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## **Содержание / Contents**

### **NEW STUDIES IN NATIONS AND NATIONALISMS**

Maksym W. Kyrchanoff

Unbeatable nationalism: the decline of intellectual tradition vs the survival of political parties

5 – 93

### **MISCELLANEA**

Никита Садовников

Быть европейцем «по-румынски»

95 – 103

# **NEW STUDIES IN NATIONS AND NATIONALISMS**

# **UNBEATABLE NATIONALISM:**

**the decline of intellectual tradition vs the  
survival of political parties**

*Maksym W. Kyrchanoff*

## **Introduction**

1. *“Nationalism is a pan-European movement”, or the inevitability of nationalism*
2. *Nationalism in the iron embrace of intellectual history*
3. *Pride and prejudice, or modern parties as stepchildren of Nationalism Studies*
4. *Nationalist parties: from marginalized outsiders to political reality of historiography*

### **Nationalism: from intellectual traditions to political parties (the logic of history, the inevitability of degeneration or the end of a beautiful era)**

1. *“...there is such a party...”, or how can we study nationalist parties*
2. *Stigmata of intellectual heritage and historiographical inertia*
3. *Topical nationalisms as victims of the conceptual flaws of historiography*
4. *The triumph of political as euthanasia of intellectual*

### **Identity and ethnicity as universal political traditions of nationalist parties (the fate of intellectual heritage in the hands of political entrepreneurs)**

1. *The inevitability and universality of ethnicity: ethnicized nationalistic imaginations*
2. *Ethnicized nationalist discourse*
3. *The universality of the political language of ethnic nationalism*
4. *Renegades or modest charm of the marginals: alternative nationalisms*

### **From political region to political nation: nations without states or regional nationalisms**

1. *Politicization of regional discourse*
2. *Ethnization of political discourse*

## **National democracy: highway of modern European nationalism and the failed political project in Russia**

- 1. Russian nationalism as an ignored factor*
- 2. Russian political nationalism*
- 3. National democracy: Russian post-Soviet and the post-democracy version*
- 4. Ideological agenda of Russian national democracy*
- 5. National democracy as the invention of a nation*
- 6. National democracy and the imagination of the nation-state*
- 7. Historical narratives of national democracy*
- 8. An alternative political project of national democracy*
- 9. The invention of regionalism and national democracy*
- 10. National democracy: pro et contra*

## **Integration, migration, globalization as universal Others of European nationalisms**

- 1. Europe of nations vs European integration: European myths as invented traditions of nationalist parties*
- 2. The coming of the new Barbarians: the migration and migrants in the political imagination of European nationalist parties*

## **Conclusions: nationalist parties in the post-national era or the insurmountability of nationalism**

## Introduction

*“Nationalism is a pan-European movement”, or the inevitability of nationalism*

Nationalism is one of the most influential ideologies in the modern world. "Nationalism is a huge and irresistible force that began to express itself too brightly from the 19th century. Indestructible shackles were broken under its mighty onslaught, great empires collapsed and new peoples appeared in historical life... Nationalism combined and coordinated forces drove to the struggle, ignited the fanaticism of enslaved nations in their struggle for freedom", claimed Mykola Mixnovs'kyi, believing that "nationalism is the angel of revenge for the humiliated, it swept a terrible red wave along the edges of the humiliated slave nations... clouds disappeared and the sun of freedom is rising. Nationalism inspired altruism and sympathy among the members of the enslaved nations, it brought burning hatred for the enslavers... Nationalism is a pan-European movement that freed dozens of enslaved and humiliated nations, created national cultures and literatures ... nationalism is the movement of light and freedom"<sup>1</sup>.

Historically and genetically nationalism arose in the 17th century as a result of the crisis of the traditional dynastic state. Nationalism began to develop dynamically in the 18th century after the bourgeois revolutions that defined the main vectors and directions for political developments, social change and cultural transformations of the Western world from Eastern Europe to the colonies of European states in the North and South America. The 19th century has a reputation of a golden age of nationalism in historiography because most European nations were victims of political and social transformations inspired by nationalism and transformed from traditional agrarian and rural communities into modern urbanized nations or nation-states.

Intellectuals<sup>2</sup>, who made a significant contribution to the progress and development of nationalism in their countries recognized themselves that nationalism was a new historical and political phenomenon that arose in the 19th century. Nationalism in the 19th century became a universal political and cultural ideology that defined the main vectors of developments, changed social structures, institutions and relations, promoted political transformations and inspires the emergence of new states on the world map. New states in the 19th

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<sup>1</sup> Mixnovs'kyi, Mykola. (2010), *Natsionalizm – vsesvitnia syl, Protsenko, Oleh; Lisovyi, Vasyl'.* (2010), *uporiad., Natsionalizm. Teoriji natsiji ta natsionalizmu vid lohana Fixte do Ernesta Gelnera.* Kyjiv: Prostir – Smoloskyp, ss. 66 – 68.

<sup>2</sup> Lenkavs'kyi, Stepan. (2002), *Natsionalizm na Ukrajin, Lenkavs'kyi, Stepan.* (2002), *Ukrajins'kyi natsionalizm. Ivano-Frankivs'k: Lileia-NV, ss. 102 – 108.*



century as the consequences of political and economic modernizations and transformations of traditional communities arose in the peripheral regions of the world, including the Americas.

The triumph of nationalism in these regions became the result of its political and social progress in continental Europe where the nationalism of the minor, oppressed and unequal groups competed with the imperialist nationalisms of the greater dominant and formally imperial nations of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Ottoman Empire. Nationalism of the 19th century actualized its political, ideological, social and cultural potential simultaneously. The history of the nationalism of unequal groups that changed dynamically in the 19th century, mutated socially and transformed culturally into nations inspired the emergence of national historiographies and promoted the further progress of the myth of a romantic politically correct liberal and liberation nationalism that fought for the rights of the oppressed groups. Constructivist and modernist approaches dominate methodologically and prevail quantitatively in the contemporary international historiography of nationalism. Modernism was able to offer universal rules and norms that determined the main directions in academic Nationalism Studies.

### *Nationalism in the iron embrace of intellectual history*

Summarizing the main achievements of the modernist historiography of nationalism, it is logical to single out its several central provisions, including: nationalism belongs to a number of relatively new phenomena in world history; nationalism has a universal character, the emergence of nationalism was a consequence of the genesis of capitalism, several waves of modernization and the crisis of traditional societies and economies; nationalism can be divided into the politically correct or civil nationalism and wrong radical and aggressive ethnic one; any nationalism strives for political independence; nations are secondary consequences of the modernization and triumph of nationalism. Modern historians believe and presume that nationalisms create nations as imagined communities because nationalists construct and imagine the nations of their dreams and provide them with invented ethnic and political traditions. Modernist and constructivist approaches are closely related to intellectual history, the history of ideas and the archaeology of ideas.

Therefore, the histories of most Western and non-Western nationalisms in the 20th and 21st centuries were written as intellectual and cultural histories. Nationalist thinking and minded intellectuals became the most attractive and inevitable heroes of this historiography. The history of nationalism was written, imagined and invented as a history of ideas, the history of intellectuals, the history of personal biographies of activists who made a significant contribution and impacts to the history of nationalism, they imagined, propagated and provided with nationalist ideas, values and myths. Intellectual history in the methodology of Nationalism studies became one of the most influential approaches and therefore most of the texts focused on the historical experience of nationalism belong to the discourse of cultural or intellectual histories. This approach was able to become so universal that many modern leading historians of nationalism prefer to write histories of various nationalistic experiences as intellectual histories and histories of ideas.

The author of this book as a historian of nationalism, on the one hand, made the most of his steps in Nationalism Studies using the paradigm of intellectual history and the history of ideas. On the other hand, nationalism does not belong to the number of exclusively historical phenomena because nationalism is the political reality of the contemporary globalizing world. The undoubted role of nationalism in contemporary history and actual politics compels its scholars and historians to look for new forms and languages of analysis and description of the nationalistic experience.

## *Pride and prejudice, or modern parties as stepchildren of Nationalism Studies*

The historiographical review is a necessary ritual part of the introduction of academic texts focused on the history and modernity of nationalism. Academic literature devoted to nationalism is so huge that it is extremely difficult to systematize it. The number of texts on the nations and nationalisms written by theorists and ideologists of various European nationalisms is significant. If the legacy of the classics of nationalist thought<sup>3</sup> inspired and continues to inspire historians to analyse different forms of nationalistic experience, then modern nationalist parties actualize historical and genetic gaps, failures and the absence of an ideological continuum between them and their historical predecessors because it is extremely difficult to integrate the radical nationalist intellectual heritage into tolerant political spaces of Europe.

Historians and intellectuals who analyse nationalism can be divided into modernists and primordialists. Modernists or constructivists dominate in the academic community. Modernists believe that nations are relatively new, young products and the results of modern history. Primordialists do not agree with the constructivist attempts of modernists to rejuvenate nations and deprive them of ancient history and historical roots. Despite this, the modern world historiography of nationalism is modernistic and the most of the author's previous texts on nationalism entirely belong to the constructivist paradigm also. Analysis of contemporary active nationalist parties convinces and proves that the international historiography of nationalism belongs to the number of historiographical illusions. The number of texts on various intellectual nationalist traditions is actually enormous and boundless, but the number of works on nationalist parties in the modern world is insignificant.

The works of Eric Hobsbawm<sup>4</sup>, Ernest Gellner<sup>5</sup>, Benedict Anderson<sup>6</sup>, Craig Calhoun<sup>7</sup>, Roger Brubaker<sup>8</sup> are classic and form the theoretical and

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<sup>3</sup> Rebet, Lev. (1955), *Teoriia natsiji*. Munchen: Suchasna Ukrajina; Dontsov, Dmytro. (1966), *Natsionalizm*. Toronto: Ukrajins'ka vydavnycha spilka; Andriievs'kyi, Dmytro. (1928), *Rozbudova natsiji*, *Natsional'na dumka*, no 7 – 8; Onats'kyi, levhen. (1933), *Natsionalizm i individualizm*, *Rozbudova natsiji*, lypen' – serpen', ss. 161 – 165; Stets'ko, Iaroslav. (1938), *Novyi suspil'nyi lad, Na sluzhbi natsiji*. Paryzh; Bandera, Stepan. (1946), *Do zasad nashoji vyzvol'noji polityky*, *Vyzvol'na polityka*, no 9 – 10, lystopad – hruden'; Vassyan, Iliian. (1928), *Do holovnyx zasad natsionalizmu*, *Rozbudova natsiji*, no 2; Boiko-Bloxin, Iurii. (1951), *Osnovy ukrajins'koho natsionalizmu*. n.p.: "Na Chuzhyni"; Stets'ko, Iaroslav. (1970), *Dvi revoliutsiji, Vyzvol'nyi sliax*, No 3, ss. 296 – 303; Stets'ko, Iaroslav. (1991), *Ukrajins'ka vyzvol'na kontseptsiiia*. Munchen: Vydannia OUN

<sup>4</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, (2012). *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 212 p.

<sup>5</sup> Ernest Gellner, (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Cornell University Press, 152 p.

methodological canons of modern interdisciplinary Nationalism Studies. The citation of these texts became a good expression in the studies of histories and modernities of nationalisms, but intellectuals who became the founding fathers of the academic analysis of nationalism preferred to ignore modern nationalist parties and disdained the analysis of their ideology that ceased to be classical civil nationalism, mutating into various forms of extremism and radicalism, including fascism and racism. Historians of nationalism are accustomed to writing its history as an intellectual history or a cultural archaeology of ideas. The political parties of modern nationalists, in comparison with their intellectual historical predecessors, do not attract the attention of historians of nationalism.

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<sup>6</sup> Benedict Anderson, (1983). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. NY: Verso, 224 p.

<sup>7</sup> Calhoun, Craig. (2007) *Nations Matter: Culture, History, and the Cosmopolitan Dream*. Routledge; Calhoun, Craig. (2001) *Nationalism*. Open University Press and University of Minnesota Press

<sup>8</sup> Brubaker, Rogers. (1992). *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*, Harvard University Press; Brubaker, Rogers. (1996). *Nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*. Cambridge University Press; Brubaker, Rogers. (2004). *Ethnicity without groups*. Harvard University Press; Brubaker, Rogers. (2006). *Nationalist politics and everyday ethnicity in a Transylvanian town*. Princeton University Press.

*Nationalist parties: from marginalized outsiders to political reality of historiography*

The rejection of the primacy of intellectual history and attempts to analyze nationalism as part of political and party discourse can be very successful and productive. Therefore, the political and historical experience of nationalist parties and groups is the main theme of this book. Intellectual and cultural paradigms dominated and defined the main vectors of the development of nationalism studies until the 1990s because intellectuals preferred to imagine and invent nationalism as predominantly intellectual trends that transformed various regions and turned them into states and changed their populations from peasants into nations. Historians of nationalism perceived this social progress and political changes as achievements of nationalist-minded intellectuals. In fact, this approach reduced the history of nationalism to intellectual history or the history of ideas.

Political and historical dynamics of the 19th and 20th centuries inspired the progress of this point of view, but the history of the 20th century corrected the main vectors and trajectories of nationalism studies because the world faced the threats of right and left authoritarianisms that used the mobilization potential of nationalisms and sought to integrate national identities into undemocratic political discourses. Peripheral cases of the development of nationalism, including National Socialism and Bolshevism, as well as their regional forms, actualized the need to study the official party dimensions of nationalism as a political ideology. The 20th century was a century of nationalism, which inspired radical social, political and cultural transformations. Nationalism transformed nations and nation-states into universal and inevitable political actors.

The political transformations of the 20th century and the ideological split of the world contributed to the transformation of nationalism into the universal political language of the modernizing states, and therefore nationalism became a worldwide political actor. Nationalist political parties became active actors in most countries of the modern globalizing world. The transplantation of Western political and social institutions, including parties, into non-European spaces, inspired the elites and political activists of Africa, Asia and Orient to organize their political parties, including nationalist ones. Therefore, nationalist parties are present in the political landscapes and spaces of almost all countries of the modern world, but the political agenda of active nationalist parties, unfortunately, ignores the original achievements of European and non-Western nationalism of the 19th and 20th centuries.

Modern nationalist parties are active in the colonization and development of virtual Internet spaces and some of them exist as exclusively Internet

projects. If the history of European and non-Western nationalisms of the 19th and 20th centuries provides historians of nationalism with numerous examples of original ideas and political theories, then the modern ideological virtual space, nationalists imagine and invent for their own needs on the internet sites of nationalist parties, is sad and monotonous. Most nationalist parties lost the original ideas of their political predecessors, becoming political business projects. Therefore, the structure and content of the sites of nationalist parties are unoriginal and unified. Despite this apparent regression and decline, the study of the history of nationalist parties, that used the principles of right-wing or left-wing nationalisms, is one of those tasks in contemporary nationalism studies, which is no less important than the analysis of various ideological discourses or canons of nationalism.

Writing an institutional party history of nationalisms in a comparative perspective can substantially correct the main trends in contemporary nationalism studies because they are uncomfortable on the Procrustean bed between the Scylla of intellectual history and the Charybdis of the archaeology of ideas. These approaches reduce the history of nationalism to the archaeology of ideas, ignoring the political and institutionalized forms and dimensions of the nationalist experiences, including various political parties, societies and other formal or formalised groups.

**Nationalism: from intellectual traditions to political parties  
(the logic of history, the inevitability of degeneration or the end of a beautiful era)**

*“...there is such a party...”, or how can we study nationalist parties*

Formally, it is very difficult or almost impossible to answer the question how to study the history of nationalism in its institutionalized party dimensions because the number of modern nationalist parties is very significant, and history provides us with several dozen examples of non-existent and defunct parties and movements of nationalist orientation. Comparing historical parties of nationalist orientation with their contemporary successors and political heirs, it would be more logical to assume that historical parties<sup>9</sup> are more attractive as objects of academic analysis in comparison with active nationalist movements and groups because the history of nationalism provides its historians with numerous examples of cultural achievements and intellectual successes of nationalists when the modern history of nationalist parties actualizes the dominance of seriality, greyness, rational political logic and the almost complete absence of original political and social ideas.

The Russian philosopher Vadim Iankov several years ago in one of his articles rhetorically asked: “Is nationalism the last and final word in the realization of human aspirations to find salvation in the collective?”<sup>10</sup>. Paraphrasing this question, it would be logical to ask: “Are the nationalist parties one more attempt of nationalism to prove its universality and to confirm that nations as political traditions are as inevitable consequences of the historical progress of nationalism and nationalistic imagination?”. It is logical to assume that analysis of the history of nationalist parties, on the one hand, is the most attractive way of writing the political institutional history of modern nationalisms. On the other hand, this approach isolates various nationalistic experiences, ignoring the general and local trends in the history of nationalism. The party and institutional history of nationalism is not a history of the ideas of nationalist state or regional parties because this approach risks degrading into primitivization and schematization of the history of nationalist parties.

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<sup>9</sup> Seviarynets, Pavel. (n.d.), *Belaruskaia xrys'tsyianskaia demakratyia. Historyia, asoby, xrys'tsiianstva i palityka, prahramy*. Mensk: n.p.; Renobales, Eduardo. (2007), ANV. *El otro nacionalismo. Historia de ANV / EAE*. Taffala: Txalaparta; Krišto, Jure. (2004), *Hrvatski katolički pokret. 1903. – 1945*. Zagreb: Glas Koncila;

<sup>10</sup> Iankov, Vadim, (2013), *Natsii i natsionalizm*, Kontinent, № 152, URL: <http://magazines.russ.ru/continent/2013/152/27ya.html>

Therefore, the author believes that it will be more logical to combine the methodological and theoretical principles and foundations of intellectual and institutional histories of nationalism.

The number of basic ideas of nationalism that became its political and intellectual myths is well known. Nationalistic mythology inspired the development of several grand narratives, which form the ideological core of any nationalism. These ideological bases of nationalism are the following: nationalism is a normal and natural political movement, the most important form of manifestation and expression of the collective will of the nation; the nation is a core value and central element of politics; political sovereignty and national state are the main goals of nationalism; the identity of the nation is unique and includes codified versions of national history, political traditions and the pantheon of the founding fathers who became sacred and mythological figures. These four principles form the ideological basis of any nationalism, but the historical, political or cultural characteristics of nationalism can substantially correct these sentiments and their translations into public and political discourses.

Therefore, the author of this book abandoned its structure based on the analysis of various nationalisms, believing that it is more logical to analyze how these central values and principles of nationalism changed in ideological programs and the preferences of modern nationalist parties and movements. The author believes that the ideology of nationalism is inevitable and the political language of nationalism is universal. Therefore, nationalism and the political nationalist parties inspired by it exist practically in all countries of the world where the concepts of "nationalism", "nation" and "nation-state" entered the number of political universals and norms of the political language.



### *Stigmata of intellectual heritage and historiographical inertia*

Nationalism invents its own political traditions to solve its problems. The invented traditions are imagined in historiography as the various social, cultural and intellectual practices of nationalist-minded intellectuals. The study and academic analysis of the invented traditions belong to intellectual history, cultural history, the history of ideas or the archaeology of ideas. Most of the texts focused on the analysis of invented traditions analyze the problems of the history of nationalisms of the 19th and 20th centuries. The modern world ceased to be a world that imagines, invents, produces and reproduces its meanings, including nationalism and identity. The modern world emerged as the result of the decay and crisis of high cultures, which inspired the degradation of intellectual communities.

If, by the middle of the 20th century, intellectuals and nationalists were genuine and real social and cultural inspirers who determined the basic trajectories and directions of development of national identities and nationalisms. Traditional media, including newspapers and television, and the post-modern Internet, weakened the role and the importance of intellectuals in society significantly. Nationalist-minded intellectuals ceased to be the only social activists who invent, imagine and produce meanings. The roles and values of nationalism by the beginning of the 21st century blurred and weakened because the traditional political language of nationalism turned out to be very complicated and incomprehensible to the majority of voters. Therefore, nationalist monopolized the role of intellectuals and pushed them.

Nationalist parties instead of intellectuals and cultural activists became the main formers of nationalist political and partly cultural discourse. Nationalist parties challenged the monopoly rights of intellectuals to invent traditions and imagine the meanings of nationalism. In fact, activities of political nationalist parties became attempts to primitivize and simplify the invented traditions and make them more understandable for voters who may not know anything about the history of nationalism in their countries, believing that the simplified political language of nationalism and national populism is a more effective tool than nationalistic imagination and inventions of traditions, which became archaic rudiments of high cultures in the modern globalizing world.

### *Topical nationalisms as victims of the conceptual flaws of historiography*

Nationalism became a universal factor relatively late when modern history began in Europe. Historians of nationalism, classics and contemporaries, analyzing nationalism as a cultural and intellectual factor, social and political actor tend to historical generalizations and panoramic studies<sup>11</sup>. Traditionally, classical and modern studies of nationalism in theoretical and concrete historical perspectives provide and inspire generalizations, comparisons and parallels between nationalistic experiences and the histories of various nations, groups and communities. Nationalist parties, historical and contemporary, in this intellectual situation are nothing more than a necessary element of a large-scale panorama of the cultural, social and intellectual histories of nationalism.

The institutionalization of political science and political analysis focused on solution of real political problems turned nationalist parties into more attractive objects of studies than their historical predecessors despite the fact that nationalists of the modern world intellectually and politically lose to their genetic historical ancestors who, several decades earlier resolutely and radically proclaimed the primacy of the nation in world. New right-wing radicals and extremists, who actively use the values of nationalism, classical liberalism and conservatism, juggle skilfully ideas borrowed from various political doctrines, but they adroitly avoid accusations of political extremes, including fascism and racism. None of the modern actively practising historians of nationalism approached to the analysis of nationalist parties as an important and serious actor in the modern and relevant political history of nationalism because the tendencies of the imagination of nationalism as a part of cultural and intellectual history dominate and prevail in the international historiography of nationalism.

Rogers Brubaker in his texts<sup>12</sup> actualizes the problems of the party dimension in the history of nationalism, but he does this situationally and periodically, preferring to analyze historical nationalist parties in contexts of the history of European nationalisms in the 20th century. Therefore, the modern

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<sup>11</sup> Alvarez Junco, Jose. (2016), *Dioses utiles. Naciones y nacionalismos*. Madrid: Galaxia Gutenberg; Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. (2001), *Nationalismus*. München: Verlag C.H. Beck oHG; Wehler, Hans-Ulrich. (2005), *Nacionalizam. Povijest, oblici, posljedice*. Zagreb: Naklada Jesenski i Turk; Guibernau, Montserrat. (2009), *The identity of nations*. Cambridge: Polity Press

<sup>12</sup> Brubaker, Rogers. (1996). *Nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national question in the New Europe*. Cambridge University Press; Brubaker, Rogers. (2004). *Natsionalizm't v novi ramki: Natsionalnata obshtnost i natsionalniiat v'pros v Nova Evropa*. Sofiia: KH; Brubaker, Rogers. (2006). *Pereobramlenyi natsionalizm. Status natsiji ta natsional'ne pytannia u novij levropi*. L'viv: Kal'variia

historiography of nationalism, in spite of its interdisciplinary nature, prefers to consistently avoid to deal with the ideological activity of modern nationalist parties. Despite its later birth and emergence, nationalism became a universal political force that could challenge the priority and role of traditional values, including Christianity and the medieval classes. Estate institutions and privileges quickly fell victims of the first waves of modernization and transformation of archaic traditional dynastic states into modernizing modern societies. If nationalism was strong enough to become a winner in the fight against the class principles of social organization, nationalism could not emerge as an unambiguous triumphant from confrontation with traditional alternative religious values and practices.

Despite this nationalism in Europe in the 19 and 20 centuries pushed the Christian churches, weakened their roles, values and influences significantly and became a form of political religion. Nationalism since its historical and political appearance in the bowels of late medieval Western civilization developed extremely dynamically, significantly and radically changing political spaces and cultural contexts. Many of the achievements of the modern political tradition of the West, including democracy, rights and freedoms, were the consequences of the progress of nationalism as a universal form of organization of society that allowed European political elites to modernize their societies radically because nationalism made national and political principles universal and inevitable, legitimized existing national or nationalizing states and struggle of the oppressed nations and unequal ethnic groups for their own political institutionalized representation, which mutates and transforms into states inevitably.

Dominant and oppressed communities and nations sought forms and ways to express their political interests. Informal communities, clubs and intellectual societies as the main ideologists and theorists of nationalism were the first attempts to organize and institutionalize nationalism as an ideology in spite of its universality and understandability for representatives of groups and communities that transformed and nationalized dynamically. Parties as a form of organization of nationalism arose in the 19th century. The institutionalization of parties was a progress and a regression in the history of nationalism simultaneously. Formally, nationalist parties and intellectuals coexisted peacefully in the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, but intellectuals were among those who determined the main vectors and trajectories of the development of nationalist ideology and other political parties, including democratic, republican, liberal, conservative, and social-democratic ones which were active in political and party struggle because nationalism has not yet become a victim of the systematization and party organization of society.

### *The triumph of political as euthanasia of intellectual*

The triumph of political parties in the 20th century was the actual euthanasia of intellectual and cultural nationalisms. Migration of nationalist discourse from intellectual spheres to political parties became a regress of nationalism because professional nationalists who became party bureaucrats replaced those generations of nationalists who sacredly and sincerely believed in the principles, ideas and values of nationalism as a civil religion and political faith. Modern intellectuals reached a compromise that a unified theory of nations and nationalism does not exist in particular and it is impossible in general. The Russian historian of nationalism, Aleksei Miller, believes that the analysis of “the imitation of organizational forms and institutions”<sup>13</sup> belongs to the number of important tasks of modern studies of nationalism.

