

Cryptography and Cyber Law

Final Assignment

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Ans to the Q: No: 1

Shor's algorithm threatens RSA and ECC because it can efficiently solve the # hard mathematical Problems. These cryptosystem rely on

i) RSA depends on difficulty of integer factorization.

ii) ECC relies on the hardness of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem.

Potential consequences for current digital infrastructure:

i) Massive Security breach:

All encrypted ~~communications~~ communications, banking transactions, emails, VPN

connections using RSA/ECC could be decrypted.

ii) Lots of confidentiality: Even post communication store today could be decrypted.

iii) Compromised authentication:

Digital signatures based on RSA/ECC could be forged, certificate, and blockchain systems.

Ans to the Q: NO: 2

Role of quantum key distribution (PKD)

Establishes symmetric keys with information-theoretic security by encoding bits on quantum states, eavesdropping includes detectable errors.

Differ from classical public-key encryption (PKC):

i) Security from physics, not computational hardness,

ii) Needs a quantum channel and authenticated classical channel, limited distance/rate, specialized

Ans to the Q: No: 3

Lattice-based crypto. vs number-theoretic (RSA/DH/ECC) in context

of quantum resistance.

i) Assumption: Lattice problems

(LWE/RLWE/SIS) vs factoring/

discrete log.

ii) Quantum: (Not) known efficient

quantum attacks on lattice

problem, believed ~~to be~~ PQ-secure,

RSA/ECC fall to short.

iii) Math/OPS: Mostly linear

algebra mod q, good performance.

Ans. to the Q: No: 4

Python based PRNG that uses the current system time and custom seed value.

Codes

import time

$$A = 6364 + 362 \underline{2} 3846793005$$

$$B = 1442695040888 \ 963407$$

$$MOD = 1 \ll 64$$

~~Def~~ (~~-~~ new) bass-in -

def log(error):
 print(error)

$x = \text{seed} \times \text{mod}$

while True:

$$x \leftarrow (A * x + c) \% \text{ mod}$$

~~yield~~

def mix_seed(user_seed: int) → int:

t = time.time_ns()

s = ($\lceil (\text{user_seed} + \text{ox9E3F79B9}$
 $+ \text{xF4A7C15}) * \text{oxBF58476}$
 $\text{DICE4E5B9}) \rceil \& (\text{mod}-1)$)

return s.

s = mix_seed(user_seed)

g = leg(s)

print("mixed_seed =", s)

for i in range(10):

v = next(g)

print(v, v/mod)

~~Ans: to the Q: No: 5~~

Sieve of Eratosthenes (Prime < 50)

Algorithm: ~~Mark~~ Mark multiple
of each unmarked number starting
from 2 up to \sqrt{n} .

Prime < 50 are:

2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43,

47.

Complexity:

Time $\rightarrow O(n \log n)$ vs trial division
 $O(n \sqrt{n})$ to list primes up to n

remove one less

Explanation of Eratosthenes:

(i) List numbers from 2 to n .

(ii) Start with the first unmarked number p , initially prime.

(iii) Mark all multiples of p as composite.

(iv) Find the next unmarked number.

(v) Repeat until $p > n$.

(vi) All unmarked numbers left are primes.

Ans to the Q No. 6

A note:

A Carmichael number is a composite number n that satisfies Fermat's Little Theorem for all integers a that are coprime to n :

$$a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

They are called absolute Pseudoprimes.

Necessary and sufficient condition

- i) n is square-free.
- ii) n has at least three distinct prime factors.
- iii) For every prime divisor p of n :

$$(n-1) \bmod (p-1) = 0$$

Verify and check the number
if it is a perfect number.

- i) $561 \rightarrow 3, 11, 17$, all $(P-1) | 560 \rightarrow$ Carmichael
- ii) $1105 \rightarrow 5, 13, 17$, all $(P-1) | 1104 \rightarrow$ Carmichael
- iii) $1729 \rightarrow 7, 13, 19$, all $(P-1) | 1728 \rightarrow$ Carmichael

Therefore, (All) three are Carmichael numbers.

