of the fate of Orient in its spiritual, moral, historical, political and cultural dimensions [Regel', 1893].

Other Russian historians, including Aleksandr Vasil'ev [Vasil'ev, 1998, 1: 142 – 143], believed, that Byzantine political elites, which in the early period of Byzantine history did not allow penetration of Goths into territory of the empire, tried to protect the empire, but in fact promoted and assisted to its cultural and ethnic exclusion, assimilation of non-Greek population, that led to crisis of empire and its Orientalization. Other factors also assisted to Orientalization of Byzantine Empire. These factors were mentioned by Aleksandr Vasil'ev in his "History of Byzantine Empire", but he did not perceive them as incentives of Orientalization, analyzing them predominantly in eventual context.

Aleksandr Vasil'ev believed that Byzantine Empire was not united in cultural and linguistic dimensions, and levels of its territories Hellenization were very different [Vasil'ev 1998: 146 – 147]. Iulian Kulakovskii [Kulakovskii, 1, 2003: 61 – 63] actualized Oriental features and elements in a history of Byzantine Empire. The policy of rapprochement with Turks in the 6th century as potential allies in war against Persia, the recurrent attacks and raids of the

Arabs, various relationships and contacts with Persians and Arabs [Vasil'ev, 1998: 238 – 239; Kulakovskii, 1, 2003: 404 – 410; Kulakovskii, 2, 2003: 51 - 60, 112 - 124, 154 - 169], gradual loss of territories that were occupied by Eastern neighbours [Kulakovskii, 3, 2004: 34 – 40] also assisted to Orientalization of Empire, which was imagined by Russian historians in the first decades of the 20th century as a state which accepted Orient as main political goal and distanced from Western world. Russian historians, including Iulian Kulakovskii and Aleksandr Vasil'ev, did not develop narratives about Orientalization of the Empire, but they preferred to list numerous historical facts which assisted to the rupture of the Empire from West and its drift to Orient. Some regions of the Empire were not Hellenized and populations continued to speak languages of pre-Greek period, and local cultures were mostly Oriental.

These factors predetermined the path of social, economic and cultural developments in direction of Orientalization. Iulian Kulakovskii in his "History of Byzantium" actualized role of Eastern factor in a history of the Empire, considering that in Byzantine Empire

racial and national differences survived... Egypt, Syria and Armenia felt themselves as separate nationalities... tribal characteristics and local languages survived in Asia Minor [Kulakovskii, 1, 2003: 59].

The similar sentiments were expressed by Fiodor Uspenskii in his multi-volume "History of Byzantine Empire", where he believed that the defeat of Byzantine Empire was historically predetermined because the Eastern provinces of Roman Empire, where territorial nucleus for Byzantine Empire was formed, were romanized less than Western provinces. Fiodor Uspenskii believed that

East pushed local features, distinctive culture, language, law, national characteristics against Romanization [Uspenskii, 1996:15].

The Byzantine Empire in this context was imagined as a small version of Asia populated by numerous tribes and this understanding assisted to development of narratives about gradual Orientalization of Byzantine Empire. Fiodor Uspensky [Uspenskii, 1996: 512] believed that Arabs were among tribe that had the greatest political influence on Byzantium. Aleksandr Vasil'ev in his "History of Byzantine Empire" actualized problems of the early history of Arabs and their Islamisation, but in this context he acted as a faithful Orientalist. The Arabs were imagined as archaic and savage nation with "primitive religious beliefs" [Vasil'ev, 1998:277].

In this context, academic language, Aleksandr Vasil'ev used for actualization of Arabic narratives in his text, had Orientalist character. The editor of Russian reissue re-publication of his work in the 1998 was forced to comment anti-Arab passages in the following way:

Aleksandr Vasil'ev when he was writing these pages used works of the first two decades of the twentieth century, but over times the

views on Arabian culture has changed and we have no reason to see it as primitive and underdeveloped [Vasil'ev 1998: 278].

Aleksandr Vasil'ev in the second and third volumes of "History of Byzantine Empire" [Vasil'ev, 2000] presented a synthetic form of the great narrative and actually tried to integrate a history of Byzantine Empire in a history of Western Europe. Aleksandr Vasil'ev, on the one hand, analyzed problems of political and cultural history of Byzantine Empire and tried to find elements of the Renaissance developments in Byzantine historic process and integrate it European historical and cultural context.

On the other hand, Aleksandr Vasil'ev unfortunately ignored processes of Orientalization, minimizing them to clean and extremely eventual Byzantine-Turkish relations and conquest of Byzantium by Turks. The proponents of this approach in their positivist attempts of Byzantine Empire's history writing preferred to write and in fact wrote predominantly eventual, political and partly social and economic history of the Empire. They also came close to attempts of theoretical understanding of Byzantinism phenomenon in context of relations between Occident and Orient. Fiodor Uspenskii [Uspenskii, 1996: 34 – 35], for example, wrote about historical and cultural role of Byzantinism, but did not define it strictly, but predominantly analyzed in political, social and economic contexts. Unfortunately, this synthetic line and attempts to trace shapes and dimensions of Orientalization in a history of Byzantine Empire in the historiography of the 20th century were among marginal. General studies and specialized journals, including "Vizantiiskii vremennik" in Russia and the USSR cultivated Byzantine myth in context of perception of Byzantium as a particular civilization.

The attempts to integrate its history in the global historical context also were among attempts to propose positive and ideologically loyal and correct forms of Byzantine myth in historiographical imagination. The methodological and theoretical positions and views of Nikodim Kondakov and his successors assisted to Orientalization of European historical process and contexts because they transformed a history of Slavs and other nations, including Georgians, in a history of primitive mechanic transplantation of Byzantine cultural achievements, but social, political, cultural and economic processes of medieval Byzantium were not similar to the same processes in Western and Slavic Europe and peripheries European regions also. Therefore, Byzantine influence was in fact a form and method of Orientalization of non-Greek world. Dmitry Obolensky idealistically identified Byzantium as a "supranational Orthodox Commonwealth" or "supranational community of Christian states" [Obolenskii, 1998: 263, 294]. Some historians tried to rehabilitate and even legitimize attempts of Hellenization of Slavs in Byzantine Empire and determined these actions as "integration of foreigners" [Ivanov, 1999: 48 – 80] or the inevitable logic of history [Obolenskii, 1998: 222 – 223], arguing that assimilation was among system buckles of Byzantine Commonwealth.

The representatives of Byzantine identity in Balkans and Eastern Europe were idealized by Dmitry Obolensky [Obolensky, 1988, Obolenskii, 1998], who preferred to ignore the negative forms of Byzantine political and cultural influences that assisted to crisis and destruction of local proto-national identities

and led to Orientalization of social, political, and economic relations that was an inevitable consequence of Byzantine expansion and penetration in the region. Dmitry Obolensky [Obolensky, 1998: 223 – 224] believed that Byzantine conquest of Bulgaria had a positive impact on Bulgarians and complained that Byzantine Empire did not have time to complete assimilation of Bulgarian population. This approach was among central elements of theoretical approach of Dmitry Obolensky who preferred to idealize Byzantine Empire, but it has marginal character for national Balkan historiographies with their strong nationalist sentiments. A history of Byzantium was reduced to a purely eventual history by proponents of Byzantine myth in its positive version, but Byzantine historical studies actualized the inevitable problems of cultural and historical affiliation of Byzantium, its relations with Occident and Orient.

George (Georgii) Vernadsky (Vernadskii) tried to propose a compromise understanding of Byzantium as a mediator between traditions of East and West:

Byzantium was the heir of the ancient civilization that assimilated the art of nomads in other European countries and brought it in the West... the art of Byzantium was the basis for the further development of medieval art in Europe and the Middle East [Vernadskii 1926/2002: 321].

This attempt was not very successful and later historians preferred and continued to cultivate Byzantium myth or develop opposite anti-Byzantium ideas and sentiments in their national historiography they belonged to. These strategies and intellectual manipulations with Byzantine historical heritage assisted to Orientalization of Byzantium in national historical memories and professional historiographical imaginations.

The strategies of imagination and invention of Byzantine history in the second half of the 20th century were actually attempts to understand and map academic discourse in context of Occidentalization or in shadow of an inevitable process of decline, crisis, degradation and Orientalization of Byzantine Empire, which lost its post-ancient cultural and political bases and degraded to Orientalizing unstable territory, but some Western historians [Obolensky, 1998] chose to ignore trends of Orientalization in Byzantine Empire and idealized its history in their equivocal attempts to replace a history of the empire by a history of imagined “commonwealth of nations”. Soviet and European historians in the second half of the 20th century believed that medieval Byzantium and West had different cultural, historical, political and social backgrounds. For example, Alexander Kazhdan [Kazhdan, 2000: 68 - 69, 72] and Kseniia Hvostova [Hvostova, 2009] periodically compared historical, social and political experience of Western world and Byzantine Empire.

Aleksandr Kazhdan presumed that “Byzantines and their European contemporaries understood mutual differences” [Kazhdan, 2000: 11], but he also insists that all attempts to limit differences by peculiarities in religion, social and economic institutions will be primitivization and simplification. Other authors, including Aleksandr Vasil’ev [Vasil’ev, 1900, Vasil’ev, 1902, Vasil’ev, 1899] actualized problems of relationship between Byzantine Empire and Muslim East, but they did not seek to give a detailed outline of a history of

degradation and Orientalization of Byzantium, and relations between Arabs and Byzantines were perceived as part of a political, mostly eventual history of Byzantium. Aleksandr Kazhdan in the 1992 [Kazhdan, 1992: 35 – 50] emphasized that during Soviet era historians unwittingly felt parallels between the USSR and Byzantine Empire. This perception of Byzantium facilitated gradual mental Orientalization of Byzantium, its transformation into a medieval Soviet Union when the Soviet Union was imagined as a form of modern Byzantium. Problems of Byzantium in Eastern or Western systems of coordinates were very controversial and debatable.

It is noteworthy that the historiographical aspects of this cultural problem become the object of ideological and political manipulations and propaganda campaigns in Soviet period. Soviet Byzantine studies were personified by loyal and extremely official Zinaida Udal'tsova [Udal'tsova 1969: 253 – 271] who tried to synthesize achievements of Soviet historians in the historiographical reviews, which formed her book "Soviet Byzantine studies for 50 years", published in the 1969. The attempts to Occidentalize former Byzantine political space are repeatedly fixed in historiography, but they were not very successful: for historians of the late 19th and early 20th centuries attempts of Byzantine elites to establish and develop relations with Catholic West were "bias conservative Byzantine Empire towards Western influences" [Uspenskii, 1922], or even a form of betrayal of Orthodoxy [Uspenskii, 4, 2005: 468 – 469]. Their contingent contemporary post-modern heirs [Karpov, 2000] tend to perceive Latin Romania as primarily imagined and psychological phantom.

Mihail Siuziumov [Siuziumov, 1968] in the second half of the 1960s attempted to actualize European status of Byzantine Empire, but he did it very gingerly, cautiously and preferred to write about its role in "world-historical process". These attempts to find place of Byzantine Empire in world history were the only ideologically acceptable form of actualization of European nature of Byzantine history. Modern Russian historian Sergei Ivanov believes that problems of Byzantine belongness to Western world were very politicized and ideologized:

I think we should always remember that "West" and "East" concepts are very recent... The concept of "West" appeared when Byzantium had died ... it is frequently asked: Is Byzantium Europe? Those who imagine Byzantium in this way will say: "Yes, Byzantium is part of Europe". I think that it's pointless conversation ... the concept of Europe as a symbol of something very good and prosperous is different to what we all want, appeared in the 17th century. The word "Europe" existed before, but the Byzantine would be very surprised if he was asked about Europe... it was simply ancient geographical concept ... Byzantium was looking at Europe from the top... Europeans were the barbarians ... In Russia, talks about Europe are always linked with complex of inferiority ... we can say: "We are much better because we are spiritual" or "We are Europe too" ... but it will be comparing of yourself with something very important, and Byzantines were not interested in it... [Ivanov, 2014].

Modern Byzantine Studies in this context are involved in interdisciplinary Western Humanities: these methodological and theoretical backgrounds assisted to rise of inter-connections of Byzantine Studies Orientalism but problems of Orientalization of Byzantium in spite of these positive developments are too far from interests of Russian historians. Some contemporary authors still try to save Byzantium and imagine it as a part of Europe and a history of Byzantine Empire is invented by them as part of European historical process. Aleksei Lidov is among leading supporters of Occidentalization of Byzantium among Russian historians. Aleksei Lidov presumes that

opposition of the Orthodox Byzantine and European West is incorrect. The Byzantine culture was more European than Western culture. It is the direct heir of ancient Greek culture, which formed the basis of European civilization ... the Western European tradition is kind of a side branch and one of the versions of Roman culture. Byzantium can not be perceived as "under-European" culture... Byzantium is Europe. This is Europe, but it is not understood, because system of concepts and descriptions belong to different types of culture and perception of the world [Lidov, 2010].

The authors, who imagine Byzantium as Europe, form a minority in shadow of other intellectuals who prefer to actualize and develop Byzantine myth based on radical refusal from its Occidentalization because historians and intellectuals of this group assisted to Orientalization of Byzantium. Soviet and American historians of the second half of the 20th century actualized narratives about unique Byzantine political order and assisted to its perception and understanding as non-European world, but they did not declare that Byzantium was the victim of Orientalization. Orientalization of Byzantium in Russian historiography was understood differently.

Historians, which can be conventionally defined as authors of classic multi-volume histories of Byzantium [Uspenskii, 2002: 5] written history as eventual in a predominantly positivist paradigm with some splashes of social and economic history. They preferred to relegate Orientalization of Byzantine Empire to primitive loss of its territories that were conquered by Muslims. The historians of the second half of the 20th century preferred to study socio-economic and political institutions of Byzantine Empire. The transformations and mutations of these institutions were imagined by them as a form of socio-economic and political Orientalization of the Empire. The institution of slavery [Kazhdan, 2000: 72 – 73], which existed and developed in Byzantium, was a form of Orientalization of social and economic relations, which assisted to their distance from the Occident and made the Empire closer to Orient. Aleksandr Kazhdan [Schmidt, 2003; El'darova, 2003; Poliakov, 2003; Bibikov, 2003; Al'perovich, 2003; Khrushchev, 2003] believed that Byzantine historical processes in cultural and anthropological perspectives were very different from similar trends in Europe where personality separated from collective social contexts. Byzantine social history did not know these historical processes and

“the feeling of fear was not understandable by the nobility of Byzantines” [Kazhdan 2000: 18].

Aleksandr Kazhdan thought that the gap between Byzantium and Europe led to extremely negative historical results:

Byzantium stood apart from Western Europe, it turned away from progressive tendencies of social and cultural developments, which were actualized in West ... economically weakened Byzantine Empire felt, when national states were forming in the West, it was powerless to resist Turkish onslaught and finally ceased to exist [Kazhdan 2000: 263].