This book is the author’s attempt to make his modest contribution to modern interdisciplinary studies of nationalism, analyzing nationalist parties as a form of regression and decline of the intellectual and cultural tradition of nationalism. The author, on the one hand, understands that his task and an attempt to analyze the ideological preferences of different nationalist parties is very arrogant and ambitious because it is extremely doubtful that the ideological characteristics and preferences of nationalist parties of different countries and even continents are extremely uncertain. The academic tradition of nationalism studies, despite it, strengthens the author’s confidence that such studies are necessary because the history of modern attempts to understand what nationalism is beginning with such texts of extremely general in nature.

On the other hand, it is obvious that the modern community of historians of nationalism has a deficit of texts focused on the modernity of nationalism as an institutionalized political and ideological discourse in the form of parties. Attempts of political analysts to eliminate gaps and lacunae in the studies of nationalism do not solve this problem because they are situational, opportunistic and even momentary. The author believes that it is more logical to analyze different nationalist parties because the comparative perspective actualizes the truly international role of nationalism as a universal and inevitable political and ideological factor and actor. If the nationalisms of the 19th and 20th centuries were political, culturally, socially and ideologically diverse, then modern nationalist parties actually killed the heterogeneity of nationalisms and their political experiences.

The wide and fertile green blossoming field degraded into a grey and dreary pen because the political language of modern nationalist parties ignores

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<sup>13</sup> Miller, Aleksei. (2016), *Natsiia. SPb: Evropeiskii Universitet*, s. 129.

diversity and avoids original ideas. The progress and triumph of nationalist political parties are comparable to the effect of the invention of neuroleptics in psychiatry, which turned automatically any exalted religious fanatic, prophet and potential messiah into patients of psychiatric hospitals. The nationalism of the era of political parties lost the need for its political prophets and messiahs, although the experience of radical nationalist parties provides historians with several examples of exalted political leaderships. Modern nationalist parties do not know what is an authoritarian political style of governance and radical nationalism with its nationalistic imagination and the invention of political traditions and rituals. Modern nationalist parties prefer to focus on the outcomes and ignore external political effects and attributes because they became closer to commercial corporations and business projects than classical political parties.

## **Identity and ethnicity as universal political traditions of nationalist parties (the fate of intellectual heritage in the hands of political entrepreneurs)**

### *The inevitability and universality of ethnicity: ethnicized nationalistic imaginations*

Dmytro Dontsov, one of the founding fathers of Ukrainian nationalism and political philosophy, believed that 1914 was a turning point in the history of the West because “our era is the time of the twilight of the gods, whom the nineteenth century prayed for. The catastrophe of 1914 flew over our heads: all the “indestructible” foundations and the “eternal” laws of social evolution crumbled to the dust, opening endless prospects before the human will”<sup>14</sup>. 2014, a hundred years later, became a year that marked radical changes and transformations in the political and intellectual life of Europe also. The revolution in Ukraine, the revision of Ukrainian territorial integrity, the change of the status of Krym, the onset of a military conflict and the appearance on the political map of the world of two failed states actualized new roles of nationalism as one of the universal ideologies that opposes attempts to restore non-Soviet institutions which deny any ethnicity except the Sovietized forms and versions Russianness.

The subsequent political, social, cultural and intellectual events and processes testify convincingly that nationalism and its political and cultural derivatives, including ethnicity and identity, determine the main vectors and trajectories of the world and regional developments. Ethnicity became a universal symbolic resource for the imagination and the invention of identity in various nationalisms. Nationalists are active in use of various ethnic, cultural and historical legacies, transforming them into political invented traditions. Nationalists inevitably construct identities, integrating the reinterpreted collective ideas of the historical ethnic past into mass modern ideas of the nation, primitivized and simplified them for use in political struggle.

Modern nationalist parties as forced receivers and heirs of the political and cultural traditions of intellectual nationalism of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century are active in use of the heritage of intellectuals who made a significant contribution to the transformation of traditional ethnicities and their mutation in mass standardized identities. Nationalist parties from Europe to Asia, from America to Orient are equally active in their attempts to manipulate

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<sup>14</sup> Dontsov, Dmytro. (1966), *Natsionalizm*. Toronto: Ukraïns’ka vydavnycha spilka, URL: [http://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/1020751/1/Doncov\\_-\\_Nacionalizm.html](http://www.e-reading.club/chapter.php/1020751/1/Doncov_-_Nacionalizm.html)

ethnic heritage and integrate it into the canons of modern political nations. Almost all modern nationalist parties pay special attention to the problems of preserving and developing identities in a globalizing world. Dmytro Andrievs'kyi wrote in 1928 that "the nation emerged again at the crossroads of historical paths"<sup>15</sup>. The activity of modern nationalist parties in their attempts to use ethnicity and identity confirms that the problems of the nation have not lost their significance and the national question has again appeared among the central ones on the news agenda. Modern nationalists are concerned about the preservation of identity, and the problems of correlation of the collective and individual backgrounds of the nation are less interested in them although they were attractive to their historical predecessors<sup>16</sup>.

Modern nationalist parties, like their historical predecessors<sup>17</sup>, are active in their attempts to synthesize the national and ethnic myths with lengthy arguments about the nation as the most important achievement of social and political progress, although the texts of nationalists of the first half of the 20th century<sup>18</sup>, who synthesized the values of a nation and class, combined the principles of national and class struggle, were more original than the texts of modern nationalists. Ethnicity is a systemically significant factor for most nationalist parties in Europe and Asia, although the Swiss historian Urs Altermatt<sup>19</sup> predicted the rise and progress of ethnic nationalism in Europe in the second half of the 1990s, but then European societies preferred to ignore his predictions because European euphoria and optimism dominated and it was impossible to imagine the progress of ethnic nationalism and the popularity of European radical rightists because they had reputations marginals and outsiders.

Iulian Vassyan in 1928 believed that "the moment of national unity"<sup>20</sup> has fundamental importance for the development of nationalism and the nation. Modern supporters of ethnic nationalism in Europe, despite the apparent intellectual degradation in comparison with their historical predecessors, continue to imagine and invent the nation as their intellectual historical predecessors did. Nationalists of minor European countries pay considerable

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<sup>15</sup> Andrievs'kyi, Dmytro. (1928), *Rozbudova natsiji, Natsional'na dumka*, no 7 – 8.

<sup>16</sup> Onats'kyi, Ievhen. (1933), *Natsionalizm i individualizm, Rozbudova natsiji, lypen' – serpen'*, ss. 161 – 165.

<sup>17</sup> Stets'ko, Iaroslav. (1938), *Novyi suspil'nyi lad, Na sluzhbi natsiji. Paryzh*

<sup>18</sup> Bandera, Stepan. (1946), *Do zasad nashoji vyzvol'noji polityky, Vyzvol'na polityka*, no 9 – 10, lystopad – hruden'

<sup>19</sup> Altermatt, Urs. (1997), *Das Fanal von Sarajevo. Ethnonationalismus in Europa*. Zurich: Neue Zurcher Zeitung

<sup>20</sup> Vassyan, Iliian. (1928), *Do holovnykh zasad natsionalizmu, Rozbudova natsiji*, no 2

attention to the problems of ethnicity and identity, insisting on the need to support, preserve and develop the national languages of countries and regions, compatriots of nationalists live in. Therefore, the nationalist parties of the modern world, despite the fact that nationalism as an ideology lost its raid of elitism and liberation romance, continue to insist, as their historical and politically genetic predecessors did<sup>21</sup>, that the nation is among the highest values.

Montserrat Guibernau, professor of politics at Queen Mary University of London, полагает что “mainstream political parties tend to dismiss the new radical right as “fascist” parties which, by default, have no legitimacy”<sup>22</sup>, but the rejection of nationalists and their marginalization does not warn the European countries against political radicalization and the rising popularity of nationalist parties and movements. Nationalist parties of the minor European countries are active in the development of ethnic nationalism. The block of two Estonian nationalist parties *Eestimaa Rahvaliid* and *Eesti Rahvuslik Liikumine*, which united in *Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond*<sup>23</sup>, tries to combine the ideas of ethnic and political nationalisms, but the first ones dominate in the ideological program, despite declarations about the need for construction and further development of “demokraatlik ja suveräänne Euroopa riik”<sup>24</sup>.

Lithuanian nationalists from *Tautininkų Sąjunga* also advocate that national values and principles become central and determinative in the organization of the state<sup>25</sup>. Therefore, *Tautininkų Sąjunga* tries to combine and synthesize the values of ethnic nationalism with the principles of political nationalism, declaring that “we are proud to be Lithuanians, and we continue to create our own culture and history. The State of Lithuania must protect the cultural heritage created by previous generations and contribute to the creation of a new culture. Lithuania is home to the Lithuanian people”<sup>26</sup>. Other Lithuanian nationalist parties propose and cultivate the same ideas. For example, *Tvarka ir Teisingumas* insists that the Republic of Lithuania is a national state of the

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<sup>21</sup> Stsibors'kyi, Mykola. (1935), *Natsiokratiia*. Paryzh

<sup>22</sup> Guibernau, Montserrat. (2010), *Migration and the rise of the radical right. Social malaise and the failure of mainstream politics*. L.: Policy Netwprk, p. 9.

<sup>23</sup> Erakond loodi märtsis 2012 kahe sarnase maailmavaatega poliitilise jõu – Eestimaa Rahvaliidu ja Eesti Rahvusliku Liikumise ühinemisel, URL: <https://www.ekre.ee/erakond/>

<sup>24</sup> Konservatiivne visioon Eestist, URL: <https://ekre.ee/konservatiivne-visioon/>

<sup>25</sup> Tautininkų Sąjunga, URL: <https://www.facebook.com/pg/tautininkai/about/>

<sup>26</sup> Mūsų istorija, URL: [https://www.facebook.com/pg/tautininkai/about/?ref=page\\_internal](https://www.facebook.com/pg/tautininkai/about/?ref=page_internal)



Lithuanian nation, where only the Lithuanian language has the status of a state, and national minorities can be parts of the Lithuanian political nation<sup>27</sup>.

*Tvarka ir Teisingumas*, as a populist movement of nationalist orientation, insists that the current ruling political elites betray Lithuanian national interests when they joined the EU, which consistently reduces the rights of member states. Therefore, Lithuanian nationalists offer the concept of *Trečioji respublika*<sup>28</sup> as a universal alternative to modern statehood. *Trečioji respublika*, as Lithuanian nationalists insist and believe, will become a true and authentic Lithuanian state because the principles and values of nationalism, social justice and direct democracy will become the foundations of the new state order. *Lietuvos nacionaldemokratų partija* also declares the need for the development of Lithuania as a national democracy. Therefore, party theorists believe that “the goal of the Lithuanian National Democratic Party is to promote and strengthen the source of power of the Lithuanian people – an independent state of Lithuania ... The Lithuanian National Democratic Party is based on national, Christian, humanistic values, protects national interests, strives to strengthen the economy, order and implement national democracy ... Lithuania is the common home of the Lithuanian land and all its citizens. This modern national idea should serve as a strong obstacle to growing and aggressive cosmopolitanism”<sup>29</sup>.

Nationalism, as Russian historian Artiom Smirnov believes, “is a collective action aimed to produce and reproduce national sovereignty as a special public good”<sup>30</sup>. Such sentiments are relevant in the ideologies of nationalist parties in countries, which were parts of the Soviet Union until the early 1990s. The *KUN* or *Konhres ukrajins’kix natsionalistiv* believes that national democracy is an ideal form of development of Ukraine. Theorists and ideologists of the *KUN* also insist that Ukraine needs to be transformed and reformed into *soborna derzhava* or a conciliar state<sup>31</sup>, abandoning the extremes of democracy, which, as Ukrainian nationalists believe, is a dead-end and unviable form of statehood. *Belaruski Narodny Front*<sup>32</sup>, the largest nationalist party of modern Belarus, insists on the

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<sup>27</sup> Seimo rinkimų programa 2016, URL: <http://www.tvarka.lt/lt/apie-mus/seimo-rinkimu-programa-2016>

<sup>28</sup> Trečioji respublika, URL: <http://www.tvarka.lt/lt/apie-mus/trecioji-respublika>

<sup>29</sup> Lietuvos nacionaldemokratų partijos programa (Politiniai principai), URL: <http://www.lndp.lt/index.php?7>

<sup>30</sup> Smirnov, Artiom. (2006), Natsionalizm: natsiia = kollektivkoe deistvie : pustoe oznachaiushchee, Logos, № 2, URL: <http://magazines.russ.ru/logos/2006/2/sm15.html>

<sup>31</sup> Dovidka. Довідка. Konhres ukrajins’kix natsionalistiv. URL: <http://cun.org.ua/pro-partiyu/dovidka/>

<sup>32</sup> Pra partyiu Belaruski Narodny Front, URL: [http://narodny.org/?page\\_id=146](http://narodny.org/?page_id=146)

consistent nationalization of the political, cultural and intellectual life of the country and criticizes Aleksandr Lukashenko's regime as authoritarian, undemocratic and anti-national. *Belaruski Narodny Front* embodies an alternative project of the Belarus political and ethnic identity, including attempts to combine nationalism and democracy, the principles of democracy and the values of the nation, the desire to nationalize the history of medieval Belarus, to integrate the Grand Duchy of Lithuania into the contexts of historical and political memories, and to prove the European character of the Belarus history and national identity<sup>33</sup>.

*KUN* believes that nationalism is an inevitable and universal political ideology. Therefore, the national state and nation, as Ukrainian nationalists believe, are two inevitable guidelines for the development of statehood<sup>34</sup>. Nationalists of young European democracies and countries that have European ambitions are active in their attempts to idealize the political principles and ideological values of nationalism. Ukrainian nationalists, inspired by nationalist intellectuals of the inter-wars period<sup>35</sup>, in contrast to Western European nationalists, use the political language of romantic and liberation nationalism actively, although nationalists in Western countries abandoned these narratives in the second half of the 20th century when they preferred to rationalize the political imagination of nationalism and free it from the romantic mythology of ethnicity and identity.

Theorists of the *KUN*, for example, believe that "Ukrainian nationalism is the basis of the ideological doctrine of the Congress. Ukrainian nationalism is an integral ideology and political movement that arose historically in the inner nature of the Ukrainian Nation ... Ukrainian nationalism unites, disciplines direct the nation to achieve common goals. Ukrainian nationalism has always been and remains the decisive force in the struggle for the freedom of the Ukrainian Nation"<sup>36</sup>. Ukrainian nationalists of *Svoboda* party declare the need to build a strong independent Ukrainian nation-state and therefore insist on the need for consistent and decisive decommunization and lustration of society, the ban of anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian political and public organizations<sup>37</sup>. These ideas

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<sup>33</sup> Prahrama Partyi BNF, URL: <http://narodny.org/?p=1116>

<sup>34</sup> Prohrama Konhresu ukrajins'kix natsionalistiv, URL: <http://cun.org.ua/pro-partiyu/programa/>

<sup>35</sup> Ol'zhych, Oleh. (1940), *Natsionalistychna kul'tura*, Nastup, 22 chervnia; Teliha, Olena. (1977), *Partachi zhyttia*, Teliha, Olena. (1977), Zbirnyk. NY: Vydannia UZX

<sup>36</sup> Prohrama Konhresu ukrajins'kix natsionalistiv, URL: <http://cun.org.ua/pro-partiyu/programa/>

<sup>37</sup> Prohrama VO "Svoboda" – prohrama zaxystu ukrajintsiv, URL: <http://svoboda.org.ua/party/program/>

actualize the ideological and political changes and transformations in some European nationalisms that mutate from pure ethnic nationalisms to mixed political projects that combine the values of the nation in general with ideas and preferences of political classes in particular.

The block of three national Latvian political parties, including *Visu Latvijai! - Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK* actively operates with categories of external threat and images of the enemy, insisting that the reductions and the subsequent complete elimination of energy dependence on Russia are Latvian priority goal<sup>38</sup>. Bulgarian nationalist parties insist that nationalism is a positive and politically necessary ideology that has nothing in common with fascism. The theorists and ideologists of Bulgarian nationalism believe that nationalism is a political and ideological synonym for patriotism<sup>39</sup>. Values and principles of ethnicity are among the priorities for *Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövetség* - one of the leading Hungarian nationalist parties. Party ideologists actively use the resource of ethnicity and identity in their attempts to criticize educational policy in Ukraine<sup>40</sup> which seeks to use the Ukrainian language as the main and only language of instruction that causes discontent of the Hungarian nationalists because Hungarians live compactly on the territory of the Uzhgorod region.

Hungarian nationalism actively uses real and symbolic political resources of ethnicity and therefore the parties of Hungarian nationalists, including organizations of the Hungarian national minority in Serbia, for example, *Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség*<sup>41</sup>, cultivates and supports Hungarian ethnicity, including language. Hungarian nationalists believe that identity, understood by them as ethnicity, belongs to the number of central and systemic political values. Therefore, *Jobbik* representatives declare that they will support and welcome the European integration of Ukraine and Serbia only if local political elites will guarantee the rights of Hungarian ethnic minorities<sup>42</sup>. Hungarian nationalist parties, including *Jobbik*, insist that ethnicity is a priority for the

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<sup>38</sup> Nacionālās apvienības mērķi Latvijās simtgadei, URL: <http://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/programma/>

<sup>39</sup> Kakvo razbirate pod natsiobaliz'm?, URL: <http://idem.bg/bns/index.php/chesto-zadavani-vaprosi>

<sup>40</sup> A kisebbségi oktatási rendszerek kerültek veszélybe az ukrán oktatási törvény elfogadásával, URL: <http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/2017-10-11/a-kisebbségi-oktatasi-rendszerek-kerultek-veszelybe-az-ukran-oktatasi-torveny-elfogadasaval/>

<sup>41</sup> Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség Programját. A Vajdasági Magyar Szövetség IX. Közgyűlésén, Szabadkán, 2004. június 19-én elfogadta a, URL: <http://www.vmsz.org.rs/content/program>

<sup>42</sup> Nemzetpolitikai program (2014-es választási program), URL: <https://www.jobbik.hu/programunk/nemzetpolitika>

development of the Hungarian identity because “the Hungarian folk spirit and the Hungarian national consciousness are the basis of our identity”<sup>43</sup>.

Croatian nationalist parties including *Hrvatska stranka prava*<sup>44</sup>, *Autohtona-Hrvatska stranka prava*<sup>45</sup>, *Hrvatska stranka prava dr. Ante Starčević*<sup>46</sup>, *Hrvatska čista stranka prava*<sup>47</sup> seek to synthesize the values of political civil and ethnic radicalism, but the ideology of all Croatian nationalist parties actualizes the values of Croatian ethnic nationalism, the principles of historical and political continuity of the traditions of the Croatian statehood. Croatian nationalists oppose the activities of the Hague International Tribunal and attempt to revise the results of the wars, which defended Croatian independence and led to the liquidation of the self-proclaimed Serbian state in Croatian territory.

Latvian nationalist parties also actively use the resources and potential of ethnic imagination. Theorists and ideologists of *Visu Latvijai! - Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK* believe that non-citizens of Latvia form the dangerous group that poses a threat to national and political security. Therefore, *Visu Latvijai! - Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK* insists that the government should refuse to grant citizenship to those Russians who bought property in Latvia, to stop the activities of hostile organizations of national minorities<sup>48</sup>, to prohibit employers to require mandatory knowledge of the Russian language by employees, and to introduce the Latvian language as the only language of the education system<sup>49</sup>.

Norwegian nationalists from *Senterpartiet* pay special attention to the problems of preserving and developing the Norwegian language, believing that globalization and the English language became threats to the Norwegian national identity<sup>50</sup>. Czech nationalists, including *Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti*, believe that the Czech Republic should develop as a national democracy based on the principles and values of Czech nationalism and Moravian patriotism<sup>51</sup>. Interest in the ethnicity of Hungarian nationalist parties is an exception to the European logic of nationalism development because nationalists in other European countries prefer to actualize other issues, including migration and European integration. Nationalists believe that

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<sup>43</sup> Elvi nyilatkozat, URL: <https://www.jobbik.hu/elvi-nyilatkozat>

<sup>44</sup> Hrvatska stranka prava, URL: <http://www.hsp.hr>

<sup>45</sup> Autohtona-Hrvatska stranka prava, URL: <http://hrvatskipravasi.hr>

<sup>46</sup> Hrvatska stranka prava dr. Ante Starčević, URL: <http://hsp-ante-starcevic.hr>

<sup>47</sup> Hrvatska čista stranka prava, URL: <http://hcsp.hr/>

<sup>48</sup> Nacionālās apvienības mērķi Latvijās simtgadei, URL: <http://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/programma/>

<sup>49</sup> 11. Saeimas Programma. 4000 zīmju programma pirms 11. Saeimas vēlēšanām, URL: <http://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/programma/4000-zimju-programma/>

<sup>50</sup> Språk, URL: <https://www.senterpartiet.no/politikk/politisk-sak/spraak>

<sup>51</sup> Programová listina, URL: <http://www.dsss.cz/programova-listina>

globalization and its regional forms, including European integration, are inevitable on the one hand, but on the other hand, nationalists prefer to idealize the world of national states, although they do not miss the opportunity to use those benefits and advantages that arose as a result of the European integration process.

### *Ethnicized nationalist discourse*

The ideas of ethnic nationalism turned out to be more popular in those countries where political elites several decades earlier had ambitions to subordinate and control neighbouring regions and build ethnically pure homogeneous states. A nation for nationalists “is a natural system and in this capacity, is an objective and absolute value”<sup>52</sup>. Therefore, the values and principles of ethnic nationalism became landmarks and guiding stars in the development of several European nationalisms, including Bulgarian and Serbian ones. *Srpska radikalna stranka*, one of the leading Serbian nationalist parties, popularizes the ideas and principles of “jedinstva srpstva” and insists that the disintegration of Yugoslavia was a national catastrophe for the Serbian nation, which automatically legitimizes any attempts to unite all historical Serbian regions and lands with modern Serbia, including Crna Gora and Serbian regions of Bosnia and Herzegovina<sup>53</sup>. Therefore, the unitary Great Serbia, which will include all the historical territories populated by Serbs<sup>54</sup> is the political ideal of Serbian political nationalism which mutates into ethnical consistently.

*România Mare*, one of the parties of modern Romanian nationalism, insists that Romania should include all the historical and ethnic territories inhabited by Romanians, but its theorists insist that this renewed and restored Great Romania will be the result of the peaceful and voluntary unification of the Romanian lands<sup>55</sup>. Romanian nationalist theorists insist that România Mare or the Greater Romania is a historical and political ideal for the development of the Romanian statehood<sup>56</sup>. *Falange Española de las JONS* also cultivates narratives of a strong, united and stable statehood, consistently criticizing and condemning the politics of autonomization and the modern autonomous communities that exist in Spain. Theorists of *Falange Española de las JONS* insist that national and territorial autonomous communities were historical and political errors inspired by democratization because they stimulate regionalism and separatism. *La Falange*<sup>57</sup>, another Spanish nationalist party which positions and imagines itself

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<sup>52</sup> Oganessian, Eduard. (2013), *Filosofia natsionalizma*, Kontinent, No 152, URL: <http://magazines.russ.ru/continent/2013/152/210.html>

<sup>53</sup> Program Srpske radikalne stranke, URL: <http://www.nova1.srpskaradikalnastranka.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/SRSprogram.pdf>

<sup>54</sup> Statut Srpske radikalne stranke, URL: <http://www.nova1.srpskaradikalnastranka.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/StatutSRS.pdf>

<sup>55</sup> Statut, Partidul România Mare, URL: <http://prm-central.ro/statut/>

<sup>56</sup> Istoric, Partidul România Mare, URL: <http://prm-central.ro/istoric/>

<sup>57</sup> Nuestro ideario, URL: <http://www.lafalange.org/nuestro-ideario/>

as the heiress of historical *La Falange* of the authoritarian period, also denies the achievements of democratization, condemns regional nationalisms and insists that Spain should be a unitary state where there is only a Spanish political and ethnic nation. Therefore, Spanish nationalists insist that a unitary state<sup>58</sup> is the most optimal model of the territorial and administrative organization of Spain. Other Spanish nationalist parties, including *España 2000*<sup>59</sup>, also believe in the danger and uselessness of the state of autonomies and insist that it is necessary to return to the model of a centralized statehood.

Bulgarian nationalists, as theorists of Hungarian nationalism, actively use the principles and ideas of ethnicity, proclaiming the need for the development of Bulgaria as a Bulgarian national state and the unification of historical Bulgarian territories, including Mizia, Thrace, Dobrudja and Macedonia<sup>60</sup>. Bulgarian nationalist parties insist that Bulgaria in the 20th century became victims of several national catastrophes, inspired by aggressive neighbours, and lost significant territories that were torn away by Romania and Serbia as historical rivals of Bulgaria. Romanian nationalists develop the same narratives and believe that Romania in the 20th century fell victim of imperialist political ambitions of its neighbours, including Hungary and the USSR<sup>61</sup>.