Ans to the Q: No: 7

Valid Algebraic Structure

$\rightarrow (\mathbb{Z}_{11}, +)$ with operation $(+, \cdot)$: Yes it's a ring (actually a field)

$(11 \text{ has no zero divisor}) \Rightarrow$ because 11 is prime.

$\rightarrow (\mathbb{Z}_{37}, +)$: Abelian group (cyclic of order 37)

$(\text{as } 37 \text{ is prime}) \Rightarrow$

$\rightarrow (\mathbb{Z}_{35}, \times)$: Not a group (zero divisors, non-units) like 5 has no inverse

The units $U(35)$ of $\varphi(35) = 24$

no from an Abelian group.

Ans: To the Q: No: 8

Reminder of $-52 \pmod{31}$

Find the least non-negative residue r with $0 < r < 31$ such that $-52 = r \pmod{31}$

Method 1 (add multiples of 31):

$$\rightarrow -52 + 31 = -21 \text{ (still negative)}$$

$$\rightarrow -21 + 31 = 10 \text{ (in range of } 0-30)$$

Method 2 (Euclidian division):

Find q, r with $-52 = 31q + r$,

$$0 \leq r < 31$$

Take, $q = -2$;

$$-52 = 31(-2) + 10 \text{ as } r = 10.$$

Therefore—

$$-52 \equiv 10 \pmod{31}$$

$$(-52 \text{ mod } 31) = 10$$

Ans! to the Q. No: 9

Multiplicative inverse of 7 mod 26.

Extended Euclid:

$$26 = 3 \cdot 7 + 5$$

$$7 = 1 \cdot 5 + 2$$

$$5 = 2 \cdot 2 + 1$$

$$1 = 3 \cdot 26 - 11 \cdot 7$$

$$\text{So, } -11 \cdot 7 \equiv 1 \pmod{26}$$

inverse is 15 (since $-11 \equiv 15$)

$$\text{check: } 7 \cdot 15 = 105 \equiv 1 \pmod{26}$$

Ans!

(10) Evaluating $(-8 \times 5 = -40)$. $-8 \times 5 \pmod{17}$

i) Multiply $\rightarrow -8 \times 5 = -40$ int. (cross out)

ii) Now add multiples of 17 until result is in $0-16$

$$-40 + 3 \times 17$$

$$= -40 + 51$$

$$= 11$$

\therefore Result is 11. (no remainder)

Tips for negative modular multiplication:

i) Replace negative numbers with their positive equivalent \pmod{m} .

Example: $-8 \equiv 9 \pmod{17}$

Then $9 \times 5 = 45 \equiv 11 \pmod{17}$

$8 \times 5 = 40 \equiv 11 \pmod{17}$

\therefore (if A)

(11)

If $b \neq 0$. (or $a \neq b$) then there exists integers x, y such that $ax + by = \gcd(a, b)$

Proof idea: Use the extended Euclidean algorithm to express $\gcd(a, b)$ as a linear combination of a and b .

Finding inverse of $97 \pmod{385}$:

1. $\gcd(97, 385) \neq 1 \rightarrow$ Inverse exists

2. Extended Euclidean algorithm

$$385 = 3(97) - 127.$$

$$385 = 3(97) - 127 \quad (\text{mod } 385).$$

$$3. \text{ So, } 97(-127) \equiv 1 \pmod{385}.$$

$$4. \text{ Positive inverse: } -127 \equiv 258 \pmod{385}$$

∴ Inverse of $97 \pmod{385}$ is 258.

(Ans.)