Russian historians presumed that Orientalization of Byzantium was result of its geographical and political location between imagined East and West. The features of Byzantine history condemned her to be object of comparison of historical processes of Orient and Occident. These problems were often studied in Russian historiography [Chekalova, 1999: 81 – 104; Lomize 1999; Ukolova, Borodin, 1999:105 – 139; Ivanov, 1999: 333 – 353]. Intellectual history of Byzantine Empire was very promising in the context of attempts to find preconditioned of Orientalism because Byzantium had developed contacts with Eastern groups and imagined them in Christian centered coordinate system as primitive barbarians, but Islam was invented as an alien religion. The processes of barbarization as a potential Occidentalization developed simultaneously with trends of Orientalization. Byzantine cultural contacts with West were permanent and developed, but these connections could not protect Byzantium from degradation and Orientalization. The attempts to transplant Western feudal institutions in the social and economic contexts of Byzantium were unsuccessful. Byzantine path of development in this situation led Byzantine Empire to degradation and assisted to its degeneration and transformation in Orient.

A history of Byzantium in this context was a history of its progressive social and economic mutations: Orientalization of Byzantium had various dimensions and this Orientalization was understood in different ways in historiography. Academic historical science insists that Orientalization had political and socio-economic forms, and some institutions of Byzantine Empire later mutated into institutions of Ottoman Empire. These ideas are promoted by moderate supporters of Orientalization of Byzantium. Radicals who occupied the opposite pole, insist that Orientalization, reduced by them to strong government and anti-Western ideas, was positive for Byzantine Empire. These sentiments and ideas have nothing in common with academic historiographical discourse, because they are actively developed and promoted by various Orthodox historians, predominantly in Russia. The publicist Valerii Shambarov is one of the brightest representatives of this obscurantist and unscientific concept. Valerii Shambarov in his texts proposes strange and odious ideas. Valerii Shambarov combined internal and external factors, ignored social processes in economic decline, crisis and erosion of social and political institutions of the Empire. Valerii Shambarov with the fervor of an amateur asserts that

Constantinople reached the highest peak, prevailed over all enemies, but wars were not disastrous for it... the attempts to make friends with the West, desire to adjust Western standards were destructive [Shambarov, 2013].

These ideas are extremely popular among non-academic historians because professional academic community of historians engaged in Byzantine Studies propose other interpretations and also take into account political, social and economic factors. The erosion of Greek ethnic core was a form of Orientalization. The Armenians were not the only non-Greek ethnic and linguistic community in Byzantium [Kazhdan, 1975, Stepanenko, 2003: 173 - 189], but the Slavs in territory of Byzantine Empire facilitated its Orientalization. Armenian strategies of Byzantium were different from the tactics to Slavic groups because Armenians become part of political class and gradually eroded political traditions, assisted to reduction of the Empire in context of external threats. Ethnic factors were not imagined in historiography as decisive in Orientalization of the Empire.

In the 1990s Aleksandr Kazhdan openly compared Byzantine political and historical experience with totalitarianism and assisted in this context to Orientalization:

When I think about a history of Byzantine Empire and its significance for man of the 20th century, I always come back to the idea that Byzantium provided us with a unique experience of European totalitarianism in Byzantium... it was not the cradle of Orthodoxy or guardian of the treasures of ancient Greece ... it was laboratory of millennial totalitarian practice [Kazhdan, 1992: 35].

Aleksandr Kazhdan, as his former student Sergei Ivanov recalled, believed that "Soviet Communism was caused by Byzantium" [Ivanov, 2014]. Byzantium in this coordinate system could be perceived as Orient or the stable and stagnant territory where political elites had stable immunity to any form of democracy, and preferred to use undemocratic and totalitarian institutions and political instruments. These numerous instances of degradation of Byzantine Empire in Russian historiography are characteristic predominantly for social and economic historiography, but cultural and other factors that assisted to Orientalization are ignored. Orientalization of Byzantium was dynamic in its political and economic institutions, but attempts to actualize historical, social, economic and political continuity between Byzantine Empire and Ottoman Empire [Marinova, 1999: 474 – 494] are too rare and controversial.

The first attempts to study integration of Greek structures in Ottoman Empire were taken in the early 20th century by Fiodor Uspenskii [Uspenskii, 2011: 634 – 637], but he preferred to describe these historical facts exclusively in the eventual context. Therefore, texts of classical Russian Byzantine historiography do not belong to Orientalist discourse because their scientific language was imagined in a completely different coordinates and texts, written

in it, belonged predominantly to traditional positivist historiography. Aleksandr Kazhdan proposed other explanation of Orientalization. He believed that

Byzantium was a conformist state, positions and power of Byzantine Basileus in the world of medieval Europe were unique [Kazhdan, 2000: 13].

Sergei Ivanov is one more figure among contemporary Russian historians who believe that culture and intellectual life of Byzantine society were gradually Orientalized:

studying Byzantium, we understand that it existed at the turn of two civilizations. Arabic and Turkish civilizations of the East were looking for their ways in Europe through territories of Byzantine Empire... Byzantine was not only in war with these forces, Byzantine Empire borrowed much ... If we look at one of the most famous mosaics of Byzantine Empire, in the church of Chora in Constantinople... we will see Theodore Metochites who brings the model of the cathedral to Christ... Theodore Metochites is a perfect vizier of a sultan, he has in a long coat and a turban ... the Byzantines borrowed from their eastern opponents and neighbors Turkic words, clothes, demeanor... the Byzantines took a lot from the West. The Byzantines knew that they were behind. They are many hundreds of years lived with the feeling that West has some savages live, and in the 12th century they realized that there was something going on ... and they tried to catch up West in the 12th century... It was the first time of modernization. Byzantium was trying to catch up with Europe in the technological sense, they were unable to do it and in the 1204 they paid for this failure [Ivanov, 2014].

Some elements of Byzantine heritage [Ivanov, 2011] were partially preserved and integrated into the cultural landscape of Istanbul preserved during Turkish period. These interpretations of political system and political culture of Byzantium are very rare, but they inevitably promote new understanding and perception of its history in context of Orientalization, radical separation from European historical process, and integration of Byzantine history in Orientalist historical and political context. Orientalization of Byzantium was initiated by historians who do not belong to number of Byzantologists. Well known Russian medievalist Nataliia Basovskaia tends to perceive Byzantium as part of Oriental history because political realities in Byzantium

were characteristic for East... political upheavals... they was so typical for Byzantine Empire... and Byzantine Empire as Eastern Roman Empire was very Eastern... it was greatly changed Roman Empire [Basovskaia 2014].

The process of invention and imagination of Byzantium in historical memories of Eastern Europe, Balkans and Russia in the 20th century was too diverse, and local intellectual communities offered several interpretations of Byzantine political and historical experience. Imagination and invention of Byzantium reflected and actualized political and ideological trends and processes of transformation in national identities and national myths. Some intellectuals were inclined to idealize Byzantine heritage and offered exclusively positive images of it. Other authors believe that role of Byzantium in historical process was negative, and they projected on its history anti-Byzantine historical myths, political complexes, and nationalistic preferences which were stimulated by Greeks as distant, remote, controversial, and questionable historical heirs of Byzantium. These trends were characterized mainly for Bulgarian historiography. The critical approach to a history of Byzantium allowed its supporters to avoid excessive ideologization and also stimulated interdisciplinary approach. The principles of interdisciplinarity in Byzantine Studies actualized problems of relations and contacts between Byzantium and Orient, which historically led to Orientalization of Byzantium. Bulgarian historians made the greatest contribution to Orientalization of Byzantium, other intellectuals tried to maneuver between these polar and ideologically mutually opposed understandings and perceptions of Byzantine history. The political collapse of Byzantine and its historic project, development of the former Byzantine Empire territories in Ottoman Empire, which was part of Orient, actualized historiographical and intellectual debates on inevitability and historical logic of Orientalization of Byzantium. In this context Byzantine Studies developed as a special or private case of the greater Orientalist discourse. Byzantium in general was very convenient object for Orientalization, although some intellectuals tried to find a place of Byzantium on the mental maps in the context of imagination and invention of medieval geographies. Orientalization or Occidentalization of Byzantium was a consequence of political situation and ideological preferences of historians involved and engaged in Byzantine Studies. The modern intellectual climate is characterized by multiple and simultaneous forms of Byzantine discourse in different national historical memories and imaginations. Some authors believe that Orientalization of Byzantium was negative process that led to crisis and historic defeat of Byzantine as European political project. Other more radical and marginal writers idealize Byzantium and believe that its form of Orientalization was fight against negative impact of Western and European influences. Byzantium in this context exists as collective hostage for historiographical debates and political speculations. Byzantium in contemporary historical memories and imaginations develop as invented tradition that has more in common with Orientalist discourse and occupies a marginal place in European historical process.

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**THE UNHEARD VOICES OF PERIPHERAL ORIENTALISMS:
UKRAINIAN, BULGARIAN, SERBIAN AND OTHER NATIONAL IMPACTS**

Ukrainian voices in Orientalist choir

It is logical to presume that historians, involved in intellectual history studied including a history of Oriental Studies, have even the most basic ideas and collective representations about a history of the object studied by them and a history of science they formally belong to. The situation is very difficult because a lot of the stereotypes and myths developed for two centuries in concepts of Orient and Orientalism. On the one hand, it is well known that definition "Orientalism" became popular after the book by Edward Said with the same title was published. Its publication assisted to the demonization of academic Oriental studies because Edward Said suggested that they were among the most effective and efficient tools of colonialism and an important component in Western legitimization of domination over the oppressed and subordinated Eastern nations. On the other hand, it is known that Orientalism historically developed as Western construct and invention, logical continuation or completion of the hard work of collective Western mind that for several centuries imagined and invented its own versions of Orient. The unique roles and original contribution of non-Western European intellectuals in genesis, formation, development and promotion of collective images of Orient are not among well known pages in a history of Orientalism and Oriental Studies. This section of the book will be focused on problems of a history of non-Western European Orientalisms which formed their national imagined, invented and collective representations about Orient.

Intellectual history of Ukraine provides its faithful and objective scholar and historian with a wide range of facts and problems which actualize Oriental dimensions and levels of Ukrainian historical process. Ukrainian intellectuals historically preferred to position and imagine themselves as Europeans, and their country was also invented by them a part of European cultural and political traditions. Ukrainian culture was formed and developed as a culture of intellectual oppositions – Russia was always opposed to Ukraine in national and historiographical imaginations as a non-European, Eastern and finally Asian state. Ukrainian intellectuals began to study "their" East / Orient later than they reached fundamental results and successes in studies of Ukrainian history as national and European history. Ukrainian historians realized that Eastern dimensions of Ukrainian history coexisted with Western ones. The history of intellectual attempts of Ukrainian intellectuals to imagine, invent and map East as Orient on mental maps of identity form the unique part of Ukrainian historiography in context of intellectual searching of Ukrainian intellectuals of their place among other historical nations of Europe.

The historical and social backgrounds for Oriental Studies in Ukraine emerged in the 20th century, but historically in previous centuries and epochs Ukrainian

lands had developed contacts with other land which belonged to Orient. The Ottoman Empire and Crimea were among these regions which stimulated Ukrainian reflections about Orient. Crimea became a bridge from European history of Ukraine to Eastern and Oriental history. Crimea actualized Oriental discourse and dimension in Ukrainian past, but it was not imagined by Ukrainian intellectuals as essential Oriental region and own Orient of Ukraine because they did not have enough time to do it, tried to integrate Crimea in Ukrainian historical contexts and ignored Oriental sense in Crimean past. Ukrainian Oriental Studies of interwar period ended as fast as they rapidly achieved their first successes because repressions against intellectuals, including first Ukrainian Orientalists, discontinued development of Oriental Studies in Ukraine from the late 1930s by the early 1990s when Ukrainian political, state and intellectual independences were restored.

Omeljan Pritsak tried to actualize proximity and relationships between Ukrainian and non-European Eastern or Oriental histories:

...the proximity of these disciplines, despite the fact that they occurred in historically different conditions, is obvious. The communication of Ukraine and East is inseparable. The great part of lands which formed Ukrainian territories belonged to the Steppes. Historically it was the realm of nomadic empires, which had close connections with the rest of nomadic world ... in the works of Ukrainian historians it was told very little about Steppes... the significant part of Ukrainian history remained outside of their viewpoint... [Pritsak, 1993].

The first academic scholar of Eastern / Oriental themes in Ukrainian historiography was Myhailo Hrushevs'kyi – the recognised “father” of modern Ukrainian historiography. He analyzed Oriental motives in the context of a history of Tatar attacks on Ukrainian land [Hrushevs'kyi, 1995]. The actualization of Crimean Tatar historical and partly ethnographical issues assisted to a gradual abandonment of historiographical ethnocentrism. Myhailo Hrushevs'kyi became the founder as national as Orientalist canon in Ukrainian historiography and he assisted to the rise and progress of new understandings of Ukrainian history as history imagined in national context for internal consumerism and as history with external levels which actualized predominantly non-European and Oriental discourses and dimensions.

In the 1920s, during active Ukrainization, Ukrainian historians tried to develop the concept of Myhailo Hrushevs'kyi and also continued to study a history of relations between Ukrainians and other ethnic groups which historically belonged to Orient. Crimea was imagined in Ukrainian intellectual tradition not as Ukrainian land, but it was invented as the zone of contacts between Europe and Oriental non-Europe [Ursu, 1994]. Orientalist themes and motifs gradually got its popularity in Ukrainian historiography where “Sxidnyi Svit” journal became the dominant national Orientalist periodical. Orientalist ideas were presented in the notable book “Ukraine and Orient” (“Ukrajina i Sxid”), which became a noticeable phenomenon of Ukrainian academic life between the two world wars. In the 1920s [Slabchenko, 1922; Tishchenko, 1928] Eastern and Oriental

regions were imagined as Ukrainian and integrated in Ukrainian historical process. It was presumed that they were historically, politically, and economically closely related with other Ukrainian territories.

"Svidnyi Svit" journal, which was published from the 1927 to the 1931, was an important step in formation of national Ukrainian Orientalism and had critical meaning in genesis and development of new national images of Orient. Only 11 numbers of this journal were published during three years. Its publication was halted in the 1930 when anti-Ukrainian repressions began [Pritsak, 1993]. Omeljan Pritsak, commenting short history of this journal, wrote:

the first number became available for readers in the 1927, the last one in the 1931... then Stalinist repressive apparatus activated and academician Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi and professor Andrii Kovalivs'kyi were not able to do anymore... that even attempted to rename journal in "Chervonnyi Svit"... many orientalists became victims of Stalin's henchmen and they were forced to go through all ways of slaves in Gulag [Pritsak, 1993].

Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi in the 1920s became the founding father of Ukrainian academic Oriental Studies. Academic works and activities of Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi were focused on different problems, including history of Turkey, Turks, Turkic nations and languages [Kryms'kyi 1926, Kryms'kyi 1927, Kryms'kyi, 1930]. Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi analyzed comprehensively Oriental problems of a history and development of social relations, economy, culture, literature and languages of peoples of Turkic origin [Kryms'kyi 1927, Kryms'kyi, 1930]. Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi inspired Ukrainian academic historiography to study monuments of Oriental literatures [Malenka, 1993, Nikolaev, 1993]. Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi in his "Istoriia Turechchyny" attempted to show development of relations between Ukrainians and groups belonged to Oriental historical traditions, including Tatars [Kryms'kyi, 1924]. Crimea was imagined as region that geographically was closer to Ukraine, but it was also invented as Orient and contact Ukrainian-Tatar zone [Kirzhaev, Ul'ianovs'kyi, 1993]. Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi inspired in the 1930 publication of collective monograph "Studiji z Krymu". The book included original studies and sources that assisted to actualization of Ukrainian intellectual context in Oriental history of Crimea and problems of relations between Crimean Tatars and Ukrainians [Studiji ... 1930]. The concept of Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi in the most systemized way was presented in his book "Istoriia Turechchyny" [Chernikov, 1993, Matveev, 1996]. Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi believed that Turkish state in its heyday belonged to number of the most influential political actors because Seljuk Turks as its founders conquered the Balkans, captured Constantinople, and established their hegemony over Mediterranean region. The Turks, who originally were nomads, assimilated achievements of urban cultures of the conquered nations and began to dominate over other groups which did not belong to Turks in linguistic, ethnic and historical contexts. Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi tried to find the origins of this unique historical progress in evolution from a small state to empire, which controlled the great parts of Orient and Eastern Europe and also had developed political and economic relations with West. Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi wrote:

for us, for Slavs, this period is more interesting because Turkey was largely Slavic state... Slavic language was semi-official, and our hapless Ukrainian slaves who dragged in Turkey in endless streams through Crimean Tatar captivity provided Turkey with Ukrainian character [Kryms'kyi, 1924].

Ukrainian intellectuals in the 1920s began to integrate two ideologically opposite and different histories – Ukrainian and Oriental one. They developed narrative that Ukraine historically contacted and had developed relations with countries and territories that geographically were located on wide spaces of Asia and historically belonged to Eastern political, cultural and religious traditions. Ukrainian historians, including Andrii Kovalivs'kyi [Chernikov, 1996, Mitriaev, 1996], focused their works on a history of relations between Ukraine and Turkey, Turkish religious history and contemporary Turkish poetry. Turkey was imagined by them as a country, which facilitated Orientalization of Ukraine and familiarized Ukrainians with Eastern culture [Kovalivs'kyi 1928, 1930]. Ukrainian historians studied problems of relations of Ukraine with East, paid special attention in this context to Turkey [Dubrovs'kyi, 1928], and believed that beginning of contacts between dwellers of future Ukrainian territories, which formed historic core of Ukraine, with representatives of Oriental traditions could be dated by period of Trypillya archaeological culture, which had parallels with cultures of Asia Minor. The genuine Orientalization of Ukrainian history was dated by historians of the 1920s and the 1930s by period of Tatar invasion and their heirs' migration in Crimea [Dubrovs'kyi, 1927].

This wide understanding of Orient was typical for Ukrainian Intellectuals between the two world wars. They did not imagine Orient as China, Japan, Mongolia, or only Turkey, they understood East / Orient extremely widely. The history of Soviet East was integrated into the emerging national discourse of Orientalism (Apuhtina 1928, Lydyzhens'kyi 1928, 1930; Hrushevs'kyi, 1930). The concept of Ukrainian Orientalism was formed in the early 1930s and its main and central statements were the followings: 1) a history of Ukraine and a history of Orient have numerous points of intersections and intercontacts, 2) East was a dual-plan category pderented by foreign and Soviet East, 3) Soviet Orient was a new type of Oriental culture, which was radically transformed on the basis of revolutionary Soviet and communist ideology, 4) a history of Soviet East was history of struggle against the heavy legacy of colonial policy of Russian monarchy. Developing these narratives Ukrainian intellectuals inevitably come into conflict with official Soviet ideology. The attempts of Ukrainian historians to study Orient were deliberately suppressed and stopped by repressions against Ukrainian Orientalists and defeat of Ukrainian Oriental Studies which were not able to revive in the 1950s and the 1960s.

The transformation of Ukrainian culture in the 20th century evolved in context of progressive affirmation of modernism and its further evolution in postmodernism. The most famous Ukrainian Oriental modernist was Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi who was in the same time “modern” for his Crimean Tatar Eastern era and for forming Ukrainian modernist canon. Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi as a writer had his predecessors, including Panteleimon Kulish and Mykola Kostomarov

[Aizenshtok, 1927]. Oriental motifs were visible in poetical texts of Lesia Ukrainka [Ognev, 1995], where they were represented predominantly by the Crimean images. Lesia Ukrainka created some remarkable Orientalist images in the period when classic Orientalism did not exist, but she anticipated some intellectual trends that several decades later became dominant in political and intellectual program of Orientalism. Lesia Ukrainka in her texts actualized the images of oppressed femininity and archaic wildness and Orient

...йде дівча татарськеє вродливе, молоденьке, ще гуля по волі... [Lesia Ukrainka, 1977: 32].

Oriental city in a poetic imagination of Lesia Ukrainka was invented as a topos of archaicness and strangeness:

скрізь мінарети й дерева срібlistі мов стережуть сей тихий сонний рай [Lesia Ukrainka, 1977: 33].

The 1890s came in Ukrainian literature as era of Oriental “ethnographic” themes and interests expansion and penetration in new texts of Ukrainian writers who become more active in formation of their own imaged of Orient. Ukrainian writers, who until that time were interested predominantly in Ukrainian peasant problems, moods and events, preferred to fulfill pages of their works with idealized or criticized descriptions of Ukrainian peasant life, tried to “get out of this vicious circle of themes and subjects” [Aizenshtok, 1927]. They attempted to dismiss from Eurocentrism and move beyond its borders. Ukrainian writers tried to fix local and ethnographic features of other ways and cultural styles of life which were different from Ukrainian ones. As classical Western Orientalists they were interested in something strange, exotic and little-known including a life of universal Others, aliens, and far Oriental mysterious unfamiliar countries. Myhailo Kotsiubins’kyi did a lot for this symbolic migration of Ukrainian writers from the favoured peasant Ukrainian and modern European topics to Orient as topos of otherness and universal oppositions to their interests.

Myhailo Kotsiubins’kyi became the author of several essays about artistic life of Crimea and Crimean Tatars. Ukrainian critics Jeremiah Aizenshtok believed that Crimea attracted him by “excellence and local characteristics of its life” [Aizenshtok, 1927]. Crimean life was interesting to Myhailo Kotsiubins’kyi in comparison with Ukrainian and European, and he acted as an Orientalist, consciously and deliberately choose situations, where differences, historical oppositions and conflicts between Oriental and European cultures were presented most clearly. For example, in the short story “На камені” Myhailo Kotsiubins’kyi offered his readers a tragic love story from the first meeting to ending of Tatar boy and girl. The real and invented realities of Tatar traditional life were actively used to actualize all possible shades of Otherness. Myhailo Kotsiubins’kyi fixed in his texts processes of extinction and decline of archaic traditions, including a wedding with *kalym*:

прийшов різник, заплатив батькові більше, ніж могли дати свої парубки і забрав її до себе – противний, неласкавий, чужий, як усі тут люди, як сей край [Kotsiubins'kyi, 1953].

The imagined Modernity of Crimea in Ukrainian context expressed itself in prose of Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi also. The writer witnessed how old archaic and traditional Crimea was gradually dying and supplanted and replaced by new and modernized one. Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi novel "Andrii Lohovs'kyi" symbolically killed archaic Ukraine and Asian Orient. Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi and other Ukrainian writers deliberately destroyed old identities, and positioned their works as impacts in integration of Crimea as Ukrainian Orient in the nationalizing Ukrainian context. Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi tried to modernize invented Orient that existed in textual imagination. The discourse of Orient as a discourse of modernization was not too original and unique for texts of Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi. It belonged to other wide discourse of modernization as a set of political and cultural practices which provided Ukrainian intellectuals with opportunities to integrate Crimean Tatar community in Ukrainian cultural landscape.

Another perception of Orient formed parallelly with development of Soviet forms of Orientalism. This version of Orientalist imagination developed among leaders of cultural and poetical Ukrainian diaspora who fled Ukraine after invasion and Sovietization of its territories which were transformed by Bolsheviks in Ukrainian SSR. The main statements of this version of Ukrainian Orientalism were proposed by representatives of Prague school in Ukrainian poetry. Evhen Malaniuk was among its recognized ideological leaders. The numerous and extremely different images of East as Orient in poetic heritage of Evhen Malaniuk had several dimensions. Orient was imagined by him as a new world which tried to modernize and change social and cultural directions in its development:

І над безоднями глибин, стихії шалом біснуватим
єдино Конструктивний Чин допоможе нам опанувати [Malaniuk
2004: 60].

These new collective representations about Orient radically differed from archaic perceptions of it and promoted principles of its revolutionary development and radical rejection of old forms of social order.

Ukraine in a poetry of Evhen Malaniuk transformed and changed in Ukrainian Orient and the country, which combined European and Asian features:

тільки ти – похитлива скітська гетеро –
простягаєш сарматських вишень уста,
тільки ти, перекохана мандрівниками,
всім даруєш розтерзане тіло для втіх
і кусають, і душать брудними руками...
на узбіччі дороги з Європи в Азію,
головою на Захід і лоном на Схід...
під тобою килимом – парча пшениці,

над тобою єдвабного неба синь, –
ти ж подряпана вся, божевільна блуднице,
в дикій слині коханців, розпусто краси! [Malaniuk 2004: 18].

Ukraine from a purely European country was transformed in poetical imagination of Evhen Malaniuk into a whore who sold herself and her imagined collective European and Asian body:

хто ґвалтував тебе? Безсила, безвладна, п'яна і
німа,
неплодну плоть, убоге тіло, давала кожному сама.
Мізерій чужих історій та сльози п'яних кобзарів –
всією тучністю просторів повія ханів і царів
[Malaniuk 2004: 60].

Ukraine was imagined as territory and collective landscapes which were not able to control their vibrant Asian energy and proposed itself to any aliens who sexually exploited it:

привабливо-безсила й гарна,
осяєш ти чужий намет,
і хижий хан буде безкарно
впивати уст отруйний мед [Malaniuk 2004: 41].

Ukraine turned in poetic imagination of Evhen Malaniuk into a bridge between Asia and Europe, and its territories were imagined and invented as springboard for migrations and further developments of different nomadic tribes, including Cumans:

Ні, ти – не мати!
Шал коханки у чорнім полум'ї коси,
в обличчі степової бранки
хміль половецької краси [Malaniuk 2004: 41]

and Tatars:

тебе б конем татарським гнати,
поки аркан не заспіва!
Бо ж ти коханка, а не мати,
зрадлива бранко степова [Malaniuk 2004: 41].

Ukraine, like fallen Byzantium, in poetry of Evhen Malaniuk transformed into East. It was rapidly Orientalized and integrated in the imagined Oriental coordinates system and become the home for new Janissaries. Evhen Malaniuk mixed and combined Ukraine with East, the poet made her become Orient and dismiss from its original European incarnations:

під сонні пестощі султана

впивала царьгородський чар,
це ж ти – попівна Роксоляна,
байстрюча мати яничар [Malaniuk 2004: 60].

Evhen Malaniuk tried to institutionalize Oriental discourse in Ukrainian poetry and imagined Orient as dual category. Orient was imagined by him as Ukraine itself and Orient, an exotic world of Asia. The concept of the East, which was formed by Evhen Malaniuks' efforts, combined and actualized Ukrainian and Eastern images as mutually dependent, closely connected, and intertwined. Imagined poetical Orient in the texts of Evhen Malaniuk expressed idea of new unity, new imagined landscape with featured of East and West. Evhen Malaniuk was among founding fathers of Ukrainian Orientalism, which was developed by representatives of Ukrainian diaspora after the 1945 and returned in Ukraine after it restored its independence.

Orientalist motifs were developed in poetry of Oleh Ol'zhych, one more representative of Prague poetical school in Ukrainian emigration. The traditional opposition "Orient" / "Occident" was characteristic for poetic narratives of Oleh Ol'zhych who believed in a inevitability of historical and logical confrontation between Western and Eastern worlds, as various forms of civilization. The images of Occident (Rome) and Orient (Carthage) in poetic heritage of Oleh Ol'zhych were presented and invented as historical rivals and opponents:

Пройшли пурпурні фінікійські дні,
Замкнувши цикл, і знову так потрохи
Згризає час суворо – мовчазні
Граніти легендарної епохи.
О, неба сірість, оливо води,
В густих туманах обважнілі віти,
Страшна вагітність, що несе плоди,
Які аж правнукам уздріти!
І ці стрункі, сухі чоловіки!
В їх простоті ясній, давноминулій
Чи ви пізнаєте, вгадаєте, який
З – посеред них є Сервій Туллій? [Ol'zhych, 1935 / 2009:46]

The history of civilization was imagined by Oleh Ol'zhych as a permanent struggle and confrontation between Orient and Occident as two diametrically opposed ways of organization of human society. The formally historical, but essentially Orientalist images of Hannibal and Carthage in poetry of Oleh Ol'zhych inevitably arisen as classical form of "Orient" / "Occident" opposition. Hannibal was imagined how personalized embodiment of Oriental and Asiatic threat to idealized Occident:

Він покотився з опалевих гір,
Важка лавина тіл людських і зброї,
Етрурії і Ляція простір
Роздерти бойових слонів сурмою.
І Требія. І Канни. І ганьба

Двох консулів перед лицем полону.
І кожний раз з Великого Горба
Нервовий марш нового легіону [Ol'zhych, 1935 / 2009:58]

Oleh Ol'zhych was among Ukrainian intellectuals who actively formed and developed images of non-European humanity as predominantly conventional, archaic, too stable and practically unchangeable. The poetic narratives of Oleh Ol'zhych in this context were based on a universal faith of Western Orientalism that non-European man was a unique man-child who was not corrupted by Western influences of rationalism and secularism:

Сизим ранком збігайте, стрункі юнаки,
До човнів, на лягунах завмерлих!
Хай зірвуться вони, як прудкі павуки,
Розсипаючи лапами перли.
В млосій тузі до моря розквітлого день
Нижче й нижче схилятися буде,
І на березі ревом військових пісень
Бородаті зустрінуть вас люди.
Солов'ями заб'ються тятиви тонкі
На бенкеті відваги і сили,
Щоб дівчата в квітках тут водили танки
І від пестоців ночі п'яніли [Ol'zhych, 1931 / 2009:137]

Oleh Ol'zhych also was the author of images of a new dynamic and rising non-Western world as inevitable historical, political and economic rival of Western, European or American, world. Japan was imagined by Oleh Ol'zhych how this versatile alternative to Western centric world:

На порозі старого світу,
Де брехні і облуди тьма,
Ти встаєш тріпотливим цвітом,
Ніжна молодосте сама!
Ти встаєш. Та незнану силу
Затаїла прозорість рук,
Вигинаєш дівоче тіло,
Напинаєшся вся, як лук,
Мить – і стрільна твої застогнали,
Повили суходіл дими ...
Бий їх, кволих, слабих, нездалих,
Остовпілих таких, як ми! [Ol'zhych, 1937 / 2009:166]

Ukrainian diaspora continued to develop Oriental Studies and form new versions of Orientalism after the same intellectual practices were interrupted in Soviet Ukraine. Development of Oriental Studies was result of wide activities of Omeljan Pritsak who was a student of Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi before the last one was repressed in the USSR. Omeljan Pritsak continued traditions of academic Oriental Studies and Ukrainian Orientalism originally proposed by Ahatanhel

Kryms'kyi. Ukrainian diaspora was able to form, develop and financially maintained its own unique and original formal and informal schools of Oriental Studied. Ukrainian Orientalism in diaspora formed under the significant influence of two factors including legacy of Oriental Studies from Soviet Ukraine and intellectual influences and different stimuli of European and American academic traditions.