Romanian nationalism is too active in use of Hungarian narratives<sup>62</sup> for the formation and promotion of the images of the Other as a universal and inevitable historical enemy<sup>63</sup>. *România Mare*, one of the nationalist Romanian parties, actively imagine Romania as a victim of foreign policy and imperial ambitions of neighbouring states<sup>64</sup>, who sought to dismember Romania, to tear away the Romanian territories<sup>65</sup>, Magyarize them<sup>66</sup> and impose foreign and alien political<sup>67</sup> and ethnic identities<sup>68</sup>. On the one hand, Romanian nationalists from

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<sup>58</sup> 133 Propuestas para una España mejor, URL: [http://www.patrisindicalista.es/ateneoazul/ps\\_textos/133\\_propuestas\\_FE\\_JONS\\_2011.pdf](http://www.patrisindicalista.es/ateneoazul/ps_textos/133_propuestas_FE_JONS_2011.pdf)

<sup>59</sup> Programa político, URL: [http://espana2000.org/?page\\_id=3226](http://espana2000.org/?page_id=3226)

<sup>60</sup> Nashata programa, URL: <http://idem.bg/bns/index.php/nashata-programa>

<sup>61</sup> Colonizări în Transilvania?, URL: <http://prm-central.ro/2012/04/colonizari-in-transilvania/>

<sup>62</sup> Românii arși pe rug de demența maghiară, URL: <http://prm-central.ro/2012/04/601/>

<sup>63</sup> Masacre în Transilvania de Nord, 1940-1944, URL: <http://prm-central.ro/2012/04/masacre-in-transilvania-de-nord-1940-1944/>

<sup>64</sup> Șovinismul maghiar, URL: <http://prm-central.ro/2012/04/sovinismul-maghiar/>

<sup>65</sup> Ungaria si ocupatia Transilvaniei, URL: <http://prm-central.ro/2012/04/ungaria-si-ocupatia-transilvaniei/>

<sup>66</sup> Românii din Transilvania – uciși de unguri pentru vina de a fi “valahi”, URL: <http://prm-central.ro/2012/04/romanii-din-transilvania---ucisi-de-unguri-pentru-vina-de-a-fi-valahi/>

<sup>67</sup> Zece ani în gulag pentru “ochii lui Stalin”, URL: <http://prm-central.ro/2012/04/zece-ani-in-gulag-pentru-ochii-lui-stalin/>

*România Mare* believe that the Soviet Union was a principled political and ideological rival of Romania because the USSR tore down the historical Romanian territories of Moldova and sovietized them<sup>69</sup>. On the other hand, Romanian nationalists insist that the Romanians were victims of Hungarian political and ideological discriminations<sup>70</sup>.

The ideologists of *VMRO*, one more party of Bulgarian nationalism, deny the right of Macedonia to be independent and sovereign state in general, insist that Macedonian nation and language do not exist and believe that Macedonia should become part of Bulgaria<sup>71</sup>. The ideologists of Bulgarian nationalism, declaring the primacy of the Bulgarians in Bulgaria, insist that Bulgaria should be a Bulgarian national state and argue that "Africans, Asians, Arabs or Gypsies cannot be Bulgarians even if they receive a Bulgarian passport because they differ from us physically, culturally, mentally and spiritually"<sup>72</sup>. Slovak nationalists from *Naše Slovensko* are also active in the promotion of the negative images of Roma in particular and migrants in general because they believe that migrants are threats to the national security and political stability of Slovakia. Therefore, nationalists are active in the promotion of the slogan "*Slovensko nie je Afrika!*"<sup>73</sup>. *VMRO* insists on the need to preserve "ancient traditions and culture"<sup>74</sup> of Bulgarians as representatives of the European historical and cultural space.

These forms of ethnic nationalism are rare for modern Europe where nationalists prefer to mimic and "hide" the values and principles of ethnicity in other ideological and political contexts, declaring that "language, culture, faith, education, folk tradition, family, national cohesion and Slavic cooperation"<sup>75</sup> are pillars of the Slovak nation and the foundations of the Slovak Republic<sup>76</sup>. Slovak nationalists insist that the Slovak Republic should be only and exclusively Slovak

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<sup>68</sup> Tezaurul României exilat în gulagul sovietic, URL: <http://prm-central.ro/2012/04/tezaurul-romaniei-exilat-in-gulagul-sovietic/>

<sup>69</sup> Suferințele românilor din Basarabia, Bucovina si Transnistria, URL: <http://prm-central.ro/2012/04/suferintele-romanilor-din-basarabia-bucovina-si-transnistria/>

<sup>70</sup> Iosif Isarionovici Stalin – ucigașul națiunilor, URL: <http://prm-central.ro/2012/04/iosif-isarionovici-stalin-ucigasul-natiunilor/>

<sup>71</sup> Programa, URL: <http://www.vmro.bg/pages/документи/програма/>

<sup>72</sup> Kakvo razbirate pod B'lgarski narod. Mogat li tsiganite da būdat B'lgari?, URL: <http://idem.bg/bns/index.php/chesto-zadavani-vaproši>

<sup>73</sup> 10 Bodov Za Naše Slovensko! Volebný program politickej strany Kotleba - Ľudová Strana Naše Slovensko, URL: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Volebn%C3%BD-program-2016.pdf>

<sup>74</sup> Programa, URL: <http://www.vmro.bg/pages/документи/програма/>

<sup>75</sup> Slovenské národné dedičstvo, URL: <http://www.sns.sk/o-nas/profil/>

<sup>76</sup> Stanovy Slovenskej národnej strany, URL: <http://www.sns.sk/dokumenty/stanovy/>



national state<sup>77</sup>. The fascination with ethnicity became a universal fad of modern European nationalists. *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi*<sup>78</sup>, one of the leading parties of Turkish nationalists, seeks to combine the values of the nation and ethnicity. Turkish nationalists are active in use of pan-Turkic ideas and also eager to actualize various forms and dimensions of ethnicity. *Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi* in its political program manipulates the concepts of nation and democracy, proposing a project for the development of Turkey as a Turkish national democracy and the assimilation of ethnic minorities and non-Turkish groups of the population. *Naše Slovensko*, Slovak nationalist party, propagandizes the ideas of the national state<sup>79</sup> more resolutely, radically and consistently because its activists insist that the first Slovak Republic is their political ideal when moderate Slovak nationalists prefer to avoid the problems of the political continuity of Slovakia and its historical predecessors.

Some European nationalist parties, including *Dansk Folkeparti*, prefer to mask ethnicity in general political and religious declarations. For example, *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* positions itself as a party of "democratic nationalism"<sup>80</sup>. *Fratelli d'Italia - Alleanza Nazionale*<sup>81</sup>, one of the leading parties of Italian nationalism, positions itself as a party of national democrats who seek to defend "the principles of popular sovereignty, freedom, democracy, justice, social solidarity, dignity and financial justice"<sup>82</sup>. *Vlaams Belang*, one of the parties of Flemish nationalism, prefers to avoid ethnic nationalism, and its activists use general political declarations to articulate the different forms, dimensions and levels of Flemish identity. Other European nationalists believe that it is perfectly permissible and normal to declare loyalty and adherence to national traditions and values. For example, *Sverigedemokraterna*, one of the largest nationalist parties in modern Sweden, pays particular attention to the preservation of national identity. *Sverigedemokraterna*, on the one hand, prefers to imagine and position itself as *partiet för kulturarvet* or "a party of cultural heritage". Ideologists of *Sverigedemokraterna* believe that culture is one of the pillars of national identity and it includes "language, behavioural patterns, customs and festivals, institutions, art and music, clothing, religion, rituals, games, values and norms for laws and moral systems". *Sverigedemokraterna*, on the other hand,

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<sup>77</sup> Košické tézy, URL: <http://www.sns.sk/dokumenty/kosicke-tezy/>

<sup>78</sup> MHP Parti Programı, URL: [http://mhp/program/mhp/mhp\\_tarihcesi.html](http://mhp/program/mhp/mhp_tarihcesi.html)

<sup>79</sup> O nás, URL: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/o-nas/>

<sup>80</sup> History, URL: <http://english.n-va.be/history>

<sup>81</sup> Fratelli d'Italia – Alleanza nazionale. Statuto, URL: <http://www.fratelli-italia.it/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/statuto23luglio.pdf>

<sup>82</sup> Fratelli d'Italia - Alleanza Nazionale, URL: <http://www.fratelli-italia.it/about-us/>

promotes the ideas of cultural Scandinavianism<sup>83</sup> and popularizes the closeness and common features of the national identities of Denmark, Sweden and Norway.

Latvian nationalist parties also realized the significant mobilization potential of general political and socio-economic rhetoric. Therefore, social and economic statements and declarations prevail in the program documents of *Visu Latvijai! - Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK*<sup>84</sup>. This bloc of three nationalist parties uses populist rhetoric actively and insists on the need to develop social protection of the population. Other European nationalists prefer to promote their ideas in the same way. Theorists of *Vlaams Belang*, for example, declares that Flanders has the right to be a political and ethnic nation simultaneously, independently making political decisions and determining the future of the nation and the region<sup>85</sup>. The party program of *Dansk Folkeparti*, on the one hand, insists that “Denmark’s independence, ensuring the freedom of the Danish people in their own country, as well as the preservation and development of people’s government and monarchy”<sup>86</sup> are among the main goals of the party. On the other hand, *Dansk Folkeparti* recognizes the special role of *Folkekirken* as an institutionalized form of Christianity and one of the foundations of the Danish identity. *Perussuomalaiset*, the Finnish nationalist party, tries to combine the values of Christianity and the idea of nationalism<sup>87</sup>, declares also that Christianity is one of the foundations and pillars of national identity<sup>88</sup>.

Spanish nationalists, including *Falange Española de las JONS*, proclaim the values of Christianity as one of the basic principles of the nation<sup>89</sup>. Therefore, Spanish nationalism, unlike other European nationalisms, has stable religious Christian Catholic backgrounds and roots. The Hungarian nationalist party *Jobbik* also tries to use the values of Christianity, declaring that Christianity is one of the pillars of the Hungarian national identity<sup>90</sup>. Therefore, party theorists declare adherence to the traditional values and principles of Hungarian ethnicity, declaring that the national state is the priority of the social and

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<sup>83</sup> Partiet för kulturarvet. Ett brett, svenskt och tillgängligt kulturliv, URL: <https://sd.se/var-politik/kulturpolitik/>

<sup>84</sup> Nacionālās apvienības mērķi Latvijas simtgadei, URL: <http://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/programma/>

<sup>85</sup> Programma, URL: <https://www.vlaamsbelang.org/programma/>

<sup>86</sup> Principprogram, URL: <https://danskfolkeparti.dk/politik/principprogram/>

<sup>87</sup> Arvomaailmamme, URL: <https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/tietoa-meista/arvomaailmamme/>

<sup>88</sup> Perussuomalaiset säännöt, URL: <https://www.perussuomalaiset.fi/tietoa-meista/perussuomalaiset-rpn-saannot/>

<sup>89</sup> Historia, URL: <https://falange.es/historia>

<sup>90</sup> Alapító Nyilatkozat, URL: <https://www.jobbik.hu/jobbikrol/alapito-nyilatkozat>

political development of Hungary<sup>91</sup>. Modern Georgian nationalism, including *საქართველოს კონსერვატიული პარტია* or *Sak'art'velos konservatiuli partia*<sup>92</sup>, tries to combine the principles of the nation and the values of political democracy actively<sup>93</sup>. Therefore, Georgian nationalists, on the one hand, insist that statehood is the main achievement of the Georgian historical process. Nationalists glorify the national Georgian movement as a form of struggle for freedom, independence, preservation of the nation and language. On the other hand, *Sak'art'velos konservatiuli partia* declares the need to “create a unified and democratic Georgian state, develop state patriotism, national ideology and ideals, preserve ethnic, confessional, cultural and traditional identity”<sup>94</sup>.

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<sup>91</sup> Kiskáté, URL: <https://www.jobbik.hu/jobbikrol/kiskate>

<sup>92</sup> *sakartvelos k'onservat'iuli p'art'ia*, URL: <http://conservatives.ge/ge/საქართველოს-კონსერვატიული>

<sup>93</sup> *p'art'iis p'rograma*, URL: <http://conservatives.ge/ge/პარტიის-პროგრამა/>

<sup>94</sup> *p'art'iis ts'esdeba*, URL: <http://conservatives.ge/ge/პარტიის-წესდება/>

### *The universality of the political language of ethnic nationalism*

Modern nationalist parties are active in the simultaneous use of languages of political and ethnic nationalisms. Despite the fact that ethnic myths and stereotypes are among sources of constant inspiration for nationalists, some parties which can be localized formally in the political space among nationalist actors prefer to avoid the temptations of ethnicity, preferring to cultivate political and civil identities. If European nationalist parties, especially in Eastern and Central Europe, actively cultivate ethnic nationalism, the parties of Western Europe tend to minimize the role of the ethnic factor in their ideologies, believing that the values and principles of civic activism and political nationalism are more attractive to voters than ethnic myths and stereotypes that contribute to the fragmentation of society and may alienate potential voters.

The values and principles of the nation as a political community of citizens define the main vectors and trajectories of the development of civil secular political nationalism in North America. Various political parties of the USA and Canada, including national (*Canadian Action Party*<sup>95</sup>, *America First Party*<sup>96</sup>, *Christian Heritage Party*<sup>97</sup>, *Christian Coalition of America*<sup>98</sup>, *Christian Liberty Party*<sup>99</sup>, *Constitution Party*<sup>100</sup>, *Canadian Democratic Movement*<sup>101</sup>, *American Independent Party*<sup>102</sup>, *Freedom Party of Canada*<sup>103</sup>, *Reform Party*<sup>104</sup>) and regional (*British Columbia Conservative Party*<sup>105</sup>, *Democratic Reform BC*<sup>106</sup>, *Saskatchewan Party*<sup>107</sup>, *Yukon Party*<sup>108</sup>, *Cascadian National Party*<sup>109</sup>, *Alaskan Independence Party*<sup>110</sup>, *Freedom Party of Ontario*<sup>111</sup>, *Nova Scotia Liberal Party*<sup>112</sup>, *Western*

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<sup>95</sup> Canadian Action Party, URL: <http://www.canadianactionparty.ca>

<sup>96</sup> America First Party, URL: <http://www.americafirstparty.org>

<sup>97</sup> Christian Heritage Party, URL: <https://www.chp.ca>

<sup>98</sup> Christian Coalition of America, URL: <http://www.cc.org>

<sup>99</sup> Christian Liberty Party, URL: <https://sites.google.com/site/christianlibertyparty/>

<sup>100</sup> Constitution Party, URL: <http://www.constitutionparty.com/>

<sup>101</sup> Canadian Democratic Movement, URL: <http://www.canadiandemocraticmovement.ca>

<sup>102</sup> American Independent Party, URL: <http://www.aipca.org/>

<sup>103</sup> Freedom Party of Canada, URL: <http://www.freedomparty.ca/>

<sup>104</sup> Reform Party, URL: <http://www.reformparty.org>

<sup>105</sup> British Columbia Conservative Party, URL: <http://www.bcconservative.ca>

<sup>106</sup> Democratic Reform BC, URL: <http://www.drbc.ca/party-2.htm>

<sup>107</sup> Saskatchewan Party, URL: <http://www.saskparty.com>

<sup>108</sup> Yukon Party, URL: <http://www.yukonpartycaucus.ca>

<sup>109</sup> Cascadian National Party, URL: <http://www.angelfire.com/wa3/cascadia/manifesto.html>

<sup>110</sup> Alaskan Independence Party, URL: <http://www.akip.org/>

<sup>111</sup> Freedom Party of Ontario, URL: <http://www.freedomparty.on.ca>

<sup>112</sup> Nova Scotia Liberal Party, URL: <https://liberal.ns.ca/>

*Canada Concept*<sup>113</sup>) prefer to promote the values of political nationalism of the nation as the community of citizens, actualizing religious principles also, although the values of Christianity never determined the main vectors and trajectories of the development of nationalist ideologies. The regionalism of Canada and the United States have no needs in ethnic incentives, and regionalist parties in this intellectual situation are radically different from European regionalists, who prefer to promote ethnic diversity and actualize the cultural and linguistic characteristics of their regions. Parties of the USA and Canada, including *Nationalist Movement*<sup>114</sup>, *National Alliance*<sup>115</sup>, *Falconist Party*<sup>116</sup>, *American Fascist Movement*<sup>117</sup>, which profess the ideas and values of nationalism in its radical forms are marginal because they seek to combine the values of nationalism with extremist ideologies, including fascism and racism. Therefore, classical nationalist parties are virtually absent in the political spaces of the United States and Canada, where ethnic or ethnicized nationalisms in the European sense are marginal and invisible political factors.

If the formal nationalistic parties of North America avoid ethnic nationalism diligently and decisively, then some nationalist groups and movements of Europe actively use ethnicity as a mobilization resource. Aleksandr Melihov, a Russian publicist, believes that "national fantasies have a serious advantage even over corporate fantasies... it is difficult for an individual to be satisfied with an inspirational fairy tale about himself that does not include some beautiful legends about his origin"<sup>118</sup>. Therefore, despite all efforts and attempts of supporters of political moderate nationalism to imagine and invent the nations as social constructs, the radicals who prefer to offer ethnocentric theories and explanations will always find supporters easier than liberal nationalists.

Latvian nationalists are also active in use of the ethnicity's potential, insisting that Latvia is the only country where Latvians have the opportunity to develop Latvian identity, including language, culture and literature. Some theorists of *Visu Latvijai! - Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK* believe that the restoration of Latvian political and state independence improved the status of Latvians and the Latvian language, but they insist that the significant number of

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<sup>113</sup> Western Canada Concept, URL: <http://www.westcan.org/>

<sup>114</sup> Nationalist Movement, URL: <http://www.nationalist.org/>

<sup>115</sup> National Alliance, URL: <https://natall.com/join-us/>

<sup>116</sup> Falconist Party, URL: <http://falconistparty.tripod.com>

<sup>117</sup> American Fascist Movement, URL: <http://americanfascistmovement.com>

<sup>118</sup> Melikhov, Aleksandr. (2007), *Kommunizm, natsionalizm, liberalizm - konkurentsiaa grioz, Znamia*, No 2, URL: <http://magazines.russ.ru/znamia/2007/2/me15.html>

non-Latvians do not allow Latvia to become a national Latvian state<sup>119</sup>. Language problems are interesting for nationalists in young democracies and dynamically nationalizing states of Central and Eastern Europe. *KUN*, for example, is active in attempts to defend the monopolistic state status of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine<sup>120</sup>. *Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond*, the party of modern Estonian nationalism, declares significant ethnic dangers and threats, Estonians are confronted with because the significant number of non-Estonian migrants live in modern Estonia<sup>121</sup>. If the theorists of nationalist parties in Western Europe avoid to label their ethnic opponents explicitly and openly, then the nationalists of peripheral European countries, in contrast to them, prefer to use the language of ethnic nationalism and insist that Russia with its idea of *russskii mir* or “Russian world”<sup>122</sup> is dangerous for the sovereignty, independence and identity of those countries that were parts of the Soviet Union. Therefore, ideologists of *Visu Latvijai! - Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK* insist that Latvian nationalism should be the main motive in political decisions taking and making. Latvian nationalist argues that the Latvian language is the basis of national identity and the only factor that guarantees the political stability of Latvia<sup>123</sup>. The Latvian National Parties consistently advocate the idea that only the Latvian language can be provided with state status<sup>124</sup>. Rihards Kols, one of the deputies of *Visu Latvijai! - Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK* insists that the national identity of European nations in the countries of young democracy will always oppose and deny values and principles of globalization<sup>125</sup>. Formally, these political demands are moderate and actualize the transformation of European nationalist parties that seek to form an attractive political image and avoid accusations of right-wing radicalism.

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<sup>119</sup> Vai Rīga reiz būs latviešu galvaspilsēta? URL: <http://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/aktualitate/vai-riga-reiz-bus-latviesu-galvaspilseta/>

<sup>120</sup> Statut Konhresu Ukrajins'kyx Natsionalistiv, URL: <http://cun.org.ua/pro-partiyu/statut/>

<sup>121</sup> Konservatiivne Manifest (kinnitatud erakonna kongressil, 24.03.2012), URL: <https://ekre.ee/konservatiivne-manifest/>

<sup>122</sup> Rihards Kols, Mesiāniskās “krievu pasaules” dekonstrukcija, URL: <http://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/aktualitate/mesianiskas-krievu-pasaules-dekonstrukcija/>

<sup>123</sup> Nacionālās apvienības atvērtā programma v4.1 (03.12.2012), URL: [http://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Nacionalas\\_apvienibas\\_VL\\_TB-LNNK\\_programma\\_v4.1.pdf](http://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Nacionalas_apvienibas_VL_TB-LNNK_programma_v4.1.pdf)

<sup>124</sup> Kā valsts valodas – latviešu valodas – statuss tika nostiprināts Latvijas likumos?, URL: <http://www.tb.lv/buj/items/ka-valsts-valodas-latviesu-valodas-statuss-tika-nostiprinats-latvijas-likumos>

<sup>125</sup> Eiropā vēlēšanās nacionālie spēki saņem arvien vairāk balsu. “LA” saruna ar Saeimas deputātu Rihardu Kolu, URL: <http://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/aktualitate/eiropa-velesanas-nacionalie-speki-sanem-arvien-vairak-balsu-la-saruna-ar-saeimas-deputatu-rihardu-kolu/>

This political logic actualized its universal character and historical inevitability at the beginning of the 21st century when nationalist non-European parties preferred to disengage from national radicals and supporters of ethnic nationalism. Tendencies of fragmentation of nationalist discourse are visible in European and non-European nationalisms. Formally the nationalist parties of Asia have much in common with the parties of European nationalisms because colonialism facilitated and inspired the transplantation of Western institutions, including parties, into non-European spaces, and the universalism of nationalist doctrine makes comparisons and analogies unavoidable. European supporters of ethnic nationalism are not single in their pathological aspirations and desires to construct ethnically homogeneous states that will be able to overcome the legacy of historical heterogeneous empires and multinational federations.

The nationalists of Hungary, Croatia, Latvia and Estonia are not alone in their aspirations to cultivate and develop ethnic nationalisms, and their political practices and strategies have much in common with the tactics of non-European nationalist parties, including Indian ones, which belief in possibility of development and progress of homogeneous Hindu India without Muslim and Christian minorities, despite the fact that the number of these groups is incomparable with the undesirable minorities of Europe. Indian nationalist parties, including *Vishva Hindu Parishad*<sup>126</sup>, *Bharatiya Janata Party*<sup>127</sup>, *Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh*<sup>128</sup>, *Nationalist Congress Party*<sup>129</sup>, *Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh*<sup>130</sup>, *Bharatiya Kisan Sangh*<sup>131</sup>, *All India Forward Bloc*<sup>132</sup> are important political actors in the ideological panorama of modern India. These parties are equally active in use of the political language of ethnic nationalism.

Therefore, theorists, ideologists and activists of these parties seek to consolidate Indian society and protect *Hindu Rashtra* (Indian nation) and *Hindu Dharma* - Indian version of political and ethnic identity. Indian nationalist discourse successfully uses the rhetoric of ethnic nationalism and the language of political nationalism equally. Formally, Indian ethnic nationalism positions itself as a cultural trend, but its theorists use cultural and historical rhetoric to mask their radical ethnic positions and views. In fact, the program of the revival of Indian civilization as Hindu one is an attempt to legitimize ethnic nationalism. Indian ethnic nationalist parties strive to develop an ethnic version of history,

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<sup>126</sup> Vishva Hindu Parishad, URL: <http://vhp.org/>

<sup>127</sup> Bharatiya Janata Party, URL: <http://www.bjp.org/about-the-party/>

<sup>128</sup> Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, URL: <http://rss.org/>

<sup>129</sup> Raashtravaadee kaangres paartee, URL: <http://ncp.org.in/about/>

<sup>130</sup> Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh, URL: <http://www.bms.org.in>

<sup>131</sup> Bharatiya Kisan Sangh, URL: <http://bharatiyakisansangh.org/>

<sup>132</sup> All India Forward Bloc, URL: <http://forwardbloc.org/>

absolutizing and idealizing the Aryan origins and roots of Indians, Hinduism and denying Islam and Christianity as alien threats. Actually, Hindu nationalists inspired nationalization and ethnization of history and made the first steps towards the ethnization of political space, the homogenization of ideological life, the consequent minimization and reduction of roles and influences of Christian and Muslim minorities in the life of Indian society. Therefore, numerous declarations and assurances about the development of a political and civil nation are not barriers and obstacles for the ideologists of Indian nationalism in their attempts to actualize the potential of ethnicity. The theorists of Indian nationalism in its Hindu version proclaim the primacy of Indian traditional ethnic identity and insist that *Hindu Dharma* should become the ideological basis of ethnization of political, cultural and social landscapes of contemporary India.

*Renegades or modest charm of the marginals:  
alternative nationalisms*

Modern political nationalism has various forms and dimensions. Civil nationalisms may intersect with ethnic versions of nationalist ideologies or may perceive values and principles of ethnicity indifferently. These nationalist ideologies may be invisible and marginal factors. Nationalisms of this type can function as political and intellectual alternatives to other versions and forms of nationalism that dominate in the particular society. Modern history provides historians and researchers of nationalism with several examples of such formally marginal and actually alternative political parties and movements of nationalist orientation. Political marginals and outsiders are noticeable and visible in the ideological spaces of several countries of the modern West and Orient.

The author believes that several political parties of nationalist orientation can be mapped among alternative forces, but ideas and values, they offer and propose, are also marginal and unacceptable for the political majority and dominant groups of societies where these nationalist parties exist, imitating political and ideological activism. Several nationalist groups and movements of the modern world from Western Europe to South America, from North America to the Middle East can be recognized as political marginals, outsiders and ideological and social alternative movements simultaneously. Modern nationalist alternative marginals are represented in political spaces of the globalising world by several parties and groups in Great Britain, Iran, Brazil, France and other countries. *Republic Campaign* is the largest political group that lobbies and popularizes the ideas, values and principles of republicanism in the UK. *Instituto Brasil Imperial* and *Pro Monarquia* are the main actors and participants in the monarchist movement in modern Brazil. *Raztakhiz Iran*,



*Conseil National Iranian pour le Elections Libres*, *Paniranist party* and other movements are supporters and adherents of the values of Iranian monarchism, combined with the ideas and principles of the Aryan myth and Iranian ethnic nationalism.

Alternative civil and ethnic nationalisms in the modern world are marginal because their theorists and ideologists suggest restoring the forms of statehood and political institutions that dominant political classes perceive as historical anachronisms or misunderstandings. Therefore, French, Brazilian and Iranian monarchists favour the restoration of the monarchy, combining the vestiges of elite political nationalism with attempts to actualize the ethnic components of national identities. If the Iranian nationalists of monarchical orientation are active in use of the principles and values of ethnicity, language and blood, then the French and Brazilian monarchists believe that the ideas of the political nation as a community of citizens are more attractive and seek to avoid the explicit and unnecessary ethnization of political programs. The British Republicans also propose a program of mainly political and state reforms, believing that the ethnization of the political spaces of Great Britain is superfluous.