(12) Given Equation -

$$43x \equiv 1 \pmod{240}$$

We need the modular inverse of ~~43 mod~~
43 mod 240.

steps (Extended Euclid):

$$1. 240 = 43(5) + 25$$

$$2. 43 = 25(1) + 18$$

$$3. 25 = 18(1) + 7$$

$$4. 18 = 7(2) + 4$$

$$5. 7 = 4(1) + 3$$

$$6. 4 = 3(1) + 1$$

$$7. \text{ Back-substitute } \rightarrow 1 = 43(67) - 240(12)$$

$$\therefore x \equiv 67 \pmod{240}$$

$$\therefore x = 67 \quad (\text{Ans})$$

$$23 = 3 \pmod{240} \quad \text{and} \quad 23 \equiv 1 \pmod{7}$$

$$23 = 3 \pmod{240} \quad \text{and} \quad 23 \equiv 1 \pmod{7}$$

$$\text{So, } 23 \cdot 23 \equiv 1 \pmod{240}$$

$$(23)^{23} \pmod{240} \equiv 1 \pmod{240}$$

Ans to the Q: No: 13

Shor's algorithm threatens RSA and ECC because it can efficiently solve the # hard mathematical problems. These cryptosystem rely on

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Method 2:

$$\therefore N = 3 \cdot 5 \cdot 7$$

105 min 20 sec = 105.25 min

$$\text{ii) } N_1 = 35, \text{ find } y_1 \text{ with } 35y_1 \equiv 1 \pmod{3}$$

$$[x \in \mathbb{Z} : x^2 \equiv 1] \quad (\text{in } \mathbb{Z}/3\mathbb{Z}) \quad 35 \equiv 2 \pmod{3}, \text{ so, } 2 \times 2 \equiv 1$$

• $i \cdot \prod_{j=1}^n = N$ olszom $y_1 \dots y_n$ számra a zárt

How is brief contribution: $2 \cdot 35 \cdot 2 = 140$

$$\text{iii) } N_2 = 21 \cdot 21 y_2 \equiv 1 \pmod{5} \rightarrow 21 \equiv 1 \pmod{5}$$

(n.bom) y₂₊₃ = 3

$$\text{Contribution: } 3 \times 21 \times 1 = 63$$

$$15 \equiv 1 \pmod{7}$$

$$21.11.8.2.3+(-b_{200})y_3=1$$

contribution: $2 \times 15 \times 1 = 30$

Sum $140 + 63 + 30 = 233$. Reduce mod 105:

(F bom) 5 133-(2-105) ~~0~~ 233 2 boom sheets

$$\Rightarrow 233 - 210 \quad (\text{Pb brom}) \& \equiv \text{Ca}$$

→ 23. Draw $\angle S = 10^\circ$

→ 23. Brown ESC-NP, 02

$$\therefore x \equiv 23 \pmod{105}. \quad \text{⑩}$$

connections using RSA/ECC could be decrypted.

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Ans to the Q: No: 18

Shor's algorithm threatens RSA and ECC because it can efficiently solve the hard mathematical problems. These cryptosystems rely on the hardness of

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Potential consequences for current digital infrastructure:

- i) Massive security breach:

All encrypted communication banking transactions, emails, VPN

(17) Phishing vs malware vs DOS.

i) Phishing: Social-engineering attacks to trick users into revealing credentials or clicking malicious links.

Impact: Credential theft, account compromise, data breaches.

ii) Malware: Malicious software (viruses, trojan, ransomware) installed to steal data, damage system, or create backdoors.

Impact: Data loss, Unauthorized access, lateral movement.

iii) Dental-of-Service (DoS): overwhelm resources to make services unavailable.

Impact: Downtime, revenue loss, reputational damage.

(16)

Steganography: Hides the existence of a message in another file (Image, audio, video).

Example: Least significant bit (LSB) image

basis for pixel modification, audio echo hiding, DCT coefficient changes in JPEG.

Goal: Secret message looks like normal media.

Cryptography: Scrambles message into unreadable ciphertext using an algorithm + key. Presence of message is obvious.

but content are protected.

Key difference:

Steganography conceals existence.

Cryptography conceals content.

$$x \equiv 23 \pmod{105}$$

(15) CIA triad in information security -

i) Confidentiality: keep data secret from unauthorized parties.

controls: encryption, access control, strong authentication, network segmentation.

ii) Integrity: Ensure data is correct and unmodified.

controls: cryptographic hashes, digital signature, checksum, input validation.

iii) Availability: Ensure authorized users can access systems and data when needed.

controls: Redundancy, backups, load balancing

Patching and monitoring, disaster recovery

- failover plan

generates identical keystream.