Omeljan Pritsak believed that influence of Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi was determined for his personal trajectories of academic career:

in the 1940th in Lviv, where I studied at the university, academician Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi arrived. We met and we were walking in the streets of Lviv ... Kryms'kyi quoted various ancient texts by heart in Arabic, Turkish, Persian. He asked me to translate and determine their authors. Well, of course I tried... and Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi invited me in Kiev - I passed exams in Ukrainian Academy of Sciences... but in the fall of the 1940th in spite of all the protests of academician Kryms'kyi... I as graduate student was mobilized in army... later I was wounded near Proskurov and was captured... I escaped, because I knew German language ... I dropped in Kiev secretly and tried to know about the fate of Academician Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi. I did not know anything comforting about him [Pritsak, 1993].

Omeljan Pritsak in the 1993 recalled that Oriental Studies in Ukrainian diaspora developed under significant influence of European Orientalists:

I was lucky enough to contact in Berlin with the university and with Richard Hartmann who was Arabist and Hans-Heinrich Shederom who was Iranist. They tried to take me in university, and then ... then I traveled around the world as much as it's too difficult to tell about it. Let me just say that when I was in Germany, I was invited in the United States, in the famous Harvard as a guest lecturer and I got permanent job. I lived in Eastern America, where intellectual life is concentrated in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, and Washington... but there was also intellectual center of Ukrainian emigration. I was actively involved in its life as academic scholar. I and other figures from diaspora tried to establish Institute of Ukrainian Studies at Harvard University [Pritsak, 1993].

The activities of Omeljan Pritsak in development of Ukrainian Orientalism had two dimensions, including studies of Oriental histories, languages, cultures and a history of relations and interactions between Ukrainians and Eastern peoples. Omeljan Pritsak played a crucial role in the integration of Ukrainian history and Ukrainian historical process in Oriental context. Eastern history in understanding of Omeljan Pritsak was imagined as a self-sufficient and an integral part of Ukrainian historical past [Pritsak, 1981]. He believed that there is no Orient without Ukrainian history and there is no Ukraine without Orient. Oriental, Asian and Turkic, problems were prevalent in academic heritage of

Omeljan Pritsak. Studying the history of Turks, Omeljan Pritsak, who had fundamental academic education and considerable ambitions, paid special attention to a history of Bulgars, Chuvash studies [Pritsak, 1981] and played the great role in progressive development and rise of Ukrainian Orientalism based on synthesis of Oriental Studies with studies in Ukrainian national history. Omeljan Pritsak did not forget that the people who came from the East, historically formed in the vast landscapes of Asian steppes and greatly influenced on the development of Ukrainian state in early stages of Ukrainian history. In these contexts interests of Omeljan Pritsak in Khazars, their history, relations between them and Cumans also with Kievan state were significant [Pritsak, 1983, 1983]. Omeljan Pritsak assisted to Orientalization of Ukrainian history because he believed that minimization of it to a history of relations between Ukrainians, peasants and nomadic steppe dwellers, relationships of subordination was harmful significant simplification of historical process. The historian argued that trends and tendencies of gradual Orientalization in history of Ukraine did not arise after Tatar aggression, but he stated that they existed earlier and appeared in when medieval Ukrainian statehood developed relationships with steppe nomads.

The repressions of the second half of the 1930s led to radical changes in Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar historiography. Ukrainian historical science becomes less national and Crimean Tatar historiography after deportation of Crimean Tatars in the 1944 ceased to exist. This did not mean that Orientalism in Ukrainian historiography disappeared. Ukrainian historians, like their predecessors, studied a history of Crimea, but its perception changed radically. After the 1945, Crimean Tatar studies were not officially banned, but it was possible to study Crimea only in official and deeply ideologized Soviet canon as a history of revolutionary movement. The history of Crimea stopped to be a national history of Tatars and it also lost its Oriental meaning. Oriental motifs almost completely disappeared from Ukrainian literature [Kochubei, 1993], and in the early 1990s Ukrainian intellectuals met with numerous methodological difficulties when they restored their opportunity to study Orient without central restrictions and Moscow dictate.

Oriental motifs were almost completely displaced after the Second World War also from Ukrainian literature. Eastern themes in academic activities of Ukrainian historians became extremely rare [Kovalivs'kyi, 1961, 1964, 1974]. Orientalism in Ukrainian SSR almost lost Ukrainian national character. Ukrainian intellectuals were forced to write in Russian, but positive moments also took place. For example, heritage of Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi returned to readers in the 1970s, but Orient almost did not appear in the literature. The national exceptions from this universal logic of Sovietization and russification were too rare and few nationally orientated intellectuals were not able to change general negative tendencies. The novels of Pavlo Zahrebel'nyi [Zahrebel'nyi, 1980] were attempts to actualize Orientalism and restore its positions in Ukrainian literature, but they formed only pseudo-romantic discourse and imitated Orientalism instead its restoration. Oriental images in this intellectual context lost deep roots and origins in Ukrainian identity because only external Oriental attributes were interesting for Ukrainian writers.

After the restoration of independent Ukrainian state Crimea was not imagined by Ukrainian intellectuals as local Ukrainian Orient. It was impossible for them to invent it in Orientalist categories because radical changes in this region during Soviet period transformed it from formal Orient to deeply neo-Soviet or post-Soviet region. Crimea was invented as a typical post-Soviet region, but it was also understood as a region with undeniable trends of gradual Orientalization. The dimensions of this trend were presented by national revival of Crimean Tatars, their attempts to return in historical motherland. Ukrainian intellectuals in the 1990s and the 2000s constructed their own Orient in Crimea because it was the only formal Ukrainian region that had connections with a history of Ottoman Empire and ethnic Turks. Crimean Tatar studies formed methodological backgrounds and foundations for Oriental Studies in Ukraine and Ukrainian intellectuals were able to propose their own images of Crimean past as a part of local Ukrainian Oriental discourse, that also could to assist to general integration of Crimea in Ukrainian cultural context. Ukrainian intellectuals, despite all the objective difficulties, were engaged on Oriental Studies again. The general interests in Oriental Studies were stimulated by feeling of Ukrainian belongness to decolonized areas. In the 1990s Ukrainian intellectuals noticed that between the history of post-colonial Oriental countries and post-Soviet Ukraine there were many parallels in construction of nation-states and institutionalization of national independence. The objective difficulties were comparable with the same problems of Asian countries and unpleasant understanding of it made Ukrainian historians to analyze some moments in national history in post-colonial contexts. In the 1990s trends of Ukrainian centered history writing were revised and Eurocentric perception of Ukrainian history lost its monopoly positions and transformed in only one among other ways and forms Ukrainian history was imagined in.

The trends of Orientalization developed parallelly and simultaneously with Eurocentrism that was among dominating intellectual tendencies. Ukrainian historiography developed as a historiography based on intellectual oppositions of Orient and Occident. Omeljan Pritsak in Kiev initiated organization of Institute of Oriental Studies. The journal "Sxidnyi Svit" also was renewed. The most of works of Ahatanhel Kryms'kyi and Omeljan Pritsak, published eaerlier in the 1920s and 1930s or in diaspora, were republished or translated from English. Ukrainian historians got free opportunities to use classical studies in a history of Turkey [Ilandzhik, 1998]. Ukrainian translation of classic work by Edward Said "Orientalism" [Saïd, 2001] became the most significant event in the attempts to transplantate Western theoretical and methodological approaches.

Ukrainian historians in the 1990s turned to analysis of characteristics and specifics of Ukrainian Orientalism. Ukrainian historian Iurii Kochubei wrote in the 1996, that "Orientalism is not Oriental Studies, not a complex knowledge about East, not science about East, not analysis of influences and interferences, connections and relationships. Orientalism for us is the perception of European civilization in the East and reconstruction of this perception in science, works of art and literature as the basis of incorrect, historically preconditioned and determined, concepts that developed in recently" [Kochubei, 1996]. Iurii Kochubei also presumed that collective image of Orient in Ukrainian intellectual tradition changed radically and become "the object of the writer's work, as well

as their own country, or the West". Iurii Kochubei wrote about the need to study Orient in a form of "dialogue between civilizations on a democratic basis of equality" [Kochubei, 1996].

Radical changes in Ukrainian literature of the 1990s assisted to rise of new forms of poetical Orientalism. The trends and tendencies of Orientalization are characteristic for poetry of Natalka Bilotserkivets'. Orientalism was imagined not as Islamic East or Tatar periphery that was characteristic for earlier literary tradition in Ukraine. Orient in works Natalka Bilotserkivets' was invented as Asia. The poem "Kino Samuraia" is significant in this context, but Oriental motifs in this context lost independent values and transformed in symbolic bridge in Ukrainian reality:

коли на червонім екрані на білих подушечках мертвих облич
лежать ієрогліфи брів і очей, неначе метелики, вишиті
шовком, - тоді я пригадую вечір в селі за містом, потоки
вишневого цвіту [Bilotserkivets', 1999: 9].

Orientalism was combined with postcolonial motives in actual Ukrainian poetry:

Сім'я вечерея, дівка подає,
її кохані вбиті вбо п'яні.
О так, ще є ченці...
А хто не є – розстанули в московському тумані.
Її істерик, ні шизофреній,
ні епілепсій скорченого духу –
тут не знайти...
Яка багата і безцільна тризна!
Яка безцінна й непотрібна річ!
Коштовна вишивка, повішена на піч!
Мов каліграма... Як моя Вітчизна [Bilotserkivets', 1999: 22].

The synthesis and combination of Russian and Ukrainian motifs, Oriental and European images became typical for Ukrainian poetic narrative because Ukraine, in spite its restored independence, was invented and imagined in post-colonial categories as incomplete Orient and Occident, which did not transform into West, but saved features of periphery including simultaneous co-existence of Orientalized Occident and Occidentalized Orient. Contemporary Ukrainian intellectual climate is characterized by persistent Orient / Occident dichotomy. Ukrainian history of Orientalism in the 20th century becomes a history of evolution of Ukrainian cultural discourse. The great part of Ukrainian historians in the 20th cultivated predominately Occidentalized forms of national identity and their intellectuals heirs in the beginning of the 21st century continued to do the same, but other Ukrainian historians, who belong to minority, invents and imagines their own visions and versions of Orient.

Serbian impacts in Orientalism

Serbia belongs to the number of countries with history which is extremely difficult for understanding and geography, which is also too unpredictable. These features are recognized by numerous scholars [Subotić, 2007, 16 - 43; Wolff, 1994, Wolfe 2003; Todorova 2005; Todorova, 1999; Đerić, 2005; Živković 2001]. The processes of modernization in Balkans were significantly different from the similar processes in Western Europe. The local national societies in Western countries came to the beginning of modernization, when they were economically, politically and culturally developed and also mentally ready for radical dismissal from traditional and archaic ways and styles of life. Balkans started their own participation in modernization when they had significant traditional and archaic legacy:

a large-scale and multilateral influence of tradition deprived internal dynamics of processes of social transformations and as a result it was limited by actualization... and strengthening of weak and intermediate forms of bourgeois modernization [Grishina, 2004: 6]

Serbia when it started its own modernization project faced with complex tasks and difficulties. The local political and cultural elite were not able to regulate social and cultural changes despite the fact that these radical transformations were initiated by them. Serbian political and intellectual classes tried to withdraw their country from Orient and turn it into West. Serbian intellectuals understood that it would be extremely difficult to become part of Europe geographically in context of mental mapping, Serbian intellectuals in this cultural atmosphere were interested predominantly in cultural Occidentalization of Serbian national identity. The burden of tradition in Serbian cultural and social contexts weighed processes of modernization in their Balkan version:

... many of the properties of traditionalism ... turned out as a force, which began to dictate and form image and character of modernization processes in the region... [Grishina, 2004: 7]

Balkan version of traditionalism had several system features including an agrarian type of political culture:

...this type of culture that was linked with the land, its agricultural use, maintaining of balance between man and nature, the lack of a personality freed peasants to produce for sustenance day and for the future ..." [Grishina, 2004: 8]

The domination of society which historically was "based on collectivism and paternalism" formed also special type of Balkan mentality originated from lack of mass education [Grishina, 2004: 8]. Russian historian Andrei Shemiakin

presumes that beginning of an active political modernization in Serbia can be dated by period when the rest of Europe have already gained considerable experience in modernization [Shemyakin, 2004: 10] and Serbia was included in this process later. It was also supposed in Russian historiography that Balkan region when historical conditions for emergence of new nation-states were institutionalized had still primitive

political systems which were built, as a rule, in an idealistic manner and imitated the most advanced for that time model presented by Western European one [Grishina, 2004: 83]

Political modernization in Serbia, including modernization of political institutions, elites and the relationships developed faster modernization of social relation [Shemiakin, 2004: 29]. The political and cultural elites Europeanized quickly, they did it consciously and voluntarily. They tried simultaneously to dismiss from Orientalist political and cultural heritage, but the vast majority of population was not able to adapt values and principles of Occidentalization of political, social and cultural landscapes inspired by ruling elites. The attempts of Balkan elites to cope and transplant Western political institutions for modernization of their national realities did not lead to positive results. Russian historian Ritta Grishina presumes that

...compared with Western forms they remained defective during their formative years and in the next decades also... [Grishina 2004: 86]

The attempts to use Western political canons in this social and cultural situations did not provide political elites with guarantee of a successful political and socio-economic modernization. Despite the facts that independent Serbian state existed from the 1830s social structure and social relations had predominantly traditional character. Serbia for a long time was not imagining and inventing by European intellectuals as Europe. Western Europeans preferred to accept it as exotic region, situated on the periphery of discovered world. Serbia in these European centered versions of imagined geographies was closer to Asia than to Europe. Ottoman Empire, this "sick man of Europe" in this cultural and intellectual situation seemed more Western, Europeanized and understandable than traditionally distant, lost, peripheral and practically unknown Serbia. By the time when independent Serbian state appeared in Balkans, local elites had two alternative variants of social and political development. The independent modernization was hard-core of the first way. The second way was presented by rapid changes, transformations and modernization, but it was possible only when Serbian lands would be integrated into Habsburg Empire where Serbs were able to developed identity and limited political autonomy [Terzić, 1995: 407 - 423].