Programs of alternative nationalisms are diverse, but they coincide in their radical nature. *Republic* is the leading and most influential organization of British Republicans. *Republic* is “a membership-based pressure group campaigning for the abolition of the monarchy and its replacement with a directly elected head of state”<sup>133</sup>. *Pro Monarquia* is a “non-profit socio-cultural association, founded in 1990... its goal is to promote and coordinate initiatives aimed to restore the monarchical regime of government in Brazil and dynastic legitimacy”<sup>134</sup>. English Republicans insist that “we want to see the monarchy abolished and the Queen replaced with an elected, democratic head of state”<sup>135</sup> because of “a democratic republic”<sup>136</sup> is their political ideal.

Supporters of the republic of England insist that the monarchy is fraught with numerous political threats because they stimulate various political, economic and social risks in particular and destabilize the situation in the country in general. Brazilian monarchists, as the British Republicans, are also active in manipulation with historical and political facts in their attempts to prove the advantages of monarchy and the doom of the republic. Monarchists believe that “monarchy is a modern and effective form of government. The 8 of

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<sup>133</sup> About Republic, URL: <https://www.republic.org.uk/about-republic>

<sup>134</sup> Pró Monarquia, URL: <http://www.monarquia.org.br/quemsomos.html>

<sup>135</sup> The monarchy isn't fit for purpose, URL: <https://www.republic.org.uk/>

<sup>136</sup> How to get rid of the monarchy, URL: <https://www.republic.org.uk/what-we-do/how-get-rid-monarchy>

the most powerful 12 economies in the world today are monarchies". Brazilian monarchists insist that republics cannot solve economic and social problems effectively and successfully. Monarchists believe that Brazil in the imperial period of its history was one of the great powers, and the Republicans lost their imperial political and historical heritage and turned Brazil into a country of the third world. Brazilian monarchists provide some examples of greater effectiveness of the monarchy in comparison with the republic, including the following: Emperor Pedro II himself paid for his trips and international visits, only 14 taxes existed in the empire in comparison with more than 60 in the Republic, the minimum wage in the empire was 275 dollars in comparison with 100 dollars in the Republic<sup>137</sup>.

Czech monarchists criticize the republic as an expensive and inefficient form of state organization also, insisting that the republic stimulates corruption and the dominance of the bureaucracy<sup>138</sup>. Czech apologists for the restoration of the monarchy are unoriginal in these statements because the French monarchists also regularly insist that the republic is ineffective and the monarchy can save the French nation from degeneration and decline only and lead it to a revival and prosperity<sup>139</sup>. Iranian nationalists of monarchical orientation idealize and promote positive images of Iranian monarchs, including Reza Shah Pahlavi<sup>140</sup> and Mohamad Reza Shah Pahlavi<sup>141</sup>. Iranian monarchists are also active in their attempts to idealize the monarchy and criticize the republic, declaring it "a state of Islamic apartheid"<sup>142</sup>.

Alternative British nationalists and Republicans, unlike monarchical nationalists in other countries, prefer to promote a negative image of the monarchy claiming that it is a historical archaism and political rudiment because the monarchy maps the UK among other modern non-democracies and does not allow England to become a truly democratic country and transit from absolute monarchy to a democracy<sup>143</sup>. If the British Republicans prefer to criticize the institution of the monarchy in historical and political contexts, then the Brazilian

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<sup>137</sup> Diferença entre monarquia e república, URL: <http://www.monarquia.org.br/o-regime-imperial.html>

<sup>138</sup> Proč podporujeme monarchii, URL: <https://www.korunaceska.cz/monarchie/proc-podporujeme-monarchii>

<sup>139</sup> Notre manifeste, URL: <https://www.actionfrancaise.net/vie-du-mouvement/manifeste/>

<sup>140</sup> rda shah bzrgu. pedr aaran nwan. abrmrd tarakh aaran zman, URL: <http://www.rastakhiz.org/main.html>

<sup>141</sup> shahnshah araamhr. shahnshah aaran zman. srdar bzrgu aaran saz, URL: <http://www.rastakhiz.org/main.html>

<sup>142</sup> hmbstgua mla dr brabr jmhwa apearthead aslama, URL: <http://fa.rezapahlavi.org/2017/1968>

<sup>143</sup> The monarchy gives politicians enormous power, URL: <https://www.republic.org.uk/what-we-want/facts/monarchy-gives-politicians-enormous-power>

monarchists<sup>144</sup> in contrast to them use the same arguments in their attempts to prove the advantages of the monarchy, pathetically declaring that the European countries in general and the monarchical states, in particular, owe their successes and achievements to the monarchy or monarchical political and cultural heritage.

English Republicans are active in the promotion of the political and ideological myth that the history of Britain was a history of “individuals making great scientific advances and medical discoveries, providing strong leadership at times of crisis and making outstanding contributions to art and literature. It is also the story of large numbers of people joining together to fight for greater representation, better conditions and equal rights”<sup>145</sup>. Republicans believe that a regularly elected head of state is more effective as a political manager because “an elected head of state's neutrality is prescribed by law, they can be genuinely independent of government, acting as an impartial referee of the political system and an extra check on the power of government... aside from these formal functions, a president represents their country on the world stage and takes a leading role at times of national celebration, uncertainty or tragedy. In carrying out these parts of the job, an elected head of state knows they will be held to account for their words and actions, providing a strong incentive to be unifying and inclusive. If a president attempts to overreach their powers, there's a clear process for removing them from office - unlike a monarch. And a president is paid a straightforward annual salary, usually with a small office and one official residence; the public is not expected to fund their extended family or maintain multiple homes”<sup>146</sup>.

If the theorists of English republicanism are active in criticizing monarchs as ineffective rulers, then the Brazilian monarchists, on the contrary, idealize the successes and achievements of the emperors<sup>147</sup> in the development and progress of Brazil<sup>148</sup>. Theoreticians and ideologists of the republic in England insist that the monarch as a formal or ceremonial head of state does not possess these attributes and therefore the monarchy is less legitimate and effective than the parliamentary or presidential republic. Supporters of the restoration of the monarchy in Brazil insist that the monarchy is not so bad and negative as its

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<sup>144</sup> O IBI saúda o aniversário de Sua Alteza Imperial e Real Príncipe Dom Bertrand, URL: <http://www.brasilimperial.org.br/layout/layout2.php?cdConteudo=178&codigo=15>

<sup>145</sup> It's a living link to our history, URL: <https://www.republic.org.uk/what-we-want/monarchy-myth-buster/its-living-link-our-history>

<sup>146</sup> What is a head of state for?, URL: <https://www.republic.org.uk/what-we-want/our-head-state>

<sup>147</sup> Os Imperadores do Brasil, URL: <http://www.monarquia.org.br/obrasilimperial.html>

<sup>148</sup> Império do Brasil, URL: <http://www.monarquia.org.br/obrasilimperial.html>

opponents believe. The Brazilian monarchists form and promote a positive and attractive image of the monarchy insisting that the Brazilian Empire was more developed and stable than the republic. Monarchists believe that the republic is an extremely ineffective form of organization of statehood and state power because, as the ideologists of monarchism insist, 9 coups, 13 radical changes of the Constitution and in fact 10 political regimes took place in more than 130 years of the republic's existence<sup>149</sup>.

Iranian monarchists use the same arguments in their polemic with supporters of the Islamic Republic, believing and insisting that the Islamic Republic initiated numerous repressions when the monarchy was a more democratic political regime and provided women with political and personal freedoms, rights to receive higher education and promoted their socialization into society<sup>150</sup>. Iranian nationalists from *Hezb-e Pān Irānist* are active in criticizing the political regime of Islamists, insisting that an Islamic republic is an ineffective form of statehood because Islamists can not solve social and economic problems<sup>151</sup>. Supporters of pan-Iranism insist that the Iranians are eager for political and economic reforms<sup>152</sup>, but the ruling regime of a religious minority<sup>153</sup> inhibits the transformation of society because possible reforms can weaken the power and influence of Islamists.

Brazilian monarchists, in contrast to the British Republicans, argue that the Republican political regime is incompetent and can not solve the numerous problems of Brazil. It is noteworthy that the Brazilian monarchists celebrate the political and ideological conjuncture very subtly and therefore use the ecological<sup>154</sup>, social<sup>155</sup> and economic<sup>156</sup> rhetoric in his criticism of the Republican political elites. Iranian monarchists are doing the same and claim that the

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<sup>149</sup> Monarquia ou República?, URL: <http://www.monarquia.org.br/o-regime-imperial.html>

<sup>150</sup> Statement on the UN's 2017 International Women's Day, 8 March 2017, URL: <http://en.rezapahlavi.org/2017/03/08/statement-on-the-uns-2016-international-womens-day-8-march-2016/>

<sup>151</sup> chealsh haa jda frarwa jmhwa aslama, URL: <http://paniranist-party.org/pages-1455.html>

<sup>152</sup> peaskh dbar kel hzb pean aaranast dr rabth ba peaam aqaa rwhana r'eas jmhwa aslama, URL: <http://paniranist-party.org/pages-1453.html>

<sup>153</sup> khwast mlt aaran baad ajra gurdd, URL: <http://paniranist-party.org/pages-1441.html>

<sup>154</sup> Achar que o CO2 decide o clima é como crer em magia, diz professor do MIT, URL: [http://www.paznocampo.org.br/Blog/Blog\\_db.asp](http://www.paznocampo.org.br/Blog/Blog_db.asp)

<sup>155</sup> Agricultura lidera preservação no Brasil, URL: [http://www.paznocampo.org.br/Blog/Blog\\_db.asp](http://www.paznocampo.org.br/Blog/Blog_db.asp); Verdes sem argumentos: o Brasil está alimentando mais de um bilhão de pessoas!, URL: [http://www.paznocampo.org.br/Blog/Blog\\_db.asp](http://www.paznocampo.org.br/Blog/Blog_db.asp)

<sup>156</sup> Eleições francesas: os verdes vão para o mato, URL: [http://www.paznocampo.org.br/Blog/Blog\\_db.asp](http://www.paznocampo.org.br/Blog/Blog_db.asp)

Islamic Republic is an undemocratic political project. The ideologists of the monarchist version of Iranian political nationalism, on the one hand, believe that the Iranians, like other Europeans, want to live in a state that will defend freedom, democracy and human rights<sup>157</sup>. On the other hand, they insist that the Islamic revolution failed to fulfil its tasks because the political and ideological discourses were monopolized by radical Islamists<sup>158</sup>. Monarchists believe in the social and economic crisis of the Islamic Republic<sup>159</sup>, its peaceful overthrow and the gradual transition of Iranian society from religious authoritarianism to democracy of Western-style.

Representatives of the Iranian Shah's family believe that the Iranian nation is free to determine the future political structure of liberated Iran. The political heirs of the exiled Shah who live in Europe and the USA state that they will respect any choice of compatriots and do not insist that the monarchy is a political panacea for Iran. French monarchists also believe that monarchy is the form of political organization of French society that will ensure progress and development of democracy<sup>160</sup>. *Iran National Council for Free Election*<sup>161</sup>, which is banned in Iran because it insists on political amnesty, legalization of political parties, freedom of speech, professes the values and principles of political nationalism also and hopes that the democratic transition from autocracy to a free society will promote the consolidation of the nation. The statements and declarations of the freedom to create and operate political parties, on the one hand, became commonplace in the program documents of the Iranian monarchist nationalist parties, including *Marze Por Gohar Party* or *Iranians for a secular republic*<sup>162</sup>. On the other hand, almost all Iranian nationalists in exile, including monarchists and ethnic nationalists, insist that human rights will be guaranteed and respected in the new Iran after the restoration of democracy<sup>163</sup>.

The theorists of the republic in England insist that the republic has several advantages in comparison with the archaic, as they state, monarchy. These advantages are following: "When Britain becomes a republic we will, at last, make sure that our nation's democratic values go right to the top... Becoming a

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<sup>157</sup> Iran: Unleashing Her Potential Through Freedom, Democracy and Human Rights, URL: <http://en.rezapahlavi.org/2010/10/12/iran-unleashing-her-potential-through-freedom-democracy-and-human-rights/>

<sup>158</sup> *sa whsht sal pes az anqlab drkeja aastadh aam?*, URL: <http://jebhemeliiran.org/?p=1231>

<sup>159</sup> *faz dwm bhran*, URL: <http://paniranist-party.org/pages-1432.html>; *aaran dr dw hrket*, URL: <http://paniranist-party.org/pages-1438.html>

<sup>160</sup> *Déclaration de principes*, URL: <http://nouvelle-action-royaliste.fr/presentation/principes>

<sup>161</sup> *Our Mission*, URL: <https://irannc.org/en/mission/>

<sup>162</sup> *baanah mtbw'eata jnbsh peaadara mrzperguhr*, URL: <http://marzeporgohar.net/fa/?p=2331>

<sup>163</sup> *hqwq bshr dr aaran nadadh gurft nkhwahd shd*, URL: <http://marzeporgohar.net/fa/?p=2295>

republic will put a stop to the Royals' routine abuses of public money and their daily interference in our country's politics... A move to a republic will give us the chance to re-balance power between government, parliament and the people... A republic will give us an effective head of state, someone chosen by us to referee the political process and champion the interests of the British people... A democratic Britain will also give a huge boost to 'brand Britain'»<sup>164</sup>. Republicans believe that the elected head of state will be more effective in defending and promoting the values and interests of the nation because he or she will be real “represent the nation, defend our democracy, act as referee in the political process, offer a non-political voice at times of crisis and celebration”<sup>165</sup> and will become truly “an independent and neutral head of state”<sup>166</sup> because the monarchy that “gives politicians enormous power”<sup>167</sup> is far from the norms and traditions of democracy.

Iranian monarchists believe that the republic is the worst form of state structure than monarchy because monarchists after the Islamic revolution in Iran became the main victims of political repression and persecution of the new "clerical regime"<sup>168</sup> and political tyranny, which, like Reza Pahlavi, the political heir to the deposed Shah, state, denies human rights and undermines the fundamental values of democracy<sup>169</sup>. Ideologists and theoreticians of Iranian nationalism in its monarchical form believe that the monarchy was closer to the western nation-state than the Islamic Republic imagined by them as an authoritarian and undemocratic theocracy<sup>170</sup>. Therefore, monarchists, on the one hand, idealize the monarchical past of Iran<sup>171</sup>, including the dynasty<sup>172</sup>, ceremonies<sup>173</sup>, political rituals<sup>174</sup> and symbolism<sup>175</sup> and, on the other hand, insist

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<sup>164</sup> What will change in a republic? URL: <https://www.republic.org.uk/what-we-want/what-will-change>

<sup>165</sup> A new head of state, URL: <https://www.republic.org.uk/what-we-want/new-head-state>

<sup>166</sup> An independent and neutral head of state, URL: <https://www.republic.org.uk/what-we-want/new-head-state>

<sup>167</sup> The monarchy gives politicians enormous power, URL: <https://www.republic.org.uk/what-we-want/facts/monarchy-gives-politicians-enormous-power>

<sup>168</sup> “Iran: The Quest for Freedom, Democracy and Human Rights” – Given at the World Affairs Council, URL: <http://en.rezapahlavi.org/2010/06/22/iran-the-quest-for-freedom-democracy-and-human-rights-given-at-the-world-affairs-council/>

<sup>169</sup> Thirty-seven years of the Islamic republic's tyranny, URL: <http://en.rezapahlavi.org/2016/02/13/thirty-seven-years-of-the-islamic-republics-tyranny/>

<sup>170</sup> Iran: From Theocracy to Democracy, URL: <http://en.rezapahlavi.org/2010/04/13/iran-from-theocracy-to-democracy/>

<sup>171</sup> kewrsh bzrgu, URL: <https://www.farahpahlavi.org/fa/about/cyrus-the-great>

<sup>172</sup> khandan pehlwa, URL: <https://www.farahpahlavi.org/fa/about/royal-family>

<sup>173</sup> mrasm tajgudara, URL: <https://www.farahpahlavi.org/fa/about/coronation>

that the republic in its Islamic form ignores rights and freedoms, rejecting the values and achievements of democracy<sup>176</sup>.

French monarchists from *L'Alliance royale* are also active in idealizing traditional and patriarchal values, insisting that the family, the church, and Catholicism were the historical pillars of the French nation and statehood<sup>177</sup>. Therefore, Iranian monarchists and nationalists in exile insist actively that the developed countries should limit their relations with Tehran because the political regime of the Islamic republic, as nationalists believe, is criminal<sup>178</sup>. Iranian nationalists in exile seek to synthesize the values and principles of the nation and ethnicity with the ideas of liberal democracy<sup>179</sup>. The nationalist Iranian monarchical discourse in this intellectual context is postcolonial because nationalist theorists synthesize the values of the nation and democracy simultaneously, seeking to transplant liberal Western ideas into Iranian national spaces and contexts, despite the fact that monarchical nationalists do not have the ability to control the processes of the political decisions taking and making in Iran really. Attempts to transplant liberalism into Iranian political contexts in this intellectual situation actualizes the ideological and even utopian nature of the monarchical forms of Iranian nationalism.

Brazilian monarchists are active in their criticism of the republic believing that republicanism is an ineffective political ideology and doctrine. Monarchists insist that Brazil in that historical period when it was an empire belonged to the most stable and dynamically developing countries of the world because the average inflation rate was 1.58% in comparison to 50% in 1891, the salary of a

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<sup>174</sup> jshnhaa 2500 sal□ shahnshaha aaran, URL: <https://www.farahpahlavi.org/fa/about/2500-celebration-of-persian-empire>

<sup>175</sup> nshanhaa slnta pehlwa, URL: [https://www.farahpahlavi.org/fa/about/coat-of-arms;tarakhcheh\\_perchem\\_haa\\_aaran](https://www.farahpahlavi.org/fa/about/coat-of-arms;tarakhcheh_perchem_haa_aaran), URL: <http://www.irancpi.net/ir/hamandishan/bahman-zahedi/489-percham.html>

<sup>176</sup> The Challenge Of Implementing Democracy And Human Rights In Iran, URL: <http://en.rezapahlavi.org/2010/03/27/the-challenge-of-implementing-democracy-and-human-rights-in-iran/>

<sup>177</sup> Plateforme politique, URL: <http://www.allianceroyale.fr/plateforme-politique/>

<sup>178</sup> mmashat ba rjeam aaran bh jhana khtrnaketr mntha khwahd shd, URL: <http://marzeporgohar.net/fa/?p=2292>

<sup>179</sup> lybralysm cheast? , URL: <http://333.irancpi.net/ir/liberal-democracy/mefahim-liebralism/1052-liberal-democracy-2013-06-01.html>; hzb mshrwth aaran, URL: <http://www.irancpi.net/ir/about-us-ir.html>; dr dfa'e az labral dmwkerasa, URL: <http://333.irancpi.net/ir/liberal-democracy/1177-liberal-democracy-2013-09-04.html>; labral dmwkerasa aguanh rah jhan swm, URL: <http://333.irancpi.net/ir/liberal-democracy/mefahim-liebralism/757-liebreral-demokrasi-002.html>; azadakhwaha w baztwlad mnsh daketatwra!, URL: <http://www.mail.irancpi.net/ir/degarandishan/firoz-nogomi/2138-degarandishan-2016-06-11.html>

worker in the period of the empire was equal to five salaries of the worker in the republic, the empire was an example of democracy because 13% of the population had the right to vote when similar figures in the UK, Italy and Portugal were equal to 7, 2 and 9% of the total population respectively<sup>180</sup>.

Iranian monarchists are also very active in the demonization of the Islamic Republic, calling for its destruction<sup>181</sup> and insisting that the clerical political regime has nothing in common with the national values and historical cultural heritage of the Iranian nation because only monarchists and other nationalists in exile symbolize and personify the national unity of Iran and the Iranian nation<sup>182</sup>. *Marze Por Gohar Party* or *Iranians for a secular republic*, one of the Iranian nationalist parties in exile, is active in criticizing the modern theocratic regime, accusing it of violating the rights of religious minorities and arguing that the new democratic Iran will be faithful to the principles and values of political nationalism, guaranteeing the rights of religious minorities<sup>183</sup>.

Monarchists blame the Islamists for systematical terror and repressions against opponents of the regime. Iranian nationalists in exile actively form a negative image of political radical Islam of Teheran and state that Islamists transformed peaceful Islam into the aggressive religion of lack of freedom, violence and suppression<sup>184</sup>. The political imagination of monarchists inspired the invention of the pantheon of the martyrs, who became victims of the Islamist regime. Iranian nationalists and monarchists in exile insist that Tehran ignores the national interests of the Iranian nation because it prefers to preserve the religious grounds of the regime<sup>185</sup> and rejected the national Iranian Aryan symbols, including history<sup>186</sup>, coat of arms, anthem and flag, replacing them with Islamist non-national religious attributes.

British Republicans insist that the monarchy is a threat to territorial integrity because Scotland, Ireland and Wales, on the one hand, were victims of aggression inspired by English monarchs. Iranian nationalists in exile, including the *Marze Por Gohar Party* or *the Iranians for a secular republic*, on the contrary

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<sup>180</sup> Nos tempos do Império do Brasil, URL: <http://www.monarquia.org.br/o-regime-imperial.html>

<sup>181</sup> mrgu br jmhwa aslama, URL: <http://www.rastakhiz.org/rastakhiz/ban/iran/iran.html>

<sup>182</sup> athad mla dr aarana bwdn mast, URL: <http://marzeporgohar.net/fa/?p=2259>

<sup>183</sup> armannamh jnbsh peaadara mrzperguhr, URL: <http://marzeporgohar.net/fa/?p=23>

<sup>184</sup> zn staza dr taza namh (qran) , zn abzara ast jnsa dr dst mrd w perwanh, URL: <https://tondar.org/content/2010/06/1605.html>

<sup>185</sup> National Aspirations vs. the Interests of the Islamic Republic, URL: <http://en.rezapahlavi.org/2016/01/22/national-aspirations-vs-the-interests-of-the-islamic-republic/>

<sup>186</sup> zadrwz zrtsht, URL: <http://www.rastakhiz.org/rastakhiz/ban/iran/iran.html>



position themselves as defenders of the territorial integrity of Iran<sup>187</sup>. On the other hand, British Republicans are active in using the negative experience of European monarchies, which face threats of political and ethnic separatisms and regionalisms<sup>188</sup>. The ideas of the British Republicans are not very original because they have much in common with the political, social and economic rhetoric of national democrats and other parties that seek to use the mobilization potential of populism. The nationalistic English discourse in its republican version closely overlaps with populism and national democracy.

Iranian nationalism in its monarchical forms and in the concepts offered by political parties in exile tries to synthesize the values of civic nationalism, the nation, the nation-state and Iranian ethnicity, including the imagination of history in contexts of the ethnic and Aryan myth in the Iranian version. Some Iranian nationalist groups in exile use images of the Sasanian era<sup>189</sup> as political symbols, although most nationalist parties prefer to use the official flag<sup>190</sup> Iran with the lion, abolished and banned by Islamists in 1979. The theorists of Iranian monarchism in exile despite their romantic relationship with the Aryan myth seek to resist the official Tehran and condemn its anti-Semitic statements<sup>191</sup> and attempts to deny the Holocaust<sup>192</sup>. Ideologists and theorists of *the Iran National Council for Free Elections* are extremely cautious in their historical manipulations and insist that their movement defends Iranian political nation in particular and respects the various regional ethnicities that form political identity Iran in general<sup>193</sup>.

Alternative European, American and Oriental nationalisms are marginal, but their theorists try to compete with the dominant discourses of political nationalism and the nation as an imagined and invented community of citizens. Despite formal differences, ideologies of monarchical nationalisms in the

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<sup>187</sup> hshdar! khake aaran frwsha nast, URL: <http://marzeporgohar.net/fa/?p=312>

<sup>188</sup> It unites the country, URL: <https://www.republic.org.uk/what-we-want/monarchy-myth-buster/it-unites-country>

<sup>189</sup> nmad mrzperguhr, mhra az zman zwal amperatwra sasanaan w aghaz ashghal aaran bh wsalh tazaan, URL: <http://marzeporgohar.net/fa/?p=2316>

<sup>190</sup> tarakhcheh perchem haa aaran, URL: <http://www.irancpi.net/ir/hamandishan/bahman-zahedi/489-percham.html>

<sup>191</sup> Statement In Condemnation Of The Islamic Republic Of Iran In Promoting Anti-Semitism And The Attack On The Jewish Synagogue, URL: <https://irannc.org/en/statement-from-the-iran-national-council-for-free-election-in-condemnation-of-the-islamic-republic-of-iran-in-promoting-anti-semitism-and-the-attack-on-the-jewish-synagogue/>

<sup>192</sup> The Statement Of Iran National Council For Free Elections In Condemnation Of Remarks By A Senior Diplomat Of The Islamic Republic Of Iran Denying The Human Tragedy Of Holocaust, URL: <https://irannc.org/en/holocaust/>

<sup>193</sup> Charter of the Iran National Council for Free Elections, URL: <https://irannc.org/en/charter/>

republics or republican nationalisms in monarchies have many common points of intersection, because monarchists and Republicans use the same language of political imagination, inventing a monarchy or republic as universal political communities and nation-states. The ideology of alternative nationalisms is original and it is logical to assume that modern marginal nationalisms are the last ideological and cultural heirs of romantic intellectual nationalisms of the 19th and 20th centuries.