(v) Error effect: 1-bit error in ciphertext only affect the same bit in plaintext (no propagation).

(25) AES modes and error propagation -

1) CBC (cipher block chaining):

→ 1-bit in ciphertext → entire current block corrupted + 1-bit flipped in next block.
→ High error spread, so integrity is badly affected.

2) CFB (cipher feedback):

→ 1-bit error → corrupts current block segment and

(24) AES - OFB mode -

(25)

i) Treats AES as a keystream generator.

ii) Process:

$\text{IV} \rightarrow \text{AES}(\text{key}) \rightarrow \text{Keystream Block}$

\downarrow
XOR with plaintext

iii) Decryption: Same keystream ~~with~~ XOR
with ciphertext \rightarrow plaintext.

iv) Synchronization: Both end must use
same key and IV to

Ans to the Q: NO: 23

Role of quantum key distribution (PKD)

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Differ from classical public-key

encryption (PKC):

a) Security from physics, not computational hardness.

b) Needs a quantum channel and authenticated classical channel, limited distance/rate, specialized

(27) SubBytes with the given partial AES-S-box—

input word: $[0x23, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x19]$

i) $0x23 \rightarrow$ row $0x2$, col $0x3 \rightarrow 0xD4$

ii) $0xA7 \rightarrow$ row $0xA$, col $0x7 \rightarrow 0x63$

iii) $0x4C \rightarrow$ row $0x4$, col $0xC \rightarrow 0x2E$

iv) $0x19 \rightarrow$ row $0x1$, col $0x9 \rightarrow$ not shown in

the Partial table (for reference, the standard

AES-S-box maps $0x19 \rightarrow 0xD4$

\therefore output: $[0xD4, 0x63, 0x2E, 0xD4]$.

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③ Simple hash function examples

- fast naive

Hash Rule: sum of ASCII values of

character mod 100

$$\rightarrow 'AB': 65 + 66 = 131.$$

$$= 131 \text{ mod } 100$$

$$= 31 \cdot 9 \text{ bmod } 18 =$$

$$\rightarrow 'BA': 66 + 65 = 131 =$$

$$\rightarrow 131 \text{ mod } 100 \text{ folding } 21 \text{ bmod } 18$$

$$\rightarrow 31 \cdot 9 \text{ bmod } 18 = 8$$

Collision: Different inputs \rightarrow same hash (3)

Implication:

: (Bob + A) + force bmod 2

weak hash \rightarrow easy to find collisions \rightarrow bad

bmod 2 :

force integrity and digital signature.

: (John + A) + force bmod 2

Ans to the Q: NO: 29

Role of quantum key distribution (PKD)

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Ans to the Q: NO: 28

Role of quantum key distribution (PKD)

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(27) Given that -

$$M = 2$$

$$e = 5$$

$$n = 14$$

$$d = 11$$

$$E = (M)H$$

$$E = M^e \mod n$$

$$E = 2^5 \mod 14$$

$$E = 32 \mod 14$$

Encryption:

$$C = M^e \mod n \quad \text{as } E = 2$$

$$= 2^5 \mod 14 \quad \text{as } E = 32$$

$$= 32 \mod 14 \quad \text{as } E = 32$$

$$= 2 \quad \text{as } E = 2$$

Decryption:

$$\therefore \text{for } M = C^d \mod n \quad \text{as } E = 2$$

$$= 2^{11} \mod 14 \quad \text{as } d = 11$$

$$= 2048 \mod 14 \quad \text{as } d = 11$$

$\therefore \text{ciphertext} = 2$.

Decrypted message = 2. (Same as original)

- Each block is independent, perfect for parallel encryption or decryption.
- Allows random access to encrypted data.

iii) ECB: Not secured (pattern leakage).
iv) CBC: Secure but sequentially. CTR
(CTR) Works to fully parallelize encryption.

Among them CTR is fast, parallel, no pattern leak, works for large files and

streaming.

flips same bit in next segment.

→ Less spread than CBC but still alters multiple bytes.

Impact: Both CBC and CFB cause decrypted data corruption if ciphertext changes, making them unsuitable where bit errors are common. Integrity checks (MAC) are commonly used.