The Serbian government of Milan Piroćanac [Perović 2003: 11 - 72] in the 1880 adopted modernization compromise based on formal independence, but their foreign policy priorities become more pro-Austrian [Shemiakin, 2004: 11]. The political experience of Habsburg Empire in the eyes of Serbian intellectuals was

imagined as set of the best options for cultural and political Occidentalization of the country. The policy of accelerated and forced modernization assisted to emergence of new problems. Russian historian Ritta Grishina presumes that

some hastily transplanted democratic political norms were fraught with imminent dangers to general strategy of modernization... [Grishina 2004: 87]

The policy of the ruling Serbian elites, as Russian historian Andrei Shemiakin presumed, assisted to stabilization of "traditional mentality" [Shemiakin, 2004:15], but Serbian political elites faced with a lack of understanding of populations' majority, which preferred to keep traditions and accepted past as universal source of their activities [Shemiakin, 2004: 26].

Independent Serbia during long historical period continued to develop as state where traditional culture dominated and the significant part of population did not understand desires of the ruling elites to Europeanize the country. Commenting on this paradox, Vladimir Dvorniković emphasized that "Sumadija peasant was the main pillar and founder" [Dvorniković 1939: 862] of independent Serbia and Serbian peasantry did not understand and did not accept modernization in its Occidental or Westernized model. Serbian elites tried to made country to accept accelerated and forced reforms as way for Westernization of country and its liberalization from Eastern (Ottoman) political heritage. Russian authors were contemporaries of this zealous Serbian Occidentalization and they wrote about their attempts "to impose European culture" [Ovsiannyi 1898:90] and "squeeze" non-European Serbian statehood "in European norms" [Kulakovskii 1883: 762]. Serbian intellectuals in the period between two world wars presumed that Serbian identity faced with various constraints and challenges. The genesis and origins of these problems were dated and localized by Serbian intellectuals and politicians in Turkish period. Turks in this context were imagined and invented as universal Others. Vladimir Dvorniković believed that Ottoman yoke deformed main directions and trajectories of Serbian identity and culture and destroyed its unity. Vladimir Dvorniković believed that Turks actualized the differences and contradictions between three different styles of social and political existence. The Eastern, patriarchal heroic, and modern European were identified by Vladimir Dvorniković as the main competing forms of social life. Vladimir Dvorniković pathetically declared that "heavy Asian blood flowed in the veins of the Yugoslavs" and "oriental Turkish laziness" become one of central social factors that turned inhabitants of Balkan countries in non-European and Eastern people. Vladimir Dvorniković complained that chronologically prolonged period of Oriental, Turkish and Asian dominance in Serbia assisted to actualization of unique psychological complex defined by him as "a defect of the will" [Dvorniković 1939: 651 – 669]. Vladimir Dvorniković insisted that Turkish conquerors brought new political, social and economic relations which formed in Serbia elements of Orient. Serbian authors believed that centuries of Ottoman political and economic slavery had the most negative impact on development of Serbian identity and society. Serbian authors sought to form and develop a negative image of Turks as a non-European and Asian nation. Imagining Turks as Asians, Serbian intellectuals automatically projected on them all negative

images mentally linked with Asia. Turks and other Eastern nations in Serbian nationalist imagination were invented as very treacherous, pampered, lazy and partly primitive people. Serbian intellectuals in this context were not original, because they projected onto Turks as Asians all traditional Western collective representations and myths about mysterious Orient as too traditional region.

Serbian authors of interwar period wrote about controversial European character of Serbia. Vladimir Velmar-Janković [Velmar-Janković 2006: 11 – 29] was among there authors who doubted in possibilities of radical Occidentalization of Serbia. In the 1928 Vladimir Velmar-Janković presumed that Serbian cultural tradition corresponded predominantly with Orient. Vladimir Velmar-Janković declared that this cultural fact simplified perception of East by Serbs and also complicated their understandings of West [Velmar-Janković 1928: 1 – 2]. Vladimir Velmar-Janković also paid special attention in his articles to biographies of non-European politicians [Velmar-Janković 1927 Velmar-Janković 1928] and suggested that Serbs in Europe were among “new nations” [Velmar-Janković 1929: 612 – 613]. Vladimir Velmar-Janković thought that trends of the forced and rapid Westernization were very negative for Serbia because they promoted the rise of social and cultural contradictions, class differences in the context of development of capitalism [Velmar-Janković 1928: 3 – 16]. These forms and elements of anti-capitalist mentality of Serbian authors were stimulated by faith of Serbian intellectual who believed that Balkans were not ready to economic or cultural developments in capitalist model.

Serbian political landscape developed as dichotomy of social and cultural challenges and intellectual responses to Occidentalization in the context of an old traditional Serbian folk culture with some tendencies to Orientalization. “Rural cultural trends”, as Ljubomir Despotović [Despotović, 2003] determined them, dominated in Serbia and confronted with “modern, urban and individualistic” trends. This opposition of anti-Western Orientalization had cultural and religious nature, but anti-European project did not propose radical alternatives of political and social development. This dichotomy was based on economic and social contradictions and Serbian Orientalism in this context was predominantly social.

Political modernization was accepted, understood and imagined by Serbian peasants as an unnecessary and superfluous initiative of political elites who deliberately

cut ties of familiar intimacy between masses and elites, they built a bureaucratic wall that stimulated obvious discontent [Shemiakin, 2004: 36]

A few hundred years of traditional Orthodox communities’ existence in Islamic state significantly influenced on the main vectors of development of identity. It is also noteworthy that in the same historical period Bulgarian political elite, which also sought to Europeanize their state and escape from Orient, sought to use “natural idealism” which was able to provide them with the hope that

...modern European political institutions and doctrines will create the right climate for social and economic changes and will directly stimulate them... [Grishina 2004: 83]

This social and cultural situation was the result of elites developments in Serbia where the great numbers of representatives of political classes were presented by European-educated intellectuals who knew European languages and had experience of prolonged living in Western Europe.

Serbian peasantry lived under domination of culture, which can be defined as traditional or Oriental. Serbia in the early 20th century was the country with stable dominance of the traditional agrarian society identified by Andrei Shemiakin as a society based on preservation of its "patriarchal and static nature" [Shemiakin, 2004:17]. Serbian peasantry by the beginning of the 20th century in the total social structure of population in general constituted 87% (Đorđević 1985). Andrei Shemiakin presumes that

the preservation of traditional Serbian peasant consciousness in society assisted to its conservation... it practically did not change archaic forms and conditions of its existence [Shemiakin, 2004: 18]

Serbian agrarian communities in this situation were virtually devoid of incentives for development and they existed only for being existed.... The neighboring Bulgaria, as well as Serbia, also developed in social situation when traditional values and relationships were also extremely stable. Commenting on features of political modernization in Bulgaria, Ritta Grishina presumes that

...innovations were based on a matrix basis ... renovation of prevailing archaic traditions and reproduction of the same basic features with few changes took place in reality... [Grishina 2004: 90].

Other Russian historian Andrei Shemiakin states that

...equality on the subsistence level was a characteristic feature of the Serbian society, and it was also important that it [equality] at least was available for all... [Shemiakin, 2004: 21].

The continental character of Serbian imagined and invented political geography formed a homogeneous political culture, and this type of culture in the early 20th century was almost unresponsive and had extremely poor adoptive potential for transplantation of European political experience. Serbia belonged to the number of non-developed countries and this factor allowed other Europeans to think and write about it as Eastern or even Oriental country. Serbia only formally became a part of Europe, but in fact, it was very archaic and too traditional. Social structure of Serbian 2 million population was also traditional because professional workers constituted only 4.000 [Shemiakin, 2004: 14]. By the 1911 only 21% of Serbians were able to read and write

[Shemiakin, 2004:42]. Serbia of the early 20th century in general did not know a clear division of responsibilities between agricultural and urbanized communities, and its national economy was among the most undeveloped European economies. It is absolutely logical to presume that traditional society dominated in this country despite the fact that in Western Europe it was the subject of historical, ethnographical and anthropological studies. The traditionalism and archaicism in Serbia formed political, economic, and cultural realities.

Social institutions that disappeared in Western Europe were influential in Serbia. The peasant commune, known in Serbia as the *zadruga*, was among the most important archaic institutions. The modernizing impulses of the ruling elites faced with traditionalism, and it was extremely difficult for them to overcome traditions. Commenting this situation and role of traditional barriers which were influential in the Balkans, Russian historian Ritta Grishina points out that

...one of the main pillars of modernization process is transformation of social structure, inherited by new state from previous traditional society... [Grishina, 2004: 122].

The mentality of Serbian majority continued to be collectivist, and collective identity dominated among Serbian peasants on national and group localized levels. Serbian statehood itself was not perceived or understood by peasantry as a product of modernity, it was primitivized and imagined as great collectivist *zadruga*. Developing this idea, Russian historian Andrei Shemiakin emphasizes that

...Serbian peasant understood the state as enlarged copy of local community... [Shemiakin, 2004: 36]

The persistent pro-European sympathies dominated among Serbian political and intellectual elites, and they tried to form and develop Serbian version of positive Occidentalism. The formation of European political sympathies led to eradication of Eastern heritage and stimulated conscious rejection of Orientalism. These intellectual tendencies led to formation of strong and stable pro-European political traditions in Serbia. The eradication of eastern legacy and deliverance from Oriental trends in Serbian cultural heritage, religious and political discourse were among extremely radical instruments of modernization. Despite all these pro-Occidental ambitions the Oriental period was an important milestone in formation of Serbian political culture which was among good graduates from school of Eastern nationalism. Serbian nationalism was much closer to Eastern ethnic nationalisms than to Western ones which were civil and political. The only mosque in Beograd, the capital of modern Serbia, is a living testimony and example that Serbian elites successfully assimilated Occidental radicalism, invented their national history in categories of conscious exile and displacement of Oriental past, and finally imagined their country as political and geographical part of Europe...

Bulgarian voices in Orientalism

The current and actual national maps of Europe and East are not only results of political processes, these maps were not arisen as a result of isolation or actualization of natural and physical features of different region. The regions and countries did not originate from geography, they arise as welcome children or unwanted bastards of nationalistic imaginations of local intellectuals who tried to institutionalize their ideas in political forms and map the idealized states they were dreaming about and struggling for. These geographical, political and intellectual imaginations in Balkans significantly influenced on processes defined by Bulgarian historian Albena Vacheva as

a desire to revolutionize the concept of collective cultural identity in historical, subjective and symbolic point of view [Vacheva, 2003].

The imagined geography generates all other forms and types of geographies, including political and economic ones. Geography in this context transformed or mutated from only natural science in politicized and ideologically marked form of geographical knowledge. Geography, like history, is an area that is widely used for invention, imagination and further promotion and popularization of national identities.

Balkan intellectuals faced with considerable difficulties in forming of their national identities, which were among results of prolonged separation from Europe and development in the state that European intellectuals did not recognize European. Bulgarian elites attempted to build idealized "European" state starting from period after Liberation. They had pro-European ambitions during monarchial period and Bulgarian intellectuals were not ready to dismiss from them when their country belonged to Soviet sphere of influence. The objective difficulties and contradictions of democratic transition and European integration become important factors in development of Bulgarian intellectual tradition. Bulgarian elites had a strong desire to break with their Eastern past. This imagined and invented Oriental discourse in Bulgarian identity and modern Bulgarian historical memory has two dimensions presented by collective ideas and representations about epoch of Ottoman rule and period of Soviet domination. The idea that Bulgarian elites were under the powerful influence of European idea became common place, influential intellectual and political constructs in post-modernist Bulgarian cultural discourse and historiography [Aretov, 2003], but Bulgarian and other Balkan intellectuals, unlike their European counterparts, who assimilated Orient predominantly in academic way, were familiar with Orient better, because some generations ago their states geographically and politically belonged to non-European world.

The situation is complicated by the fact that development of Bulgarian nationalism, political modernization and transformation of identity led to restoration of independent Bulgarian state, where the ruling elites and intellectual communities exerted great efforts for political and cultural drift from Oriental Asia to more attractive Occidental Europe [Strandzheva, 2002]. The unpleasant discovery waited Bulgarian intellectuals after restoration of political

independence: Bulgaria did not belong to Europe politically, culturally and economically, Bulgaria and Europe co-existed in various systems of intellectual and political coordinates. Early modern independent Bulgaria was similar to those states that became results in the colonial empires collapse and developed as postcolonial. It is difficult to clearly determine was Bulgaria post-colonial country or not. Bulgarian intellectuals were more interesting to position themselves as Europeans, and they preferred to imagine their country as liberated, new, young Europe [Daskalov, 1998, Aretov, 2006, Zaimova, 1992; Zaimova, 1997, Todorova 2004; Todorova 1997], when European intellectuals were not always agree with them and preferred imagine Bulgarians as new Europeans who recently come back home from Orient. This was result of negative historical and geographical dynamic that transformed Bulgaria from European state in victim of Turks who come from East. Western Balkan periphery was subjected to forced Orientalization that greatly influenced on general trajectories of development of Bulgarian Orientalism in particular and its Balkan perception in general. Europeans were not always inclined to see Bulgarians as new Europeans, representatives of European culture and a country that was part of European history and political tradition. The ten years before Liberation, Bulgaria in the eyes of enlightened Europeans was just one of the Turkish provinces or European Turkey [Karlova, 1870, Karlova, 1986, Detrez, 2002]. Bulgarian nationalists and intellectual disagreed with these non-attractive symbolic statuses and tried to transform their post-colonial and post-Oriental country, based on typical Balkan old patriarchal system of collectivist values, in rapidly and dynamically Europeanizing society which successfully assimilated Western political values and cultural traditions.

This situation of early independence did not satisfy Bulgarian intellectuals and cultural atmosphere in general made them come to logical conclusion and ambitious goal, formulated by Bulgarian cultural elites: firstly, Bulgaria will cease to be Orient; secondly, Bulgaria should be Europe; thirdly, Bulgarian intellectuals will again restore their spirit ties and cultural connections with Occident, which were developed several centuries before, they were torn by Turkish invaders who occupied Balkans [Chernokozhev, 2003]. The European trends were extremely important for Bulgarian intellectuals who correlated progress of modernization with Europe as imagined and idealized Occident. Bulgarian intellectuals radically dismissed from identification with Orient attempted to escape from it politically, mentally and intellectually. The concept of "Europe" as "Occident" for Bulgarian nationalists had a strong correlations and connotations with the concept of "nation" [Mishkova 2002] when principle of nationality in this context correlated and linked with Western political nationalism in the most general perspective. The imagining and inventing concepts of "Bulgaria" and "Europe" were among the most popular in Bulgarian cultural and intellectual practices [Aretov, 1994] of that period, they were almost identical and had much in common in political and cultural lexicon of Bulgaria when its political elites tried to find their ways in Europe.

