

Preliminary Findings Volume Two

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	Low-level bribery					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Physical violence index	2.076*** (0.284)		1.595*** (0.339)	1.666*** (0.357)	2.051*** (0.357)	0.639 (0.527)
Performance legitimization		0.062 (0.057)	0.114** (0.054)	0.018 (0.059)	−0.031 (0.061)	−0.081 (0.100)
Logged GDP per capita				0.108 (0.081)	0.125 (0.084)	0.061 (0.109)
Electoral democracy index					2.356*** (0.617)	0.141 (0.793)
Mass killing (3 years)						−0.184 (0.262)
Intercept	−0.103 (0.191)	1.201*** (0.087)	0.272 (0.221)	0.235 (0.248)	−0.424 (0.292)	1.254*** (0.462)
Num.Obs.	19 730	12 848	12 842	9881	9881	2420
R2	0.164	0.004	0.096	0.095	0.124	0.029
R2 Adj.	0.164	0.004	0.096	0.094	0.124	0.027
AIC	83 703.6	52 661.5	54 210.1	43 692.6	43 966.1	11 525.4

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standard errors clustered by country.


These models are largely what I have done before, though I have filtered to autocratic countries (i.e., a V-Dem polyarchy

index of 0.42 and lower) instead of taking only the most autocratic 20% of the sample. In addition, I've included a lagged variable in the final model, where the variable is coded "1" if there has been a mass killing in the country in the last three years, and "0" if not.

As you can see from the results, adding that variable increases the standard errors and makes everything statistically insignificant, but I blame that—at least partially—on the severely reduced sample size (the data by Treisman and Guriev is limited).

I've also made a boxplot to see if there is any notable difference between the two "types" of countries, below.

Low-level corruption in mass killing autocracies and non-mass killing autocracies



	Low-level bribery						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Physical violence index	0.838** (0.417)		0.927** (0.448)	0.909* (0.481)	0.903* (0.484)	0.925* (0.486)	0.233 (0.462)
Performance legitimization		-0.067 (0.088)	-0.023 (0.092)	-0.020 (0.095)	-0.018 (0.095)	-0.022 (0.094)	0.016 (0.132)
Logged GDP per capita				-0.011 (0.101)	-0.013 (0.102)	-0.003 (0.103)	-0.086 (0.115)
Legislative electoral competitiveness					-0.011 (0.058)	-0.040 (0.065)	0.097 (0.068)
Executive electoral competitiveness						0.115 (0.083)	-0.023 (0.082)
Mass killing							-0.191 (0.282)
Intercept	0.279 (0.248)	0.800*** (0.110)	0.262 (0.277)	0.286 (0.365)	0.320 (0.405)	0.075 (0.467)	0.797 (0.485)
Num.Obs.	1957	1927	1927	1927	1927	1922	859
R2	0.036	0.005	0.049	0.049	0.049	0.057	0.042
R2 Adj.	0.036	0.004	0.048	0.048	0.047	0.054	0.036
AIC	7754.8	7616.0	7714.4	7716.6	7719.0	7702.4	3622.4

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standard errors clustered by country.

I've used data from the Database of Political Institutions here. Unfortunately, as they do not have a variable for corruption *or* political repression, the main dependent and independent variables are still from the V-Dem data. However, here I've used their measures of democracy. They have two indices, the "legislative index of electoral competitiveness" and "executive index of electoral competitiveness". I've utilised the former to select autocracies, and have not included multi-party states which are dominant party systems in the sample.

While the significance levels are not at the 99% level, probably due to sample size, the directionality of the effect remains the same.

Finally, I've tried something else suggested by Dr. Sugiyama: she suggested that the time it takes to open a business

may be an interesting proxy measure by which we can measure corruption (and for what it's worth, I think it does make sense for high levels of low-level corruption to make the process take longer).

	Time taken to open business (days)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Physical violence index	37.842*** (14.524)		37.052** (18.629)	33.010 (21.973)	26.839 (22.722)
Performance legitimization		−3.280 (3.850)	−0.537 (4.674)	0.367 (4.745)	0.257 (4.727)
Logged GDP per capita				−2.699 (4.045)	−3.866 (4.599)
Electoral democracy index					−29.517 (31.781)
Intercept	18.332*** (6.734)	39.985*** (4.201)	19.064* (10.939)	25.522 (17.011)	38.479* (22.824)
Num.Obs.	984	984	984	954	954
R2	0.060	0.009	0.060	0.060	0.064
R2 Adj.	0.059	0.008	0.059	0.057	0.060
AIC	9925.1	9977.4	9926.9	9641.8	9640.0

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Standard errors clustered by country.

Regrettably, the World Bank data used here offers less data points than I would have liked. However, the initial theory is supported nonetheless in the first model and the third model: higher levels of physical violence lead to more days to open a business.