## **From political region to political nation: nations without states or regional nationalisms**

### *Politicization of regional discourse*

Regional nationalisms of modern Europe are very diverse and include nationalist movements of Catalan or Galician nationalists and nationalist groups of formal political nations that do not have their own institutions of representation. English nationalism is the most vivid example of the nationalism of a formally dominant ethnic group, which is an invisible actor in political contexts. English nationalism includes the two ideological and political dimensions presented by *English Democrats Party*<sup>194</sup> and *Campaign for an English Parliament*<sup>195</sup>. These political movements became late attempts to institutionalize Englishness in the political dimension, despite the fact that Englishmen formally possess a set of attributes that are necessary for a political nation. Modern English nationalism claims that the Englishmen as a nation, on the one hand, have ethnicity and identity, including English language, culture, classical literature and traditions. On the other hand, English nationalists insist that Englishmen are not a political nation that is equal to the Welsh or Scots because they are unable to have, form and elect their political institutions, including the English parliament.

English nationalists are unhappy with the fact that the British project in the historical perspective was stronger and more influential than English one. Therefore, they seek to liberate English identity and actualize its political functions and dimensions. Modern English nationalism combines calls to restore the English parliament with moderate Europeanism and isolationism. English democrats, as nationalists of other European countries argue that their nation belongs to the number of European ones, English history is part of European political, social and cultural history, but they strongly disagree with the attempts of supranational institutions of the European Union to substitute national governments and parliaments. Therefore, English nationalists promote the idea of a Europe of nations, resolutely denying attempts to federalize the European integration project.

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<sup>194</sup> Frequently Asked Questions, URL: <http://englishdemocrats.party/frequently-asked-questions/>; Constitution, URL: <http://englishdemocrats.party/our-party/constitution/>; Party History, URL: <http://englishdemocrats.party/our-party/party-history/>

<sup>195</sup> Campaign for an English Parliament, URL: <http://thecep.org.uk/aims-principles-and-policies/>

Regional nationalist parties are more active in the simultaneous use of political and ethnic nationalisms. *Bayernpartei*<sup>196</sup> is the most influential party of regional nationalists in Germany and insists on the separation of Bavaria from the FRG and the creation of an independent Bavarian state. Bavarian nationalists believe that Bayern should become independent, but they recognize that the Constitution of Germany does not provide them with the right to separate from the rest of the federal lands. Despite this, the Bavarian regional nationalists believe that if the majority of the population of Bavaria prefers independence, then Berlin will not be able to ignore this decision and political will of the nation<sup>197</sup>. *Die Friesen*<sup>198</sup>, the political party of Frisian regional nationalists, prefers to use the same tactics and strategies, consistently insisting on the need to preserve the Frisian identity, including language and culture<sup>199</sup>.

*Junts per Catalunya*, one of the leading political parties of Catalan nationalism, insists that Catalonia is an independent political nation that has the right to be independent and sovereign in its own national state<sup>200</sup>. *Junts per Catalunya* criticizes the central government consistently, accusing it of a coup d'état and a rejection of democracy<sup>201</sup>. These ideas sound quite radical because the Spanish nationalist parties deny the existence of the Catalan political nation, believing that the state of autonomies became a temporary abandonment of the principles of a centralized statehood. Despite the formal defeat of the Catalan nationalists in 2017 and their political inability to become an independent state, Catalonia became an example for other European regional

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<sup>196</sup> Satzung der Bayernpartei. Diese Satzung wurde am 30. Oktober 2011 auf dem Landesparteitag der Bayernpartei in Bamberg verabschiedet, URL: <http://landesverband.bayernpartei.de/satzung/>

<sup>197</sup> Häufig gestellte Fragen, URL: <http://landesverband.bayernpartei.de/haeufig-gestellte-fragen/>

<sup>198</sup> Grundsatzprogramm, URL: <http://www.die-friesen.eu/unsere-partei/grundsatzprogramm/>

<sup>199</sup> Sieben Thesen, URL: <http://www.die-friesen.eu/unsere-partei/sieben-thesen/>

<sup>200</sup> Argumentari, URL: <https://juntspercatalunya.cat/argumentari/>

<sup>201</sup> President Puigdemont: “Estic disposat a reunir-me amb Rajoy a Brussel·les, és el moment de la política”, URL: <https://juntspercatalunya.cat/noticies/president-puigdemont-disposat-reunir-me-rajoy-brusselles-moment-politica/>; Junts per Catalunya considera que el rei espanyol “té demà l’oportunitat de donar retorn a l’oferta de diàleg” del president Puigdemont, URL: <https://juntspercatalunya.cat/noticies/junts-catalunya-considera-que-rei-espanyol-dema-loportunitat-donar-retorn-loferta-dialeg-president-puigdemont/>; President Puigdemont: “No han decapitat la presidència de la Generalitat de Catalunya, han decapitat la democràcia”, URL: <https://juntspercatalunya.cat/noticies/president-puigdemont-no-han-decapitat-presidencia-generalitat-catalunya-han-decapitat-democracia/>; Eduard Pujol: “Felip VI ha optat per tornar a ser el rei del 155, enlloc d’escollar la voluntat expressada nítidament pels catalans a les urnes”, URL: <https://juntspercatalunya.cat/noticies/eduard-pujol-felip-vi-ha-optat-tornar-rei-155-enlloc-descollar-voluntat-expressada-nitidament-pels-catalans-urnes/>

nationalisms, and Madrid's attempts to suppress the national movement in Catalonia inspired several waves of support among the nationalists of other European nations<sup>202</sup> who do not have an independent statehood<sup>203</sup>.

Various nationalist parties of the Basque Country, for example, *Eusko Alkartasuna*<sup>204</sup>, are very active in their attempts to synthesize the values of the nation and ethnicity, class and nationalism, the principles of Christianity, Christian and national democracies. Modern nationalist Basque parties seek to use two universal languages in their attempts to invent and imagine the nation, identity and ethnicity, including primordialism and constructivism. On the one hand, nationalists relentlessly declare the antiquity and uniqueness of the Basque identity. On the other hand, they insist on the need to promote and popularize the concept of the "Basque Homeland" and restore the "political existence of the Basques", including the revitalization of the language<sup>205</sup>. It is noteworthy that the Basque nationalist parties use several political languages simultaneously, including the language of ethnic nationalism, combining it with social slogans and economic demands<sup>206</sup>.

Social orientation distinguishes modern Basque nationalism from contexts of other European nationalisms, but these ideological and political preferences integrate it into the greater and wider contexts of nationalisms of Spain, where nationalist and socialist discourse coexist simultaneously in regional separatist nationalisms. The ideologists of Basque nationalism believe that this sacred and symbolic act is possible only after the Basque territories will be united and become an independent state. The ideological preferences of modern Basque nationalism have much in common with the nationalisms of those nations, for example, Georgians, who have their statehood because their theorists seek to preserve and integrate primordial myths of ethnicity and identity to modern political constructs, including nation, nation-state, democracy, nationalism and

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<sup>202</sup> Qu'èm hòrt preocupats per la situacion en Catalonha, URL: <http://partitoccitan.org/en-direct/comunicats/comunicat-quem-hort-preocupats-per-la-situacion-en-catalonha/>; Comunicat Region Provença: Catalan de luench ò fraire..., URL: <http://partitoccitan.org/en-direct/comunicats/comunicat-region-provenca-catalan-de-luench-o-fraire/>; Catalonha: Victoire de la démocratie et naissance d'un nouvel État Européen!, URL: <http://partitoccitan.org/en-direct/comunicats/catalonha-victoire-de-la-democratie-et-naissance-dun-nouvel-etat-europeen/>

<sup>203</sup> Occitania saluda la republica sociala catalana!, URL: <http://partitoccitan.org/en-direct/comunicats/occitania-saluda-la-republica-sociala-catalana/>

<sup>204</sup> Eusko Alkartasuna, URL: <http://www.euskoalkartasuna.eus/>

<sup>205</sup> Ezagutu EAJ-PNV. Historia eta ideologia, URL: <https://www.eaj-pnv.eus/historia-eta-ideologia/>

<sup>206</sup> Gizarte eta lurralde kohesioa, ikuspegi estrategikoa eta kalitatezko enplegua, URL: <https://www.geroabai.com/eu/gure-iritzia/garapen-ekonomikoa#ideas>

national democracy. Galician national organizations, including *Bloque Nacionalista Galego*, offer fairly radical theses and ideas, synthesizing the values of the class and the principles of the nation and affirming that “Galicia is a nation and therefore has the right to self-determination and independently and sovereignly determine its future.

Galician nationalism is the democratic reaction of our people to the situation of economic dependence, political and cultural oppression in Galicia, which impedes the progress and well-being of the Galician society. BNG is a nationalist organization because it protects the national sovereignty and freedom of the Galician nation of the Republic of Galicia – a sovereign, democratic, secular and republican state”<sup>207</sup>. The regional nationalist parties of Spain are among the influential political actors that define the main vectors and trajectories of their regional and even local developments, imagining their nations and inventing them as political traditions, but the Spanish situation is unique and not characteristic of other European regions because regionalist organizations of the formal majorities coexist simultaneously with peripheral and national political groups of nationalist orientation. The experience of regional nationalist parties, including *Chunta Aragonesista*<sup>208</sup>, *Compromisu por Asturias*<sup>209</sup>, *Izquierda Castellana*<sup>210</sup>, *Frente Popular Galega*<sup>211</sup>, *Juntos por la autonomía del País Leonés*<sup>212</sup>, *Partido Regionalista del País Leonés*<sup>213</sup>, *Nación Andaluza*<sup>214</sup> actualizes the potential for the synthesis of a classic number of nationalistic ideas, myths and virtues with the principles and values of the social class and class struggle. The regional nationalist parties of Spain combine attempts to develop and revitalize local identities with criticism of the central government and attempts to propose a new agenda, including a green economy and integration programs for migrants and minorities.

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<sup>207</sup> Carta de principios políticos, ideolóxicos e valores do BNG, URL: <http://www.bng.gal/estaticas/principios-do-bng/>

<sup>208</sup> Chunta Aragonesista, URL: <http://www.chunta.org/>

<sup>209</sup> Compromisu por Asturias, URL: <http://compromisu.com/>

<sup>210</sup> Izquierda Castellana, URL: <http://izca.net/>

<sup>211</sup> Frente Popular Galega, URL: <http://frentepopular.gl/>

<sup>212</sup> Juntos por la autonomía del País Leonés, URL: <http://www.upl.es/>

<sup>213</sup> Partido Regionalista del País Leonés, URL: <http://prepal-pais-leones.webnode.es>

<sup>214</sup> Nación Andaluza, URL: <https://nacionandaluza.org/>

### *Ethnization of political discourse*

Italian regional nationalisms differ from Spanish ones significantly. If the Galician, Catalan and Basque nationalisms are active in using the language of political nationalism and class social justice simultaneously, then the regional nationalisms of Italy exist and develop in another system of coordinates. *Il movimento proLombardia indipendenza*, for example, is the largest regional nationalist party of Lombardy, which aspires to self-determination of the region and criticizes the social and economic policies of the Italian elites actively<sup>215</sup>. *Lega Nord - Lega Lombarda* is also active in its criticism and consistent rejection of the policy of Rome in the regions of Italy<sup>216</sup>. Venetian nationalist groups, including *Il Movimento Indipendenza Veneta*<sup>217</sup> and *Liga Veneta Repubblica*<sup>218</sup>, prefer to use mainly economic arguments, combining them with political appeals to the historical experience of independent Venetian statehood and the relatively late unification of Italy in the second half of the 19th century. All these arguments, as the Venetian nationalists believe, provide Venice with legitimate rights to fight for secession from Italy and the creation of a sovereign and independent state.

*Movimento Independentista Ligure*<sup>219</sup> as other Italian regional nationalisms seeks to strengthen local identity<sup>220</sup>, transform it into a national one and achieve economic and tax concessions<sup>221</sup>, forcing Rome to begin the processes of federalization of the country<sup>222</sup>. *Sardigna Natzione Indipendentzia*<sup>223</sup> aims to promote and popularize the ideas of Sardinian independence, combining the movement for independence with attempts to develop a regional identity and its transformation into a national<sup>224</sup>. *Indipendèntzia Repubrica de Sardigna*<sup>225</sup>, another political organization of Sardinian nationalists, belongs to a number of more radical groups which believe that the creation of an independent republic is the main goal and task of Sardinian nationalism. *Progetu República de*

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<sup>215</sup> *Perché volere l'indipendenza*, URL: <http://www.prolombardia.eu/lindipendenza/perche-volere-lindipendenza/>

<sup>216</sup> *Lega Nord - Lega Lombarda*, URL: <http://www.naz-lombardia.leganord.org>

<sup>217</sup> *Il Movimento Indipendenza Veneta*, URL: <https://www.indipendenzaveneta.com/chi-siamo>

<sup>218</sup> *Liga Veneta Repubblica*, URL: <http://ligavenetarepubblica.org>

<sup>219</sup> *M.I.L. Movimento Independentista Ligure*, URL: <http://www.mil2002.org/>

<sup>220</sup> *Chi siamo, cosa vogliamo*, URL: <http://www.mil2002.org/chisiamo.htm>

<sup>221</sup> *Statuto*, URL: <http://www.mil2002.org/statuto.htm>

<sup>222</sup> *I dieci valori della Civiltà Ligure*, URL: [http://www.mil2002.org/10\\_valori.htm](http://www.mil2002.org/10_valori.htm)

<sup>223</sup> *Sardigna Natzione Indipendentzia*, URL: <http://www.sardignanatzione.it/>

<sup>224</sup> *Progetu politicu de SNI est formadu dae duas tesi ambas aproadas (tesi n. 1 aproada in cungrèssu sa n. 2 est prus a suta)*, URL: <http://www.sardignanatzione.it/prog-politicu>

<sup>225</sup> *Indipendèntzia Repubrica de Sardigna*, URL: <http://www.irsonline.net/documento-politico/>

*Sardigna*<sup>226</sup> also seeks to promote the idea of Sardinian political and economic independence insisting that the region needs emancipation and liberation from the excessive and intrusive guardianship of the central authorities. The nationalists of Lombardy, who are active in use of the experience of the regional nationalists of Spain<sup>227</sup>, seek a peaceful secession from Italy<sup>228</sup>, insist that the country needs to be federalized<sup>229</sup> and try to combine the political language with various forms of nationalistic imagination.

Regional movements in Italy insist that they are nationalistic. Ideologists of *Sardigna Natzione Indipendentzia* are active in their attempts to popularize and promote the ideas and values of Sardinian nationalism. Party activists believe that “the realization of nationalism leads to independence. Independence is an instrument of nationalism, not its architect ... The Sardinian nation exists and needs independence, it must be liberated, there is no need to build it”<sup>230</sup>. Therefore, the regional nationalists of Italy criticize the central Italian authorities, accusing them of corruption and inability to change the situation. They actively develop the ideas of regional identity, including language and culture. “*Lombardia independence nel cuore dell'Europe*” or “independent Lombardy in the heart of Europe”<sup>231</sup> is the political goal and ideal of Lombardian regional nationalists.

Bavarian regional nationalists develop the same political tradition and insist that Berlin deprived Bavaria of its historical and political rights<sup>232</sup> illegally despite the fact that “Bavaria is the oldest state of the German-speaking space and one of the oldest states of Europe. Bavarians have a real, inherited, consolidated state consciousness and deep reasons to love their Bavarian, Franconian and Swabian homeland”<sup>233</sup>. The Frisian regional nationalists are also active in their

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<sup>226</sup> Manifesto, URL: <https://progres.net/manifesto/>

<sup>227</sup> L'indipendenza in Europa, URL: <http://www.prolombardia.eu/lindipendenza/lindipendenza-europa/>

<sup>228</sup> Come arrivare all'indipendenza, URL: <http://www.prolombardia.eu/lindipendenza/come-arrivare-allindipendenza/>

<sup>229</sup> Appunti per una Lombardia indipendente e federale, Due soluzioni sardiste sono possibili quella unionista e quella indipendentista, URL: <http://www.prolombardia.eu/appunti-per-una-lombardia-indipendente-e-federale/>

<sup>230</sup> Due soluzioni sardiste sono possibili quella unionista e quella indipendentista, URL: <http://www.sardignanatzione.it/prog-politicu>

<sup>231</sup> Il movimento proLombardia indipendenza, URL: <http://www.prolombardia.eu/il-movimento-prolombardia-indipendenza/>

<sup>232</sup> Zehn Punkte in weiß-blau, URL: <http://landesverband.bayernpartei.de/zehn-punkte-in-weiss-blau/>

<sup>233</sup> Programm, URL: <http://landesverband.bayernpartei.de/programm/>



polemics with Berlin and insist that the Frisians were independent always<sup>234</sup> and their history differs significantly from German and European histories<sup>235</sup>. Historical features, as Frisian nationalists insist, actualize the right of the region to become an independent state. Scottish nationalists have much in common in their ideological preferences with the Catalan regionalists and actively use the separatist slogans. *Scottish National Party*<sup>236</sup>, in contrast to Catalan regionalists, represents more moderate trends in modern European regional nationalisms because Scottish nationalists believe that Scotland should and can become an independent state only after the society reach a compromise and will be ready to proclaim the independence of the majority of the nation, but not of a radical nationalist minority.

Welsh nationalists are partly in agreement with the Scottish nationalists in their desire to change the political status of the region and become an independent state. *Movement for a Sovereign State of Wales* or *Mudiad Gwladwriaeth Sofren Cymru* believes that political independence is a political dream and ideal of the Welsh nation<sup>237</sup>, which has no political freedom for several centuries after the English conquest. On the one hand, the Welsh nationalists believe that “sovereignty is the moral, emotional, psychological and aspirational rights of any people living in a country to control their own destiny. Welsh statehood is the fundamental right of the people”<sup>238</sup>. Therefore, Welsh nationalists believe that “the Sovereign State of Wales will be a fully autonomous sovereign independent and democratic nation-state”<sup>239</sup>.

On the other hand, Welsh radical regionalists piously believe in Sovereign Welsh State<sup>240</sup> as the invented tradition of the Welsh identity and the institutionalized dimension of the political nation. Other regional nationalisms in the European Union are less active and have mainly social, economic or tax purposes. For example, *Ruch Autônômije Ślůnska*<sup>241</sup> in Poland does not seek to separate Silesia and create a new state, but ideologists of the movement, on the one hand, seek to obtain economic benefits and preferences, challenging the right to collect taxes and use them in the territory of the region exclusively. The

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<sup>234</sup> Friesische Geschichte, URL: <http://www.die-friesen.eu/friesische-geschichte/>

<sup>235</sup> Friesische Identität, URL: <http://www.die-friesen.eu/friesische-identitaet/>

<sup>236</sup> Constitution. A Better Scotland, URL: <https://www.snp.org/constitution>

<sup>237</sup> Croeso, URL: <https://sovereignwales.com/>

<sup>238</sup> Maniffesto Gwladwriaeth Sofren Cymru, URL: <https://sovereignwales.com/manifesto/>

<sup>239</sup> Cyfansoddiad Gwladwriaeth Sofren Cymru, URL: <https://sovereignwales.com/constitution/>

<sup>240</sup> Datganiad sofraniaeth i Gymru, URL: <https://sovereignwales.com/declaration/>

<sup>241</sup> Cele Ruchu Autonomii Ślůska, URL: <http://autonomia.pl/cele-ruchu-autonomii-slaska/>

political nationalism of *Bayernpartei* has clear economic prerequisites<sup>242</sup> and the backgrounds because ideologists of the movement are keen in their attempts to collect the facts that prove Bavarian significant contribution and impact to the economy of Germany despite the fact that German political elites ignore the rights of the region. *Ålands Framtid*<sup>243</sup> also has predominantly social and economic interests, although activists of the movement seek to develop the cultural identity of the region in Scandinavian and European contexts.

Silesian regionalists believe that autonomy can become the most optimal model for the development of the region and deny the need for political independence because it is presumed that sovereign Silesia will not be able to compete economically with more developed neighbours, including Germany and Poland. On the other hand, Silesian regionalism has cultural and linguistic origins and roots. Activists of Silesian regionalism believe that Silesia historically and culturally always differed from the rest of Poland because it had contacts with German and Czech territories and therefore the local language, which developed under the Germanic and Moravian influence, is closer to the medieval Polish language than the dialects of other Polish lands.

Therefore, ideologists of the movement tend to preserve and develop a local identity<sup>244</sup>. *Kaszëbskô Jednota*, another organization of regional nationalists in Poland, insists that the development of identity and the preservation of ethnicity are the key tasks of Kashubian nationalism<sup>245</sup>. Interest in local languages became a common place in the political programs of regional nationalists. For example, Frisian regionalists in Germany are active in their attempts to prove that the Frisian language developed independently from German and had its own literary traditions and norms<sup>246</sup>. *Il movimento proLombardia indipendenza* insists that the Lombardian language is an independent literary language<sup>247</sup> and seeks to promote and develop bilingualism in the region<sup>248</sup>.

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<sup>242</sup> Warum Eigenstaatlichkeit?, URL: <http://landesverband.bayernpartei.de/unabhaengigkeit/warum-eigenstaatlichkeit/>

<sup>243</sup> Vår politik, URL: [http://www.alandsframtid.ax/index/var\\_politik](http://www.alandsframtid.ax/index/var_politik)

<sup>244</sup> Statut Ruchu Autonomii Śląska, URL: <http://autonomia.pl/statut-ruchu-autonomii-slaska/>

<sup>245</sup> Kim më jesmë ë jaczé są naje céle?, URL: <http://www.kaszebsko.com/kim-jesme-e-jacze-sa-naje-cele.html>

<sup>246</sup> Friesische Sprache, URL: <http://www.die-friesen.eu/die-friesische-sprache/>

<sup>247</sup> Lingua lombarda o dialetto lombardo?, URL: <http://www.prolombardia.eu/lingua-lombarda-dialetto-lombardo/>

<sup>248</sup> Bilinguismo in Lombardia, URL: <http://www.prolombardia.eu/bilinguismo-in-lombardia/>

Sardinian regional nationalists also insist on the independent status of the Sardinian language and the development of bilingualism<sup>249</sup>. Regional nationalists in French Normandy are also very active in their attempts to prove and actualize the uniqueness of the historical and cultural identity of the region. Therefore, they declare that Normandy had experience of independent political and state developments. Norman regional nationalists are very active in use of history and therefore argue with English nationalists because they try to prove the progressive nature and positive cultural consequences of the Norman conquest of England in 1066. Regional nationalists of Normandy argue that medieval regional culture became the social and historical ancestral home of two independent cultural traditions, including the French and Anglo-Norman<sup>250</sup>. *Leia Naziunale*, the party of Corsican nationalists is more radical than other regional nationalisms in France because its ideologists criticize Paris consistently and accuse it of assimilation of regional cultures, languages and identities.

Therefore, Corsican nationalists deny the possibility of autonomy and compromise with the central authorities, insisting on the separation and establishment of an independent state<sup>251</sup>. Ideologists of *Ålands Framtid* also pay special attention to the problems of linguistic identity insisting that Finnish government ignores the needs of the local population and forces the inhabitants of the islands to abandon the Swedish language because they inspire and stimulate the more active use of Finnish<sup>252</sup>. Regional nationalist parties and groups of peripheral regions of Europe are deprived of the opportunities to influence political, social and economic processes. Therefore, the nationalist parties of the Celtic regions, including *Celtic League*, *Strollad Breizh*, and *Adsav* prefer to cultivate and develop regional and local linguistic and cultural ethnicities and identities<sup>253</sup>.

Celtic League, which unites the nationalists of the Celtic regions of Great Britain and France, seeks to cultivate the values of ethnic and linguistic nationalism when other organizations, including *Strollad Breizh* and *Adsav*, are more politicized and ideologized because they try to synthesize nationalistic ideas with appeals for social<sup>254</sup> and economic justice<sup>255</sup>. *Ruch Autûnûmije*

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<sup>249</sup> *Istatudu de Sardigna Natzione – Indipendentzia*. Aprodadu dae su Cungressu Natzionale de su 16/10/2011, URL: <http://www.sardignanatzione.it/istatudu-de-sni>

<sup>250</sup> *Les grandes options du Mouvement Normand*, URL: [https://www.tvnc.tv/Les-grandes-options-du-Mouvement-Normand\\_a702.html](https://www.tvnc.tv/Les-grandes-options-du-Mouvement-Normand_a702.html)

<sup>251</sup> *Leia Naziunale*, URL: <http://www.leia-naziunale.com/quale-simu>

<sup>252</sup> *Partiprogram Ålands Framtid*, november 2006. Politisk Ideologi «Demokrati, Demilitariserat, Svenskspråkigt», URL: [http://www.alandsframtid.ax/index/politisk\\_ideologi](http://www.alandsframtid.ax/index/politisk_ideologi)

<sup>253</sup> *Celtic League*, URL: <https://www.celticleague.net/>

<sup>254</sup> *Adsav*, URL: <http://blog.adsav.org/>

*Ślůnska*, as other regional nationalist parties and movements in the EU, was inspired by the discontent of the policy of the central authorities. Therefore, the ideologists of the movement do not position themselves as separatists, but they try to prove that *Ruch Autůnůmije Ślůnska* emerged as a reaction of economically and politically dissatisfied and dissenting citizens. The activists of the movement believe that the regional politics of the Polish authorities is wrong because only Warsaw makes political decisions when regions do not have rights to express their opinions and disagreements<sup>256</sup>.

*L'Union Dēmocratique Bretonne* as other European regional nationalists seeks to use the discontent of regional communities that do not have the right to make their own political and economic decisions. *Mouvement Normand*<sup>257</sup>, the political party of the Norman regionalists and nationalists, has mainly social and economic demands, combining them with political claims to Paris, accusing the capital of bureaucratization and centralization. Political ideologists of *L'Union Dēmocratique Bretonne* insist that the desire for autonomy is not a form of separatist sentiments. Autonomization, as regional regionalists believe, is another step towards the solution of social and economic problems<sup>258</sup>, which Paris cannot and does not want to solve, fearing the rise and progress of regional economies as an alternative to the domination of the centre. Norman regionalists and nationalists are also moderate and not too radical. Regional nationalists of Normandy offer a political program that includes several ideas. Regionalists insist on the need to unite all historic Norman territories into one administrative unit, and to restore, develop and promote Norman culture and identity. Therefore, they do not demand independence and sovereignty, insisting only on autonomization. Norman nationalists declare loyalty to the principles of the territorial integrity and unity of France, combining these statements with pro-European sentiments, proclaiming that "Normandy is the land of France and intends to remain French. Normandy is in France and in Europe"<sup>259</sup>.