It is possible to map and localize elements of peculiar proto-Orientalism in texts of Bulgarian intellectuals of the 1920s and the 1930s, including Nikolai Yordanov, Atanas Iliev, Asen Zlatarov, and Atanas Ishirkov. Bulgarian intellectuals of inter-wars period paid special attention in their texts to problems

which some decades later would be analyzed in the context of mental and imagined geographies proposed by Western for fixation of mobile and non-stable boundaries and frontiers of Oriental post-colonial identities. Nikolai Yordanov in the 1926 pointed out that West, in spite of permanently increasing number of publications about East and endless stream of European travelers in Asia had certain difficulties in determining for themselves what Orient was. Nikolai Yordanov compared Orient and West, which “was proud of its science”, presumed that West was “humble disciple” who only started to understand East. This opposition and dichotomy “Orient” / “Occident” become more prominent in context of historical discrepancies in levels of development of these two regions. In the middle of the 1920s, more than twenty years before the beginning of process of decolonization, Bulgarian intellectual tried to understand special catalytic role of religion in the East, which with nationalism determined the main trajectories of Oriental histories [Yordanov, 1926:393 – 398].

The processes analyzed in the middle of the 1920s by Bulgarian intellectuals, a few decades later became dominant or extremely influential in Oriental states, where decolonization, which led to emergence on new nation and nationalizing states, started and radically changed political maps inherited by region from former European colonizers. The collapse of colonial empires and emergence of new states in East provoke a new wave of interest in this region from Western European and American authors, who, as imagined “disciples” and “pupils” of Nikolai Yordanov, re-invented, re-imagined and re-discovered Orient for themselves and their academic needs. The classical postcolonial analysis in this intellectual context emerged in process when new pos-colonial Orient was re-discovered and localized on imagined maps of post-colonial world, but some of these ideas and moods of intellectual trends of post-colonial era were originally proposed in the texts of Bulgarian intellectuals of the 1920s.

This cultural dichotomy of simultaneous co-existence of Orient and Occident in the texts of Atanas Iliev got new features. The world, including Bulgaria, was invented and imagined by Atanas Iliev as a sphere of Occidental influence and as Western cultural projection to other forms of culture. Atanas Iliev in their texts formulated extremely controversial questions including the following: how long interaction between East and West, based on the models of subordination and domination, will determine general vectors and main trajectories of relations between Orient and Occident. Bulgaria was imagined by them in this intellectual context as new, state that recently became free. Bulgarian intellectuals presumed that this Bulgaria faced with powerful cultural influence of West, but this country was able to preserve its national, language and cultural identity. Atanas Iliev presumed that Western cultural influences were necessary and pointed out that in the future the role of these effects will be significant [Iliev, 1926]. Atanas Iliev declared the need to compound “native” cultural values with Western cultural influences. This problem become especially relevant after the First World War, which changed radically relationship between the ruling political elites and suppressed masses, forced representatives of elites to communicate directly with citizens. Commenting on particularities of this situation Bulgarian intellectuals, including Atanas Iliev, presumed that after Liberation of Bulgaria the country developed very rapidly and quickly, but it was not able to assimilate Western culture. This led to a conflict between various

trends among Bulgarian intellectuals who had diametrically opposed attitudes to possibilities of reconciliation between national tradition and Western cultural influence [Iliev, 1926].

Bulgarian intellectuals in the middle of the 1920s had some special and totally unique historical premonitions. The ideas of Atanas Iliev, expressed by him in the 1926, were relevant with cultural metamorphosis of postcolonial societies. Atanas Iliev in his articles published after the First World War, analyzed transcultural situations which would be determined as postcolonialism. How can we explain fact that Bulgarian intellectuals in the 1920s wrote about events which become part of political and social realities only in the end of the 1970s? It is not possible to answer this question categorically and unequivocally because other Bulgarian intellectuals who were historical contemporaries of Atanas Iliev proposed similar ideas.

Atanas Ishirkov, commenting the specifics of cultural development, wrote about division of peoples' cultures in cultural, poorly-cultural and uncivilized. The original standard, which could be used for verification and determination of cultural levels of different national cultures, as Atanas Ishirkov thought, was only Western culture. Atanas Ishirkov presumed that definition of Europe was synonymous of culture in general. Atanas Ishirkov was interested in impact of Western culture on "poorly cultural nations". Atanas Ishirkov, analyzing various forms of this influence, believed that many "natural" peoples in Africa or America, who were forced to come into contact with Europeans, were destroyed and assimilated [Ishirkov, 1926, 139 - 149]. Nikola Yordanov [Yordanov, 1926] imagined Asia as part of world which appeared as a result of development of Western book culture and literature traditions. Ianko Ianev [Ianev, 1933] also actualized historical choice of Bulgaria between East and West.

Asen Zlatarov, another author of the 1920s, described relationships between European and Eastern cultures in a different way. Asen Zlatarov believed that Japan was a classical example that characterized potential of Western experience in non-European and non-Western countries. Asen Zlatarov believed that in a relatively short chronological period Japan experienced significant changes and become one of the most developed countries in Asia and a mostly Europeanized non-European state. Asen Zlatarov believed that Japanese experience had the particular importance because Europeanization did not lead to colonization, and it allowed Japanese nation to remain Japanese and preserve national culture, language and religion, and also connect them with achievements of Western national cultures [Zlatarov, 1926].

The ideas of Bulgarian authors, who were active between two world wars, presentimented post-colonialism in spite of fact that phenomenon of post-colonialism logically and chronologically is correlated predominantly with the second half of the 20th century. The ideas of Bulgarian intellectuals of the 1920s and the 1930s actualized the problem of Bulgarian belongingness and participation in Oriental and post-colonial experiences. The origins of Bulgarian proto-Orientalism were among results of cultural experience got by Bulgarian intellectuals after the Liberation in the process of gradual transformation of traditional institutions that existed during Ottoman period in Bulgaria. The attempts to Bulgarize the political institution of nation-state of the Western type also actualized post-Oriental and post-colonial status of Bulgarian after its

Liberation. Bulgarian intellectuals revised national identity, de-Orientalized it and marginalized Oriental motifs in Bulgarian national memory.

Bulgarian return to Occident was a mental break with Orient. It was not so easy because the range of European intellectuals attitudes to Bulgaria was limited by a sense of political and cultural indulgence of sympathy. European intellectuals in Bulgaria saw the semi-civilized and semi-barbarian periphery [Zaimova, 2002], which should be integrated in the Western cultural discourse and liberated from semi-barbaric or even barbaric Oriental heritage. Historically and politically motivated rejection of belongness to Orient was a conscious choice of Bulgarian cultural discourse to be a part of Occident. Bulgaria degraded from Occident to Orient when it lost common cultural borders with Europe [Zaimova, 2003] during period of active territorial expansion of Ottoman Empire. Ottoman political elites were able to exclude Bulgaria and Bulgarians from Western cultural and political landscapes, but they could not Orientalize them in general. Geographic and intellectual speculations and reflection about "Occident" and "Orient" concepts become an effective mechanism, which assisted to cultural transformations and social changes of traditional identities of Bulgarian peasants and their politically and culturally stimulated mutations in modern nations. The national imagination and deconstruction become a universal intellectual practice of Bulgarian community. The integration of Bulgarian humanities in an international context also actualized problems and challenges of Orientalism in the context of genesis of post-colonial analysis. The recognized belongness of Bulgarian intellectual communities also actualized their responsibility for moral justification and legitimation of cultural and intellectual dominance of Western world over Orient.

Institute for Literature Studies of Bulgarian Academy of Sciences can be imagined as a leader in the process of popularization in Bulgaria of Western methods of Humanities. The group of outstanding literary critics formed formal and informal circle of scholars who inspired and initiated publication of several books and collections of articles [Bilich, Savich, 2004; Aretov, 2001 – 2003] which became radical attempts to overcome methodological gap between Bulgarian and the world (Western) humanitarian studies. Several contemporary Bulgarian intellectuals, including Nikolai Aretov [Aretov, 2000], Boris Angelov [Angelov, 2000], Albena Vacheva [Vacheva, 2003: 457 - 479], Desislava Lilova [Lilova 2005; Lilova 2003: 27 - 62], Milena Kirova [Kirova, 2003 128 - 147], Lidiia Mihova [Mihova, 1995, Mihova, 2001], Diana Mishkova [Mishkova, 1992: 89 - 119; Mishkova, 1995: 36 - 53; Mishkova, 2001], Violeta Ruseva [Ruseva 2003 111 - 118], Velichko Todorov [Todorov, 2000; Todorov, 1996], Georgi Chobanov [Chobanov, 1999] formed and developed original Bulgarian school in the inter-disciplinary studies of nations and identities, nationalisms, modernisms and postmodernisms, nationalist imaginations, political, geographical and intellectual mapping, cultural and intellectual transformations. Bulgarian intellectuals [Angelov, 2010 Zaimova, 2006 Mineva, 2000] inspired by external intellectual stimulus, were active in popularization of Western post-modernist and constructivist concepts, including classical Orientalist approach, in Bulgarian historiography. Bulgarian interest in Orientalism in theoretical perspective inspired new original texts [Zaimova, 2012] focused on attempts to imagine a history of Bulgaria in Oriental and partially post-colonial system of

coordinates. It is noteworthy, that among these Bulgarian intellectuals practically there are no professional Orientalists, but values of their intellectual impacts and cultural contributions in development of new imagined and invented geographies are obvious.

The significant increase of interest in local archaic and almost Oriental or even Asian, popular culture of Bulgarian folklore [Chernokozhev, 2002] historically and culturally proceeded to Occidentalization of cultural landscape in Bulgaria. These cultural tendencies were among results of desire of Bulgarian authors to fix Western elements, separate them from Oriental obeas and negative Eastern influences. Bulgarian intellectuals were extremely active and successful in their attempts to escape from East to West. Bulgarian cultural discourse existed and developed as deeply fragmented for some decades after national liberation and Orientalist and Occidental trends simultaneously coexisted in Bulgarian identity. The poetic narrative Hristo Pavlovich, who passionately argued that

праотци наши юнаци били!... Храбрий Александр Македонски
тях спомощници он е имал, с техния успехи же войнишки
Гърция, Азия завладял!... [Rakovski 1981: 281 - 282]

was more Oriental than Occidental. Turkic images (“...с турци побратими те станеха...”) were not so terrible and horrible as they became some decades later, but images of Greeks (“...гърци безумни и несмислени...”) who formally belonged to the same Orthodox religion with Bulgarians were among the negative [Rakovski 1981: 235].

Petar Mutafchiev played a special role in formation and development of European narratives in Bulgarian historiography. Petar Mutafchiev in the middle of the 1920s initiated one of the first attempts of scientific comparisons of specificities of historical development of East and West in Bulgarian historiography. These attempts were not forgiven in socialist Bulgaria where he had reputation of the “bourgeois-idealistic” and “reactionary-fascist” forger [Petrov, 1950 - 1951: 393 - 425]. Analyzing phenomenon of Occident Petar Mutafchiev presumed that Europe was often limited “not inly by lands which geographically formed European mainland, but also by lands inhabited by Roman-Germanic peoples” [Mutafchiev, 1925: 127 - 157]. Petar Mutafchiev [Mutafchiev, 1941; Mutafciev, 1943] was among Bulgarian intellectuals who did a lot for de-Orientalization of Bulgaria. Petar Mutafchiev tried to prove that Bulgarians were historically autochthonous population and Turks were imagined as foreign and alien nomads. The political tasks of mental displacement and exile of other cultures and alien groups from Bulgarian cultural context were solved by Bulgarian political elites rather quickly: Muslims were marginalized, they were not recognized and degraded from former ruling group to marginal invisible minority. Ethnic Turks were forced to leave territory of Bulgaria. Bulgarian political and intellectual elites consciously and radically de-Turkized state because they were interested in its further development as ethnically pure Bulgarian national state. Bulgarian intellectuals in these contexts sought to synthesize political and ethnic nationalisms of elites with their own cultural nationalism, but they were united in their political faith that new and modern Bulgarian culture will develop as European identity.

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МАРОККО – ВО ВРЕМЕНИ И ПРОСТРАНСТВЕ

Так сложилось, что более десяти лет, в разные периоды своей жизни я провела в Северной Африке, точнее в странах Магриба (Алжир, Тунис и Марокко), где работала переводчиком французского языка в разных российских компаниях. Несмотря на экзотику, которая порой зашкаливает в этом регионе, меня часто посещало ощущение родства. Прежде всего, для меня как лингвиста это были языковые явления: топонимы, имена, названия блюд. Иногда какие-то культурные факты, до изумления, напоминающие то родную одежду, то еду, то жилища. Эти записки – очень краткое описание впечатлений, которые не претендуют на строгую научность, но надеюсь, станут для кого-то небольшим открытием и, может быть, подтолкнут к дальнейшим познаниям.

Марокко сказочная страна. Это понимаешь ещё в самолёте, когда приземляешься, и в одном иллюминаторе видна ровная полоса соприкосновения оранжевой земли и синей воды, в которую опускается ослепляющее солнце, а в иллюминаторах напротив уже сумерки, почти ночь. Вода – это таинственное «Море Мрака», так называли в древности Атлантический океан¹⁰, за которым – Новый Свет. А берег – это Африка, родительница человечества. Всё вместе – Королевство Марокко. Марокко по площади занимает 57-ое место в мире. Но на такой небольшой территории есть всё. Белые от снега вершины Атласа, с вулканическими озёрами и реликтовыми кедрами, где дома с красными черепичными крышами как в Таллинне и горнолыжные трассы, как в Швейцарии. Другая горная цепь – хребет Рифа идет по берегу Средиземного моря, её название и означает «берег»¹¹. Горы Рифа¹² образуют те самые Геркулесовы столбы из древнегреческих мифов. Скала Абила, относится к Европе, а другая — Джебель-Муса расположена на территории Марокко, всего в 14 километрах. По одной из легенд, Геракл любил отдыхать здесь в гроте перед очередным подвигом. Однажды он пробил горы так, что между ними образовался проход – Гибралтарский пролив. А форма образовавшегося прохода в гроте потрясюще напоминает контур Африки, мне нравилось фотографироваться на её фоне. Реликтовая впадина уэда¹³ Себу отделяет горы Рифа от Среднего Атласа. Плодородные зелёные долины реки Себу, и сегодня вполне узнаваемы на полотнах Эжена Делакруа, копии которых я дарила марокканским коллегам. Мы с детским восторгом даже находили места¹⁴, изображённые на полотнах 180-летней давности и описания местности в мемуарах художника¹⁵.

На самом юге страны сходятся Атлантический и песчаный океан само название которого вызывает неутолимую жажду – величественная Сахара. Про которую надо

¹⁰ Сегодняшнее название океану было дано только в начале 16 века картографом Вальд-Земюллером.

¹¹ Мазеин Н. В. *Арабские географические названия*

¹² Рифейские горы (Рипейские горы, Рипы, Рифы, Рипеи, Рифеи) — также обозначение возвышенностей, дающих начало основным рекам Скифии; в греческой мифологии это и горы, на которых находилось жилище северного ветра Борей. Аристотель также указывал, что Рипейские горы лежат за крайней Скифией

¹³ Уэд – название рек; название сухих русел рек и речных долин временных или периодических водных потоков в Северной Африке.

¹⁴ С 2011 по 2014 я работала в Марокко, где российская компания строила плотину М'Дез, как раз в местах, где пребывал Делакруа. У него есть полотно «Переправа», по-берберски название места плотины как раз и называется мост, т.е. переправа.