② Best AES Modes for large files with parallel processing -

i) CTR (counter) Mode: Best choice.

→ Encrypts counters with AES to produce keystream.

Q6 Why ECC gives same security with smaller keys - $\Sigma + \Sigma \times \Sigma = \sqrt{\Sigma}$

i) ECC security relies on EC-DLP, which currently has no sub-exponential time algorithm.

ii) Because EC-DLP is harder per bit, smaller key sizes give same security.

iii) Example: 256-bit ECC \approx 3072-bit RSA

$$\Sigma + \Sigma \times \Sigma + \sqrt{\Sigma} = \text{RSA}$$

384-bit ECC \approx 7680-bit RSA

iv) Benefits: Faster encryption/decryption, less bandwidth, lower storage and power use.

(35)

The Equation of Elliptic curve -

$y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$ (i)

$$y^2 \equiv x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$$

condition: $4a^3 + 27b^2 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$ (ii)

→ Why used in Cryptography -

i) Security based on Elliptic curve

Discrete Logarithm Problem, which

is hard to solve.

ii) Achieves same security with much

shorter keys compared to RSA/DH.

iii) Smaller keys → faster computation,

less memory, lower power and

storage. Ideal for constrained device.

longer keys for multi-factor

authentication and delegation (iv)

better performance

of various ciphering

ciphers.

(b) Step in the TLS Handshake Process →

- i) ClientHello : Client sends supported TLS version, cipher suites.
- ii) ServerHello : Sends ServerHelloDone to indicate it's ready for client response
- iii) Client Exchange : Client encrypts Pre-master secret with server's public key.
- iv) Certificate Verify : Client may send its certificate and prove possession of private key.
- v) Key Derivation : Both sides user Pre-master Secret + both nonces to generate the master secret.
- vi) Exchange Cipher Spec : Client and server signal they are switching to the newly negotiated symmetric encryption.

Ans to the Q: No: 33

Lattice-based crypto. vs number-theoretic (RSA/DH/ECC) in context

of quantum resistance.

i) Assumption: Lattice problems

(LWE/RLWE/SIS) vs factoring/

discrete log.

ii) Quantum: (Alo) known efficient

quantum attacks on lattice

problem, believed \oplus PQ-secure,

RSA/ECC fall to short.

iii) MATH/GPS: mostly linear

algebra mod q: good performance.

(b) TSL Handshake and main steps & how symmetric keys are established -

i) Client to Server: ClientHello (version, cipher suite)

ii) Server to Client: ServerHello, certificate, server key exchange, ServerHelloDone.

iii) Client verifies certificate, sends ClientKeyExchange.

iv) Both compute pre-master to master secret to derive symmetric keys via PRF.

v) Exchange changeCipherSpec and Finished message to start encrypted traffic.

Asymmetric crypto is used for server authentication and for security exchanging the Pre-cation and for security. Ephemeral DH gives forward master secret. Symmetric keys are derived from the agreed secret from Diffie-Hellman.

(31) Given that -
message = 15, security key = 7.

$$MAC = (message + secret\ key) \bmod 17$$

Step 1: Compute MAC -

$$MAC = (15 + 7) \bmod 17$$

$$= 5.$$

Original MAC is 5. Final (iii)

Step 2: Attacker changes message to 10:

$$MAC = (10 + 7) \bmod 17$$

$$\rightarrow 17 \bmod 17$$

$$= 0$$

∴ Yes, if they Attacker see an exciting (message, MAC) pair, because the Schema is linear, Attacker can Adjust MAC by the message difference. If attacker does not see any MAC or key, they cannot compute it.

Q. What are the three common IoT-specific attacks?

1. Firmware hijacking: Mitigation: Signed firmware, Secure boot, authenticated update channels, strict code integrity check.

2. Physical tempering: Temper evidence (hardware, secure elements / TCM), device attestation, disable debug ports.

3. Botnet: Enforce strong unique credentials, disable default passwords, rate-limit/auth lockout, network segmentation, timely patches, IDS/IPS, monitoring, disconnection.