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<sup>255</sup> *Principes*, URL: <http://partibreton.bzh/index.php/programme/principes>

<sup>256</sup> FAQ – najczēściej zadawane pytania, URL: <http://autonomia.pl/faq-najczestsze-pytania/>

<sup>257</sup> Pourquoi le Mouvement Normand?, URL: [https://www.tvnc.tv/Pourquoi-le-Mouvement-Normand\\_a701.html](https://www.tvnc.tv/Pourquoi-le-Mouvement-Normand_a701.html)

<sup>258</sup> L'autonomie rēgionale, URL: <http://www.udb-bzh.net/index.php/fr/notre-programme/l-autonomie-regionale>

<sup>259</sup> Les grandes options du Mouvement Normand, URL: [https://www.tvnc.tv/Les-grandes-options-du-Mouvement-Normand\\_a702.html](https://www.tvnc.tv/Les-grandes-options-du-Mouvement-Normand_a702.html)

**National democracy:  
highway of modern European nationalism  
and the failed political project in Russia**

*Russian nationalism as an ignored factor*

The modern Russian Federation, better known as Russia, belongs to relatively new states, despite the fact that official Russian historiography claims that the history of the country is more than a thousand years old. Despite the mythologization of history Russian statehood and the modern Russian state appeared on political maps of the world in 1991 only after the collapse of the Soviet Union. If Soviet liberals and dissidents believed or presumed that the Baltic republics, occupied in 1940, the Transcaucasian republics or even the ignored Ukraine, whose identity and language they preferred to Russify, could become independent states, but virtually no one believed in Russian independence and did not foresee the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of independent Russia. Despite these sceptical ideas, in 1991 the USSR ceased to exist and Russia became independent states.

The independence's euphoria in Russia passed quickly and, unlike other post-Soviet countries, it was political in the Russian Federation in its nature because national ideas and motivations did not play a significant role and their significance in Russia in general, in contrast to the national republics, was minimal. Russia, like other post-Soviet countries, was faced with numerous social and economic crises and problems that significantly impeded and slowed down national building in particular. Russia was radically different from other post-Soviet countries because the attempts to build a nation and nation-state were timid and extremely unsuccessful. Russia in general, unlike the national republics in particular, achieved very modest successes in the development of the nation and nation-state. Despite these complex and contradictory relations between Russian ruling political elites with Russian nationalism in its various forms, nationalism was an important and influential factor in the political, cultural and intellectual histories of post-Soviet Russia. Russian nationalism developed differently from regional nationalisms in the national republics. Sergei Volkov, one of the Russian nationalist intellectuals, in the middle of 2010s suggested that in the Russian nationalist doctrine actually coexisted six different nationalisms<sup>260</sup>.

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<sup>260</sup> Sergei Volkov, *Pochemu RF est' priamoe prodolzhenie Sovdepii?*  
<http://salery.livejournal.com/7468.html>

The contradictions between them root in relation to the Russian Empire, the USSR and democracy. Theorists of nationalism did not know what unity and ideological compromise were because they preferred internal debates. Russian nationalism almost from the very beginning developed as an ethnic and Russian national imagination existed in the ethnocentric system of political coordinates. Russian nationalism imagined the disintegration of the USSR as its own tragedy and national catastrophe, unlike nationalisms in the national republics where local intellectual and political elites tried to subordinate moderate nationalism and used it as a factor of political, social and cultural consolidations in their confrontations with the federal centre. It is logical to presume that the history of Russian post-Soviet nationalism can be divided into the several stages. The 1990s became the first period when Russian nationalism was a marginal political and ideological trend. The 2000s, when President Vladimir Putin began resolutely to abolish the modest results of democratic reforms, became a period of activation of Russian nationalism, which developed as a simultaneous coexistence of conservative and democratic trends. The 2010s became the third stage in the modern evolution of Russian nationalism when it finally fragmented and disintegrated into democratic and authoritarian conservative trends.

### *Russian political nationalism*

This article is an attempt to analyse the ideology and evolution of modern and moderate Russian political nationalism. What is moderate Russian political nationalism? This is not so easy to answer this question because the actual Russian nationalism is extremely diverse and heterogeneous. There is no compromise among Russian nationalists because they perceive modern events in Russia and the world too differently and proposed various and mutually exclusive agendas. Traditional Russian nationalism prefer to develop several narratives, including the perception of Russian nation as the highest political and ideological value, imagination of the disintegration of the Russian Empire and the USSR as the most negative events, non-recognition of the post-Soviet nations as legitimate one, invention of the federation as political evil, and stable belief that Russia must return to a unitary state and start active Russification of non-Russian ethnic groups. These statements of traditional Russian nationalism are both archaic and unreal because they are rooted in idealistic faith in primordialism and *Sonderweg* of the Russian nation.

Marginal ethnic nationalism represents a second trend in the actual Russian nationalism. Neopagans form an avant-garde of this trend in Russian nationalism. Supporters of this trend believe in the many thousands of years of Russian history and actively "find" Slavic footprints and influences in world history from Ancient Egypt to the present, declaring all languages as derivatives of the Russian one. The ideology of this trend ridiculous from the academic point of view, but despite it, this trend of Russian nationalism occupies its own place in the contemporary heterogeneous Russian nationalist ideology. National democracy is the third trend in modern Russian nationalism and the author of this article will analyse the national democratic tendencies in the intellectual and political transformations of Russian nationalism exactly.

*National democracy:  
Russian post-Soviet and the post-democracy version*

What is Russian national democracy? It is also difficult to answer this particular question as well as to find the answer to the question what is Russian nationalism in general. Russian national democracy arose later than in other Western countries, which was the result of late democratization, its actual failure and the slow fragmentation of political space and nationalist discourse than in European countries. Russian national democracy emerged as a result of Russian democratization and topical political history, which, unlike some other post-Soviet countries, moved to authoritarianism later and did it only in the 2000s while some formal democratic institutions were able to survive. The political program of Russian national democracy was an attempt to synthesize the values of nationalism with democratic principles. The ideas and political preferences of several Russian intellectuals, including Aleksandr Sevast'ianov, Aleksei Shiropayev, Konstantin Krylov, Sergei Sergeev, Valerii Solov'ev, Pavel Sviatkov, Il'ia Lazarenko can be defined as national-democratic. Aleksandr Sevast'ianov was probably the first Russian nationalist in the post-Soviet Russia who used the definition of "national democracy".

There are several common features in individual intellectual biographies of the ideologists of modern Russian national democracy. Most leaders of Russian national democracy were born in the period between the 1950s and 1970s. Some of them received higher education in humanities and defended dissertations: Aleksandr Sevast'ianov is a candidate of philological sciences, Sergei Sergeev is a candidate of historical sciences, Valerii Solov'ev is a doctor of historical sciences. Most of the ideologists of the national democracy received a humanitarian education and this fact inspired the formation of a new image of Russian nationalism and promote its intellectual reputation that contrasts with earlier images of nationalism as an aggressive ideology. Russian national democracy in Vladimir Putin's Russia develops and exists as a predominantly intellectual concept and part of the formally heterogeneous political and ideological mosaic of modern Russian nationalism because theorists and ideologists of national democracy do not have the opportunity to be active politicians. Formally, only one national-democratic organization, "*Demokraticheskii vybor*" received the status of the registered political party. Other national-democratic groups, including *Natsional'no-demokraticheskaja partiia*, "*Novaia sila*", *Natsional'no-demokraticheskii Al'ians*, and "*Obshchee delo*" are not registered and do not have an officially recognized status, but these bureaucratic barriers and obstacles did not prevent them from becoming virtual political parties which exist mainly on the Internet and social networks.



### *Ideological agenda of Russian national democracy*

The ideological program and preferences of Russian national democracy are heterogeneous and diverse. Summing up the ideas of theorists of national democracy, it is possible to formulate several ideological principles and statements, theorists of Russian national democracy offer as the central points of the political program and the actual agenda. National democrats believe that the disengagement from radical Russian nationalists as extremists, the development of the Russian national statehood and the Russian national state, the transformation of Russia from a mixed federation into a symmetrical one are primary political tasks. National democrats popularize anti-communism and imagine communism as a criminal ideology.

Theorists of Russian national democracy insists on lustration of Communists and Vladimir Putin's supporters. National democrats deny the concept of empire as a systemic value of the Russian nation, recognize the independence of all post-Soviet republics and promote peaceful coexistence with Europe. National democrats condemn also the idea of restoration of the Russian Empire and the USSR, abandon the idea of the need to preserve the North Caucasus as part of the Federation, and deny the special Russian way of development. Therefore, the ideologues of Russian national democracy recognize European values, including political rights and freedoms, a free market, social responsibility, the independence of courts. They also propose to change the orientation of foreign policy radically. The restriction of migration policy, visas for citizens of Central Asian and the trans-Caucasian republics, allied relations with developed Western countries, counteraction to Islam are the basic ideas, national democrats offer as guidelines for a new concept of foreign policy.

### *National democracy as the invention of a nation*

The ideologists of Russian national democracy believe that the formation and development of a political nation is one of the most important tasks of Russian nationalism: "we advocate the formation of a Russian political nation and the creation of a national state where the Russian nation will constitute the unconditional majority of the population"<sup>261</sup>. Russian nationalism, as Sergei Sergeev insisted in 2007, was "the last chance of Russia"<sup>262</sup>, a Oleg Nemenskii, six years later, wrote about the need to determine the boundaries of the Russian nation<sup>263</sup>, but these appeals remained unheeded and ignored. National democrats insist that the nation is a universal political community and an inevitable political development guideline: "the modern world is the world of nations. The nation is the victorious form of state and international life in Europe ... there are only two alternatives: to build a national democratic state, or build a multinational empire and perish like Yugoslavia or the USSR"<sup>264</sup>. On the one hand, the Russian national democrats insist on the active use of Western political experience, but they also recognize that the political nation in modern Russia is absent. Ideologists of national democracy propose to reform the political structure of modern Russia, changing radically the Constitution, the structure of parliament, and federalism<sup>265</sup>, but they prefer to avoid controversial problems, including the fate of non-Russian nations in this imagined national Russia. Therefore, ideologists of the national democracy prefer to actualize the predominantly Russian question and insist that "the unfortunate historical truth for us is that the Russian nation has not yet formed... all European nations without exception have passed the path of national formation and the creation of national states, and only the Russian people are still deprived of their political identity"<sup>266</sup>.

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<sup>261</sup> Aleksei Shiropayev, Il'ia Lazarenko, Mihail Pozharskii. Manifest Organizatsionnogo Komiteta Natsional-Demokratov, Natsional-demokratiia v Rossii. Svoboda. Natsiia. Progress. 2007, 20 iiulia, <https://ru-nazdem.livejournal.com/1672.html>

<sup>262</sup> Sergei Sergeev, Natsionalizm eto traditsionalizm, Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei, 2007, 24 oktiabria, <http://www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=18177>

<sup>263</sup> Oleg Nemenskii, Rossiiskaia natsiia vs Russkii narod, Voprosy natsionalizma, 2012, No 1, ss. 82 – 95.

<sup>264</sup> Manifest ob obrazovanii Natsional-demokraticheskogo dvizheniia Russkii Grazhdanskii Soiuz, Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei, 2010, 19 noiabria, <http://www.apn.ru/special/article23357.htm>

<sup>265</sup> Pavel Sviatenkov. Chto nuzhno izmenit' v Konstitutsii Rossii? <http://vnatio.org/news2989/>

<sup>266</sup> Aleksei Shiropayev, Il'ia Lazarenko, Mihail Pozharskii. Manifest Organizatsionnogo Komiteta Natsional-Demokratov, Natsional-demokratiia v Rossii. Svoboda. Natsiia. Progress. 2007, 20 iiulia, <https://ru-nazdem.livejournal.com/1672.html>

Sergei Sergeev<sup>267</sup>, one of the ideologists of Russian national democracy, expresses the same point of view and stresses that the nation in the Western sense as the imagined community in Russia historically did not arise. Russian national democrats insist that the concepts of "nationalism" and "democracy" are closely related and mutually dependent. Therefore, they declare that "We, the Russian national democrats, representatives of Russian political nationalism, are convinced of the inseparability of the concepts "nation" and "democracy". A democratic state presupposes the existence of a nation with a common destiny and common interests... and only democracy gives the nation the opportunity to express its will and the realization of its interests"<sup>268</sup>. Ideologists of Russian national democracy offers a concept that is idealistic because it proposes an ideal non-existent democratic Russia where the nation and other political institutions exist in conditions of Western European political, social and economic realities. Russian national democrats try to localize the causes of the weakness of the Russian political nation in the deformations and development mutations inspired by the Tatar conquest, which institutionalized the "weakness or uniqueness of the Russian legal and moral culture, and rule and arbitrariness of supreme power in Russia"<sup>269</sup>. The ideological preferences of national democracy actualize the traditional ideas of Russian nationalism, including the supremacy and primacy of the Russian nation and the values of Western democracy simultaneously, as well as the ideas of the political nation. Belief in the universality of the nation is combined in the ideological program of national democracy with attempts to popularize the values of Western democracy.

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<sup>267</sup> Sergei Sergeev, *U nas eshchio net natsii, Natsional'no-demokraticeskaja partiia*, 2016, 16 avgusta, <http://www.rosndp.org/bila-li-v-rossijskoj-imperii-russkaya-naciya.html>

<sup>268</sup> *Manifest ob obrazovanii Natsional-demokraticeskogo dvizheniia Russkii Grazhdanskii Soiuz*, Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei, 2010, 19 noiabria, <http://www.apn.ru/special/article23357.htm>

<sup>269</sup> Sergei Sergeev, *Natsionalizm i zapadnichestvo*, Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei, 2017, 4 noiabria, <http://www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=36801>

### *National democracy and the imagination of the nation-state*

The Manifesto of the National Democrats Organizing Committee proclaims that “only democracy and parliamentarism can lead the Russian nation to economic and political prosperity. Only democratic procedures can ensure the rotation of elites and lead the best representatives of the nation to government”<sup>270</sup>. National democracy theorists insist that the actual political regime in Russia is not actually democratic, but it stagnates as an authoritarian because it exists as a “dictatorship based on the remnants of the feudal Soviet bureaucratic system ... and the regime of commercial cosmopolitanism”<sup>271</sup>. Modern Russian national democracy promotes the negative image of political elites actively. Therefore, "Russian Federation" in the political imagination of democratic nationalists turned to invented political tradition, which they use to criticize the current political elites. National democrats provide the image of the Russian Empire with the most negative connotations, imagining it as an anti-national and neo-colonial state: “the Russian Federation is a fragment of the Soviet empire, it has not found its identity and plunged into an increasingly deep systemic crisis., the Russian Federation inherited from the imperial traditions of the Russian Empire and the USSR the worst of them – the colonial character of the state”<sup>272</sup>.

The ideas of political and economic regionalization in the program of national democracy, on the one hand, are combined with the belief in the need for consistent democratization, including secularism and the real guarantee of civil rights and freedoms: "the formation of European nations occurred with the simultaneous emergence of secularism – the liberation of nations from the power of church corporations. The national state can only be secular. There is no place in a progressive and free national state for religious obscurantism, clericalism, retrograde and other indispensable attributes of backward peoples and countries of the third world ... We stand for the maximum of civil rights and freedoms ... only a civilized person can intelligently manage the achievements of civilization and freedoms ... we stand for a control of migration policy ... the

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<sup>270</sup> Aleksei Shiropayev, Il'ia Lazarenko, Mihail Pozharskii. *Manifest Organizatsionnogo Komiteta Natsional-Demokratov, Natsional-demokratiia v Rossii. Svoboda. Natsiia. Progress. 2007, 20 iiulia*, <https://ru-nazdem.livejournal.com/1672.html>

<sup>271</sup> Lev Trapeznikov, *Burzhuaznaia revoliutsiia kak istoricheskaia zakonomernost', Natsional'no-demokraticheskaia partiia*, 2016, 23 sentiabria, <http://www.rosndp.org/burzhuaznaya-revoluciya-kak-istoricheskaya-zakonomernostj.html>

<sup>272</sup> *Manifest ob obrazovanii Natsional-demokraticeskogo dvizheniia Russkii Grazhdanskii Soiuz, Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei*, 2010, 19 noiabria, <http://www.apn.ru/special/article23357.htm>

maximum restriction of 'uncivilized elements' from the countries of the Caucasus and Central Asia"<sup>273</sup>. On the other hand, national democrats insist consistently that Russia is a European country: "Russia is obliged to follow only its own interests and firmly defend these interests, remaining an integral part of Europe"<sup>274</sup>. The political program of modern Russian national democracy is alternative and marginal because the ideas of Russian national democrats are in conflict with the ideological preferences of the ruling political classes. National democrats criticize the political regime actively and have many claims to the modern elites who received power in the early 2000s because they were able to consolidate regime and preserve the situation, stopping the reforms.

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<sup>273</sup> Aleksei Shiropaev, Il'ia Lazarenko, Mihail Pozharskii. *Manifest Organizatsionnogo Komiteta Natsional-Demokratov, Natsional-demokratiia v Rossii. Svoboda. Natsiia. Progress. 2007, 20 iiulia*, <https://ru-nazdem.livejournal.com/1672.html>

<sup>274</sup> Lev Trapeznikov, *Tochka zreniia, Natsional'no-demokraticheskaia partiia*, 2016, 18 iiunia, <http://www.rosndp.org/tochka-zr.html>

### *Historical narratives of national democracy*

Historical imagination and the invention of history in the national system of coordinates plays one of the central roles in the ideological programs of modern Russian national democracy. The historical imagination of modern Russian national democracy is rooted genetically in the texts of Aleksandr Ianov<sup>275</sup> and actively uses the achievements of academic post-modernist historiography<sup>276</sup>. Theoreticians and ideologists of national democracy, on the one hand, abandon the ideas of historical messianism of their historical predecessors and do not believe in Russian historical *Sonderweg*. On the other hand, they believe that the history of Russia provides historians with numerous examples of relations with the West, the development of democratic institutions and traditions, the implementation of various regional scenarios of historical and political developments. Two points of view arose among the Russian national democrats. Oleg Nemenskii expresses a pessimistic concept, believing that "the Russian state has never been a Russian. It has always been a definite form of political organization of the space of the East European Plain"<sup>277</sup>.

Oleg Nemenskii imagines the history of Russia as a history where some processes which determined the main directions and trajectories of the development of the West were absent in Russian historical contexts<sup>278</sup>, including the nationalist movements of the 19th and 20th centuries as attempts to modernize agrarian cultures. Oleg Nemenskii believes that the history of Russian nationalism "missed" the stage of "radicalization"<sup>279</sup> of agrarian traditional cultures and their transformation into modern and national ones. Therefore, Oleg Nemenskii prefers to write the history of Russia as a history of the absence of Russian nationalism, which was able to imagine and invent the Russian

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<sup>275</sup> Aleksandr Ianov, *Rossii i Evropa. 1462-1921. Evropeiskoe stoletie Rossii. 1480-1560*. Moskva: Novyi Hronograf, 2008. 694 s.; Aleksandr Ianov, *Rossii i Evropa. 1462-1921. Zagadka nikolaevskoi Rossii. 1825-1855*. Moskva: Novyi Hronograf, 2008. 502 s.; Aleksandr Ianov, *Rossii i Evropa. 1462-1921. Drama patriotizma v Rossii. 1855-1921*. Moskva: Novyi Hronograf, 2008. 676 s.

<sup>276</sup> Igor' Danilevskii, *Drevniaia Rus' glazami sovremennikov i potomkov (IX - XII vv.)*. Moskva: Aspekt-Press, 1998. 398 s.; Igor' Danilevskii, *Russkie zemli glazami sovremennikov i potomkov (XII - XIV vv.)*. Moskva: Aspekt-Press, 2001. 387 s.; Nikolai Klenov, *Nesostoiavshiesia stolitsy Rusi. Novgorod. Tver'. Smolensk*. Moskva: Veche, 2011, 320 s.

<sup>277</sup> Oleg Nemenskii, *Uhod s Ravniny*, *Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei*, 2006, 5 apreliia, <http://www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=1857>

<sup>278</sup> Oleg Nemenskii, *Natsionalizm gorodskoi i sel'skii*, *Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei*, 2010, 11 iiunia, <http://www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=22868>

<sup>279</sup> Oleg Nemenskii, *Rustikalizatsiia russkosti*, *Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei*, 2015, 13 maia, <http://www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=33519>

nation. Sergei Sergeev, on the contrary, believes that Kievan Rus was “an organic part of the then European-Christian world”, and Novgorod, Pskov and Viatka became continuers of political democratic traditions<sup>280</sup>. Russian national democrats, in their attempts to develop new versions of the historical narrative, insist that the Mongol-Tatar conquest provoked political and social mutations that substantially weakened and completely destroyed earlier democratic institutions and made invisible the regional levels of the historical process. Some Russian nationalists seek to Europeanize and democratize the history of Russia.

Therefore, they carefully search for democratic institutions in the past of Russia but find examples how the central elites destroyed and suppressed these institutions and made impossible the formation of a political nation and nation-state. National democrats imagine Russian history after the overthrow of the Mongol-Tatar yoke before the imperial transformation of Russia as oppression and persecution of the rudiments of democratic institutions. The history of the Russian Empire is invented as an unpleasant political experiment with separate glimpses of freedom and attempts to revive democratic traditions. Russian national democrats, for example, imagine the Decembrists as the first Russian nationalists in particular, but Decembrism, in general, is invented as a failed attempt to institutionalize Russian nationalism. Nationalists prefer to integrate the history of Russia in the early 20th century into their own historical grand narrative as one more unsuccessful attempt to modernize and actualize the principles and values of the political nation and nation-state. The historical imagination of the national democracy uses the historiographical principle of gaps and failures actively. Therefore, the Soviet period of Russian history is imagined as a political and intellectual catastrophe when the Russians fell victims of Sovietization and could not, unlike other ethnic groups of the USSR, transform into a nation with their own quasi-state elites and institutions. The historical imagination of Russian national democracy depends on the myths of the cycle of history: therefore, on the one hand, they imagine the 1990s as an attempt to restore democratic institutions and, on the other hand, insist that the 2000s and 2010s became a period of anti-democratic and anti-regional regression.

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<sup>280</sup> Sergei Sergeev, *Ruskaia natsiia, ili rasskaz ob istorii eio otsutstviia*, <https://www.litres.ru/sergey-mihaylovich-sergeev/russkaya-naciya-ili-rasskaz-ob-istorii-ee-otsutstviya>

### *An alternative political project of national democracy*

Ideologists of national democracy in 2007 insisted that political, economic and social regime fell into a deep structural crisis because "the attempt to create a new modern democratic state on the territory of the former RSFSR failed. All the basic attributes of democracy, including the principle of separation of powers, the institution of free elections, the federal structure, local government, the independence of the courts are virtually eliminated only"<sup>281</sup>. National Russian democracy in this intellectual situation actualizes the syncretic nature of its ideology because the political regime in Russia unified the political spaces so deeply that various political ideologies began to broadcast ideas that historically were alien to them. Russian nationalism marginalized by the authorities and demonized by them in the mass public consciousness was no exception to this logic of the development of modern Russian statehood because of the traditional democrats, on the one hand, and the nationalists, on the other hand, were the same victims of political and ideological unification.

Actually, Russian ruling elites, trying to protect themselves, inspired the convergence of nationalists and liberals, without assuming what political doctrine could arise as a result of this connection, which was unnatural only from a formal point of view. Marginalizing democrats, liberals and nationalists, the ruling political elites did not understand and did not realize that they created new incentives for the rise and progress of nationalism by the formation mechanism of the Russian political nation because the construction and development of the nation as a political community of citizens was never among the tasks of the political regime that emerged in Russia on the ideological ruins of the 1990s. The theoreticians of Russian national democracy understand that their ideas do not coincide with the official ideological discourse. Criticizing the contemporary foreign policy of the ruling elites, Russian national democrats believe that only Western orientation and the active use of Western political experience, the transplantation of the institution of nation into Russian contexts can save modern Russia from a deep crisis and further disintegration: "if we want to build a Russian democratic nation, but not a new version of the 'service people', then we can take its model only from the West ... the West as a system of national states ... The struggle for the Russian nation is a struggle for democracy"<sup>282</sup>.

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<sup>281</sup> Manifest Natsional'nogo russkogo osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia "NAROD", Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei, 2007, 27 iyunia, <http://www.apn.ru/publications/article17321.htm>

<sup>282</sup> Sergei Sergeev, Natsionalizm i zapadnichestvo, Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei, 2017, 4 noiabria, <http://www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=36801>



National democrats propose a program of reforms, including the modernization of political institutions and relations in the form of consistent Westernization and the rejection of the myths of the Russian nationalism proposed by its other trends that, unlike the national democracy, idealize the empire and deny democratic Western political experience. On the other hand, the concept of national democracy is marginal for modern Russia where it is little known and rejected also by the political classes and the electorate. National democracy in its program suggests reforms that include the democratization and nationalization of the political regime simultaneously and require a decisive and radical deconstruction of the political system that emerged in the 2000s.

### *The invention of regionalism and national democracy*

The ideologists of modern Russian national democracy invent and imagine Russia as a regional country, insisting and emphasizing actively that the Russian regions became the victims of political and economic disparities that arose in the 19th and 20th centuries and did not allow potential Russian regions to become political, cultural and economic alternative centres. Russian national democrats understand the importance of the regional problems and factors. The invention of democracy as a universal political tradition in the ideology of modern Russian liberal nationalism coexist with attempts to actualize the regionalist levels and dimensions of modern Russian statehood: "we stand for maximum freedoms and preferences for the Russian regions. We consider that actual system is unfair and harmful to the nation and state when all economic resources are concentrated in Moscow, bleeding regions, which are pinned firmly to the ubiquitous centre of the bureaucratic 'power vertical'. We stand for free regional self-government and for the development of regional centres. We stand for genuine federalism, for a "multipolar" Russia with many developed and independent regional centres with the widest powers"<sup>283</sup>.