¹⁵ http://delakrua.ru/year_1832_5

рассказывать отдельно. Марокко – это также ворота в чёрную Африку, расположенные всего в десятке километров от Европы. Королевство Марокко мусульманская страна, находящаяся за тысячи километров от духовных исламских центров, это самая западная окраина арабского Востока. В этом месте, сошлись сразу три континента со множеством самобытностей, что делает королевство хранилищем сокровенных традиций и источником вдохновения для художников, писателей, кинематографистов и просто для тех, кто, подобно мне, не может «насытиться» этой страной.

С прагматической точки зрения Марокко это очень перспективное государство, открытое к сотрудничеству. Король Хасан II, отец нынешнего монарха Мухаммеда VI определил стратегический треугольник: Европа-США-Россия. Марокко - геополитический мост между Европой и Африкой, динамично развивающийся регион, который переживает образовательный бум, и, с недавнего времени, позиционирует себя как образовательный хаб для подготовки африканских кадров. Например, в университете-партнёре ВГУ из города Фес уже сегодня обучаются студенты из 23 стран Африки. Многие его выпускники занимают высокие государственные посты в своих государствах. Безусловно, это хорошая идея для приостановки потоков нежелательных мигрантов в Европу, с которой у страны стабильные, если не родственные отношения. В Марокко представлено большое количество крупнейших мировых компаний, банков, строительных международных проектов. Я бы назвала Марокко «столицей» африканского континента. В сотрудничестве с ней очень заинтересован Китай, Канада, Латиноамериканские страны. Российские компании и научные кадры, некогда присутствовавшие во всех регионах континента, оставившие по себе добрую память, должны вернуться на африканскую землю, в том числе, чтоб не отстать от общемирового тренда. Тем более, нас там точно ждут.

Про название. Официальное название Королевства Марокко – аль Мамляка аль Магрибия – «самая дальняя страна солнечного заката». Магриб в переводе с арабского означает «запад, закат». Ведь когда садится солнце, наступает «морок», в значениях «мрак, сумрак...». А ещё Морок — в славянской мифологии, дух темноты, в значениях «мрак, сумрак...», дух очарования, ворожейства. Владимир Даль в свое время писал: «О колдунах народ верит, что они отводят глаза, т. е. напускают такую мару или мороку, что никто не видит того, что есть, а все видят то, чего вовсе нет¹⁶. И правда, природная изолированность придаёт жителям Магриба, особенно его оконечности – Марокко нечто загадочное и колдовское. А магрибские колдуны снискали себе славу во всём арабском мире. Достаточно вспомнить магрибского колдуна из сказок 1000 и 1 ночь. Для истории Восточной Европы магрибские колдуны значимы по той причине, что они являлись основной боевой магической силой армии османов, во время завоевания Европы. После того, как магрибские колдуны покинули османских правителей (примерно 1603 год), они перестали оказывать значительное влияние на европейскую политику и сосредоточились на севере африканского континента. Марокканских женщин-колдуний опасаются и местные, вполне образованные подданные королевства. Мне как-то тоже пришлось убедиться в том, что странные явления существуют, как добрые, так и опасные. А еще, в марокканском эпосе колдун непременно с голубыми глазами, там дурной глаз называют белым, т.е. светлым. Общения с нашим голубоглазым соотечественником они старались избегать. Купить снадобья для колдовского ритуала и узнать рецепт можно на обычном рынке: на ткани, прямо на земле лежат сухие коренья, какие-то лапы, жуки, кристаллы – на все случаи. Необычные

¹⁶ Даль В.И. О поверьях, суевериях и предрассудках русского народа./Сборник «Русское колдовство». М.: «Эксмо»/СПб.: «Terra Fantastica», 2002. – с.25.

способности у жителей Варварийского берега, или Берберии¹⁷, так некогда называлось побережье Северной Африки западнее Египта, отмечали уже античные авторы. И сейчас их побаиваются даже соседи.

Марокканцы. Марокканская нация сложилась из потомков древних берберов – автохтонов (самоназвание амазиги), небольшого количества евреев (бежавших после разрушения храма в начале нашей эры и изгнанные из Испании в 15 веке) и арабов, которые пришли в Северную Африку в 7-8 веках. По некоторым данным берберское население составляет 60% марокканцев, это древнейший народ, ломающий стереотипы об африканцах. Сохранились изображения белокожих, русых берберов в египетских пирамидах. Берберы были хозяевами на северном африканском берегу и в Средиземноморье, Карфаген соперничал с Римом. А «воцарение первого императора африканского происхождения, Септимия Севера, происходящего из берберской семьи, торжественно открыло великую страницу Римской империи» – речь идёт о спартанском образе жизни¹⁸. Берберские корни были у Августина Блаженного, которого почитает католическая и православная церковь. Сегодня берберы, арабы, марокканские евреи так перемешаны, что в большинстве случаев по внешности невозможно определить кто перед тобой. Гораздо больше скажут косвенные признаки: место рождения, род занятий, психологические нюансы. И всё же, несмотря на тысячелетнее смешение арабского и берберского субстратов, большое количество берберских племен и разнообразие их типажей, многие лица коренного населения Марокко вполне европейские. Может быть смуглее. Как-то один наш коллега, мсье Буаду, вполне светский человек, появился в офисе в чалме. И объяснил, что это, потому что его наши сотрудники постоянно принимают за русского и что-то говорят по-русски. «Ага – отвечаю ему – а теперь вас принимают за русского в чалме!» Он оценил шутку, а чалму больше не надевал, зато быстро освоил несколько фраз по-русски. Берберы во многом сформировали разнообразие и специфику культуры Марокко, в которой смешалось несколько культурных пластов: черная Африка, европейская Андалузия, Ближний Восток.

О племена, и нравы! Марокко этнически неоднородная страна. Это естественно, так как само географическое положение обусловило интерес пришлых народов, каждый из которых оставил после себя этническую пестроту. Финикийцы, ливийцы, вандалы, латиняне, арабы, евреи, андалусийцы, соседи из чёрной Африки и европейцы в разные эпохи приходили сюда. А естественная изоляция: за горами, на горах и в пустыне, помогла также сохраниться в нетронутом виде не только многим природным уголкам и растениям, но и реликтовым автохтонам.

Зимой в горах идут обильные снегопады. Например, на пасху в 2012 году, снег покрыл всё толщиной в 20 см, и это 16 апреля! Потом бурные потоки воды затопляют мосты и дороги. Поэтому берберские общины Высокого Атласа часто оказываются отрезанными от окружающего мира. Из долины в долину можно перебраться только через перевалы по узким горным тропам, где проходят только ослы да козы. После обильных дождей селевые потоки разрушают жилища в одночасье. Правда глинистые почвы это и благодатный материал для строительства домов. Глину месят с соломой, формируют кизяки-кирпичи, как делали в русских деревнях ещё совсем недавно. Сушат и складывают

¹⁷ Варварский берег (фр. Côte des Barbaresques) — европейское название средиземноморского побережья Северной Африки, со времён позднего Средневековья (XV век) и до XIX века. К Варварскому берегу относили побережье стран Магриба: Алжира, Туниса и Марокко.

¹⁸ Властелины Рима: Биографии римских императоров от Адриана до Диоклетиана / Пер. с лат. С. П. Кондратьева. М.: Наука, 1992. 384 с. [Scriptores Historiae Augustae].

жилища очень быстро, а крыши покрывают как соломой тростником, точно как малороссийские мазанки, только небелёные, окруженные тростниковыми плетнями и кактусовыми зарослями.

Берберы отличаются от арабского населения характером: большей суровостью, силой, обострённым чувством справедливости, правда, очень часто в свою пользу. Они довольно жестокий народ, так как выживают в сложных природных условиях; бесконечное переселение и вражда друг с другом на протяжении столетий сформировало их характер и национальные традиции. Берберские имена запрещены, используются традиционные для ислама имена, но как-то моя знакомая берберка призналась, у них в деревне, в семьях частенько называют берберскими именами. Например, её домашние называют Уэльха. Она произнесла имя быстро и звучало оно как...Ольга!

Роль перекрёстка из Европы в чёрную Африку и с Ближнего Востока в Атлантику и многовековое смешение оставили свой также яркий след в берберских языках, одежде, узорах ковров. Оставила она и нерешенные до сих пор загадки. Например, о происхождении берберов, этих африканских европейцев, внешний вид которых потряс древних путешественников и, позднее, французских колонизаторов-генералов, многие из которых стали увлеченными этнологами. Малика Хашид, учёная-берберка, уже в 21 веке, на основании археологических данных, недавней генетической экспертизы и других исследований, пришла к выводу, что берберы Северной Африки – это две ветви европеоидов: местных и пришлых, но пришедших на эти земли так давно, что нет возможности определить откуда. Чтобы составить представление о том, как выглядят некоторые из них, можно посмотреть на лица Эдит Пиаф (урожденная Гассун, фамилия часто встречается в г. Мекнес), бабушка которой была марокканской берберкой. Берберские корни у французской актрисы Изабель Аджани. Из мужчин самый известный – это футболист Зинетдин Зидан и Сами Насери, актер из «Такси». У берберов есть свое летоисчисление: 2018 - это новый 2968 год по берберскому календарю, встречают его 13 января!

В Марокко каждое племя, каждая долина, каждое село имеет свои уникальные характеристики, идентифицируемые его музыкой, архитектурными особенностями, обычаями. Если мужское платье более или менее одинаковое, то одежда, причёски, пение, манера танцевать и условия жизни женщин в каждой провинции отличаются от одного племени к другому. Существует огромная разница между черными одеждами женщин племени туарегов, и женщинами из Бхалиля, это в 20 км от Феса, которые носят белое покрывало с головы до пят, как античные статуи. Отличаются своими причёсками, женщины из Риссани: высветленные пряди вдоль лица, костюмами Аит Моргат и украшениями женщины племени Издег. Каждый регион и каждое племя имеет свой собственный диалект. Соплеменники узнают друг друга по одежде, языкам и акцентам. А вот между собой, в качестве языка коммуникации, они используют диалект арабского – дарижа, или французский!

Туареги. И всё-таки есть одно племя, именно мужчины которого очень выразительны. Это туареги. Кочевой народ пустыни, они обитают в нескольких странах, презирая границы и условности, «нет у них родины, нет им изгнания». Среди них встречаются как чернокожие представители, так и сохранившие европейские черты лица, даже со светлыми глазами, правда, изрядно загоревшие. Женщины-туареги отличаются от других мусульманок большей независимостью от религиозных традиций. Они все образованы, в том смысле, что сохраняют древнейшее на земле письмо тифинаг, они, а не мужчины передают грамоту дочерям, а мужчины уезжают на заработки, водят караваны. У туарегов именно мужчины носят *лисам*, часть ткани от чалмы, закрывающую нижнюю часть

лица. Это понятно, т.к. в пустыне песчаные ветра поднимают пыль, от которой страдают органы дыхания. Но по их легенде, когда мужчины не справлялись с набегами соседей, женщины племени встали на свою защиту и прогнали навсегда врагов. А своим мужчинам кинули *лисам* – прикрыть краску стыда. Туареги носят ярко-синюю длинную одежду-балахоны, которую красят натуральными красителями, но без применения воды, а вбивают краску камнями. Они говорят, что этот синий минерал сохраняет влагу тела.

Как-то мне случилось познакомиться с одним представителем этого народа, он со сдержанным удовольствием ответил на мои вопросы. Почему синий цвет одежд? Потому что это доступный минеральный краситель, а ещё, это сокровенный символ, по их легендам, туареги приплыли в пустыню по воде и их прародина там, где вода. Цвет одежды – это память о ней. Они – люди моря! Что значит ваше имя? Есть версия, что они уплыли либо от природной катастрофы, либо были изгнаны за что-то, т.е. *отвергнуты*. А поскольку некоторые диалекты берберского языка принимают в женском роде приставку Т, то получается и совсем интересно: t-wareg, т-варег (варяги?). А ещё я узнала, почему туареги подводят черным глаза, причем мужчины не меньше чем женщины. Безусловно, чувство красоты в крови этого народа. Но подводка, это очень древняя традиция. Как я поняла, она выполняет защитную функцию от песка, пыли и последующего конъюнктивита. А вот наносят её тоненькой палочкой, которая служит и пробкой в тонком тюбике-цилиндре с порошком сурьмы. Палочку в черной субстанции надо положить на нижнее веко и крепко закрыть глаза, зажав между веками, и тонкая подводка готова. Правда чисто и тонко это получается не сразу. Действительно, макияж вокруг глаз делается не только для красоты. «При анализе многочисленных образцов этой косметики у египетских мумий, современные учёные установили, что большая часть её делалась на основе свинца, который увеличивал оксид азота в клетках кожи до 240%. Важно то, что оксид азота является ключевым сигнальным агентом в организме, усиливающим иммунную систему. В тропических и болотистых районах Нила, где свирепствовали глазные инфекции, это было очень важно. К тому же макияж защищал кожу от прямых солнечных лучей»¹⁹.

Красота, страшная сила! Модные у нас татуировки из хны на руках, которые в Марокко наносят и сплошь на ладони, ногти и подошвы, тоже имеют эстетическую и практическую причину. Хна (хенна) — краска из высушенных листьев невзрачного деревца, лавсонии, которые собирают во время цветения, после высушивания и растирания в порошок, изготавливается краска. Её используют для окрашивания волос, лечения кожи головы и тела, даже при головной боли. Хна природный антисептик, а еще, мне кажется, обладает антимикозными свойствами. Часто можно увидеть у детей и взрослых оранжевые пятки и подошвы и такие же окрашенные ладони и ногти. В условиях жизни при недостатке воды, понятно преклонение перед этим растением. С давних времён большую популярность в арабских странах получила роспись по телу с использованием хны в эстетических и религиозных целях, которая называется *менди*. Рисунок держится до трёх недель и, в зависимости от добавок, обладает различными оттенками, от светло-оранжевого до тёмно-красного и чёрного. Невестам перед свадьбой наносят необыкновенно красивые ритуальные узоры в потаённых местах. Для усиления магических женских чар и, думаю, из гигиенических соображений. Гостям на ладонку наносят также кружок из кашицы хны, который потом долго не смывается и напоминает о празднике и молодожёнах.

Религия и не только. Марокканцы, хотя и достаточно консервативны в своем поведении, особого религиозного фанатизма (по крайней мере, на людях) не проявляют.

¹⁹ <http://fishki.net/2132599-10-ne-ochen-prijatnyh-strannostej-drevnih-egiptjan.html>

Чем-то это даже напоминает православие в российской глубинке – без явного рвения, но и всяких новомодных новшеств себе тоже не позволяют. Огромное влияние на культуру Марокко, несомненно, оказывал и оказывает Ислам. Но в культуре марокканцев, особенно берберов, прослеживается и более ранний, доисламский период развития Марокко, тот самый древний, общечеловеческий, который сохранился в их языке. Когда я в гостях сказала новорождённому малышу «Агу!» семья пришла в неописуемый восторг! Они также разговаривают со своими младенцами! Тут же выяснилось, что по-берберски «говорить» - «гули», «гулия» как «гулить!». «Кушать, есть» звучит как «ешч», а тот же кус-кус – блюдо, которое теперь популярно во всём мире и значит - кушать, вкушать, кусать? Название одного из блюд, которым меня угостили в Фесе, заставило пережить очередное потрясение – «морозия». Это отварное мясо с черносливом, разобранное на мелкие волокна, подаётся холодным. А едят его в самый холодный день в году! Может быть, когда-то это был холодец, который ели в мороз? Кто знает?! Кстати, «знать» по берберски «изнах», как знахарь! За марокканцами, особенно за их женщинами закрепились слава знатоков магии, колдовских наук, силы трав и камней. Сложенные пирамидки из камней вдоль дорог – сродни медитации. Мне так никто не смог объяснить – зачем. Но моё предположение, что это может быть символ гор – жилища берберов, где они укрывались от врагов и куда спасались, возможно, от потопа, воспринималось очень благосклонно. Может быть, играет свою роль воспитание в вере без рассуждений, но мои попытки «дойти до самой сути» озадачивали марокканцев, они признавались, что им даже не приходили в голову подобные вопросы. Культ поклонения деревьям, источникам, почитание «марабутов» — местных чудотворцев-святых прямо противоречит основной исламской доктрине поклонения исключительно Аллаху. Название «аль-мурабитун», переводится как воины границы, от арабского «рибат» – разновидность крепости. Марабутские домики, как кельи отшельников – без окон, человек там как замурован, кстати, по-французски слово стена – mur!

Знахарство, лечение травами, часто, кстати, вполне эффективное, широко распространено. Для марокканцев эти вещи являются нормальным явлением. Большое количество аптек, где не редкость встретить русскоязычного хозяина, даже выпускника ВГУ, свидетельство того, что государство всё же борется с пережитками и времена меняются.

Дороги. Марокко это одновременно очень традиционная и уже современная, вполне европейская страна, с современными машинами, связью, телевидением, модной одеждой, повсеместным французским, отличными дорогами. Платные дороги существуют там уже больше 20 лет. Площадки для отдыха очень уютные, в цветах, с кафе и бесплатными, чистыми туалетами. На заправках, о счастье, водитель из машины не выходит, служащие заправят машину, возьмут деньги, отдадут сдачу, за небольшие чаевые протрут стекло и подкачают шины. В Марокко очень распространена аренда автомобилей. Даже в самом маленьком городке обязательно есть пара офисов Location de voitures. Взять машину в аренду даже иностранцу не является большой проблемой. Но ещё лучше, если у вас есть знакомый «локасьёнщик». В Марокко я была не как турист, не один раз и достаточно долго, поэтому у нас был такой знакомый знакомого, который за три минуты вписывал данные наших прав в страховку – и вперед! Аренда бюджетного автомобиля вполне демократична по цене, продлить срок аренды можно по телефону. Полицейские на дорогах любезные и общительные, но если не пристёгнут ремень или остановили за разговор по телефону – бескомпромиссны. Штраф за разговор по телефону, например, обойдется в перерасчете в 1500 рублей. Ещё одно наблюдение: ездить в Марокко очень комфортно и не страшно, даже на кажущуюся кутерьму на городских дорогах, на небольшие аварии

никто не обращает внимания, поэтому из-за них никогда нет пробок и потому же, видимо, довольно много машин с помятыми бочками.

Деловое Марокко я имела возможность прочувствовать на разных уровнях. От совещаний в министерствах, до общения с малограмотными рабочими, которые, тем не менее, могли немного объясниться по-французски. Привычка жить в упорядоченном ритме, спешить, стремление всё быстро решить и выполнить – здесь исчезают в течение месяца. А потом ты погружаешься в обволакивающий кисель, без четкого ощущения времени, без тревог не успеть и суеты, но когда в итоге всё получается. Это не праздность, не лень, это другой образ жизни, образ мыслей, философия. В Марокко бесполезно просить прислать, например, прайс-лист на что-либо, чтобы быстрее принять решение. Не скажут цены и по телефону. «Приезжайте, поговорим, обсудим!». Личное общение, приязнь – тут залог успеха. Деловые отношения начинаются с приветствия – Добро пожаловать! А первым вопросом будет: Как вам Марокко? Конечно, ждут положительного ответа, конечно, вы так и ответите. Только если неискренне, то держите лицо и думайте потише! Это Восток! На доверии, которое кажется наивным, здесь строятся отношения. Иностранцев любят, это гость, а гость это барака – благодать! Как-то мы с директором нашей фирмы по пути на мероприятие, заехали в одну компанию узнать о возможности заказа оборудования. В итоге договорились об устраивающей нас цене, об отсрочке оплаты на максимальный срок, подписали соглашение – и это, без каких-либо документов, даже визитки с собой не было. К счастью, у меня в сумке всегда лежал пакетик с сувенирами. Брелок матрёшка оказался достаточным аргументом нашей благонадежности и подтверждением нашего «происхождения»! А ещё я поняла, что в Марокко все так или иначе знакомы или родня, и всем обо всём известно. В аэропорту Касабланки таможенник по ходу дела расспросил про то, как идут работы по строительству плотины, а полицейский из Агадира, у которого мы спросили дорогу, попросил посодействовать его родственнику в трудоустройстве в российскую компанию! В Марокко работают по французским стандартам, понятным для нас, деловая документация ведётся на французском языке. Хотя с языками в Марокко тоже всё весьма интересно и сложно.

Языки. Официальных языков два: арабский уже 12 веков и берберский – с 2012 года, хотя и без этого статуса он выживал все эти тысячелетия. Арабский литературный язык – не родной ни для кого в Марокко. Его начинают учить в начальной школе и продолжают в вузе. Официальные обращения по телевидению, судопроизводство, теологическое образование – это сфера использования арабского стандартизованного, т.е. современного. Не путать с арабским литургическим, языком Корана, от которого он отстоит примерно как русский от церковно-славянского. С берберским языком, самоназвание тамазигт, тоже всё непросто. Его своеобразное письмо, которое называется тифинаг, т.е. «наше письмо», встречается на камнях древних развалин до нашей эры. Более двух тысяч лет его сохраняют женщины племени туарегов. Берберский язык обязателен для изучения в государственных школах. Насколько я заметила, учат его весьма неохотно. В негосударственных школах и в многочисленных иностранных миссиях (это чаще всего французские школы) берберский язык не учат вообще. Ощутимое диалектное разнообразие, географическая удалённость говорящих и, как я заметила, отсутствие многих слов и понятий, препятствуют широкому распространению языка амазигов. Фонетическая интерференция берберского приоткрывает какие-то неизведанные языковые глубины того самого родства, о котором я говорила в самом начале. Например, арабофоны называют охотничью собаку (древнейшая порода борзых, с которой они ездят на охоту) салюки, а вот берберофоны – слюги! У нашего коллеги бербера была фамилия Жари, но по-берберски фамилия звучит Ярий, что и значит, то что слышится – ярый, сильный.

Берберский является родным языком для примерно 30%, в основном сельского населения, существуя в устной форме. А вот язык, на котором говорят в Марокко повсеместно, родной для подавляющего числа марокканцев – называется дарижа (берберы произносят дарья). Парадокс ситуации в том, что дарижа, не имеет официального статуса, для письма используется то латиница, то арабская графика. Дарижу называют марокканским арабским языком, но от арабского он отличается примерно также, как французский от латыни. Этот диалект вобрал в себя большое количество заимствований из всего языкового репертуара, так или иначе имевшего место в Марокко. Марокканский арабский не учат в школе, но на него переходят преподаватели для объяснения материала. Сегодня в стране образовалось движение за придание родному языку марокканцев - дариже, официального статуса. И в этом есть своя логика. Правда, для реализации этого плана предстоит большая работа: подготовка учителей, издание учебников, разработка стандартов, методик... А пока в Марокко множатся вывески и указатели на трёх языках – арабском, тамазигте и французском. На французском языке говорят хуже или лучше повсеместно, он – первый иностранный в стране. За чуть более вековое присутствие в Марокко французский язык прочно занимает нишу языка науки и общения с Западом. В своей речи в 2016 году, посвящённой реформе образования король Мухаммед VI аргументировал изучение французского языка с самого раннего возраста, необходимостью экономического роста и технологического прорыва для страны, которые немыслимы без доступа к новым технологиям без знания французского языка. В последнее время в состоятельных и образованных семьях родители говорят с детьми по-французски буквально с пелёнок, это как второй родной язык. Его начинают учить в детском саду и на французском учатся дальше в университетах.

Немного о русских и русском языке. Интерес к России очень живой. Марокканцы в курсе мировых и наших новостей, с большим энтузиазмом обсуждают передачи, которые смотрели по RT, особенно исторического плана. Как я заметила, с историей они знакомы как-то странно. Но об этом расскажу в другой раз. Кое-что показала марокканцам из русской кухни. Вообще, при всём уважении к нашей кухне, нам надо бы что-то придумать для внешнего её представления. Как это сделали, например, итальянцы со своими лазаньями и пиццей. Солёные помидоры совсем не котируются, зато очень им понравилась русская окрошка, я её делала на кефире, т.к. для кваса не было чёрного хлеба и назвала «холодный суп». Понравилась манная каша (называли её пудингом), которую они совсем не знают, хотя манки завались, её используют вместо панировки для жарки рыбы и для других целей. Стереотипные представления о матрёшках и балалайках тут отсутствуют, но очень нравятся наши шапки-ушанки. Этот подарок если не наденут на голову, из-за понятного тепла, то положат на приборную панель, чтоб в ветровое стекло было видно, знакомым на зависть! Большинство марокканцев в курсе международных событий и охотно их обсуждают. Заметно желание говорить по-русски и учить русский язык. Во время работы на недавнем проекте в Марокко, у меня был интересный опыт преподавания русского языка, о чём попросила марокканская сторона. Они с большим уважением отмечали, когда на совещаниях мне удавалось понять то, что они говорили на арабском, конечно это не глубокие знания, скорее опыт и интуиция. На первых же занятиях, естественно, возник вопрос изучения русского мата. Опыт, который перерос в твердое убеждение, свидетельствует, что говоря на иностранном языке нужно быть очень осторожным с употреблением идиом, поговорок, не говоря уже о ругательствах. Очень часто они неуместны и вызывают чувство неловкости, когда звучат в устах иностранца. Поэтому я сказала, что русский язык такой чудесный, что если очень надо, можно выругаться ... алфавитом! Например, если ситуация терпимо неважная сказать:

ёклмн, ну а когда похуже – опрст, т – точка! Алфавит и правила чтения пошли на «ура»! Марокканцы в своем большинстве легко осваивают иностранные языки. Этому, безусловно, способствует ситуация билингвизма и диглоссии, когда с рождения приходится говорить на нескольких языках, подъязыках и диалектах. Но есть и ещё что-то, более глубокое... Мои ученики часто удивляли, тем как иногда буквально на лету ловили и усваивали слова и грамматику, и я их искренне хвалила. И как-то один из самых успевающих учеников мне сказал потрясающую вещь: «У меня ощущение, что я не учу русский язык, а вспоминаю». И вот, вскоре после изучения алфавитного мата у нас было еженедельное совещание. Это когда заказчик, исполнитель, субподрядчики обсуждают насущные дела. Переговоры, как обычно, шли долго и бурно. И тогда в самый острый момент дискуссии марокканский ответственный за качество воскликнул, что нерешенная сегодня проблема – это «ёклмн», а вот завтра будет «опрст»! Наш директор замер, видимо, в ожидании развития сюжета, а шеф проекта без малейшего акцента строго сказал по-русски «я знаю». Русский язык изучают в Марокко, но непростительно мало. В вузах есть преподаватели русского языка, а несколько лет назад министр образования предложил создание восьми новых кафедр русского языка в марокканских университетах.

Университеты. Кстати, древнейший университет арабо-мусульманского мира, да и вообще в мире, Карауин (караван), основанный в 859 году, находится в сердце Марокко, в старинном городе Фес, бывшей столице. Здесь можно поблудить по старой медине – живому музею. Живому, потому что в нём живут, ничего меняя несколько столетий семьи в десятом поколении. Мы со студентами жили в рияде, так называют красивейшие традиционные дома с внутренним двориком, с фонтаном и апельсиновыми деревьями. Его хозяйка, мадам Суад сказала, что достоверно знает, её рияду 280 лет. Но на этом месте был другой, более старый, принадлежавший их семье. Рияды, это ряды домов, перетекающих один в другой, серые снаружи, но с 4-х метровыми красивейшими резными дверями, за которыми располагаются шедевры настоящего мавританского быта и скрывались семейные тайны. Такие же огромные двери ведут и в знаменитый Карауин. Этот университет образован из медресе²⁰, в которой учили мудрости в прежние времена. Сегодня больше похожего на мечеть. Аль-Карауин, т.е. «караван» - действующий университет, с великолепной библиотекой. Он был основан двумя сестрами Фатимой и Мириам аль-Фихри, дочерьми купца из Кайруана (самый святой город мусульман Магриба, находится в Тунисе). Сестры, будучи прекрасно образованными и получив в наследство много денег после смерти отца, потратили их на строительство мечети и при ней медресе. Это первое медресе в мире было открыто в Марокко в 859 году. Сюда по сей день продолжают стекаться верующие и желающие вкушать мудрости Востока. Приезжал сюда учиться и наш соотечественник Василий Иванович Немирович-Данченко – брат известного режиссера. Правда теперь войти внутрь не мусульманину не разрешается. Запрет появился после того, как во время протектората французские солдаты оскверняли Карауин, заходя в пьяном виде в это священное место, топтали драгоценные ковры²¹ грязными сапогами.

Как всегда в случае с Марокко, тут же в старинном Фесе есть современный сетевой университет, который сотрудничает с университетами Европы, США, Латинской Америки, Африки. В 30 километрах от Феса, есть город Ифран, приехав в который оказываешься... как, например, в Таллине. Покатые красные крыши, печные трубы, растения средней полосы, например тополя, с той только разницей, что совершенно неаллергичны.

²⁰ Медресе́ (араб. букв. «место, где изучают») — мусульманское учебное заведение, выполняющее функцию средней общеобразовательной школы и мусульманской духовной семинарии.

²¹ В мусульманской традиции принято снимать обувь при входе в храм.

Университет Аль-Ахаваин основан в 1993 году, подобие нашей ВШЭ. Студенческие общежития – это кампус из шале.

Про Марокко можно говорить бесконечно. Рассказать что-то новое о стране тому, кто в ней бывал также сложно, как и рассказать о самом интересном, тому, кто о ней почти ничего не знает. У России с Марокко безвизовый режим, достаточно загранпаспорта и 90 дней познаний, открытий, впечатлений, эмоций - обеспечены. В 2017 году, в ежегодной тронной речи король Марокко Мухаммед VI говорил о развитии отношений с нашей страной, в том числе в сфере образования. Так что у Марокко и России есть все условия для успешного сотрудничества.

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