Russian national democrats insist that the regional policy of Vladimir Putin is erroneous because the central elites ignore the interests of the regions and prefer to ignore those regional difficulties and contradictions, different parts of Russia are faced. National democrats believe that the un-development of Russian regions became one of the reasons for the failure of the project of political nation building. National democrats in modern Russia became probably the first generation of Russian nationalist-minded intellectuals who try to imagine and invent a modern nation, despite the fact that their European counterparts did it in the 19th or 20th centuries successfully. Russian national democrats in this intellectual situation face a lack of understanding and therefore try to popularize the Western concepts of nationalism and the nation as the political community<sup>284</sup>. Russian nationalists did it too late with several decades delay, although this form of assimilation of the European and Western humanities in particular and knowledge about nationalism, in general, became traditional in Russia.

Attempts of national democrats to popularize Western theories of the nation among political classes are less successful than the expansion of Western

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<sup>283</sup> Aleksei Shiropaev, Il'ia Lazarenko, Mihail Pozharskii. *Manifest Organizatsionnogo Komiteta Natsional-Demokratov, Natsional-demokratiia v Rossii. Svoboda. Natsiia. Progress. 2007, 20 iiulia*, <https://ru-nazdem.livejournal.com/1672.html>

<sup>284</sup> Sergei Sergeev, *Natsiia v russkoi istorii, Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei*, 2009, 18 maia, <http://www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=21603>

methods and theoretical approaches into academic studies of nationalism, where modernism and constructivism determine the basic trajectories and vectors of the analysis of nationalism. Sergei Sergeev, one of the ideologists of Russian national democracy, believes that the political nation in general and the idea of a political nation in particular were not developed in Russian history<sup>285</sup> because "if a political entity was understood as a nation, the nation did not exist until October 17, 1905, because the Russians never formed autonomous from the state social and political elite as the nucleus of any nation with political rights"<sup>286</sup>. Sergei Sergeev became one of the inspirers of the myth of the absence of a political nation in the Western sense in Russia. Therefore, he named one of his books published in 2017, "The Russian Nation, or the Story of the History of Its Absence"<sup>287</sup>.

Russian national democrats believe that the Russians were a formal ethnic majority that did not have real rights and preferences<sup>288</sup>, and therefore political elites tried to minimize effects of historical regionalism in Russia and a new regionalism could not arise until the beginning of the 20th century because the nation as a political actor in Russia appeared only as one of the results of the first Russian revolution. Ideologists of national democracy<sup>289</sup> presume that the historical and political failure of Russian regionalism and regions with political and social ambitions in the invisible periphery and background of Moscow became a result of domination of elitist political which ignored the principles and values of a nation and regions were not able to reach the level comparable to the experience of European political nations. The crisis and the fall of the project of the Russian political nation, as theorists of Russian national democracy presume, was the result of disproportions in Russian political and social developments, where until the 20th century the political nation was virtually absent and was a fiction and a chimaera<sup>290</sup>. Modern Russian national

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<sup>285</sup> Sergei Sergeev, *la hotel razobrat'sia, pochemu v RF net russkoi natsii*, Agentstvo politicheskikh novostei, 2017, 17 fevralia, <http://www.apn.ru/index.php?newsid=36009>

<sup>286</sup> Sergei Sergeev, *Byla li v Rossiiskoi imperii russkaia natsiia? Natsional'no-demokraticheskaiia in Russia partiia*, 2016, 18 marta, <http://www.rosndp.org/bila-li-v-rossijskoj-imperii-russkaya-naciya.html>

<sup>287</sup> Sergei Sergeev, *Russkaia natsiia, ili istoriia eio otsutstviia*. Moskva: Tsentrpoligraf, 2017. 740 s.

<sup>288</sup> Sergei Sergeev, *Pobediteli ne poluchaiut nichego*, Natsional'no-demokraticheskaiia partiia, 2016, 2 marta, <http://www.rosndp.org/pobediteli-ne-poluchayut-nichego.html>

<sup>289</sup> Lev Trapeznikov, *Evoliutsiia russkogo soznaniia i rol' obshchestvennykh organizatsii v politicheskoi bor'be*, Natsional'no-demokraticheskaiia partiia, 2015, 14 dekabria, <http://www.rosndp.org/evolyuciya-russkogo-soznaniya-i-rolj-obshchestvennih-organizacij-v-politicheskoi-borjbe.html>

<sup>290</sup> Sergei Sergeev, *Printsip Moskvyy*, <http://www.rosndp.org/princip-moskvi.html>

democrats are democrats, regionalists and nationalists simultaneously because they insist that Moscow authoritarian and anti-democratic policies destroyed and suppressed regional development potentials. National democrats try to modernize regional levels and dimensions of modern Russia and Russian history, nationalize them and imagine their new Russian identities, which can be a real alternative to the official localized forms of state-controlled patriotism which only imitate regionalism.

### *National democracy: pro et contra*

National democracy became an important segment and element in the ideological mosaic of modern Russian nationalism, but the ideas of national democrats continue to be marginal, and the theorists and ideologists of the movement are practically invisible in the modern information landscape of Russia because the media prefer to broadcast and reproduce exclusively official political and ideological discourses. Several reasons led Russian national democracy to its present state. Russia belongs to a number of countries where the processes of political and economic modernization began later than in the rest of Europe. The slow speed of social changes hampered the transformation of traditional agrarian and urban communities into modern nations. Russian nationalism in Russia, unlike the countries of Western Europe, did not arise earlier than the Russian nation. Russian nationalism and the Russian nation became the secondary consequences of social and political modernizations. Russia has never been a national state, nationalizing state and a nation-state in the Western sense.

Elements of political and civic nationalisms, a nation as the imagined community, invented traditions have never dominated because they always existed in the shadow of a hypertrophically developed a centralized state that perceived Russian and regional nationalisms, liberal and leftist political ideologies with a sense of identical rejection and politically motivated dislike. Russians could become a political nation only in the Soviet period because the USSR was an attempt of radical social and economic modernization, but they did not become a nation-state during the existence of the USSR or after its collapse. Russians in the USSR were an invisible majority and did not have their formal political and cultural institutions as invented traditions. The Russians could not become a political nation and a nation-state after the collapse of the USSR because they did not receive their own political institutions. Russian nationalism in these unfavourable conditions was marginal in the USSR and the post-Soviet Russian Federation.

The radicalization of Russian nationalism in the form of anti-Semitism, Orthodox obscurantism, chauvinism inspired and promoted its marginalization, but radical nationalists was visible, their voices were audible and these factors slowed the emergence of national democracy as a political version of Russian nationalism significantly. National democracy is an alternative trend in the development of Russian nationalism because its ideologists tried to synthesize and combine the values of nationalism and the principles of liberal democracy. Theorists of liberal Russian nationalism are too ambitious in their attempts to nationalize the values of democracy and integrate their intellectual contexts of

Russian nationalism and intellectual history of Russia. National democracy in Russia arose under the European political and intellectual influences, on the one hand, in the context of attempts to democratize nationalism and transplant Western institutions in it. This attempt was not very successful, but institutions that imitate the democratic principles of the organization of society and the state in Russia continue to exist. On the other hand, the progress of national democracy in the actual intellectual history was a consequence of the transplantation of Western theoretical Nationalism Studies that radically differed from the earlier Russian theories of nations that absolutize and idealize the principles and values of ethnicity, blood and religion.

National democracy in modern Russia is marginal and it is logical to assume that 2018 will not become a time of radical improvement and progress of Russian liberal nationalists because ruling political elites will mobilize all available political resources and mechanisms for marginalization and demonization of the possible competitors. National democracy in this situation will inevitably become the best candidate for the role of the enemy because its ideas and principles synthesize the values of nationalism, the nation, democracy, rights and freedoms that are equally alien to the modern political class of Russia. Despite marginality, Russian national democracy could become a part of the history of Russian nationalism, and the author presumes that the history of national democracy awaits its scholars who will be able to localize it in intellectual history and the archaeology of the ideas of post-Soviet Russia.

## **Integration, migration, globalization as universal Others of European nationalisms**

### *Europe of nations vs European integration: European myths as invented traditions of nationalist parties*

European integration, Euroscepticism and attempts to revise the modern project of European integration managed to become commonplaces in the ideology and political programs of European nationalist parties. Alekandr Sotnichenko, a Russian historian, believes that the role of nationalism in the modern world changed: "nationalism ... is a secondary factor of modernity if it does not contradict global integration processes ... most modern nationalists agree to occupy the second honour place. They are satisfied with the main trends of the modern world, including global inequality, secularization, inviolability of the individual and private property, market economic system"<sup>291</sup>. Modern European nationalists are active when political processes encroach on these values of nationalism. European integration, which inspired the common market and other supranational institutions, was an attempt to encroach on the primacy and the rule of the nation and the nation-state.

Therefore, European integration divided the nationalists into its ardent opponents and supporters. If nationalist parties in countries that aspire to become members of the European Union accept integration positively, then the nationalists of the "old" Europe, on the contrary, believe that European integration has more negative than positive consequences for its participants. If the Macedonian nationalists are still full of enthusiasm and are confident that European integration can influence on their country in a positive way, then the Swiss nationalists from *Schweizerische Volkspartei*<sup>292</sup> insist that European integration led to results that are radically different from the declared goals in the early 1950s when integration processes were just beginning. *Sverigedemokraterna*, the Swedish nationalist party, is also convinced that the negative effects of European integration are more evident than its positive results because of Brussels, as nationalists believe, limits the sovereignty of participants in European integration consistently. Swedish nationalists strongly criticize the expansion of the powers of European institutions and insist that

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<sup>291</sup> Sotnichenko, Aleksandr. (2009). *Protiv techeniia: natsionalizm v sovremennom mire*, Neva, No 2, URL: <http://magazines.russ.ru/neva/2009/2/so10.html>

<sup>292</sup> SVP – die Partei für die Schweiz. *Parteiprogramm 2015 bis 2019*, URL: [https://www.svp.ch/wp-content/uploads/Parteiprogramm\\_2015-d.pdf](https://www.svp.ch/wp-content/uploads/Parteiprogramm_2015-d.pdf)

transformation of the EU into a federation<sup>293</sup> will lead to negative results for European nations.

*Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond*, the Estonian nationalist party, believes that the EU should function as a Europe of nations<sup>294</sup>, and the powers of common European institutions should be limited substantially because of Brussels's interference in the internal affairs of member countries<sup>295</sup>, as Estonian nationalists believe, is unacceptable. Polish nationalists, including *Kongres Nowej Prawicy* or *Nowa Prawica*, prefer to develop ideas of cultural Europeanism insisting that modern Europe is rooted in ancient and medieval political and Christian traditions historically<sup>296</sup>, although this idea formed historically in the first half of the 20th century in the nationalisms of those European nations<sup>297</sup>, which did not have independent statehoods, but believed in Europe as the source of the nation's political tradition, sovereignty, freedom and independence. Lithuanian national democrats are known as active critics of the extremes of European integration. National democrats, on the one hand, insist that transnational institutions are harmful and dangerous for states that participate in European integration.

On the other hand, Lithuanian national democrats, as moderate nationalists, defend the project of a united Europe as a Europe of nations. Therefore, Lithuanian national democrats insist that "we do not agree with the pernicious and humiliating assertion that Lithuania is a country that goes to Europe. We do not need to go anywhere from our land. The state of Lithuania was, is and will be in Europe, in the middle of Europe – between East and West"<sup>298</sup>. Ukrainian nationalists from *KUN* also believe that Ukraine is an integral part of the European cultural tradition and civilization<sup>299</sup>. Bulgarian nationalist parties believe that European integration can lead to some positive results, but it will be possible only if the EU remains the Europe of nations and will not be transformed into a federation<sup>300</sup>. Therefore, nationalist parties in Central and Eastern Europe, including *Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti* from the Czech

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<sup>293</sup> EU-politik, URL: <https://sd.se/var-politik/>

<sup>294</sup> Meie Eesti Eest! Rahvusriikide Euroopa eest!, URL: <https://www.ekre.ee/eurovalimiste-platvorm/>

<sup>295</sup> Konservatiivne Moto, URL: <https://ekre.ee/konservatiivne-programm/>

<sup>296</sup> Polityczne ABC, URL: <http://knp.org.pl/program/polityczne-abc/>

<sup>297</sup> Іанів, Володимир Мухайло. (1996), *Психологічні основи оксиденталізму*. Мюнхен: *Українськ'й Віл'ньї Університет*

<sup>298</sup> Lietuvos nacionaldemokratų partijos programa (Politiniai principai), URL: <http://www.lndp.lt/index.php?7>

<sup>299</sup> Програма Конгресу Українськ'йх націоналістів, URL: <http://cun.org.ua/pro-partiyu/programa/>

<sup>300</sup> Programa, URL: <http://www.vmro.bg/pages/документи/програма/>



Republic, believe that the European integration project is part of a conspiracy of transnational organizations and an attempt to deprive national states of sovereignty and political independence<sup>301</sup>.

*Sverigedemokraterna*, as other nationalist parties in Europe, formally declares itself as a pro-European political force, but party theorists prefer to emphasize that the modern EU is radically different from the Union, Sweden joined in, in 1994<sup>302</sup>. Moderate Slovak nationalists imagine themselves as a pro-European political party, but they, as nationalists in other European countries, seek to counter the tendencies of federalization and the strengthening of transnational institutions<sup>303</sup>. It is noteworthy that the nationalists of the European regions and young democracies, which are nationalizing societies, imagine European integration more positively than those countries that initiated the processes of European integration in the middle of the 20th century. For example, Scottish nationalists negatively perceived the decision of Britain to leave the European Union<sup>304</sup> believing that the membership of Scotland in the Union correlate with the interests of the nation more than the refusal to participate in European integration<sup>305</sup>.

Lithuanian national democrats criticize the federalization of Europe, believing that “we are against a single European state, against the creation of a single European nation. Europe, created by cosmopolitan, globalist principles, has no future”<sup>306</sup>. Slovak nationalists from *Naše Slovensko* perceive the processes of European integration in particular and Euro-Atlantic integration in general negatively, insisting that Slovakia should not depend on the EU and NATO<sup>307</sup>. The ideologists of the Norwegian *Senterpartiet* also believe that the processes of European integration contribute to the erosion of national states in Europe and therefore insist that Norway should minimize its contacts with Brussels because of the EU, as nationalists believe, seeks to deprive Norway of

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<sup>301</sup> Program DSSS 2015, URL: <http://www.dsss.cz/program-dsss-2015>

<sup>302</sup> Partiet för en EU-kritisk politik. Vi vill folkomrösta för en kritisk EU-politik, URL: <https://sd.se/var-politik/eu-politik/>

<sup>303</sup> Žiadosti slovenských vlastnecov Bruselu, URL: <http://www.sns.sk/dokumenty/popradske-memorendum/>

<sup>304</sup> What is the SNP's plan for Brexit?, URL: [https://www.snp.org/what\\_is\\_the\\_snp\\_plan\\_for\\_brexit](https://www.snp.org/what_is_the_snp_plan_for_brexit)

<sup>305</sup> Will the SNP oppose leaving the EU in a vote in the Scottish Parliament?, URL: [https://www.snp.org/pb\\_will\\_the\\_snp\\_oppose\\_leaving\\_the\\_eu\\_in\\_a\\_vote\\_in\\_the\\_scottish\\_parliament](https://www.snp.org/pb_will_the_snp_oppose_leaving_the_eu_in_a_vote_in_the_scottish_parliament)

<sup>306</sup> Lietuvos nacionaldemokratų partijos programa (Politiniai principai), URL: <http://www.lndp.lt/index.php?7>

<sup>307</sup> O nás, URL: <http://www.naseslovensko.net/o-nas/>

political independence and state sovereignty<sup>308</sup>. *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* declares that European integration, despite all the results and achievements, did not justify the hopes of Europeans because it stimulated the rise of bureaucracy's influence instead of improvement of the living standards of Europeans<sup>309</sup>.

Theorists of *Dansk Folkeparti* negatively perceive European integration also, insisting that "the party wishes friendly and dynamic cooperation with all democratic and liberal states in the world, but we do not want Denmark to accept sovereignty ... The Party is against the European Union. We highly value such fundamental freedoms as freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and freedom of belief, emphasizing the importance of observing these freedoms for other nations"<sup>310</sup>. If Danish nationalists imagine the EU negatively, the Flemish nationalists insist, on the one hand, that European integration has positive consequences for the nations of Europe because "Europe is the cradle of our civilization, and cooperation in Europe brought us peace and prosperity"<sup>311</sup>. On the other hand, Flemish nationalism imagines European integration positively as an integration of nation-states that preserve and develop their national identities.

Therefore, Flemish nationalists negatively perceive the European Union as institution, believing that the integration created a powerful bureaucracy that prefer to ignore the ideals of romantics who inspired European unity. Nationalists of the old Europe prefer to develop Euroscepticism, insisting that the bureaucracy of Brussels is too expensive for members of the European Union. The political program of *Dansk Folkeparti* promotes the idea that the EU became an extremely cumbersome and expensive organization that began to dictate its rules to the rest of European countries and in fact ceased to be beneficial to the member states<sup>312</sup>. Nationalists in this intellectual situation are forced to offer mutually exclusive ideas and values. For example, *VMRO-DPMNE* recognizes the importance of the participation in the European integration process, and party leaders insist that "the protection of Macedonian culture, national cultural wealth, Macedonian identity and language"<sup>313</sup> belong to the priority tasks, but despite declarations about the need for identity development, Macedonian modern nationalism of *VMRO-DPMNE* lose its ethnic core gradually

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<sup>308</sup> EU og EØS, URL: <https://www.senterpartiet.no/politikk/politisk-sak/eu-og-eos>

<sup>309</sup> Europees beleid, URL: <http://www.n-va.be/standpunten/europees-beleid>

<sup>310</sup> Principprogram, URL: <https://danskfolkeparti.dk/politik/principprogram/>

<sup>311</sup> Programma, URL: <https://www.vlaamsbelang.org/programma/>

<sup>312</sup> Vidste du – om EU, URL: <https://danskfolkeparti.dk/eu/>

<sup>313</sup> Realno. Programa na VMRO-DPMNE 2017 – 2020. Rabota, sigurnost, napredok! Skopje, 2017. ss. 12, 430.

and transform into party of the predominantly political nationalism with its political, economic and social ambitions.

Nationalist parties in other European countries face the same problems. *Dansk Folkeparti* in its program focuses mainly on political issues, migration and economic problems. Party theorists pay less attention to Danish identity, declaring only that "the country is based on the Danish cultural heritage... Danish culture must be preserved and strengthened. Culture consists of a sum of history, experience, beliefs, languages and customs of the Danish people. The protection and further development of this culture is a prerequisite for our existence as a free and enlightened society. Therefore, we are striving for a broad effort to strengthen Danish dignity throughout the world. Outside Denmark's borders, economic, political and moral support should be granted to Danish minorities"<sup>314</sup>. The erosion of ethnicity is characteristic of the programmatic documents of the Polish party *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, despite the fact that the concept of "*narod*" is present in its program. Theorists and ideologists of *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* gradually abandon the ethnocentric perception of the nation preferring to define a nation as a predominantly political community<sup>315</sup>. Slovak nationalists from *Slovenská národná strana* also try to propagate the ideas of a political nation, imagining the Slovak Republic as the main achievement of Slovak national history<sup>316</sup>. These transformations and metamorphoses became consequences of the modernization of the party programs of European nationalist parties, which seek to integrate the values of nationalism into the principles of European integration.

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<sup>314</sup> Principprogram, URL: <https://danskfolkeparti.dk/politik/principprogram/>

<sup>315</sup> Zdrowie. Rodzina. Praca. Program Prawa i Sprawiedliwości 2014. Warszawa: Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, 2014. URL: <http://pis.org.pl/dokumenty>

<sup>316</sup> Definícia SNS, URL: <http://www.sns.sk/o-nas/profil/>

*The coming of the new Barbarians:  
the migration and migrants in the political imagination of  
European nationalist parties*

Modern nationalist parties in Europe are in solidarity in their negative attitude to migration in general and to migrants from Muslim countries in particular, insisting that Europe must preserve its European traditions and stop dependence on the US in internal affairs<sup>317</sup>. Montserrat Guibernau presumes that “in the last fifteen years or so, prejudice, fear and resentment towards immigrants and refugees have been growing within western societies. The large influx of refugees from eastern Europe and Africa into European countries in the 1990s gave rise to talk of an “invasion of the poor” and expressions such as the “storming of Europe”. Over time, a number of economic, social, political and cultural arguments have been developed to justify a negative attitude towards immigrants. These range from the downward pressure that migrants push on wages and rising unemployment among the native population, to their comparatively high birth rates with potential detrimental implications for the existing welfare system, demographic developments, and national identity”<sup>318</sup>.

The problems of migration became central in nationalist discourse and political imagination, marginalizing topics of identity, ethnicity and language that were extremely popular among nationalists several decades earlier. The nationalist parties of the “old Europe”, including *Schweizerische Volkspartei*<sup>319</sup>, insist that migration from Muslim countries became a threat to the national identity and security of Europe because migrants are Muslims and do not want to integrate into European society and refuse to accept traditional European values, including religious (Catholicism or Protestantism) and political (human rights and freedoms). *Nieuw-Vlaamse Alliantie* suggests limiting migration<sup>320</sup> also because refugees from Arab countries do not integrate into European society and contribute to the Islamization of Europe. The Cyprus nationalist party *Ethniko Laiko Metopo* insists that the migration from Muslim countries destroys the European identity because migrants cannot integrate into Christian European societies, do not accept and do not understand the values and human

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<sup>317</sup> Európának a maga kezébe kell vennie a sorsát, URL: <http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/2017-09-18/europanak-a-maga-kezebe-kell-vennie-a-sorsat/>

<sup>318</sup> Guibernau, Montserrat. (2010), *Migration and the rise of the radical right. Social malaise and the failure of mainstream politics*. L.: Policy Network, p. 10.

<sup>319</sup> SVP – die Partei für die Schweiz. Parteiprogramm 2015 bis 2019, URL: [https://www.svp.ch/wp-content/uploads/Parteiprogramm\\_2015-d.pdf](https://www.svp.ch/wp-content/uploads/Parteiprogramm_2015-d.pdf)

<sup>320</sup> Asiel, migratie en inburgering, URL: <http://www.n-va.be/standpunten/asiel-migratie-en-inburgering>

rights, reject all principles that are central and fundamental in the European political and ethnic identities<sup>321</sup>.

*Vlaams Belang* theorists are a more radical solution of migration problems than other European nationalists because suggest deporting migrants<sup>322</sup>. *Ethniko Laiko Metopo* insists that migration from Muslim countries worsens the economic and social situations in Europe, promotes the growth of terrorism and Islamic extremism<sup>323</sup>. Therefore, Cypriot nationalists try to manipulate public opinion, forming a negative image of migrants<sup>324</sup> and actively publishing materials about their crimes in Europe<sup>325</sup>. *Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti* from the Czech Republic criticizes the migration policy of the European Union actively and insists that migrants cannot integrate into Czech society and therefore they become the causes of numerous social and economic problems<sup>326</sup>. Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán Viktor uses the ideas of ethnic Hungarian nationalism actively and insists that “we want Hungarian Hungary” or “*Magyar Magyarországot*” and “European Europe” or “*európai Európát*”<sup>327</sup>. Other Hungarian nationalist parties, including *Jobbik*, popularize the idea of the “Europe of Nations”<sup>328</sup> instead of modern European integration that promotes erosion of European national identities.

The ideologists of Hungarian nationalism from *Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség* insist that attempts of the European Union to allocate quotas for migrants and to force member states to accept migrants on their territory are unfair because illegal migration is a serious threat to national security and a destabilizing factor. *Jobbik* as a Hungarian nationalist party imagines European integration negatively and insists that the European Union became one of the attempts to globalize the world and weaken traditional values of the Hungarian

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<sup>321</sup> *Néa áfixi lathrometanastón! Énteka allodapói pérasan apó ta katechómena*, URL: <http://elamcy.com/2017/12/27/nea-afixi-lathrometanaston-enteka-allodapi-perasan-apo-ta-katechomena/>

<sup>322</sup> *Programma*, URL: <https://www.vlaamsbelang.org/programma/>

<sup>323</sup> *Ethnikismós kai Akrodexiá*, URL: <http://elamcy.com/2017/12/26/ethnikismos-ke-akrodexia/>

<sup>324</sup> *Sti Souidia i Astynomía antimetopízei to kýma viasmón kalóntas tis gynáikes na kleistoún spíti!*, URL: <http://elamcy.com/2017/12/19/sti-souidia-i-astynomia-antimetopizi-to-kyma-viasmon-kalontas-tis-gynekes-na-klistoun-spiti/>

<sup>325</sup> *Afganós machaírose méchri thanátou 15chroni sti Germanía!*, URL: <http://elamcy.com/2017/12/28/afganos-macherose-mechri-thanatou-15chroni-sti-germania/>

<sup>326</sup> *Program DSSS 2015*, URL: <http://www.dsss.cz/program-dsss-2015>

<sup>327</sup> *Mi Magyar Magyarországot akarunk*, URL: <http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/2017-09-18/mi-magyar-magyarorszagot-akarunk/>

<sup>328</sup> *Nemzetek Európája (2014-es választási program)*, URL: <https://www.jobbik.hu/programunk/nemzetek-europaja>

ethnic identity<sup>329</sup>. Theorists of *Visu Latvijai! - Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK*, a bloc of Latvian nationalist parties, develop anti-immigration ideas. If the influx of refugees from Muslim countries stimulates anti-immigration sentiments in Western Europe, then the origins of Latvian anti-migration nationalism are different. Latvia during the Soviet occupation experienced several waves of migration of the population which spoke only in Russian. The political elites of Latvia, after the restoration of state independence, chose not to grant rights to those who moved to Latvia after 1940 and their descendants.

Therefore, the migration problem in Latvia is mainly a problem of the Russian minority. Theorists of the Latvian national parties believe that migration will have negative results and consequences because an increase in the number of immigrants will stimulate social and economic problems<sup>330</sup>. Latvian nationalist parties in this intellectual situation prefer to develop and promote anti-immigration sentiments. Roberts Zīle, one of the deputies of *Visu Latvijai! - Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK*, who represents Latvia in the European Parliament, declares categorically that Latvia will never enter the list of countries that will specifically invite migrants to eliminate the labour shortage<sup>331</sup>. The nationalist parties of Lithuania and Estonia are in solidarity with Latvian nationalists in their attitude towards migration. Therefore, representatives of the Baltic nationalist parties signed *Bauska Deklaratsioon*, where they declared their negative attitude towards migration<sup>332</sup>. *Dansk Folkeparti* insists that Denmark will be only Danish and will never become a polyethnic country<sup>333</sup>.

Dutch *Partij voor de Vrijheid* insists that the Netherlands needs a consistent de-Islamization and re-nationalization. Therefore, ideologists of *Partij voor de Vrijheid* insist that the ban on halal food, the deportation of criminal migrants, the elimination of Islamic education, taxes on Islamic traditional clothing<sup>334</sup> can become effective measures in the fight against migration and Islamization of the country. Ideologists of *B'lgarski natsionalen soiuz* also imagine migration negatively and insist that political elites, on the one hand, should consistently and decisively limit the influx of Africans and Arabs to Bulgaria because the

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<sup>329</sup> Alapító Nyilatkozat, URL: <https://www.jobbik.hu/jobbikrol/alapito-nyilatkozat>

<sup>330</sup> Vai atbalstāt imigrantu iebruksanu Latvijā?, URL: <http://www.tb.lv/buj/items/vai-atbalstat-imigrantu-iebruksanu-latvija>

<sup>331</sup> Roberts Zīle: Nekāda darbaspēka ieguvuma no bēgļiem nebūs arī Latvijā, URL: <http://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/aktualitate/roberts-zile-nekada-darbaspeka-ieguvuma-no-begliem-nebus-ari-latvija/>

<sup>332</sup> Bauska Deklaratsioon, URL: <https://www.ekre.ee/bauska-deklaratsioon/>

<sup>333</sup> Principprogram, URL: <https://danskfolkeparti.dk/politik/principprogram/>

<sup>334</sup> Verkiezingsprogramma, URL: <https://www.pvv.nl/visie.html>

growth of non-Bulgarian ethnic groups creates a threat of transformation and mutation of Bulgaria from Bulgarian national state to a refugee camp<sup>335</sup>.

*VMRO*, another party of Bulgarian nationalists, believes that political elites of Bulgaria as an EU member state must resist resolutely and consistently the integration of Turkey because the Turks are not Europeans historically, culturally and religiously<sup>336</sup>. *Sverigedemokraterna*, one of the Swedish nationalist parties, is extremely critical of the current migration situation. The ideologists of the party claim that Sweden historically experienced several migration waves, but the migrants were Europeans and they quickly integrated, and their descendants assimilated into Swedish culture and language. Modern migrants, as ideologists of *Sverigedemokraterna* state, are not Europeans, because they came from Muslim countries and they are not able to understand and accept Swedish culture, language and identity. Therefore, party theorists insist that modern migration has the most negative political, social, economic and cultural consequences.

Party ideologists of *Sverigedemokraterna* declare that “Swedish democrats do not oppose immigration, but they believe that immigration should not create a threat to our national identity, welfare and security of our country”<sup>337</sup>. Norwegian *Fremskrittspartiet* insists that the previous governments of Norway conducted erroneous policies and attracted a significant number of migrants. Therefore, moderate Norwegian nationalists insist on radical changes in the migration policy. They presume that it is needed to restrict and minimize the number of refugees from the East into the country<sup>338</sup>. Therefore, the ideologists of European nationalist parties believe that the tightening of customs control for migrants<sup>339</sup> can be an effective tool in the fight against illegal migration. Danish nationalists insist that migration policy should be radically tightened and the entry of Muslim migrants should be limited<sup>340</sup>. Tuzson Bence<sup>341</sup>, State Secretary and one of the ideologists of *Fidesz – Magyar Polgári Szövetség*, insists

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<sup>335</sup> Mrazite li chuzhdentsite i po spetsialno bezhantsite i imigrantite?, URL: <http://idem.bg/bns/index.php/chesto-zadavani-vaprozi>

<sup>336</sup> Programa, URL: <http://www.vmro.bg/pages/документи/програма/>

<sup>337</sup> Ansvarsfull invandringsspolitik. Mindre splittring – mer gemenskap, URL: <https://sd.se/var-politik/invandringsspolitik/>

<sup>338</sup> Prinsipp- og handlingsprogram, URL: <https://www.frp.no/hva-vi-mener/prinsipp-og-handlingsprogram>

<sup>339</sup> Strengere Europese grenscontroles voor reizigers zonder visumplicht, URL: <http://www.n-va.be/nieuws/strengere-europese-grenscontroles-voor-reizigers-zonder-visumplicht>

<sup>340</sup> Stramninger på udlændingepolitikken, URL: <https://danskfolkeparti.dk/politik/principprogram/>

<sup>341</sup> A bevándorlás ügyében nincs kompromisszum, URL: <http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/2017-09-23/a-bevandorlas-ugyeben-nincs-kompromisszum/>

categorically that the problems of migration are among the most important issues and it will be extremely difficult to reach a compromise and force Hungary to give up its national interests and start to accept migrants. Roberts Zīle, one of the representatives of *Visu Latvijai! - Tēvzemei un Brīvībai / LNNK* in the European Parliament, strongly condemns the idea of quotas and declares that Latvia is not interested in migrants<sup>342</sup>.

Szijjártó Péter, one of the ideologists of Hungarian nationalism, argues that EU assistance to migrants are pointless because it will be more logical, efficient and rational to force migrants from Arab countries not to go to the EU, including Hungary, persuading them to stay in neighbouring states with a related culture and language<sup>343</sup>. Gulyás Gergely insists that "the quota system is "meaningless illegal and dangerous"<sup>344</sup>. Other Hungarian nationalists from *Fidesz - Magyar Polgári Szövetség* agree with him and presume that it is more logical and rational to help Hungarian families instead of helping new immigrants<sup>345</sup> who do not know Hungarian language and cannot integrate into the Hungarian society effectively and successfully because they are among factors which destabilize the social system and economies of European states.

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<sup>342</sup> Roberts Zīle: EK virzītā piespiedu kvotu sistēma nav risinājums, URL: <http://www.nacionalaapvieniba.lv/aktualitate/roberts-zile-ek-virzita-piespiedu-kvotu-sistema-migrantu-sadalei-nav-risinajums/>

<sup>343</sup> Magyarország komoly biztonsági fenyegetésnek tartja az illegális migrációt, URL: <http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/2017-09-21/magyarorszag-komoly-biztonsagi-fenyegetesnek-tartja-az-illegalis-migraciot/>

<sup>344</sup> Értelmetlen, jogtalan és veszélyes a kvótarendszer, URL: <http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/2017-09-18/ertelmetlen-jogtalan-es-veszelyes-a-kvotarendszer/>

<sup>345</sup> A Fidesz a Magyar családokat és a munkából élő embereket szeretné támogatni, nem a bevándorlást, URL: <http://www.fidesz.hu/hirek/2017-09-22/a-fidesz-a-magyar-csaladokat-es-a-munkabol-elo-embereket-szeretne-tamogatni-nem-a-bevandorlast/>



**Conclusions:**  
**nationalist parties in the post-national era or the insurmountability of  
nationalism**

Nationalism since the critical historical moment, when Europe abandoned the principles of the dynastic state and changed the social organization of society, influenced the political development and transformation of society significantly. Nationalism in the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries existed and developed as intellectual trends that promote and defend the values and principles of the nation, competed with other secular political ideologies. In the 20th century, nationalism mutated into an extremely amorphous political and ideological phenomenon and therefore nationalists began to use actively the ideological principles and values of the nation and class simultaneously. Nationalist political parties in world history of the 19th and the 20th centuries developed and co-existed with various forms of intellectual and cultural nationalisms simultaneously.

Therefore, the political and ethnic values of intellectual nationalism were represented in the programs of the majority of parties, which can be defined as a nationalist. The theorists and ideologists of nationalist parties as nationalist-minded intellectuals were active in the imagination of nations and the invention of their collective social, cultural or political traditions. Invented traditions of modern nations became the results of political activity of intellectuals and its institutionalization inspired by rational practising nationalist politicians. If intellectuals imagined and invented the myths of a nation, including language and blood, then practising nationalists politicized and instrumentalized nationalist ideologies. The history of nationalist parties in these cultural situations ceased to be only and exclusively an intellectual history because the attempts of nationalists to unite the political myth with real political practices, tactics and strategies of political struggle inspired politically and ideologically motivated terror, violence, assimilation and forced forms and methods of integration of national and ethnic minorities.

The history of nationalist parties in this intellectual situation became a history of collective responsibilities and attempts to forget the crimes of predecessors or to recall and imagine connections with historical and political early generations of nationalists. Nationalism in the 19th, 20th and 21st centuries developed discretely, and the history of European nationalisms provides its historians with numerous examples of lacunae and failures in European nationalisms from Portugal to Ukraine and Belarus. Discreteness in the development of organizational forms of peripheral nationalisms coincides with the discreteness of the political and state experiences of several European

nations that in the 19th and 20th centuries did not have their national forms of statehood and had no opportunity to imagine and invent their political and ethnic identities independently because they belonged to others states territorially and structurally where political elites attempted to assimilate minorities or influence the main vectors and trajectories of development of national identities of the oppressed and unequal groups.

The political parties of these groups as institutionalized forms of nationalism were active in their struggle for changing the political status, for the progress and development of nations that were imagined as the conditions for political sovereignty and the successful transformation of the ethnic nation into a nation-state as an imagined political community of citizens. The historical forms of nationalism, organized in political parties, became a universal form of existence and organization of nationalist discourse and marginalized nationalist-minded intellectuals essentially. In the 20th and 21st centuries, the organizational political forms of nationalism were diverse and range from classical nationalist parties to regionalist and separatist groups that belong to the greater ideological discourse of nationalism. Nationalism by the 21st century actualized its status as a universal political ideology several times because the actual history of the West testified that nationalism did not become the property of history.

Actively practising nationalists do not intend to abandon nationalism as a universal ideological panacea in the struggle for political and ethnic equality with other groups. The events of the 21st century actualize the role of nationalist parties and movements in the modern world, where politicians prefer to use the universal language of nationalism despite their formal affiliation to diametrically opposite segments of political spaces. Nationalism in the 21st century, once again after the events of the 1920s and 1930s, actualized its ability to unite with the left ideological political discourse. The events of 2017 in Catalonia, on the one hand, were the result of the political activities of the Catalan nationalists, who were extremely active, consistent and determined in their struggles for Catalan identity and Catalan language.

On the other hand, the Catalan crisis became a consequence of social and economic problems and it is not surprising that the Catalan nationalist parties develop social and nationalist ideas simultaneously. The desire to actualize the principles of the ethnic nation and the values of the social class is a characteristic feature of the majority of regional nationalist parties in modern Spain. Modern nationalism continues to develop and change actively and dynamically, the forecasts of liberals and sceptics about the triumph of liberalism and the inevitable death of the nation turned out to be erroneous and premature. Nationalism actualizes its role as a universal political factor and

actor, which determines the main directions of developments and transformations of political discourses. Nationalism is one of the factors that assist to the preservation and further progress of national identities in spite of the fact that the modern world became a globalizing space where transnational corporations and formal national governments have economic motivations exclusively and continue to define the main vectors and directions of political and intellectual processes.

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# MISCELLANEA

## **БЫТЬ ЕВРОПЕЙЦЕМ «ПО-РУМЫНСКИ»**

*Автор анализирует итоги ассоциации Румынии с Европейским союзом в сравнении с возложенными на нее задачами.*

*Ключевые слова: Румыния, Расширение Европейского Союза, Политический имидж.*

*The Author analyzes result of Romanian Eurointegration in comparison with the goals were accomplished.*

*Keywords: Romania, EU Extension, Political Image.*

### **ВВЕДЕНИЕ**

«Окно в Европу». Как непривычно и иронично звучит эта фраза в отношении, казалось бы, Европейских государств, неразрывно связанных со старым светом общей историей и культурой. Речь идет о Восточной Европе. Традиционно аграрные, небогатые государства, в бытность свою выступавшие под чуждым «цивилизованному Западу» флагом. Их недавняя ассоциация с Евросоюзом со стороны выглядит как рывок отчаяния в безуспешных попытках «догнать» своих западных коллег по политическому процессу, а также «смыть» из истории период участия в ОВД, как пятно, порочащее политический имидж. Особенно показателен был в этом отношении 2007 год, когда «Окно в Европу» открыли для двух достаточно отсталых и бедных Европейских стран: Румынии и Болгарии.

Наиболее выразительно это «открытие» смотрится в отношении Румынии. Страна с одним из самых низких имиджевых рейтингов среди всех членов Евросоюза. Несмотря на значительный экономический рост – бедность, уступающая лишь Болгарии и приближающейся к ней на сегодняшний момент Греции, слабо развитая промышленность, стагнация некоторых отраслей экономики и процветающая коррупция вкупе со зловещим прошлым делает ее одним из аутсайдеров среди восточноевропейских членов Европейского Сообщества. Пост-биполярная эпоха и ее последствия для стран бывшего соцблока и резко контрастирующие по внешним признакам с ними успехи развития Европейского Союза, «кредитное опьянение», увеличение политического веса как части экономического и политического гиганта... Слишком заманчивый фасад для

правительства Траяна Бэсэску, увидевшего в Евросоюзе надежный щит против разрушительных экономических и политических кризисов. Фасад, обещающий «вернуть» Румынию в Европу []. Не был ли этот «фасад» очередной бутафорией в глазах румынского правительства?

В данной статье мы собираемся проанализировать основные цели, преследовавшиеся лидерами Румынии при ассоциации с Европейским Союзом и их результат. Структура разделов статьи будет построена по принципу «цель – причина – результат». Используя ее, исследователь ставит целью ответ на вопрос: что такое «быть европейцем по-румынски»?

### **«Пост-Чаусимский синдром». Политический имидж**

Весна 1990 года. Чета Чаушеску свергнута. В стране, пережившей гражданский и политический кризис, появились шансы на создание демократического правительства. Спустя полтора месяца, 20 мая 1990 года было избрано первое демократическое правительство Теодора Столожана, одна из основополагающих целей которого была ясна: не допустить возвращения к политическому строю и методам государственного управления своего предшественника. Удалось ли развеять зловещий ореол «Чаусимы»?

*Цель.* Программа-максимум: сохранение и возможное повышение политического влияния в регионе в условиях отсутствия среди балканских стран однозначного лидера. Программа-минимум: устранение негативного политического имиджа, связанного с эпохой правления Чаушеску. Сделать страну привлекательной для сотрудничества с мировыми лидерами.

*Результат.* Среди государств Европейского союза Румыния, несмотря на значительное «облагораживание» за счет сотрудничества с НАТО и активным инвестициям из-за рубежа продолжает входить в число самых низкорейтинговых государств не только Восточной Европы, но и мира в целом [9]. Так, к моменту вступления в Евросоюз страна не соответствовала «стокгольмским критериям» как минимум наполовину. По мнению исследователя Кристиана Пырвулеску Румыния была далека от трансформации в правовое государство, механизм эффективной – по меркам ЕС – защиты прав человека



отсутствовал, то же можно было сказать и о системе правосудия [10]. Часто случалось, что население страны грозили расколоть очередные президентские или парламентские выборы. Тем не менее, политические реформы не поставили окончательную точку в погоне за «апгрейдом» политического имиджа, не говоря уже о том, что на начало 2017 года в стране не существует гражданского мира [8].

С другой стороны, вступление в Европейский Союз послужило «ускорителем» начатых внутривластных реформ. Тот же Пырвулеску замечает, что мониторинг со стороны Евросоюза заставил правительство заняться совершенствованием системы защиты прав человека, борьбой с экономическими преступлениями, попытками избежать злоупотребления властью. [10]

Если проанализировать политическое влияние Румынии, то можно прийти к выводу, что оно держится лишь благодаря участию в НАТО и статусу члена ЕС, в то время как в остальном в качестве имеющего хоть какой-то политический вес в международных процессах Румынию признают лишь Молдова и Болгария [11]. В самом же Евросоюзе у страны высоки лишь инвестиционные рейтинги [7]. Ярким примером отсутствия доверия и авторитета среди руководства Евросоюза по отношению к Румынии является отказ от принятия страны в Шенгенскую зону. Дополнительные проблемы для поднятия политического имиджа страны создает крайне неблагоприятные коррупционные показатели. По оценкам Аналитического центра Еврокомиссии от февраля 2017 года, борьба с коррупцией в Румынии находится даже на чуть более низком уровне, чем до ассоциации с Евросоюзом, а правительство Сорина Гриндяну готовится ослабить антикоррупционное законодательство [1]. Многочисленные антикоррупционные митинги и демонстрации в настоящее время остаются безрезультатными, и основная причина роста коррупции вкупе с отсутствием внимания к данной проблеме со стороны властей заключена в несовершенной системе распределений субсидий Европейского союза, а также отсутствия четкой стратегии использования европейских фондов как таковой [5], явлении, получившем название «Кредитное опьянение».

## **«Кредитное опьянение» и антикризисный щит**

К моменту заключения договора об ассоциации с Европейским Союзом экономическая ситуация в Румынии оставляла желать лучшего. По данным аналитического центра Ereport реальный и номинальный ВВП Румынии испытывали умеренный, но непрекращающийся спад. Наиболее уязвимыми

*Цель.* Программа-максимум: достигнуть экономического благополучия, необходимого для становления Румынии как регионального лидера, преодоления промышленностью зависимости от иностранных производителей.

Программа-минимум: восстановить все пострадавшие в XX веке отрасли промышленности, главным образом добывающую и машиностроительную.

*Результат.* Первоначально надежды на восстановление экономики не были оправданы. Состояние государственного бюджета, уровень безработицы и инфляции, промышленное производство и показатели ВВП в связи с начавшимся в 2008 году мировым финансовым кризисом находились в крайне плачевном состоянии [2]. Исследователи связывают неудачи в быстром решении проблемы с неготовностью Румынии к эффективным экономическим реформам, слепые надежды на интеграцию как на «антикризисное вундерваффе» и общую уязвимость румынской экономики к финансовым кризисам. Так, весьма вредоносным фактором стало отсутствие четкой системы распределения субсидий, полученных со стороны Евросоюза. «Кредитное опьянение», которое в условиях процветающей коррупции могло стать дорогой в никуда. Наиболее наглядно это проиллюстрировал факт, что кризис 2008 года превратил достаточно медленный спад экономических показателей страны в катастрофическое падение, достигшее своего пика в 2010 году [2]. Лишь постепенное восстановление ведущих экономических стран Европейского Союза и увеличивающийся размер субсидий позволили остановить лавинообразное обнищание страны.

Немаловажным фактором в процессе восстановления отдельных отраслей экономики стала совместимость общеевропейских программ

с национальными. Речь идет о сельскохозяйственном секторе Румынии, традиционно одним из наиболее прибыльных для страны. Местные сельскохозяйственные производители просто не выдерживают конкуренции с более дешевой и качественной продукцией из соседних стран. Из-за высокой стоимости земельных участков практически около 40% таковых находятся в собственности зарубежных предпринимателей. [9] По мнению министра сельского хозяйства Акима Ирмеску, Румыния является «рынком десятого сорта, куда сплавляется импортный хлам с истекшим сроком годности».

Другим проблемным явлением в экономике Румынии является ее энергетический сектор. Дело в том, что нефтедобывающая промышленность страны в лице компании Petrom, ранее находившаяся в государственной собственности, на фоне неспособности правительственного департамента успешно обеспечивать и контролировать добычу нефти, в 2004 году была приватизирована австрийской корпорацией OMV, причем на весьма «льготных» условиях и за средства, едва достигающие 15% от всех нефтяных запасов, находящихся в данном регионе, без учета стоимости необходимого оборудования [6]. К 2010 году действия OMV из-за весьма скромных поступлений в государственный бюджет и неоправдавшихся надежд, возложенных на энергосектор, явно расценивались как самый настоящий неоколониализм [9]. Такой же виток «неоколониализма» захватил и другие отрасли румынской промышленности. Даже государственная телекоммуникационная компания, одна из ключевых статей дохода государственного бюджета, на настоящий момент принадлежит греческому коммуникационному «гиганту» OTE. Как и в случае с Petrom – OMV продажа компании была произведена по достаточно низким ценам.

Лишь к 2012 году за счет зарубежных собственников ситуация нормализовалась благодаря росту производства и постепенному восстановлению добывающей промышленности. К настоящему моменту Румыния отнюдь не экономический гигант даже в сравнении со своими ближайшими соседями, однако экономика страны испытывает стабильный подъем по всем показателям. На данный момент в стране впервые за несколько лет были замечены дефляция и снижение уровня безработицы, а уровень экономического роста на

2017 год был отмечен как наибольший среди всех государств-участниц Евросоюза (5,6%), что несомненно, является крупным успехом для страны Балканского региона [3]. Некоторые граничащие с Румынией страны, такие как Молдова и Болгария, видят в соседке символ успеха и доказательства перспективности ассоциации с ЕС.

В то же время нельзя не отметить тот факт, что одна из важнейших причин быстрого восстановления румынской экономики после катастрофических последствий кризиса 2008 года – субсидирование страны со стороны экономических гигантов Европейского Союза, прежде всего Германии. Платой за экономическое развитие стал лавинообразный рост внешнего долга Румынии, на начало 2017 года составляющий около 50% от ВВП [2]. Во многом рост долга удается задержать благодаря инвестициям в экономику страны эмигрантов. Так, в марте 2017 года размер инвестиций достиг значения в 52 млрд. евро, что втрое превысило объем инвестиций со стороны других европейских государств [6]. Шансы, что рост внешнего долга будет остановлен весьма велики. Тем не менее, долговые показатели в половину ВВП остаются серьезной проблемой, и сможет ли быстро развивающаяся страна избежать неблагоприятных последствий для собственной экономики и не повторить печальный опыт 1983<sup>346</sup> года, покажет время. С другой стороны, многие исследователи отмечают шокирующий уровень бедности в государстве, который доходит до 25%, уступая по данному «антипоказателю» лишь Болгарию, с более 30% бедного населения [11]. Скорее всего, тенденция снижения доходов населения будет продолжаться все ближайшее время, пока рост внешнего долга не будет окончательно остановлен.

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<sup>346</sup> Исследователь имеет в виду режим жесткой экономики и курс на выплату внешнего государственного долга, начатый благодаря инициативе Н. Чаушеску в 1983 году.

## **ЗАКЛЮЧЕНИЕ**

Румыния с одной стороны наряду с Грецией и Болгарией в настоящее время является любопытной иллюстрацией призрачных гарантий процветания при ассоциации с Европейским Союзом. Как показали опыт финансового кризиса 2008 года, попытки приспособиться к экономической и социальной политике ЕС и оценки экспертов, надежды на благополучие могут быть оправданы не сразу. Восстановление позитивного политического имиджа во многом было затруднено из-за традиционно присущих многим балканским странам коррупции, политической нестабильности, слабо развитому финансово-экономическому рычагу воздействия на международные процессы хотя бы в масштабе региона и, конечно же, истекающей из них слепой надежде на «Европейский спасательный плот». На данный момент Румыния выглядит как типичный представитель «государств второго сорта» как в мире, так и в Европе.

Социальная политика страны так же оставляет желать лучшего, так как отсутствие к потребностям населения продолжает оставаться серьезным тормозом на пути к улучшению как уровня жизни, так и соответствия стандартам Европейского Союза, а значит, и улучшения имиджа и влияния страны в регионе [12].

Одновременно с этим это небольшое балканское государство демонстрирует значительный экономический успех благодаря субсидированию государствами Евросоюза, невиданными ранее темпами развития и, как следствие, возросшей инвестиционной привлекательности. Именно постепенное преодоление бедности делает Румынию если не достигающей благополучия (вследствие постепенного снижения доходов значительной части населения), то хотя бы подающей надежды страной, которая может стать «контрастной иллюстрацией» к предыдущим неудачным попыткам государств интегрироваться в Европейский союз. С другой стороны, и этот показатель результативного сотрудничества с Объединенной Европой не является однозначно оптимистичным ввиду растущей бедности румынского народа. С другой стороны, охотный прием на работу граждан Румынии в других государствах Евросоюза, доход,

превышающий местный как минимум вдвое, и растущий инвестиционный имидж помогут если не снизить, то хотя бы заморозить внешний долг, со временем формируя надежную финансовую базу для дальнейшего развития [4].

Подводя итог под исследованием результатов десятилетнего пребывания Румынии в Евросоюзе следует отметить вероятную роль этой страны в качестве доказательства возможности достижения благополучия под крылом «Объединенной Европы». Одновременно страна рискует пойти по пути Греции, став жертвой огромного внешнего долга, выплатить который не получится даже в случае повторения знаменитой программы жесткой экономии.

Таким образом исследователь может сказать, что «быть европейцем по-румынски», значит «получить второй шанс» в своем развитии. Сейчас, население, уже давно следовавшее по совершенно тупиковому пути, получило возможность вернуться «на распутье». Будет ли это возвращением на ту же бесперспективную тропу, либо попыткой найти путь к дальнейшему развитию – вопрос времени.

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